##
## Copyright (c) 2008-2010 Robert N. M. Watson
## All rights reserved.
##
## This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
## Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
##
## Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
## modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
## are met:
## 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
## notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
## 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
## notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
## documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
##
## THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
## ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
## IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
## ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
## FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
## DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
## OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
## HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
## LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
## OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
## SUCH DAMAGE.
##
## List of system calls enabled in capability mode, one name per line.
##
## System calls listed here operate either fully or partially in the absence
## of global namespaces or ambient authority. In capability mode system calls
## that operate only on global namespaces or require ambient authority have no
## utility and thus are not permitted.
##
## Notes:
## - sys_exit(2), abort2(2) and close(2) are very important.
## - Sorted alphabetically, please keep it that way.
##
## $FreeBSD$
##
##
## Allow ACL and MAC label operations by file descriptor, subject to
## capability rights. Allow MAC label operations on the current process but
## we will need to scope __mac_get_pid(2).
##
__acl_aclcheck_fd
__acl_delete_fd
__acl_get_fd
__acl_set_fd
__mac_get_fd
#__mac_get_pid
__mac_get_proc
__mac_set_fd
__mac_set_proc
##
## Allow creating special file descriptors like eventfd(2).
##
__specialfd
##
## Allow sysctl(2) as we scope internal to the call; this is a global
## namespace, but there are several critical sysctls required for almost
## anything to run, such as hw.pagesize. For now that policy lives in the
## kernel for performance and simplicity, but perhaps it could move to a
## proxying daemon in userspace.
##
__sysctl
__sysctlbyname
##
## Allow umtx operations as these are scoped by address space.
##
## XXRW: Need to check this very carefully.
##
_umtx_op
##
## Allow process termination using abort2(2).
##
abort2
##
## Allow accept(2) since it doesn't manipulate namespaces directly, rather
## relies on existing bindings on a socket, subject to capability rights.
##
accept
accept4
##
## Allow AIO operations by file descriptor, subject to capability rights.
##
aio_cancel
aio_error
aio_fsync
aio_read
aio_return
aio_suspend
aio_waitcomplete
aio_write
aio_writev
aio_readv
##
## audit(2) is a global operation, submitting to the global trail, but it is
## controlled by privilege, and it might be useful to be able to submit
## records from sandboxes. For now, disallow, but we may want to think about
## providing some sort of proxy service for this.
##
#audit
##
## Allow bindat(2).
##
bindat
##
## Allow capability mode and capability system calls.
##
cap_enter
cap_fcntls_get
cap_fcntls_limit
cap_getmode
cap_ioctls_get
cap_ioctls_limit
__cap_rights_get
cap_rights_limit
##
## Allow read-only clock operations.
##
clock_getres
clock_gettime
##
## Always allow file descriptor close(2).
##
close
close_range
closefrom
##
## Allow connectat(2).
##
connectat
##
## copy_file_range(2) reads from one descriptor and writes to the other.
##
copy_file_range
##
## cpuset(2) and related calls are limited to caller's own process/thread.
##
#cpuset
cpuset_getaffinity
cpuset_getdomain
#cpuset_getid
cpuset_setaffinity
cpuset_setdomain
#cpuset_setid
##
## Always allow dup(2) and dup2(2) manipulation of the file descriptor table.
##
dup
dup2
##
## Allow extended attribute operations by file descriptor, subject to
## capability rights.
##
extattr_delete_fd
extattr_get_fd
extattr_list_fd
extattr_set_fd
##
## Allow changing file flags, mode, and owner by file descriptor, subject to
## capability rights.
##
fchflags
fchmod
fchown
##
## For now, allow fcntl(2), subject to capability rights, but this probably
## needs additional scoping.
##
fcntl
##
## Allow fexecve(2), subject to capability rights. We perform some scoping,
## such as disallowing privilege escalation.
##
fexecve
##
## Allow flock(2), subject to capability rights.
##
flock
##
## Allow fork(2), even though it returns pids -- some applications seem to
## prefer this interface.
##
fork
##
## Allow fpathconf(2), subject to capability rights.
##
fpathconf
##
## Allow various file descriptor-based I/O operations, subject to capability
## rights.
##
freebsd11_fstat
freebsd11_fstatat
freebsd11_getdirentries
freebsd11_fstatfs
freebsd11_mknodat
freebsd6_ftruncate
freebsd6_lseek
freebsd6_mmap
freebsd6_pread
freebsd6_pwrite
##
## Allow querying file and file system state with fstat(2) and fstatfs(2),
## subject to capability rights.
##
fstat
fstatfs
##
## Allow further file descriptor-based I/O operations, subject to capability
## rights.
##
fdatasync
fsync
ftruncate
##
## Allow futimens(2) and futimes(2), subject to capability rights.
##
futimens
futimes
##
## Allow querying process audit state, subject to normal access control.
##
getaudit
getaudit_addr
getauid
##
## Allow thread context management with getcontext(2).
##
getcontext
##
## Allow directory I/O on a file descriptor, subject to capability rights.
## Originally we had separate capabilities for directory-specific read
## operations, but on BSD we allow reading the raw directory data, so we just
## rely on CAP_READ now.
##
getdents
getdirentries
##
## Allow querying certain trivial global state.
##
getdomainname
##
## Allow querying certain per-process resource limit state.
##
getdtablesize
##
## Allow querying current process credential state.
##
getegid
geteuid
##
## Allow querying certain trivial global state.
##
gethostid
gethostname
##
## Allow querying per-process timer.
##
getitimer
##
## Allow querying current process credential state.
##
getgid
getgroups
getlogin
getloginclass
##
## Allow querying certain trivial global state.
##
getpagesize
getpeername
##
## Allow querying certain per-process scheduling, resource limit, and
## credential state.
##
## XXXRW: getpgid(2) needs scoping. It's not clear if it's worth scoping
## getppid(2). getpriority(2) needs scoping. getrusage(2) needs scoping.
## getsid(2) needs scoping.
##
getpgid
getpgrp
getpid
getppid
getpriority
getresgid
getresuid
getrlimit
getrusage
getsid
##
## Allow getrandom
##
getrandom
##
## Allow querying socket state, subject to capability rights.
##
## XXXRW: getsockopt(2) may need more attention.
##
getsockname
getsockopt
##
## Allow querying the global clock.
##
gettimeofday
##
## Allow querying current process credential state.
##
getuid
##
## Allow ioctl(2), which hopefully will be limited by applications only to
## required commands with cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall.
##
ioctl
##
## Allow querying current process credential state.
##
issetugid
##
## Allow kevent(2), as we will authorize based on capability rights on the
## target descriptor.
##
kevent
##
## Allow kill(2), as we allow the process to send signals only to himself.
##
kill
##
## Allow message queue operations on file descriptors, subject to capability
## rights.
## NOTE: Corresponding sysents are initialized in sys/kern/uipc_mqueue.c with
## SYF_CAPENABLED.
##
kmq_notify
kmq_setattr
kmq_timedreceive
kmq_timedsend
##
## Allow kqueue(2), we will control use.
##
kqueue
##
## Allow managing per-process timers.
##
ktimer_create
ktimer_delete
ktimer_getoverrun
ktimer_gettime
ktimer_settime
##
## We can't allow ktrace(2) because it relies on a global namespace, but we
## might want to introduce an fktrace(2) of some sort.
##
#ktrace
##
## Allow AIO operations by file descriptor, subject to capability rights.
##
lio_listio
##
## Allow listen(2), subject to capability rights.
##
## XXXRW: One might argue this manipulates a global namespace.
##
listen
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights.
##
lseek
##
## Allow simple VM operations on the current process.
##
madvise
mincore
minherit
mlock
mlockall
##
## Allow memory mapping a file descriptor, and updating protections, subject
## to capability rights.
##
mmap
mprotect
##
## Allow simple VM operations on the current process.
##
msync
munlock
munlockall
munmap
##
## Allow the current process to sleep.
##
nanosleep
##
## Allow querying the global clock.
##
ntp_gettime
##
## Allow AIO operations by file descriptor, subject to capability rights.
##
oaio_read
oaio_write
##
## Allow simple VM operations on the current process.
##
break
##
## Allow AIO operations by file descriptor, subject to capability rights.
##
olio_listio
##
## Operations relative to directory capabilities.
##
chflagsat
faccessat
fchmodat
fchownat
fstatat
futimesat
linkat
mkdirat
mkfifoat
mknodat
openat
readlinkat
renameat
symlinkat
unlinkat
funlinkat
utimensat
##
## Process descriptor-related system calls are allowed.
##
pdfork
pdgetpid
pdkill
#pdwait4 # not yet implemented
##
## Allow pipe(2).
##
pipe
pipe2
##
## Allow poll(2), which will be scoped by capability rights.
##
poll
ppoll
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights.
##
posix_fallocate
pread
preadv
##
## Allow access to profiling state on the current process.
##
profil
##
## Disallow ptrace(2) for now, but we do need debugging facilities in
## capability mode, so we will want to revisit this, possibly by scoping its
## operation.
##
#ptrace
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights.
##
pwrite
pwritev
read
readv
recv
recvfrom
recvmsg
##
## Allow real-time scheduling primitives to be used.
##
## XXXRW: These require scoping.
##
rtprio
rtprio_thread
##
## Allow simple VM operations on the current process.
##
sbrk
##
## Allow querying trivial global scheduler state.
##
sched_get_priority_max
sched_get_priority_min
##
## Allow various thread/process scheduler operations.
##
## XXXRW: Some of these require further scoping.
##
sched_getparam
sched_getscheduler
sched_rr_get_interval
sched_setparam
sched_setscheduler
sched_yield
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights.
## NOTE: Corresponding sysents are initialized in sys/netinet/sctp_syscalls.c
## with SYF_CAPENABLED.
##
sctp_generic_recvmsg
sctp_generic_sendmsg
sctp_generic_sendmsg_iov
sctp_peeloff
##
## Allow pselect(2) and select(2), which will be scoped by capability rights.
##
## XXXRW: But is it?
##
pselect
select
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights. Use of
## explicit addresses here is restricted by the system calls themselves.
##
send
sendfile
sendmsg
sendto
##
## Allow setting per-process audit state, which is controlled separately by
## privileges.
##
setaudit
setaudit_addr
setauid
##
## Allow setting thread context.
##
setcontext
##
## Allow setting current process credential state, which is controlled
## separately by privilege.
##
setegid
seteuid
setgid
##
## Allow use of the process interval timer.
##
setitimer
##
## Allow setpriority(2).
##
## XXXRW: Requires scoping.
##
setpriority
##
## Allow setting current process credential state, which is controlled
## separately by privilege.
##
setregid
setresgid
setresuid
setreuid
##
## Allow setting process resource limits with setrlimit(2).
##
setrlimit
##
## Allow creating a new session with setsid(2).
##
setsid
##
## Allow setting socket options with setsockopt(2), subject to capability
## rights.
##
## XXXRW: Might require scoping.
##
setsockopt
##
## Allow setting current process credential state, which is controlled
## separately by privilege.
##
setuid
##
## shm_open(2) is scoped so as to allow only access to new anonymous objects.
##
shm_open
shm_open2
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights.
##
shutdown
##
## Allow signal control on current process.
##
sigaction
sigaltstack
sigblock
sigfastblock
sigpending
sigprocmask
sigqueue
sigreturn
sigsetmask
sigstack
sigsuspend
sigtimedwait
sigvec
sigwaitinfo
sigwait
##
## Allow creating new socket pairs with socket(2) and socketpair(2).
##
socket
socketpair
##
## Allow simple VM operations on the current process.
##
## XXXRW: Kernel doesn't implement this, so drop?
##
sstk
##
## Do allow sync(2) for now, but possibly shouldn't.
##
sync
##
## Always allow process termination with sys_exit(2).
##
sys_exit
##
## sysarch(2) does rather diverse things, but is required on at least i386
## in order to configure per-thread data. As such, it's scoped on each
## architecture.
##
sysarch
##
## Allow thread operations operating only on current process.
##
thr_create
thr_exit
thr_kill
##
## Disallow thr_kill2(2), as it may operate beyond the current process.
##
## XXXRW: Requires scoping.
##
#thr_kill2
##
## Allow thread operations operating only on current process.
##
thr_new
thr_self
thr_set_name
thr_suspend
thr_wake
##
## Allow manipulation of the current process umask with umask(2).
##
umask
##
## Allow submitting of process trace entries with utrace(2).
##
utrace
##
## Allow generating UUIDs with uuidgen(2).
##
uuidgen
##
## Allow I/O-related file descriptors, subject to capability rights.
##
write
writev
##
## Allow processes to yield(2).
##
yield
