-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-96:11 Security Advisory Revised: Wed May 22 00:11:46 PDT 1996 FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: security compromise from man page utility Category: core Module: man Announced: 1996-05-21 Affects: FreeBSD 2.0, 2.0.5, 2.1, 2.1-stable, and 2.2-current Corrected: 2.1-stable and 2.2-current as of 1996-05-21 FreeBSD only: yes Patches: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-96:11/ ============================================================================= I. Background FreeBSD replaced the standard BSD manual page reader with code developed by a third party to support compressed manual pages. A bug was found in the manual page reader which can allow an unprivileged local user to compromise system security in a limited fashion. This problem is present in all source code and binary distributions of FreeBSD version 2.x released before 1996-05-21. II. Problem Description The man program is setuid to the "man" user. By executing a particular sequence of commands, an unprivileged local user may gain the access privileges of the "man" user. However, root access could be obtained with further work. III. Impact The "man" user has no particular special privileges, it is the owner of the /usr/share/man/cat[0-9] directory hierarchy. Unformatted system manual pages are owned by the "bin" user. However, further exploits once "man" is obtained could possibly allow a local user to obtain unlimited access via a trojan horse. This vulnerability can only be exploited by users with a valid account on the local system. IV. Workaround One may simply disable the setuid bit on the /usr/bin/man file. This will disable caching of formatted manual pages, no system functionality will be lost. This workaround will suffice for all versions of FreeBSD affected by this problem. As root, execute the command: # chmod u-s /usr/bin/man then verify that the setuid permissions of the files have been removed. The permissions array should read "-r-xr-xr-x" as shown here: # ls -l /usr/bin/man -r-xr-xr-x 1 man bin 28672 May 19 20:38 /usr/bin/man We also suggest applying the following patch to the source distribution so that the man program will not be installed setuid man should you rebuild from sources: *** /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/man/man/Makefile Sun Feb 25 13:39:52 1996 --- /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/man/man/Makefile Wed May 22 00:13:05 1996 *************** *** 1,7 **** PROG= man SRCS= man.c manpath.c glob.c - BINMODE=4555 - BINOWN= man .if exists(${.CURDIR}/../lib/obj) LDADD= -L${.CURDIR}/../lib/obj -lman --- 1,5 ---- V. Solution The FreeBSD team is in the process of rewriting portions of the manual program to avoid this and similar vulnerabilities. This security advisory will be updated when a complete solution is available. ============================================================================= FreeBSD, Inc. Web Site: http://www.freebsd.org/ Confidential contacts: security-officer@freebsd.org PGP Key: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc Security notifications: security-notifications@freebsd.org Security public discussion: security@freebsd.org Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software. Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document for original copies of all patches if necessary. ============================================================================= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMaLAllUuHi5z0oilAQFblwP/atY+PmOBakOsKhWywcPu5LvjaAAH5m8B 3KGrtM/CBGEeFvk4qth8aeoTxLfhNtwrsvvnAAKFvqWbdHNU8CnlRgPKbzpyq+cs JB5NAaUYiCI9/87qRajpbjNLxJuDiCOUKcuvU/lgKLvr4oZ86ZVSu5uPieVXaJ8L RVKCjkRnUw8= =IMYL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----