src/sys/dev/random, branch stable/13

random(4): Fix a typo in a source code comment

2024-02-25T07:44:50+00:00

- s/parmeter/parameter/

(cherry picked from commit 5e89e34f846a233fb97302c05af5a47c694405a1)

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line sh pattern

2023-08-23T17:43:27+00:00

Remove /^\s*#[#!]?\s*\$FreeBSD\$.*$\n/

Similar commit in current:
(cherry picked from commit 031beb4e239b)

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line .c pattern

2023-08-23T17:43:25+00:00

Remove /^[\s*]*__FBSDID\("\$FreeBSD\$"\);?\s*\n/

Similar commit in current:
(cherry picked from commit 685dc743dc3b)

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: two-line .h pattern

2023-08-23T17:43:20+00:00

Remove /^\s*\*\n \*\s+\$FreeBSD\$$\n/

Similar commit in current:
(cherry picked from commit 95ee2897e98f)

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

2023-07-25T15:13:49+00:00

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of BSD-2-Clause.

Discussed with:		pfg
MFC After:		3 days
Sponsored by:		Netflix

(cherry picked from commit 4d846d260e2b9a3d4d0a701462568268cbfe7a5b)

random(3): Fix a typo in a source code comment

2022-04-14T06:06:21+00:00

- s/psuedo/pseudo/

(cherry picked from commit 474df59def1a8ab90354381b0103cbc9556fce12)

Add support for getting early entropy from UEFI

2022-03-11T02:11:41+00:00

UEFI provides a protocol for accessing randomness. This is a good way
to gather early entropy, especially when there's no driver for the RNG
on the platform (as is the case on the Marvell Armada8k (MACCHIATObin)
for now).

If the entropy_efi_seed option is enabled in loader.conf (default: YES)
obtain 2048 bytes of entropy from UEFI and pass is to the kernel as a
"module" of name "efi_rng_seed" and type "boot_entropy_platform"; if
present, ingest it into the kernel RNG.

Submitted by:	Greg V
Reviewed by:	markm, kevans
Approved by:	csprng (markm)
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20780

randomdev: Remove 100 ms sleep from write routine

2021-12-05T18:27:01+00:00

This was introduced in 2014 along with the comment (which has since
been deleted):
	/* Introduce an annoying delay to stop swamping */

Modern cryptographic random number generators can ingest arbitrarily
large amounts of non-random (or even maliciously selected) input
without losing their security.

Depending on the number of "boot entropy files" present on the system,
this can speed up the boot process by up to 1 second.

Reviewed by:	cem
Sponsored by:	https://www.patreon.com/cperciva
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32984

(cherry picked from commit 1580afcd6eaf803192f014f3658036cbd49a6e3c)

nehemiah: manually assemble xstore(-rng)

2021-10-28T00:35:54+00:00

PR:	259218

(cherry picked from commit 362c6d8dec6dfbedc5717e45769042279a1dd3df)

kern: random: collect ~16x less from fast-entropy sources

2021-10-06T06:44:07+00:00

Previously, we were collecting at a base rate of:

64 bits x 32 pools x 10 Hz = 2.5 kB/s

This change drops it to closer to 64-ish bits per pool per second, to
work a little better with entropy providers in virtualized environments
without compromising the security goals of Fortuna.

(cherry picked from commit 5e79bba562bc303eed669dbd0d391b6c6a9c289b)