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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-99:01                                            Security Advisory
                                                                FreeBSD, Inc.

Topic:          BSD File Flags and Programming Techniques

Category:       core
Module:         kernel
Announced:      1999-09-04
Affects:        FreeBSD 3.2 (and earlier)
		FreeBSD-current before the correction date.
Corrected:      FreeBSD-3.3 RELEASE
		FreeBSD-current as of 1999/08/02
		FreeBSD-3.2-stable as of 1999/08/02
		FreeBSD-2.2.8-stable as of 1999/08/04
FreeBSD only:   NO

Patches:        ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-99:01/

I.   Background    

BSD 4.4 added various flags to files in the file system.  These flags
control various aspects of which operations are permitted on those
files.  Historically, root has been been able to do all of these
operations so many programs that knew they were running as root didn't
check to make sure that these operations succeeded.

II.  Problem Description

A user can set flags and mode on the device which they logged into.
Since a bug in login and other similar programs causes the normal
chown to fail, this first user will own the terminal of any login.

III. Impact

Local users can execute a man-in-the-middle attack against any other
user (including root) when the other users logs in.  This give them
the ability to snoop and alter all text that the user writes.  Results
of this include the ability to execute commands as the user, and
stealing the user's password (and anything else the users writes over
the connection, including passwords for other machines).

IV.  Workaround

None.

V.   Solution

    FreeBSD-current

        Index: kern/vfs_syscalls.c
        ===================================================================
        RCS file: /home/imp/FreeBSD/CVS/src/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c,v
        retrieving revision 1.125
        retrieving revision 1.128
        diff -u -r1.125 -r1.128
        --- vfs_syscalls.c	1999/07/29 17:02:56	1.125
        +++ vfs_syscalls.c	1999/08/04 04:52:18	1.128
        @@ -1892,13 +1892,23 @@
                int error;
                struct vattr vattr;

        +	/*
        +	 * Prevent non-root users from setting flags on devices.  When
        +	 * a device is reused, users can retain ownership of the device
        +	 * if they are allowed to set flags and programs assume that
        +	 * chown can't fail when done as root.
        +	 */
        +	if ((vp->v_type == VCHR || vp->v_type == VBLK) && 
        +	    ((error = suser_xxx(p->p_ucred, p, PRISON_ROOT)) != 0))
        +		return (error);
        +
                VOP_LEASE(vp, p, p->p_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
                vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, p);
                VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
                vattr.va_flags = flags;
                error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, p->p_ucred, p);
                VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, p);
        -	return error;
        +	return (error);
         }

         /*

    FreeBSD-3.2-stable

        Index: kern/vfs_syscalls.c
        ===================================================================
        RCS file: /home/imp/FreeBSD/CVS/src/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c,v
        retrieving revision 1.112.2.3
        retrieving revision 1.112.2.5
        diff -u -r1.112.2.3 -r1.112.2.5
        --- vfs_syscalls.c	1999/07/30 01:07:23	1.112.2.3
        +++ vfs_syscalls.c	1999/08/11 21:39:50	1.112.2.5
        @@ -1839,13 +1839,23 @@
                int error;
                struct vattr vattr;

        +  	/*
        +	 * Prevent non-root users from setting flags on devices.  When
        +	 * a device is reused, users can retain ownership of the device
        +	 * if they are allowed to set flags and programs assume that
        +	 * chown can't fail when done as root.
        +	 */
        +	if ((vp->v_type == VCHR || vp->v_type == VBLK) && 
        +	    ((error = suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag)) != 0))
        +		return (error);
        +
                VOP_LEASE(vp, p, p->p_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
                vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, p);
                VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
                vattr.va_flags = flags;
                error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, p->p_ucred, p);
                VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, p);
        -	return error;
        +	return (error);
         }

         /*

    FreeBSD 2.2.8-stable:

        Index: kern/vfs_syscalls.c
        ===================================================================
        RCS file: /home/imp/FreeBSD/CVS/src/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c,v
        retrieving revision 1.51.2.7
        retrieving revision 1.51.2.8
        diff -u -r1.51.2.7 -r1.51.2.8
        --- vfs_syscalls.c	1998/07/03 03:50:31	1.51.2.7
        +++ vfs_syscalls.c	1999/08/04 18:58:56	1.51.2.8
        @@ -1439,6 +1439,17 @@
                if (error)
                        return (error);
                vp = nd.ni_vp;
        +	if ((error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, p->p_ucred, p)))
        +		return (error);
        +	/*
        +	 * Prevent non-root users from setting flags on devices.  When
        +	 * a device is reused, users can retain ownership of the device
        +	 * if they are allowed to set flags and programs assume that
        +	 * chown can't fail when done as root.
        +	 */
        +	if ((vp->v_type == VCHR || vp->v_type == VBLK) &&
        +	    ((error = suser(p->p_ucred, &p->p_acflag)) != 0))
        +		return (error);
                LEASE_CHECK(vp, p, p->p_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
                VOP_LOCK(vp);
                VATTR_NULL(&vattr);

VI.  Credits

Theo de Raadt came up with the firewalling solution presented here.

lumpy@blue.9mm.com brought this problem to light.

=============================================================================
FreeBSD, Inc.

Web Site:                       http://www.freebsd.org/
Confidential contacts:          security-officer@freebsd.org
Security notifications:         security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion:     freebsd-security@freebsd.org
PGP Key:                ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/public_key.asc

Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
        modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
        Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
        for original copies of all patches if necessary.
=============================================================================

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