src/usr.sbin/pkg/pkg.c, branch upstream/11.1.0

Remove extra debug that crept in

2015-09-08T22:24:20+00:00

Implement pubkey support for the bootstrap

2015-09-08T21:25:36+00:00

Note that to not interfer with finger print it expects a signature on pkg itself
which is named pkg.txz.pubkeysign

To genrate it:
echo -n "$(sha256 -q pkg.txz)" | openssl dgst -sha256 -sign /thekey \
    -binary -out ./pkg.txz.pubkeysig

Note the "echo -n" which prevent signing the '\n' one would get otherwise

PR:		202622
MFC after:	1 week

Fix indentation, no functional changes

2015-09-08T19:25:15+00:00

Issue warning and refuse to proceed further if the configured

2015-08-19T18:24:39+00:00

repository signature_type is unsupported by bootstrap pkg(7).

Previously, when signature_type specified an unsupported method,
the bootstrap pkg(7) would proceed like when signature_type is
"none".  MITM attackers may be able to use this vulnerability and
bypass validation and install their own versions of pkg(8).

At this time, only fingerprint and none are supported by the
bootstrap pkg(7).

FreeBSD's official pkg(8) repository uses the fingerprint method
and is therefore unaffected.

Errata candidate.

Discussed with:	bapt@
Submitted by:	Fabian Keil
Obtained from:	ElectroBSD

Allow fetching pkg(8) even if servers/proxies are not passing Content-length

2015-04-03T17:35:30+00:00

Test the return of fetchParseURL(3)

2015-02-04T00:18:06+00:00

CID:		1125811
MFC after:	1 week

Plug resources leak

2015-02-04T00:10:57+00:00

CID:		1125813
CID:		1125807
CID:		1125808
MFC after:	1 week

When we fail to extract the pkg binaries (for example, / is read-only),

2014-07-16T00:12:57+00:00

give a more helpful error message.

MFC after:	1 week

Import libucl 0.4.0

2014-04-22T22:02:06+00:00

Adapt pkg(7) to the new libucl API

Remove a useless newline, warnx already appends a newline

2014-02-23T23:49:10+00:00