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authorCy Schubert <cy@FreeBSD.org>2003-03-21 00:54:06 +0000
committerCy Schubert <cy@FreeBSD.org>2003-03-21 00:54:06 +0000
commitaf7a454fd3da00363fde4728708eb83d5e734230 (patch)
tree8dc748b7f3a65ad37e15622ed189237948b2c5db
parent9945021b5e86c3939516e949c36acaf41406e915 (diff)
downloadports-af7a454fd3da00363fde4728708eb83d5e734230.tar.gz
ports-af7a454fd3da00363fde4728708eb83d5e734230.zip
Patches from:
- MITKRB5-SA-2003-005: Buffer overrun and underrun in principal name handling - MITKRB5-SA-2003-004: Cryptographic weaknesses in Kerberos v4 protocol; KDC and realm compromise possible. - MITKRB5-SA-2003-003: Faulty length checks in xdrmem_getbytes may allow kadmind DoS. - Additional patches from RedHat. Approved by: kris (wearing his portmgr hat) Obtained from: MIT Website and Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
Notes
Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=77170
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c13
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-include::krb5.hin16
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c27
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h15
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c233
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::main.c37
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c34
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c89
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c86
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c42
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c29
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c17
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c136
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c13
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-include::krb5.hin16
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c27
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h15
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c233
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::main.c37
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c34
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c89
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c86
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c42
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c29
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c17
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c136
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c13
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-include::krb5.hin16
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c27
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h15
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c233
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::main.c37
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c34
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c89
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c86
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c42
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c29
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c17
-rw-r--r--security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c136
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c13
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-include::krb5.hin16
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c27
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h15
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c233
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::main.c37
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c34
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c89
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c86
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c42
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c14
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c29
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c12
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c17
-rw-r--r--security/krb5/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c136
76 files changed, 3356 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/Makefile b/security/krb5-16/Makefile
index cff9b3b0bc9a..826ca046d324 100644
--- a/security/krb5-16/Makefile
+++ b/security/krb5-16/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= krb5
PORTVERSION= 1.2.7
+PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= security
.if defined(USA_RESIDENT) && ${USA_RESIDENT} == "NO"
# XXX crypto-publish.org does not at this time have the krb5-1.2.7 tarball.
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2115fd77a446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c
+--- appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2002-03-29 00:07:09.000000000-0500
++++ appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2003-02-03 17:30:18.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,6 +441,10 @@
+ * first component of a service name especially since
+ * the default is of length 4.
+ */
++ if (krb5_princ_size(telnet_context,ticket->server) < 1) {
++ (void) strcpy(errbuf, "malformed service name");
++ goto errout;
++ }
+ if (krb5_princ_component(telnet_context,ticket->server,0)->length < 256) {
+ char princ[256];
+ strncpy(princ,
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a92c4eb7058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c
+--- clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 15:24:57.000000000 -0500
++++ clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 17:56:38.000000000 -0500
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
+ krb5_data *p2 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, temp_client, j);
+
+- if ((p1->length != p2->length) ||
++ if (!p1 || !p2 || (p1->length != p2->length) ||
+ memcmp(p1->data,p2->data,p1->length)){
+ got_one = FALSE;
+ break;
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..150551765d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c.orig Mon Dec 6 13:56:09 1999
++++ clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c Tue Feb 25 19:54:14 2003
+@@ -620,7 +620,9 @@
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, temp_client)->length))){
+
+
+- if(nelem){
++ if(nelem &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, *client) > 0) &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, temp_client) > 0)){
+ krb5_data *p1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, *client, 0);
+ krb5_data *p2 =
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-include::krb5.hin b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..812664fc0b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: include/krb5.hin
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/include/krb5.hin,v
+retrieving revision 1.94.2.5.2.17
+diff -p -u -r1.94.2.5.2.17 krb5.hin
+--- include/krb5.hin 2002/04/16 23:47:53 1.94.2.5.2.17
++++ include/krb5.hin 2003/03/19 00:38:54
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ typedef krb5_const krb5_principal_data F
+ #define krb5_princ_size(context, princ) (princ)->length
+ #define krb5_princ_type(context, princ) (princ)->type
+ #define krb5_princ_name(context, princ) (princ)->data
+-#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) ((princ)->data + i)
++#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) (i < krb5_princ_size(context, princ) ? ((princ)->data + i) : NULL)
+
+ /*
+ * end "base-defs.h"
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..58e41c08a5e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
+--- kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 15:24:58.000000000 -0500
++++ kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 17:54:27.000000000 -0500
+@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
+ krb5_data *tgs_1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
+
+- if (server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
++ if (!tgs_1 || server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
+ memcmp(server_1->data, tgs_1->data, tgs_1->length)) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..078a4b73c4fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.96.2.2.2.3
+diff -p -u -r5.96.2.2.2.3 kdc_util.c
+--- kdc/kdc_util.c 2002/10/31 00:38:34 5.96.2.2.2.3
++++ kdc/kdc_util.c 2003/03/19 00:39:00
+@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ realm_compare(princ1, princ2)
+ krb5_boolean krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal)
+ krb5_principal principal;
+ {
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
++ if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, principal) > 0 &&
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE) &&
+ (!memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->data,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME, KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE)))
+@@ -1195,7 +1196,8 @@
+ return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
+ }
+ /* ...and that the second component matches the server realm... */
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
++ if ((krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, ticket->server) <= 1) ||
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->length) ||
+ memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->data,
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..262f3ff8cb29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.h,v
+retrieving revision 5.44.4.1
+diff -u -r5.44.4.1 kdc_util.h
+--- kdc/kdc_util.h 2001/10/13 00:12:26 5.44.4.1
++++ kdc/kdc_util.h 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@
+ const krb5_fulladdr *,
+ int is_secondary,
+ krb5_data **));
++void enable_v4_crossrealm(char *);
+ #else
+ #define process_v4(foo,bar,quux,foobar) KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION
+ #endif
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5b197f68afd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+Index: kdc/kerberos_v4.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.68.2.3.2.1
+diff -u -r5.68.2.3.2.1 kerberos_v4.c
+--- kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/08/15 21:28:54 5.68.2.3.2.1
++++ kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
+
+ void kerberos_v4 PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT));
+ void kerb_err_reply PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT, long, char *));
+-static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno));
++static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno, krb5_boolean));
+
+ /* Attributes converted from V5 to V4 - internal representation */
+ #define V4_KDB_REQUIRES_PREAUTH 0x1
+@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@
+
+ static const int v4mode_table_nents = sizeof(v4mode_table)/
+ sizeof(v4mode_table[0]);
++static int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+
+ void process_v4_mode(progname, string)
+ const char *progname;
+@@ -210,6 +211,11 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++void enable_v4_crossrealm ( char *programname) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "Enabling v4 cross-realm compatibility; this is a known security hole");
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ process_v4( pkt, client_fulladdr, is_secondary, resp)
+ const krb5_data *pkt;
+@@ -401,6 +407,14 @@
+ #define MIN5 300
+ #define HR21 255
+
++/*
++ * Previously this code returned either a v4 key or a v5 key and you
++ * could tell from the enctype of the v5 key whether the v4 key was
++ * useful. Now we return both keys so the code can try both des3 and
++ * des decryption. We fail if the ticket doesn't have a v4 key.
++ * Also, note as a side effect, the v5 key is basically useless in
++ * the client case. It is still returned so the caller can free it.
++ */
+ static int
+ kerb_get_principal(name, inst, principal, maxn, more, k5key, kvno, issrv)
+ char *name; /* could have wild card */
+@@ -482,8 +496,28 @@
+ return(0);
+ }
+ } else {
+- /* XXX yes I know this is a hardcoded search order */
+- if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ if ( krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4, kvno, &pkey) &&
++ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ -1, kvno, &pkey)) {
++ lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
++ "KDC V4: failed to find key for %s.%s #%d",
++ name, inst, kvno);
++ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
++ return(0);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
++ memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
++ memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
++ }
++ memset(k, 0, sizeof k);
++ if (issrv) {
++ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (kdc_context, k5key);
++ if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+ ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+ -1, kvno, &pkey) &&
+ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+@@ -504,12 +538,10 @@
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
+ return(0);
+ }
++ compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv);
++ memset (k, 0, sizeof k);
+ }
+
+- if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
+- memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
+- memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
+- }
+ /* convert v5's entries struct to v4's Principal struct:
+ * v5's time-unit for lifetimes is 1 sec, while v4 uses 5 minutes.
+ */
+@@ -746,21 +778,14 @@
+ kdb_encrypt_key(key, key, master_key,
+ master_key_schedule, DECRYPT);
+ /* construct and seal the ticket */
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* We always issue des tickets; the 3des tickets are a broken hack*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
++ a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
++ client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
++ lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
++
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -840,8 +865,15 @@
+ strncpy(tktrlm, (char *)auth->dat + 3, REALM_SZ);
+ tktrlm[REALM_SZ-1] = '\0';
+ kvno = (krb5_kvno)auth->dat[2];
+- if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno)) {
+- lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ if ((!allow_v4_crossrealm)&&strcmp(tktrlm, local_realm) != 0) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "Cross realm ticket from %s denied by policy,", tktrlm);
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 0)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
+ "FAILED set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
+ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
+ /* no better error code */
+@@ -851,6 +883,19 @@
+ }
+ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
+ ad, 0);
++ if (kerno) {
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 1)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "FAILED 3des set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
++ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
++ /* no better error code */
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
++ ad, 0);
++ }
+
+ if (kerno) {
+ klog(L_ERR_UNK, "FAILED krb_rd_req from %s: %s",
+@@ -916,21 +961,13 @@
+ des_new_random_key(session_key);
+ #endif
+
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* ALways issue des tickets*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
++ ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
++ (char *) session_key, lifetime,
++ kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -1138,20 +1175,22 @@
+
+ /* Set the key for krb_rd_req so we can check tgt */
+ static int
+-set_tgtkey(r, kvno)
++set_tgtkey(r, kvno, use_3des)
+ char *r; /* Realm for desired key */
+ krb5_kvno kvno;
++ krb5_boolean use_3des;
+ {
+ int n;
+ static char lastrealm[REALM_SZ] = "";
+ static int last_kvno = 0;
++ static krb5_boolean last_use_3des = 0;
+ Principal p_st;
+ Principal *p = &p_st;
+ C_Block key;
+ krb5_keyblock k5key;
+
+ k5key.contents = NULL;
+- if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno)
++ if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno && last_use_3des == use_3des)
+ return (KSUCCESS);
+
+ /* log("Getting key for %s", r); */
+@@ -1173,11 +1212,12 @@
+ return KFAILURE;
+ }
+
+- if (!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
++ if (use_3des&&!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+ krb_set_key_krb5(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ strncpy(lastrealm, r, sizeof(lastrealm) - 1);
+ lastrealm[sizeof(lastrealm) - 1] = '\0';
+ last_kvno = kvno;
++ last_use_3des = use_3des;
+ } else {
+ /* unseal tgt key from master key */
+ memcpy(key, &p->key_low, 4);
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::main.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e16cbece0fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-kdc::main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Index: kdc/main.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/main.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.99.4.1
+diff -u -r5.99.4.1 main.c
+--- kdc/main.c 2001/09/26 00:46:11 5.99.4.1
++++ kdc/main.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
+ usage(name)
+ char *name;
+ {
+- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-n]\n", name);
++ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-X] [-n]\n", name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
+ * Loop through the option list. Each time we encounter a realm name,
+ * use the previously scanned options to fill in for defaults.
+ */
+- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:3")) != -1) {
++ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:X3")) != -1) {
+ switch(c) {
+ case 'r': /* realm name for db */
+ if (!find_realm_data(optarg, (krb5_ui_4) strlen(optarg))) {
+@@ -661,6 +661,11 @@
+ v4mode = strdup(optarg);
+ #endif
+ break;
++ case 'X':
++#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
++ enable_v4_crossrealm(argv[0]);
++#endif
++ break;
+ case '3':
+ #ifdef ATHENA_DES3_KLUDGE
+ if (krb5_enctypes_list[krb5_enctypes_length-1].etype
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8204faee367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+Index: krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.17.2.1.2.1
+diff -u -r1.17.2.1.2.1 cnv_tkt_skey.c
+--- krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/03/01 16:05:20 1.17.2.1.2.1
++++ krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -173,25 +173,7 @@
+ sname,
+ sinst,
+ v4_skey->contents);
+- } else {
+- /* Force enctype to be raw if using DES3. */
+- if (v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 ||
+- v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1)
+- v4_skey->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW;
+- ret = krb_cr_tkt_krb5(v4tkt,
+- 0, /* flags */
+- pname,
+- pinst,
+- prealm,
+- *((unsigned long *)kaddr.contents),
+- (char *) v5etkt->session->contents,
+- lifetime,
+- /* issue_data */
+- server_time,
+- sname,
+- sinst,
+- v4_skey);
+- }
++ } else abort();
+
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5etkt);
+ v5tkt->enc_part2 = NULL;
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d121045582a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+Index: krb524/krb524d.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/krb524d.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.40.4.3
+diff -u -r1.40.4.3 krb524d.c
+--- krb524/krb524d.c 2002/08/29 06:48:05 1.40.4.3
++++ krb524/krb524d.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+ void *handle;
+
+ int use_keytab, use_master;
++int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+ char *keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab kt;
+
+@@ -134,7 +135,10 @@
+ config_params.mask = 0;
+
+ while (argc) {
+- if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
++ if (strncmp(*argv, "-X", 2) == 0) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ }
++ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
+ use_keytab = 1;
+ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-m", 2) == 0)
+ use_master = 1;
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
+ if (debug)
+ printf("V5 ticket decoded\n");
+
+- if( v5tkt->server->length >= 1
++ if( krb5_princ_size(context, v5tkt->server) >= 1
+ &&krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->length == 3
+ &&strncmp(krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->data,
+ "afs", 3) == 0) {
+@@ -495,19 +499,7 @@
+ &v5_service_key, NULL)))
+ goto error;
+
+- if ((ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+- 0, /* highest kvno */
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
++ if ( (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
+ 0,
+ &v4_service_key, v4kvno)))
+@@ -515,8 +507,19 @@
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf("service key retrieved\n");
++ if ((ret = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(context, &v5_service_key, v5tkt))) {
++ goto error;
++ }
+
+- ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
++ if (!(allow_v4_crossrealm || krb5_realm_compare(context, v5tkt->server,
++ v5tkt->enc_part2->client))) {
++ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY ;
++ goto error;
++ }
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++ v5tkt->enc_part2= NULL;
++
++ ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
+ &v4_service_key,
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)saddr);
+ if (ret)
+@@ -532,6 +535,9 @@
+ printf("v4 credentials encoded\n");
+
+ error:
++ if (v5tkt->enc_part2)
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++
+ if(v5_service_key.contents)
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &v5_service_key);
+ if (v4_service_key.contents)
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a77f4bc32718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Index: lib/kdb/keytab.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.11.4.2
+diff -u -r5.11.4.2 keytab.c
+--- lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/08/15 21:27:34 5.11.4.2
++++ lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/10/15 23:32:46
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+ #include "kdb_kt.h"
+
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal);
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_close KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab));
+
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_get_entry KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_const_principal,
+@@ -98,6 +100,8 @@
+ krb5_db_entry db_entry;
+ krb5_boolean more = 0;
+ int n = 0;
++ int xrealm_tgt = is_xrealm_tgt(context, principal);
++ int similar;
+
+ /* Open database */
+ /* krb5_db_init(context); */
+@@ -127,16 +131,31 @@
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ /* For cross realm tgts, we match whatever enctype is provided;
++ * for other principals, we only match the first enctype that is
++ * found. Since the TGS and AS code do the same thing, then we
++ * will only successfully decrypt tickets we have issued.*/
+ kerror = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, &db_entry,
+- enctype, -1, kvno, &key_data);
++ xrealm_tgt?enctype:-1,
++ -1, kvno, &key_data);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++
+ kerror = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(context, master_key,
+ key_data, &entry->key, NULL);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ kerror = krb5_c_enctype_compare(context, enctype, entry->key.enctype, &similar);
++ if (kerror)
++ goto error;
++
++ if (!similar) {
++ kerror = KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Coerce the enctype of the output keyblock in case we got an
+ * inexact match on the enctype; this behavior will go away when
+@@ -154,3 +173,27 @@
+ krb5_db_close_database(context);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * is_xrealm_tgt: Returns true if the principal is a cross-realm TGT
++ * principal-- a principal with first component krbtgt and second
++ * component not equal to realm.
++ */
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal princ)
++{
++ krb5_data *dat;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, princ) != 2)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 0);
++ if (strncmp("krbtgt", dat->data, dat->length) != 0)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 1);
++ if (dat->length != princ->realm.length)
++ return 1;
++ if (strcmp(dat->data, princ->realm.data) == 0)
++ return 0;
++ return 1;
++
++}
++
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c97b3a3c85ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c
+--- lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 1999-09-24 17:19:01.000000000-0400
++++ lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 2003-02-03 18:02:25.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ fail:
+
+- for (i = 0; i < ret_entry->principal->length; i++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, ret_entry->principal); i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, ret_entry->principal, i);
+ if (princ->data)
+ free(princ->data);
+@@ -498,9 +498,9 @@
+ }
+
+ if (KTVERSION(id) == KRB5_KT_VNO_1) {
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length + 1;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal) + 1;
+ } else {
+- count = htons((u_short) entry->principal->length);
++ count = htons((u_short) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal));
+ }
+
+ if (!xfwrite(&count, sizeof(count), 1, KTFILEP(id))) {
+@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
+ goto abend;
+ }
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, entry->principal, i);
+ size = princ->length;
+@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@
+ krb5_int32 total_size, i;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+
+ total_size = sizeof(count);
+ total_size += krb5_princ_realm(context, entry->principal)->length + (sizeof(krb5_int16));
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4ad0d8cc43c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 1999-09-24 17:19:24.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 2003-02-03 17:35:40.000000000 -0500
+@@ -347,7 +347,9 @@
+ for (next_server = top_server; *next_server; next_server++) {
+ krb5_data *realm_1 = krb5_princ_component(context, next_server[0], 1);
+ krb5_data *realm_2 = krb5_princ_component(context, tgtr->server, 1);
+- if (realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
++ if (realm_1 != NULL &&
++ realm_2 != NULL &&
++ realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
+ !memcmp(realm_1->data, realm_2->data, realm_1->length)) {
+ break;
+ }
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8eb73b24c158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2002-02-28 12:08:35.000000000 -0500
++++ lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2003-02-03 17:44:04.000000000 -0500
+@@ -173,11 +173,13 @@
+ cp++;
+ size++;
+ } else if (c == COMPONENT_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ i++;
+ } else if (c == REALM_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ parsed_realm = cp+1;
+ } else
+@@ -186,7 +188,8 @@
+ if (parsed_realm)
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->length = size;
+ else
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ if (i + 1 != components) {
+ #if !defined(_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(macintosh)
+ fprintf(stderr,
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79e16f93110d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 1999-09-24 17:19:48.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 2003-02-03 19:29:32.000000000 -0500
+@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
+ unsigned long uid = geteuid();
+ #endif
+
++ if (piece == NULL)
++ return ENOMEM;
++
+ rcache = (krb5_rcache) malloc(sizeof(*rcache));
+ if (!rcache)
+ return ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..690eb5febea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.27.4.1
+diff -p -u -r5.27.4.1 unparse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2002/08/12 22:55:01 5.27.4.1
++++ lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2003/03/19 00:39:02
+@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ krb5_unparse_name_ext(context, principal
+ *q++ = COMPONENT_SEP;
+ }
+
+- q--; /* Back up last component separator */
++ if (i > 0)
++ q--; /* Back up last component separator */
+ *q++ = REALM_SEP;
+
+ cp = krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->data;
diff --git a/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2508c3620772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-16/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+Index: xdr_mem.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.8
+diff -c -r1.8 xdr_mem.c
+*** lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 1998/02/14 02:27:24 1.8
+--- lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 2003/02/04 22:57:24
+***************
+*** 47,52 ****
+--- 47,54 ----
+ #include <gssrpc/xdr.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
++ #include <string.h>
++ #include <limits.h>
+
+ static bool_t xdrmem_getlong();
+ static bool_t xdrmem_putlong();
+***************
+*** 83,89 ****
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = size;
+ }
+
+ static void
+--- 85,91 ----
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = (size > INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : size; /* XXX */
+ }
+
+ static void
+***************
+*** 98,105 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 100,109 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 111,118 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 115,124 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 125,132 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 131,140 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 139,146 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 147,156 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 179,185 ****
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+--- 189,195 ----
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (len >= 0 && xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/Makefile b/security/krb5-17/Makefile
index cff9b3b0bc9a..826ca046d324 100644
--- a/security/krb5-17/Makefile
+++ b/security/krb5-17/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= krb5
PORTVERSION= 1.2.7
+PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= security
.if defined(USA_RESIDENT) && ${USA_RESIDENT} == "NO"
# XXX crypto-publish.org does not at this time have the krb5-1.2.7 tarball.
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2115fd77a446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c
+--- appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2002-03-29 00:07:09.000000000-0500
++++ appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2003-02-03 17:30:18.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,6 +441,10 @@
+ * first component of a service name especially since
+ * the default is of length 4.
+ */
++ if (krb5_princ_size(telnet_context,ticket->server) < 1) {
++ (void) strcpy(errbuf, "malformed service name");
++ goto errout;
++ }
+ if (krb5_princ_component(telnet_context,ticket->server,0)->length < 256) {
+ char princ[256];
+ strncpy(princ,
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a92c4eb7058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c
+--- clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 15:24:57.000000000 -0500
++++ clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 17:56:38.000000000 -0500
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
+ krb5_data *p2 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, temp_client, j);
+
+- if ((p1->length != p2->length) ||
++ if (!p1 || !p2 || (p1->length != p2->length) ||
+ memcmp(p1->data,p2->data,p1->length)){
+ got_one = FALSE;
+ break;
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..150551765d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c.orig Mon Dec 6 13:56:09 1999
++++ clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c Tue Feb 25 19:54:14 2003
+@@ -620,7 +620,9 @@
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, temp_client)->length))){
+
+
+- if(nelem){
++ if(nelem &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, *client) > 0) &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, temp_client) > 0)){
+ krb5_data *p1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, *client, 0);
+ krb5_data *p2 =
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-include::krb5.hin b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..812664fc0b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: include/krb5.hin
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/include/krb5.hin,v
+retrieving revision 1.94.2.5.2.17
+diff -p -u -r1.94.2.5.2.17 krb5.hin
+--- include/krb5.hin 2002/04/16 23:47:53 1.94.2.5.2.17
++++ include/krb5.hin 2003/03/19 00:38:54
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ typedef krb5_const krb5_principal_data F
+ #define krb5_princ_size(context, princ) (princ)->length
+ #define krb5_princ_type(context, princ) (princ)->type
+ #define krb5_princ_name(context, princ) (princ)->data
+-#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) ((princ)->data + i)
++#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) (i < krb5_princ_size(context, princ) ? ((princ)->data + i) : NULL)
+
+ /*
+ * end "base-defs.h"
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..58e41c08a5e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
+--- kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 15:24:58.000000000 -0500
++++ kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 17:54:27.000000000 -0500
+@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
+ krb5_data *tgs_1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
+
+- if (server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
++ if (!tgs_1 || server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
+ memcmp(server_1->data, tgs_1->data, tgs_1->length)) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..078a4b73c4fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.96.2.2.2.3
+diff -p -u -r5.96.2.2.2.3 kdc_util.c
+--- kdc/kdc_util.c 2002/10/31 00:38:34 5.96.2.2.2.3
++++ kdc/kdc_util.c 2003/03/19 00:39:00
+@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ realm_compare(princ1, princ2)
+ krb5_boolean krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal)
+ krb5_principal principal;
+ {
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
++ if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, principal) > 0 &&
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE) &&
+ (!memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->data,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME, KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE)))
+@@ -1195,7 +1196,8 @@
+ return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
+ }
+ /* ...and that the second component matches the server realm... */
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
++ if ((krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, ticket->server) <= 1) ||
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->length) ||
+ memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->data,
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..262f3ff8cb29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.h,v
+retrieving revision 5.44.4.1
+diff -u -r5.44.4.1 kdc_util.h
+--- kdc/kdc_util.h 2001/10/13 00:12:26 5.44.4.1
++++ kdc/kdc_util.h 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@
+ const krb5_fulladdr *,
+ int is_secondary,
+ krb5_data **));
++void enable_v4_crossrealm(char *);
+ #else
+ #define process_v4(foo,bar,quux,foobar) KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION
+ #endif
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5b197f68afd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+Index: kdc/kerberos_v4.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.68.2.3.2.1
+diff -u -r5.68.2.3.2.1 kerberos_v4.c
+--- kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/08/15 21:28:54 5.68.2.3.2.1
++++ kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
+
+ void kerberos_v4 PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT));
+ void kerb_err_reply PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT, long, char *));
+-static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno));
++static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno, krb5_boolean));
+
+ /* Attributes converted from V5 to V4 - internal representation */
+ #define V4_KDB_REQUIRES_PREAUTH 0x1
+@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@
+
+ static const int v4mode_table_nents = sizeof(v4mode_table)/
+ sizeof(v4mode_table[0]);
++static int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+
+ void process_v4_mode(progname, string)
+ const char *progname;
+@@ -210,6 +211,11 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++void enable_v4_crossrealm ( char *programname) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "Enabling v4 cross-realm compatibility; this is a known security hole");
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ process_v4( pkt, client_fulladdr, is_secondary, resp)
+ const krb5_data *pkt;
+@@ -401,6 +407,14 @@
+ #define MIN5 300
+ #define HR21 255
+
++/*
++ * Previously this code returned either a v4 key or a v5 key and you
++ * could tell from the enctype of the v5 key whether the v4 key was
++ * useful. Now we return both keys so the code can try both des3 and
++ * des decryption. We fail if the ticket doesn't have a v4 key.
++ * Also, note as a side effect, the v5 key is basically useless in
++ * the client case. It is still returned so the caller can free it.
++ */
+ static int
+ kerb_get_principal(name, inst, principal, maxn, more, k5key, kvno, issrv)
+ char *name; /* could have wild card */
+@@ -482,8 +496,28 @@
+ return(0);
+ }
+ } else {
+- /* XXX yes I know this is a hardcoded search order */
+- if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ if ( krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4, kvno, &pkey) &&
++ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ -1, kvno, &pkey)) {
++ lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
++ "KDC V4: failed to find key for %s.%s #%d",
++ name, inst, kvno);
++ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
++ return(0);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
++ memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
++ memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
++ }
++ memset(k, 0, sizeof k);
++ if (issrv) {
++ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (kdc_context, k5key);
++ if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+ ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+ -1, kvno, &pkey) &&
+ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+@@ -504,12 +538,10 @@
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
+ return(0);
+ }
++ compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv);
++ memset (k, 0, sizeof k);
+ }
+
+- if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
+- memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
+- memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
+- }
+ /* convert v5's entries struct to v4's Principal struct:
+ * v5's time-unit for lifetimes is 1 sec, while v4 uses 5 minutes.
+ */
+@@ -746,21 +778,14 @@
+ kdb_encrypt_key(key, key, master_key,
+ master_key_schedule, DECRYPT);
+ /* construct and seal the ticket */
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* We always issue des tickets; the 3des tickets are a broken hack*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
++ a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
++ client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
++ lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
++
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -840,8 +865,15 @@
+ strncpy(tktrlm, (char *)auth->dat + 3, REALM_SZ);
+ tktrlm[REALM_SZ-1] = '\0';
+ kvno = (krb5_kvno)auth->dat[2];
+- if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno)) {
+- lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ if ((!allow_v4_crossrealm)&&strcmp(tktrlm, local_realm) != 0) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "Cross realm ticket from %s denied by policy,", tktrlm);
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 0)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
+ "FAILED set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
+ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
+ /* no better error code */
+@@ -851,6 +883,19 @@
+ }
+ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
+ ad, 0);
++ if (kerno) {
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 1)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "FAILED 3des set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
++ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
++ /* no better error code */
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
++ ad, 0);
++ }
+
+ if (kerno) {
+ klog(L_ERR_UNK, "FAILED krb_rd_req from %s: %s",
+@@ -916,21 +961,13 @@
+ des_new_random_key(session_key);
+ #endif
+
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* ALways issue des tickets*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
++ ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
++ (char *) session_key, lifetime,
++ kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -1138,20 +1175,22 @@
+
+ /* Set the key for krb_rd_req so we can check tgt */
+ static int
+-set_tgtkey(r, kvno)
++set_tgtkey(r, kvno, use_3des)
+ char *r; /* Realm for desired key */
+ krb5_kvno kvno;
++ krb5_boolean use_3des;
+ {
+ int n;
+ static char lastrealm[REALM_SZ] = "";
+ static int last_kvno = 0;
++ static krb5_boolean last_use_3des = 0;
+ Principal p_st;
+ Principal *p = &p_st;
+ C_Block key;
+ krb5_keyblock k5key;
+
+ k5key.contents = NULL;
+- if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno)
++ if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno && last_use_3des == use_3des)
+ return (KSUCCESS);
+
+ /* log("Getting key for %s", r); */
+@@ -1173,11 +1212,12 @@
+ return KFAILURE;
+ }
+
+- if (!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
++ if (use_3des&&!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+ krb_set_key_krb5(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ strncpy(lastrealm, r, sizeof(lastrealm) - 1);
+ lastrealm[sizeof(lastrealm) - 1] = '\0';
+ last_kvno = kvno;
++ last_use_3des = use_3des;
+ } else {
+ /* unseal tgt key from master key */
+ memcpy(key, &p->key_low, 4);
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::main.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e16cbece0fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-kdc::main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Index: kdc/main.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/main.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.99.4.1
+diff -u -r5.99.4.1 main.c
+--- kdc/main.c 2001/09/26 00:46:11 5.99.4.1
++++ kdc/main.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
+ usage(name)
+ char *name;
+ {
+- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-n]\n", name);
++ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-X] [-n]\n", name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
+ * Loop through the option list. Each time we encounter a realm name,
+ * use the previously scanned options to fill in for defaults.
+ */
+- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:3")) != -1) {
++ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:X3")) != -1) {
+ switch(c) {
+ case 'r': /* realm name for db */
+ if (!find_realm_data(optarg, (krb5_ui_4) strlen(optarg))) {
+@@ -661,6 +661,11 @@
+ v4mode = strdup(optarg);
+ #endif
+ break;
++ case 'X':
++#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
++ enable_v4_crossrealm(argv[0]);
++#endif
++ break;
+ case '3':
+ #ifdef ATHENA_DES3_KLUDGE
+ if (krb5_enctypes_list[krb5_enctypes_length-1].etype
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8204faee367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+Index: krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.17.2.1.2.1
+diff -u -r1.17.2.1.2.1 cnv_tkt_skey.c
+--- krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/03/01 16:05:20 1.17.2.1.2.1
++++ krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -173,25 +173,7 @@
+ sname,
+ sinst,
+ v4_skey->contents);
+- } else {
+- /* Force enctype to be raw if using DES3. */
+- if (v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 ||
+- v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1)
+- v4_skey->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW;
+- ret = krb_cr_tkt_krb5(v4tkt,
+- 0, /* flags */
+- pname,
+- pinst,
+- prealm,
+- *((unsigned long *)kaddr.contents),
+- (char *) v5etkt->session->contents,
+- lifetime,
+- /* issue_data */
+- server_time,
+- sname,
+- sinst,
+- v4_skey);
+- }
++ } else abort();
+
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5etkt);
+ v5tkt->enc_part2 = NULL;
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d121045582a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+Index: krb524/krb524d.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/krb524d.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.40.4.3
+diff -u -r1.40.4.3 krb524d.c
+--- krb524/krb524d.c 2002/08/29 06:48:05 1.40.4.3
++++ krb524/krb524d.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+ void *handle;
+
+ int use_keytab, use_master;
++int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+ char *keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab kt;
+
+@@ -134,7 +135,10 @@
+ config_params.mask = 0;
+
+ while (argc) {
+- if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
++ if (strncmp(*argv, "-X", 2) == 0) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ }
++ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
+ use_keytab = 1;
+ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-m", 2) == 0)
+ use_master = 1;
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
+ if (debug)
+ printf("V5 ticket decoded\n");
+
+- if( v5tkt->server->length >= 1
++ if( krb5_princ_size(context, v5tkt->server) >= 1
+ &&krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->length == 3
+ &&strncmp(krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->data,
+ "afs", 3) == 0) {
+@@ -495,19 +499,7 @@
+ &v5_service_key, NULL)))
+ goto error;
+
+- if ((ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+- 0, /* highest kvno */
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
++ if ( (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
+ 0,
+ &v4_service_key, v4kvno)))
+@@ -515,8 +507,19 @@
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf("service key retrieved\n");
++ if ((ret = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(context, &v5_service_key, v5tkt))) {
++ goto error;
++ }
+
+- ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
++ if (!(allow_v4_crossrealm || krb5_realm_compare(context, v5tkt->server,
++ v5tkt->enc_part2->client))) {
++ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY ;
++ goto error;
++ }
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++ v5tkt->enc_part2= NULL;
++
++ ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
+ &v4_service_key,
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)saddr);
+ if (ret)
+@@ -532,6 +535,9 @@
+ printf("v4 credentials encoded\n");
+
+ error:
++ if (v5tkt->enc_part2)
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++
+ if(v5_service_key.contents)
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &v5_service_key);
+ if (v4_service_key.contents)
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a77f4bc32718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Index: lib/kdb/keytab.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.11.4.2
+diff -u -r5.11.4.2 keytab.c
+--- lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/08/15 21:27:34 5.11.4.2
++++ lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/10/15 23:32:46
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+ #include "kdb_kt.h"
+
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal);
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_close KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab));
+
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_get_entry KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_const_principal,
+@@ -98,6 +100,8 @@
+ krb5_db_entry db_entry;
+ krb5_boolean more = 0;
+ int n = 0;
++ int xrealm_tgt = is_xrealm_tgt(context, principal);
++ int similar;
+
+ /* Open database */
+ /* krb5_db_init(context); */
+@@ -127,16 +131,31 @@
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ /* For cross realm tgts, we match whatever enctype is provided;
++ * for other principals, we only match the first enctype that is
++ * found. Since the TGS and AS code do the same thing, then we
++ * will only successfully decrypt tickets we have issued.*/
+ kerror = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, &db_entry,
+- enctype, -1, kvno, &key_data);
++ xrealm_tgt?enctype:-1,
++ -1, kvno, &key_data);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++
+ kerror = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(context, master_key,
+ key_data, &entry->key, NULL);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ kerror = krb5_c_enctype_compare(context, enctype, entry->key.enctype, &similar);
++ if (kerror)
++ goto error;
++
++ if (!similar) {
++ kerror = KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Coerce the enctype of the output keyblock in case we got an
+ * inexact match on the enctype; this behavior will go away when
+@@ -154,3 +173,27 @@
+ krb5_db_close_database(context);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * is_xrealm_tgt: Returns true if the principal is a cross-realm TGT
++ * principal-- a principal with first component krbtgt and second
++ * component not equal to realm.
++ */
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal princ)
++{
++ krb5_data *dat;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, princ) != 2)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 0);
++ if (strncmp("krbtgt", dat->data, dat->length) != 0)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 1);
++ if (dat->length != princ->realm.length)
++ return 1;
++ if (strcmp(dat->data, princ->realm.data) == 0)
++ return 0;
++ return 1;
++
++}
++
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c97b3a3c85ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c
+--- lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 1999-09-24 17:19:01.000000000-0400
++++ lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 2003-02-03 18:02:25.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ fail:
+
+- for (i = 0; i < ret_entry->principal->length; i++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, ret_entry->principal); i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, ret_entry->principal, i);
+ if (princ->data)
+ free(princ->data);
+@@ -498,9 +498,9 @@
+ }
+
+ if (KTVERSION(id) == KRB5_KT_VNO_1) {
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length + 1;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal) + 1;
+ } else {
+- count = htons((u_short) entry->principal->length);
++ count = htons((u_short) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal));
+ }
+
+ if (!xfwrite(&count, sizeof(count), 1, KTFILEP(id))) {
+@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
+ goto abend;
+ }
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, entry->principal, i);
+ size = princ->length;
+@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@
+ krb5_int32 total_size, i;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+
+ total_size = sizeof(count);
+ total_size += krb5_princ_realm(context, entry->principal)->length + (sizeof(krb5_int16));
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4ad0d8cc43c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 1999-09-24 17:19:24.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 2003-02-03 17:35:40.000000000 -0500
+@@ -347,7 +347,9 @@
+ for (next_server = top_server; *next_server; next_server++) {
+ krb5_data *realm_1 = krb5_princ_component(context, next_server[0], 1);
+ krb5_data *realm_2 = krb5_princ_component(context, tgtr->server, 1);
+- if (realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
++ if (realm_1 != NULL &&
++ realm_2 != NULL &&
++ realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
+ !memcmp(realm_1->data, realm_2->data, realm_1->length)) {
+ break;
+ }
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8eb73b24c158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2002-02-28 12:08:35.000000000 -0500
++++ lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2003-02-03 17:44:04.000000000 -0500
+@@ -173,11 +173,13 @@
+ cp++;
+ size++;
+ } else if (c == COMPONENT_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ i++;
+ } else if (c == REALM_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ parsed_realm = cp+1;
+ } else
+@@ -186,7 +188,8 @@
+ if (parsed_realm)
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->length = size;
+ else
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ if (i + 1 != components) {
+ #if !defined(_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(macintosh)
+ fprintf(stderr,
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79e16f93110d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 1999-09-24 17:19:48.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 2003-02-03 19:29:32.000000000 -0500
+@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
+ unsigned long uid = geteuid();
+ #endif
+
++ if (piece == NULL)
++ return ENOMEM;
++
+ rcache = (krb5_rcache) malloc(sizeof(*rcache));
+ if (!rcache)
+ return ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..690eb5febea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.27.4.1
+diff -p -u -r5.27.4.1 unparse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2002/08/12 22:55:01 5.27.4.1
++++ lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2003/03/19 00:39:02
+@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ krb5_unparse_name_ext(context, principal
+ *q++ = COMPONENT_SEP;
+ }
+
+- q--; /* Back up last component separator */
++ if (i > 0)
++ q--; /* Back up last component separator */
+ *q++ = REALM_SEP;
+
+ cp = krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->data;
diff --git a/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2508c3620772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-17/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+Index: xdr_mem.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.8
+diff -c -r1.8 xdr_mem.c
+*** lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 1998/02/14 02:27:24 1.8
+--- lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 2003/02/04 22:57:24
+***************
+*** 47,52 ****
+--- 47,54 ----
+ #include <gssrpc/xdr.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
++ #include <string.h>
++ #include <limits.h>
+
+ static bool_t xdrmem_getlong();
+ static bool_t xdrmem_putlong();
+***************
+*** 83,89 ****
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = size;
+ }
+
+ static void
+--- 85,91 ----
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = (size > INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : size; /* XXX */
+ }
+
+ static void
+***************
+*** 98,105 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 100,109 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 111,118 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 115,124 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 125,132 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 131,140 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 139,146 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 147,156 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 179,185 ****
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+--- 189,195 ----
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (len >= 0 && xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/Makefile b/security/krb5-appl/Makefile
index cff9b3b0bc9a..826ca046d324 100644
--- a/security/krb5-appl/Makefile
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= krb5
PORTVERSION= 1.2.7
+PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= security
.if defined(USA_RESIDENT) && ${USA_RESIDENT} == "NO"
# XXX crypto-publish.org does not at this time have the krb5-1.2.7 tarball.
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2115fd77a446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c
+--- appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2002-03-29 00:07:09.000000000-0500
++++ appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2003-02-03 17:30:18.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,6 +441,10 @@
+ * first component of a service name especially since
+ * the default is of length 4.
+ */
++ if (krb5_princ_size(telnet_context,ticket->server) < 1) {
++ (void) strcpy(errbuf, "malformed service name");
++ goto errout;
++ }
+ if (krb5_princ_component(telnet_context,ticket->server,0)->length < 256) {
+ char princ[256];
+ strncpy(princ,
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a92c4eb7058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c
+--- clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 15:24:57.000000000 -0500
++++ clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 17:56:38.000000000 -0500
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
+ krb5_data *p2 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, temp_client, j);
+
+- if ((p1->length != p2->length) ||
++ if (!p1 || !p2 || (p1->length != p2->length) ||
+ memcmp(p1->data,p2->data,p1->length)){
+ got_one = FALSE;
+ break;
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..150551765d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c.orig Mon Dec 6 13:56:09 1999
++++ clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c Tue Feb 25 19:54:14 2003
+@@ -620,7 +620,9 @@
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, temp_client)->length))){
+
+
+- if(nelem){
++ if(nelem &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, *client) > 0) &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, temp_client) > 0)){
+ krb5_data *p1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, *client, 0);
+ krb5_data *p2 =
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-include::krb5.hin b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..812664fc0b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: include/krb5.hin
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/include/krb5.hin,v
+retrieving revision 1.94.2.5.2.17
+diff -p -u -r1.94.2.5.2.17 krb5.hin
+--- include/krb5.hin 2002/04/16 23:47:53 1.94.2.5.2.17
++++ include/krb5.hin 2003/03/19 00:38:54
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ typedef krb5_const krb5_principal_data F
+ #define krb5_princ_size(context, princ) (princ)->length
+ #define krb5_princ_type(context, princ) (princ)->type
+ #define krb5_princ_name(context, princ) (princ)->data
+-#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) ((princ)->data + i)
++#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) (i < krb5_princ_size(context, princ) ? ((princ)->data + i) : NULL)
+
+ /*
+ * end "base-defs.h"
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..58e41c08a5e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
+--- kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 15:24:58.000000000 -0500
++++ kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 17:54:27.000000000 -0500
+@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
+ krb5_data *tgs_1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
+
+- if (server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
++ if (!tgs_1 || server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
+ memcmp(server_1->data, tgs_1->data, tgs_1->length)) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..078a4b73c4fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.96.2.2.2.3
+diff -p -u -r5.96.2.2.2.3 kdc_util.c
+--- kdc/kdc_util.c 2002/10/31 00:38:34 5.96.2.2.2.3
++++ kdc/kdc_util.c 2003/03/19 00:39:00
+@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ realm_compare(princ1, princ2)
+ krb5_boolean krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal)
+ krb5_principal principal;
+ {
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
++ if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, principal) > 0 &&
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE) &&
+ (!memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->data,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME, KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE)))
+@@ -1195,7 +1196,8 @@
+ return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
+ }
+ /* ...and that the second component matches the server realm... */
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
++ if ((krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, ticket->server) <= 1) ||
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->length) ||
+ memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->data,
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..262f3ff8cb29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.h,v
+retrieving revision 5.44.4.1
+diff -u -r5.44.4.1 kdc_util.h
+--- kdc/kdc_util.h 2001/10/13 00:12:26 5.44.4.1
++++ kdc/kdc_util.h 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@
+ const krb5_fulladdr *,
+ int is_secondary,
+ krb5_data **));
++void enable_v4_crossrealm(char *);
+ #else
+ #define process_v4(foo,bar,quux,foobar) KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION
+ #endif
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5b197f68afd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+Index: kdc/kerberos_v4.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.68.2.3.2.1
+diff -u -r5.68.2.3.2.1 kerberos_v4.c
+--- kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/08/15 21:28:54 5.68.2.3.2.1
++++ kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
+
+ void kerberos_v4 PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT));
+ void kerb_err_reply PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT, long, char *));
+-static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno));
++static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno, krb5_boolean));
+
+ /* Attributes converted from V5 to V4 - internal representation */
+ #define V4_KDB_REQUIRES_PREAUTH 0x1
+@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@
+
+ static const int v4mode_table_nents = sizeof(v4mode_table)/
+ sizeof(v4mode_table[0]);
++static int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+
+ void process_v4_mode(progname, string)
+ const char *progname;
+@@ -210,6 +211,11 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++void enable_v4_crossrealm ( char *programname) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "Enabling v4 cross-realm compatibility; this is a known security hole");
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ process_v4( pkt, client_fulladdr, is_secondary, resp)
+ const krb5_data *pkt;
+@@ -401,6 +407,14 @@
+ #define MIN5 300
+ #define HR21 255
+
++/*
++ * Previously this code returned either a v4 key or a v5 key and you
++ * could tell from the enctype of the v5 key whether the v4 key was
++ * useful. Now we return both keys so the code can try both des3 and
++ * des decryption. We fail if the ticket doesn't have a v4 key.
++ * Also, note as a side effect, the v5 key is basically useless in
++ * the client case. It is still returned so the caller can free it.
++ */
+ static int
+ kerb_get_principal(name, inst, principal, maxn, more, k5key, kvno, issrv)
+ char *name; /* could have wild card */
+@@ -482,8 +496,28 @@
+ return(0);
+ }
+ } else {
+- /* XXX yes I know this is a hardcoded search order */
+- if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ if ( krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4, kvno, &pkey) &&
++ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ -1, kvno, &pkey)) {
++ lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
++ "KDC V4: failed to find key for %s.%s #%d",
++ name, inst, kvno);
++ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
++ return(0);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
++ memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
++ memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
++ }
++ memset(k, 0, sizeof k);
++ if (issrv) {
++ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (kdc_context, k5key);
++ if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+ ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+ -1, kvno, &pkey) &&
+ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+@@ -504,12 +538,10 @@
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
+ return(0);
+ }
++ compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv);
++ memset (k, 0, sizeof k);
+ }
+
+- if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
+- memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
+- memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
+- }
+ /* convert v5's entries struct to v4's Principal struct:
+ * v5's time-unit for lifetimes is 1 sec, while v4 uses 5 minutes.
+ */
+@@ -746,21 +778,14 @@
+ kdb_encrypt_key(key, key, master_key,
+ master_key_schedule, DECRYPT);
+ /* construct and seal the ticket */
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* We always issue des tickets; the 3des tickets are a broken hack*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
++ a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
++ client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
++ lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
++
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -840,8 +865,15 @@
+ strncpy(tktrlm, (char *)auth->dat + 3, REALM_SZ);
+ tktrlm[REALM_SZ-1] = '\0';
+ kvno = (krb5_kvno)auth->dat[2];
+- if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno)) {
+- lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ if ((!allow_v4_crossrealm)&&strcmp(tktrlm, local_realm) != 0) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "Cross realm ticket from %s denied by policy,", tktrlm);
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 0)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
+ "FAILED set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
+ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
+ /* no better error code */
+@@ -851,6 +883,19 @@
+ }
+ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
+ ad, 0);
++ if (kerno) {
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 1)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "FAILED 3des set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
++ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
++ /* no better error code */
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
++ ad, 0);
++ }
+
+ if (kerno) {
+ klog(L_ERR_UNK, "FAILED krb_rd_req from %s: %s",
+@@ -916,21 +961,13 @@
+ des_new_random_key(session_key);
+ #endif
+
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* ALways issue des tickets*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
++ ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
++ (char *) session_key, lifetime,
++ kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -1138,20 +1175,22 @@
+
+ /* Set the key for krb_rd_req so we can check tgt */
+ static int
+-set_tgtkey(r, kvno)
++set_tgtkey(r, kvno, use_3des)
+ char *r; /* Realm for desired key */
+ krb5_kvno kvno;
++ krb5_boolean use_3des;
+ {
+ int n;
+ static char lastrealm[REALM_SZ] = "";
+ static int last_kvno = 0;
++ static krb5_boolean last_use_3des = 0;
+ Principal p_st;
+ Principal *p = &p_st;
+ C_Block key;
+ krb5_keyblock k5key;
+
+ k5key.contents = NULL;
+- if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno)
++ if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno && last_use_3des == use_3des)
+ return (KSUCCESS);
+
+ /* log("Getting key for %s", r); */
+@@ -1173,11 +1212,12 @@
+ return KFAILURE;
+ }
+
+- if (!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
++ if (use_3des&&!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+ krb_set_key_krb5(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ strncpy(lastrealm, r, sizeof(lastrealm) - 1);
+ lastrealm[sizeof(lastrealm) - 1] = '\0';
+ last_kvno = kvno;
++ last_use_3des = use_3des;
+ } else {
+ /* unseal tgt key from master key */
+ memcpy(key, &p->key_low, 4);
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::main.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e16cbece0fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-kdc::main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Index: kdc/main.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/main.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.99.4.1
+diff -u -r5.99.4.1 main.c
+--- kdc/main.c 2001/09/26 00:46:11 5.99.4.1
++++ kdc/main.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
+ usage(name)
+ char *name;
+ {
+- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-n]\n", name);
++ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-X] [-n]\n", name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
+ * Loop through the option list. Each time we encounter a realm name,
+ * use the previously scanned options to fill in for defaults.
+ */
+- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:3")) != -1) {
++ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:X3")) != -1) {
+ switch(c) {
+ case 'r': /* realm name for db */
+ if (!find_realm_data(optarg, (krb5_ui_4) strlen(optarg))) {
+@@ -661,6 +661,11 @@
+ v4mode = strdup(optarg);
+ #endif
+ break;
++ case 'X':
++#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
++ enable_v4_crossrealm(argv[0]);
++#endif
++ break;
+ case '3':
+ #ifdef ATHENA_DES3_KLUDGE
+ if (krb5_enctypes_list[krb5_enctypes_length-1].etype
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8204faee367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+Index: krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.17.2.1.2.1
+diff -u -r1.17.2.1.2.1 cnv_tkt_skey.c
+--- krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/03/01 16:05:20 1.17.2.1.2.1
++++ krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -173,25 +173,7 @@
+ sname,
+ sinst,
+ v4_skey->contents);
+- } else {
+- /* Force enctype to be raw if using DES3. */
+- if (v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 ||
+- v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1)
+- v4_skey->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW;
+- ret = krb_cr_tkt_krb5(v4tkt,
+- 0, /* flags */
+- pname,
+- pinst,
+- prealm,
+- *((unsigned long *)kaddr.contents),
+- (char *) v5etkt->session->contents,
+- lifetime,
+- /* issue_data */
+- server_time,
+- sname,
+- sinst,
+- v4_skey);
+- }
++ } else abort();
+
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5etkt);
+ v5tkt->enc_part2 = NULL;
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d121045582a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+Index: krb524/krb524d.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/krb524d.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.40.4.3
+diff -u -r1.40.4.3 krb524d.c
+--- krb524/krb524d.c 2002/08/29 06:48:05 1.40.4.3
++++ krb524/krb524d.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+ void *handle;
+
+ int use_keytab, use_master;
++int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+ char *keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab kt;
+
+@@ -134,7 +135,10 @@
+ config_params.mask = 0;
+
+ while (argc) {
+- if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
++ if (strncmp(*argv, "-X", 2) == 0) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ }
++ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
+ use_keytab = 1;
+ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-m", 2) == 0)
+ use_master = 1;
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
+ if (debug)
+ printf("V5 ticket decoded\n");
+
+- if( v5tkt->server->length >= 1
++ if( krb5_princ_size(context, v5tkt->server) >= 1
+ &&krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->length == 3
+ &&strncmp(krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->data,
+ "afs", 3) == 0) {
+@@ -495,19 +499,7 @@
+ &v5_service_key, NULL)))
+ goto error;
+
+- if ((ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+- 0, /* highest kvno */
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
++ if ( (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
+ 0,
+ &v4_service_key, v4kvno)))
+@@ -515,8 +507,19 @@
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf("service key retrieved\n");
++ if ((ret = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(context, &v5_service_key, v5tkt))) {
++ goto error;
++ }
+
+- ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
++ if (!(allow_v4_crossrealm || krb5_realm_compare(context, v5tkt->server,
++ v5tkt->enc_part2->client))) {
++ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY ;
++ goto error;
++ }
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++ v5tkt->enc_part2= NULL;
++
++ ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
+ &v4_service_key,
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)saddr);
+ if (ret)
+@@ -532,6 +535,9 @@
+ printf("v4 credentials encoded\n");
+
+ error:
++ if (v5tkt->enc_part2)
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++
+ if(v5_service_key.contents)
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &v5_service_key);
+ if (v4_service_key.contents)
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a77f4bc32718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Index: lib/kdb/keytab.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.11.4.2
+diff -u -r5.11.4.2 keytab.c
+--- lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/08/15 21:27:34 5.11.4.2
++++ lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/10/15 23:32:46
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+ #include "kdb_kt.h"
+
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal);
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_close KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab));
+
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_get_entry KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_const_principal,
+@@ -98,6 +100,8 @@
+ krb5_db_entry db_entry;
+ krb5_boolean more = 0;
+ int n = 0;
++ int xrealm_tgt = is_xrealm_tgt(context, principal);
++ int similar;
+
+ /* Open database */
+ /* krb5_db_init(context); */
+@@ -127,16 +131,31 @@
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ /* For cross realm tgts, we match whatever enctype is provided;
++ * for other principals, we only match the first enctype that is
++ * found. Since the TGS and AS code do the same thing, then we
++ * will only successfully decrypt tickets we have issued.*/
+ kerror = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, &db_entry,
+- enctype, -1, kvno, &key_data);
++ xrealm_tgt?enctype:-1,
++ -1, kvno, &key_data);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++
+ kerror = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(context, master_key,
+ key_data, &entry->key, NULL);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ kerror = krb5_c_enctype_compare(context, enctype, entry->key.enctype, &similar);
++ if (kerror)
++ goto error;
++
++ if (!similar) {
++ kerror = KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Coerce the enctype of the output keyblock in case we got an
+ * inexact match on the enctype; this behavior will go away when
+@@ -154,3 +173,27 @@
+ krb5_db_close_database(context);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * is_xrealm_tgt: Returns true if the principal is a cross-realm TGT
++ * principal-- a principal with first component krbtgt and second
++ * component not equal to realm.
++ */
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal princ)
++{
++ krb5_data *dat;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, princ) != 2)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 0);
++ if (strncmp("krbtgt", dat->data, dat->length) != 0)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 1);
++ if (dat->length != princ->realm.length)
++ return 1;
++ if (strcmp(dat->data, princ->realm.data) == 0)
++ return 0;
++ return 1;
++
++}
++
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c97b3a3c85ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c
+--- lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 1999-09-24 17:19:01.000000000-0400
++++ lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 2003-02-03 18:02:25.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ fail:
+
+- for (i = 0; i < ret_entry->principal->length; i++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, ret_entry->principal); i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, ret_entry->principal, i);
+ if (princ->data)
+ free(princ->data);
+@@ -498,9 +498,9 @@
+ }
+
+ if (KTVERSION(id) == KRB5_KT_VNO_1) {
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length + 1;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal) + 1;
+ } else {
+- count = htons((u_short) entry->principal->length);
++ count = htons((u_short) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal));
+ }
+
+ if (!xfwrite(&count, sizeof(count), 1, KTFILEP(id))) {
+@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
+ goto abend;
+ }
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, entry->principal, i);
+ size = princ->length;
+@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@
+ krb5_int32 total_size, i;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+
+ total_size = sizeof(count);
+ total_size += krb5_princ_realm(context, entry->principal)->length + (sizeof(krb5_int16));
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4ad0d8cc43c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 1999-09-24 17:19:24.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 2003-02-03 17:35:40.000000000 -0500
+@@ -347,7 +347,9 @@
+ for (next_server = top_server; *next_server; next_server++) {
+ krb5_data *realm_1 = krb5_princ_component(context, next_server[0], 1);
+ krb5_data *realm_2 = krb5_princ_component(context, tgtr->server, 1);
+- if (realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
++ if (realm_1 != NULL &&
++ realm_2 != NULL &&
++ realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
+ !memcmp(realm_1->data, realm_2->data, realm_1->length)) {
+ break;
+ }
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8eb73b24c158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2002-02-28 12:08:35.000000000 -0500
++++ lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2003-02-03 17:44:04.000000000 -0500
+@@ -173,11 +173,13 @@
+ cp++;
+ size++;
+ } else if (c == COMPONENT_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ i++;
+ } else if (c == REALM_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ parsed_realm = cp+1;
+ } else
+@@ -186,7 +188,8 @@
+ if (parsed_realm)
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->length = size;
+ else
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ if (i + 1 != components) {
+ #if !defined(_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(macintosh)
+ fprintf(stderr,
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79e16f93110d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 1999-09-24 17:19:48.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 2003-02-03 19:29:32.000000000 -0500
+@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
+ unsigned long uid = geteuid();
+ #endif
+
++ if (piece == NULL)
++ return ENOMEM;
++
+ rcache = (krb5_rcache) malloc(sizeof(*rcache));
+ if (!rcache)
+ return ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..690eb5febea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.27.4.1
+diff -p -u -r5.27.4.1 unparse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2002/08/12 22:55:01 5.27.4.1
++++ lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2003/03/19 00:39:02
+@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ krb5_unparse_name_ext(context, principal
+ *q++ = COMPONENT_SEP;
+ }
+
+- q--; /* Back up last component separator */
++ if (i > 0)
++ q--; /* Back up last component separator */
+ *q++ = REALM_SEP;
+
+ cp = krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->data;
diff --git a/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2508c3620772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5-appl/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+Index: xdr_mem.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.8
+diff -c -r1.8 xdr_mem.c
+*** lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 1998/02/14 02:27:24 1.8
+--- lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 2003/02/04 22:57:24
+***************
+*** 47,52 ****
+--- 47,54 ----
+ #include <gssrpc/xdr.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
++ #include <string.h>
++ #include <limits.h>
+
+ static bool_t xdrmem_getlong();
+ static bool_t xdrmem_putlong();
+***************
+*** 83,89 ****
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = size;
+ }
+
+ static void
+--- 85,91 ----
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = (size > INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : size; /* XXX */
+ }
+
+ static void
+***************
+*** 98,105 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 100,109 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 111,118 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 115,124 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 125,132 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 131,140 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 139,146 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 147,156 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 179,185 ****
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+--- 189,195 ----
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (len >= 0 && xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
diff --git a/security/krb5/Makefile b/security/krb5/Makefile
index cff9b3b0bc9a..826ca046d324 100644
--- a/security/krb5/Makefile
+++ b/security/krb5/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= krb5
PORTVERSION= 1.2.7
+PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= security
.if defined(USA_RESIDENT) && ${USA_RESIDENT} == "NO"
# XXX crypto-publish.org does not at this time have the krb5-1.2.7 tarball.
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2115fd77a446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-appl::telnet::libtelnet::kerberos5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c krb5-1.2.7/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c
+--- appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2002-03-29 00:07:09.000000000-0500
++++ appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c 2003-02-03 17:30:18.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,6 +441,10 @@
+ * first component of a service name especially since
+ * the default is of length 4.
+ */
++ if (krb5_princ_size(telnet_context,ticket->server) < 1) {
++ (void) strcpy(errbuf, "malformed service name");
++ goto errout;
++ }
+ if (krb5_princ_component(telnet_context,ticket->server,0)->length < 256) {
+ char princ[256];
+ strncpy(princ,
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a92c4eb7058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::heuristic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c krb5-1.2.7/src/clients/ksu/heuristic.c
+--- clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 15:24:57.000000000 -0500
++++ clients/ksu/heuristic.c 2003-02-03 17:56:38.000000000 -0500
+@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@
+ krb5_data *p2 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, temp_client, j);
+
+- if ((p1->length != p2->length) ||
++ if (!p1 || !p2 || (p1->length != p2->length) ||
+ memcmp(p1->data,p2->data,p1->length)){
+ got_one = FALSE;
+ break;
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..150551765d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-clients::ksu::krb_auth_su.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c.orig Mon Dec 6 13:56:09 1999
++++ clients/ksu/krb_auth_su.c Tue Feb 25 19:54:14 2003
+@@ -620,7 +620,9 @@
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, temp_client)->length))){
+
+
+- if(nelem){
++ if(nelem &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, *client) > 0) &&
++ (krb5_princ_size(context, temp_client) > 0)){
+ krb5_data *p1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(context, *client, 0);
+ krb5_data *p2 =
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-include::krb5.hin b/security/krb5/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..812664fc0b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-include::krb5.hin
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Index: include/krb5.hin
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/include/krb5.hin,v
+retrieving revision 1.94.2.5.2.17
+diff -p -u -r1.94.2.5.2.17 krb5.hin
+--- include/krb5.hin 2002/04/16 23:47:53 1.94.2.5.2.17
++++ include/krb5.hin 2003/03/19 00:38:54
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ typedef krb5_const krb5_principal_data F
+ #define krb5_princ_size(context, princ) (princ)->length
+ #define krb5_princ_type(context, princ) (princ)->type
+ #define krb5_princ_name(context, princ) (princ)->data
+-#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) ((princ)->data + i)
++#define krb5_princ_component(context, princ,i) (i < krb5_princ_size(context, princ) ? ((princ)->data + i) : NULL)
+
+ /*
+ * end "base-defs.h"
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..58e41c08a5e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::do_tgs_req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c krb5-1.2.7/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
+--- kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 15:24:58.000000000 -0500
++++ kdc/do_tgs_req.c 2003-02-03 17:54:27.000000000 -0500
+@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
+ krb5_data *tgs_1 =
+ krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
+
+- if (server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
++ if (!tgs_1 || server_1->length != tgs_1->length ||
+ memcmp(server_1->data, tgs_1->data, tgs_1->length)) {
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
+ find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..078a4b73c4fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.96.2.2.2.3
+diff -p -u -r5.96.2.2.2.3 kdc_util.c
+--- kdc/kdc_util.c 2002/10/31 00:38:34 5.96.2.2.2.3
++++ kdc/kdc_util.c 2003/03/19 00:39:00
+@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ realm_compare(princ1, princ2)
+ krb5_boolean krb5_is_tgs_principal(principal)
+ krb5_principal principal;
+ {
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
++ if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, principal) > 0 &&
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->length ==
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE) &&
+ (!memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, principal, 0)->data,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME, KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE)))
+@@ -1195,7 +1196,8 @@
+ return KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
+ }
+ /* ...and that the second component matches the server realm... */
+- if ((krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
++ if ((krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, ticket->server) <= 1) ||
++ (krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->length !=
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->length) ||
+ memcmp(krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, ticket->server, 1)->data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server)->data,
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..262f3ff8cb29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kdc_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Index: kdc/kdc_util.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kdc_util.h,v
+retrieving revision 5.44.4.1
+diff -u -r5.44.4.1 kdc_util.h
+--- kdc/kdc_util.h 2001/10/13 00:12:26 5.44.4.1
++++ kdc/kdc_util.h 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@
+ const krb5_fulladdr *,
+ int is_secondary,
+ krb5_data **));
++void enable_v4_crossrealm(char *);
+ #else
+ #define process_v4(foo,bar,quux,foobar) KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION
+ #endif
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5b197f68afd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::kerberos_v4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+Index: kdc/kerberos_v4.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/kerberos_v4.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.68.2.3.2.1
+diff -u -r5.68.2.3.2.1 kerberos_v4.c
+--- kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/08/15 21:28:54 5.68.2.3.2.1
++++ kdc/kerberos_v4.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
+
+ void kerberos_v4 PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT));
+ void kerb_err_reply PROTOTYPE((struct sockaddr_in *, KTEXT, long, char *));
+-static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno));
++static int set_tgtkey PROTOTYPE((char *, krb5_kvno, krb5_boolean));
+
+ /* Attributes converted from V5 to V4 - internal representation */
+ #define V4_KDB_REQUIRES_PREAUTH 0x1
+@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@
+
+ static const int v4mode_table_nents = sizeof(v4mode_table)/
+ sizeof(v4mode_table[0]);
++static int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+
+ void process_v4_mode(progname, string)
+ const char *progname;
+@@ -210,6 +211,11 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++void enable_v4_crossrealm ( char *programname) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "Enabling v4 cross-realm compatibility; this is a known security hole");
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+ process_v4( pkt, client_fulladdr, is_secondary, resp)
+ const krb5_data *pkt;
+@@ -401,6 +407,14 @@
+ #define MIN5 300
+ #define HR21 255
+
++/*
++ * Previously this code returned either a v4 key or a v5 key and you
++ * could tell from the enctype of the v5 key whether the v4 key was
++ * useful. Now we return both keys so the code can try both des3 and
++ * des decryption. We fail if the ticket doesn't have a v4 key.
++ * Also, note as a side effect, the v5 key is basically useless in
++ * the client case. It is still returned so the caller can free it.
++ */
+ static int
+ kerb_get_principal(name, inst, principal, maxn, more, k5key, kvno, issrv)
+ char *name; /* could have wild card */
+@@ -482,8 +496,28 @@
+ return(0);
+ }
+ } else {
+- /* XXX yes I know this is a hardcoded search order */
+- if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ if ( krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4, kvno, &pkey) &&
++ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
++ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
++ -1, kvno, &pkey)) {
++ lt = klog(L_KRB_PERR,
++ "KDC V4: failed to find key for %s.%s #%d",
++ name, inst, kvno);
++ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
++ return(0);
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
++ memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
++ memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
++ }
++ memset(k, 0, sizeof k);
++ if (issrv) {
++ krb5_free_keyblock_contents (kdc_context, k5key);
++ if (krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+ ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+ -1, kvno, &pkey) &&
+ krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &entries,
+@@ -504,12 +538,10 @@
+ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &entries, nprinc);
+ return(0);
+ }
++ compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv);
++ memset (k, 0, sizeof k);
+ }
+
+- if (!compat_decrypt_key(pkey, k, k5key, issrv)) {
+- memcpy( &principal->key_low, k, LONGLEN);
+- memcpy( &principal->key_high, (krb5_ui_4 *) k + 1, LONGLEN);
+- }
+ /* convert v5's entries struct to v4's Principal struct:
+ * v5's time-unit for lifetimes is 1 sec, while v4 uses 5 minutes.
+ */
+@@ -746,21 +778,14 @@
+ kdb_encrypt_key(key, key, master_key,
+ master_key_schedule, DECRYPT);
+ /* construct and seal the ticket */
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
+- a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
+- client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
+- lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* We always issue des tickets; the 3des tickets are a broken hack*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, a_name_data.name,
++ a_name_data.instance, local_realm,
++ client_host.s_addr, (char *) session_key,
++ lifetime, kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
++
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -840,8 +865,15 @@
+ strncpy(tktrlm, (char *)auth->dat + 3, REALM_SZ);
+ tktrlm[REALM_SZ-1] = '\0';
+ kvno = (krb5_kvno)auth->dat[2];
+- if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno)) {
+- lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ if ((!allow_v4_crossrealm)&&strcmp(tktrlm, local_realm) != 0) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "Cross realm ticket from %s denied by policy,", tktrlm);
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 0)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
+ "FAILED set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
+ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
+ /* no better error code */
+@@ -851,6 +883,19 @@
+ }
+ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
+ ad, 0);
++ if (kerno) {
++ if (set_tgtkey(tktrlm, kvno, 1)) {
++ lt = klog(L_ERR_UNK,
++ "FAILED 3des set_tgtkey realm %s, kvno %d. Host: %s ",
++ tktrlm, kvno, inet_ntoa(client_host));
++ /* no better error code */
++ kerb_err_reply(client, pkt,
++ KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, lt);
++ return;
++ }
++ kerno = krb_rd_req(auth, "krbtgt", tktrlm, client_host.s_addr,
++ ad, 0);
++ }
+
+ if (kerno) {
+ klog(L_ERR_UNK, "FAILED krb_rd_req from %s: %s",
+@@ -916,21 +961,13 @@
+ des_new_random_key(session_key);
+ #endif
+
+- if (K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+- krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- key);
+- } else {
+- krb_cr_tkt_krb5(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
+- ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
+- (char *) session_key, lifetime,
+- kerb_time.tv_sec,
+- s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
+- &k5key);
+- }
++ /* ALways issue des tickets*/
++ krb_create_ticket(tk, k_flags, ad->pname, ad->pinst,
++ ad->prealm, client_host.s_addr,
++ (char *) session_key, lifetime,
++ kerb_time.tv_sec,
++ s_name_data.name, s_name_data.instance,
++ key);
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s));
+@@ -1138,20 +1175,22 @@
+
+ /* Set the key for krb_rd_req so we can check tgt */
+ static int
+-set_tgtkey(r, kvno)
++set_tgtkey(r, kvno, use_3des)
+ char *r; /* Realm for desired key */
+ krb5_kvno kvno;
++ krb5_boolean use_3des;
+ {
+ int n;
+ static char lastrealm[REALM_SZ] = "";
+ static int last_kvno = 0;
++ static krb5_boolean last_use_3des = 0;
+ Principal p_st;
+ Principal *p = &p_st;
+ C_Block key;
+ krb5_keyblock k5key;
+
+ k5key.contents = NULL;
+- if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno)
++ if (!strcmp(lastrealm, r) && last_kvno == kvno && last_use_3des == use_3des)
+ return (KSUCCESS);
+
+ /* log("Getting key for %s", r); */
+@@ -1173,11 +1212,12 @@
+ return KFAILURE;
+ }
+
+- if (!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
++ if (use_3des&&!K4KDC_ENCTYPE_OK(k5key.enctype)) {
+ krb_set_key_krb5(kdc_context, &k5key);
+ strncpy(lastrealm, r, sizeof(lastrealm) - 1);
+ lastrealm[sizeof(lastrealm) - 1] = '\0';
+ last_kvno = kvno;
++ last_use_3des = use_3des;
+ } else {
+ /* unseal tgt key from master key */
+ memcpy(key, &p->key_low, 4);
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::main.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e16cbece0fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-kdc::main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Index: kdc/main.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/kdc/main.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.99.4.1
+diff -u -r5.99.4.1 main.c
+--- kdc/main.c 2001/09/26 00:46:11 5.99.4.1
++++ kdc/main.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
+ usage(name)
+ char *name;
+ {
+- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-n]\n", name);
++ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d dbpathname] [-r dbrealmname] [-R replaycachename ]\n\t[-m] [-k masterenctype] [-M masterkeyname] [-p port] [-4 v4mode] [-X] [-n]\n", name);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
+ * Loop through the option list. Each time we encounter a realm name,
+ * use the previously scanned options to fill in for defaults.
+ */
+- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:3")) != -1) {
++ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "r:d:mM:k:R:e:p:s:n4:X3")) != -1) {
+ switch(c) {
+ case 'r': /* realm name for db */
+ if (!find_realm_data(optarg, (krb5_ui_4) strlen(optarg))) {
+@@ -661,6 +661,11 @@
+ v4mode = strdup(optarg);
+ #endif
+ break;
++ case 'X':
++#ifdef KRB5_KRB4_COMPAT
++ enable_v4_crossrealm(argv[0]);
++#endif
++ break;
+ case '3':
+ #ifdef ATHENA_DES3_KLUDGE
+ if (krb5_enctypes_list[krb5_enctypes_length-1].etype
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8204faee367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::cnv_tkt_skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+Index: krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.17.2.1.2.1
+diff -u -r1.17.2.1.2.1 cnv_tkt_skey.c
+--- krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/03/01 16:05:20 1.17.2.1.2.1
++++ krb524/cnv_tkt_skey.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -173,25 +173,7 @@
+ sname,
+ sinst,
+ v4_skey->contents);
+- } else {
+- /* Force enctype to be raw if using DES3. */
+- if (v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 ||
+- v4_skey->enctype == ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1)
+- v4_skey->enctype = ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW;
+- ret = krb_cr_tkt_krb5(v4tkt,
+- 0, /* flags */
+- pname,
+- pinst,
+- prealm,
+- *((unsigned long *)kaddr.contents),
+- (char *) v5etkt->session->contents,
+- lifetime,
+- /* issue_data */
+- server_time,
+- sname,
+- sinst,
+- v4_skey);
+- }
++ } else abort();
+
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5etkt);
+ v5tkt->enc_part2 = NULL;
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d121045582a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-krb524::krb524d.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+Index: krb524/krb524d.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/krb524/krb524d.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.40.4.3
+diff -u -r1.40.4.3 krb524d.c
+--- krb524/krb524d.c 2002/08/29 06:48:05 1.40.4.3
++++ krb524/krb524d.c 2002/10/15 23:32:45
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+ void *handle;
+
+ int use_keytab, use_master;
++int allow_v4_crossrealm = 0;
+ char *keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab kt;
+
+@@ -134,7 +135,10 @@
+ config_params.mask = 0;
+
+ while (argc) {
+- if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
++ if (strncmp(*argv, "-X", 2) == 0) {
++ allow_v4_crossrealm = 1;
++ }
++ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-k", 2) == 0)
+ use_keytab = 1;
+ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-m", 2) == 0)
+ use_master = 1;
+@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
+ if (debug)
+ printf("V5 ticket decoded\n");
+
+- if( v5tkt->server->length >= 1
++ if( krb5_princ_size(context, v5tkt->server) >= 1
+ &&krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->length == 3
+ &&strncmp(krb5_princ_component(context, v5tkt->server, 0)->data,
+ "afs", 3) == 0) {
+@@ -495,19 +499,7 @@
+ &v5_service_key, NULL)))
+ goto error;
+
+- if ((ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW,
+- 0, /* highest kvno */
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_LOCAL_DES3_HMAC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+- ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
+- 0,
+- &v4_service_key, v4kvno)) &&
+- (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
++ if ( (ret = lookup_service_key(context, v5tkt->server,
+ ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
+ 0,
+ &v4_service_key, v4kvno)))
+@@ -515,8 +507,19 @@
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf("service key retrieved\n");
++ if ((ret = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(context, &v5_service_key, v5tkt))) {
++ goto error;
++ }
+
+- ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
++ if (!(allow_v4_crossrealm || krb5_realm_compare(context, v5tkt->server,
++ v5tkt->enc_part2->client))) {
++ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY ;
++ goto error;
++ }
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++ v5tkt->enc_part2= NULL;
++
++ ret = krb524_convert_tkt_skey(context, v5tkt, &v4tkt, &v5_service_key,
+ &v4_service_key,
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)saddr);
+ if (ret)
+@@ -532,6 +535,9 @@
+ printf("v4 credentials encoded\n");
+
+ error:
++ if (v5tkt->enc_part2)
++ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(context, v5tkt->enc_part2);
++
+ if(v5_service_key.contents)
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &v5_service_key);
+ if (v4_service_key.contents)
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c krb5-1.2.7/src/krb524/krb524d.c
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a77f4bc32718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::kdb::keytab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Index: lib/kdb/keytab.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/kdb/keytab.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.11.4.2
+diff -u -r5.11.4.2 keytab.c
+--- lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/08/15 21:27:34 5.11.4.2
++++ lib/kdb/keytab.c 2002/10/15 23:32:46
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+ #include "kdb_kt.h"
+
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal);
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_close KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab));
+
+ krb5_error_code krb5_ktkdb_get_entry KRB5_PROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_const_principal,
+@@ -98,6 +100,8 @@
+ krb5_db_entry db_entry;
+ krb5_boolean more = 0;
+ int n = 0;
++ int xrealm_tgt = is_xrealm_tgt(context, principal);
++ int similar;
+
+ /* Open database */
+ /* krb5_db_init(context); */
+@@ -127,16 +131,31 @@
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ /* For cross realm tgts, we match whatever enctype is provided;
++ * for other principals, we only match the first enctype that is
++ * found. Since the TGS and AS code do the same thing, then we
++ * will only successfully decrypt tickets we have issued.*/
+ kerror = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, &db_entry,
+- enctype, -1, kvno, &key_data);
++ xrealm_tgt?enctype:-1,
++ -1, kvno, &key_data);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++
+ kerror = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(context, master_key,
+ key_data, &entry->key, NULL);
+ if (kerror)
+ goto error;
+
++ kerror = krb5_c_enctype_compare(context, enctype, entry->key.enctype, &similar);
++ if (kerror)
++ goto error;
++
++ if (!similar) {
++ kerror = KRB5_KDB_NO_PERMITTED_KEY;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Coerce the enctype of the output keyblock in case we got an
+ * inexact match on the enctype; this behavior will go away when
+@@ -154,3 +173,27 @@
+ krb5_db_close_database(context);
+ return(kerror);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * is_xrealm_tgt: Returns true if the principal is a cross-realm TGT
++ * principal-- a principal with first component krbtgt and second
++ * component not equal to realm.
++ */
++static int
++is_xrealm_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal princ)
++{
++ krb5_data *dat;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, princ) != 2)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 0);
++ if (strncmp("krbtgt", dat->data, dat->length) != 0)
++ return 0;
++ dat = krb5_princ_component(context, princ, 1);
++ if (dat->length != princ->realm.length)
++ return 1;
++ if (strcmp(dat->data, princ->realm.data) == 0)
++ return 0;
++ return 1;
++
++}
++
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c97b3a3c85ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::keytab::file:ktf_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c
+--- lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 1999-09-24 17:19:01.000000000-0400
++++ lib/krb5/keytab/file/ktf_util.c 2003-02-03 18:02:25.000000000-0500
+@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ fail:
+
+- for (i = 0; i < ret_entry->principal->length; i++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < krb5_princ_size(context, ret_entry->principal); i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, ret_entry->principal, i);
+ if (princ->data)
+ free(princ->data);
+@@ -498,9 +498,9 @@
+ }
+
+ if (KTVERSION(id) == KRB5_KT_VNO_1) {
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length + 1;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal) + 1;
+ } else {
+- count = htons((u_short) entry->principal->length);
++ count = htons((u_short) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal));
+ }
+
+ if (!xfwrite(&count, sizeof(count), 1, KTFILEP(id))) {
+@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
+ goto abend;
+ }
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ princ = krb5_princ_component(context, entry->principal, i);
+ size = princ->length;
+@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@
+ krb5_int32 total_size, i;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+
+- count = (krb5_int16) entry->principal->length;
++ count = (krb5_int16) krb5_princ_size(context, entry->principal);
+
+ total_size = sizeof(count);
+ total_size += krb5_princ_realm(context, entry->principal)->length + (sizeof(krb5_int16));
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4ad0d8cc43c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::gc_frm_kdc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 1999-09-24 17:19:24.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/gc_frm_kdc.c 2003-02-03 17:35:40.000000000 -0500
+@@ -347,7 +347,9 @@
+ for (next_server = top_server; *next_server; next_server++) {
+ krb5_data *realm_1 = krb5_princ_component(context, next_server[0], 1);
+ krb5_data *realm_2 = krb5_princ_component(context, tgtr->server, 1);
+- if (realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
++ if (realm_1 != NULL &&
++ realm_2 != NULL &&
++ realm_1->length == realm_2->length &&
+ !memcmp(realm_1->data, realm_2->data, realm_1->length)) {
+ break;
+ }
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8eb73b24c158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+diff -ur krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c krb5-1.2.7/src/lib/krb5/krb/parse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2002-02-28 12:08:35.000000000 -0500
++++ lib/krb5/krb/parse.c 2003-02-03 17:44:04.000000000 -0500
+@@ -173,11 +173,13 @@
+ cp++;
+ size++;
+ } else if (c == COMPONENT_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ i++;
+ } else if (c == REALM_SEP) {
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ size = 0;
+ parsed_realm = cp+1;
+ } else
+@@ -186,7 +188,8 @@
+ if (parsed_realm)
+ krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->length = size;
+ else
+- krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
++ if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > i)
++ krb5_princ_component(context, principal, i)->length = size;
+ if (i + 1 != components) {
+ #if !defined(_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(macintosh)
+ fprintf(stderr,
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79e16f93110d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::srv_rcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 1999-09-24 17:19:48.000000000 -0400
++++ lib/krb5/krb/srv_rcache.c 2003-02-03 19:29:32.000000000 -0500
+@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
+ unsigned long uid = geteuid();
+ #endif
+
++ if (piece == NULL)
++ return ENOMEM;
++
+ rcache = (krb5_rcache) malloc(sizeof(*rcache));
+ if (!rcache)
+ return ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..690eb5febea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::krb5::krb::unparse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Index: lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c,v
+retrieving revision 5.27.4.1
+diff -p -u -r5.27.4.1 unparse.c
+--- lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2002/08/12 22:55:01 5.27.4.1
++++ lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c 2003/03/19 00:39:02
+@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ krb5_unparse_name_ext(context, principal
+ *q++ = COMPONENT_SEP;
+ }
+
+- q--; /* Back up last component separator */
++ if (i > 0)
++ q--; /* Back up last component separator */
+ *q++ = REALM_SEP;
+
+ cp = krb5_princ_realm(context, principal)->data;
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2508c3620772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-lib::rpc::xdr_mem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+Index: xdr_mem.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.8
+diff -c -r1.8 xdr_mem.c
+*** lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 1998/02/14 02:27:24 1.8
+--- lib/rpc/xdr_mem.c 2003/02/04 22:57:24
+***************
+*** 47,52 ****
+--- 47,54 ----
+ #include <gssrpc/xdr.h>
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
++ #include <string.h>
++ #include <limits.h>
+
+ static bool_t xdrmem_getlong();
+ static bool_t xdrmem_putlong();
+***************
+*** 83,89 ****
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = size;
+ }
+
+ static void
+--- 85,91 ----
+ xdrs->x_op = op;
+ xdrs->x_ops = &xdrmem_ops;
+ xdrs->x_private = xdrs->x_base = addr;
+! xdrs->x_handy = (size > INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : size; /* XXX */
+ }
+
+ static void
+***************
+*** 98,105 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 100,109 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *lp = (long)ntohl(*((rpc_u_int32 *)(xdrs->x_private)));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 111,118 ****
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32)) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 115,124 ----
+ long *lp;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < sizeof(rpc_int32))
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ *(rpc_int32 *)xdrs->x_private = (rpc_int32)htonl((rpc_u_int32)(*lp));
+ xdrs->x_private += sizeof(rpc_int32);
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 125,132 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 131,140 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(addr, xdrs->x_private, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 139,146 ****
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if ((xdrs->x_handy -= len) < 0)
+ return (FALSE);
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+--- 147,156 ----
+ register unsigned int len;
+ {
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy < len)
+ return (FALSE);
++ else
++ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ memmove(xdrs->x_private, addr, len);
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+ return (TRUE);
+***************
+*** 179,185 ****
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;
+--- 189,195 ----
+ {
+ rpc_int32 *buf = 0;
+
+! if (len >= 0 && xdrs->x_handy >= len) {
+ xdrs->x_handy -= len;
+ buf = (rpc_int32 *) xdrs->x_private;
+ xdrs->x_private += len;