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From e0e11644622a589129a01e11e5d105dc74a098de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:44:46 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 04/40] dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE()
[CVE-2014-8092 4/4]
Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients
in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during
checks.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
include/dix.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h
index 991a3ce..e0c6ed8 100644
--- include/dix.h
+++ include/dix.h
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE.
#define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\
if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \
- (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \
+ ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \
+ ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \
return(BadLength)
#define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\
--
2.1.2
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