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authorJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2015-12-03 17:22:58 +0000
committerJung-uk Kim <jkim@FreeBSD.org>2015-12-03 17:22:58 +0000
commit737d7e8d3945c206c037e139055821aa0c64bb8e (patch)
treeb0284af4e4144e27eb9f39e88c53868060774b16
parente9fcefce9bb70f20c272a996443928c5f6ab8cd8 (diff)
downloadsrc-737d7e8d3945c206c037e139055821aa0c64bb8e.tar.gz
src-737d7e8d3945c206c037e139055821aa0c64bb8e.zip
Import OpenSSL 1.0.2e.vendor/openssl/1.0.2e
Notes
Notes: svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/; revision=291707 svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.2e/; revision=291708; tag=vendor/openssl/1.0.2e
-rw-r--r--CHANGES242
-rw-r--r--CONTRIBUTING38
-rwxr-xr-xConfigure11
-rw-r--r--FAQ1055
-rw-r--r--FREEBSD-upgrade4
-rw-r--r--Makefile37
-rw-r--r--Makefile.org35
-rw-r--r--NEWS10
-rw-r--r--README178
-rw-r--r--apps/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--apps/app_rand.c3
-rw-r--r--apps/apps.c9
-rw-r--r--apps/asn1pars.c4
-rw-r--r--apps/ca.c14
-rw-r--r--apps/ecparam.c7
-rw-r--r--apps/engine.c5
-rw-r--r--apps/ocsp.c4
-rw-r--r--apps/pkcs12.c14
-rw-r--r--apps/s_cb.c5
-rw-r--r--apps/s_client.c11
-rw-r--r--apps/s_server.c51
-rw-r--r--appveyor.yml60
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl9
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl198
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c15
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_x509.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/b_dump.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/bio/bss_file.c13
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl10
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl174
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl6
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/s390x.S109
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl16
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl16
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl5
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl27
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_exp.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_mont.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_recp.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bntest.c74
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h68
-rw-r--r--crypto/buffer/buf_str.c21
-rw-r--r--crypto/buffer/buffer.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_enc.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_sd.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/cms/cms_smime.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/comp/c_zlib.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_def.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/conf/conf_sap.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/cryptlib.c26
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dhtest.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c19
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/Makefile2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/ec/ec_key.c12
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/engine/eng_list.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c13
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/e_des3.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/encode.c198
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_key.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_lib.c36
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/p_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/jpake/jpake.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/mem_clr.c4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl13
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl18
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl10
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl12
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl22
-rw-r--r--crypto/modes/wrap128.c4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslconf.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslconf.h.in2
-rw-r--r--crypto/opensslv.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pem_info.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c10
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl20
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c27
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c25
-rw-r--r--crypto/ppccap.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c32
-rw-r--r--crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl4
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/sparccpuid.S2
-rw-r--r--crypto/sparcv9cap.c47
-rw-r--r--crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c34
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c2
-rwxr-xr-xcrypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_lu.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c11
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c15
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c19
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c10
-rw-r--r--doc/HOWTO/keys.txt5
-rw-r--r--doc/README27
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/dgst.pod5
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/genrsa.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/pkcs12.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/req.pod13
-rw-r--r--doc/apps/x509.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod6
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod4
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod9
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod3
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/buffer.pod49
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/crypto/engine.pod10
-rw-r--r--doc/dir-locals.example.el15
-rw-r--r--doc/openssl-c-indent.el62
-rw-r--r--doc/openssl_button.gifbin2063 -> 0 bytes
-rw-r--r--doc/openssl_button.html7
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod35
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod2
-rw-r--r--doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod85
-rw-r--r--e_os.h4
-rw-r--r--engines/e_chil.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--ssl/bio_ssl.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/clienthellotest.c219
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_both.c7
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_clnt.c37
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_meth.c14
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_srvr.c45
-rw-r--r--ssl/s23_clnt.c21
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_both.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_cbc.c47
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_clnt.c124
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_enc.c110
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_pkt.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_srvr.c78
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl.h4
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_asn1.c5
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_cert.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_ciph.c22
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_err.c5
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_lib.c11
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h20
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_rsa.c41
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_sess.c4
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssltest.c1
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c48
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c65
-rw-r--r--ssl/tls1.h17
-rwxr-xr-xutil/domd3
-rw-r--r--util/indent.pro16
-rwxr-xr-xutil/mk1mf.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xutil/mkrc.pl2
-rwxr-xr-xutil/mkstack.pl2
-rw-r--r--util/pl/VC-32.pl7
-rwxr-xr-xutil/pod2mantest58
-rw-r--r--util/selftest.pl1
-rwxr-xr-xutil/toutf8.sh17
206 files changed, 2571 insertions, 2378 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 5d4c234363f6..5e9225b57cd9 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,64 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+ *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
+ (CVE-2015-3193)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+ routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+ used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+ DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+ vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+ authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+ (CVE-2015-3194)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2015-3195)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+ This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+ though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+ legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ return an error
+ [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
+
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
*) Alternate chains certificate forgery
@@ -15,8 +73,18 @@
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
(Google/BoringSSL).
+ (CVE-2015-1793)
[Matt Caswell]
+ *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+ If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+ the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+ result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+ identify hint data.
+ (CVE-2015-3196)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
*) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
@@ -55,9 +123,9 @@
callbacks.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
- independently by Hanno Bck.
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
(CVE-2015-1789)
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
*) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
@@ -71,7 +139,7 @@
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-1790)
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
*) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
@@ -201,7 +269,7 @@
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-0289)
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
*) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
@@ -209,10 +277,10 @@
servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
- This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Ksper
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
(OpenSSL development team).
(CVE-2015-0293)
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
*) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
@@ -272,6 +340,10 @@
Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
+ *) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit
+ keys by default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
*) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
@@ -717,12 +789,12 @@
version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
sanity and breaks all known clients.
- [David Benjamin, Emilia Ksper]
+ [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
@@ -733,7 +805,7 @@
Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
@@ -813,10 +885,10 @@
with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
- Thanks to Felix Grbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3510)
- [Emilia Ksper]
+ [Emilia Käsper]
*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
@@ -853,7 +925,7 @@
properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamki (Codenomicon) for
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-5139)
[Steve Henson]
@@ -865,7 +937,7 @@
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3508)
- [Emilia Ksper, and Steve Henson]
+ [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
@@ -895,22 +967,22 @@
client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
code on a vulnerable client or server.
- Thanks to Jri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
- [Jri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+ [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
*) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
are subject to a denial of service attack.
- Thanks to Felix Grbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
- [Felix Grbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+ [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
*) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
compilation flags.
[mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
*) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
- in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
[mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
*) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
@@ -982,9 +1054,9 @@
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
- Emilia Ksper for the initial patch.
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
- [Emilia Ksper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
@@ -1159,7 +1231,7 @@
EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
implementations).
- [Emilia Ksper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
*) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
@@ -1435,7 +1507,7 @@
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
- [Emilia Ksper (Google)]
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
@@ -1449,7 +1521,7 @@
lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
the last update always remained unused).
- [Emilia Ksper (Google)]
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
*) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
[Bob Buckholz (Google)]
@@ -2258,7 +2330,7 @@
*) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification functionality.
- [Zoltn Glzik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+ [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
*) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
@@ -3426,7 +3498,7 @@
*) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
initialised value as BN_new().
- [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Mller]
+ [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
*) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
[Steve Henson]
@@ -3445,7 +3517,7 @@
some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
- [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Mller]
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
*) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
@@ -3512,7 +3584,7 @@
[Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
*) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
- [Gtz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+ [Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
*) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
control of the error stack.
@@ -4227,7 +4299,7 @@
[Steve Henson]
*) Undo Cygwin change.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
@@ -4260,11 +4332,11 @@
[Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
*) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
- [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jnicke, resolves #1014]
+ [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
*) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
[Steve Henson]
@@ -4726,7 +4798,7 @@
pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
- [Gtz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
+ [Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
*) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
[Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>]
@@ -6831,7 +6903,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) BN_sqr() bug fix.
- [Ulf Mller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
+ [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
*) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
@@ -6991,7 +7063,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Fix OAEP check.
- [Ulf Mller, Bodo Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
@@ -7253,10 +7325,10 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Use better test patterns in bntest.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
[Bodo Moeller]
@@ -7401,14 +7473,14 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
- [Bodo Mller]
+ [Bodo Möller]
*) Add DSO method for VMS.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
wrong sign.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
packages. The default package contains applications, application
@@ -7426,7 +7498,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
random number < q in the DSA library.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default
behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
@@ -7692,7 +7764,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
Random Numbers.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
DSA key.
@@ -7912,7 +7984,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
@@ -7944,7 +8016,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
@@ -8033,7 +8105,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
- [Ulf Mller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+ [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow@DEMENTIA.ORG>]
*) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
@@ -8134,7 +8206,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Rolf Haberrecker <rolf@suse.de>]
*) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
[Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
@@ -8153,7 +8225,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
@@ -8183,14 +8255,14 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
- [Ulf Mller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+ [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>]
*) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. New functions
RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application,
the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
or -rand.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
@@ -8223,7 +8295,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
#define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
- [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Mller]
+ [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
*) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
record layer.
@@ -8274,17 +8346,17 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
bits.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
options to produce them.
@@ -8292,11 +8364,11 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
for p == 0.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
@@ -8320,7 +8392,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
use void * instead of char * in lhash.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
(the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
@@ -8365,13 +8437,13 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
the comments.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
@@ -8381,25 +8453,25 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
- [Ulf Mller, Bodo Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
[Steve Henson]
*) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
Rabin-Miller iterations.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
(Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
"dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
@@ -8455,7 +8527,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
- [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Mller]
+ [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
*) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
@@ -8464,7 +8536,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
(RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
@@ -8494,7 +8566,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword,
unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
@@ -9328,7 +9400,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
delete an unused file.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
@@ -9417,7 +9489,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
worked.
*) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
- [Ulf Mller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
+ [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
*) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
@@ -9534,7 +9606,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Ben Laurie]
*) DES library cleanups.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
@@ -9577,7 +9649,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Christian Forster <fo@hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
*) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
@@ -9690,7 +9762,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
-Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
@@ -9747,10 +9819,10 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Ben Laurie]
*) Support Borland C++ builder.
- [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Mller]
+ [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
*) Support Mingw32.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9759,7 +9831,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
*) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Update HPUX configuration.
[Anonymous]
@@ -9792,7 +9864,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) OAEP decoding bug fix.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
David Harris.
@@ -9815,21 +9887,21 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
*) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
extension adding in x509 utility.
[Steve Henson]
*) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
prototypes.
[Steve Henson]
*) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
@@ -9858,7 +9930,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
@@ -9876,13 +9948,13 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
*) Change functions to ANSI C.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Fix typos in error codes.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Mller]
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
*) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9919,7 +9991,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) New Configure option "rsaref".
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
[Bodo Moeller]
@@ -9967,7 +10039,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Tweaks to Configure
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
@@ -9977,11 +10049,11 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
- [Ulf Mller]
+ [Ulf Möller]
*) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
@@ -10520,7 +10592,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
Hagino <itojun@kame.net>]
*) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
- [Ulf Mller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+ [Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
@@ -10530,7 +10602,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
- [Ulf Mller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+ [Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
[Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
@@ -10677,7 +10749,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
- [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Mller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+ [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
[Ben Laurie]
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING b/CONTRIBUTING
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9d63d8abb672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
+----------------------------
+
+Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
+http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
+would like to submit a patch, send it to rt@openssl.org with
+the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
+textual explanation of what your patch does.
+
+You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+mail to rt@openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
+that we can more easily keep track of it.
+
+If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
+OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
+Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
+reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
+
+Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
+current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
+warnings using the --strict-warnings flag. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
+platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
+
+Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
+to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
+use the following command:
+
+# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
+
+Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
+follows:
+
+# cd openssl-work
+# [your changes]
+# ./Configure dist; make clean
+# cd ..
+# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index d99eed7f9303..ac86cd6cf6a2 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ my %table=(
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
@@ -1646,21 +1647,22 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
$shlib_minor=$2;
}
+my $ecc = $cc;
+$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
+
if ($strict_warnings)
{
- my $ecc = $cc;
- $ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
my $wopt;
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
{
- $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
+ $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
}
if ($ecc eq "clang")
{
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
{
- $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
+ $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
}
}
}
@@ -1713,6 +1715,7 @@ while (<IN>)
s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $ecc eq "gcc" || $ecc eq "clang";
}
s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;
diff --git a/FAQ b/FAQ
index 3be831056da7..22c5cf7dc2f3 100644
--- a/FAQ
+++ b/FAQ
@@ -1,1053 +1,2 @@
-OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions
---------------------------------------
-
-[MISC] Miscellaneous questions
-
-* Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
-* Where is the documentation?
-* How can I contact the OpenSSL developers?
-* Where can I get a compiled version of OpenSSL?
-* Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
-* What is an 'engine' version?
-* How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
-* How does the versioning scheme work?
-
-[LEGAL] Legal questions
-
-* Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
-* Can I use OpenSSL with GPL software?
-
-[USER] Questions on using the OpenSSL applications
-
-* Why do I get a "PRNG not seeded" error message?
-* Why do I get an "unable to write 'random state'" error message?
-* How do I create certificates or certificate requests?
-* Why can't I create certificate requests?
-* Why does <SSL program> fail with a certificate verify error?
-* Why can I only use weak ciphers when I connect to a server using OpenSSL?
-* How can I create DSA certificates?
-* Why can't I make an SSL connection using a DSA certificate?
-* How can I remove the passphrase on a private key?
-* Why can't I use OpenSSL certificates with SSL client authentication?
-* Why does my browser give a warning about a mismatched hostname?
-* How do I install a CA certificate into a browser?
-* Why is OpenSSL x509 DN output not conformant to RFC2253?
-* What is a "128 bit certificate"? Can I create one with OpenSSL?
-* Why does OpenSSL set the authority key identifier extension incorrectly?
-* How can I set up a bundle of commercial root CA certificates?
-
-[BUILD] Questions about building and testing OpenSSL
-
-* Why does the linker complain about undefined symbols?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: command not found"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: 1 no implemented"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: stack empty"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Alpha Tru64 Unix?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail with "ar: command not found"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Win32 with VC++?
-* What is special about OpenSSL on Redhat?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on MacOS X?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail on MacOS X?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in BN_sqr test [on a 64-bit platform]?
-* Why does OpenBSD-i386 build fail on des-586.s with "Unimplemented segment type"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in sha512t on x86 CPU?
-* Why does compiler fail to compile sha512.c?
-* Test suite still fails, what to do?
-* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
-* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
-* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
-
-[PROG] Questions about programming with OpenSSL
-
-* Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
-* I've compiled a program under Windows and it crashes: why?
-* How do I read or write a DER encoded buffer using the ASN1 functions?
-* OpenSSL uses DER but I need BER format: does OpenSSL support BER?
-* I've tried using <M_some_evil_pkcs12_macro> and I get errors why?
-* I've called <some function> and it fails, why?
-* I just get a load of numbers for the error output, what do they mean?
-* Why do I get errors about unknown algorithms?
-* Why can't the OpenSSH configure script detect OpenSSL?
-* Can I use OpenSSL's SSL library with non-blocking I/O?
-* Why doesn't my server application receive a client certificate?
-* Why does compilation fail due to an undefined symbol NID_uniqueIdentifier?
-* I think I've detected a memory leak, is this a bug?
-* Why does Valgrind complain about the use of uninitialized data?
-* Why doesn't a memory BIO work when a file does?
-* Where are the declarations and implementations of d2i_X509() etc?
-
-===============================================================================
-
-[MISC] ========================================================================
-
-* Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
-
-The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.1a was released on Apr 19th, 2012.
-
-In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
-snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
-ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
-
-
-* Where is the documentation?
-
-OpenSSL is a library that provides cryptographic functionality to
-applications such as secure web servers. Be sure to read the
-documentation of the application you want to use. The INSTALL file
-explains how to install this library.
-
-OpenSSL includes a command line utility that can be used to perform a
-variety of cryptographic functions. It is described in the openssl(1)
-manpage. Documentation for developers is currently being written. Many
-manual pages are available; overviews over libcrypto and
-libssl are given in the crypto(3) and ssl(3) manpages.
-
-The OpenSSL manpages are installed in /usr/local/ssl/man/ (or a
-different directory if you specified one as described in INSTALL).
-In addition, you can read the most current versions at
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
-to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
-not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
-documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
-directory.
-
-There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
-in doc/openssl.txt
-
-The original SSLeay documentation is included in OpenSSL as
-doc/ssleay.txt. It may be useful when none of the other resources
-help, but please note that it reflects the obsolete version SSLeay
-0.6.6.
-
-
-* How can I contact the OpenSSL developers?
-
-The README file describes how to submit bug reports and patches to
-OpenSSL. Information on the OpenSSL mailing lists is available from
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-
-
-* Where can I get a compiled version of OpenSSL?
-
-You can finder pointers to binary distributions in
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/related/binaries.html> .
-
-Some applications that use OpenSSL are distributed in binary form.
-When using such an application, you don't need to install OpenSSL
-yourself; the application will include the required parts (e.g. DLLs).
-
-If you want to build OpenSSL on a Windows system and you don't have
-a C compiler, read the "Mingw32" section of INSTALL.W32 for information
-on how to obtain and install the free GNU C compiler.
-
-A number of Linux and *BSD distributions include OpenSSL.
-
-
-* Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
-
-autoconf will probably be used in future OpenSSL versions. If it was
-less Unix-centric, it might have been used much earlier.
-
-* What is an 'engine' version?
-
-With version 0.9.6 OpenSSL was extended to interface to external crypto
-hardware. This was realized in a special release '0.9.6-engine'. With
-version 0.9.7 the changes were merged into the main development line,
-so that the special release is no longer necessary.
-
-* How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
-
-We provide MD5 digests and ASC signatures of each tarball.
-Use MD5 to check that a tarball from a mirror site is identical:
-
- md5sum TARBALL | awk '{print $1;}' | cmp - TARBALL.md5
-
-You can check authenticity using pgp or gpg. You need the OpenSSL team
-member public key used to sign it (download it from a key server, see a
-list of keys at <URL: http://www.openssl.org/about/>). Then
-just do:
-
- pgp TARBALL.asc
-
-* How does the versioning scheme work?
-
-After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter
-releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
-new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and
-can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
-the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
-binary compatibility is guaranteed.
-
-Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
-backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
-in the next minor release.
-
-* What happens when the letter release reaches z?
-
-It was decided after the release of OpenSSL 0.9.8y the next version should
-be 0.9.8za then 0.9.8zb and so on.
-
-
-[LEGAL] =======================================================================
-
-* Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
-
-For information on intellectual property rights, please consult a lawyer.
-The OpenSSL team does not offer legal advice.
-
-You can configure OpenSSL so as not to use IDEA, MDC2 and RC5 by using
- ./config no-idea no-mdc2 no-rc5
-
-
-* Can I use OpenSSL with GPL software?
-
-On many systems including the major Linux and BSD distributions, yes (the
-GPL does not place restrictions on using libraries that are part of the
-normal operating system distribution).
-
-On other systems, the situation is less clear. Some GPL software copyright
-holders claim that you infringe on their rights if you use OpenSSL with
-their software on operating systems that don't normally include OpenSSL.
-
-If you develop open source software that uses OpenSSL, you may find it
-useful to choose an other license than the GPL, or state explicitly that
-"This program is released under the GPL with the additional exemption that
-compiling, linking, and/or using OpenSSL is allowed." If you are using
-GPL software developed by others, you may want to ask the copyright holder
-for permission to use their software with OpenSSL.
-
-
-[USER] ========================================================================
-
-* Why do I get a "PRNG not seeded" error message?
-
-Cryptographic software needs a source of unpredictable data to work
-correctly. Many open source operating systems provide a "randomness
-device" (/dev/urandom or /dev/random) that serves this purpose.
-All OpenSSL versions try to use /dev/urandom by default; starting with
-version 0.9.7, OpenSSL also tries /dev/random if /dev/urandom is not
-available.
-
-On other systems, applications have to call the RAND_add() or
-RAND_seed() function with appropriate data before generating keys or
-performing public key encryption. (These functions initialize the
-pseudo-random number generator, PRNG.) Some broken applications do
-not do this. As of version 0.9.5, the OpenSSL functions that need
-randomness report an error if the random number generator has not been
-seeded with at least 128 bits of randomness. If this error occurs and
-is not discussed in the documentation of the application you are
-using, please contact the author of that application; it is likely
-that it never worked correctly. OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later make the
-error visible by refusing to perform potentially insecure encryption.
-
-If you are using Solaris 8, you can add /dev/urandom and /dev/random
-devices by installing patch 112438 (Sparc) or 112439 (x86), which are
-available via the Patchfinder at <URL: http://sunsolve.sun.com>
-(Solaris 9 includes these devices by default). For /dev/random support
-for earlier Solaris versions, see Sun's statement at
-<URL: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsrdb/27606&zone_32=SUNWski>
-(the SUNWski package is available in patch 105710).
-
-On systems without /dev/urandom and /dev/random, it is a good idea to
-use the Entropy Gathering Demon (EGD); see the RAND_egd() manpage for
-details. Starting with version 0.9.7, OpenSSL will automatically look
-for an EGD socket at /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool and
-/etc/entropy.
-
-Most components of the openssl command line utility automatically try
-to seed the random number generator from a file. The name of the
-default seeding file is determined as follows: If environment variable
-RANDFILE is set, then it names the seeding file. Otherwise if
-environment variable HOME is set, then the seeding file is $HOME/.rnd.
-If neither RANDFILE nor HOME is set, versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6 will
-use file .rnd in the current directory while OpenSSL 0.9.6a uses no
-default seeding file at all. OpenSSL 0.9.6b and later will behave
-similarly to 0.9.6a, but will use a default of "C:\" for HOME on
-Windows systems if the environment variable has not been set.
-
-If the default seeding file does not exist or is too short, the "PRNG
-not seeded" error message may occur.
-
-The openssl command line utility will write back a new state to the
-default seeding file (and create this file if necessary) unless
-there was no sufficient seeding.
-
-Pointing $RANDFILE to an Entropy Gathering Daemon socket does not work.
-Use the "-rand" option of the OpenSSL command line tools instead.
-The $RANDFILE environment variable and $HOME/.rnd are only used by the
-OpenSSL command line tools. Applications using the OpenSSL library
-provide their own configuration options to specify the entropy source,
-please check out the documentation coming the with application.
-
-
-* Why do I get an "unable to write 'random state'" error message?
-
-
-Sometimes the openssl command line utility does not abort with
-a "PRNG not seeded" error message, but complains that it is
-"unable to write 'random state'". This message refers to the
-default seeding file (see previous answer). A possible reason
-is that no default filename is known because neither RANDFILE
-nor HOME is set. (Versions up to 0.9.6 used file ".rnd" in the
-current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
-
-
-* How do I create certificates or certificate requests?
-
-Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
-the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
-out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
-extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )
-
-
-* Why can't I create certificate requests?
-
-You typically get the error:
-
- unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config
- problems making Certificate Request
-
-This is because it can't find the configuration file. Check out the
-DIAGNOSTICS section of req(1) for more information.
-
-
-* Why does <SSL program> fail with a certificate verify error?
-
-This problem is usually indicated by log messages saying something like
-"unable to get local issuer certificate" or "self signed certificate".
-When a certificate is verified its root CA must be "trusted" by OpenSSL
-this typically means that the CA certificate must be placed in a directory
-or file and the relevant program configured to read it. The OpenSSL program
-'verify' behaves in a similar way and issues similar error messages: check
-the verify(1) program manual page for more information.
-
-
-* Why can I only use weak ciphers when I connect to a server using OpenSSL?
-
-This is almost certainly because you are using an old "export grade" browser
-which only supports weak encryption. Upgrade your browser to support 128 bit
-ciphers.
-
-
-* How can I create DSA certificates?
-
-Check the CA.pl(1) manual page for a DSA certificate example.
-
-
-* Why can't I make an SSL connection to a server using a DSA certificate?
-
-Typically you'll see a message saying there are no shared ciphers when
-the same setup works fine with an RSA certificate. There are two possible
-causes. The client may not support connections to DSA servers most web
-browsers (including Netscape and MSIE) only support connections to servers
-supporting RSA cipher suites. The other cause is that a set of DH parameters
-has not been supplied to the server. DH parameters can be created with the
-dhparam(1) command and loaded using the SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() for example:
-check the source to s_server in apps/s_server.c for an example.
-
-
-* How can I remove the passphrase on a private key?
-
-Firstly you should be really *really* sure you want to do this. Leaving
-a private key unencrypted is a major security risk. If you decide that
-you do have to do this check the EXAMPLES sections of the rsa(1) and
-dsa(1) manual pages.
-
-
-* Why can't I use OpenSSL certificates with SSL client authentication?
-
-What will typically happen is that when a server requests authentication
-it will either not include your certificate or tell you that you have
-no client certificates (Netscape) or present you with an empty list box
-(MSIE). The reason for this is that when a server requests a client
-certificate it includes a list of CAs names which it will accept. Browsers
-will only let you select certificates from the list on the grounds that
-there is little point presenting a certificate which the server will
-reject.
-
-The solution is to add the relevant CA certificate to your servers "trusted
-CA list". How you do this depends on the server software in uses. You can
-print out the servers list of acceptable CAs using the OpenSSL s_client tool:
-
-openssl s_client -connect www.some.host:443 -prexit
-
-If your server only requests certificates on certain URLs then you may need
-to manually issue an HTTP GET command to get the list when s_client connects:
-
-GET /some/page/needing/a/certificate.html
-
-If your CA does not appear in the list then this confirms the problem.
-
-
-* Why does my browser give a warning about a mismatched hostname?
-
-Browsers expect the server's hostname to match the value in the commonName
-(CN) field of the certificate. If it does not then you get a warning.
-
-
-* How do I install a CA certificate into a browser?
-
-The usual way is to send the DER encoded certificate to the browser as
-MIME type application/x-x509-ca-cert, for example by clicking on an appropriate
-link. On MSIE certain extensions such as .der or .cacert may also work, or you
-can import the certificate using the certificate import wizard.
-
-You can convert a certificate to DER form using the command:
-
-openssl x509 -in ca.pem -outform DER -out ca.der
-
-Occasionally someone suggests using a command such as:
-
-openssl pkcs12 -export -out cacert.p12 -in cacert.pem -inkey cakey.pem
-
-DO NOT DO THIS! This command will give away your CAs private key and
-reduces its security to zero: allowing anyone to forge certificates in
-whatever name they choose.
-
-* Why is OpenSSL x509 DN output not conformant to RFC2253?
-
-The ways to print out the oneline format of the DN (Distinguished Name) have
-been extended in version 0.9.7 of OpenSSL. Using the new X509_NAME_print_ex()
-interface, the "-nameopt" option could be introduded. See the manual
-page of the "openssl x509" commandline tool for details. The old behaviour
-has however been left as default for the sake of compatibility.
-
-* What is a "128 bit certificate"? Can I create one with OpenSSL?
-
-The term "128 bit certificate" is a highly misleading marketing term. It does
-*not* refer to the size of the public key in the certificate! A certificate
-containing a 128 bit RSA key would have negligible security.
-
-There were various other names such as "magic certificates", "SGC
-certificates", "step up certificates" etc.
-
-You can't generally create such a certificate using OpenSSL but there is no
-need to any more. Nowadays web browsers using unrestricted strong encryption
-are generally available.
-
-When there were tight restrictions on the export of strong encryption
-software from the US only weak encryption algorithms could be freely exported
-(initially 40 bit and then 56 bit). It was widely recognised that this was
-inadequate. A relaxation of the rules allowed the use of strong encryption but
-only to an authorised server.
-
-Two slighly different techniques were developed to support this, one used by
-Netscape was called "step up", the other used by MSIE was called "Server Gated
-Cryptography" (SGC). When a browser initially connected to a server it would
-check to see if the certificate contained certain extensions and was issued by
-an authorised authority. If these test succeeded it would reconnect using
-strong encryption.
-
-Only certain (initially one) certificate authorities could issue the
-certificates and they generally cost more than ordinary certificates.
-
-Although OpenSSL can create certificates containing the appropriate extensions
-the certificate would not come from a permitted authority and so would not
-be recognized.
-
-The export laws were later changed to allow almost unrestricted use of strong
-encryption so these certificates are now obsolete.
-
-
-* Why does OpenSSL set the authority key identifier (AKID) extension incorrectly?
-
-It doesn't: this extension is often the cause of confusion.
-
-Consider a certificate chain A->B->C so that A signs B and B signs C. Suppose
-certificate C contains AKID.
-
-The purpose of this extension is to identify the authority certificate B. This
-can be done either by including the subject key identifier of B or its issuer
-name and serial number.
-
-In this latter case because it is identifying certifcate B it must contain the
-issuer name and serial number of B.
-
-It is often wrongly assumed that it should contain the subject name of B. If it
-did this would be redundant information because it would duplicate the issuer
-name of C.
-
-
-* How can I set up a bundle of commercial root CA certificates?
-
-The OpenSSL software is shipped without any root CA certificate as the
-OpenSSL project does not have any policy on including or excluding
-any specific CA and does not intend to set up such a policy. Deciding
-about which CAs to support is up to application developers or
-administrators.
-
-Other projects do have other policies so you can for example extract the CA
-bundle used by Mozilla and/or modssl as described in this article:
-
- <URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/modssl-users@modssl.org/msg16980.html>
-
-
-[BUILD] =======================================================================
-
-* Why does the linker complain about undefined symbols?
-
-Maybe the compilation was interrupted, and make doesn't notice that
-something is missing. Run "make clean; make".
-
-If you used ./Configure instead of ./config, make sure that you
-selected the right target. File formats may differ slightly between
-OS versions (for example sparcv8/sparcv9, or a.out/elf).
-
-In case you get errors about the following symbols, use the config
-option "no-asm", as described in INSTALL:
-
- BF_cbc_encrypt, BF_decrypt, BF_encrypt, CAST_cbc_encrypt,
- CAST_decrypt, CAST_encrypt, RC4, RC5_32_cbc_encrypt, RC5_32_decrypt,
- RC5_32_encrypt, bn_add_words, bn_div_words, bn_mul_add_words,
- bn_mul_comba4, bn_mul_comba8, bn_mul_words, bn_sqr_comba4,
- bn_sqr_comba8, bn_sqr_words, bn_sub_words, des_decrypt3,
- des_ede3_cbc_encrypt, des_encrypt, des_encrypt2, des_encrypt3,
- des_ncbc_encrypt, md5_block_asm_host_order, sha1_block_asm_data_order
-
-If none of these helps, you may want to try using the current snapshot.
-If the problem persists, please submit a bug report.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: command not found"?
-
-You didn't install "bc", the Unix calculator. If you want to run the
-tests, get GNU bc from ftp://ftp.gnu.org or from your OS distributor.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: 1 no implemented"?
-
-On some SCO installations or versions, bc has a bug that gets triggered
-when you run the test suite (using "make test"). The message returned is
-"bc: 1 not implemented".
-
-The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it. GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
-for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: stack empty"?
-
-On some DG/ux versions, bc seems to have a too small stack for calculations
-that the OpenSSL bntest throws at it. This gets triggered when you run the
-test suite (using "make test"). The message returned is "bc: stack empty".
-
-The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it. GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
-for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Alpha Tru64 Unix?
-
-On some Alpha installations running Tru64 Unix and Compaq C, the compilation
-of crypto/sha/sha_dgst.c fails with the message 'Fatal: Insufficient virtual
-memory to continue compilation.' As far as the tests have shown, this may be
-a compiler bug. What happens is that it eats up a lot of resident memory
-to build something, probably a table. The problem is clearly in the
-optimization code, because if one eliminates optimization completely (-O0),
-the compilation goes through (and the compiler consumes about 2MB of resident
-memory instead of 240MB or whatever one's limit is currently).
-
-There are three options to solve this problem:
-
-1. set your current data segment size soft limit higher. Experience shows
-that about 241000 kbytes seems to be enough on an AlphaServer DS10. You do
-this with the command 'ulimit -Sd nnnnnn', where 'nnnnnn' is the number of
-kbytes to set the limit to.
-
-2. If you have a hard limit that is lower than what you need and you can't
-get it changed, you can compile all of OpenSSL with -O0 as optimization
-level. This is however not a very nice thing to do for those who expect to
-get the best result from OpenSSL. A bit more complicated solution is the
-following:
-
------ snip:start -----
- make DIRS=crypto SDIRS=sha "`grep '^CFLAG=' Makefile.ssl | \
- sed -e 's/ -O[0-9] / -O0 /'`"
- rm `ls crypto/*.o crypto/sha/*.o | grep -v 'sha_dgst\.o'`
- make
------ snip:end -----
-
-This will only compile sha_dgst.c with -O0, the rest with the optimization
-level chosen by the configuration process. When the above is done, do the
-test and installation and you're set.
-
-3. Reconfigure the toolkit with no-sha0 option to leave out SHA0. It
-should not be used and is not used in SSL/TLS nor any other recognized
-protocol in either case.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail with "ar: command not found"?
-
-Getting this message is quite usual on Solaris 2, because Sun has hidden
-away 'ar' and other development commands in directories that aren't in
-$PATH by default. One of those directories is '/usr/ccs/bin'. The
-quickest way to fix this is to do the following (it assumes you use sh
-or any sh-compatible shell):
-
------ snip:start -----
- PATH=${PATH}:/usr/ccs/bin; export PATH
------ snip:end -----
-
-and then redo the compilation. What you should really do is make sure
-'/usr/ccs/bin' is permanently in your $PATH, for example through your
-'.profile' (again, assuming you use a sh-compatible shell).
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Win32 with VC++?
-
-Sometimes, you may get reports from VC++ command line (cl) that it
-can't find standard include files like stdio.h and other weirdnesses.
-One possible cause is that the environment isn't correctly set up.
-To solve that problem for VC++ versions up to 6, one should run
-VCVARS32.BAT which is found in the 'bin' subdirectory of the VC++
-installation directory (somewhere under 'Program Files'). For VC++
-version 7 (and up?), which is also called VS.NET, the file is called
-VSVARS32.BAT instead.
-This needs to be done prior to running NMAKE, and the changes are only
-valid for the current DOS session.
-
-
-* What is special about OpenSSL on Redhat?
-
-Red Hat Linux (release 7.0 and later) include a preinstalled limited
-version of OpenSSL. Red Hat has chosen to disable support for IDEA, RC5 and
-MDC2 in this version. The same may apply to other Linux distributions.
-Users may therefore wish to install more or all of the features left out.
-
-To do this you MUST ensure that you do not overwrite the openssl that is in
-/usr/bin on your Red Hat machine. Several packages depend on this file,
-including sendmail and ssh. /usr/local/bin is a good alternative choice. The
-libraries that come with Red Hat 7.0 onwards have different names and so are
-not affected. (eg For Red Hat 7.2 they are /lib/libssl.so.0.9.6b and
-/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6b with symlinks /lib/libssl.so.2 and
-/lib/libcrypto.so.2 respectively).
-
-Please note that we have been advised by Red Hat attempting to recompile the
-openssl rpm with all the cryptography enabled will not work. All other
-packages depend on the original Red Hat supplied openssl package. It is also
-worth noting that due to the way Red Hat supplies its packages, updates to
-openssl on each distribution never change the package version, only the
-build number. For example, on Red Hat 7.1, the latest openssl package has
-version number 0.9.6 and build number 9 even though it contains all the
-relevant updates in packages up to and including 0.9.6b.
-
-A possible way around this is to persuade Red Hat to produce a non-US
-version of Red Hat Linux.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on MacOS X?
-
-If the failure happens when trying to build the "openssl" binary, with
-a large number of undefined symbols, it's very probable that you have
-OpenSSL 0.9.6b delivered with the operating system (you can find out by
-running '/usr/bin/openssl version') and that you were trying to build
-OpenSSL 0.9.7 or newer. The problem is that the loader ('ld') in
-MacOS X has a misfeature that's quite difficult to go around.
-Look in the file PROBLEMS for a more detailed explanation and for possible
-solutions.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail on MacOS X?
-
-If the failure happens when running 'make test' and the RC4 test fails,
-it's very probable that you have OpenSSL 0.9.6b delivered with the
-operating system (you can find out by running '/usr/bin/openssl version')
-and that you were trying to build OpenSSL 0.9.6d. The problem is that
-the loader ('ld') in MacOS X has a misfeature that's quite difficult to
-go around and has linked the programs "openssl" and the test programs
-with /usr/lib/libcrypto.dylib and /usr/lib/libssl.dylib instead of the
-libraries you just built.
-Look in the file PROBLEMS for a more detailed explanation and for possible
-solutions.
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in BN_sqr test [on a 64-bit platform]?
-
-Failure in BN_sqr test is most likely caused by a failure to configure the
-toolkit for current platform or lack of support for the platform in question.
-Run './config -t' and './apps/openssl version -p'. Do these platform
-identifiers match? If they don't, then you most likely failed to run
-./config and you're hereby advised to do so before filing a bug report.
-If ./config itself fails to run, then it's most likely problem with your
-local environment and you should turn to your system administrator (or
-similar). If identifiers match (and/or no alternative identifier is
-suggested by ./config script), then the platform is unsupported. There might
-or might not be a workaround. Most notably on SPARC64 platforms with GNU
-C compiler you should be able to produce a working build by running
-'./config -m32'. I understand that -m32 might not be what you want/need,
-but the build should be operational. For further details turn to
-<openssl-dev@openssl.org>.
-
-* Why does OpenBSD-i386 build fail on des-586.s with "Unimplemented segment type"?
-
-As of 0.9.7 assembler routines were overhauled for position independence
-of the machine code, which is essential for shared library support. For
-some reason OpenBSD is equipped with an out-of-date GNU assembler which
-finds the new code offensive. To work around the problem, configure with
-no-asm (and sacrifice a great deal of performance) or patch your assembler
-according to <URL: http://www.openssl.org/~appro/gas-1.92.3.OpenBSD.patch>.
-For your convenience a pre-compiled replacement binary is provided at
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/~appro/gas-1.92.3.static.aout.bin>.
-Reportedly elder *BSD a.out platforms also suffer from this problem and
-remedy should be same. Provided binary is statically linked and should be
-working across wider range of *BSD branches, not just OpenBSD.
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in sha512t on x86 CPU?
-
-If the test program in question fails withs SIGILL, Illegal Instruction
-exception, then you more than likely to run SSE2-capable CPU, such as
-Intel P4, under control of kernel which does not support SSE2
-instruction extentions. See accompanying INSTALL file and
-OPENSSL_ia32cap(3) documentation page for further information.
-
-* Why does compiler fail to compile sha512.c?
-
-OpenSSL SHA-512 implementation depends on compiler support for 64-bit
-integer type. Few elder compilers [ULTRIX cc, SCO compiler to mention a
-couple] lack support for this and therefore are incapable of compiling
-the module in question. The recommendation is to disable SHA-512 by
-adding no-sha512 to ./config [or ./Configure] command line. Another
-possible alternative might be to switch to GCC.
-
-* Test suite still fails, what to do?
-
-Another common reason for failure to complete some particular test is
-simply bad code generated by a buggy component in toolchain or deficiency
-in run-time environment. There are few cases documented in PROBLEMS file,
-consult it for possible workaround before you beat the drum. Even if you
-don't find solution or even mention there, do reserve for possibility of
-a compiler bug. Compiler bugs might appear in rather bizarre ways, they
-never make sense, and tend to emerge when you least expect them. In order
-to identify one, drop optimization level, e.g. by editing CFLAG line in
-top-level Makefile, recompile and re-run the test.
-
-* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
-
-If you are a new user then it is quite likely you haven't found a bug and
-something is happening you aren't familiar with. Check this FAQ, the associated
-documentation and the mailing lists for similar queries. If you are still
-unsure whether it is a bug or not submit a query to the openssl-users mailing
-list.
-
-
-* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
-
-Bug reports with no security implications should be sent to the request
-tracker. This can be done by mailing the report to <rt@openssl.org> (or its
-alias <openssl-bugs@openssl.org>), please note that messages sent to the
-request tracker also appear in the public openssl-dev mailing list.
-
-The report should be in plain text. Any patches should be sent as
-plain text attachments because some mailers corrupt patches sent inline.
-If your issue affects multiple versions of OpenSSL check any patches apply
-cleanly and, if possible include patches to each affected version.
-
-The report should be given a meaningful subject line briefly summarising the
-issue. Just "bug in OpenSSL" or "bug in OpenSSL 0.9.8n" is not very helpful.
-
-By sending reports to the request tracker the bug can then be given a priority
-and assigned to the appropriate maintainer. The history of discussions can be
-accessed and if the issue has been addressed or a reason why not. If patches
-are only sent to openssl-dev they can be mislaid if a team member has to
-wade through months of old messages to review the discussion.
-
-See also <URL: http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html>
-
-
-* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
-
-If you think your bug has security implications then please send it to
-openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
-acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
-more active team members (e.g. Steve).
-
-Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
-considered to be security issues.
-
-[PROG] ========================================================================
-
-* Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
-
-Yes (with limitations: an SSL connection may not concurrently be used
-by multiple threads). On Windows and many Unix systems, OpenSSL
-automatically uses the multi-threaded versions of the standard
-libraries. If your platform is not one of these, consult the INSTALL
-file.
-
-Multi-threaded applications must provide two callback functions to
-OpenSSL by calling CRYPTO_set_locking_callback() and
-CRYPTO_set_id_callback(), for all versions of OpenSSL up to and
-including 0.9.8[abc...]. As of version 1.0.0, CRYPTO_set_id_callback()
-and associated APIs are deprecated by CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback()
-and friends. This is described in the threads(3) manpage.
-
-* I've compiled a program under Windows and it crashes: why?
-
-This is usually because you've missed the comment in INSTALL.W32.
-Your application must link against the same version of the Win32
-C-Runtime against which your openssl libraries were linked. The
-default version for OpenSSL is /MD - "Multithreaded DLL".
-
-If you are using Microsoft Visual C++'s IDE (Visual Studio), in
-many cases, your new project most likely defaulted to "Debug
-Singlethreaded" - /ML. This is NOT interchangeable with /MD and your
-program will crash, typically on the first BIO related read or write
-operation.
-
-For each of the six possible link stage configurations within Win32,
-your application must link against the same by which OpenSSL was
-built. If you are using MS Visual C++ (Studio) this can be changed
-by:
-
- 1. Select Settings... from the Project Menu.
- 2. Select the C/C++ Tab.
- 3. Select "Code Generation from the "Category" drop down list box
- 4. Select the Appropriate library (see table below) from the "Use
- run-time library" drop down list box. Perform this step for both
- your debug and release versions of your application (look at the
- top left of the settings panel to change between the two)
-
- Single Threaded /ML - MS VC++ often defaults to
- this for the release
- version of a new project.
- Debug Single Threaded /MLd - MS VC++ often defaults to
- this for the debug version
- of a new project.
- Multithreaded /MT
- Debug Multithreaded /MTd
- Multithreaded DLL /MD - OpenSSL defaults to this.
- Debug Multithreaded DLL /MDd
-
-Note that debug and release libraries are NOT interchangeable. If you
-built OpenSSL with /MD your application must use /MD and cannot use /MDd.
-
-As per 0.9.8 the above limitation is eliminated for .DLLs. OpenSSL
-.DLLs compiled with some specific run-time option [we insist on the
-default /MD] can be deployed with application compiled with different
-option or even different compiler. But there is a catch! Instead of
-re-compiling OpenSSL toolkit, as you would have to with prior versions,
-you have to compile small C snippet with compiler and/or options of
-your choice. The snippet gets installed as
-<install-root>/include/openssl/applink.c and should be either added to
-your application project or simply #include-d in one [and only one]
-of your application source files. Failure to link this shim module
-into your application manifests itself as fatal "no OPENSSL_Applink"
-run-time error. An explicit reminder is due that in this situation
-[mixing compiler options] it is as important to add CRYPTO_malloc_init
-prior first call to OpenSSL.
-
-* How do I read or write a DER encoded buffer using the ASN1 functions?
-
-You have two options. You can either use a memory BIO in conjunction
-with the i2d_*_bio() or d2i_*_bio() functions or you can use the
-i2d_*(), d2i_*() functions directly. Since these are often the
-cause of grief here are some code fragments using PKCS7 as an example:
-
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int len;
-
- len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); /* or Malloc, error checking omitted */
- p = buf;
- i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
-
-At this point buf contains the len bytes of the DER encoding of
-p7.
-
-The opposite assumes we already have len bytes in buf:
-
- unsigned char *p;
- p = buf;
- p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, len);
-
-At this point p7 contains a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error
-occurred. If an error occurred ERR_print_errors(bio) should give more
-information.
-
-The reason for the temporary variable 'p' is that the ASN1 functions
-increment the passed pointer so it is ready to read or write the next
-structure. This is often a cause of problems: without the temporary
-variable the buffer pointer is changed to point just after the data
-that has been read or written. This may well be uninitialized data
-and attempts to free the buffer will have unpredictable results
-because it no longer points to the same address.
-
-Memory allocation and encoding can also be combined in a single
-operation by the ASN1 routines:
-
- unsigned char *buf = NULL; /* mandatory */
- int len;
- len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &buf);
- if (len < 0)
- /* Error */
- /* Do some things with 'buf' */
- /* Finished with buf: free it */
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
-In this special case the "buf" parameter is *not* incremented, it points
-to the start of the encoding.
-
-
-* OpenSSL uses DER but I need BER format: does OpenSSL support BER?
-
-The short answer is yes, because DER is a special case of BER and OpenSSL
-ASN1 decoders can process BER.
-
-The longer answer is that ASN1 structures can be encoded in a number of
-different ways. One set of ways is the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) with various
-permissible encodings. A restriction of BER is the Distinguished Encoding
-Rules (DER): these uniquely specify how a given structure is encoded.
-
-Therefore, because DER is a special case of BER, DER is an acceptable encoding
-for BER.
-
-
-* I've tried using <M_some_evil_pkcs12_macro> and I get errors why?
-
-This usually happens when you try compiling something using the PKCS#12
-macros with a C++ compiler. There is hardly ever any need to use the
-PKCS#12 macros in a program, it is much easier to parse and create
-PKCS#12 files using the PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create() functions
-documented in doc/openssl.txt and with examples in demos/pkcs12. The
-'pkcs12' application has to use the macros because it prints out
-debugging information.
-
-
-* I've called <some function> and it fails, why?
-
-Before submitting a report or asking in one of the mailing lists, you
-should try to determine the cause. In particular, you should call
-ERR_print_errors() or ERR_print_errors_fp() after the failed call
-and see if the message helps. Note that the problem may occur earlier
-than you think -- you should check for errors after every call where
-it is possible, otherwise the actual problem may be hidden because
-some OpenSSL functions clear the error state.
-
-
-* I just get a load of numbers for the error output, what do they mean?
-
-The actual format is described in the ERR_print_errors() manual page.
-You should call the function ERR_load_crypto_strings() before hand and
-the message will be output in text form. If you can't do this (for example
-it is a pre-compiled binary) you can use the errstr utility on the error
-code itself (the hex digits after the second colon).
-
-
-* Why do I get errors about unknown algorithms?
-
-The cause is forgetting to load OpenSSL's table of algorithms with
-OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(). See the manual page for more information. This
-can cause several problems such as being unable to read in an encrypted
-PEM file, unable to decrypt a PKCS#12 file or signature failure when
-verifying certificates.
-
-* Why can't the OpenSSH configure script detect OpenSSL?
-
-Several reasons for problems with the automatic detection exist.
-OpenSSH requires at least version 0.9.5a of the OpenSSL libraries.
-Sometimes the distribution has installed an older version in the system
-locations that is detected instead of a new one installed. The OpenSSL
-library might have been compiled for another CPU or another mode (32/64 bits).
-Permissions might be wrong.
-
-The general answer is to check the config.log file generated when running
-the OpenSSH configure script. It should contain the detailed information
-on why the OpenSSL library was not detected or considered incompatible.
-
-
-* Can I use OpenSSL's SSL library with non-blocking I/O?
-
-Yes; make sure to read the SSL_get_error(3) manual page!
-
-A pitfall to avoid: Don't assume that SSL_read() will just read from
-the underlying transport or that SSL_write() will just write to it --
-it is also possible that SSL_write() cannot do any useful work until
-there is data to read, or that SSL_read() cannot do anything until it
-is possible to send data. One reason for this is that the peer may
-request a new TLS/SSL handshake at any time during the protocol,
-requiring a bi-directional message exchange; both SSL_read() and
-SSL_write() will try to continue any pending handshake.
-
-
-* Why doesn't my server application receive a client certificate?
-
-Due to the TLS protocol definition, a client will only send a certificate,
-if explicitly asked by the server. Use the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag of the
-SSL_CTX_set_verify() function to enable the use of client certificates.
-
-
-* Why does compilation fail due to an undefined symbol NID_uniqueIdentifier?
-
-For OpenSSL 0.9.7 the OID table was extended and corrected. In earlier
-versions, uniqueIdentifier was incorrectly used for X.509 certificates.
-The correct name according to RFC2256 (LDAP) is x500UniqueIdentifier.
-Change your code to use the new name when compiling against OpenSSL 0.9.7.
-
-
-* I think I've detected a memory leak, is this a bug?
-
-In most cases the cause of an apparent memory leak is an OpenSSL internal table
-that is allocated when an application starts up. Since such tables do not grow
-in size over time they are harmless.
-
-These internal tables can be freed up when an application closes using various
-functions. Currently these include following:
-
-Thread-local cleanup functions:
-
- ERR_remove_state()
-
-Application-global cleanup functions that are aware of usage (and therefore
-thread-safe):
-
- ENGINE_cleanup() and CONF_modules_unload()
-
-"Brutal" (thread-unsafe) Application-global cleanup functions:
-
- ERR_free_strings(), EVP_cleanup() and CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data().
-
-
-* Why does Valgrind complain about the use of uninitialized data?
-
-When OpenSSL's PRNG routines are called to generate random numbers the supplied
-buffer contents are mixed into the entropy pool: so it technically does not
-matter whether the buffer is initialized at this point or not. Valgrind (and
-other test tools) will complain about this. When using Valgrind, make sure the
-OpenSSL library has been compiled with the PURIFY macro defined (-DPURIFY)
-to get rid of these warnings.
-
-
-* Why doesn't a memory BIO work when a file does?
-
-This can occur in several cases for example reading an S/MIME email message.
-The reason is that a memory BIO can do one of two things when all the data
-has been read from it.
-
-The default behaviour is to indicate that no more data is available and that
-the call should be retried, this is to allow the application to fill up the BIO
-again if necessary.
-
-Alternatively it can indicate that no more data is available and that EOF has
-been reached.
-
-If a memory BIO is to behave in the same way as a file this second behaviour
-is needed. This must be done by calling:
-
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
-
-See the manual pages for more details.
-
-
-* Where are the declarations and implementations of d2i_X509() etc?
-
-These are defined and implemented by macros of the form:
-
-
- DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) and IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
-
-The implementation passes an ASN1 "template" defining the structure into an
-ASN1 interpreter using generalised functions such as ASN1_item_d2i().
-
-
-===============================================================================
+The FAQ is now maintained on the web:
+ https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index f1b3c425d594..161ef406b3af 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
# Xlist
setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2d
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2d
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2e
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2e
###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index f36147287f5d..e2bbb475c7df 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2d
+VERSION=1.0.2e
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -205,7 +205,9 @@ CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
-BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
+# LC_ALL=C ensures that error [and other] messages are delivered in
+# same language for uniform treatment.
+BUILDENV= LC_ALL=C PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)'\
CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
@@ -499,25 +501,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+ --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+ -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+ find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+ \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
+ \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+ | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- $(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
- gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap:
- @$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
- `find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
dist:
diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index d77e26495887..0333644415a2 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
-BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
+# LC_ALL=C ensures that error [and other] messages are delivered in
+# same language for uniform treatment.
+BUILDENV= LC_ALL=C PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)'\
CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
@@ -497,25 +499,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+ --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+ -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+ find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+ \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
+ \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+ | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- $(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
- gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap:
- @$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
- `find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
dist:
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 29e48053efe7..e1c78f834f08 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,9 +5,19 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+ o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
+ o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
+ o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
+ o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs
+ o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ return an error
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+ o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
diff --git a/README b/README
index 493141b69ca0..49c4c9f147c3 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.2d 9 Jul 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015
- Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
All rights reserved.
@@ -10,17 +10,17 @@
The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
- protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
- The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
- Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its
- related documentation.
+ Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as
+ well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is
+ managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to
+ communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related
+ documentation.
- OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young
+ OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young
and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
- OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license) situation, which basically means
- that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial
- purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
+ OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to
+ get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you
+ fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
OVERVIEW
--------
@@ -28,90 +28,39 @@
The OpenSSL toolkit includes:
libssl.a:
- Implementation of SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1 and the required code to support
- both SSLv2, SSLv3 and TLSv1 in the one server and client.
+ Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS.
libcrypto.a:
- General encryption and X.509 v1/v3 stuff needed by SSL/TLS but not
- actually logically part of it. It includes routines for the following:
-
- Ciphers
- libdes - EAY's libdes DES encryption package which was floating
- around the net for a few years, and was then relicensed by
- him as part of SSLeay. It includes 15 'modes/variations'
- of DES (1, 2 and 3 key versions of ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb;
- pcbc and a more general form of cfb and ofb) including desx
- in cbc mode, a fast crypt(3), and routines to read
- passwords from the keyboard.
- RC4 encryption,
- RC2 encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
- Blowfish encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
- IDEA encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
-
- Digests
- MD5 and MD2 message digest algorithms, fast implementations,
- SHA (SHA-0) and SHA-1 message digest algorithms,
- MDC2 message digest. A DES based hash that is popular on smart cards.
-
- Public Key
- RSA encryption/decryption/generation.
- There is no limit on the number of bits.
- DSA encryption/decryption/generation.
- There is no limit on the number of bits.
- Diffie-Hellman key-exchange/key generation.
- There is no limit on the number of bits.
-
- X.509v3 certificates
- X509 encoding/decoding into/from binary ASN1 and a PEM
- based ASCII-binary encoding which supports encryption with a
- private key. Program to generate RSA and DSA certificate
- requests and to generate RSA and DSA certificates.
-
- Systems
- The normal digital envelope routines and base64 encoding. Higher
- level access to ciphers and digests by name. New ciphers can be
- loaded at run time. The BIO io system which is a simple non-blocking
- IO abstraction. Current methods supported are file descriptors,
- sockets, socket accept, socket connect, memory buffer, buffering, SSL
- client/server, file pointer, encryption, digest, non-blocking testing
- and null.
-
- Data structures
- A dynamically growing hashing system
- A simple stack.
- A Configuration loader that uses a format similar to MS .ini files.
+ Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but
+ not logically part of it.
openssl:
A command line tool that can be used for:
- Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters
+ Creation of key parameters
Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
- Calculation of Message Digests
- Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
- SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
+ Calculation of message digests
+ Encryption and decryption
+ SSL/TLS client and server tests
Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
+ And more...
INSTALLATION
------------
- To install this package under a Unix derivative, read the INSTALL file. For
- a Win32 platform, read the INSTALL.W32 file. For OpenVMS systems, read
- INSTALL.VMS.
-
- Read the documentation in the doc/ directory. It is quite rough, but it
- lists the functions; you will probably have to look at the code to work out
- how to use them. Look at the example programs.
-
- PROBLEMS
- --------
-
- For some platforms, there are some known problems that may affect the user
- or application author. We try to collect those in doc/PROBLEMS, with current
- thoughts on how they should be solved in a future of OpenSSL.
+ See the appropriate file:
+ INSTALL Linux, Unix, etc.
+ INSTALL.DJGPP DOS platform with DJGPP
+ INSTALL.NW Netware
+ INSTALL.OS2 OS/2
+ INSTALL.VMS VMS
+ INSTALL.W32 Windows (32bit)
+ INSTALL.W64 Windows (64bit)
+ INSTALL.WCE Windows CE
SUPPORT
-------
- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details of how to obtain
+ See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain
commercial technical support.
If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
@@ -137,56 +86,33 @@
Email the report to:
- openssl-bugs@openssl.org
+ rt@openssl.org
+
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs@openssl.org is recorded in the public
- request tracker database (see https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html
- for details) and also forwarded to a public mailing list. Confidential
- mail may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from
- the key servers).
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt@openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
----------------------------
- Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
- http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
- would like to submit a patch, send it to openssl-bugs@openssl.org with
- the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
- textual explanation of what your patch does.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
- OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
- Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
- reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
-
- Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
-
- Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
- if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt@bis.doc.gov
- (formerly BXA) with a copy to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator;
- please take some time to look at
- http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html [sic]
- and
- http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (EAR Section 740.13(e))
- for the details. If "your encryption source code is too large to serve as
- an email attachment", they are glad to receive it by fax instead; hope you
- have a cheap long-distance plan.
-
- Our preferred format for changes is "diff -u" output. You might
- generate it like this:
-
- # cd openssl-work
- # [your changes]
- # ./Configure dist; make clean
- # cd ..
- # diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
+ See CONTRIBUTING
+
+ LEGALITIES
+ ----------
+ A number of nations, in particular the U.S., restrict the use or export
+ of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions
+ you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to
+ develop or distribute cryptographic code.
diff --git a/apps/Makefile b/apps/Makefile
index cafe55458ddc..8c3297ea6724 100644
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
depend: local_depend
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
- @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
diff --git a/apps/app_rand.c b/apps/app_rand.c
index 595fc7821c85..7f40bba76468 100644
--- a/apps/app_rand.c
+++ b/apps/app_rand.c
@@ -124,10 +124,7 @@ int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, BIO *bio_e, int dont_warn)
char buffer[200];
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
- BIO_printf(bio_e, "Loading 'screen' into random state -");
- BIO_flush(bio_e);
RAND_screen();
- BIO_printf(bio_e, " done\n");
#endif
if (file == NULL)
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index 7478fc379a55..2e778054ca8f 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -119,9 +119,6 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# include <strings.h>
-#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -1352,7 +1349,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
{"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
{NULL, 0, 0}
};
- return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
+ if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
+ *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
+ return 1;
}
int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)
diff --git a/apps/asn1pars.c b/apps/asn1pars.c
index 11b07875943b..0a6b990b503d 100644
--- a/apps/asn1pars.c
+++ b/apps/asn1pars.c
@@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
|| (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
- typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 3b7336c0466e..0b66095b83b6 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -99,25 +99,19 @@
#undef PROG
#define PROG ca_main
-#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
-#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
+#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
+#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca"
-#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
+#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
-#define ENV_DIR "dir"
-#define ENV_CERTS "certs"
-#define ENV_CRL_DIR "crl_dir"
-#define ENV_CA_DB "CA_DB"
#define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir"
#define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate"
#define ENV_SERIAL "serial"
#define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber"
-#define ENV_CRL "crl"
#define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key"
-#define ENV_RANDFILE "RANDFILE"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate"
@@ -2538,6 +2532,8 @@ static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
char **rrow, *a_tm_s;
a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+ if (a_tm == NULL)
+ return -1;
/* get actual time and make a string */
a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0);
diff --git a/apps/ecparam.c b/apps/ecparam.c
index 06ac77b838a3..71b67f435cfd 100644
--- a/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -416,14 +416,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (check) {
- if (group == NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
}
diff --git a/apps/engine.c b/apps/engine.c
index 3d70cac416d6..460ec60cb14c 100644
--- a/apps/engine.c
+++ b/apps/engine.c
@@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ static void identity(char *ptr)
static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
{
- int l = strlen(s);
-
if (*buf == NULL) {
*size = step;
*buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
@@ -109,9 +107,6 @@ static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
**buf = '\0';
}
- if (**buf != '\0')
- l += 2; /* ", " */
-
if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
*size += step;
*buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);
diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index 926083dd1b5c..6ed255d4b563 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -1261,8 +1261,8 @@ static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path,
return NULL;
}
- if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
+ if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c
index 4ff64495a956..e41b445a50b0 100644
--- a/apps/pkcs12.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -134,13 +134,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
apps_startup();
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
- else
-# endif
- cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
-
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
if (bio_err == NULL)
bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
@@ -148,6 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
goto end;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+ else
+# endif
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+
args = argv + 1;
while (*args) {
diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index dd3aa74e02af..5b5e711bf2eb 100644
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -981,6 +981,11 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
extname = "next protocol";
break;
#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+ case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation:
+ extname = "application layer protocol negotiation";
+ break;
+#endif
case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
extname = "TLS padding";
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index e55f2c5abc88..f80711fd5e58 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -424,6 +424,14 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -serverinfo types - send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -curves arg - Elliptic curves to advertise (colon-separated list)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -2065,6 +2073,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (pass)
OPENSSL_free(pass);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin);
+#endif
if (vpm)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
ssl_excert_free(exc);
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index acef382c2c4b..f19532b75fab 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -652,6 +652,12 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
" -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client \n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n");
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
@@ -2881,6 +2887,21 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
goto err;
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+ && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
delay(1000);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
@@ -3211,6 +3232,21 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+ && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n");
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
@@ -3224,6 +3260,21 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
goto err;
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+ && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
delay(1000);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
diff --git a/appveyor.yml b/appveyor.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8695359488d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/appveyor.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+platform:
+ - x86
+ - x64
+
+environment:
+ matrix:
+ - VSVER: 9
+ - VSVER: 10
+ - VSVER: 11
+ - VSVER: 12
+ - VSVER: 14
+
+configuration:
+ - plain
+ - shared
+
+matrix:
+ allow_failures:
+ - platform: x64
+ VSVER: 9
+ - platform: x64
+ VSVER: 10
+ - platform: x64
+ VSVER: 11
+
+before_build:
+ - ps: >-
+ If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
+ $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
+ $env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
+ $env:DO="do_ms"
+ } Else {
+ $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
+ $env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
+ $env:DO="do_win64a"
+ }
+ - ps: >-
+ If ($env:Configuration -Like "*shared*") {
+ $env:MAK="ntdll.mak"
+ } Else {
+ $env:MAK="nt.mak"
+ }
+ - ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
+ - call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
+ - perl Configure %TARGET% no-asm
+ - call ms\%DO%
+
+build_script:
+ - nmake /f ms\%MAK%
+
+test_script:
+ - nmake /f ms\%MAK% test
+
+notifications:
+ - provider: Email
+ to:
+ - openssl-commits@openssl.org
+ on_build_success: false
+ on_build_failure: true
+ on_build_status_changed: true
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
index 451d0e0ed1e2..60286ecb9645 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
-# better performance on most recent -archs...
+# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
#
# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
- # recent -archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+ # recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
# I favor compact code to minimize cache
# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
# in real-life applications...
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ sub enctransform()
# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
-# -archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
index 33b1aed3c0b4..5a100fa8983b 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
index 97992adca7c3..c803cdebc112 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10);
-$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
index 19b0433b3b1b..bfe29268c781 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
@@ -139,11 +139,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
je ${func}_avx2
___
$code.=<<___;
- and \$`1<<30`,%eax # mask "Intel CPU" bit
- and \$`1<<28|1<<9`,%r10d # mask AVX+SSSE3 bits
- or %eax,%r10d
- cmp \$`1<<28|1<<9|1<<30`,%r10d
- je ${func}_avx
+ and \$`1<<28`,%r10d # check for AVX
+ jnz ${func}_avx
ud2
___
}
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
index f67df8cf13da..9b2e37aafb1a 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
-# AESNI extenstion
+# AESNI extension
sub aeskeygenassist
{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
index 7fda60ed9e4d..1759ae9dcff2 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
@@ -337,24 +337,27 @@ Lenc_entry:
addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo
?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out
?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key # prepare for unaligned access
- vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp # redundant in aligned case
- ?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
- lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
bl _vpaes_encrypt_core
+ andi. r8, $out, 15
+ li r9, 16
+ beq Lenc_out_aligned
+
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
- vsel v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
- vmr $outhead, v0
- stvx v1, 0, $out
- addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not a typo
- ########
+ mtctr r9
+Lenc_out_unaligned:
+ stvebx v0, 0, $out
+ addi $out, $out, 1
+ bdnz Lenc_out_unaligned
+ b Lenc_done
- lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
- vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
- stvx v1, 0, $out
+.align 4
+Lenc_out_aligned:
+ stvx v0, 0, $out
+Lenc_done:
li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
@@ -566,24 +569,27 @@ Ldec_entry:
addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo
?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out
?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key
- vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp # redundant in aligned case
- ?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
- lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
bl _vpaes_decrypt_core
+ andi. r8, $out, 15
+ li r9, 16
+ beq Ldec_out_aligned
+
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
- vsel v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
- vmr $outhead, v0
- stvx v1, 0, $out
- addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not a typo
- ########
+ mtctr r9
+Ldec_out_unaligned:
+ stvebx v0, 0, $out
+ addi $out, $out, 1
+ bdnz Ldec_out_unaligned
+ b Ldec_done
- lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
- vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
- stvx v1, 0, $out
+.align 4
+Ldec_out_aligned:
+ stvx v0, 0, $out
+Ldec_done:
li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
@@ -658,11 +664,11 @@ Ldec_entry:
$PUSH r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp)
and r30, r5, r9 # copy length&-16
+ andi. r9, $out, 15 # is $out aligned?
mr r5, r6 # copy pointer to key
mr r31, r7 # copy pointer to iv
- blt Lcbc_abort
- cmpwi r8, 0 # test direction
li r6, -1
+ mcrf cr1, cr0 # put aside $out alignment flag
mr r7, r12 # copy vrsave
mtspr 256, r6 # preserve all AltiVec registers
@@ -672,6 +678,7 @@ Ldec_entry:
lvx v25, r9, r31
?vperm v24, v24, v25, $inpperm
+ cmpwi r8, 0 # test direction
neg r8, $inp # prepare for unaligned access
vxor v7, v7, v7
?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key
@@ -681,13 +688,37 @@ Ldec_entry:
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo
- lvx $outhead, 0, $out
beq Lcbc_decrypt
bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat
li r0, 16
+ beq cr1, Lcbc_enc_loop # $out is aligned
+
+ vmr v0, $inptail
+ lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
+ addi $inp, $inp, 16
+ ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+ vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv
+
+ bl _vpaes_encrypt_core
+
+ andi. r8, $out, 15
+ vmr v24, v0 # put aside iv
+ sub r9, $out, r8
+ vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
+
+Lcbc_enc_head:
+ stvebx $outhead, r8, r9
+ cmpwi r8, 15
+ addi r8, r8, 1
+ bne Lcbc_enc_head
+
+ sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16
+ addi $out, $out, 16
+ beq Lcbc_unaligned_done
+
Lcbc_enc_loop:
vmr v0, $inptail
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
@@ -713,6 +744,32 @@ Lcbc_decrypt:
bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat
li r0, 16
+ beq cr1, Lcbc_dec_loop # $out is aligned
+
+ vmr v0, $inptail
+ lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
+ addi $inp, $inp, 16
+ ?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+ vmr v25, v0 # put aside input
+
+ bl _vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+ andi. r8, $out, 15
+ vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv
+ vmr v24, v25
+ sub r9, $out, r8
+ vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
+
+Lcbc_dec_head:
+ stvebx $outhead, r8, r9
+ cmpwi r8, 15
+ addi r8, r8, 1
+ bne Lcbc_dec_head
+
+ sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16
+ addi $out, $out, 16
+ beq Lcbc_unaligned_done
+
Lcbc_dec_loop:
vmr v0, $inptail
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
@@ -733,23 +790,29 @@ Lcbc_dec_loop:
bne Lcbc_dec_loop
Lcbc_done:
- addi $out, $out, -1
- lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
- vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
- stvx v1, 0, $out
-
+ beq cr1, Lcbc_write_iv # $out is aligned
+
+Lcbc_unaligned_done:
+ andi. r8, $out, 15
+ sub $out, $out, r8
+ li r9, 0
+Lcbc_tail:
+ stvebx $outhead, r9, $out
+ addi r9, r9, 1
+ cmpw r9, r8
+ bne Lcbc_tail
+
+Lcbc_write_iv:
neg r8, r31 # write [potentially unaligned] iv
+ li r10, 4
?lvsl $outperm, 0, r8
- li r6, 15
- vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff
- ?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
- lvx $outhead, 0, r31
+ li r11, 8
+ li r12, 12
vperm v24, v24, v24, $outperm # rotate right/left
- vsel v0, $outhead, v24, $outmask
- lvx v1, r6, r31
- stvx v0, 0, r31
- vsel v1, v24, v1, $outmask
- stvx v1, r6, r31
+ stvewx v24, 0, r31 # ivp is at least 32-bit aligned
+ stvewx v24, r10, r31
+ stvewx v24, r11, r31
+ stvewx v24, r12, r31
mtspr 256, r7 # restore vrsave
li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
@@ -872,18 +935,21 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
# encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
li r8, 0x30 # mov \$0x30,%r8d
- addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+ li r9, 4
+ li r10, 8
+ li r11, 12
?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out # prepare for unaligned access
vnor $outmask, v9, v9 # 0xff..ff
- lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm $outmask, v9, $outmask, $outperm
#stvx v0, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx)
- vperm v1, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
- vsel v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask
- vmr $outhead, v1
- stvx v2, 0, $out
+ vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
+ stvewx $outhead, 0, $out # some are superfluous
+ stvewx $outhead, r9, $out
+ stvewx $outhead, r10, $out
+ addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+ stvewx $outhead, r11, $out
b Lschedule_go
Lschedule_am_decrypting:
@@ -893,20 +959,24 @@ Lschedule_am_decrypting:
addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
# decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
lvx v1, r8, r10 # vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1
+ li r9, 4
+ li r10, 8
+ li r11, 12
vperm v4, v3, v3, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3
neg r0, $out # prepare for unaligned access
?lvsl $outperm, 0, r0
- addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo
vnor $outmask, v9, v9 # 0xff..ff
- lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm $outmask, $outmask, v9, $outperm
#stvx v4, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx)
- vperm v4, v4, v4, $outperm # rotate right/left
- vsel v2, $outhead, v4, $outmask
- vmr $outhead, v4
- stvx v2, 0, $out
+ vperm $outhead, v4, v4, $outperm # rotate right/left
+ stvewx $outhead, 0, $out # some are superfluous
+ stvewx $outhead, r9, $out
+ stvewx $outhead, r10, $out
+ addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+ stvewx $outhead, r11, $out
+ addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo
xori r8, r8, 0x30 # xor \$0x30, %r8
Lschedule_go:
@@ -1038,14 +1108,15 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last:
#stvx v0, r0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
+ li r10, 4
vsel v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
- vmr $outhead, v0
+ li r11, 8
stvx v2, 0, $out
-
- addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo
- lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
- vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
- stvx v1, 0, $out
+ li r12, 12
+ stvewx v0, 0, $out # some (or all) are redundant
+ stvewx v0, r10, $out
+ stvewx v0, r11, $out
+ stvewx v0, r12, $out
b Lschedule_mangle_done
.align 4
@@ -1057,15 +1128,18 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
bl _vpaes_schedule_transform # output transform
#stvx v0, r0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key
+ addi r9, $out, -15 # -15 is not typo
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
+ li r10, 4
vsel v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
- vmr $outhead, v0
+ li r11, 8
stvx v2, 0, $out
+ li r12, 12
+ stvewx v0, 0, r9 # some (or all) are redundant
+ stvewx v0, r10, r9
+ stvewx v0, r11, r9
+ stvewx v0, r12, r9
- addi $out, $out, -15 # -15 is not typo
- lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
- vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
- stvx v1, 0, $out
Lschedule_mangle_done:
mtlr r7
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
index a5d2da10bb72..0ca985a2be1e 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
+#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
+#endif
+
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
int indent);
static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
#else
dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
#endif
+
+ if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
+ BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
p = *pp;
tot = p + length;
op = p - 1;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
index c96da091d39c..d21829af192f 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
EVP_PKEY *ret;
+ const unsigned char *p = *pp;
if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
- !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
+ !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
- p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
+ p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
if (!p8)
goto err;
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
-
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
} else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
+ *pp = p;
if (a != NULL)
(*a) = ret;
return (ret);
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
* input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
*/
inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
+ p = *pp;
/*
* Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
* can just count the elements.
@@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
* traditional format */
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
EVP_PKEY *ret;
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
@@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = p;
if (a) {
*a = ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 7fd336a40226..9256049d1588 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+ int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+ aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@@ -350,9 +352,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
- *in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
+ *in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
@@ -489,9 +491,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
- *in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
+ *in = p;
return 1;
default:
@@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
auxerr:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
err:
- ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+ if (combine == 0)
+ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (errtt)
ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
", Type=", it->sname);
@@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
} else {
/* Nothing special */
ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
- -1, 0, opt, ctx);
+ -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
index a5a403c26e10..eaf046639d6a 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
@@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
BIGNUM *bn;
- if (!*pval)
- bn_new(pval, it);
+
+ if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
+ return 0;
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
bn_free(pval, it);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
index 4b682018c2de..6c57a7971c9d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
@@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
{
X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
if (!xpk)
return NULL;
pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
if (!pktmp)
return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
if (a) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
*a = pktmp;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
index 5f266a26b4c2..e2cac836943d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
- ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
+ ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
if (!ret)
return NULL;
/* update length */
- length -= *pp - q;
- if (!length)
- return ret;
- if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
+ length -= q - *pp;
+ if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
goto err;
+ *pp = q;
return ret;
err:
if (freeret) {
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c b/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c
index 76bbc1370ff7..ad93592a714a 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c
@@ -163,10 +163,13 @@ int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
if (!(objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)))
return 0;
if (!(aux = aux_get(x)))
- return 0;
+ goto err;
if (!aux->reject && !(aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()))
- return 0;
+ goto err;
return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp);
+ err:
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+ return 0;
}
void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x)
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_dump.c b/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
index ed8e521449a4..ccf0e287c4e8 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
rows++;
for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
- buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
index d7f15b0699c9..bfba93e62bbd 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
@@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
NULL,
};
-BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
- BIO *ret;
FILE *file = NULL;
# if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
@@ -164,6 +163,14 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
# else
file = fopen(filename, mode);
# endif
+ return (file);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+ BIO *ret;
+ FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode);
+
if (file == NULL) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
@@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
else
strcat(p, "t");
# endif
- fp = fopen(ptr, p);
+ fp = file_fopen(ptr, p);
if (fp == NULL) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
index 8f529c95cf05..72381a77240c 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
# referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks
# by 18-40%.
#
-# Cmara, D.; Gouva, C. P. L.; Lpez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
# Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
#
# http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ ___
################
# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
# BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
-# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0b1b0
+# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
{
$code.=<<___;
.global bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $mask,#7<<2
sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8]
- bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1b1
+ bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
str $lo,[$ret,#8]
str $hi,[$ret,#12]
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
eor r2,r2,$a
eor $b,$b,r3
eor $a,$a,r2
- bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0b0
+ bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
str $lo,[$ret]
str $hi,[$ret,#4]
eor $a,$a,r2
eor $b,$b,r3
- bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)(b1+b0)
+ bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
___
@r=map("r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
index 951abc53ea5b..a9a42abfc302 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
-// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving
+// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
// of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
-// clause in Itanium -architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
// highly appreciated.
//
// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
index 68e3733e3f79..9e3c12d788e5 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
$POP= "ld";
} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0;
+
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
@@ -294,12 +296,12 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
extrdi $t0,$a0,32,32 ; lwz $t0,4($ap)
extrdi $t1,$a0,32,0 ; lwz $t1,0($ap)
- lwz $t2,12($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t3,8($ap)
- lwz $t4,4($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t5,0($np)
- lwz $t6,12($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t7,8($np)
+ lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+ lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+ lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
lwz $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0,1] value
@@ -463,14 +465,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
L1st:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
- lwz $t0,4($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t1,0($ap)
- lwz $t2,12($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t3,8($ap)
- lwz $t4,4($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t5,0($np)
- lwz $t6,12($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
- lwz $t7,8($np)
+ lwz $t0,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t1,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+ lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+ lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+ lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
+ lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
lwz $t0,0($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
@@ -505,14 +507,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
@@ -651,8 +653,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
@@ -673,8 +675,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
@@ -686,8 +688,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
@@ -699,8 +701,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fctid $T0a,$T0a
fctid $T0b,$T0b
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
@@ -787,14 +789,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
@@ -823,14 +825,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,8($tp)
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
@@ -857,10 +859,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j]
stwu $t0,16($tp)
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
@@ -1165,23 +1167,23 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
srwi $c1,$t1,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
@@ -1218,8 +1220,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fctid $T1a,$T1a
addc $t0,$t0,$t2
adde $t4,$t4,$t3
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
fctid $T1b,$T1b
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
@@ -1229,19 +1231,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
fctid $T2b,$T2b
srwi $c1,$t3,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
fctid $T3a,$T3a
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
fctid $T3b,$T3b
insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits
@@ -1354,14 +1356,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
@@ -1397,14 +1399,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,0($tp)
- lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
- lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
- lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
- lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
+ lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
+ lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
+ lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
+ lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
@@ -1433,12 +1435,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
addc $t2,$t2,$t6
adde $t0,$t0,$t7
- lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
- lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
+ lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
- lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
- lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
+ lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+ lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
index 3bd45dbac01d..12b571c282dc 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
index cd9f13eca292..9d18d40e7784 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
@@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
if ($SIZE_T==8) {
my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1b1
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp)
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0b0
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
lmg @r[0],@r[3],0($rp)
xgr $lo,$hi
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
index 43fcb79bc011..f5eebe413a28 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
@@ -18,71 +18,106 @@
.align 4
bn_mul_add_words:
lghi zero,0 // zero = 0
- la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside
- lghi %r2,0 // i=0;
+ la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside [to give way to]
+ lghi %r2,0 // return value
ltgfr %r4,%r4
bler %r14 // if (len<=0) return 0;
- stmg %r6,%r10,48(%r15)
- lghi %r10,3
- lghi %r8,0 // carry = 0
- nr %r10,%r4 // len%4
+ stmg %r6,%r13,48(%r15)
+ lghi %r2,3
+ lghi %r12,0 // carry = 0
+ slgr %r1,%r3 // rp-=ap
+ nr %r2,%r4 // len%4
sra %r4,2 // cnt=len/4
jz .Loop1_madd // carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken
algr zero,zero // clear carry
-.Loop4_madd:
- lg %r7,0(%r2,%r3) // ap[i]
+ lg %r7,0(%r3) // ap[0]
+ lg %r9,8(%r3) // ap[1]
mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w
- alcgr %r7,%r8 // +=carry
- alcgr %r6,zero
- alg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // +=rp[i]
- stg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // rp[i]=
+ brct %r4,.Loop4_madd
+ j .Loop4_madd_tail
- lg %r9,8(%r2,%r3)
+.Loop4_madd:
mlgr %r8,%r5
+ lg %r11,16(%r3) // ap[i+2]
+ alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry
+ alcgr %r6,zero
+ alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i]
+ stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]=
+
+ mlgr %r10,%r5
+ lg %r13,24(%r3)
alcgr %r9,%r6
alcgr %r8,zero
- alg %r9,8(%r2,%r1)
- stg %r9,8(%r2,%r1)
+ alg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+ stg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+
+ mlgr %r12,%r5
+ lg %r7,32(%r3)
+ alcgr %r11,%r8
+ alcgr %r10,zero
+ alg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+ stg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
- lg %r7,16(%r2,%r3)
mlgr %r6,%r5
- alcgr %r7,%r8
- alcgr %r6,zero
- alg %r7,16(%r2,%r1)
- stg %r7,16(%r2,%r1)
+ lg %r9,40(%r3)
+ alcgr %r13,%r10
+ alcgr %r12,zero
+ alg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+ stg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
- lg %r9,24(%r2,%r3)
+ la %r3,32(%r3) // i+=4
+ brct %r4,.Loop4_madd
+
+.Loop4_madd_tail:
mlgr %r8,%r5
+ lg %r11,16(%r3)
+ alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry
+ alcgr %r6,zero
+ alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i]
+ stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]=
+
+ mlgr %r10,%r5
+ lg %r13,24(%r3)
alcgr %r9,%r6
alcgr %r8,zero
- alg %r9,24(%r2,%r1)
- stg %r9,24(%r2,%r1)
+ alg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+ stg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
- la %r2,32(%r2) // i+=4
- brct %r4,.Loop4_madd
+ mlgr %r12,%r5
+ alcgr %r11,%r8
+ alcgr %r10,zero
+ alg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+ stg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
- la %r10,1(%r10) // see if len%4 is zero ...
- brct %r10,.Loop1_madd // without touching condition code:-)
+ alcgr %r13,%r10
+ alcgr %r12,zero
+ alg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+ stg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+
+ la %r3,32(%r3) // i+=4
+
+ la %r2,1(%r2) // see if len%4 is zero ...
+ brct %r2,.Loop1_madd // without touching condition code:-)
.Lend_madd:
- alcgr %r8,zero // collect carry bit
- lgr %r2,%r8
- lmg %r6,%r10,48(%r15)
+ lgr %r2,zero // return value
+ alcgr %r2,%r12 // collect even carry bit
+ lmg %r6,%r13,48(%r15)
br %r14
.Loop1_madd:
- lg %r7,0(%r2,%r3) // ap[i]
+ lg %r7,0(%r3) // ap[i]
mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w
- alcgr %r7,%r8 // +=carry
+ alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry
alcgr %r6,zero
- alg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // +=rp[i]
- stg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // rp[i]=
+ alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i]
+ stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]=
- lgr %r8,%r6
- la %r2,8(%r2) // i++
- brct %r10,.Loop1_madd
+ lgr %r12,%r6
+ la %r3,8(%r3) // i++
+ brct %r2,.Loop1_madd
j .Lend_madd
.size bn_mul_add_words,.-bn_mul_add_words
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
index 808a1e59691d..b57953027298 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
-# from one benchmark and -arch to another. Below are interval values
+# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
# code:
#
@@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
&push ("edi");
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1b1
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
&movq ("mm7",$R);
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0b0
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
&movq ("mm6",$R);
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&pxor ($R,"mm7");
&mov ($a,&wparam(0));
- &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)-a1b1-a0b0
+ &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
&movq ($A,$R);
&psllq ($R,32);
@@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1b1
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
&mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0b0
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&mov ("ebp",&wparam(0));
@r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
index d5488866e0cf..d77dc433d405 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
# undef mul_add
/*-
- * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath -code;
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
* "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it
* want to keep the value of zero;
*/
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
index 226c66c35e35..42bbec2fb7ef 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
# for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
-# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and -arch to another.
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
# Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
# [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
# 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5
- pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1b1
+ pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
pxor %xmm3,%xmm5
- pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0b0
- pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)
+ pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0
+ pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
xorps %xmm0,%xmm4
- xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)-a0b0-a1b1
+ xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
pslldq \$8,%xmm4
psrldq \$8,%xmm5
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov \$0xf,$mask
mov $a1,$a
mov $b1,$b
- call _mul_1x1 # a1b1
+ call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1
mov $lo,16(%rsp)
mov $hi,24(%rsp)
mov 48(%rsp),$a
mov 64(%rsp),$b
- call _mul_1x1 # a0b0
+ call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0
mov $lo,0(%rsp)
mov $hi,8(%rsp)
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 56(%rsp),$b
xor 48(%rsp),$a
xor 64(%rsp),$b
- call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)(b0+b1)
+ call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
___
@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
$code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
index 2989b58f256e..725833d022e2 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+ my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+ $addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
# int bn_mul_mont(
$rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp,
$ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap,
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 820de3d6f627..64e668f140c2 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+ my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+ $addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
# int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
$rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp,
$ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap,
@@ -1779,6 +1784,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
.align 32
.L8x_tail_done:
add (%rdx),%r8 # can this overflow?
+ adc \$0,%r9
+ adc \$0,%r10
+ adc \$0,%r11
+ adc \$0,%r12
+ adc \$0,%r13
+ adc \$0,%r14
+ adc \$0,%r15 # can't overflow, because we
+ # started with "overhung" part
+ # of multiplication
xor %rax,%rax
neg $carry
@@ -3125,6 +3139,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
.align 32
.Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
add 24+8(%rsp),%r8 # can this overflow?
+ adc \$0,%r9
+ adc \$0,%r10
+ adc \$0,%r11
+ adc \$0,%r12
+ adc \$0,%r13
+ adc \$0,%r14
+ adc \$0,%r15 # can't overflow, because we
+ # started with "overhung" part
+ # of multiplication
mov $carry,%rax # xor %rax,%rax
sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf
@@ -3168,13 +3191,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
$code.=<<___;
- xor %rbx,%rbx
+ xor %ebx,%ebx
sub %r15,%rsi # compare top-most words
adc %rbx,%rbx
mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num
- .byte 0x67
or %rbx,%rax
- .byte 0x67
mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num
xor \$1,%rax
sar \$3+2,%rcx # cf=0
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 24afdd60a227..50cf3231b07b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -662,12 +662,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bn_check_top(p);
bn_check_top(m);
- top = m->top;
-
- if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
+ if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return (0);
}
+
+ top = m->top;
+
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(rr);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
index 97c55ab72098..ce59fe701f9d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
*/
pB = &local_B;
+ local_B.flags = 0;
BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
goto err;
@@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
*/
pA = &local_A;
+ local_A.flags = 0;
BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index cfa1c7ce1499..2c61da11093f 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
bn_check_top(a);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- return 0;
+ goto err;
if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
goto err;
@@ -699,18 +699,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
int top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
- bn_wexpand(u, top);
+ if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
+ goto err;
udp = u->d;
for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
udp[i] = 0;
u->top = top;
- bn_wexpand(b, top);
+ if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
+ goto err;
bdp = b->d;
bdp[0] = 1;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bdp[i] = 0;
b->top = top;
- bn_wexpand(c, top);
+ if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
+ goto err;
cdp = c->d;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
cdp[i] = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index aadd5db1d8db..be95bd55d020 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
if (mont == NULL)
return;
- BN_free(&(mont->RR));
- BN_free(&(mont->N));
- BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+ BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+ BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+ BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
OPENSSL_free(mont);
}
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
+ if (BN_is_zero(mod))
+ return 0;
+
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
index 6826f93b3882..7497ac624d94 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
@@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
BN_zero(d);
- if (!BN_copy(r, m))
+ if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 0;
+ }
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return (1);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c b/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
index 6d76b1284e10..efa48bdf8772 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
* exceeded.
*/
if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
- return 0;
+ goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
- return 0;
+ goto err;
/* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return 0;
}
/*
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bntest.c b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
index 470d5dabf1ec..1e35988022bb 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
@@ -441,6 +441,14 @@ int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
BN_init(&d);
BN_init(&e);
+ BN_one(&a);
+ BN_zero(&b);
+
+ if (BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
if (i < num1) {
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
@@ -516,9 +524,9 @@ int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
do {
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
- s = b.d[0];
- } while (!s);
+ } while (BN_is_zero(&b));
+ s = b.d[0];
BN_copy(&b, &a);
r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
@@ -781,6 +789,18 @@ int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (mont == NULL)
return 0;
+ BN_zero(&n);
+ if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_set_word(&n, 16);
+ if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
@@ -887,6 +907,14 @@ int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_one(b);
+ BN_zero(c);
+ if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
@@ -952,6 +980,14 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_one(b);
+ BN_zero(c);
+ if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
@@ -980,6 +1016,24 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
}
}
+
+ /* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
+ BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
+ BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
+ BN_hex2bn(&c,
+ "4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
+ "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
+ "4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+ "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+ "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+ "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
+ BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
+ BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
+ if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
@@ -999,6 +1053,22 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_one(b);
+ BN_zero(c);
+ if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
+ "succeeded\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_set_word(c, 16);
+ if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
+ "succeeded\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
index 33361de99572..229e181f67b5 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
@@ -1,32 +1,44 @@
-/******************************************************************************
-* Copyright(c) 2012, Intel Corp.
-* Developers and authors:
-* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
-* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
-* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
+/*****************************************************************************
+* *
+* Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation *
+* *
+* All rights reserved. *
+* *
+* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without *
+* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are *
+* met: *
+* *
+* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright *
+* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. *
+* *
+* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright *
+* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the *
+* documentation and/or other materials provided with the *
+* distribution. *
+* *
+* * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its *
+* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from *
+* this software without specific prior written permission. *
+* *
+* *
+* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY *
+* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE *
+* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR *
+* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR *
+* CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, *
+* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, *
+* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR *
+* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF *
+* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING *
+* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS *
+* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. *
+* *
******************************************************************************
-* LICENSE:
-* This submission to OpenSSL is to be made available under the OpenSSL
-* license, and only to the OpenSSL project, in order to allow integration
-* into the publicly distributed code.
-* The use of this code, or portions of this code, or concepts embedded in
-* this code, or modification of this code and/or algorithm(s) in it, or the
-* use of this code for any other purpose than stated above, requires special
-* licensing.
-******************************************************************************
-* DISCLAIMER:
-* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS
-* ``AS IS''. ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
-* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR THE COPYRIGHT
-* OWNERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
-* OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
-* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
-* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
-* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
-* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-******************************************************************************/
+* Developers and authors: *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel *
+*****************************************************************************/
#ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
# define RSAZ_EXP_H
diff --git a/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c b/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
index ebc5ab4646ce..fa0d608e76bb 100644
--- a/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <limits.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
}
@@ -81,16 +82,22 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
char *ret;
if (str == NULL)
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
siz = BUF_strnlen(str, siz);
+ if (siz >= INT_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
- BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
+
+ memcpy(ret, str, siz);
+ ret[siz] = '\0';
+
return (ret);
}
@@ -98,13 +105,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
{
void *ret;
- if (data == NULL)
- return (NULL);
+ if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
+ return NULL;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
if (ret == NULL) {
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
}
diff --git a/crypto/buffer/buffer.h b/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
index c343dd772f1e..efd240a5f91e 100644
--- a/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
@@ -86,7 +86,13 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
+
+/*
+ * Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
+ * first |siz| bytes of |str|.
+ */
char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
+
void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index 85ae928a496f..b14b4b68b5c9 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
ok = 1;
err:
- if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
+ if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
ec->key = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index a8322dcdf1a6..b91c01691fec 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
/* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (encalg == NULL) {
+ goto merr;
+ }
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c b/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
index 721ffd5afb85..a41aca8e1277 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
@@ -857,6 +857,8 @@ int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain)
} else {
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&mctx);
pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL);
+ if (pkctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
index 5522a376acb6..07e3472e1079 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
BIO *cmsbio;
int ret = 0;
if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c b/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
index 6731af8b0d7b..9c32614d3c70 100644
--- a/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
+++ b/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
@@ -404,8 +404,9 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
{
#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
- if (zlib_dso)
+ if (zlib_dso != NULL)
DSO_free(zlib_dso);
+ zlib_dso = NULL;
#endif
}
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
index faca9aeb571b..68c77cec7d8b 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
@@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
goto err;
}
- section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
+ section = BUF_strdup("default");
if (section == NULL) {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);
if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
index 544fe9738719..c042cf222dc7 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+ openssl_configured = 1;
}
void OPENSSL_no_config()
diff --git a/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/cryptlib.c
index ca0e3ccc0c7a..c9f674ba8e62 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -953,13 +953,29 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
/* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
- HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL"));
- const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
- ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0);
- DeregisterEventSource(h);
+ HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
+
+ if (hEventLog != NULL) {
+ const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
+
+ if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
+ 1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+ /*
+ * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
+ * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
+ * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
+ * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
+ */
+ OutputDebugString(pmsg);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
+ }
} else
# endif
- MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP);
+ MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
}
#else
void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/dh/dh.h
index 0502f1a9cc14..b17767328183 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct dh_st {
BIGNUM *p;
BIGNUM *g;
long length; /* optional */
- BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x */
+ BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x % p */
BIGNUM *priv_key; /* x */
int flags;
BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dhtest.c b/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
index c9dd76bc75e1..6fe8ff4c0c49 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
@@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
* Work out shared secrets using both sides and compare with expected
* values.
*/
- if (!DH_compute_key(Z1, dhB->pub_key, dhA))
+ if (DH_compute_key(Z1, dhB->pub_key, dhA) == -1)
goto bad_err;
- if (!DH_compute_key(Z2, dhA->pub_key, dhB))
+ if (DH_compute_key(Z2, dhA->pub_key, dhB) == -1)
goto bad_err;
if (memcmp(Z1, td->Z, td->Z_len))
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index 2a5cd71371a7..c40e1777ade1 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+ prkey = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 5a328aaab5b4..15f3bb4f3f39 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -114,16 +114,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
}
# endif
else {
- const EVP_MD *evpmd;
- size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
-
- if (bits >= 2048) {
- qbits = 256;
- evpmd = EVP_sha256();
- } else {
- qbits = 160;
- evpmd = EVP_sha1();
- }
+ const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+ size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
@@ -176,13 +168,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
if (seed_in != NULL)
memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
- if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -203,7 +196,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
goto err;
- if (!seed_len) {
+ if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/Makefile b/crypto/ec/Makefile
index 359ef4e40fd4..89491454a441 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ec/Makefile
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ dclean:
mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
clean:
- rm -f *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
+ rm -f *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
diff --git a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
index 84379fce1cb9..648c969be621 100755
--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec.h b/crypto/ec/ec.h
index 6d3178f609f4..81e6faf6c5c5 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum {
/** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
* which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
- /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02 */
+ /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
* which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index 4ad8494981bf..33abf61f4441 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -970,8 +970,9 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
- if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
+ if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
return NULL;
@@ -989,6 +990,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
*a = group;
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+ *in = p;
return (group);
}
@@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
int ok = 0;
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
- if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
+ if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1096,6 +1099,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
if (a)
*a = ret;
+ *in = p;
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
index 55ce3fe9beb2..c784b6fd30a3 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+ int ok = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+#endif
if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
@@ -382,14 +385,15 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
if (!point)
goto err;
+ tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
is_char_two = 1;
- tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (is_char_two) {
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
x, y, ctx))
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h
index c4016ac3e19b..a6f0930f829c 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ void *ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx);
* \return pointer to a ECDSA_METHOD structure or NULL if an error occurred
*/
-ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method);
+ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(const ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method);
/** frees a ECDSA_METHOD structure
* \param ecdsa_method pointer to the ECDSA_METHOD structure
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
index 1c0231031850..8dc1dda46259 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ void *ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx)
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ecdsa->ex_data, idx));
}
-ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth)
+ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(const ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth)
{
ECDSA_METHOD *ret;
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index 926d95c0d7fc..8fb9c3373dd6 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -1292,15 +1292,18 @@ static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), r,
BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), s) == 0) {
dsaret = DSA_SIG_new();
+ if (dsaret == NULL)
+ goto err;
dsaret->r = r;
dsaret->s = s;
+ r = s = NULL;
} else {
const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
- BN_free(r);
- BN_free(s);
dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_sign) (dgst, dlen, dsa);
}
err:
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
zapparams(&kop);
return (dsaret);
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
index 3384e3182893..83c95d56f466 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
}
if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
+ return 0;
}
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
if (!engine_list_add(e)) {
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
index b1c586e6fd96..37800213c764 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
@@ -498,7 +498,18 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+ /*
+ * Assembly stitch handles AVX-capable processors, but its
+ * performance is not optimal on AMD Jaguar, ~40% worse, for
+ * unknown reasons. Incidentally processor in question supports
+ * AVX, but not AMD-specific XOP extension, which can be used
+ * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
+ * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
+ * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
+ */
if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */
+ ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */
+ | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) && /* "Intel CPU"? */
plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
(blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
@@ -816,8 +827,6 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return -1;
- len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
-
if (ctx->encrypt) {
key->payload_length = len;
if ((key->aux.tls_ver =
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_des3.c b/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
index 96f272eb8046..bf6c1d2d3d39 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
# endif
# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1)
- ! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2))
+ || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2))
return 0;
# else
DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c
index c361d1f01269..c6abc4ae8e47 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
-# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f])
#else
/*
* We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
* as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
*/
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
-# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f])
#endif
/*-
@@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
#define B64_WS 0xE0
#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
+#define B64_BASE64(a) !B64_NOT_BASE64(a)
static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
@@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
};
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+ if (a & 0x80)
+ return B64_ERROR;
+ return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#else
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+ a = os_toascii[a];
+ if (a & 0x80)
+ return B64_ERROR;
+ return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#endif
+
void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
{
ctx->length = 48;
@@ -218,8 +235,9 @@ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
{
- ctx->length = 30;
+ /* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
ctx->num = 0;
+ ctx->length = 0;
ctx->line_num = 0;
ctx->expect_nl = 0;
}
@@ -228,139 +246,123 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
* -1 for error
* 0 for last line
* 1 for full line
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
+ * content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
+ * in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
+ * rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
+ * content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
+ * we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
+ * - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
+ * - Input has zero-length.
+ * -1 is returned if:
+ * - Invalid characters are detected.
+ * - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
+ * - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
*/
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
- int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl;
+ int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
unsigned char *d;
n = ctx->num;
d = ctx->enc_data;
- ln = ctx->line_num;
- exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
- /* last line of input. */
- if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) {
+ if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
+ eof++;
+ if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
+ eof++;
+ }
+
+ /* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
+ if (inl == 0) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
}
- /* We parse the input data */
for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
- /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream a lot */
- if (ln >= 80) {
- rv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* Get char and put it into the buffer */
tmp = *(in++);
v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
- /* only save the good data :-) */
- if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
- OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
- d[n++] = tmp;
- ln++;
- } else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
+ if (v == B64_ERROR) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
- /*
- * have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line. seof
- * will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how
- * many characters to chop off.
- */
if (tmp == '=') {
- if (seof == -1)
- seof = n;
eof++;
+ } else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
+ /* More data after padding. */
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- if (v == B64_CR) {
- ln = 0;
- if (exp_nl)
- continue;
+ if (eof > 2) {
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- /* eoln */
- if (v == B64_EOLN) {
- ln = 0;
- if (exp_nl) {
- exp_nl = 0;
- continue;
- }
- }
- exp_nl = 0;
-
- /*
- * If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process
- * it.
- */
- if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
- v = B64_EOF;
- /*
- * In case things were given us in really small records (so two
- * '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the
- * incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the
- * count
- */
- eof = 0;
- if (d[n - 1] == '=')
- eof++;
- if (d[n - 2] == '=')
- eof++;
- /* There will never be more than two '=' */
+ if (v == B64_EOF) {
+ seof = 1;
+ goto tail;
}
- if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) {
- /*
- * This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines. We
- * process the line and then need to accept the '\n'
- */
- if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64))
- exp_nl = 1;
- if (n > 0) {
- v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
- n = 0;
- if (v < 0) {
- rv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if (eof > v) {
- rv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- ret += (v - eof);
- } else {
- eof = 1;
- v = 0;
+ /* Only save valid base64 characters. */
+ if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
+ if (n >= 64) {
+ /*
+ * We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
+ * we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
+ * manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
+ */
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
}
+ OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+ d[n++] = tmp;
+ }
- /*
- * This is the case where we have had a short but valid input
- * line
- */
- if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) {
- rv = 0;
+ if (n == 64) {
+ decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+ n = 0;
+ if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+ rv = -1;
goto end;
- } else
- ctx->length = v;
+ }
+ ret += decoded_len - eof;
+ out += decoded_len - eof;
+ }
+ }
- if (seof >= 0) {
- rv = 0;
+ /*
+ * Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
+ * 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
+ * behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
+ */
+tail:
+ if (n > 0) {
+ if ((n & 3) == 0) {
+ decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+ n = 0;
+ if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+ rv = -1;
goto end;
}
- out += v;
+ ret += (decoded_len - eof);
+ } else if (seof) {
+ /* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
}
}
- rv = 1;
- end:
+
+ rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
+end:
+ /* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
*outl = ret;
ctx->num = n;
- ctx->line_num = ln;
- ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
return (rv);
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_key.c b/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
index 71fa627b20d3..5be9e336f9e7 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
prompt = prompt_string;
ui = UI_new();
+ if (ui == NULL)
+ return -1;
UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
(len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
if (verify)
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
for (;;) {
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
- return 0;
+ goto err;
if (addmd++)
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
goto err;
@@ -188,6 +190,6 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
rv = type->key_len;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
return rv;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index a53a27ca0c92..7e0bab90d49a 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -72,11 +72,22 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) {
- ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+ case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(c) == NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap)
+ ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
ret = 1;
- } else
+ break;
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
+ }
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
@@ -89,9 +100,22 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
- return 1;
- ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
+ break;
+ }
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c b/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
index e3fa95db9289..7934c95fad0c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
@@ -228,12 +228,16 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
{
EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
- if (!pbe_algs)
+
+ if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
- if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ if (pbe_algs == NULL)
+ goto err;
}
+
+ if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
@@ -242,6 +246,10 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
return 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index 1171d3086d0b..c0171244d5d0 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
{
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
+ if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
return 0;
pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
return (key != NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
index 59f81342e94d..6435f1b632cf 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
@@ -96,12 +96,17 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
return -1;
}
- if (!ppkey)
+ if (ppkey == NULL)
return -1;
- if (!*ppkey)
+ if (*ppkey == NULL)
*ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (*ppkey == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
if (ret <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c b/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
index 29b2b5dffcf7..944c6c857b17 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
@@ -108,9 +108,14 @@ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
- return 0;
- EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os);
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
+ goto err;
return 1;
+
+ err:
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ return 0;
}
static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
diff --git a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
index 8c38727e20fd..ebc09755756d 100644
--- a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
+++ b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
@@ -219,6 +219,9 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
int ret = 0;
+ if (h == NULL || t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL || t3 == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name);
/* t1 = g^b */
@@ -234,6 +237,7 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
else
JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
+end:
/* cleanup */
BN_free(t3);
BN_free(t2);
diff --git a/crypto/mem_clr.c b/crypto/mem_clr.c
index 3df1f3928d06..1a06636d0ce8 100644
--- a/crypto/mem_clr.c
+++ b/crypto/mem_clr.c
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *p = ptr;
size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
+
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ return;
+
while (loop--) {
*(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
index 7e4e04ea2530..4be25571ea28 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
index 77fbf34465db..8ccc963ef297 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
# processes one byte in 8.45 cycles, A9 - in 10.2, Snapdragon S4 -
# in 9.33.
#
-# Cmara, D.; Gouva, C. P. L.; Lpez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
# Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
#
# http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -126,6 +126,11 @@ $code=<<___;
.text
.code 32
+#ifdef __clang__
+#define ldrplb ldrbpl
+#define ldrneb ldrbne
+#endif
+
.type rem_4bit,%object
.align 5
rem_4bit:
@@ -432,12 +437,12 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
veor $IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi
.Lgmult_neon:
___
- &clmul64x64 ($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo"); # H.loXi.lo
+ &clmul64x64 ($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo"); # H.lo·Xi.lo
$code.=<<___;
veor $IN#lo,$IN#lo,$IN#hi @ Karatsuba pre-processing
___
- &clmul64x64 ($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo"); # (H.lo+H.hi)(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
- &clmul64x64 ($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi"); # H.hiXi.hi
+ &clmul64x64 ($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo"); # (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+ &clmul64x64 ($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi"); # H.hi·Xi.hi
$code.=<<___;
veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xl @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xh
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
index 0365e0f1ff42..5bc28702019a 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ gcm_init_vis3:
or $V,%lo(0xA0406080),$V
or %l0,%lo(0x20C0E000),%l0
sllx $V,32,$V
- or %l0,$V,$V ! (0xE0i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+ or %l0,$V,$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
stx $V,[%i0+16]
ret
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
mov 0xE1,%l7
sllx %l7,57,$xE1 ! 57 is not a typo
- ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+ ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
xor $Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl ! Karatsuba pre-processing
xmulx $Xlo,$Hlo,$C0
@@ -411,9 +411,9 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
xmulx $Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
sll $C0,3,$sqr
- srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! 0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+ srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
xor $C0,$sqr,$sqr
- sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C00xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+ sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
xor $C0,$C1,$C1 ! Karatsuba post-processing
xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
xor $Xhi,$C2,$C2
xor $Xhi,$C1,$C1
- xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! 0xE1<<1<<56
+ xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56
xor $C0,$C2,$C2
xmulx $C1,$xE1,$C0
xor $C1,$C3,$C3
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
mov 0xE1,%l7
sllx %l7,57,$xE1 ! 57 is not a typo
- ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+ ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
and $inp,7,$shl
andn $inp,7,$inp
@@ -490,9 +490,9 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
xmulx $Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
sll $C0,3,$sqr
- srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! 0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+ srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
xor $C0,$sqr,$sqr
- sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C00xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+ sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
xor $C0,$C1,$C1 ! Karatsuba post-processing
xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
xor $Xhi,$C2,$C2
xor $Xhi,$C1,$C1
- xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! 0xE1<<1<<56
+ xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56
xor $C0,$C2,$C2
xmulx $C1,$xE1,$C0
xor $C1,$C3,$C3
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
index 23a5527b30af..0269169fa743 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ $S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit
# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
-# on contemporary -archs.
+# on contemporary µ-archs.
{
my $cnt;
my $rem_4bit = "eax";
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
index 6e656ca13b80..0bcb6d4e028b 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
@@ -576,15 +576,15 @@ $code.=<<___ if (0 || (&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi)&&0));
# experimental alternative. special thing about is that there
# no dependency between the two multiplications...
mov \$`0xE1<<1`,%eax
- mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10 # ((7..0)0xE0)&0xff
+ mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10 # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
mov \$0x07,%r11d
movq %rax,$T1
movq %r10,$T2
movq %r11,$T3 # borrow $T3
pand $Xi,$T3
- pshufb $T3,$T2 # ($Xi&7)0xE0
+ pshufb $T3,$T2 # ($Xi&7)·0xE0
movq %rax,$T3
- pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Xi,$T1 # (0xE1<<1)
+ pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Xi,$T1 # ·(0xE1<<1)
pxor $Xi,$T2
pslldq \$15,$T2
paddd $T2,$T2 # <<(64+56+1)
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
je .Lskip4x
sub \$0x30,$len
- mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax # ((7..0)0xE0)&0xff
+ mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
movdqu 0x30($Htbl),$Hkey3
movdqu 0x40($Htbl),$Hkey4
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
index e76a58c343c1..71457cf4fc59 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ $code=<<___;
le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
vxor $zero,$zero,$zero
- vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.loXi.lo
- vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hiXi.lo+H.loXi.hi
- vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hiXi.hi
+ vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo
+ vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
+ vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st phase
@@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ $code=<<___;
.align 5
Loop:
subic $len,$len,16
- vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.loXi.lo
+ vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo
subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0
- vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hiXi.lo+H.loXi.hi
+ vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
and r0,r0,$len
- vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hiXi.hi
+ vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi
add $inp,$inp,r0
vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st phase
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
index 0b9cd7359fba..0886d2180702 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
@@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
#endif
vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
- vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.loXi.lo
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
- vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hiXi.hi
- vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
+ vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
#endif
vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ I[i]^=Xi
- vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ HIi+1
+ vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In
b .Loop_mod2x_v8
@@ -235,14 +235,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop_mod2x_v8:
vext.8 $t2,$IN,$IN,#8
subs $len,$len,#32 @ is there more data?
- vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.loXi.lo
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.lo·Xi.lo
cclr $inc,lo @ is it time to zero $inc?
vpmull.p64 $Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
veor $t2,$t2,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
- vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hiXi.hi
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hi·Xi.hi
veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xln @ accumulate
- vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+2]
veor $Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
- vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ HIi+1
+ vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
veor $IN,$IN,$Xh @ accumulate $IN early
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
@@ -291,10 +291,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi
veor $t1,$t0,$t2 @ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
- vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.loXi.lo
+ vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
- vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hiXi.hi
- vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+ vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
+ vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
diff --git a/crypto/modes/wrap128.c b/crypto/modes/wrap128.c
index 4dcaf0326fa8..384978371af2 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/wrap128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/wrap128.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
return 0;
A = B;
t = 1;
- memcpy(out + 8, in, inlen);
+ memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
if (!iv)
iv = default_iv;
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
A = B;
t = 6 * (inlen >> 3);
memcpy(A, in, 8);
- memcpy(out, in + 8, inlen);
+ memmove(out, in + 8, inlen);
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
R = out + inlen - 8;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8) {
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
index 442a5b63d4ba..cabf53933a44 100755
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
@@ -246,12 +246,6 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
*p = 0;
port = p + 1;
- } else {
- /* Not found: set default port */
- if (*pssl)
- port = "443";
- else
- port = "80";
}
*pport = BUF_strdup(port);
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
index 1834256af271..47d5f83ef9b0 100644
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
@@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
return 1;
}
- i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response);
- if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)))
+ if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
goto err;
rd = br->tbsResponseData;
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);
diff --git a/crypto/opensslconf.h b/crypto/opensslconf.h
index 15487c9f93be..b4d522e68505 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslconf.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslconf.h
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ extern "C" {
optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
-#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
# define DES_PTR
# define DES_RISC1
# define DES_UNROLL
diff --git a/crypto/opensslconf.h.in b/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
index 814309becb6c..7a1c85d6ec9d 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
+++ b/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
-#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
# define DES_PTR
# define DES_RISC1
# define DES_UNROLL
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index c06b13ac6b0f..abcef15b17d9 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000204fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000205fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2d-fips 9 Jul 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2e-fips 3 Dec 2015"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2d 9 Jul 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
index 68747d162586..4d736a1d07e5 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
xi->enc_len = 0;
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+ if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
@@ -193,6 +195,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
xi->enc_len = 0;
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+ if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
@@ -214,6 +218,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
xi->enc_len = 0;
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+ if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index ee4b6a8241cc..82d45273ed16 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -624,13 +624,11 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
- length -= 20;
} else {
if (length < 24) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
- length -= 24;
pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
@@ -692,23 +690,23 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
if (inlen <= 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
if (!enctmp) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
(unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
p += saltlen;
/* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
p += 8;
if (keylen < 8) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
inlen = keylen - 8;
q = enctmp + 8;
diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl b/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl
index f89e81429931..0f46cf06bcb8 100755
--- a/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl
+++ b/crypto/perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl
@@ -151,6 +151,26 @@ my $vmr = sub {
" vor $vx,$vy,$vy";
};
+# Some ABIs specify vrsave, special-purpose register #256, as reserved
+# for system use.
+my $no_vrsave = ($flavour =~ /aix|linux64le/);
+my $mtspr = sub {
+ my ($f,$idx,$ra) = @_;
+ if ($idx == 256 && $no_vrsave) {
+ " or $ra,$ra,$ra";
+ } else {
+ " mtspr $idx,$ra";
+ }
+};
+my $mfspr = sub {
+ my ($f,$rd,$idx) = @_;
+ if ($idx == 256 && $no_vrsave) {
+ " li $rd,-1";
+ } else {
+ " mfspr $rd,$idx";
+ }
+};
+
# PowerISA 2.06 stuff
sub vsxmem_op {
my ($f, $vrt, $ra, $rb, $op) = @_;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
index 982805d988de..d9f03a39fd15 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
@@ -75,15 +75,19 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
safebag->value.bag = bag;
safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
return safebag;
+
+ err:
+ PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag);
+ return NULL;
}
/* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
@@ -127,6 +131,7 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
p8))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
return NULL;
}
@@ -144,14 +149,18 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
return p7;
+
+ err:
+ PKCS7_free(p7);
+ return NULL;
}
/* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
@@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
@@ -193,7 +202,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
if (!pbe) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
@@ -202,10 +211,14 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
passlen, bags, 1))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
return p7;
+
+ err:
+ PKCS7_free(p7);
+ return NULL;
}
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
index 3a166e613003..9c2dcab02463 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
const unsigned char *pbuf;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
/* Extract useful info from parameter */
if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
param->value.sequence == NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 5ab4bf290e14..a9277827ff2d 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
}
if (!saltlen)
saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
- p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
- if (!(p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen))) {
+ if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
+ p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
if (!salt) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index c8d7db01bd73..946aaa65435b 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
else {
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ goto err;
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
}
if (bio == NULL)
@@ -1156,7 +1158,6 @@ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx)
rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
if (rsk == NULL)
return NULL;
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0);
if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx)
return (NULL);
ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx);
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
index dbd4100c8d02..c4d3724d2a48 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
char buf[4096];
int i, j = 0, k, ret = 0;
- BIO *p7bio;
- BIO *tmpin, *tmpout;
+ BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+ BIO *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;
if (!p7) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
@@ -274,18 +274,12 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
return 0;
}
-#if 0
- /*
- * NB: this test commented out because some versions of Netscape
- * illegally include zero length content when signing data.
- */
/* Check for data and content: two sets of data */
if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT);
return 0;
}
-#endif
sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
@@ -295,7 +289,6 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
}
signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, certs, flags);
-
if (!signers)
return 0;
@@ -308,14 +301,12 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer,
p7->d.sign->cert)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- sk_X509_free(signers);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&cert_ctx, "smime_sign");
} else if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, NULL)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- sk_X509_free(signers);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCRL))
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, p7->d.sign->crl);
@@ -328,8 +319,7 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
- sk_X509_free(signers);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
/* Check for revocation status here */
}
@@ -348,7 +338,7 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
if (tmpin == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
} else
tmpin = indata;
@@ -398,15 +388,12 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
ret = 1;
err:
-
if (tmpin == indata) {
if (indata)
BIO_pop(p7bio);
}
BIO_free_all(p7bio);
-
sk_X509_free(signers);
-
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ppccap.c b/crypto/ppccap.c
index 2b7f704cd82a..74af4732b5fa 100644
--- a/crypto/ppccap.c
+++ b/crypto/ppccap.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
#if defined(__linux) || defined(_AIX)
# include <sys/utsname.h>
#endif
-#include <crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ppc_arch.h"
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
index 75750dbf334d..20722d3e7246 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
# achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
# If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
# RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
-# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU -arch detection
+# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection
# is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
# preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index ca3922e6c298..4e0621827cf3 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int plen;
- if (alg == NULL)
+ if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL)
return NULL;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 2465fbdebf19..7f7dca39fd08 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
+extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_GENCB *cb);
#endif
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
- return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+ return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
#endif
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 19461c6364d4..82ca8324dfbc 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -218,14 +218,13 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
*prm_len = 16;
ret = 1;
- } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
+ } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- else
+ } else {
ret = 1;
- }
-
- /* Special case: SSL signature */
- if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ }
+ } else if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ /* Special case: SSL signature */
if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
else
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
index e9712953e993..85c7440b8c68 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
@@ -297,22 +297,30 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
} else
printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
- /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */
+ /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */
for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
- int b;
- unsigned char saved = ctext[n];
- for (b = 0; b < 256; ++b) {
- if (b == saved)
- continue;
- ctext[n] = b;
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
+ ctext[n] ^= 1;
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key,
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if (num > 0) {
- printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
- err = 1;
- }
+ if (num > 0) {
+ printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ break;
}
+ ctext[n] ^= 1;
}
+
+ /* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */
+ for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) {
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num > 0) {
+ printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
next:
RSA_free(key);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
index 4895eb3ddf85..e0b5d83b6201 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
# switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
# comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
# 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
-# pair of -ops, and it's the additional -ops, two per round, that
+# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
# make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
-# as single -op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
+# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
# equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
# cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
# to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
index a8ee075eaaa0..f856bb888b0e 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
index 9bb6b498190f..9a6acc347d33 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
index 6462e45ba75b..e9077143817c 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
# SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007.
#
# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
-# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some -archs, but
+# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
#
# May 2012.
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
index adf2ddccd18b..3d37ae31ad3e 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
index e96ec00314a4..2f6a202c3765 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
#
# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
-# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer -archs improvement varies from 15%
+# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
# to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
# code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
# code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
index fc0e15b3c059..6cad72e25573 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
# SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
# PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the
# code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit
-# code path delivering adequate peformance even in "blended" 32-bit
+# code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit
# build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by
# vendor compiler on PA-8600...
#
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
index b7b44b441136..58665667f149 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
diff --git a/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
index eea2006fba18..7b12ec293154 100644
--- a/crypto/sparccpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
fmovs %f1,%f3
fmovs %f0,%f2
- add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to callers top of stack
+ add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack
ret
restore
diff --git a/crypto/sparcv9cap.c b/crypto/sparcv9cap.c
index 8bf2846929b1..a36e46179294 100644
--- a/crypto/sparcv9cap.c
+++ b/crypto/sparcv9cap.c
@@ -237,6 +237,17 @@ static void common_handler(int sig)
siglongjmp(common_jmp, sig);
}
+#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+extern unsigned int getisax(unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz) __attribute__ ((weak));
+# elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+#pragma weak getisax
+extern unsigned int getisax(unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz);
+# else
+static unsigned int (*getisax) (unsigned int vec[], unsigned int sz) = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
{
char *e;
@@ -255,6 +266,42 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
return;
}
+#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)
+ if (getisax != NULL) {
+ unsigned int vec[1];
+
+ if (getisax (vec,1)) {
+ if (vec[0]&0x0020) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS1;
+ if (vec[0]&0x0040) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS2;
+ if (vec[0]&0x0080) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_BLK;
+ if (vec[0]&0x0100) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_FMADD;
+ if (vec[0]&0x0400) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_VIS3;
+
+ /* reconstruct %cfr copy */
+ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] = (vec[0]>>17)&0x3ff;
+ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]&CFR_MONTMUL)<<1;
+ if (vec[0]&0x20000000) OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] |= CFR_CRC32C;
+
+ /* Some heuristics */
+ /* all known VIS2-capable CPUs have unprivileged tick counter */
+ if (OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]&SPARCV9_VIS2)
+ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED;
+
+ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU;
+
+ /* detect UltraSPARC-Tx, see sparccpud.S for details... */
+ if ((OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]&SPARCV9_VIS1) &&
+ _sparcv9_vis1_instrument() >= 12)
+ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] &= ~(SPARCV9_VIS1 | SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU);
+ }
+
+ if (sizeof(size_t) == 8)
+ OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] |= SPARCV9_64BIT_STACK;
+
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Initial value, fits UltraSPARC-I&II... */
OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0] = SPARCV9_PREFER_FPU | SPARCV9_TICK_PRIVILEGED;
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 50f75d7e4c9f..a3f1a8a0a4d5 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -521,12 +521,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
{
int len;
- char *result = NULL;
- char *vf;
+ char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
char *defgNid = NULL;
+ int vfsize = 0;
if ((user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
@@ -564,22 +564,23 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
- if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL))
+ vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
+ if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
goto err;
t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
- *verifier = vf;
if (*salt == NULL) {
char *tmp_salt;
if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(vf);
goto err;
}
t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
*salt = tmp_salt;
}
+ *verifier = vf;
+ vf = NULL;
result = defgNid;
err:
@@ -587,11 +588,21 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
BN_free(N_bn);
BN_free(g_bn);
}
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
+ OPENSSL_free(vf);
+ BN_clear_free(s);
+ BN_clear_free(v);
return result;
}
/*
- * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
+ * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
+ * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
+ * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
+ * random salt.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
+ * BIGNUMS.
*/
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
@@ -600,6 +611,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+ BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
if ((user == NULL) ||
(pass == NULL) ||
@@ -614,10 +626,12 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
goto err;
- *salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ } else {
+ salttmp = *salt;
}
- x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass);
+ x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
*verifier = BN_new();
if (*verifier == NULL)
@@ -631,9 +645,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
srp_bn_print(*verifier);
result = 1;
+ *salt = salttmp;
err:
-
+ if (*salt != salttmp)
+ BN_clear_free(salttmp);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
return result;
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 3ce765dfa1b6..da8991173ced 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
TS_failure_info[i].code)) {
if (!first)
- strcpy(failure_text, ",");
+ strcat(failure_text, ",");
else
first = 0;
strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text);
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
index c584e5b92b25..7725951d6b71 100755
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
# table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
# minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
# channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
-# gap among different -archs is smaller.
+# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
#
# Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
# whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index b0d653903ff5..50120a4d70c6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -536,8 +536,6 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- /* Check cache first */
- idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
/*
* Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index a2f1dbefe352..ab94948f0135 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
- return ok;
+ goto end;
/*
* If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
* again later.
@@ -347,14 +347,15 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
- return ok;
+ goto end;
if (ok == 0)
break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ ok = 0;
+ goto end;
}
num++;
}
@@ -752,6 +753,10 @@ static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
char *name;
+ if (id->peername != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
+ id->peername = NULL;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index 1ea0c69f5743..592a8a5f6a5c 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
}
if (paramid->peername)
OPENSSL_free(paramid->peername);
+ paramid->peername = NULL;
if (paramid->email) {
OPENSSL_free(paramid->email);
paramid->email = NULL;
@@ -165,7 +166,6 @@ static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
paramid->ip = NULL;
paramid->iplen = 0;
}
-
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
@@ -176,13 +176,20 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(void)
param = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *param);
if (!param)
return NULL;
- paramid = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *paramid);
+ memset(param, 0, sizeof(*param));
+
+ paramid = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*paramid));
if (!paramid) {
OPENSSL_free(param);
return NULL;
}
- memset(param, 0, sizeof *param);
- memset(paramid, 0, sizeof *paramid);
+ memset(paramid, 0, sizeof(*paramid));
+ /* Exotic platforms may have non-zero bit representation of NULL */
+ paramid->hosts = NULL;
+ paramid->peername = NULL;
+ paramid->email = NULL;
+ paramid->ip = NULL;
+
param->id = paramid;
x509_verify_param_zero(param);
return param;
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
index 0febc1b3edc1..d97f6226b9ee 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
goto err;
}
pol = POLICYINFO_new();
+ if (pol == NULL) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
pol->policyid = pobj;
}
if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
index b97ed271e3e2..2855269668be 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
}
tval.value = val->value;
sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
+ if (sub == NULL)
+ goto memerr;
if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
goto err;
if (!*ptree)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
index fe0d8063d1f1..48ac0959cb10 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
*/
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Hgskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
index 350b39889fcc..43fd362aeda0 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
*/
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Hgskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 36b0d87a0d8b..845be673b799 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -380,6 +380,14 @@ static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
}
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
{
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
@@ -499,7 +507,8 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
/* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
- if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK)
+ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+ !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
}
x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
@@ -538,14 +547,6 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
*/
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
-#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
{
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
index 6e0b8d6844c8..0b7c68180e78 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
@@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ static STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a,
SCT *sct;
unsigned char *p, *p2;
unsigned short listlen, sctlen = 0, fieldlen;
+ const unsigned char *q = *pp;
- if (d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, pp, length) == NULL)
+ if (d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&oct, &q, length) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (oct->length < 2)
goto done;
@@ -279,6 +280,7 @@ static STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a,
done:
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(oct);
+ *pp = q;
return sk;
err:
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
index bdd7b95f4570..4d1ecc58bf94 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
X509_NAME *name = NULL;
int i;
- int cnid;
+ int cnid = NID_undef;
int alt_type;
int san_present = 0;
int rv = 0;
@@ -949,7 +949,6 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
else
equal = equal_wildcard;
} else {
- cnid = 0;
alt_type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
equal = equal_case;
}
@@ -980,11 +979,16 @@ static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
if (rv != 0)
return rv;
- if (!cnid
+ if (cnid == NID_undef
|| (san_present
&& !(flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT)))
return 0;
}
+
+ /* We're done if CN-ID is not pertinent */
+ if (cnid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
i = -1;
name = X509_get_subject_name(x);
while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, cnid, i)) >= 0) {
diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
index 7ae2a3a11833..ba0314fafce0 100644
--- a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
+++ b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
@@ -40,9 +40,8 @@ consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
3. To generate a DSA key
-A DSA key can be used for signing only. This is important to keep
-in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with a
-DSA key can really be used for.
+A DSA key can be used for signing only. It is important to
+know what a certificate request with a DSA key can really be used for.
Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process. First,
you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key:
diff --git a/doc/README b/doc/README
index 6ecc14d99457..cc760402ae9b 100644
--- a/doc/README
+++ b/doc/README
@@ -1,12 +1,21 @@
- apps/openssl.pod .... Documentation of OpenSSL `openssl' command
- crypto/crypto.pod ... Documentation of OpenSSL crypto.h+libcrypto.a
- ssl/ssl.pod ......... Documentation of OpenSSL ssl.h+libssl.a
- openssl.txt ......... Assembled documentation files for OpenSSL [not final]
- ssleay.txt .......... Assembled documentation of ancestor SSLeay [obsolete]
- standards.txt ....... Assembled pointers to standards, RFCs or internet drafts
- that are related to OpenSSL.
+README This file
- An archive of HTML documents for the SSLeay library is available from
- http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/
+fingerprints.txt
+ PGP fingerprints of authoried release signers
+standards.txt
+ Pointers to standards, RFC's and IETF Drafts that are
+ related to OpenSSL. Incomplete.
+
+HOWTO/
+ A few how-to documents; not necessarily up-to-date
+apps/
+ The openssl command-line tools; start with openssl.pod
+ssl/
+ The SSL library; start with ssl.pod
+crypto/
+ The cryptographic library; start with crypto.pod
+
+Formatted versions of the manpages (apps,ssl,crypto) can be found at
+ https://www.openssl.org/docs/manpages.html
diff --git a/doc/apps/dgst.pod b/doc/apps/dgst.pod
index 9e15798d8279..b27bb946b1b2 100644
--- a/doc/apps/dgst.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/dgst.pod
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ B<openssl> B<dgst>
[B<-hex>]
[B<-binary>]
[B<-r>]
-[B<-hmac arg>]
[B<-non-fips-allow>]
[B<-out filename>]
[B<-sign filename>]
@@ -64,10 +63,6 @@ output the digest or signature in binary form.
output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
-=item B<-hmac arg>
-
-set the HMAC key to "arg".
-
=item B<-non-fips-allow>
Allow use of non FIPS digest when in FIPS mode. This has no effect when not in
diff --git a/doc/apps/genrsa.pod b/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
index cb03d09b95eb..3dc9870f34b9 100644
--- a/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
@@ -10,12 +10,6 @@ B<openssl> B<genrsa>
[B<-out filename>]
[B<-passout arg>]
[B<-aes128>]
-[B<-aes128>]
-[B<-aes192>]
-[B<-aes256>]
-[B<-camellia128>]
-[B<-camellia192>]
-[B<-camellia256>]
[B<-aes192>]
[B<-aes256>]
[B<-camellia128>]
diff --git a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
index 8e0d91798ac4..744984838dc7 100644
--- a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2.
these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and
certificates to be selected. Any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 PBE algorithm name
-can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a a cipher name
+can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a cipher name
(as output by the B<list-cipher-algorithms> command is specified then it
is used with PKCS#5 v2.0. For interoperability reasons it is advisable to only
use PKCS#12 algorithms.
diff --git a/doc/apps/req.pod b/doc/apps/req.pod
index df68cb0921fd..54a4d394d282 100644
--- a/doc/apps/req.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/req.pod
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ B<openssl> B<req>
[B<-keygen_engine id>]
[B<-[digest]>]
[B<-config filename>]
-[B<-subj arg>]
[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
[B<-x509>]
[B<-days n>]
@@ -490,7 +489,7 @@ be input by calling it "1.organizationName".
The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or
long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual
values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName,
-organizationUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
+organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier.
Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or
@@ -506,16 +505,16 @@ Examine and verify certificate request:
Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
- openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
+ openssl genrsa -out key.pem 2048
openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
The same but just using req:
- openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+ openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
Generate a self signed root certificate:
- openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
@@ -531,7 +530,7 @@ expansion:
Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
[ req ]
- default_bits = 1024
+ default_bits = 2048
default_keyfile = privkey.pem
distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
attributes = req_attributes
@@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ Sample configuration containing all field values:
RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd
[ req ]
- default_bits = 1024
+ default_bits = 2048
default_keyfile = keyfile.pem
distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
attributes = req_attributes
diff --git a/doc/apps/x509.pod b/doc/apps/x509.pod
index a1326edeefb6..26f71c883295 100644
--- a/doc/apps/x509.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/x509.pod
@@ -539,7 +539,8 @@ very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in
"space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it
more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for
the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also
-indents the fields by four characters.
+indents the fields by four characters. If no field separator is specified
+then B<sep_comma_plus_space> is used by default.
=item B<dn_rev>
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
index b34528104ddf..2c177f0b6d86 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions
#include <openssl/bio.h>
int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len);
- int BIO_gets(BIO *b,char *buf, int size);
+ int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size);
int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len);
- int BIO_puts(BIO *b,const char *buf);
+ int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all.
BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
-BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>
+BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
index bd6bc8632394..e8cbf658b47d 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand, BN_rand_range, BN_pseudo_rand_range - generate pseudo-r
=head1 DESCRIPTION
BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of
-B<bits> bits in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the
+B<bits> in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the
most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0,
it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of
the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
+number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
index 16a67f22b0c4..b1a4d201b75c 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ maximum of 1024 bits.
If B<seed> is B<NULL> or B<seed_len> E<lt> 20, the primes will be
generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate
them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random
-seed is chosen and placed at B<seed>.
+seed is chosen.
DSA_generate_parameters_ex() places the iteration count in
*B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod b/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
index 954af469d5aa..49dc01ced147 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ EC_GROUP_get0_seed returns a pointer to the seed that was used to generate the p
specified. EC_GROUP_get_seed_len returns the length of the seed or 0 if the seed is not specified.
EC_GROUP_set_seed returns the length of the seed that has been set. If the supplied seed is NULL, or the supplied seed length is
-0, the the return value will be 1. On error 0 is returned.
+0, the return value will be 1. On error 0 is returned.
EC_GROUP_cmp returns 0 if the curves are equal, 1 if they are not equal, or -1 on error.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod b/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
index e859689bcb50..0fa2de1721b7 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ The functions EC_KEY_get0_group, EC_KEY_set_group, EC_KEY_get0_private_key, EC_K
The functions EC_KEY_get_conv_form and EC_KEY_set_conv_form get and set the point_conversion_form for the B<key>. For a description
of point_conversion_forms please refer to L<EC_POINT_new(3)|EC_POINT_new(3)>.
-EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data and EC_KEY_get_key_method_data enable the caller to associate arbitary additional data specific to the
-elliptic curve scheme being used with the EC_KEY object. This data is treated as a "black box" by the ec library. The data to be stored by EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data is provided in the B<data> parameter, which must have have associated functions for duplicating, freeing and "clear_freeing" the data item. If a subsequent EC_KEY_get_key_method_data call is issued, the functions for duplicating, freeing and "clear_freeing" the data item must be provided again, and they must be the same as they were when the data item was inserted.
+EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data and EC_KEY_get_key_method_data enable the caller to associate arbitrary additional data specific to the
+elliptic curve scheme being used with the EC_KEY object. This data is treated as a "black box" by the ec library. The data to be stored by EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data is provided in the B<data> parameter, which must have associated functions for duplicating, freeing and "clear_freeing" the data item. If a subsequent EC_KEY_get_key_method_data call is issued, the functions for duplicating, freeing and "clear_freeing" the data item must be provided again, and they must be the same as they were when the data item was inserted.
EC_KEY_set_flags sets the flags in the B<flags> parameter on the EC_KEY object. Any flags that are already set are left set. The currently defined standard flags are EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW and EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED. In addition there is the flag EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH which is specific to ECDH and is defined in ecdh.h. EC_KEY_get_flags returns the current flags that are set for this EC_KEY. EC_KEY_clear_flags clears the flags indicated by the B<flags> parameter. All other flags are left in their existing state.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
index e0217e40cba8..0ead2d2f8aa1 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0
or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates
the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
-Unlike other functions the return value 0 from EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() only
-indicates that the signature did not verify successfully (that is tbs did
-not match the original data or the signature was of invalid form) it is not an
-indication of a more serious error.
+EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() returns 1 for success; any other value indicates
+failure. A return value of zero indicates that the signature did not verify
+successfully (that is, tbs did not match the original data or the signature had
+an invalid form), while other values indicate a more serious error (and
+sometimes also indicate an invalid signature form).
The error codes can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index fb6036f959ba..c69e6a6d700e 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() initializes cipher contex B<ctx>.
EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
with cipher B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized
before calling this function. B<type> is normally supplied
-by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
+by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
default implementation is used. B<key> is the symmetric key to use
and B<iv> is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes
used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
index 7d793e19ef7a..19112a542d89 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ encrypted using this key.
EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
with cipher B<type> using a random secret key and IV. B<type> is normally
-supplied by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
+supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be
decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B<ek> is an array of
buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
index 14ecc775af6a..c63d6b339318 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
=head1 NAME
-EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing functions
+EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing
+functions
=head1 SYNOPSIS
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
index 0def17aac1c5..521b9f535c7b 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_check_host.pod
@@ -135,6 +135,6 @@ L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ipasc(3)|X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ipasc(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
-These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/buffer.pod b/doc/crypto/buffer.pod
index 781f5b11ee54..52c5c841eb03 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/buffer.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/buffer.pod
@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@
=head1 NAME
-BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow, BUF_strdup - simple
-character arrays structure
+BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_new_ex, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow - simple
+character array structure
+
+BUF_strdup, BUF_strndup, BUF_memdup, BUF_strlcpy, BUF_strlcat -
+standard C library equivalents
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -15,25 +18,22 @@ character arrays structure
int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);
- char * BUF_strdup(const char *str);
+ char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
+ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
-The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for
-various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.
+ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
+
+ size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
-The library uses the BUF_MEM structure defined in buffer.h:
+ size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
- typedef struct buf_mem_st
- {
- int length; /* current number of bytes */
- char *data;
- int max; /* size of buffer */
- } BUF_MEM;
+ size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
-B<length> is the current size of the buffer in bytes, B<max> is the amount of
-memory allocated to the buffer. There are three functions which handle these
-and one "miscellaneous" function.
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for
+various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.
BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size.
@@ -44,14 +44,17 @@ BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to
B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in
size.
-BUF_strdup() copies a null terminated string into a block of allocated
-memory and returns a pointer to the allocated block.
-Unlike the standard C library strdup() this function uses OPENSSL_malloc() and so
-should be used in preference to the standard library strdup() because it can
-be used for memory leak checking or replacing the malloc() function.
+BUF_strdup(), BUF_strndup(), BUF_memdup(), BUF_strlcpy(),
+BUF_strlcat() and BUF_strnlen are equivalents of the standard C
+library functions. The dup() functions use OPENSSL_malloc() underneath
+and so should be used in preference to the standard library for memory
+leak checking or replacing the malloc() function.
+
+Memory allocated from these functions should be freed up using the
+OPENSSL_free() function.
-The memory allocated from BUF_strdup() should be freed up using the OPENSSL_free()
-function.
+BUF_strndup makes the explicit guarantee that it will never read past
+the first B<siz> bytes of B<str>.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
index 343ffe151914..b025de7b2ff6 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions
=head1 DESCRIPTION
These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the
-the same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
+same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
for example in certificate subject and issuer names.
Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
diff --git a/doc/crypto/engine.pod b/doc/crypto/engine.pod
index f5ab1c3e50fd..48741ee30629 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/engine.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/engine.pod
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee
that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released.
However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is
-initiliased and able to use any of its cryptographic
+initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic
implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not
initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to
support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a
@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference
implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid
difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two
kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an
-ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised ready to
-perform cryptographic operations and will remain uninitialised
+ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and
+is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised
until after you have released your reference.
I<Structural references>
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation>
Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin
to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of
OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be
-used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operation, otherwise
+used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise
OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code
illustrates how to approach this;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations>
Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations
bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by
-OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialise,
+OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised,
it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work;
/* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */
diff --git a/doc/dir-locals.example.el b/doc/dir-locals.example.el
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79d0b01108d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/dir-locals.example.el
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+;;; This is an example of what a .dir-locals.el suitable for OpenSSL
+;;; development could look like.
+;;;
+;;; Apart from setting the CC mode style to "OpenSSL-II", it also
+;;; makes sure that tabs are never used for indentation in any file,
+;;; and that the fill column is 78.
+;;;
+;;; For more information see (info "(emacs) Directory Variables")
+
+((nil
+ (indent-tabs-mode . nil)
+ (fill-column . 78)
+ )
+ (c-mode
+ (c-file-style . "OpenSSL-II")))
diff --git a/doc/openssl-c-indent.el b/doc/openssl-c-indent.el
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..144a915675ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/openssl-c-indent.el
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+;;; This Emacs Lisp file defines a C indentation style for OpenSSL.
+;;;
+;;; This definition is for the "CC mode" package, which is the default
+;;; mode for editing C source files in Emacs 20, not for the older
+;;; c-mode.el (which was the default in less recent releaes of Emacs 19).
+;;;
+;;; Recommended use is to add this line in your .emacs:
+;;;
+;;; (load (expand-file-name "~/PATH/TO/openssl-c-indent.el"))
+;;;
+;;; To activate this indentation style, visit a C file, type
+;;; M-x c-set-style <RET> (or C-c . for short), and enter "eay".
+;;; To toggle the auto-newline feature of CC mode, type C-c C-a.
+;;;
+;;; If you're a OpenSSL developer, you might find it more comfortable
+;;; to have this style be permanent in your OpenSSL development
+;;; directory. To have that, please perform this:
+;;;
+;;; M-x add-dir-local-variable <RET> c-mode <RET> c-file-style <RET>
+;;; "OpenSSL-II" <RET>
+;;;
+;;; A new buffer with .dir-locals.el will appear. Save it (C-x C-s).
+;;;
+;;; Alternatively, have a look at dir-locals.example.el
+
+;;; For suggesting improvements, please send e-mail to levitte@openssl.org.
+
+;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
+;; Note, it could be easy to inherit from the "gnu" style... however,
+;; one never knows if that style will change somewhere in the future,
+;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitely instead
+;; and mark them with a comment. // RLevitte 2015-08-31
+;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
+
+(c-add-style "OpenSSL-II"
+ '((c-basic-offset . 4)
+ (indent-tabs-mode . nil)
+ (fill-column . 78)
+ (comment-column . 33)
+ (c-comment-only-line-offset 0 . 0) ; From "gnu" style
+ (c-hanging-braces-alist ; From "gnu" style
+ (substatement-open before after) ; From "gnu" style
+ (arglist-cont-nonempty)) ; From "gnu" style
+ (c-offsets-alist
+ (statement-block-intro . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (knr-argdecl-intro . 0)
+ (knr-argdecl . 0)
+ (substatement-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (substatement-label . 0) ; From "gnu" style
+ (label . 1)
+ (statement-case-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (statement-cont . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (arglist-intro . c-lineup-arglist-intro-after-paren) ; From "gnu" style
+ (arglist-close . c-lineup-arglist) ; From "gnu" style
+ (inline-open . 0) ; From "gnu" style
+ (brace-list-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (topmost-intro-cont first c-lineup-topmost-intro-cont
+ c-lineup-gnu-DEFUN-intro-cont) ; From "gnu" style
+ )
+ (c-special-indent-hook . c-gnu-impose-minimum) ; From "gnu" style
+ (c-block-comment-prefix . "* ")
+ ))
diff --git a/doc/openssl_button.gif b/doc/openssl_button.gif
deleted file mode 100644
index 3d3c90c9f849..000000000000
--- a/doc/openssl_button.gif
+++ /dev/null
Binary files differ
diff --git a/doc/openssl_button.html b/doc/openssl_button.html
deleted file mode 100644
index 44c91bd3d068..000000000000
--- a/doc/openssl_button.html
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-
-<!-- the `Includes OpenSSL Cryptogaphy Software' button -->
-<!-- freely usable by any application linked against OpenSSL -->
-<a href="http://www.openssl.org/">
-<img src="openssl_button.gif"
- width=102 height=47 border=0></a>
-
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
index 8e832a57eaac..04300fbe6f3f 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
@@ -2,29 +2,39 @@
=head1 NAME
-SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert - add certificate to chain
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs - add or clear
+extra chain certificates
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
- long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x509)
+ long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+ long SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the certificate
-chain presented together with the certificate. Several certificates
-can be added one after the other.
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the extra chain
+certificates associated with B<ctx>. Several certificates can be added one
+after another.
+
+SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() clears all extra chain certificates
+associated with B<ctx>.
+
+These functions are implemented as macros.
=head1 NOTES
-When constructing the certificate chain, the chain will be formed from
-these certificates explicitly specified. If no chain is specified,
-the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA
-certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
+When sending a certificate chain, extra chain certificates are sent in order
+following the end entity certificate.
+
+If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the
+available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
-The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
+The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be
+freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application
+B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
=head1 RESTRICTIONS
@@ -37,8 +47,9 @@ be used instead.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() returns 1 on success. Check out the
-error stack to find out the reason for failure otherwise.
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() return
+1 on success and 0 for failure. Check out the error stack to find out the
+reason for failure.
=head1 SEE ALSO
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
index 332f181187a8..ba16b50f0879 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ them to suit its needs: for example to add a hostname check.
Check hostname matches "www.foo.com" in peer certificate:
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = SSL_get0_param(ssl);
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com");
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com", 0);
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d3b7601909e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_check_chain.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_check_chain - check certificate chain suitability
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_check_chain() checks whether certificate B<x>, private key B<pk> and
+certificate chain B<chain> is suitable for use with the current session
+B<s>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_check_chain() returns a bitmap of flags indicating the validity of the
+chain.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_VALID>: the chain can be used with the current session.
+If this flag is B<not> set then the certificate will never be used even
+if the application tries to set it because it is inconsistent with the
+peer preferences.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_SIGN>: the EE key can be used for signing.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE>: the signature algorithm of the EE certificate is
+acceptable.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE>: the signature algorithms of all CA certificates
+are acceptable.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM>: the parameters of the end entity certificate are
+acceptable (e.g. it is a supported curve).
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM>: the parameters of all CA certificates are acceptable.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN>: the end entity certificate algorithm
+can be used explicitly for signing (i.e. it is mentioned in the signature
+algorithms extension).
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME>: the issuer name is acceptable. This is only
+meaningful for client authentication.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE>: the certificate type is acceptable. Only meaningful
+for client authentication.
+
+B<CERT_PKEY_SUITEB>: chain is suitable for Suite B use.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+SSL_check_chain() must be called in servers after a client hello message or in
+clients after a certificate request message. It will typically be called
+in the certificate callback.
+
+An application wishing to support multiple certificate chains may call this
+function on each chain in turn: starting with the one it considers the
+most secure. It could then use the chain of the first set which returns
+suitable flags.
+
+As a minimum the flag B<CERT_PKEY_VALID> must be set for a chain to be
+usable. An application supporting multiple chains with different CA signature
+algorithms may also wish to check B<CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE> too. If no
+chain is suitable a server should fall back to the most secure chain which
+sets B<CERT_PKEY_VALID>.
+
+The validity of a chain is determined by checking if it matches a supported
+signature algorithm, supported curves and in the case of client authentication
+certificate types and issuer names.
+
+Since the supported signature algorithms extension is only used in TLS 1.2
+and DTLS 1.2 the results for earlier versions of TLS and DTLS may not be
+very useful. Applications may wish to specify a different "legacy" chain
+for earlier versions of TLS or DTLS.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/e_os.h b/e_os.h
index 45fef691a094..1fa36c171980 100644
--- a/e_os.h
+++ b/e_os.h
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
# include <sys/select.h>
# endif
-# if defined(sun)
+# if defined(__sun) || defined(sun)
# include <sys/filio.h>
# else
# ifndef VMS
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
# endif
-# if defined(sun) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4)
+# if (defined(__sun) || defined(sun)) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4)
/* include headers first, so our defines don't break it */
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <string.h>
diff --git a/engines/e_chil.c b/engines/e_chil.c
index 69d49d7d3a88..72d14fe383a4 100644
--- a/engines/e_chil.c
+++ b/engines/e_chil.c
@@ -839,6 +839,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
bn_fix_top(rtmp->n);
res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (res == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rtmp);
# endif
diff --git a/ssl/Makefile b/ssl/Makefile
index 42f1af5c8e93..7b90fb037550 100644
--- a/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/ssl/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES=
CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c
APPS=
LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
diff --git a/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/ssl/bio_ssl.c
index a0c583e34215..d2d4d2ea2d2d 100644
--- a/ssl/bio_ssl.c
+++ b/ssl/bio_ssl.c
@@ -419,6 +419,10 @@ static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason;
break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ break;
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/ssl/clienthellotest.c b/ssl/clienthellotest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..77517c61b1f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/clienthellotest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2
+#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN 1
+#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN 2
+#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN 1
+#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN 2
+#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN 2
+#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN 2
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 2
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for TLS1.2
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 0
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG 1
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *con;
+ BIO *rbio;
+ BIO *wbio;
+ BIO *err;
+ long len;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char *dataend;
+ char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
+ unsigned int tmplen;
+ unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int size;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ int currtest = 0;
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ /*
+ * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
+ * produced when we try to connect
+ */
+ for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+ testresult = 0;
+ if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) {
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method());
+ } else {
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ }
+ con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+ rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+ if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+ || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+ if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
+ /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+ dataend = data + len;
+
+ /* Skip the record header */
+ data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ /* Skip the handshake message header */
+ data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ /* Skip client version and random */
+ data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Skip session id */
+ tmplen = *data;
+ data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+ if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Skip ciphers */
+ tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+ if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Skip compression */
+ tmplen = *data;
+ data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+ if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Extensions len */
+ tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN;
+ if (data + tmplen > dataend)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Loop through all extensions */
+ while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) {
+ type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN;
+ size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN;
+ if (data + size > dataend)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+ || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+ if (size == strlen(dummytick)
+ && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) {
+ /* Ticket data is as we expected */
+ testresult = 1;
+ } else {
+ printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size;
+ data += size;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ SSL_free(con);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (!testresult) {
+ printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+ BIO_free(err);
+
+ return testresult?0:1;
+}
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index b4ee7abe27dc..c2c8d57e9d9c 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1370,9 +1370,12 @@ int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+ BIO *wbio;
+
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 4c2ccbf5ae08..3ddfa7bca4b7 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -133,12 +133,14 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
{
- if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- return (DTLSv1_client_method());
+ if (ver == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ return DTLS_client_method();
+ else if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return DTLSv1_client_method();
else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
- return (DTLSv1_2_client_method());
+ return DTLSv1_2_client_method();
else
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
@@ -147,13 +149,13 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
dtls1_connect,
dtls1_get_client_method, DTLSv1_enc_data)
- IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
DTLSv1_2_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_connect,
dtls1_get_client_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
- IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
DTLS_client_method,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_connect,
@@ -315,13 +317,12 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
s->shutdown = 0;
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
@@ -366,11 +367,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
- 0);
+ 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
@@ -378,6 +383,10 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ /* receive renewed session ticket */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ }
} else
s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
}
@@ -500,9 +509,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
diff --git a/ssl/d1_meth.c b/ssl/d1_meth.c
index 734077493f84..899010e9851c 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_meth.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_meth.c
@@ -64,12 +64,14 @@
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver)
{
- if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
- return (DTLSv1_method());
+ if (ver == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ return DTLS_method();
+ else if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return DTLSv1_method();
else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
- return (DTLSv1_2_method());
+ return DTLSv1_2_method();
else
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
@@ -77,12 +79,12 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
dtls1_accept,
dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_method, DTLSv1_enc_data)
- IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
DTLSv1_2_method,
dtls1_accept,
dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
- IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
DTLS_method,
dtls1_accept,
dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index 655333a25210..e677d880f0ac 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -131,12 +131,14 @@ static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
{
- if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
- return (DTLSv1_server_method());
+ if (ver == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ return DTLS_server_method();
+ else if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return DTLSv1_server_method();
else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
- return (DTLSv1_2_server_method());
+ return DTLSv1_2_server_method();
else
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
@@ -145,13 +147,13 @@ IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method, DTLSv1_enc_data)
- IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
DTLSv1_2_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method, DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
- IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
DTLS_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
@@ -283,6 +285,19 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+ * support secure renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
} else {
/*
* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
@@ -421,9 +436,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
@@ -635,9 +654,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index e4e707cf687e..f782010c4782 100644
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -375,12 +375,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
-#if 0
- /* don't reuse session-id's */
+ /*
+ * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as
+ * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead
+ */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
-#endif
p = s->s3->client_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
@@ -445,9 +446,6 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
/*
* put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse)
*/
-#if 0
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-#endif
s2n(0, d);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
@@ -738,6 +736,8 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+
/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
@@ -796,13 +796,6 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
}
s->init_num = 0;
- /*
- * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a
- * session-id
- */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
- goto err;
-
return (SSL_connect(s));
err:
return (-1);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
index 019e21cd0274..09d0661e81f6 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p;
size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
else
headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p;
size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
else
headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index a0edcef90ada..557622f51365 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -411,8 +411,9 @@ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
* functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
* a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
* padding too. )
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
*/
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
const unsigned char header[13],
@@ -455,7 +456,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
case NID_md5:
- MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c);
+ if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
@@ -464,7 +466,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
length_is_big_endian = 0;
break;
case NID_sha1:
- SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c);
+ if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
@@ -472,14 +475,16 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
case NID_sha224:
- SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
+ if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 224 / 8;
break;
case NID_sha256:
- SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
+ if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
@@ -488,7 +493,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
case NID_sha384:
- SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
+ if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
@@ -497,7 +503,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
md_length_size = 16;
break;
case NID_sha512:
- SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
+ if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
@@ -513,8 +520,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
*/
OPENSSL_assert(0);
if (md_out_size)
- *md_out_size = -1;
- return;
+ *md_out_size = 0;
+ return 0;
}
OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
@@ -652,7 +659,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
*/
if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
/* Should never happen */
- return;
+ return 0;
}
overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
md_transform(md_state.c, header);
@@ -733,26 +740,34 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ );
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
+ goto err;
if (is_sslv3) {
/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ goto err;
} else {
/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ goto err;
}
EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
if (md_out_size)
*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+ return 1;
+err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 6af145a8b744..bc5254c81160 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1050,6 +1050,11 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
+ /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
+ if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+ ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ else
+ ct->mask_ssl = 0;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
* return an error.
@@ -1699,6 +1704,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p += i;
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1719,6 +1730,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p += i;
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
@@ -1740,6 +1756,11 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
p += i;
n -= param_len;
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
@@ -1935,14 +1956,20 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
q = md_buf;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+ (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
+ NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
q += size;
j += size;
}
@@ -1961,12 +1988,16 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
} else
#endif
{
- EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
@@ -2208,6 +2239,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
@@ -2226,6 +2258,19 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
+ n2s(p, ticklen);
+ /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+ if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+ if (ticklen == 0)
+ return 1;
+
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
@@ -2257,14 +2302,6 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
s->session = new_sess;
}
- n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
- n2s(p, ticklen);
- /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
- if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
@@ -2275,6 +2312,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
@@ -2462,6 +2500,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
@@ -2927,6 +2966,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
*
@@ -2936,10 +2980,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
- EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
- /* Generate session key */
- if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key */
+ || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
@@ -2960,13 +3007,18 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
- EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
@@ -2982,7 +3034,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
- < 0) {
+ <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
@@ -3177,7 +3229,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
@@ -3365,7 +3420,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
- i = 0;
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index cda2d8c77603..47a0ec9fe04b 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -253,7 +253,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
- ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m);
+ if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* COMPRESS */
if (s->expand != NULL) {
@@ -288,7 +291,10 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
- ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m);
+ if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* COMPRESS */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
@@ -691,19 +697,21 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
return 0;
npad = (48 / n) * n;
- if (sender != NULL)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret);
+ if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i) <= 0
+
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
@@ -775,33 +783,36 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
/* Final param == is SSLv3 */
- ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
- mac_sec, md_size, 1);
+ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+ return -1;
} else {
unsigned int md_size_u;
/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8);
rec_char = rec->type;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1);
p = md;
s2n(rec->length, p);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
md_size = md_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
@@ -846,24 +857,31 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], strlen((const char *)salt[i]));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i],
+ strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n) <= 0
+
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
out += n;
ret += n;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
- if (s->msg_callback) {
+ if (ret > 0 && s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index ad9eeb6fd453..64793d6af34f 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
{
- if (s == NULL)
+ if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL)
return;
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 603c285ac499..379890237e86 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
} else if (i <= 0) {
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
* using a datagram service
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index acd3b9e964a2..ee83105b75bf 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -383,7 +383,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
*/
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
@@ -902,7 +901,7 @@ int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
- int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
+ int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
@@ -1095,8 +1094,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
- ret = -2;
+ cookie_valid = 1;
}
p += cookie_len;
@@ -1231,7 +1229,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
@@ -1466,8 +1464,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
- if (ret < 0)
- ret = -ret;
+ ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
@@ -1477,7 +1474,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
+ return ret;
}
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
@@ -1950,14 +1947,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+ (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
+ : s->ctx->sha1,
+ NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
+ (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
q += i;
j += i;
}
@@ -1985,16 +1990,17 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+ if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto err;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
s2n(i, p);
n += i + 2;
@@ -2867,7 +2873,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
@@ -3099,7 +3113,17 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
unsigned char signature[64];
int idx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+ if (pctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (i != 64) {
fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 6fe1a2474d43..afec1f5bf29f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -2681,6 +2681,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292
# define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134
# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388
# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135
# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289
# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136
@@ -2846,8 +2847,11 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106
# define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107
# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375
# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393
# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395
# define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111
# define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112
# define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index 39d48eabf03b..35cc27c5e985 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -121,13 +121,16 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st {
int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
{
#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
- int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0, v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
+ int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0;
unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2];
unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0;
unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ int v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char cbuf;
int v11 = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 93a1eb941ab9..a73f866cb9a7 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+ ret->references = 1;
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
/*
* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
@@ -325,7 +326,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
#endif
}
- ret->references = 1;
/*
* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
* will be set during handshake.
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 2cc9a4a21f75..6957bda78509 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -376,10 +376,11 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
int pkey_id = 0;
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1);
- if (ameth) {
- EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
+ if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ ameth) > 0) {
+ return pkey_id;
}
- return pkey_id;
+ return 0;
}
#else
@@ -391,7 +392,9 @@ static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
int pkey_id = 0;
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1);
if (ameth) {
- EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ ameth) <= 0)
+ pkey_id = 0;
}
if (tmpeng)
ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
@@ -1404,15 +1407,16 @@ static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
const char **prule_str)
{
unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0;
- if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128"))
- suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
- else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY"))
+ if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) {
suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
- else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2")) {
+ } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) {
suiteb_comb2 = 1;
suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
- } else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192"))
+ } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) {
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) {
suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
+ }
if (suiteb_flags) {
c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 1a6030e6238d..6d1366f2a59d 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
"ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "ssl3_enc"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET),
+ "ssl3_generate_master_secret"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
"ssl3_get_certificate_request"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "ssl3_get_cert_status"},
@@ -386,8 +388,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
"bad data returned by callback"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH), "bad dh g length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE), "bad dh g value"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH), "bad dh pub key length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE), "bad dh pub key value"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH), "bad dh p length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE), "bad dh p value"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE), "bad dsa signature"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"},
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index c0931e787728..f2071db93702 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
s->options = ctx->options;
s->mode = ctx->mode;
s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+ s->references = 1;
if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
/*
@@ -405,7 +406,6 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
- s->references = 1;
s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
SSL_clear(s);
@@ -1980,7 +1980,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
ret->extra_certs = NULL;
/* No compression for DTLS */
- if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
@@ -3507,8 +3507,11 @@ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
{
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (md)
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL);
+ if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+ *hash = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
return *hash;
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 6c2c551e5e34..a8e4efceba5f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *limit, int *al);
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
- unsigned char *d, int n);
+ unsigned char *limit);
int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s);
int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
@@ -1439,15 +1439,15 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char header[13],
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_plus_mac_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char header[13],
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
index b1b2318350a5..b0f75c913f91 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -195,6 +198,15 @@ static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (pktmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+ * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+ */
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
ERR_clear_error();
@@ -396,6 +408,10 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
}
if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+ * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+ */
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
ERR_clear_error();
@@ -516,7 +532,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -750,31 +769,31 @@ static int serverinfo_find_extension(const unsigned char *serverinfo,
*extension_data = NULL;
*extension_length = 0;
if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0)
- return 0;
+ return -1;
for (;;) {
unsigned int type = 0;
size_t len = 0;
/* end of serverinfo */
if (serverinfo_length == 0)
- return -1; /* Extension not found */
+ return 0; /* Extension not found */
/* read 2-byte type field */
if (serverinfo_length < 2)
- return 0; /* Error */
+ return -1; /* Error */
type = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
serverinfo += 2;
serverinfo_length -= 2;
/* read 2-byte len field */
if (serverinfo_length < 2)
- return 0; /* Error */
+ return -1; /* Error */
len = (serverinfo[0] << 8) + serverinfo[1];
serverinfo += 2;
serverinfo_length -= 2;
if (len > serverinfo_length)
- return 0; /* Error */
+ return -1; /* Error */
if (type == extension_type) {
*extension_data = serverinfo;
@@ -814,10 +833,12 @@ static int serverinfo_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
/* Find the relevant extension from the serverinfo */
int retval = serverinfo_find_extension(serverinfo, serverinfo_length,
ext_type, out, outlen);
+ if (retval == -1) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return -1; /* Error */
+ }
if (retval == 0)
- return 0; /* Error */
- if (retval == -1)
- return -1; /* No extension found, don't send extension */
+ return 0; /* No extension found, don't send extension */
return 1; /* Send extension */
}
return -1; /* No serverinfo data found, don't send
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 07e7379abfd1..68390d310809 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
# endif
-#endif
dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
dest->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
@@ -324,7 +324,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
goto err;
}
# endif
-#endif
if (ticket != 0) {
dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
@@ -334,6 +333,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
}
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (src->srp_username) {
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 6737adf239c0..aaf6c6bd896d 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@
/* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */
#define _BSD_SOURCE 1
+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index e2a8f8691978..f46544b4d713 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -384,6 +384,8 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->expand != NULL) {
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
@@ -422,11 +424,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (!mac_ctx)
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
goto err;
s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
- } else
+ } else {
mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->compress != NULL) {
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
@@ -499,7 +504,12 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
+ if (mac_key == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -931,8 +941,9 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0)
+ ret = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return ((int)ret);
}
@@ -1059,17 +1070,24 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
*/
/* Final param == not SSLv3 */
- ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
+ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ return -1;
+ }
} else {
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
- t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ return -1;
+ }
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (!send && FIPS_mode())
tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 210a5e87430f..3176d1e3baba 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
} else
# endif
{
- if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
+ if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
*pcurves = eccurves_auto;
pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
} else {
@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- const unsigned char *d, int n)
+ const unsigned char *limit)
{
unsigned short type, size;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
@@ -1866,11 +1866,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ if (data >= (limit - 2))
return;
data += 2;
- if (data > (d + n - 4))
+ if (data > (limit - 4))
return;
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
@@ -1878,7 +1878,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
- if (data + size > d + n)
+ if (data + size > limit)
return;
data += size;
@@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
- if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
+ if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
@@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
} else {
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- if (data + len != d + n)
+ if (data + len != limit)
return;
if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
@@ -1974,7 +1974,7 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
}
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+ unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
@@ -2016,22 +2016,22 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
- if (data == d + n)
+ if (data == limit)
goto ri_check;
- if (data > (d + n - 2))
+ if (data > (limit - 2))
goto err;
n2s(data, len);
- if (data > (d + n - len))
+ if (data + len != limit)
goto err;
- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+ while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
- if (data + size > (d + n))
+ if (data + size > (limit))
goto err;
# if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
@@ -2405,7 +2405,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
}
/* Spurious data on the end */
- if (data != d + n)
+ if (data != limit)
goto err;
*p = data;
@@ -2465,8 +2465,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
return 1;
}
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
- int n)
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *limit)
{
int al = -1;
unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
* switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
* need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
*/
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
@@ -2487,7 +2487,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
}
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
@@ -3385,10 +3385,13 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
return 2;
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+ etick + 16) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
@@ -3396,13 +3399,14 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
if (mlen < 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
@@ -3413,11 +3417,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec) {
+ if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
@@ -3450,6 +3453,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return -1;
}
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h
index 5929607ff8b6..7e237d0631a3 100644
--- a/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -231,13 +231,12 @@ extern "C" {
/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
# define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat 15
-/* ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00 */
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC7301 */
# define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16
/*
* ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
- * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
- * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding
*/
# define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21
@@ -262,20 +261,19 @@ extern "C" {
# define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
# endif
-/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
+/* NameType value from RFC3546 */
# define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
-/* status request value from RFC 3546 */
+/* status request value from RFC3546 */
# define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
-/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */
# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0
# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0
# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1
# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2
# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2
-/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */
-
+/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */
# define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0
# define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1
# define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2
@@ -430,7 +428,6 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066
/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
-
# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F
# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030
# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031
@@ -595,7 +592,7 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA"
-/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
+/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */
# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
diff --git a/util/domd b/util/domd
index bab48cb7a27e..6a628c7f96c2 100755
--- a/util/domd
+++ b/util/domd
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ if [ "$MAKEDEPEND" = "" ]; then MAKEDEPEND=makedepend; fi
cp Makefile Makefile.save
# fake the presence of Kerberos
touch $TOP/krb5.h
-if expr "$MAKEDEPEND" : '.*gcc$' > /dev/null; then
+if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep -q "clang" ||
+ echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep -q "gcc"; then
args=""
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
if [ "$1" != "--" ]; then args="$args $1"; fi
diff --git a/util/indent.pro b/util/indent.pro
index e8714310cc4d..4dcda5df78ca 100644
--- a/util/indent.pro
+++ b/util/indent.pro
@@ -749,3 +749,19 @@
-T ssl_trace_tbl
-T _stdcall
-T tls12_lookup
+-T OPTIONS
+-T OPT_PAIR
+-T uint64_t
+-T int64_t
+-T uint32_t
+-T int32_t
+-T uint16_t
+-T int16_t
+-T uint8_t
+-T int8_t
+-T STRINT_PAIR
+-T felem
+-T felem_bytearray
+-T SH_LIST
+-T PACKET
+-T RECORD_LAYER
diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 9b8abc0cf115..99652aff918c 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ $defs= <<"EOF";
# N.B. You MUST use -j on FreeBSD.
# This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution.
# This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and
-# by default leave the 'intertesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
+# by default leave the 'interesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
# that needs deleting in .${o}tmp.
# The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which
# does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all
diff --git a/util/mkrc.pl b/util/mkrc.pl
index 0ceadcf8d143..83ee6a4167fc 100755
--- a/util/mkrc.pl
+++ b/util/mkrc.pl
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ BEGIN
VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
// Optional:
//VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
- VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
+ VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright © 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
//VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
//VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
//VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
diff --git a/util/mkstack.pl b/util/mkstack.pl
index 2bd96cd0c1ea..f4520d4dd328 100755
--- a/util/mkstack.pl
+++ b/util/mkstack.pl
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ while(<IN>) {
EOF
}
- foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
+ foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
$new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
diff --git a/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/util/pl/VC-32.pl
index da05e9dff810..284fe0381ed9 100644
--- a/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+++ b/util/pl/VC-32.pl
@@ -358,15 +358,17 @@ sub do_link_rule
local($ret,$_);
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
- $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
+ $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs";
if ($standalone == 1)
{
+ $ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj\n";
$ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
- $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
+ $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
$ret.="$files $libs\n<<\n";
}
elsif ($standalone == 2)
{
+ $ret.="\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
@@ -379,6 +381,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
}
else
{
+ $ret.="\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n";
}
diff --git a/util/pod2mantest b/util/pod2mantest
deleted file mode 100755
index 384e683df4cc..000000000000
--- a/util/pod2mantest
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-# This script is used by test/Makefile to check whether a sane 'pod2man'
-# is installed.
-# ('make install' should not try to run 'pod2man' if it does not exist or if
-# it is a broken 'pod2man' version that is known to cause trouble. if we find
-# the system 'pod2man' to be broken, we use our own copy instead)
-#
-# In any case, output an appropriate command line for running (or not
-# running) pod2man.
-
-
-IFS=:
-if test "$OSTYPE" = "msdosdjgpp"; then IFS=";"; fi
-
-try_without_dir=true
-# First we try "pod2man", then "$dir/pod2man" for each item in $PATH.
-for dir in dummy${IFS}$PATH; do
- if [ "$try_without_dir" = true ]; then
- # first iteration
- pod2man=pod2man
- try_without_dir=false
- else
- # second and later iterations
- pod2man="$dir/pod2man"
- if [ ! -f "$pod2man" ]; then # '-x' is not available on Ultrix
- pod2man=''
- fi
- fi
-
- if [ ! "$pod2man" = '' ]; then
- failure=none
-
- if "$pod2man" --section=1 --center=OpenSSL --release=dev pod2mantest.pod | fgrep OpenSSL >/dev/null; then
- :
- else
- failure=BasicTest
- fi
-
- if [ "$failure" = none ]; then
- if "$pod2man" --section=1 --center=OpenSSL --release=dev pod2mantest.pod | grep '^MARKER - ' >/dev/null; then
- failure=MultilineTest
- fi
- fi
-
-
- if [ "$failure" = none ]; then
- echo "$pod2man"
- exit 0
- fi
-
- echo "$pod2man does not work properly ('$failure' failed). Looking for another pod2man ..." >&2
- fi
-done
-
-echo "No working pod2man found. Consider installing a new version." >&2
-echo "As a workaround, we'll use a bundled old copy of pod2man.pl." >&2
-echo "$1 ../../util/pod2man.pl"
diff --git a/util/selftest.pl b/util/selftest.pl
index 7b32e9f4ff2a..59842efae8f0 100644
--- a/util/selftest.pl
+++ b/util/selftest.pl
@@ -199,3 +199,4 @@ while (<IN>) {
}
print "\nTest report in file $report\n";
+die if $ok != 2;
diff --git a/util/toutf8.sh b/util/toutf8.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..8a4254b3df3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/toutf8.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# Very simple script to detect and convert files that we want to re-encode to UTF8
+
+git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | \
+ while read F; do
+ charset=`file -bi "$F" | sed -e 's|.*charset=||'`
+ if [ "$charset" != "utf-8" -a "$charset" != "binary" -a "$charset" != "us-ascii" ]; then
+ iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF8 < "$F" > "$F.utf8" && \
+ ( cmp -s "$F" "$F.utf8" || \
+ ( echo "$F"
+ mv "$F" "$F.iso-8859-1"
+ mv "$F.utf8" "$F"
+ )
+ )
+ fi
+ done