security/openssl35: Security update to 3.5.6

Security:	c7a52cee-32ab-11f1-9839-8447094a420f
MFH:		2026Q3

3 files changed, 4 insertions, 492 deletions

diff --git a/security/openssl35/Makefile b/security/openssl35/Makefile
index e4944d1c2052..c4d1e4a28f28 100644
--- a/security/openssl35/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl35/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 PORTNAME=	openssl
-PORTVERSION=	3.5.5
-PORTREVISION=	1
+PORTVERSION=	3.5.6
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 PKGNAMESUFFIX=	35
 MASTER_SITES=	https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/${DISTNAME}/
diff --git a/security/openssl35/distinfo b/security/openssl35/distinfo
index 4176d3ac1f44..5ffea85bc5bf 100644
--- a/security/openssl35/distinfo
+++ b/security/openssl35/distinfo
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1769522567
-SHA256 (openssl-3.5.5.tar.gz) = b28c91532a8b65a1f983b4c28b7488174e4a01008e29ce8e69bd789f28bc2a89
-SIZE (openssl-3.5.5.tar.gz) = 53104821
+TIMESTAMP = 1775569726
+SHA256 (openssl-3.5.6.tar.gz) = deae7c80cba99c4b4f940ecadb3c3338b13cb77418409238e57d7f31f2a3b736
+SIZE (openssl-3.5.6.tar.gz) = 53121812
diff --git a/security/openssl35/files/patch-CVE-2026-2673 b/security/openssl35/files/patch-CVE-2026-2673
deleted file mode 100644
index 032355ca7917..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl35/files/patch-CVE-2026-2673
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,487 +0,0 @@
-From 85977e013f32ceb96aa034c0e741adddc1a05e34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
-Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2026 18:37:06 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix group tuple handling in DEFAULT expansion
-
-Also fine-tune docs and add tests.
-
-Fixes: #30109
-Fixes: CVE-2026-2673
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.foundation>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-MergeDate: Fri Mar 13 12:44:06 2026
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30110)
----
- CHANGES.md                       |  10 ++-
- NEWS.md                          |   5 +-
- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
- ssl/t1_lib.c                     |  92 +++++++++++++----------
- test/tls13groupselection_test.c  |  37 ++++++++--
- 5 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
-index 6266e019225ed..ff86aeecb59fa 100644
---- CHANGES.md.orig
-+++ CHANGES.md
-@@ -27,7 +27,18 @@
-
- OpenSSL 3.5
- -----------
-+
-+### Changes between 3.5.5 and 3.5.6 [xx XXX xxxx]
-+
-+ * Fixed loss of key agreement group tuple structure when the `DEFAULT` keyword
-+   is used in the server-side configuration of the key-agreement group list.
-+   This could result in accepting a less preferred than intended client
-+   keyshare.
-
-+   ([CVE-2026-2673])
-+
-+   *Viktor Dukhovni*
-+
- ### Changes between 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 [27 Jan 2026]
-
-  * Fixed Improper validation of PBMAC1 parameters in PKCS#12 MAC verification.
-@@ -21611,6 +21618,7 @@ ndif
- 
- <!-- Links -->
- 
-+[CVE-2026-2673]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2026-2673
- [CVE-2026-22796]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2026-22796
- [CVE-2026-22795]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2026-22795
- [CVE-2025-69421]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2025-69421
-diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
-index eb1a4487bfb58..cfbe72e491584 100644
---- NEWS.md.orig
-+++ NEWS.md
-@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ -----------
- OpenSSL 3.5
- -----------
-
-+### Major changes between OpenSSL 3.5.5 and OpenSSL 3.5.6 [under development]
-+
-+  * Fixed loss of key agreement group tuple structure when the `DEFAULT` keyword
-+    is used in the server-side configuration of the key-agreement group list.
-+    ([CVE-2026-2673])
-+
- ### Major changes between OpenSSL 3.5.4 and OpenSSL 3.5.5 [27 Jan 2026]
-
- OpenSSL 3.5.5 is a security patch release. The most severe CVE fixed in this
-@@ -1992,6 +1994,7 @@ OpenSSL 0.9.x
-   * Support for various new platforms
- 
- <!-- Links -->
-+[CVE-2026-2673]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2026-2673
- [CVE-2026-22796]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2026-22796
- [CVE-2026-22795]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2026-22795
- [CVE-2025-69421]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2025-69421
-diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
-index 017eefd3176a9..472d3858315a9 100755
---- doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod.orig
-+++ doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_curves.pod
-@@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ SSL_get1_curves, SSL_get_shared_curve, SSL_CTX_get0_implemented_groups
- 
- For all of the functions below that set the supported groups there must be at
- least one group in the list. A number of these functions identify groups via a
--unique integer NID value. However, support for some groups may be added by
--external providers. In this case there will be no NID assigned for the group.
-+unique integer B<NID> value. However, support for some groups may be added by
-+external providers. In this case there will be no B<NID> assigned for the group.
- When setting such groups applications should use the "list" form of these
- functions (i.e. SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() and SSL_set1_groups_list()).
- 
- SSL_CTX_set1_groups() sets the supported groups for B<ctx> to B<glistlen>
--groups in the array B<glist>. The array consist of all NIDs of supported groups.
-+groups in the array B<glist>. The array consist of all B<NIDs> of supported groups.
- The supported groups for B<TLSv1.3> include:
- B<NID_X9_62_prime256v1>,
- B<NID_secp384r1>,
-@@ -73,20 +73,27 @@ B<SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE> is set, the order of the elements in the
- array determines the selected group. Otherwise, the order is ignored and the
- client's order determines the selection.
- 
--For a TLS 1.3 server, the groups determine the selected group, but
--selection is more complex. A TLS 1.3 client sends both a group list as well as a
--predicted subset of groups. Choosing a group outside the predicted subset incurs
--an extra roundtrip. However, in some situations, the most preferred group may
--not be predicted. OpenSSL considers all supported groups in I<clist> to be comparable
--in security and prioritizes avoiding roundtrips above either client or server
--preference order. If an application uses an external provider to extend OpenSSL
--with, e.g., a post-quantum algorithm, this behavior may allow a network attacker
--to downgrade connections to a weaker algorithm. It is therefore recommended
--to use SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() with the ability to specify group tuples.
-+For a TLS 1.3 server, the groups determine the selected group, but selection is
-+more complex.
-+A TLS 1.3 client sends both a group list and predicted keyshares for a subset
-+of groups.
-+A server choosing a group outside the client's predicted subset incurs an extra
-+roundtrip.
-+However, in some situations, the most preferred group may not be predicted.
-+
-+When groups are specified via SSL_CTX_set1_groups() as a list of B<NID>
-+values, OpenSSL considers all supported groups in I<clist> to be comparable in
-+security and prioritises avoiding roundtrips above either client or server
-+preference order.
-+If an application uses an external provider to extend OpenSSL with, e.g., a
-+post-quantum algorithm, this behavior may allow a network attacker to downgrade
-+connections to a weaker algorithm.
-+It is therefore recommended to use SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() instead, making
-+it possible to specify group tuples as described below.
- 
- SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list() sets the supported groups for B<ctx> to
- string I<list>. In contrast to SSL_CTX_set1_groups(), the names of the
--groups, rather than their NIDs, are used.
-+groups, rather than their B<NIDs>, are used.
- 
- The commands below list the available groups for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3,
- respectively:
-@@ -102,30 +109,72 @@ The preferred group names are those defined by
- L<IANA|https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8>.
- 
- The I<list> can be used to define several group tuples of comparable security
--levels, and can specify which key shares should be sent by a client.
--The specified list elements can optionally be ignored, if not implemented
-+levels, and can specify which predicted key shares should be sent by a client.
-+Group tuples are used by OpenSSL TLS servers to decide whether to request a
-+stronger keyshare than those predicted by sending a Hello Retry Request
-+(B<HRR>) even if some of the predicted groups are supported.
-+OpenSSL clients ignore tuple boundaries, and pay attenion only to the overall
-+order of I<list> elements and which groups are selected as predicted keyshares
-+as described below.
-+
-+The specified list elements can optionally be ignored if not implemented
- (listing unknown groups otherwise results in error).
--It is also possible to specify the built-in default set of groups, and to explicitly
--remove a group from that list.
--
--In its simplest form, the string I<list> is just a colon separated list
--of group names, for example "P-521:P-384:P-256:X25519:ffdhe2048". The first
--group listed will also be used for the B<key_share> sent by a client in a
--TLSv1.3 B<ClientHello>. For servers note the discussion above. The list should
--be in order of preference with the most preferred group first.
--
--Group tuples of comparable security are defined by separating them from each
--other by a tuple separator C</>. Keyshares to be sent by a client are specified
--by prepending a C<*> to the group name, while any C<*> will be ignored by a
--server. The following string I<list> for example defines three tuples when
--used on the server-side, and triggers the generation of three key shares
--when used on the client-side: P-521:*P-256/*P-384/*X25519:P-384:ffdhe2048.
--
--If a group name is preceded with the C<?> character, it will be ignored if an
--implementation is missing. If a group name is preceded with the C<-> character, it
--will be removed from the list of groups if present (including not sending a
--key share for this group), ignored otherwise. The pseudo group name
--C<DEFAULT> can be used to select the OpenSSL built-in default list of groups.
-+It is also possible to specify the built-in default set of groups, and to
-+explicitly remove a group from that list.
-+
-+In its simplest legacy form, the string I<list> is just a colon separated list
-+of group names, for example "P-521:P-384:P-256:X25519:ffdhe2048".
-+The first group listed will in this case be used as the sole predicted
-+B<key_share> sent by a client in a TLSv1.3 B<ClientHello>.
-+The list should be in order of preference with the most preferred group first.
-+
-+A more expressive syntax supports definition of group tuples of comparable
-+security by separating them from each other with C</> characters.
-+
-+The predicted keyshares to be sent by clients can be explicitly specified by
-+adding a C<*> prefix to the associated group name.
-+These C<*> prefixes are ignored by servers.
-+
-+If a group name is prefixed with the C<?> character, it will be ignored if an
-+implementation is missing.
-+Otherwise, listing an unknown group name will cause a failure to parse the
-+I<list>.
-+Note that whether a group is known or not may depend on the OpenSSL version,
-+how OpenSSL was compiled and/or which providers are loaded.
-+Make sure you have the correct spelling of the group name and when in doubt
-+prefix it with a C<?> to handle configurations in which it might nevertheless
-+be unknown.
-+
-+If a group name is prefixed with the C<-> character, it will be removed from
-+the list of groups specified up to that point.
-+It can be added again if specified later.
-+Removal of groups that have not been included earlier in the list is silently
-+ignored.
-+
-+The pseudo group name C<DEFAULT> can be used to select the OpenSSL built-in
-+default list of groups.
-+Prepending one or more groups to C<DEFAULT> using only C<:> separators prepends those
-+groups to the built-in default list's first tuple.
-+Additional tuples can be prepended by use of the C</> separator.
-+Appending a set of groups to C<DEFAULT> using only C<:> separators appends those
-+groups to the built-in default list's last tuple.
-+Additional tuples can be appended by use of the C</> separator.
-+
-+The B<DEFAULT> list selects B<X25519MLKEM768> as one of the predicted keyshares.
-+In rare cases this can lead to failures or timeouts because the resulting
-+larger TLS Client Hello message may no longer fit in a single TCP segment and
-+firewall software may erroneously disrupt the TLS handshake.
-+If this is an issue or concern, prepending C<?X25519MLKEM768:> without a C<*>
-+prefix leads to its occurrence in the default list to be ignored as a duplicate,
-+and along with that also the keyshare prediction.
-+The group will then only be selected by servers that specifically expect it,
-+after a Hello Retry Request (HRR).
-+Servers that specifically prefer B<X25519MLKEM768>, are much less likely to be
-+found behind problematic firewalls.
-+
-+The following string I<list> for example defines three tuples when used on the
-+server-side, and triggers the generation of three key shares when used on the
-+client-side: P-521:*P-256/*P-384/*X25519:P-384:ffdhe2048.
- 
- For a TLS 1.3 client, all the groups in the string I<list> are added to the
- supported groups extension of a C<ClientHello>, in the order in which they are listed,
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-index 52dbdd9d4adeb..42953b530e8b8 100644
---- ssl/t1_lib.c.orig
-+++ ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
- 
- /* Group list string of the built-in pseudo group DEFAULT_SUITE_B */
- #define SUITE_B_GROUP_NAME "DEFAULT_SUITE_B"
--#define SUITE_B_GROUP_LIST "secp256r1:secp384r1",
-+#define SUITE_B_GROUP_LIST "?secp256r1:?secp384r1",
- 
- struct provider_ctx_data_st {
-     SSL_CTX *ctx;
-@@ -1244,8 +1244,8 @@ typedef struct {
-     size_t ksidcnt; /* Number of key shares */
-     uint16_t *ksid_arr; /* The IDs of the key share groups (flat list) */
-     /* Variable to keep state between execution of callback or helper functions */
--    size_t tuple_mode; /* Keeps track whether tuple_cb called from 'the top' or from gid_cb */
--    int ignore_unknown_default; /* Flag such that unknown groups for DEFAULT[_XYZ] are ignored */
-+    int inner; /* Are we expanding a DEFAULT list */
-+    int first; /* First tuple of possibly nested expansion? */
- } gid_cb_st;
- 
- /* Forward declaration of tuple callback function */
-@@ -1320,16 +1320,16 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
-             for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(default_group_strings); i++) {
-                 if ((size_t)len == (strlen(default_group_strings[i].list_name))
-                     && OPENSSL_strncasecmp(default_group_strings[i].list_name, elem, len) == 0) {
-+                    int saved_first;
-+
-                     /*
-                      * We're asked to insert an entire list of groups from a
-                      * DEFAULT[_XYZ] 'pseudo group' which we do by
-                      * recursively calling this function (indirectly via
-                      * CONF_parse_list and tuple_cb); essentially, we treat a DEFAULT
-                      * group string like a tuple which is appended to the current tuple
--                     * rather then starting a new tuple. Variable tuple_mode is the flag which
--                     * controls append tuple vs start new tuple.
-+                     * rather then starting a new tuple.
-                      */
--
-                     if (ignore_unknown || remove_group)
-                         return -1; /* removal or ignore not allowed here -> syntax error */
- 
-@@ -1350,15 +1350,17 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
-                         default_group_strings[i].group_string,
-                         strlen(default_group_strings[i].group_string));
-                     restored_default_group_string[strlen(default_group_strings[i].group_string) + restored_prefix_index] = '\0';
--                    /* We execute the recursive call */
--                    garg->ignore_unknown_default = 1; /* We ignore unknown groups for DEFAULT_XYZ */
--                    /* we enforce group mode (= append tuple) for DEFAULT_XYZ group lists */
--                    garg->tuple_mode = 0;
--                    /* We use the tuple_cb callback to process the pseudo group tuple */
-+                    /*
-+                     * Append first tuple of result to current tuple, and don't
-+                     * terminate the last tuple until we return to a top-level
-+                     * tuple_cb.
-+                     */
-+                    saved_first = garg->first;
-+                    garg->inner = garg->first = 1;
-                     retval = CONF_parse_list(restored_default_group_string,
-                         TUPLE_DELIMITER_CHARACTER, 1, tuple_cb, garg);
--                    garg->tuple_mode = 1; /* next call to tuple_cb will again start new tuple */
--                    garg->ignore_unknown_default = 0; /* reset to original value */
-+                    garg->inner = 0;
-+                    garg->first = saved_first;
-                     /* We don't need the \0-terminated string anymore */
-                     OPENSSL_free(restored_default_group_string);
- 
-@@ -1378,9 +1380,6 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
-     if (len == 0)
-         return -1; /* Seems we have prefxes without a group name -> syntax error */
- 
--    if (garg->ignore_unknown_default == 1) /* Always ignore unknown groups for DEFAULT[_XYZ] */
--        ignore_unknown = 1;
--
-     /* Memory management in case more groups are present compared to initial allocation */
-     if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
-         uint16_t *tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr,
-@@ -1514,7 +1513,7 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
-         /* and update the book keeping for the number of groups in current tuple */
-         garg->tuplcnt_arr[garg->tplcnt]++;
- 
--        /* We memorize if needed that we want to add a key share for the current group */
-+        /* We want to add a key share for the current group */
-         if (add_keyshare)
-             garg->ksid_arr[garg->ksidcnt++] = gid;
-     }
-@@ -1523,6 +1522,39 @@ static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
-     return retval;
- }
- 
-+static int grow_tuples(gid_cb_st *garg)
-+{
-+    static size_t max_tplcnt = (~(size_t)0) / sizeof(size_t);
-+
-+    /* This uses OPENSSL_realloc_array() in newer releases */
-+    if (garg->tplcnt == garg->tplmax) {
-+        size_t newcnt = garg->tplmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
-+        size_t newsz = newcnt * sizeof(size_t);
-+        size_t *tmp;
-+
-+        if (newsz > max_tplcnt
-+            || (tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(garg->tuplcnt_arr, newsz)) == NULL)
-+            return 0;
-+
-+        garg->tplmax = newcnt;
-+        garg->tuplcnt_arr = tmp;
-+    }
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int close_tuple(gid_cb_st *garg)
-+{
-+    size_t gidcnt = garg->tuplcnt_arr[garg->tplcnt];
-+
-+    if (gidcnt == 0)
-+        return 1;
-+    if (!grow_tuples(garg))
-+        return 0;
-+
-+    garg->tuplcnt_arr[++garg->tplcnt] = 0;
-+    return 1;
-+}
-+
- /* Extract and process a tuple of groups */
- static int tuple_cb(const char *tuple, int len, void *arg)
- {
-@@ -1536,16 +1568,9 @@ static int tuple_cb(const char *tuple, int len, void *arg)
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    /* Memory management for tuples */
--    if (garg->tplcnt == garg->tplmax) {
--        size_t *tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(garg->tuplcnt_arr,
--            (garg->tplmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT) * sizeof(*garg->tuplcnt_arr));
--
--        if (tmp == NULL)
--            return 0;
--        garg->tplmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
--        garg->tuplcnt_arr = tmp;
--    }
-+    if (garg->inner && !garg->first && !close_tuple(garg))
-+        return 0;
-+    garg->first = 0;
- 
-     /* Convert to \0-terminated string */
-     restored_tuple_string = OPENSSL_malloc((len + 1 /* \0 */) * sizeof(char));
-@@ -1560,15 +1585,8 @@ static int tuple_cb(const char *tuple, int len, void *arg)
-     /* We don't need the \o-terminated string anymore */
-     OPENSSL_free(restored_tuple_string);
- 
--    if (garg->tuplcnt_arr[garg->tplcnt] > 0) { /* Some valid groups are present in current tuple... */
--        if (garg->tuple_mode) {
--            /* We 'close' the tuple */
--            garg->tplcnt++;
--            garg->tuplcnt_arr[garg->tplcnt] = 0; /* Next tuple is initialized to be empty */
--            garg->tuple_mode = 1; /* next call will start a tuple (unless overridden in gid_cb) */
--        }
--    }
--
-+    if (!garg->inner && !close_tuple(garg))
-+        return 0;
-     return retval;
- }
- 
-@@ -1599,8 +1617,6 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-     }
- 
-     memset(&gcb, 0, sizeof(gcb));
--    gcb.tuple_mode = 1; /* We prepare to collect the first tuple */
--    gcb.ignore_unknown_default = 0;
-     gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
-     gcb.tplmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
-     gcb.ksidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
-diff --git a/test/tls13groupselection_test.c b/test/tls13groupselection_test.c
-index 8340a9fd2b3b6..bcae5e7159446 100644
---- test/tls13groupselection_test.c.orig
-+++ test/tls13groupselection_test.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ typedef enum SERVER_RESPONSE {
-     SH = 2
- } SERVER_RESPONSE;
- 
-+static const char *response_desc[] = {
-+    "HRR",
-+    "INIT",
-+    "SH",
-+};
-+
- static char *cert = NULL;
- static char *privkey = NULL;
- 
-@@ -307,7 +313,23 @@ static const struct tls13groupselection_test_st tls13groupselection_tests[] = {
-     { "*brainpoolP256r1:X25519", /* test 43 */
-         "X25519",
-         SERVER_PREFERENCE,
--        NEGOTIATION_FAILURE, INIT }
-+        NEGOTIATION_FAILURE, INIT },
-+
-+    /* DEFAULT retains tuple structure */
-+    { "*X25519:secp256r1",
-+        "secp256r1:DEFAULT", /* test 44 */
-+        SERVER_PREFERENCE,
-+        "secp256r1", HRR },
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+    { "*ffdhe2048:secp256r1",
-+        "DEFAULT:ffdhe4096", /* test 45 */
-+        CLIENT_PREFERENCE,
-+        "secp256r1", HRR },
-+    { "x25519:ffdhe2048:*ffdhe4096",
-+        "DEFAULT:ffdhe4096", /* test 46 */
-+        SERVER_PREFERENCE,
-+        "x25519", HRR },
-+#endif
- };
- 
- static void server_response_check_cb(int write_p, int version,
-@@ -318,10 +340,12 @@ static void server_response_check_cb(int write_p, int version,
-     enum SERVER_RESPONSE *server_response = (enum SERVER_RESPONSE *)arg;
-     /* Prepare check for HRR */
-     const uint8_t *incoming_random = (uint8_t *)buf + 6;
--    const uint8_t magic_HRR_random[32] = { 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11,
-+    const uint8_t magic_HRR_random[32] = {
-+        0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11,
-         0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91,
-         0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E,
--        0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C };
-+        0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C
-+    };
- 
-     /* Did a server hello arrive? */
-     if (write_p == 0 && /* Incoming data... */
-@@ -450,13 +474,16 @@ static int test_groupnegotiation(const struct tls13groupselection_test_st *curre
-         group_name_client = SSL_group_to_name(clientssl, negotiated_group_client);
-         if (!TEST_int_eq(negotiated_group_client, negotiated_group_server))
-             goto end;
--        if (!TEST_int_eq((int)current_test_vector->expected_server_response, (int)server_response))
-+        if (!TEST_str_eq(response_desc[current_test_vector->expected_server_response],
-+                response_desc[server_response]))
-             goto end;
-         if (TEST_str_eq(group_name_client, current_test_vector->expected_group))
-             ok = 1;
-     } else {
-         TEST_false_or_end(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE));
--        if (test_type == TEST_NEGOTIATION_FAILURE && !TEST_int_eq((int)current_test_vector->expected_server_response, (int)server_response))
-+        if (test_type == TEST_NEGOTIATION_FAILURE
-+            && !TEST_str_eq(response_desc[current_test_vector->expected_server_response],
-+                response_desc[server_response]))
-             goto end;
-         ok = 1;
-     }
-