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diff --git a/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:20.rtsold.asc b/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:20.rtsold.asc deleted file mode 100644 index 2d3772ea8e..0000000000 --- a/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:20.rtsold.asc +++ /dev/null @@ -1,169 +0,0 @@ ------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -Hash: SHA1 - -============================================================================= -FreeBSD-SA-14:20.rtsold Security Advisory - The FreeBSD Project - -Topic: rtsold(8) remote buffer overflow vulnerability - -Category: core -Module: rtsold -Announced: 2014-10-21 -Credits: Florian Obser, Hiroki Sato -Affects: FreeBSD 9.1 and later. -Corrected: 2014-10-21 20:20:07 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-PRERELEASE) - 2014-10-21 20:20:36 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC2-p1) - 2014-10-21 20:20:36 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC1-p1) - 2014-10-21 20:20:36 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-BETA3-p1) - 2014-10-21 20:21:10 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p10) - 2014-10-21 20:20:17 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) - 2014-10-21 20:21:10 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p3) - 2014-10-21 20:21:10 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p13) - 2014-10-21 20:21:10 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p20) -CVE Name: CVE-2014-3954 - -For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, -including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the -following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>. - -I. Background - -As part of the stateless addess autoconfiguration (SLAAC) mechanism, -IPv6 routers periodically broadcast router advertisement messages on -attached networks to inform hosts of the correct network prefix, -router address and MTU, as well as additional network parameters such -as the DNS servers (RDNSS), DNS search list (DNSSL) and whether a -stateful configuration service is available. Hosts that have recently -joined the network can broadcast a router solicitation message to -solicit an immediate advertisement instead of waiting for the next -periodic advertisement. - -The router solicitation daemon, rtsold(8), broadcasts router -solicitation messages at startup or when the state of an interface -changes from passive to active. Incoming router advertisement -messages are first processed by the kernel and then passed on to -rtsold(8), which handles the DNS and stateful configuration options. - -II. Problem Description - -Due to a missing length check in the code that handles DNS parameters, -a malformed router advertisement message can result in a stack buffer -overflow in rtsold(8). - -III. Impact - -Receipt of a router advertisement message with a malformed DNSSL -option, for instance from a compromised host on the same network, can -cause rtsold(8) to crash. - -While it is theoretically possible to inject code into rtsold(8) -through malformed router advertisement messages, it is normally -compiled with stack protection enabled, rendering such an attack -extremely difficult. - -When rtsold(8) crashes, the existing DNS configuration will remain in -force, and the kernel will continue to receive and process periodic -router advertisements. - -IV. Workaround - -No workaround is available, but systems that do not run rtsold(8) are -not affected. - -As a general rule, SLAAC should not be used on networks where trusted -and untrusted hosts coexist in the same broadcast domain. - -V. Solution - -Perform one of the following: - -1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or -release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. - -2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: - -Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 -platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: - -# freebsd-update fetch -# freebsd-update install - -3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: - -The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable -FreeBSD release branches. - -a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the -detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. - -# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:20/rtsold.patch -# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:20/rtsold.patch.asc -# gpg --verify rtsold.patch.asc - -b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: - -# cd /usr/src -# patch < /path/to/rtsold.patch - -c) Recompile rtsold. Execute the following commands as root: - -# cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/rtsold -# make && make install - -4) Restart the affected service - -To restart the affected service after updating the system, either -reboot the system or execute the following command as root: - -# service rtsold restart - -VI. Correction details - -The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each -affected branch. - -Branch/path Revision -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -stable/9/ r273412 -releng/9.1/ r273415 -releng/9.2/ r273415 -releng/9.3/ r273415 -stable/10/ r273411 -releng/10.0/ r273415 -releng/10.1/ r273414 -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the -following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a -machine with Subversion installed: - -# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base - -Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: - -<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN> - -VII. References - -<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3954> - -The latest revision of this advisory is available at -<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:20.rtsold.asc> ------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -Version: GnuPG v1 - -iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJURsSoAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rn5GsP/2y0fUJYVdsZjA4VtUcLFp4Q -nhjGO3I4NOXZAj3c+bWwbw/Bmg7juFVXiAdLgcpK8UuTT+0znAkEcGoG+uA9q6K1 -PoFjTmXoukIqtu4sd5Gxp74+xVqY41XOuwanHNMiCbvGEbInxoCs3t56C7Ai1/9m -DXhDCukNEH9JZv5qUS5L7IcosuQs2l1viU9oUA/hSfVeI9IFKp8SItDthwtLVrXe -bgr50oQdCtwR3gx3Dwkg//er3JCsSJ0ixJO0bGGaqnGLPq7gwmJf8zKy10EE2fri -AMpUcYMsO+MqhE+PyyuW9MJaPpX+zghZac75UYPh0EckIn8m2p6QGYXcDtZ18qR8 -uq4JCk5nDARKuy7kraEuNJgFzNIBN/wVwOSqaF4n43vhmsuiKF9uzePrtEhB7xoN -7vT66EXXkCgiqQrQVJ6IH5LzoUJtYVDZTWLWU66r919qbQzYQFU7uslaGF8rgVIg -HZOfEbDto3dvULmbVHkaWiyotKYSKXZROBTKvTOWVs+BX37zQgg4PGuU6CqatB8R -Sltg2kxycQXoIm5XiiSL18RTgxEWb+DKfw8e/691EM1/F3XIQVNX11wJpeZwL/sf -zE9TtTnmqpIBPGIe7aURgJWwX/iA4ljAqB1t5DmgIQrJMXovMXnAVMIu4L2jy+gY -eRy82+SI3pc3thChv2hv -=L56U ------END PGP SIGNATURE----- |