MFH

5 files changed, 290 insertions, 64 deletions

diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/cgi/query-pr-summary.cgi b/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/cgi/query-pr-summary.cgi
index 1eb2cfbada..fc5b4052fa 100755
--- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/cgi/query-pr-summary.cgi
+++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/cgi/query-pr-summary.cgi
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ $closed_too    = 0;
 require './cgi-lib.pl';
 require './cgi-style.pl';
 require './query-pr-lib.pl';
-require 'getopts.pl';
 
 if (!$ENV{'QUERY_STRING'} or $ENV{'QUERY_STRING'} eq 'query') {
 	print &html_header("Query $project problem reports");
diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/releng/index.xml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/releng/index.xml
index acff3ebfe8..7236de901f 100644
--- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/releng/index.xml
+++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/releng/index.xml
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@
 
     <tr>
       <td><tt>head</tt></td>
-      <td>Frozen</td>
-      <td>&contact.re;</td>
-      <td>Active development branch for 10-CURRENT.</td>
+      <td>Open</td>
+      <td>committers</td>
+      <td>Active development branch for 11.0-CURRENT.</td>
     </tr>
 
     <tr>
diff --git a/ja_JP.eucJP/books/handbook/security/chapter.xml b/ja_JP.eucJP/books/handbook/security/chapter.xml
index e8ccf73288..f4d9d93a6b 100644
--- a/ja_JP.eucJP/books/handbook/security/chapter.xml
+++ b/ja_JP.eucJP/books/handbook/security/chapter.xml
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
      The FreeBSD Documentation Project
      The FreeBSD Japanese Documentation Project
 
-     Original revision: 1.122
-     Waiting for:	1.123 or mac/chapter.xml
-			("mac" referenced from disks).
+     Original revision: r15428
      Translation note: "fs-acl" section added in rev.1.118 is moved to
 	handbook/basics in rev.1.134 and moved back to this file in
 	rev.1.150. The traslation is already done in handbook/basics, so we
@@ -81,11 +79,12 @@
 	<para>FreeBSD で使われている SSH 実装である
 	  OpenSSH の設定および使用方法</para>
       </listitem>
-
+<!--
       <listitem>
-	<para>拡張されたファイルシステムアクセス制御リスト
-	  (ACL) の UFS での設定および使用方法</para>
+	<para>How to configure and load access control extension
+	  modules using the TrustedBSD MAC Framework.</para>
       </listitem>
+-->
     </itemizedlist>
 
     <para>この章を読む前に、次のことが必要になります。</para>
@@ -3801,68 +3800,264 @@ user@unfirewalled.myserver.com's password: <userinput>*******</userinput></scree
       <para>&man.sshd.8; &man.sftp-server.8;</para>
     </sect2>
   </sect1>
-
-<!-- XXX 2006/05/01 hiroo: Do not translate this section.
-     See the translation note in the header for the reason.
-  <sect1 id="fs-acl">
+<!--
+  <sect1 id="mac">
     <sect1info>
       <authorgroup>
 	<author>
-	  <firstname>Tom</firstname>
-	  <surname>Rhodes</surname>
-	  <contrib>Contributed by </contrib>
+	  <firstname>Robert</firstname>
+	  <surname>Watson</surname>
+	  <contrib>Sponsored by DARPA and Network Associates Laboratories.
+	    Contributed by </contrib>
 	</author>
       </authorgroup>
     </sect1info>
     <indexterm>
-      <primary>ACL</primary>
+      <primary>MAC</primary>
     </indexterm>
-    <title>File System Access Control Lists</title>
-
-    <para>In conjunction with file system enhancements like snapshots, FreeBSD 5.0
-      and later offers the security of File System Access Control Lists
-      (<acronym>ACLs</acronym>).</para>
-
-    <para>Access Control Lists extend the standard UNIX
-      permission model in a highly compatible (POSIX.1e) way.  This feature
-      permits an administrator to make use of and take advantage of a
-      more sophisticated security model.</para>
-
-    <para>For <acronym>ACLs</acronym> to work:</para>
-
-    <programlisting>options UFS_ACL</programlisting>
-
-    <para>must be compiled into the kernel.  If this option has
-      not been compiled in, a warning message will be displayed
-      when attempting to mount a file system sporting <acronym>ACLs</acronym>.
-      <acronym>ACLs</acronym> rely on extended attributes being enabled on
-      the file system.  This is supported natively in the next generation of
-      the <acronym>UNIX</acronym> file system or <acronym>UFS2</acronym>.</para>
-
-    <note><para>The use of extended attributes on <acronym>UFS1</acronym> file
-      systems will lead to higher administration overhead and lower overall
-      file system performance.  <acronym>UFS2</acronym> does not have this
-      problem.</para></note>
-
-    <para>To enable <acronym>ACLs</acronym> on a file system, the <option>-a</option>
-      option can be passed to &man.tunefs.8; in a manner similar to the Soft Updates
-      process:</para>
-
-    <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>umount /usr</userinput>
-&prompt.root; <userinput>tunefs -a enable /dev/<replaceable>diskNsNx</replaceable></userinput>
-&prompt.root; <userinput>mount /dev/<replaceable>diskNsNx</replaceable> /usr</userinput></screen>
-
-    <para>This assumes that <devicename>/dev/<replaceable>diskNsNx</replaceable></devicename> is the
-      <filename>/usr</filename> partition.</para>
-
-    <para><acronym>ACLs</acronym> can also be enabled by passing the
-      <option>-o acls</option> argument to &man.mount.8;:</para>
-
-    <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>mount -o acls /dev/<replaceable>diskNsNx</replaceable> /usr</userinput></screen>
+    <title>Mandatory Access Control (MAC)</title>
+
+    <para>FreeBSD 5.0 includes a new kernel security framework, the
+      TrustedBSD MAC Framework.  The MAC Framework permits compile-time,
+      boot-time, and run-time extension of the kernel access control
+      policy, and can be used to load support for Mandatory Access
+      Control (<acronym>MAC</acronym>), and custom security modules
+      such as hardening modules.  The MAC Framework is currently
+      considered to be an experimental feature, and should not yet
+      be used in production environments without careful consideration.
+      It is anticipated that the MAC Framework will be appropriate for
+      more widespread production use by FreeBSD 5.2.</para>
+
+    <para>When configured into a kernel, the MAC Framework permits
+      security modules to augment the existing kernel access control
+      model, restricting access to system services and objects.  For
+      example, the &man.mac.bsdextended.4; module augments file system
+      access control, permitting administrators to provide a
+      firewall-like ruleset constraining access to file system objects
+      based on user ids and group membership.  Some modules require
+      little or no configuration, such as &man.mac.seeotheruids.4,
+      whereas others perform ubiquitous object labeling, such as
+      &man.mac.biba.4; and &man.mac.mls.4;, and require extensive
+      configuration.</para>
+
+    <para>To enable the MAC Framework in your system kernel, you must
+      add the following entry to your kernel configuration:</para>
+
+    <programlisting>options MAC</programlisting>
+
+    <para>Security policy modules shipped with the base system may
+     be loaded using &man.kldload.8; or in the boot &man.loader.8;
+     They may also be compiled directly into the kernel using the
+     following options, if the use of modules is not desired.</para>
+
+    <para>Different MAC policies may be configured in different ways;
+      frequently, MAC policy modules export configuration parameters
+      using the &man.sysctl.8; <acronym>MIB</acronym> using the
+      <varname>security.mac</varname> namespace.  Policies relying on
+      file system or other labels may require a configuration step
+      that involes assigning initial labels to system objects or
+      creating a policy configuration file.  For information on how to
+      configure and use each policy module, see its man page.</para>
+
+    <para>A variety of tools are available to configure the MAC Framework
+      and labels maintained by various policies.  Extensions have been
+      made to the login and credential management mechanisms
+      (&man.setusercontext.3;) to support initial user labeling using
+      &man.login.conf.5;.  In addition, modifications have been made
+      to &man.su.1;, &man.ps.1;, &man.ls.1;, and &man.ifconfig.8; to
+      inspect and set labels on processes, files, and interfaces.  In
+      addition, several new tools have been added to manage labels
+      on objects, including &man.getfmac.8;, &man.setfmac.8;, and
+      &man.setfsmac.8; to manage labels on files, and &man.getpmac.8; and
+      &man.setpmac.8;.</para>
+
+    <para>What follows is a list of policy modules shipped with FreeBSD
+      5.0.</para>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-biba">
+      <title>Biba Integrity Policy (mac_biba)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>Biba Integrity Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_biba.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_BIBA</literal></para>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>TCB</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>The Biba Integrity Policy (&man.mac.biba.4;) provides
+	for hierarchical and non-hierarchical labeling of all system
+	objects with integrity data, and the strict enforcement of
+	an information flow policy to prevent corruption of high
+	integrity subjects and data by low-integrity subjects.
+	Integrity is enforced by preventing high integrity
+	subjects (generally processes) from reading low integrity
+	objects (often files), and preventing low integrity
+	subjects from writing to high integrity objects.
+	This security policy is frequently used in commercial
+	trusted systems to provide strong protection for the
+	Trusted Code Base (<acronym>TCB</acronym>).  Because it
+	provides ubiquitous labeling, the Biba integrity policy
+	must be compiled into the kernel or loaded at boot.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-bsdextended">
+      <title>File System Firewall Policy (mac_bsdextended)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>File System Firewall Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_bsdextended.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_BSDEXTENDED</literal></para>
+      <para> The File System Firewall Policy (&man.mac.bsdextended.4;)
+	provides an extension to the BSD file system permission model,
+	permitting the administrator to define a set of firewall-like
+	rules for limiting access to file system objects owned by
+	other users and groups.  Managed using &man.ugidfw.8;, rules
+	may limit access to files and directories based on the uid
+	and gids of the process attempting the access, and the owner
+	and group of the target of the access attempt.  All rules
+	are restrictive, so they may be placed in any order.  This policy
+	requires no prior configuration or labeling, and may be
+	appropriate in multi-user environments where mandatory limits
+	on inter-user data exchange are required.  Caution should be
+	exercised in limiting access to files owned by the super-user or
+	other system user ids, as many useful programs and directories
+	are owned by these users.  As with a network firewall,
+	improper application of file system firewall rules may render
+	the system unusable.  New tools to manage the rule set may be
+	easily written using the &man.libugidfw.3; library.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-ifoff">
+      <title>Interface Silencing Policy (mac_ifoff)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>Interface Silencing Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_ifoff.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_IFOFF</literal></para>
+      <para>The interface silencing policy (&man.mac.ifoff.4;)
+	prohibits the use of network interfaces during the boot
+	until explicitly enabled, preventing spurious stack output
+	stack response to incoming packets.  This is appropriate
+	for use in environments where the monitoring of packets
+	is required, but no traffic may be generated.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-lomac">
+      <title>Low-Watermark Mandatory Access Control (LOMAC)
+	(mac_lomac)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>Low-Watermark Mandatory Access Control</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>LOMAC</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: Network Associates Laboratories</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_lomac.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_LOMAC</literal></para>
+      <para>Similar to the Biba Integrity Policy, the LOMAC
+	policy (&man.mac.lomac.4;) relies on the ubiquitous
+	labeling of all system objects with integrity labels.
+	Unlike Biba, LOMAC permits high integrity subjects to
+	read from low integrity objects, but then downgrades the
+	label on the subject to prevent future writes to high
+	integrity objects.  This policy may provide for greater
+	compatibility, as well as require less initial
+	configuration than Biba.  However, as with Biba, it
+	ubiquitously labels objects and must therefore be
+	compiled into the kernel or loaded at boot.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-mls">
+      <title>Multi-Level Security Policy (MLS) (mac_mls)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>Multi-Level Security Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>MLS</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_mls.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_MLS</literal></para>
+      <para>Multi-Level Security (<acronym>MLS</acronym>)
+        (&man.mac.mls.4;) provides for hierarchical and non-hierarchical
+        labeling of all system objects with sensitivity data, and the
+        strict enforcement of an information flow policy to prevent
+        the leakage of confidential data to untrusted parties.  The
+        logical conjugate of the Biba Integrity Policy,
+        <acronym>MLS</acronym> is frequently shipped in commercial
+        trusted operating systems to protect data secrecy in
+        multi-user environments.  Hierarchal labels provide support
+        for the notion of clearances and classifications in
+        traditional parlance; non-hierarchical labels provide support
+        for <quote>need-to-know.</quote>  As with Biba, ubiquitous
+        labeling of objects occurs, and it must therefore be compiled
+        into the kernel or loaded at boot.  As with Biba, extensive
+        initial configuration may be required.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-none">
+      <title>MAC Stub Policy (mac_none)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>MAC Stub Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_none.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_NONE</literal></para>
+      <para>The None policy (&man.mac.none.4;) provides a stub
+	sample policy for developers, implementing all entry
+	points, but not changing the system access control
+	policy.  Running this on a production system would
+	not be highly beneficial.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-partition">
+      <title>Process Partition Policy (mac_partition)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>Process Partition Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_partition.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_PARTITION</literal></para>
+      <para>The Partition policy (&man.mac.partition.4;) provides for a
+	simple process visibility limitation, assigning labels to
+	processes identifying what numeric system partition they
+	are present in.  If none, all other processes are visible
+	using standard monitoring tools; if a partition identifier
+	is present, then only other processes in the same
+	partition are visible.  This policy may be compiled into
+	the kernel, loaded at boot, or loaded at run-time.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-seeotheruids">
+      <title>See Other Uids Policy (mac_seeotheruids)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>See Other Uids Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_seeotheruids.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS</literal></para>
+      <para>The See Other Uids policy (&man.mac.seeotheruids.4;)
+        implements a similar process visibility model to
+        mac_partition, except that it relies on process credentials to
+        control visibility of processes, rather than partition labels.
+        This policy may be configured to exempt certain users and
+        groups, including permitting system operators to view all
+        processes without special privilege.  This policy may be
+        compiled into the kernel, loaded at boot, or loaded at
+        run-time.</para>
+    </sect2>
+    <sect2 id="mac-policy-test">
+      <title>MAC Framework Test Policy (mac_test)</title>
+      <indexterm>
+	<primary>MAC Framework Test Policy</primary>
+      </indexterm>
+      <para>Vendor: TrustedBSD Project</para>
+      <para>Module name: mac_test.ko</para>
+      <para>Kernel option: <literal>MAC_TEST</literal></para>
+      <para>The Test policy (&man.mac.test.4;) provides a regression
+        test environment for the MAC Framework, and will cause a
+        fail-stop in the event that internal MAC Framework assertions
+        about proper data labeling fail.  This module can be used to
+        detect failures to properly label system objects in the kernel
+        implementation.  This policy may be compiled into the kernel,
+        loaded at boot, or loaded at run-time.</para>
+    </sect2>
 
-    <para>This flag can also be set  in <filename>/etc/fstab</filename>.
-      It is recommended to use the former over the latter to avoid remount
-      issues with the root file system.</para>
   </sect1>
 -->
 </chapter>
diff --git a/ja_JP.eucJP/share/xml/news.xml b/ja_JP.eucJP/share/xml/news.xml
index 51ffe2119d..b075aa5482 100644
--- a/ja_JP.eucJP/share/xml/news.xml
+++ b/ja_JP.eucJP/share/xml/news.xml
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
      the contents of <title> will be preferred over <p>.
 
      $FreeBSD$
-     Original revision: r43098
+     Original revision: r43106
 -->
 <news>
     <cvs:keyword xmlns:cvs="http://www.FreeBSD.org/XML/CVS">
@@ -34,6 +34,22 @@
       <name>11</name>
 
       <day>
+	<name>5</name>
+
+	<event>
+	  <title>&os;&nbsp;10.0-BETA3 公開</title>
+
+	  <p>&os;-10.0 リリースサイクルから 3
+	    回目のベータ版が公開されました (<a
+	      href="&lists.stable;/2013-November/075704.html">アナウンス</a>)。
+	    <a
+	      href="&url.doc.base;/books/handbook/mirrors-ftp.html">&os;
+	    ミラーサイト</a> から amd64, i386, ia64, powerpc, powerpc64 および
+	    sparc64 アーキテクチャの ISO イメージを入手できます。</p>
+	</event>
+      </day>
+
+      <day>
 	<name>2</name>
 
 	<event>
diff --git a/share/xml/news.xml b/share/xml/news.xml
index ebb747f5f2..e3886845fe 100644
--- a/share/xml/news.xml
+++ b/share/xml/news.xml
@@ -34,6 +34,22 @@
       <name>11</name>
 
       <day>
+	<name>5</name>
+
+	<event>
+	  <title>&os;&nbsp;10.0-BETA3 Available</title>
+
+	  <p>The third BETA build for the &os;-10.0 release cycle is
+	    now available.  ISO images for the amd64, i386, ia64,
+	    powerpc, powerpc64 and sparc64 architectures are <a
+	      href="&lists.stable;/2013-November/075704.html">available</a>
+	    on most of our <a
+	      href="&url.doc.base-en;/books/handbook/mirrors-ftp.html">&os;
+	    mirror sites</a>.</p>
+	</event>
+      </day>
+
+      <day>
 	<name>2</name>
 
 	<event>