<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>src/sys/netinet, branch stable/14</title>
<subtitle>FreeBSD source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/'/>
<entry>
<title>tcp_hostcache: explicitly typecast atomic_load_int to (int) for comparison</title>
<updated>2026-07-28T08:26:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Scheffenegger</name>
<email>rscheff@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-21T14:51:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=3a51f7b13512b8ca7abd62f44cc404b056cd0c91'/>
<id>3a51f7b13512b8ca7abd62f44cc404b056cd0c91</id>
<content type='text'>
Sponsored by:   NetApp, Inc.
MFC after:      1 week
Reviewed By:    tuexen, #transport, markj
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58360

(cherry picked from commit f22b08443f6ae3620dd14ade4e2376b8531fd6f3)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sponsored by:   NetApp, Inc.
MFC after:      1 week
Reviewed By:    tuexen, #transport, markj
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58360

(cherry picked from commit f22b08443f6ae3620dd14ade4e2376b8531fd6f3)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>man: Fix RFC 1918 network prefix lengths</title>
<updated>2026-07-20T16:30:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yusuke Ichiki</name>
<email>public@yusuke.pub</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T14:58:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=f6e0e0dab369f346ad825ffbb86ee68cb70b5402'/>
<id>f6e0e0dab369f346ad825ffbb86ee68cb70b5402</id>
<content type='text'>
According to RFC 1918, the following IP prefixes are reserved for
private internets:

    10.0.0.0/8
    172.16.0.0/12
    192.168.0.0/16

This PR fixes the prefix lengths in references to private networks
("RFC 1918 networks", "the standard private IP address ranges").
The changes are limited to man pages.

Signed-off-by:	Yusuke Ichiki &lt;public@yusuke.pub&gt;
Pull Request:	https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/2328

(cherry picked from commit 1403ca10189c47ad1de3915eeb030deddc114685)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
According to RFC 1918, the following IP prefixes are reserved for
private internets:

    10.0.0.0/8
    172.16.0.0/12
    192.168.0.0/16

This PR fixes the prefix lengths in references to private networks
("RFC 1918 networks", "the standard private IP address ranges").
The changes are limited to man pages.

Signed-off-by:	Yusuke Ichiki &lt;public@yusuke.pub&gt;
Pull Request:	https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/2328

(cherry picked from commit 1403ca10189c47ad1de3915eeb030deddc114685)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>accf_tls: accept filter that waits for TLS handshake header</title>
<updated>2026-07-14T23:08:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gleb Smirnoff</name>
<email>glebius@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-24T20:36:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=d73ce9d7264a0c7a506fc5f0acfe5fa051dad7f8'/>
<id>d73ce9d7264a0c7a506fc5f0acfe5fa051dad7f8</id>
<content type='text'>
(cherry picked from commit c68eed82a3dcadf0c826e9e150f59769f4c44f24)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
(cherry picked from commit c68eed82a3dcadf0c826e9e150f59769f4c44f24)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Wrap a long line in udp_send()</title>
<updated>2026-07-14T14:08:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-15T15:57:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=32ae329ac9c24109ec71969deaa00fdb39705844'/>
<id>32ae329ac9c24109ec71969deaa00fdb39705844</id>
<content type='text'>
No functional change intended.

MFC after:	1 week

(cherry picked from commit 3b69c7201fd06b368090f2ee3840d384a949cba8)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
No functional change intended.

MFC after:	1 week

(cherry picked from commit 3b69c7201fd06b368090f2ee3840d384a949cba8)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libalias: Serialize updates to the global instance list</title>
<updated>2026-07-14T13:02:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-08T22:46:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=4b539c58e986ad46d2180abba33796511669124f'/>
<id>4b539c58e986ad46d2180abba33796511669124f</id>
<content type='text'>
libalias maintains a global list of all libalias handles.  The list was
updated without any locking, but nothing prevents updates from running
concurrently.

MFC after:	1 week

(cherry picked from commit 2ff705f32a2033201a8f83f1ade5ddbc0460387d)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
libalias maintains a global list of all libalias handles.  The list was
updated without any locking, but nothing prevents updates from running
concurrently.

MFC after:	1 week

(cherry picked from commit 2ff705f32a2033201a8f83f1ade5ddbc0460387d)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rack: Reload the TCP stack PCB after reacquiring the inpcb lock</title>
<updated>2026-06-30T17:00:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-23T21:46:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=df8885512da546e6ba619039625ec43a945b9889'/>
<id>df8885512da546e6ba619039625ec43a945b9889</id>
<content type='text'>
Malicious userspace might switch TCP stacks twice while the inpcb lock
is dropped.  If it does so, the validation of tp-&gt;t_fb might succeed,
but the saved pointer to the stack PCB might be invalid.  Reload it to
avoid this problem, as BBR already does.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:43.tcp
Security:	CVE-2026-49422
Reported by:	Maik Münch
Reviewed by:	tuexen
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57791
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Malicious userspace might switch TCP stacks twice while the inpcb lock
is dropped.  If it does so, the validation of tp-&gt;t_fb might succeed,
but the saved pointer to the stack PCB might be invalid.  Reload it to
avoid this problem, as BBR already does.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:43.tcp
Security:	CVE-2026-49422
Reported by:	Maik Münch
Reviewed by:	tuexen
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57791
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libalias: Fix buffer overflow in RTSP aliasing</title>
<updated>2026-06-30T17:00:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dag-Erling Smørgrav</name>
<email>des@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-28T22:10:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=2f84081641aac179be145a7deafec492cada4742'/>
<id>2f84081641aac179be145a7deafec492cada4742</id>
<content type='text'>
In alias_rtsp_out(), we construct a new packet in a fixed-length buffer
before copying it back into the original buffer.  We never checked if
the data we were writing to this temporary buffer fit in it, nor if the
result fit in the original buffer.

* Use a dynamically sized allocated buffer instead of a fixed-length
  stack buffer.

* Check for overflow before appending to our temporary buffer.

* Check for overflow before copying the data back to the packet buffer.

* While here, use size_t for sizes and bool for booleans.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:41.libalias
Security:	CVE-2026-49420
MFC after:	1 week
Reviewed by:	markj
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57753
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In alias_rtsp_out(), we construct a new packet in a fixed-length buffer
before copying it back into the original buffer.  We never checked if
the data we were writing to this temporary buffer fit in it, nor if the
result fit in the original buffer.

* Use a dynamically sized allocated buffer instead of a fixed-length
  stack buffer.

* Check for overflow before appending to our temporary buffer.

* Check for overflow before copying the data back to the packet buffer.

* While here, use size_t for sizes and bool for booleans.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:41.libalias
Security:	CVE-2026-49420
MFC after:	1 week
Reviewed by:	markj
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57753
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>in6_mcast: Fix a race in in6p_set_source_filter()</title>
<updated>2026-06-09T19:15:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-29T20:12:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=522182827ea173e07668b1ac40a8173c620bb99e'/>
<id>522182827ea173e07668b1ac40a8173c620bb99e</id>
<content type='text'>
We drop the inpcb lock in order to copy in the source list, but this
leaves a window where the multicast filter structure might be freed.
This can be exploited to obtain root privileges.

In the v4 code this race is mitigated by holding the global multicast
lock across the gap.

Restructure the code to copy in filters before doing anything else, so
that there's no need to drop the inpcb lock and reason about the
correctness of doing so.  Do the same in the v4 code for consistency.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:29.ip6_multicast
Security:	CVE-2026-49412
Reported by:	Andrew Griffiths &lt;andrew@calif.io&gt;
Reported by:	Maik Münch &lt;maik@secfault-security.com&gt;
Reviewed by:	glebius
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57347
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We drop the inpcb lock in order to copy in the source list, but this
leaves a window where the multicast filter structure might be freed.
This can be exploited to obtain root privileges.

In the v4 code this race is mitigated by holding the global multicast
lock across the gap.

Restructure the code to copy in filters before doing anything else, so
that there's no need to drop the inpcb lock and reason about the
correctness of doing so.  Do the same in the v4 code for consistency.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:29.ip6_multicast
Security:	CVE-2026-49412
Reported by:	Andrew Griffiths &lt;andrew@calif.io&gt;
Reported by:	Maik Münch &lt;maik@secfault-security.com&gt;
Reviewed by:	glebius
Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57347
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>igmp: Avoid leaving dangling pointers in the state-change queue</title>
<updated>2026-05-19T16:46:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-12T17:53:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=51fcd5ddf016835619c94f4dbdc5b29150fc2e48'/>
<id>51fcd5ddf016835619c94f4dbdc5b29150fc2e48</id>
<content type='text'>
When igmp_v3_merge_state_changes() is iterating over state-change
packets, there is a case where it'll free a queued packet but will fail
to remove it from the queue.  Fix that.

Reported by:	Yuxiang Yang, Yizhou Zhao, Xuewei Feng, Qi Li, and Ke Xu from Tsinghua University using GLM5.1 from Z.ai
Reviewed by:	pouria, glebius
MFC after:	1 week
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56947

(cherry picked from commit beab4a237a45aea809e81802b9e1e9ff30f3d929)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When igmp_v3_merge_state_changes() is iterating over state-change
packets, there is a case where it'll free a queued packet but will fail
to remove it from the queue.  Fix that.

Reported by:	Yuxiang Yang, Yizhou Zhao, Xuewei Feng, Qi Li, and Ke Xu from Tsinghua University using GLM5.1 from Z.ai
Reviewed by:	pouria, glebius
MFC after:	1 week
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56947

(cherry picked from commit beab4a237a45aea809e81802b9e1e9ff30f3d929)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: cleanup</title>
<updated>2026-05-19T12:56:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Tuexen</name>
<email>tuexen@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-22T17:44:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=61c9f9b482ca927d3da668f73f434474cd835e31'/>
<id>61c9f9b482ca927d3da668f73f434474cd835e31</id>
<content type='text'>
No functional change intended.

Reviewed by:		pouria, rrs, Timo Völker
Sponsored by:		Netflix, Inc.
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D55415

(cherry picked from commit c984c7593e11aa95f21f79bb5425a9d5e9181945)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
No functional change intended.

Reviewed by:		pouria, rrs, Timo Völker
Sponsored by:		Netflix, Inc.
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D55415

(cherry picked from commit c984c7593e11aa95f21f79bb5425a9d5e9181945)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
