Import OpenSSL 1.0.1e.vendor/openssl/1.0.1e

Approved by:	secteam (delphij, simon), benl (silence)

175 files changed, 2672 insertions, 874 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 7013e4c12c0f..ca82ad295d5c 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,53 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+  *)
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+     ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+     Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+     and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+     <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2012-2686)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+     [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+     if renegotiating.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
 
   *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index cbbf4de8b25f..9c803dc0663d 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -171,20 +171,22 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-debug",	"gcc44:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-debug-64",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-ben-macos",	"cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::-Wl,-search_paths_first::::",
 "debug-ben-macos-gcc46",	"gcc-mp-4.6:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wconversion -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-darwin64","cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "debug-ben-no-opt",	"gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-ben-strict",	"gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
 "debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
-"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
@@ -243,7 +245,7 @@ my %table=(
 "solaris-sparcv7-cc","cc:-xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-xarch=v8 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):/usr/ccs/bin/ar rs::/64",
+"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
 ####
 "debug-solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xarch=v8 -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 
@@ -464,8 +466,8 @@ my %table=(
 "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
 # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
 # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
-"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
+"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
+"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
 
 #
 # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)
diff --git a/FAQ b/FAQ
index bb6f7e2d297a..35780f807bd6 100644
--- a/FAQ
+++ b/FAQ
@@ -83,11 +83,11 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.1c was released on May 10th, 2012.
+OpenSSL 1.0.1e was released on Feb 11th, 2013.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
-ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous CVS access.
+ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
 
 
 * Where is the documentation?
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index 38ba519cfa7a..1aa5b7021eee 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
 # Xlist
 setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
 setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1c
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1c
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1e
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1e
 
 ###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
 
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ comm -23 old new
 # See that files to add makes sense
 comm -13 old new
 
-tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar xf - -C dist
+tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist
 cd dist
 comm -23 ../old ../new | xargs svn rm
 # Make sure to remove empty directories
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index d5db11b41770..54e3541613ac 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.1c
+VERSION=1.0.1e
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib
 NM= nm
 PERL= /usr/bin/perl
 TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
 MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
 LIBDIR=lib
 
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ rehash.time: certs apps
 		[ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
 		OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
 		export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
-		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs) && \
+		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
 		touch rehash.time; \
 	else :; fi
 
diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 55273ea364a3..2db31ead6fa9 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ RANLIB= ranlib
 NM= nm
 PERL= perl
 TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
 MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
 LIBDIR=lib
 
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ rehash.time: certs apps
 		[ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
 		OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
 		export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
-		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs) && \
+		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
 		touch rehash.time; \
 	else :; fi
 
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 4f069cbd14ca..0269f2277fce 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,18 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e:
+
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d:
+
+      o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
+      o Include the fips configuration module.
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c:
 
       o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
diff --git a/PROBLEMS b/PROBLEMS
index d247470f0611..3eaab01f2ce4 100644
--- a/PROBLEMS
+++ b/PROBLEMS
@@ -197,3 +197,17 @@ reconfigure with additional no-sse2 [or 386] option passed to ./config.
 We don't have framework to associate -ldl with no-dso, therefore the only
 way is to edit Makefile right after ./config no-dso and remove -ldl from
 EX_LIBS line.
+
+* hpux-parisc2-cc no-asm build fails with SEGV in ECDSA/DH.
+
+Compiler bug, presumably at particular patch level. Remaining
+hpux*-parisc*-cc configurations can be affected too. Drop optimization
+level to +O2 when compiling bn_nist.o.
+
+* solaris64-sparcv9-cc link failure
+
+Solaris 8 ar can fail to maintain symbol table in .a, which results in
+link failures. Apply 109147-09 or later or modify Makefile generated
+by ./Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc and replace RANLIB assignment with
+
+	RANLIB= /usr/ccs/bin/ar rs
diff --git a/README b/README
index de51583a6ff6..ad2d90f0d1dd 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1c 10 May 2012
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current CVS or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
  OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
  can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
  compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index 4e11915b0255..1096eee4cfae 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	X509_NAME *n = NULL;
 	int nid;
 
-	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values)
+	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
 		goto error;
@@ -2236,6 +2236,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	return n;
 
 error:
@@ -2244,6 +2245,8 @@ error:
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	if (ne_types)
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+	if (mval)
+		OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	if (buf)
 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return NULL;
diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 2a83d1936e4c..1cf50e00294d 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -1408,6 +1408,7 @@ bad:
 			if (!NCONF_get_number(conf,section,
 				ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours))
 				crlhours = 0;
+			ERR_clear_error();
 			}
 		if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0))
 			{
diff --git a/apps/cms.c b/apps/cms.c
index d75414098733..5f77f8fbb03f 100644
--- a/apps/cms.c
+++ b/apps/cms.c
@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
+		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
+				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -1039,6 +1041,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
+		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
 
 		if (secret_key)
 			{
diff --git a/apps/dgst.c b/apps/dgst.c
index b08e9a7c786f..81bd870f991a 100644
--- a/apps/dgst.c
+++ b/apps/dgst.c
@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			out_bin = 1;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-d") == 0)
 			debug=1;
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
-			non_fips_allow=1;
 		else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-fips-fingerprint"))
 			hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm";
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
+			non_fips_allow=1;
 		else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-hmac"))
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1)
diff --git a/apps/dhparam.c b/apps/dhparam.c
index b47097cbb223..1297d6fb5ec9 100644
--- a/apps/dhparam.c
+++ b/apps/dhparam.c
@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n");
 			if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb))
 				{
-				if(dh) DH_free(dh);
 				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 				goto end;
 				}
diff --git a/apps/dsaparam.c b/apps/dsaparam.c
index fe72c1d3dfa8..683d51391b00 100644
--- a/apps/dsaparam.c
+++ b/apps/dsaparam.c
@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ bad:
 				goto end;
 				}
 #endif
+			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"Error, DSA key generation failed\n");
 			goto end;
 			}
@@ -429,13 +430,19 @@ bad:
 
 		assert(need_rand);
 		if ((dsakey=DSAparams_dup(dsa)) == NULL) goto end;
-		if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey)) goto end;
+		if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey))
+			{
+			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+			DSA_free(dsakey);
+			goto end;
+			}
 		if 	(outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
 			i=i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out,dsakey);
 		else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
 			i=PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out,dsakey,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL);
 		else	{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+			DSA_free(dsakey);
 			goto end;
 			}
 		DSA_free(dsakey);
diff --git a/apps/genrsa.c b/apps/genrsa.c
index 37e9310910b2..ece114c876a6 100644
--- a/apps/genrsa.c
+++ b/apps/genrsa.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
-#define DEFBITS	512
+#define DEFBITS	1024
 #undef PROG
 #define PROG genrsa_main
 
diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index 01847dfad74a..83c5a7670052 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n	 	 number of days before next update\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id       identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n        number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg>     use specified digest in the request");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg>     use specified digest in the request\n");
 		goto end;
 		}
 
diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index 2cd73376dfaf..84c3b447c295 100644
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
 
 		/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
 		 * the private key */
-		
-		
+
+
 		/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
 		 * the SSL context */
 		if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
@@ -436,6 +436,8 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 
 	if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
 	    version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
 	    version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 	    version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index fc806eb67263..3ba66056038a 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -357,12 +357,14 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug      - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status           - request certificate status from server\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket        - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
 # endif
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
+#endif
  	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label   - Export keying material using label\n");
  	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len  - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
 	}
@@ -502,7 +504,9 @@ static char * MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
 	}
 
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+#endif
 
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
@@ -536,7 +540,7 @@ static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, con
 	ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
 	return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 	}
-# endif
+# endif  /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
 #endif
 
 enum
@@ -945,11 +949,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			jpake_secret = *++argv;
 			}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-use_srtp") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
 			}
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keymatexport") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -1130,6 +1136,8 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting client callback\n");
 		SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb);
 		}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
 #endif
@@ -1890,6 +1898,10 @@ end:
 			print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,1);
 		SSL_free(con);
 		}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+	if (next_proto.data)
+		OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
+#endif
 	if (ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
 	if (cert)
 		X509_free(cert);
@@ -1897,6 +1909,8 @@ end:
 		EVP_PKEY_free(key);
 	if (pass)
 		OPENSSL_free(pass);
+	if (vpm)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
 	if (cbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); }
 	if (sbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(sbuf); }
 	if (mbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(mbuf); }
@@ -2061,6 +2075,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
  	{
  	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile=SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s);
  
@@ -2068,6 +2083,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
 		BIO_printf(bio,"SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
 			   srtp_profile->name);
 	}
+#endif
  
 	SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s));
 	if (keymatexportlabel != NULL)
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index 3f9b3704c62a..8198d7f0653e 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -556,7 +556,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
 # endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
+# endif
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label   - Export keying material using label\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len  - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
@@ -923,7 +925,9 @@ static char *jpake_secret = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 static char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+#endif
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
@@ -1206,13 +1210,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srp_verifier_file = *(++argv);
-			meth=TLSv1_server_method();
+			meth = TLSv1_server_method();
 			}
 		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuserseed") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srpuserseed = *(++argv);
-			meth=TLSv1_server_method();
+			meth = TLSv1_server_method();
 			}
 #endif
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-www") == 0)
@@ -1319,11 +1323,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 			jpake_secret = *(++argv);
 			}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-use_srtp") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
 			}
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keymatexport") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -1431,25 +1437,24 @@ bad:
 				goto end;
 				}
 			}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		if (next_proto_neg_in)
-			{
-			unsigned short len;
-			next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len,
-				next_proto_neg_in);
-			if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-				goto end;
-			next_proto.len = len;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			next_proto.data = NULL;
-			}
-# endif
 #endif
 		}
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 
+	if (next_proto_neg_in)
+		{
+		unsigned short len;
+		next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, next_proto_neg_in);
+		if (next_proto.data == NULL)
+			goto end;
+		next_proto.len = len;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		next_proto.data = NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+
 
 	if (s_dcert_file)
 		{
@@ -1550,8 +1555,10 @@ bad:
 	else
 		SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,128);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
+#endif
 
 #if 0
 	if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
@@ -1730,7 +1737,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 #endif
 	
-	if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,s_cert,s_key))
+	if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key))
 		goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2,s_cert2,s_key2))
@@ -1738,7 +1745,7 @@ bad:
 #endif
 	if (s_dcert != NULL)
 		{
-		if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,s_dcert,s_dkey))
+		if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey))
 			goto end;
 		}
 
@@ -1893,7 +1900,15 @@ end:
 		OPENSSL_free(pass);
 	if (dpass)
 		OPENSSL_free(dpass);
+	if (vpm)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (tlscstatp.host)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+	if (tlscstatp.port)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+	if (tlscstatp.path)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
 	if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
 	if (s_cert2)
 		X509_free(s_cert2);
@@ -2433,6 +2448,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf);
 	str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
 	BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)");
+
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 	SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
 	if (next_proto_neg)
@@ -2442,6 +2458,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
 		}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	{
 	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
 	  = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
@@ -2450,6 +2467,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
 			   srtp_profile->name);
 	}
+#endif
 	if (SSL_cache_hit(con)) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n");
 	if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) &
 		TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
@@ -2701,6 +2719,11 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 				}
 			BIO_puts(io,"\n");
 
+			BIO_printf(io,
+				"Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+		      		SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
+							"" : " NOT");
+
 			/* The following is evil and should not really
 			 * be done */
 			BIO_printf(io,"Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
index 8358b12fddb1..9886ca376691 100644
--- a/apps/speed.c
+++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM]={
   "aes-128 cbc","aes-192 cbc","aes-256 cbc",
   "camellia-128 cbc","camellia-192 cbc","camellia-256 cbc",
   "evp","sha256","sha512","whirlpool",
-  "aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige","ghash"};
+  "aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige","ghash" };
 static double results[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM];
 static int lengths[SIZE_NUM]={16,64,256,1024,8*1024};
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig)
 #if defined(_WIN32)
 
 #if !defined(SIGALRM)
-#define SIGALRM
+# define SIGALRM
 #endif
 static unsigned int lapse,schlock;
 static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs) { lapse = secs*1000; }
diff --git a/apps/srp.c b/apps/srp.c
index 80e1b8a6607e..9c7ae184db16 100644
--- a/apps/srp.c
+++ b/apps/srp.c
@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char* id, char type)
 	if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX) 
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
-		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX  && !strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid])) 
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
+		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX  && !strcmp(id,pp[DB_srpid])) 
 			return i;
 		}
 	else for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
 
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != DB_SRP_INDEX && !strcmp(id,pp[DB_srpid])) 
 			return i;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, int indx, int verbose, char *s)
 	if (indx >= 0 && verbose)
 		{
 		int j;
-		char **pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
+		char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
 		BIO_printf(bio, "%s \"%s\"\n", s, pp[DB_srpid]);
 		for (j = 0; j < DB_NUMBER; j++)
 			{
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void print_user(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, int userindex, int verbose)
 	{
 	if (verbose > 0)
 		{
-		char **pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+		char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
 
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != 'I')
 			{
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ bad:
 	/* Lets check some fields */
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
 	
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX)
 			{
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ bad:
 
 	if (gNindex >= 0)
 		{
-		gNrow = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, gNindex);
-		print_entry(db, bio_err, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N") ;
+		gNrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,gNindex);
+		print_entry(db, bio_err, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N");
 		}
 	else if (maxgN > 0 && !SRP_get_default_gN(gN))
 		{
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ bad:
 			if (userindex >= 0)
 				{
 				/* reactivation of a new user */
-				char **row = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+				char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
 				BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" reactivated.\n", user);
 				row[DB_srptype][0] = 'V';
 
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ bad:
 			else
 				{
 
-				char **row = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+				char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
 				char type = row[DB_srptype][0];
 				if (type == 'v')
 					{
@@ -664,9 +664,9 @@ bad:
 
 					if (!(gNid=srp_create_user(user,&(row[DB_srpverifier]), &(row[DB_srpsalt]),gNrow?gNrow[DB_srpsalt]:NULL, gNrow?gNrow[DB_srpverifier]:NULL, passout, bio_err,verbose)))
 						{
-							BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user);
-							errors++;
-							goto err;
+						BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user);
+						errors++;
+						goto err;
 						}
 
 					row[DB_srptype][0] = 'v';
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ bad:
 				}
 			else
 				{
-				char **xpp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+				char **xpp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
 				BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" revoked. t\n", user);
 
 				xpp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R';
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ bad:
 		/* Lets check some fields */
 		for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 			{
-			pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+			pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
 	
 			if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == 'v')
 				{
diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
index b9749dcd363d..893670ff4132 100644
--- a/apps/verify.c
+++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -222,11 +222,19 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto end;
 		}
 
-	if (argc < 1) check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
+	ret = 0;
+	if (argc < 1)
+		{ 
+		if (1 != check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
+			ret = -1;
+		}
 	else
+		{
 		for (i=0; i<argc; i++)
-			check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
-	ret=0;
+			if (1 != check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
+				ret = -1;
+		}
+
 end:
 	if (ret == 1) {
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
@@ -235,13 +243,16 @@ end:
 		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
 #endif
 		BIO_printf(bio_err," cert1 cert2 ...\n");
+
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"recognized usages:\n");
-		for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+		for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++)
+			{
 			X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
 			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
-			BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n", X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
-								X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
-		}
+			BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n",
+				   X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
+				   X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
+			}
 	}
 	if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
 	if (cert_ctx != NULL) X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx);
@@ -249,7 +260,7 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
 	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
 	apps_shutdown();
-	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
 	}
 
 static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,
diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c
index e6e5e0d4e524..3863ab968dad 100644
--- a/apps/x509.c
+++ b/apps/x509.c
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			days=atoi(*(++argv));
 			if (days == 0)
 				{
-				BIO_printf(STDout,"bad number of days\n");
+				BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad number of days\n");
 				goto bad;
 				}
 			}
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ bad:
 				}
 			else if (text == i)
 				{
-				X509_print_ex(out,x,nmflag, certflag);
+				X509_print_ex(STDout,x,nmflag, certflag);
 				}
 			else if (startdate == i)
 				{
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl
index 2ce6deffc88c..e52395421b3c 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl
@@ -1036,9 +1036,9 @@ _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	nop
 .end	_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key
 
-.globl	AES_set_encrypt_key
-.ent	AES_set_encrypt_key
-AES_set_encrypt_key:
+.globl	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+.ent	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
 	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
 	.set	noreorder
@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
 	.cplocal	$Tbl
-	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_set_encrypt_key
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,private_AES_set_encrypt_key
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	jr	$ra
 	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
-.end	AES_set_encrypt_key
+.end	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
 ___
 
 my ($head,$tail)=($inp,$bits);
@@ -1091,9 +1091,9 @@ my ($tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8,$tp9,$tpb,$tpd,$tpe)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
 my ($m,$x80808080,$x7f7f7f7f,$x1b1b1b1b)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2);
 $code.=<<___;
 .align	5
-.globl	AES_set_decrypt_key
-.ent	AES_set_decrypt_key
-AES_set_decrypt_key:
+.globl	private_AES_set_decrypt_key
+.ent	private_AES_set_decrypt_key
+private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
 	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
 	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
 	.set	noreorder
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
 	.cplocal	$Tbl
-	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_set_decrypt_key
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,private_AES_set_decrypt_key
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	jr	$ra
 	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
-.end	AES_set_decrypt_key
+.end	private_AES_set_decrypt_key
 ___
 }}}
 
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
index 445a1e67620e..e75dcd0315e5 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
@@ -1598,11 +1598,11 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
 	lghi	$s1,0x7f
 	nr	$s1,%r0
 	lghi	%r0,0			# query capability vector
-	la	%r1,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	%r1,$tweak-16($sp)
 	.long	0xb92e0042		# km %r4,%r2
 	llihh	%r1,0x8000
 	srlg	%r1,%r1,32($s1)		# check for 32+function code
-	ng	%r1,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	ng	%r1,$tweak-16($sp)
 	lgr	%r0,$s0			# restore the function code
 	la	%r1,0($key1)		# restore $key1
 	jz	.Lxts_km_vanilla
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
 
 	lrvg	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the last tweak
 	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+8($sp)
-	stmg	%r0,%r3,$tweak-32(%r1)	# wipe copy of the key
+	stmg	%r0,%r3,$tweak-32($sp)	# wipe copy of the key
 
 	nill	%r0,0xffdf		# switch back to original function code
 	la	%r1,0($key1)		# restore pointer to $key1
@@ -1684,11 +1684,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	$i1,0x87
 	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
-	srlg	$i2,$s0,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s0,$s0,1
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
 	xgr	$s0,$i1
-	ogr	$s1,$i2
 .Lxts_km_start:
 	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
@@ -1745,11 +1743,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	$i1,0x87
 	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
-	srlg	$i2,$s0,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s0,$s0,1
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
 	xgr	$s0,$i1
-	ogr	$s1,$i2
 
 	ltr	$len,$len		# clear zero flag
 	br	$ra
@@ -1781,8 +1777,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	clr	%r0,%r1
 	jl	.Lxts_enc_software
 
+	st${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 
 	sllg	$len,$len,4		# $len&=~15
 	slgr	$out,$inp
@@ -1830,9 +1826,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	stg	$i2,8($i3)
 
 .Lxts_enc_km_done:
-	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)		# wipe tweak
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+8($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 .align	16
@@ -1843,12 +1839,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
 
 	slgr	$out,$inp
 
-	xgr	$s0,$s0			# clear upper half
-	xgr	$s1,$s1
-	lrv	$s0,$stdframe+4($sp)	# load secno
-	lrv	$s1,$stdframe+0($sp)
-	xgr	$s2,$s2
-	xgr	$s3,$s3
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# ivp
+	llgf	$s0,0($s3)		# load iv
+	llgf	$s1,4($s3)
+	llgf	$s2,8($s3)
+	llgf	$s3,12($s3)
 	stm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	la	$key,0($key2)
 	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
@@ -1864,11 +1859,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
@@ -1917,11 +1910,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
@@ -1956,7 +1947,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .size	AES_xts_encrypt,.-AES_xts_encrypt
 ___
 # void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
-#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,u64 secno);
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
 #
 $code.=<<___;
 .globl	AES_xts_decrypt
@@ -1988,8 +1980,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	clr	%r0,%r1
 	jl	.Lxts_dec_software
 
+	st${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 
 	nill	$len,0xfff0		# $len&=~15
 	slgr	$out,$inp
@@ -2028,11 +2020,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	lghi	$i1,0x87
 	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
-	srlg	$i2,$s0,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s0,$s0,1
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
 	xgr	$s0,$i1
-	ogr	$s1,$i2
 	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
 
@@ -2075,9 +2065,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	stg	$s2,0($i3)
 	stg	$s3,8($i3)
 .Lxts_dec_km_done:
-	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)		# wipe tweak
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+8($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 .align	16
@@ -2089,12 +2079,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	srlg	$len,$len,4
 	slgr	$out,$inp
 
-	xgr	$s0,$s0			# clear upper half
-	xgr	$s1,$s1
-	lrv	$s0,$stdframe+4($sp)	# load secno
-	lrv	$s1,$stdframe+0($sp)
-	xgr	$s2,$s2
-	xgr	$s3,$s3
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# ivp
+	llgf	$s0,0($s3)		# load iv
+	llgf	$s1,4($s3)
+	llgf	$s2,8($s3)
+	llgf	$s3,12($s3)
 	stm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	la	$key,0($key2)
 	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
@@ -2113,11 +2102,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
@@ -2156,11 +2143,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$i2,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$i3,$s3
 	stmg	$i2,$i3,$tweak($sp)	# save the 1st tweak
@@ -2176,11 +2161,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
index 48fa857d5b1b..34cbb5d84429 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $verticalspin=1;	# unlike 32-bit version $verticalspin performs
 			# ~15% better on both AMD and Intel cores
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
index c6f6b3334afe..3c8f6c19e7bd 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
 	   $1>=10);
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # void aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(const void *inp,
 #			void *out,
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
index 499f3b3f42f8..0dbb194b8d74 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
@@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $movkey = $PREFIX eq "aesni" ? "movups" : "movups";
 @_4args=$win64?	("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
index c9c6312fa74a..ceb02b50ddb6 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
 my @XMM=map("%xmm$_",(15,0..14));	# best on Atom, +10% over (0..15)
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
index 37998db5e139..41f2e46f60c6 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $PREFIX="vpaes";
 
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
index 264ebf2393a2..ead37ac32582 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_strex.c
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
+	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index 432722e4099e..fc84cd3d191b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 
 	int mdnid, pknid;
 
+	if (!pkey)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
index 627ec87f9f89..b649e1fcf96c 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
@@ -175,12 +175,15 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	if (key->pkey)
 		{
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
 		ret = key->pkey;
 		}
 	else
+		{
 		key->pkey = ret;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index 1b1e4bec8121..8990909971ca 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -77,10 +77,20 @@
 #define OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE 0xc0
 #endif
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && !defined(IP_MTU)
 #define IP_MTU      14 /* linux is lame */
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+/* Standard definition causes type-punning problems. */
+#undef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+#define s6_addr32 __u6_addr.__u6_addr32
+#define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a)               \
+        (((a)->s6_addr32[0] == 0) &&          \
+         ((a)->s6_addr32[1] == 0) &&          \
+         ((a)->s6_addr32[2] == htonl(0x0000ffff)))
+#endif
+
 #ifdef WATT32
 #define sock_write SockWrite  /* Watt-32 uses same names */
 #define sock_read  SockRead
@@ -255,7 +265,7 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
 	{
 #if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
 	bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
-	int sz = sizeof(int);
+	union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
 
 	/* Is a timer active? */
 	if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0)
@@ -265,8 +275,10 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
 		/* Read current socket timeout */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
 		int timeout;
+
+		sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
 		if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
-					   (void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
+					   (void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); }
 		else
 			{
@@ -274,9 +286,12 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
 			data->socket_timeout.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
 			}
 #else
+		sz.i = sizeof(data->socket_timeout);
 		if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, 
 						&(data->socket_timeout), (void *)&sz) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); }
+		else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
+			OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(data->socket_timeout));
 #endif
 
 		/* Get current time */
@@ -445,11 +460,10 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	int *ip;
 	struct sockaddr *to = NULL;
 	bio_dgram_data *data = NULL;
-#if defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU)
-	long sockopt_val = 0;
-	unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && (defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU))
+	int sockopt_val = 0;
+	socklen_t sockopt_len;	/* assume that system supporting IP_MTU is
+				 * modern enough to define socklen_t */
 	socklen_t addr_len;
 	union	{
 		struct sockaddr	sa;
@@ -531,7 +545,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		break;
 		/* (Linux)kernel sets DF bit on outgoing IP packets */
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO)
 		addr_len = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
 		memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 		if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0)
@@ -539,7 +553,6 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			ret = 0;
 			break;
 			}
-		sockopt_len = sizeof(sockopt_val);
 		switch (addr.sa.sa_family)
 			{
 		case AF_INET:
@@ -548,7 +561,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 				&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
 				perror("setsockopt");
 			break;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER)
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO)
 		case AF_INET6:
 			sockopt_val = IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO;
 			if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER,
@@ -565,7 +578,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		break;
 #endif
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU)
 		addr_len = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
 		memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 		if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0)
@@ -727,12 +740,15 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 #endif
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
 		{
-		int timeout, sz = sizeof(timeout);
+		union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+		int timeout;
 		struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+
+		sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
 		if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
-			(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
+			(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
 		else
 			{
@@ -740,12 +756,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
 			ret = sizeof(*tv);
 			}
-		}
 #else
+		sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
 		if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, 
-			ptr, (void *)&ret) < 0)
+			ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
+		else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(struct timeval));
+			ret = (int)sz.s;
+			}
+		else
+			ret = sz.i;
 #endif
+		}
 		break;
 #endif
 #if defined(SO_SNDTIMEO)
@@ -765,12 +789,15 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 #endif
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
 		{
-		int timeout, sz = sizeof(timeout);
+		union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+		int timeout;
 		struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+
+		sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
 		if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
-			(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
+			(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
 		else
 			{
@@ -778,12 +805,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
 			ret = sizeof(*tv);
 			}
-		}
 #else
+		sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
 		if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, 
-			ptr, (void *)&ret) < 0)
+			ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
+		else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(struct timeval));
+			ret = (int)sz.s;
+			}
+		else
+			ret = sz.i;
 #endif
+		}
 		break;
 #endif
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP:
@@ -955,7 +990,6 @@ static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a)
 #ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
 void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp)
 	{
-	unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
 	int ret;
 	struct sctp_authkey_event* authkeyevent = &snp->sn_auth_event;
 
@@ -965,9 +999,8 @@ void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp)
 
 		/* delete key */
 		authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyevent->auth_keynumber;
-		sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
 		ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY,
-		      &authkeyid, sockopt_len);
+		      &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
 		}
 	}
 #endif
@@ -1298,7 +1331,7 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	{
 	long ret=1;
 	bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL;
-	unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
+	socklen_t sockopt_len = 0;
 	struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid;
 	struct sctp_authkey *authkey;
 
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
index c162a3ec2304..38b51645f067 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	move	$ta3,$ra
-	bal	bn_div_words
+	bal	bn_div_words_internal
 	move	$ra,$ta3
 	$MULTU	$ta2,$v0
 	$LD	$t2,-2*$BNSZ($a3)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
index 54aeb01921e3..bfd6e975416d 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 use strict;
 my $code=".text\n\n";
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
index 1658acbbddd6..a30d4ef02958 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open STDOUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
 
 ($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx");	$a=$lo;
 ($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
index 5d79b35e1cf2..17fb94c84c9f 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # int bn_mul_mont(
 $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
index 057cda28aaed..8f8dc5a59798 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
 $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index 52b3304293a5..7b2403185e62 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
     *
     *					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
     */
+#undef bn_div_words
 #  define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0)		\
 	({  asm volatile (			\
 		"divl	%4"			\
@@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
     * Same story here, but it's 128-bit by 64-bit division. Wow!
     *					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
     */
+#  undef bn_div_words
 #  define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0)		\
 	({  asm volatile (			\
 		"divq	%4"			\
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
index 4a352119ba8a..a808f53178fb 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ err:
 /* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
 static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
index eecfd8cc99e7..817c773b6590 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -282,16 +282,23 @@ extern "C" {
 #  endif
 # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
 #  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
-#   define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)	({	\
+#   if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4 /* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */
+#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)		 (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
+#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({	\
+	__uint128_t ret=(__uint128_t)(a)*(b);	\
+	(high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret;	 })
+#   else
+#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)	({	\
 	register BN_ULONG ret;		\
 	asm ("dmultu	%1,%2"		\
 	     : "=h"(ret)		\
 	     : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l");	\
 	ret;			})
-#   define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)	\
+#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)\
 	asm ("dmultu	%2,%3"		\
 	     : "=l"(low),"=h"(high)	\
 	     : "r"(a), "r"(b));
+#    endif
 #  endif
 # endif		/* cpu */
 #endif		/* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
diff --git a/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl b/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
index 76955e47265c..9f4b82fa4821 100755
--- a/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 sub hi() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1h/;    $r; }
 sub lo() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/;
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c b/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c
index a5fc2c4e2b42..202168810126 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_cd.c
@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 #include "cms_lcl.h"
 
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CompressedData)
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
index f873ce379445..bebeaf29c7ba 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
 	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
-	size_t tkeylen;
+	size_t tkeylen = 0;
 
 	int ok = 0;
 
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c b/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
index f88e8f3b5257..b62d1bfac02b 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_lib.c
@@ -411,9 +411,7 @@ int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain,
 		 * algorithm  OID instead of digest.
 		 */
 			|| EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mtmp)) == nid)
-			{
 			return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mctx, mtmp);
-			}
 		chain = BIO_next(chain);
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c
index c6f4cb2d55be..213890e0c28f 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mall.c
@@ -76,5 +76,6 @@ void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	ENGINE_add_conf_module();
 #endif
+	EVP_add_alg_module();
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/cryptlib.c b/crypto/cryptlib.c
index 766ea8cac737..304c6b70627b 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ void CRYPTO_THREADID_current(CRYPTO_THREADID *id)
 	CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL));
 #else
 	/* For everything else, default to using the address of 'errno' */
-	CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(id, &errno);
+	CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(id, (void*)&errno);
 #endif
 	}
 
@@ -704,6 +704,7 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
     }
     else
 	vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid();
+
     /*
      * |(1<<10) sets a reserved bit to signal that variable
      * was initialized already... This is to avoid interference
@@ -924,3 +925,16 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const char *assertion)
 	}
 
 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)	{ return stderr; }
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/cryptlib.h b/crypto/cryptlib.h
index 1761f6b66879..d26f9630eade 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.h
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.h
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ extern "C" {
 
 void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void);
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *,...);
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta,...);
 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void);
 extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated;
 
diff --git a/crypto/crypto.h b/crypto/crypto.h
index 6aeda0a9ace3..f92fc5182d9e 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto.h
+++ b/crypto/crypto.h
@@ -488,10 +488,10 @@ void CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions(void (**m)(void *,int,const char *,int,int),
 				    long (**go)(void));
 
 void *CRYPTO_malloc_locked(int num, const char *file, int line);
-void CRYPTO_free_locked(void *);
+void CRYPTO_free_locked(void *ptr);
 void *CRYPTO_malloc(int num, const char *file, int line);
 char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char *file, int line);
-void CRYPTO_free(void *);
+void CRYPTO_free(void *ptr);
 void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *addr,int num, const char *file, int line);
 void *CRYPTO_realloc_clean(void *addr,int old_num,int num,const char *file,
 			   int line);
@@ -574,6 +574,13 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void);
 #define fips_cipher_abort(alg) while(0)
 #endif
 
+/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It
+ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents
+ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a
+ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be
+ * non-zero. */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
diff --git a/crypto/des/set_key.c b/crypto/des/set_key.c
index d3e69ca8b586..da4d62e11287 100644
--- a/crypto/des/set_key.c
+++ b/crypto/des/set_key.c
@@ -63,9 +63,8 @@
  * 1.1 added norm_expand_bits
  * 1.0 First working version
  */
-#include "des_locl.h"
-
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "des_locl.h"
 
 OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,DES_check_key,0)	/* defaults to false */
 
diff --git a/crypto/des/str2key.c b/crypto/des/str2key.c
index 9c2054bda6b9..1077f99d1b27 100644
--- a/crypto/des/str2key.c
+++ b/crypto/des/str2key.c
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-#include "des_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "des_locl.h"
 
 void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key)
 	{
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec.h b/crypto/ec/ec.h
index 9d01325af33b..dfe8710d3309 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group);
 void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag);
 int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group);
 
-void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *, point_conversion_form_t);
+void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form);
 point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *);
 
-unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *);
+unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x);
 size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *);
 size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len);
 
@@ -626,8 +626,8 @@ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *c
  */
 int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
 
-int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
-int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *);
+int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);
 
 /** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^num p[i] * m[i]
  *  \param  group  underlying EC_GROUP object
@@ -800,16 +800,24 @@ const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key);
 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub);
 
 unsigned EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
-void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *, unsigned int);
-point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *);
-void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *, point_conversion_form_t);
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
 /* functions to set/get method specific data  */
-void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *, 
+void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, 
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *));
-void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *, void *data,
+/** Sets the key method data of an EC_KEY object, if none has yet been set.
+ *  \param  key              EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  data             opaque data to install.
+ *  \param  dup_func         a function that duplicates |data|.
+ *  \param  free_func        a function that frees |data|.
+ *  \param  clear_free_func  a function that wipes and frees |data|.
+ *  \return the previously set data pointer, or NULL if |data| was inserted.
+ */
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *));
 /* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */
-void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *, int);
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag);
 
 /** Creates a table of pre-computed multiples of the generator to 
  *  accelerate further EC_KEY operations.
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
index bf9fd2dc2c43..7fa247593d91 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
@@ -520,18 +520,27 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
 void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *))
 	{
-	return EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
+	void *ret;
+
+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+	ret = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+	return ret;
 	}
 
-void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *))
 	{
 	EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data;
+
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
 	ex_data = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
 	if (ex_data == NULL)
 		EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
 	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+	return ex_data;
 	}
 
 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
index d1ed66c37e76..66ee397d86c4 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_pmeth.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
 
 	pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ctx->peerkey->pkey.ec);
 
-	/* NB: unlike PKS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is
+	/* NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is
 	 * not an error, the result is truncated.
 	 */
 
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
index 079e47431b4f..f04f132c7ad6 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
 		ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
 		ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one };
 
-
 	return &ret;
 #endif
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
index f107782de006..102eaa9b2326 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ectest.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group)
 	}
 
 static void prime_field_tests(void)
-	{	
+	{
 	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 	BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
 	EC_GROUP *group;
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh/Makefile b/crypto/ecdh/Makefile
index 65d8904ee8a6..ba05fea05ca0 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ecdh/Makefile
@@ -84,17 +84,12 @@ ech_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 ech_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 ech_err.o: ech_err.c
 ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ech_key.c ech_locl.h
+ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ech_key.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ech_key.o: ech_key.c ech_locl.h
 ech_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 ech_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 ech_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh/ech_key.c b/crypto/ecdh/ech_key.c
index f44da9298b5e..2988899ea2ab 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh/ech_key.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh/ech_key.c
@@ -68,9 +68,6 @@
  */
 
 #include "ech_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
 
 int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
 	EC_KEY *eckey,
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c b/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
index dadbfd3c49f5..0644431b756a 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c
@@ -222,8 +222,15 @@ ECDH_DATA *ecdh_check(EC_KEY *key)
 		ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)ecdh_data_new();
 		if (ecdh_data == NULL)
 			return NULL;
-		EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdh_data,
-			ecdh_data_dup, ecdh_data_free, ecdh_data_free);
+		data = EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdh_data,
+			   ecdh_data_dup, ecdh_data_free, ecdh_data_free);
+		if (data != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Another thread raced us to install the key_method
+			 * data and won. */
+			ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
+			ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+			}
 	}
 	else
 		ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
index e477da430bab..814a6bf40465 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
@@ -200,8 +200,15 @@ ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa_check(EC_KEY *key)
 		ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)ecdsa_data_new();
 		if (ecdsa_data == NULL)
 			return NULL;
-		EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdsa_data,
-			ecdsa_data_dup, ecdsa_data_free, ecdsa_data_free);
+		data = EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdsa_data,
+			   ecdsa_data_dup, ecdsa_data_free, ecdsa_data_free);
+		if (data != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Another thread raced us to install the key_method
+			 * data and won. */
+			ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
+			ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+			}
 	}
 	else
 		ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
diff --git a/crypto/err/err_all.c b/crypto/err/err_all.c
index bd8946d8ba0f..8eb547d98d59 100644
--- a/crypto/err/err_all.c
+++ b/crypto/err/err_all.c
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@
 #endif
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #endif
@@ -95,6 +97,9 @@
 #include <openssl/ui.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
 #include <openssl/ts.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
@@ -102,11 +107,6 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
 #include <openssl/jpake.h>
 #endif
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
 
 void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void)
 	{
@@ -130,7 +130,9 @@ void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void)
 	ERR_load_ASN1_strings();
 	ERR_load_CONF_strings();
 	ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 	ERR_load_COMP_strings();
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 	ERR_load_EC_strings();
 #endif
@@ -153,15 +155,14 @@ void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void)
 #endif
 	ERR_load_OCSP_strings();
 	ERR_load_UI_strings();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	ERR_load_FIPS_strings();
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
 	ERR_load_CMS_strings();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
 	ERR_load_JPAKE_strings();
 #endif
-	ERR_load_COMP_strings();
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	ERR_load_FIPS_strings();
 #endif
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/Makefile b/crypto/evp/Makefile
index 0fe1b96bff45..1e46cebf5e76 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/evp/Makefile
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ TESTDATA=evptests.txt
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
-LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c \
+LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c evp_cnf.c \
 	e_des.c e_bf.c e_idea.c e_des3.c e_camellia.c\
 	e_rc4.c e_aes.c names.c e_seed.c \
 	e_xcbc_d.c e_rc2.c e_cast.c e_rc5.c \
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c \
 	e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c evp_fips.c	\
 	e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
 
-LIBOBJ=	encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o \
+LIBOBJ=	encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \
 	e_des.o e_bf.o e_idea.o e_des3.o e_camellia.o\
 	e_rc4.o e_aes.o names.o e_seed.o \
 	e_xcbc_d.o e_rc2.o e_cast.o e_rc5.o \
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ files:
 links:
 	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
 	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
-	cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test
+	[ ! -f $(TESTDATA) ] || cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test
 	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
 
 install:
@@ -356,6 +356,20 @@ evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
 evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h evp_acnf.c
+evp_cnf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h ../cryptlib.h evp_cnf.c
 evp_enc.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
 evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
@@ -437,28 +451,22 @@ evp_pkey.o: ../asn1/asn1_locl.h ../cryptlib.h evp_pkey.c
 m_dss.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 m_dss.o: ../cryptlib.h m_dss.c
 m_dss1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 m_dss1.o: ../cryptlib.h m_dss1.c
 m_ecdsa.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
@@ -563,16 +571,13 @@ m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 m_sha.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_locl.h m_sha.c
 m_sha1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
+m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
 m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 m_sha1.o: ../cryptlib.h m_sha1.c
 m_sigver.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 m_sigver.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c
index 467e6b5ae9cf..6fc469f9c452 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/digest.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size)
 	return FIPS_digestfinal(ctx, md, size);
 #else
 	int ret;
+
 	OPENSSL_assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 	ret=ctx->digest->final(ctx,md);
 	if (size != NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 1e4af0cb7511..1bfb5d92b340 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -969,8 +969,6 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 
 	if (!gctx->iv_set)
 		return -1;
-	if (!ctx->encrypt && gctx->taglen < 0)
-		return -1;
 	if (in)
 		{
 		if (out == NULL)
@@ -1012,6 +1010,8 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 		{
 		if (!ctx->encrypt)
 			{
+			if (gctx->taglen < 0)
+				return -1;
 			if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
 					ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
 				return -1;
@@ -1217,6 +1217,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 			vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len*8, &cctx->ks);
 			CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
 					&cctx->ks, (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt);
+			cctx->str = NULL;
 			cctx->key_set = 1;
 			break;
 			}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index 710fb79baf45..483e04b605b7 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ typedef struct
 	defined(_M_AMD64)	|| defined(_M_X64)	|| \
 	defined(__INTEL__)	)
 
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(PEDANTIC)
+# define BSWAP(x) ({ unsigned int r=(x); asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); r; })
+#endif
+
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
 #define AESNI_CAPABLE   (1<<(57-32))
 
@@ -167,6 +171,9 @@ static void sha1_update(SHA_CTX *c,const void *data,size_t len)
 		SHA1_Update(c,ptr,res);
 }
 
+#ifdef SHA1_Update
+#undef SHA1_Update
+#endif
 #define SHA1_Update sha1_update
 
 static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
@@ -184,6 +191,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 	sha_off = SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
 #endif
 
+	key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
+
 	if (len%AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0;
 
 	if (ctx->encrypt) {
@@ -234,47 +243,210 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 					&key->ks,ctx->iv,1);
 		}
 	} else {
-		unsigned char mac[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+		union { unsigned int  u[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+			unsigned char c[32+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } mac, *pmac;
+
+		/* arrange cache line alignment */
+		pmac = (void *)(((size_t)mac.c+31)&((size_t)0-32));
 
 		/* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */
 		aesni_cbc_encrypt(in,out,len,
 				&key->ks,ctx->iv,0);
 
 		if (plen) {	/* "TLS" mode of operation */
-			/* figure out payload length */
-			if (len<(size_t)(out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-				return 0;
-
-			len -= (out[len-1]+1+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+			size_t inp_len, mask, j, i;
+			unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen;
+			int ret = 1;
+			union {	unsigned int  u[SHA_LBLOCK];
+				unsigned char c[SHA_CBLOCK]; }
+				*data = (void *)key->md.data;
 
 			if ((key->aux.tls_aad[plen-4]<<8|key->aux.tls_aad[plen-3])
-			    >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
-				len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			    >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
 				iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-			}
 
-			key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = len>>8;
-			key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = len;
+			if (len<(iv+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1))
+				return 0;
+
+			/* omit explicit iv */
+			out += iv;
+			len -= iv;
+
+			/* figure out payload length */
+			pad = out[len-1];
+			maxpad = len-(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+1);
+			maxpad |= (255-maxpad)>>(sizeof(maxpad)*8-8);
+			maxpad &= 255;
+
+			inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+pad+1);
+			mask = (0-((inp_len-len)>>(sizeof(inp_len)*8-1)));
+			inp_len &= mask;
+			ret &= (int)mask;
+
+			key->aux.tls_aad[plen-2] = inp_len>>8;
+			key->aux.tls_aad[plen-1] = inp_len;
 
-			/* calculate HMAC and verify it */
+			/* calculate HMAC */
 			key->md = key->head;
 			SHA1_Update(&key->md,key->aux.tls_aad,plen);
-			SHA1_Update(&key->md,out+iv,len);
-			SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
 
+#if 1
+			len -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;		/* amend mac */
+			if (len>=(256+SHA_CBLOCK)) {
+				j = (len-(256+SHA_CBLOCK))&(0-SHA_CBLOCK);
+				j += SHA_CBLOCK-key->md.num;
+				SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,j);
+				out += j;
+				len -= j;
+				inp_len -= j;
+			}
+
+			/* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+			bitlen = key->md.Nl+(inp_len<<3);	/* at most 18 bits */
+#ifdef BSWAP
+			bitlen = BSWAP(bitlen);
+#else
+			mac.c[0] = 0;
+			mac.c[1] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>16);
+			mac.c[2] = (unsigned char)(bitlen>>8);
+			mac.c[3] = (unsigned char)bitlen;
+			bitlen = mac.u[0];
+#endif
+
+			pmac->u[0]=0;
+			pmac->u[1]=0;
+			pmac->u[2]=0;
+			pmac->u[3]=0;
+			pmac->u[4]=0;
+
+			for (res=key->md.num, j=0;j<len;j++) {
+				size_t c = out[j];
+				mask = (j-inp_len)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8);
+				c &= mask;
+				c |= 0x80&~mask&~((inp_len-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-8));
+				data->c[res++]=(unsigned char)c;
+
+				if (res!=SHA_CBLOCK) continue;
+
+				mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+				data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+				sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+				mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+				pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+				pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+				pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+				pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+				pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+				res=0;
+			}
+
+			for(i=res;i<SHA_CBLOCK;i++,j++) data->c[i]=0;
+
+			if (res>SHA_CBLOCK-8) {
+				mask = 0-((inp_len+8-j)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+				data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] |= bitlen&mask;
+				sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+				mask &= 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+				pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+				pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+				pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+				pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+				pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+				memset(data,0,SHA_CBLOCK);
+				j+=64;
+			}
+			data->u[SHA_LBLOCK-1] = bitlen;
+			sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+			mask = 0-((j-inp_len-73)>>(sizeof(j)*8-1));
+			pmac->u[0] |= key->md.h0 & mask;
+			pmac->u[1] |= key->md.h1 & mask;
+			pmac->u[2] |= key->md.h2 & mask;
+			pmac->u[3] |= key->md.h3 & mask;
+			pmac->u[4] |= key->md.h4 & mask;
+
+#ifdef BSWAP
+			pmac->u[0] = BSWAP(pmac->u[0]);
+			pmac->u[1] = BSWAP(pmac->u[1]);
+			pmac->u[2] = BSWAP(pmac->u[2]);
+			pmac->u[3] = BSWAP(pmac->u[3]);
+			pmac->u[4] = BSWAP(pmac->u[4]);
+#else
+			for (i=0;i<5;i++) {
+				res = pmac->u[i];
+				pmac->c[4*i+0]=(unsigned char)(res>>24);
+				pmac->c[4*i+1]=(unsigned char)(res>>16);
+				pmac->c[4*i+2]=(unsigned char)(res>>8);
+				pmac->c[4*i+3]=(unsigned char)res;
+			}
+#endif
+			len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+#else
+			SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,inp_len);
+			res = key->md.num;
+			SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
+
+			{
+			unsigned int inp_blocks, pad_blocks;
+
+			/* but pretend as if we hashed padded payload */
+			inp_blocks = 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+			res += (unsigned int)(len-inp_len);
+			pad_blocks = res / SHA_CBLOCK;
+			res %= SHA_CBLOCK;
+			pad_blocks += 1+((SHA_CBLOCK-9-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+			for (;inp_blocks<pad_blocks;inp_blocks++)
+				sha1_block_data_order(&key->md,data,1);
+			}
+#endif
 			key->md = key->tail;
-			SHA1_Update(&key->md,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-			SHA1_Final(mac,&key->md);
+			SHA1_Update(&key->md,pmac->c,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+			SHA1_Final(pmac->c,&key->md);
 
-			if (memcmp(out+iv+len,mac,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-				return 0;
+			/* verify HMAC */
+			out += inp_len;
+			len -= inp_len;
+#if 1
+			{
+			unsigned char *p = out+len-1-maxpad-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+			size_t off = out-p;
+			unsigned int c, cmask;
+
+			maxpad += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+			for (res=0,i=0,j=0;j<maxpad;j++) {
+				c = p[j];
+				cmask = ((int)(j-off-SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+				res |= (c^pad)&~cmask;	/* ... and padding */
+				cmask &= ((int)(off-1-j))>>(sizeof(int)*8-1);
+				res |= (c^pmac->c[i])&cmask;
+				i += 1&cmask;
+			}
+			maxpad -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+			res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+			ret &= (int)~res;
+			}
+#else
+			for (res=0,i=0;i<SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;i++)
+				res |= out[i]^pmac->c[i];
+			res = 0-((0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1));
+			ret &= (int)~res;
+
+			/* verify padding */
+			pad = (pad&~res) | (maxpad&res);
+			out = out+len-1-pad;
+			for (res=0,i=0;i<pad;i++)
+				res |= out[i]^pad;
+
+			res = (0-res)>>(sizeof(res)*8-1);
+			ret &= (int)~res;
+#endif
+			return ret;
 		} else {
 			SHA1_Update(&key->md,out,len);
 		}
 	}
 
-	key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
-
 	return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -309,6 +481,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void
 		SHA1_Init(&key->tail);
 		SHA1_Update(&key->tail,hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
 
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key,sizeof(hmac_key));
+
 		return 1;
 		}
 	case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h
index 0d1b20a7d38a..faeb3c24e61b 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -402,7 +402,6 @@ struct evp_cipher_st
 /* Length of tag for TLS */
 #define EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN				16
 
-
 typedef struct evp_cipher_info_st
 	{
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
@@ -789,8 +788,8 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cfb128(void);
 # define EVP_aes_128_cfb EVP_aes_128_cfb128
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ofb(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ctr(void);
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_gcm(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_ccm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_gcm(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_xts(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ecb(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cbc(void);
@@ -800,8 +799,8 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_cfb128(void);
 # define EVP_aes_192_cfb EVP_aes_192_cfb128
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ofb(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ctr(void);
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_gcm(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_ccm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_gcm(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ecb(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cbc(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb1(void);
@@ -810,8 +809,8 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_cfb128(void);
 # define EVP_aes_256_cfb EVP_aes_256_cfb128
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ofb(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ctr(void);
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_gcm(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_ccm(void);
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_gcm(void);
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_xts(void);
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void);
@@ -1243,6 +1242,8 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
 	int (*ctrl_str)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 					const char *type, const char *value));
 
+void EVP_add_alg_module(void);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -1257,6 +1258,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 #define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY				 133
 #define EVP_F_AES_XTS					 172
 #define EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER				 175
+#define EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT				 177
 #define EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY				 159
 #define EVP_F_CMAC_INIT					 173
 #define EVP_F_D2I_PKEY					 100
@@ -1350,15 +1352,19 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 #define EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS			 153
 #define EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS				 163
 #define EVP_R_ENCODE_ERROR				 115
+#define EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION			 165
+#define EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE			 166
 #define EVP_R_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT_ERROR			 119
 #define EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY			 127
 #define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY			 128
 #define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY			 129
 #define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_ECDSA_KEY			 141
 #define EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY			 142
+#define EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED			 167
 #define EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR			 134
 #define EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED			 111
 #define EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST				 152
+#define EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE				 168
 #define EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH			 130
 #define EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION				 148
 #define EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE				 102
@@ -1383,6 +1389,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 #define EVP_R_TOO_LARGE					 164
 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER				 160
 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST				 161
+#define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION				 169
 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM			 121
 #define EVP_R_UNSUPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS		 135
 #define EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM			 156
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2e4db3023593
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/* evp_cnf.c */
+/* Written by Stephen Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2007.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
+
+/* Algorithm configuration module. */
+
+static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+	{
+	int i;
+	const char *oid_section;
+	STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
+	CONF_VALUE *oval;
+	oid_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
+	if(!(sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, oid_section)))
+		{
+		EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	for(i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++)
+		{
+		oval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
+		if (!strcmp(oval->name, "fips_mode"))
+			{
+			int m;
+			if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m))
+				{
+				EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (m > 0)
+				{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+				if (!FIPS_mode() && !FIPS_mode_set(1))
+					{
+					EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE);
+					return 0;
+					}
+#else
+				EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+				return 0;
+#endif
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
+			ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", oval->name,
+						", value=", oval->value);
+			}
+				
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+void EVP_add_alg_module(void)
+	{
+	CONF_module_add("alg_section", alg_module_init, 0);
+	}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
index db0f76d59bcd..08eab9882f6b 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY),	"AES_INIT_KEY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_XTS),	"AES_XTS"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER),	"AES_XTS_CIPHER"},
+{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT),	"ALG_MODULE_INIT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY),	"CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_CMAC_INIT),	"CMAC_INIT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_D2I_PKEY),	"D2I_PKEY"},
@@ -171,15 +172,19 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS)  ,"different parameters"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS)     ,"disabled for fips"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ENCODE_ERROR)          ,"encode error"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION) ,"error loading section"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_ERROR_SETTING_FIPS_MODE),"error setting fips mode"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT_ERROR),"evp pbe cipherinit error"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY)  ,"expecting an rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY)    ,"expecting a dh key"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY)   ,"expecting a dsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_ECDSA_KEY) ,"expecting a ecdsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY)    ,"expecting a ec key"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED),"fips mode not supported"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR)  ,"initialization error"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED) ,"input not initialized"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST)        ,"invalid digest"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE)     ,"invalid fips mode"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH)    ,"invalid key length"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION)     ,"invalid operation"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE)          ,"iv too large"},
@@ -204,6 +209,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE)             ,"too large"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER)        ,"unknown cipher"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST)        ,"unknown digest"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION)        ,"unknown option"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM) ,"unknown pbe algorithm"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS),"unsuported number of rounds"},
 {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) ,"unsupported algorithm"},
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_dss.c b/crypto/evp/m_dss.c
index 4ad63ada6fe2..6fb7e9a86105 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_dss.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_dss.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_dss1.c b/crypto/evp/m_dss1.c
index f80170efeb98..2df362a6701f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_dss1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_dss1.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c
index 3cb11f1ebb1f..bd0c01ad3c46 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_sha1.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_sign.c b/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
index dfa48c157cf5..8afb664306e9 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_sign.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
 	{
 	unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 	unsigned int m_len;
-	int i=0,ok=0,v;
+	int i = 0,ok = 0,v;
 	EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
 	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
 
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_verify.c b/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
index 5f5c409f45fc..c66d63ccf859 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_verify.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
 	{
 	unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 	unsigned int m_len;
-	int i=-1,ok=0,v;
+	int i = 0,ok = 0,v;
 	EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;
 	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
 
diff --git a/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c b/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c
index 82c2cb2d98a9..b5b165b05264 100644
--- a/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/md4/md4_dgst.c
@@ -106,22 +106,23 @@ void md4_block_data_order (MD4_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t num)
 
 	for (;num--;)
 		{
-	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 0)=l;		HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 1)=l;
+	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 0)=l;
+	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 1)=l;
 	/* Round 0 */
-	R0(A,B,C,D,X( 0), 3,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 2)=l;
-	R0(D,A,B,C,X( 1), 7,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 3)=l;
-	R0(C,D,A,B,X( 2),11,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 4)=l;
-	R0(B,C,D,A,X( 3),19,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 5)=l;
-	R0(A,B,C,D,X( 4), 3,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 6)=l;
-	R0(D,A,B,C,X( 5), 7,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 7)=l;
-	R0(C,D,A,B,X( 6),11,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 8)=l;
-	R0(B,C,D,A,X( 7),19,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 9)=l;
-	R0(A,B,C,D,X( 8), 3,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(10)=l;
-	R0(D,A,B,C,X( 9), 7,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(11)=l;
-	R0(C,D,A,B,X(10),11,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(12)=l;
-	R0(B,C,D,A,X(11),19,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(13)=l;
-	R0(A,B,C,D,X(12), 3,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(14)=l;
-	R0(D,A,B,C,X(13), 7,0);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(15)=l;
+	R0(A,B,C,D,X( 0), 3,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 2)=l;
+	R0(D,A,B,C,X( 1), 7,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 3)=l;
+	R0(C,D,A,B,X( 2),11,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 4)=l;
+	R0(B,C,D,A,X( 3),19,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 5)=l;
+	R0(A,B,C,D,X( 4), 3,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 6)=l;
+	R0(D,A,B,C,X( 5), 7,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 7)=l;
+	R0(C,D,A,B,X( 6),11,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 8)=l;
+	R0(B,C,D,A,X( 7),19,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 9)=l;
+	R0(A,B,C,D,X( 8), 3,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(10)=l;
+	R0(D,A,B,C,X( 9), 7,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(11)=l;
+	R0(C,D,A,B,X(10),11,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(12)=l;
+	R0(B,C,D,A,X(11),19,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(13)=l;
+	R0(A,B,C,D,X(12), 3,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(14)=l;
+	R0(D,A,B,C,X(13), 7,0);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(15)=l;
 	R0(C,D,A,B,X(14),11,0);
 	R0(B,C,D,A,X(15),19,0);
 	/* Round 1 */
diff --git a/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h b/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
index c8085b0eadf9..99c3e5004c97 100644
--- a/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/md4/md4_locl.h
@@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ void md4_block_data_order (MD4_CTX *c, const void *p,size_t num);
 #define HASH_FINAL		MD4_Final
 #define	HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)	do {	\
 	unsigned long ll;		\
-	ll=(c)->A; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->B; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->C; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->D; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
 	} while (0)
 #define	HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER	md4_block_data_order
 
diff --git a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
index 867885435e29..f11224d17220 100755
--- a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
 no warnings qw(uninitialized);
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $code .= <<EOF;
 .text
diff --git a/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h b/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
index 968d577995aa..74d63d1f9cfd 100644
--- a/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/md5/md5_locl.h
@@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ void md5_block_data_order (MD5_CTX *c, const void *p,size_t num);
 #define HASH_FINAL		MD5_Final
 #define	HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)	do {	\
 	unsigned long ll;		\
-	ll=(c)->A; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->B; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->C; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->D; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
 	} while (0)
 #define	HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER	md5_block_data_order
 
diff --git a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
index b74bb1a75944..d66ed6a1c6a3 100644
--- a/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/mdc2/mdc2dgst.c
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #include <openssl/mdc2.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 
 #undef c2l
 #define c2l(c,l)	(l =((DES_LONG)(*((c)++)))    , \
diff --git a/crypto/mem.c b/crypto/mem.c
index 21c001138083..1cc62eafd122 100644
--- a/crypto/mem.c
+++ b/crypto/mem.c
@@ -121,10 +121,10 @@ static void (*set_debug_options_func)(long) = NULL;
 static long (*get_debug_options_func)(void) = NULL;
 #endif
 
-
 int CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(void *(*m)(size_t), void *(*r)(void *, size_t),
 	void (*f)(void *))
 	{
+	/* Dummy call just to ensure OPENSSL_init() gets linked in */
 	OPENSSL_init();
 	if (!allow_customize)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
index 6b09669d474a..83c727e07f95 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ sub mmx_loop() {
     { my @lo  = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
       my @hi  = ("mm3","mm4","mm5");
       my @tmp = ("mm6","mm7");
-      my $off1=0,$off2=0,$i;
+      my ($off1,$off2,$i) = (0,0,);
 
       &add	($Htbl,128);			# optimize for size
       &lea	("edi",&DWP(16+128,"esp"));
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ sub reduction_alg9 {	# 17/13 times faster than Intel version
 my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
 
 	# 1st phase
-	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi)		#
+	&movdqa		($T1,$Xi);		#
 	&psllq		($Xi,1);
 	&pxor		($Xi,$T1);		#
 	&psllq		($Xi,5);		#
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
 	&movdqa		($Xhn,$Xn);
 	 &pxor		($Xhi,$T1);		# "Ii+Xi", consume early
 
-	  &movdqa	($T1,$Xi)		#&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); 1st phase
+	  &movdqa	($T1,$Xi);		#&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); 1st phase
 	  &psllq	($Xi,1);
 	  &pxor		($Xi,$T1);		#
 	  &psllq	($Xi,5);		#
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
index a5ae180882db..38d779edbcfd 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # common register layout
 $nlo="%rax";
diff --git a/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
index 7d6d03497027..0e6ff8b0a155 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,void *key,block128_f block)
 #  endif
 	gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable,ctx->H.u);
 #  if	defined(GHASH_ASM_X86)			/* x86 only */
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2)
+#   if	defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2)
 	if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]&(1<<25)) {	/* check SSE bit */
 #   else
 	if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]&(1<<23)) {	/* check MMX bit */
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,const unsigned char *tag,
 	void (*gcm_gmult_p)(u64 Xi[2],const u128 Htable[16])	= ctx->gmult;
 #endif
 
-	if (ctx->mres)
+	if (ctx->mres || ctx->ares)
 		GCM_MUL(ctx,Xi);
 
 	if (is_endian.little) {
diff --git a/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/crypto/objects/o_names.c
index 84380a96a98c..4a548c2ed497 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/o_names.c
+++ b/crypto/objects/o_names.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int OBJ_NAME_new_index(unsigned long (*hash_func)(const char *),
 		name_funcs_stack=sk_NAME_FUNCS_new_null();
 		MemCheck_on();
 		}
-	if ((name_funcs_stack == NULL))
+	if (name_funcs_stack == NULL)
 		{
 		/* ERROR */
 		return(0);
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index 415d67e61cfd..276718304dd2 100644
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 		{
 		EVP_PKEY *skey;
 		skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
-		ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
-		if(ret <= 0)
+		if (skey)
+			{
+			ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+			EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+			}
+		if(!skey || ret <= 0)
 			{
 			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
 			goto end;
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
 		if(!init_res)
 			{
+			ret = -1;
 			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
 			goto end;
 			}
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 71be3590af47..5bc8e53e66ad 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000103fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000105fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1c-fips 10 May 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1c 10 May 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_all.c b/crypto/pem/pem_all.c
index 3e7a6093ad82..eac0460e3ebe 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_all.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_all.c
@@ -193,7 +193,61 @@ RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa, pem_password_cb *cb,
 
 #endif
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *k;
+		int ret;
+		k = EVP_PKEY_new();
+		if (!k)
+			return 0;
+		EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(k, x);
+
+		ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(k);
+		return ret;
+		}
+	else
+		return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_RSAPrivateKey,
+					PEM_STRING_RSA,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *k;
+		int ret;
+		k = EVP_PKEY_new();
+		if (!k)
+			return 0;
+
+		EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(k, x);
+
+		ret = PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(k);
+		return ret;
+		}
+	else
+		return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_RSAPrivateKey,
+					PEM_STRING_RSA,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
+}
+#endif
+
+#else
+
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(RSAPrivateKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
+
+#endif
+
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA, PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC, RSAPublicKey)
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, RSA_PUBKEY)
 
@@ -223,7 +277,59 @@ DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa, pem_password_cb *cb,
 	return pkey_get_dsa(pktmp, dsa);	/* will free pktmp */
 }
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *k;
+		int ret;
+		k = EVP_PKEY_new();
+		if (!k)
+			return 0;
+		EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(k, x);
+
+		ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(k);
+		return ret;
+		}
+	else
+		return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_DSAPrivateKey,
+					PEM_STRING_DSA,bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *k;
+		int ret;
+		k = EVP_PKEY_new();
+		if (!k)
+			return 0;
+		EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(k, x);
+		ret = PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(k);
+		return ret;
+		}
+	else
+		return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_DSAPrivateKey,
+					PEM_STRING_DSA,fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
+}
+#endif
+
+#else
+
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb_const(DSAPrivateKey, DSA, PEM_STRING_DSA, DSAPrivateKey)
+
+#endif
+
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, DSA_PUBKEY)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
@@ -269,8 +375,63 @@ EC_KEY *PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **key, pem_password_cb *cb,
 
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP, PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS, ECPKParameters)
 
+
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *k;
+		int ret;
+		k = EVP_PKEY_new();
+		if (!k)
+			return 0;
+		EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(k, x);
+
+		ret = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(k);
+		return ret;
+		}
+	else
+		return PEM_ASN1_write_bio((i2d_of_void *)i2d_ECPrivateKey,
+						PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY,
+						bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                               unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+                                               pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *k;
+		int ret;
+		k = EVP_PKEY_new();
+		if (!k)
+			return 0;
+		EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(k, x);
+		ret = PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, k, enc, kstr, klen, cb, u);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(k);
+		return ret;
+		}
+	else
+		return PEM_ASN1_write((i2d_of_void *)i2d_ECPrivateKey,
+						PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY,
+						fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb,u);
+}
+#endif
+
+#else
+
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY, ECPrivateKey)
 
+#endif
+
 IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC, EC_PUBKEY)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index cfc89a992155..5a421fc4b6ae 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
 			goto err;
 		/* The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt.  It is
 		 * NOT taken from the BytesToKey function */
-		EVP_BytesToKey(enc,EVP_md5(),iv,kstr,klen,1,key,NULL);
+		if (!EVP_BytesToKey(enc,EVP_md5(),iv,kstr,klen,1,key,NULL))
+			goto err;
 
 		if (kstr == (unsigned char *)buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,PEM_BUFSIZE);
 
@@ -406,12 +407,15 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
 		/* k=strlen(buf); */
 
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx,enc,NULL,key,iv);
-		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx,data,&j,data,i);
-		EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx,&(data[j]),&i);
+		ret = 1;
+		if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx,enc,NULL,key,iv)
+			|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx,data,&j,data,i)
+			|| !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx,&(data[j]),&i))
+			ret = 0;
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			goto err;
 		i+=j;
-		ret=1;
 		}
 	else
 		{
@@ -459,14 +463,17 @@ int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen,
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, klen);
 #endif
 
-	EVP_BytesToKey(cipher->cipher,EVP_md5(),&(cipher->iv[0]),
-		(unsigned char *)buf,klen,1,key,NULL);
+	if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher->cipher,EVP_md5(),&(cipher->iv[0]),
+		(unsigned char *)buf,klen,1,key,NULL))
+		return 0;
 
 	j=(int)len;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx,cipher->cipher,NULL, key,&(cipher->iv[0]));
-	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx,data,&i,data,j);
-	o=EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx,&(data[i]),&j);
+	o = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx,cipher->cipher,NULL, key,&(cipher->iv[0]));
+	if (o)
+		o = EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx,data,&i,data,j);
+	if (o)
+		o = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx,&(data[i]),&j);
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)buf,sizeof(buf));
 	OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)key,sizeof(key));
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_seal.c b/crypto/pem/pem_seal.c
index 59690b56aeee..b6b4e13498eb 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_seal.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_seal.c
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ int PEM_SealInit(PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, EVP_MD *md_type,
 	EVP_EncodeInit(&ctx->encode);
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md);
-	EVP_SignInit(&ctx->md,md_type);
+	if (!EVP_SignInit(&ctx->md,md_type))
+		goto err;
 
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx->cipher);
 	ret=EVP_SealInit(&ctx->cipher,type,ek,ekl,iv,pubk,npubk);
@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ int PEM_SealFinal(PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, int *sigl,
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx->cipher,s,(int *)&i);
+	if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx->cipher,s,(int *)&i))
+		goto err;
 	EVP_EncodeUpdate(&ctx->encode,out,&j,s,i);
 	*outl=j;
 	out+=j;
diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl b/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
index 6fc2510905be..24561e759aba 100644
--- a/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
+++ b/crypto/perlasm/cbc.pl
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ sub cbc
 &set_label("PIC_point");
 	&blindpop("edx");
 	&lea("ecx",&DWP(&label("cbc_enc_jmp_table")."-".&label("PIC_point"),"edx"));
-	&mov($count,&DWP(0,"ecx",$count,4))
+	&mov($count,&DWP(0,"ecx",$count,4));
 	&add($count,"edx");
 	&xor("ecx","ecx");
 	&xor("edx","edx");
diff --git a/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl b/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl
index 96b1b73e1a3a..f937d07c87df 100755
--- a/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl
+++ b/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ sub ::generic
 sub ::call	{ &::emit("call",(&::islabel($_[0]) or "$nmdecor$_[0]")); }
 sub ::call_ptr	{ &::emit("call",@_);	}
 sub ::jmp_ptr	{ &::emit("jmp",@_);	}
+sub ::lock	{ &::data_byte(0xf0);	}
 
 sub get_mem
 { my($size,$addr,$reg1,$reg2,$idx)=@_;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
index c55c7b60b343..61d58502fd18 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
@@ -176,24 +176,32 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
 		out += u;
 		for (j = 0; j < v; j++) B[j] = Ai[j % u];
 		/* Work out B + 1 first then can use B as tmp space */
-		if (!BN_bin2bn (B, v, Bpl1)) goto err;
-		if (!BN_add_word (Bpl1, 1)) goto err;
+		if (!BN_bin2bn (B, v, Bpl1))
+			goto err;
+		if (!BN_add_word (Bpl1, 1))
+			goto err;
 		for (j = 0; j < Ilen ; j+=v) {
-			if (!BN_bin2bn (I + j, v, Ij)) goto err;
-			if (!BN_add (Ij, Ij, Bpl1)) goto err;
-			BN_bn2bin (Ij, B);
+			if (!BN_bin2bn(I + j, v, Ij))
+				goto err;
+			if (!BN_add(Ij, Ij, Bpl1))
+				goto err;
+			if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B))
+				goto err;
 			Ijlen = BN_num_bytes (Ij);
 			/* If more than 2^(v*8) - 1 cut off MSB */
 			if (Ijlen > v) {
-				BN_bn2bin (Ij, B);
+				if (!BN_bn2bin (Ij, B))
+					goto err;
 				memcpy (I + j, B + 1, v);
 #ifndef PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN
 			/* If less than v bytes pad with zeroes */
 			} else if (Ijlen < v) {
 				memset(I + j, 0, v - Ijlen);
-				BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen); 
+				if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen))
+					goto err;
 #endif
-			} else BN_bn2bin (Ij, I + j);
+			} else if (!BN_bn2bin (Ij, I + j))
+				goto err;
 		}
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c b/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c
index c8d06d6cdc83..0fd31e730ffa 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/bio_pk7.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 #include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VXWORKS)
 #include <memory.h>
 #endif
 #include <stdio.h>
diff --git a/crypto/ppccap.c b/crypto/ppccap.c
index ab89ccaa12c8..f71ba66aa382 100644
--- a/crypto/ppccap.c
+++ b/crypto/ppccap.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <setjmp.h>
 #include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #include <crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp;
 static void ill_handler (int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp,sig); }
 
 void OPENSSL_ppc64_probe(void);
+void OPENSSL_altivec_probe(void);
 
 void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
 	{
@@ -82,6 +84,15 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
 
 	OPENSSL_ppccap_P = 0;
 
+#if defined(_AIX)
+	if (sizeof(size_t)==4
+# if defined(_SC_AIX_KERNEL_BITMODE)
+	    && sysconf(_SC_AIX_KERNEL_BITMODE)!=64
+# endif
+	   )
+		return;
+#endif
+
 	memset(&ill_act,0,sizeof(ill_act));
 	ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler;
 	ill_act.sa_mask    = all_masked;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index fcdd3f2a845f..1e3bcb9bc426 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -123,10 +123,10 @@
 
 #include "e_os.h"
 
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "rand_lcl.h"
 
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index daf1dab97395..476a0cd187ee 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -210,8 +210,11 @@ static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
 
 static void drbg_free_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
 	{
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(out, olen);
-	OPENSSL_free(out);
+	if (out)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(out, olen);
+		OPENSSL_free(out);
+		}
 	}
 
 /* Set "additional input" when generating random data. This uses the
diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 030e07f41826..7f1428072d27 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -57,7 +57,9 @@
  */
 
 /* We need to define this to get macros like S_IFBLK and S_IFCHR */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
 #define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
+#endif
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
index 7f684092d40a..272fa91e1a1e 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 my ($dat,$in0,$out,$ctx,$inp,$len, $func,$nargs);
 
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
index d6eac205e98e..75750dbf334d 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $dat="%rdi";	    # arg1
 $len="%rsi";	    # arg2
diff --git a/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c b/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c
index 63f0d983f7b4..d8e72da51bfc 100644
--- a/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/ripemd/rmd_dgst.c
@@ -105,21 +105,21 @@ void ripemd160_block_data_order (RIPEMD160_CTX *ctx, const void *p, size_t num)
 
 	A=ctx->A; B=ctx->B; C=ctx->C; D=ctx->D; E=ctx->E;
 
-	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 0)=l;	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 1)=l;
-	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL00,SL00);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 2)=l;
-	RIP1(E,A,B,C,D,WL01,SL01);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 3)=l;
-	RIP1(D,E,A,B,C,WL02,SL02);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 4)=l;
-	RIP1(C,D,E,A,B,WL03,SL03);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 5)=l;
-	RIP1(B,C,D,E,A,WL04,SL04);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 6)=l;
-	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL05,SL05);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 7)=l;
-	RIP1(E,A,B,C,D,WL06,SL06);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 8)=l;
-	RIP1(D,E,A,B,C,WL07,SL07);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 9)=l;
-	RIP1(C,D,E,A,B,WL08,SL08);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(10)=l;
-	RIP1(B,C,D,E,A,WL09,SL09);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(11)=l;
-	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL10,SL10);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(12)=l;
-	RIP1(E,A,B,C,D,WL11,SL11);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(13)=l;
-	RIP1(D,E,A,B,C,WL12,SL12);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(14)=l;
-	RIP1(C,D,E,A,B,WL13,SL13);	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(15)=l;
+	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 0)=l;(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 1)=l;
+	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL00,SL00);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 2)=l;
+	RIP1(E,A,B,C,D,WL01,SL01);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 3)=l;
+	RIP1(D,E,A,B,C,WL02,SL02);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 4)=l;
+	RIP1(C,D,E,A,B,WL03,SL03);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 5)=l;
+	RIP1(B,C,D,E,A,WL04,SL04);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 6)=l;
+	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL05,SL05);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 7)=l;
+	RIP1(E,A,B,C,D,WL06,SL06);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 8)=l;
+	RIP1(D,E,A,B,C,WL07,SL07);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 9)=l;
+	RIP1(C,D,E,A,B,WL08,SL08);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(10)=l;
+	RIP1(B,C,D,E,A,WL09,SL09);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(11)=l;
+	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL10,SL10);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(12)=l;
+	RIP1(E,A,B,C,D,WL11,SL11);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(13)=l;
+	RIP1(D,E,A,B,C,WL12,SL12);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(14)=l;
+	RIP1(C,D,E,A,B,WL13,SL13);	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(15)=l;
 	RIP1(B,C,D,E,A,WL14,SL14);
 	RIP1(A,B,C,D,E,WL15,SL15);
 
diff --git a/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h b/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
index f14b346e6622..2bd8957d1437 100644
--- a/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/ripemd/rmd_locl.h
@@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ void ripemd160_block_data_order (RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *p,size_t num);
 #define HASH_FINAL              RIPEMD160_Final
 #define	HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)	do {	\
 	unsigned long ll;		\
-	ll=(c)->A; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->B; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->C; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->D; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->E; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->A; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->B; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->C; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->D; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->E; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
 	} while (0)
 #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER   ripemd160_block_data_order
 
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 4814a2fc15e8..5f269e577af4 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ struct rsa_st
 
 RSA *	RSA_new(void);
 RSA *	RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
-int	RSA_size(const RSA *);
+int	RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
 
 /* Deprecated version */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 2e1ddd48d35b..88ee2cb557f0 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -847,12 +847,12 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
 
 	/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
-         * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+	 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
 	 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
 	 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
 	 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
-         * they ensure p > q [steve]
-         */
+	 * they ensure p > q [steve]
+	 */
 	if (BN_is_negative(r0))
 		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
 	if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 553d212ebe9c..af4d24a56ef5 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 	if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
 		return -1;
 
-	if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
 		goto decoding_err;
 	else
 		{
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
index fe8207f77f8c..33da3e0e3c0d 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-armv4-large.pl
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ for($i=0;$i<5;$i++) {
 $code.=<<___;
 	teq	$Xi,sp
 	bne	.L_00_15		@ [((11+4)*5+2)*3]
+	sub	sp,sp,#25*4
 ___
 	&BODY_00_15(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
 	&BODY_16_19(@V);	unshift(@V,pop(@V));
@@ -186,7 +187,6 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 
 	ldr	$K,.LK_20_39		@ [+15+16*4]
-	sub	sp,sp,#25*4
 	cmn	sp,#0			@ [+3], clear carry to denote 20_39
 .L_20_39_or_60_79:
 ___
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
index db28f0805a11..02d35d1614c1 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-ia64.pl
@@ -271,7 +271,8 @@ tmp6=loc13;
 
 ___
 
-{ my $i,@V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+{ my $i;
+  my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
 
 	for($i=0;$i<16;$i++)	{ &BODY_00_15(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
 	for(;$i<20;$i++)	{ &BODY_16_19(\$code,$i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl
index 85e8d68086bb..e65291bbd979 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-sparcv9a.pl
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ ___
 # programmer detect if current CPU is VIS capable at run-time.
 sub unvis {
 my ($mnemonic,$rs1,$rs2,$rd)=@_;
-my $ref,$opf;
+my ($ref,$opf);
 my %visopf = (	"fmul8ulx16"	=> 0x037,
 		"faligndata"	=> 0x048,
 		"fpadd32"	=> 0x052,
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
index f27c1e3fb031..cfdc45cce6da 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
 	   $1>=10);
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $ctx="%rdi";	# 1st arg
 $inp="%rsi";	# 2nd arg
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
index 5b9f3337add3..7eab6a5b88b2 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ sub BODY_00_15_x86 {
 	&mov	("edx",$Ehi);
 	&mov	("esi","ecx");
 
-	&shr	("ecx",9)	# lo>>9
+	&shr	("ecx",9);	# lo>>9
 	&mov	("edi","edx");
-	&shr	("edx",9)	# hi>>9
+	&shr	("edx",9);	# hi>>9
 	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
 	&shl	("esi",14);	# lo<<14
 	&mov	("eax","edx");
@@ -207,9 +207,9 @@ sub BODY_00_15_x86 {
 	&mov	($Dhi,"ebx");
 	&mov	("esi","ecx");
 
-	&shr	("ecx",2)	# lo>>2
+	&shr	("ecx",2);	# lo>>2
 	&mov	("edi","edx");
-	&shr	("edx",2)	# hi>>2
+	&shr	("edx",2);	# hi>>2
 	&mov	("ebx","ecx");
 	&shl	("esi",4);	# lo<<4
 	&mov	("eax","edx");
@@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&mov	("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+4,"esp"));
 	&mov	("esi","ecx");
 
-	&shr	("ecx",1)	# lo>>1
+	&shr	("ecx",1);	# lo>>1
 	&mov	("edi","edx");
-	&shr	("edx",1)	# hi>>1
+	&shr	("edx",1);	# hi>>1
 	&mov	("eax","ecx");
 	&shl	("esi",24);	# lo<<24
 	&mov	("ebx","edx");
@@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&mov	("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+4,"esp"));
 	&mov	("esi","ecx");
 
-	&shr	("ecx",6)	# lo>>6
+	&shr	("ecx",6);	# lo>>6
 	&mov	("edi","edx");
-	&shr	("edx",6)	# hi>>6
+	&shr	("edx",6);	# hi>>6
 	&mov	("eax","ecx");
 	&shl	("esi",3);	# lo<<3
 	&mov	("ebx","edx");
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
index f611a2d898e2..8d5167855781 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 if ($output =~ /512/) {
 	$func="sha512_block_data_order";
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c b/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c
index 7c65b60276cd..c56ec94020e1 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha1_one.c
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
 unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md)
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c b/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
index 81219af08834..a98690225fdc 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA)
 
 #undef  SHA_0
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha256.c b/crypto/sha/sha256.c
index f88d3d6dadba..4eae07484913 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha256.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha256.c
@@ -88,17 +88,17 @@ int SHA224_Final (unsigned char *md, SHA256_CTX *c)
 	switch ((c)->md_len)		\
 	{   case SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH:	\
 		for (nn=0;nn<SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH/4;nn++)	\
-		{   ll=(c)->h[nn]; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }	\
+		{   ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }	\
 		break;			\
 	    case SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH:	\
 		for (nn=0;nn<SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH/4;nn++)	\
-		{   ll=(c)->h[nn]; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }	\
+		{   ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }	\
 		break;			\
 	    default:			\
 		if ((c)->md_len > SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)	\
 		    return 0;				\
 		for (nn=0;nn<(c)->md_len/4;nn++)		\
-		{   ll=(c)->h[nn]; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }	\
+		{   ll=(c)->h[nn]; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));   }	\
 		break;			\
 	}				\
 	} while (0)
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha_dgst.c b/crypto/sha/sha_dgst.c
index c946ad827d58..fb63b17ff2c3 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha_dgst.c
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA0) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA)
 
 #undef  SHA_1
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h b/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
index 7a0c3ca8d8ce..d673255f78b0 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@
 #define HASH_CBLOCK             SHA_CBLOCK
 #define HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,s)   do {	\
 	unsigned long ll;		\
-	ll=(c)->h0; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->h1; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->h2; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->h3; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
-	ll=(c)->h4; HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->h0; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->h1; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->h2; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->h3; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
+	ll=(c)->h4; (void)HOST_l2c(ll,(s));	\
 	} while (0)
 
 #if defined(SHA_0)
@@ -256,21 +256,21 @@ static void HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (SHA_CTX *c, const void *p, size_t num)
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 0)=l;		HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 1)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 0,A,B,C,D,E,T,X( 0));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 2)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 1,T,A,B,C,D,E,X( 1));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 3)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 2,E,T,A,B,C,D,X( 2));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 4)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 3,D,E,T,A,B,C,X( 3));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 5)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 4,C,D,E,T,A,B,X( 4));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 6)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 5,B,C,D,E,T,A,X( 5));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 7)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 6,A,B,C,D,E,T,X( 6));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 8)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 7,T,A,B,C,D,E,X( 7));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 9)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 8,E,T,A,B,C,D,X( 8));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(10)=l;
-		BODY_00_15( 9,D,E,T,A,B,C,X( 9));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(11)=l;
-		BODY_00_15(10,C,D,E,T,A,B,X(10));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(12)=l;
-		BODY_00_15(11,B,C,D,E,T,A,X(11));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(13)=l;
-		BODY_00_15(12,A,B,C,D,E,T,X(12));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(14)=l;
-		BODY_00_15(13,T,A,B,C,D,E,X(13));	HOST_c2l(data,l); X(15)=l;
+		(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 0)=l;	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 1)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 0,A,B,C,D,E,T,X( 0));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 2)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 1,T,A,B,C,D,E,X( 1));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 3)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 2,E,T,A,B,C,D,X( 2));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 4)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 3,D,E,T,A,B,C,X( 3));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 5)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 4,C,D,E,T,A,B,X( 4));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 6)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 5,B,C,D,E,T,A,X( 5));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 7)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 6,A,B,C,D,E,T,X( 6));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 8)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 7,T,A,B,C,D,E,X( 7));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X( 9)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 8,E,T,A,B,C,D,X( 8));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(10)=l;
+		BODY_00_15( 9,D,E,T,A,B,C,X( 9));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(11)=l;
+		BODY_00_15(10,C,D,E,T,A,B,X(10));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(12)=l;
+		BODY_00_15(11,B,C,D,E,T,A,X(11));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(13)=l;
+		BODY_00_15(12,A,B,C,D,E,T,X(12));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(14)=l;
+		BODY_00_15(13,T,A,B,C,D,E,X(13));	(void)HOST_c2l(data,l); X(15)=l;
 		BODY_00_15(14,E,T,A,B,C,D,X(14));
 		BODY_00_15(15,D,E,T,A,B,C,X(15));
 		}
diff --git a/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
index ae61f7f5cedb..0cc247e48971 100644
--- a/crypto/sparccpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -235,10 +235,10 @@ _sparcv9_rdtick:
 .global	_sparcv9_vis1_probe
 .align	8
 _sparcv9_vis1_probe:
-	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
 	add	%sp,BIAS+2,%o1
-	retl
 	.word	0xc19a5a40	!ldda	[%o1]ASI_FP16_P,%f0
+	retl
+	.word	0x81b00d80	!fxor	%f0,%f0,%f0
 .type	_sparcv9_vis1_probe,#function
 .size	_sparcv9_vis1_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis1_probe
 
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index c8be907d7f7f..4a3d13edf6cb 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
 		}
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data,i);
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data,i);
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX)
 			{
 			/*we add this couple in the internal Stack */
@@ -581,7 +581,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
 	if (*salt == NULL)
 		{
 		char *tmp_salt;
-		if ((tmp_salt = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL)
+
+		if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL)
 			{
 			OPENSSL_free(vf);
 			goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/symhacks.h b/crypto/symhacks.h
index 403f592dcd69..07a412f84586 100644
--- a/crypto/symhacks.h
+++ b/crypto/symhacks.h
@@ -193,17 +193,17 @@
 #undef SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback
 #define SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback	SSL_CTX_set_srp_un_cb
 #undef ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext
-#define ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext ssl_add_clihello_use_srtp_ext
+#define ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext	ssl_add_clihello_use_srtp_ext
 #undef ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext
-#define ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext ssl_add_serhello_use_srtp_ext
+#define ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext	ssl_add_serhello_use_srtp_ext
 #undef ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext
-#define ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext ssl_parse_clihello_use_srtp_ext
+#define ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext	ssl_parse_clihello_use_srtp_ext
 #undef ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext
-#define ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext ssl_parse_serhello_use_srtp_ext
+#define ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext	ssl_parse_serhello_use_srtp_ext
 #undef SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb
-#define SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb
+#define SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb	SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb
 #undef SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb
-#define SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb
+#define SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb	SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb
 
 /* Hack some long ENGINE names */
 #undef ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp_crt
@@ -316,8 +316,6 @@
 #define ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity     ec_GFp_simple_pt_set_to_inf
 #undef ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine
 #define ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine	ec_GFp_simple_pts_make_affine
-#undef ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp
-#define ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp       ec_GFp_simple_grp_get_curve_GFp
 #undef ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp
 #define ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp \
                                                 ec_GFp_smp_set_Jproj_coords_GFp
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
index 5832a73cf59a..a38c7581e6a0 100644
--- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -122,9 +122,15 @@
  * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for
  * the intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi.
  */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_VXWORKS)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
 #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
 #endif
+#endif
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
index 32cf16380b54..cb2381c22ba1 100755
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ $tbl="ebp";
 	&mov	("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
 	&mov	("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp"));
 for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
-    my $func = ($i==0)? movq : pxor;
+    my $func = ($i==0)? \&movq : \&pxor;
 	&movb	(&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
 	&movb	(&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
 	&scale	("esi","ecx");
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl
index 87c0843dc1d3..24b2ff60c38b 100755
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-x86_64.pl
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 sub L() { $code.=".byte	".join(',',@_)."\n"; }
 sub LL(){ $code.=".byte	".join(',',@_).",".join(',',@_)."\n"; }
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 7c2aaee2e9a2..352aa374343b 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -86,10 +86,9 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
-	ret=strlen(f);
 	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
 		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,ret))
+	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
 		goto err;
 	OPENSSL_free(f);
 	if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
@@ -249,14 +248,14 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
 	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL);
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+	    && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+	    && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
+		ret=(((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+		     ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+		     )&0xffffffffL;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
 
-	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
-		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
-		)&0xffffffffL;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index b0779db0231b..12d71f54e2e5 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
 	{
 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
 	int i;
-	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
+	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
 	if (i >= 0)
 		{
 		/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
 	else
 		exta = NULL;
 
-	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
+	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
 
 	if (i >= 0)
 		{
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 181bd34979bc..ad688657e01e 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -474,11 +474,11 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
 	for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
 		{
 		ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
-		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
-			continue;
 		if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
 					== NID_freshest_crl)
 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
+			continue;
 		if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
 			{
 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
diff --git a/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl b/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl
index 7b7b93b22322..6ebfd017ea56 100644
--- a/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl
+++ b/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 ($arg1,$arg2,$arg3,$arg4)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order
 				 ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");	# Unix order
diff --git a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
index 39fd8f22931d..c18b0e2486d6 100644
--- a/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
+++ b/crypto/x86cpuid.pl
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
 	&jnz	(&label("nohalt"));	# not enough privileges
 
 	&pushf	();
-	&pop	("eax")
+	&pop	("eax");
 	&bt	("eax",9);
 	&jnc	(&label("nohalt"));	# interrupts are disabled
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
 #	arguments is 1 or 2!
 &function_begin_B("OPENSSL_indirect_call");
 	{
-	my $i,$max=7;		# $max has to be chosen as 4*n-1
+	my ($max,$i)=(7,);	# $max has to be chosen as 4*n-1
 				# in order to preserve eventual
 				# stack alignment
 	&push	("ebp");
diff --git a/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod b/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod
index ed69952f3799..d326101cde78 100644
--- a/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod
@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ prints a usage message.
 
 =item B<-newcert>
 
-creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are
-written to the file "newreq.pem".
+creates a new self signed certificate. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".
 
 =item B<-newreq>
 
-creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are
-written to the file "newreq.pem".
+creates a new certificate request. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".
 
 =item B<-newreq-nodes>
 
diff --git a/doc/apps/verify.pod b/doc/apps/verify.pod
index 336098f1e3b5..da683004bd27 100644
--- a/doc/apps/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -54,35 +54,37 @@ in PEM format concatenated together.
 =item B<-untrusted file>
 
 A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+in PEM format concatenated together.
 
 =item B<-purpose purpose>
 
-the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification
-will be done. Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>,
-B<nssslserver>, B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION>
-section for more information.
+The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
+B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
+Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
+B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
+information.
 
 =item B<-help>
 
-prints out a usage message.
+Print out a usage message.
 
 =item B<-verbose>
 
-print extra information about the operations being performed.
+Print extra information about the operations being performed.
 
 =item B<-issuer_checks>
 
-print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate
-of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer
-certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages
-does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
-verify process several rejections may take place.
+Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the
+current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was
+rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that
+anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
+rejections may take place.
 
 =item B<-policy arg>
 
-Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set
-(see RFC3280 et al). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric
-form. This argument can appear more than once.
+Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
+RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
+This argument can appear more than once.
 
 =item B<-policy_check>
 
@@ -90,41 +92,40 @@ Enables certificate policy processing.
 
 =item B<-explicit_policy>
 
-Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
+Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
 
 =item B<-inhibit_any>
 
-Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
+Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
 
 =item B<-inhibit_map>
 
-Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC3280 et al).
+Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
 
 =item B<-policy_print>
 
-Print out diagnostics, related to policy checking
+Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
 
 =item B<-crl_check>
 
-Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to lookup a valid CRL.
+Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
 If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs. 
 
 =item B<-crl_check_all>
 
 Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
-to lookup valid CRLs.
+to look up valid CRLs.
 
 =item B<-ignore_critical>
 
 Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
-supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by
-RFC3280 et al). If this option is set critical extensions are
-ignored.
+supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
+If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
 
 =item B<-x509_strict>
 
-Disable workarounds for broken certificates which have to be disabled
-for strict X.509 compliance.
+For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
+certificates.
 
 =item B<-extended_crl>
 
@@ -142,16 +143,15 @@ because it doesn't add any security.
 
 =item B<->
 
-marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
+Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
 certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
 with a B<->.
 
 =item B<certificates>
 
-one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included
-then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should
-all be in PEM format.
-
+One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
+will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
+in PEM format.
 
 =back
 
diff --git a/doc/apps/x509.pod b/doc/apps/x509.pod
index 3002b081235e..d2d9eb812af1 100644
--- a/doc/apps/x509.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/x509.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<x509>
 [B<-purpose>]
 [B<-dates>]
 [B<-modulus>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
 [B<-fingerprint>]
 [B<-alias>]
 [B<-noout>]
@@ -135,6 +136,10 @@ section for more information.
 
 this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
 
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+outputs the the certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PEM format.
+
 =item B<-modulus>
 
 this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
index f2f455990f54..13b91f1e6e57 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 L<EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)|EVP_PKEY_keygen(3)> 
 
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
index 42b2a8c44ed1..847983237b9b 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 
 =head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
index d9d6d76c7211..27464be5718e 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
index 91c9c5d0a5d3..e495a81242b9 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_encrypt.pod
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 
 =head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod
index 1a9c7954c55a..8ff597d44adf 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest.pod
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ public key algorithm.
 L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
index 37c6fe95030d..fd431ace6dcc 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_keygen.pod
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 
 =head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
index 2fb52c34863f..a044f2c13127 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_verify(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 
 =head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
index f93e5fc6c3af..90612ba2f07a 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)|EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_sign(3)|EVP_PKEY_sign(3)>,
-L<EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(3)>,
+L<EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)|EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(3)>,
 L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)|EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> 
 
 =head1 HISTORY
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
index f3605eb8264e..23a28a9c43e8 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
@@ -2,23 +2,23 @@
 
 =head1 NAME
 
-EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init, EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover - recover signature using a public key algorithm
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
 
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
- int EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
- int EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
+ int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 			unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
 			const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-The EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() function initializes a public key algorithm
 context using key B<pkey> for a verify recover operation.
 
-The EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() function recovers signed data
+The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data
 using B<ctx>. The signature is specified using the B<sig> and
 B<siglen> parameters. If B<rout> is B<NULL> then the maximum size of the output
 buffer is written to the B<routlen> parameter. If B<rout> is not B<NULL> then
@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ Sometimes however it is useful to obtain the data originally signed using a
 signing operation. Only certain public key algorithms can recover a signature
 in this way (for example RSA in PKCS padding mode).
 
-After the call to EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() algorithm specific control
+After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() algorithm specific control
 operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
 operation.
 
-The function EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() can be called more than once on the same
+The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same
 context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
-EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover() return 1 for success
+EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() return 1 for success
 and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
 
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
  ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key);
  if (!ctx)
 	/* Error occurred */
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover_init(ctx) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx) <= 0)
 	/* Error */
  if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
 	/* Error */
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
 	/* Error */
 
  /* Determine buffer length */
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, NULL, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
 	/* Error */
 
  rout = OPENSSL_malloc(routlen);
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Recover digest originally signed using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
  if (!rout)
 	/* malloc failure */
  
- if (EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, rout, &routlen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
 	/* Error */
 
  /* Recovered data is routlen bytes written to buffer rout */
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost89.c b/engines/ccgost/gost89.c
index 7ebae0f71f82..b0568c6b3c84 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost89.c
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost89.c
@@ -369,7 +369,13 @@ int gost_mac(gost_ctx *ctx,int mac_len,const unsigned char *data,
 		memset(buf2,0,8);
 		memcpy(buf2,data+i,data_len-i);
 		mac_block(ctx,buffer,buf2);
-		}	
+		i+=8;
+		}
+	if (i==8)
+		{
+		memset(buf2,0,8);
+		mac_block(ctx,buffer,buf2);
+		}
 	get_mac(buffer,mac_len,mac);
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -389,7 +395,13 @@ int gost_mac_iv(gost_ctx *ctx,int mac_len,const unsigned char *iv,const unsigned
 		memset(buf2,0,8);
 		memcpy(buf2,data+i,data_len-i);
 		mac_block(ctx,buffer,buf2);
+		i+=8;
 		}	
+	if (i==8)
+		{
+		memset(buf2,0,8);
+		mac_block(ctx,buffer,buf2);
+		}
 	get_mac(buffer,mac_len,mac);
 	return 1;
 	}
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost_crypt.c b/engines/ccgost/gost_crypt.c
index cde58c0e9b7c..52aef15acf4b 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost_crypt.c
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost_crypt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "e_gost_err.h"
 #include "gost_lcl.h"
+
+#if !defined(CCGOST_DEBUG) && !defined(DEBUG)
+# ifndef NDEBUG
+#  define NDEBUG
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <assert.h>
+
 static int gost_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, 
 	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
 static int	gost_cipher_init_cpa(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
@@ -206,12 +214,13 @@ int gost_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 static void gost_crypt_mesh (void *ctx,unsigned char *iv,unsigned char *buf)
 	{
 	struct ossl_gost_cipher_ctx *c = ctx;
-	if (c->count&&c->key_meshing && c->count%1024==0)
+	assert(c->count%8 == 0 && c->count <= 1024);
+	if (c->key_meshing && c->count==1024)
 		{
 		cryptopro_key_meshing(&(c->cctx),iv);
 		}	
 	gostcrypt(&(c->cctx),iv,buf);
-	c->count+=8;
+	c->count = c->count%1024 + 8;
 	}
 
 static void gost_cnt_next (void *ctx, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf)
@@ -219,7 +228,8 @@ static void gost_cnt_next (void *ctx, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf)
 	struct ossl_gost_cipher_ctx *c = ctx;
 	word32 g,go;
 	unsigned char buf1[8];
-	if (c->count && c->key_meshing && c->count %1024 ==0)
+	assert(c->count%8 == 0 && c->count <= 1024);
+	if (c->key_meshing && c->count==1024)
 		{
 		cryptopro_key_meshing(&(c->cctx),iv);
 		}
@@ -248,7 +258,7 @@ static void gost_cnt_next (void *ctx, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf)
 	buf1[7]=(unsigned char)((g>>24)&0xff);
 	memcpy(iv,buf1,8);
 	gostcrypt(&(c->cctx),buf1,buf);
-	c->count +=8;
+	c->count = c->count%1024 + 8;
 	}
 
 /* GOST encryption in CFB mode */
@@ -511,12 +521,13 @@ static void mac_block_mesh(struct ossl_gost_imit_ctx *c,const unsigned char *dat
 	 * interpret internal state of MAC algorithm as iv during keymeshing
 	 * (but does initialize internal state from iv in key transport
 	 */
-	if (c->key_meshing&& c->count && c->count %1024 ==0)
+	assert(c->count%8 == 0 && c->count <= 1024);
+	if (c->key_meshing && c->count==1024)
 		{
 		cryptopro_key_meshing(&(c->cctx),buffer);
 		}
 	mac_block(&(c->cctx),c->buffer,data);
-	c->count +=8;
+	c->count = c->count%1024 + 8;
 	}
 
 int gost_imit_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
@@ -565,6 +576,12 @@ int gost_imit_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *md)
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL, GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (c->count==0 && c->bytes_left)
+		{
+		unsigned char buffer[8];
+		memset(buffer, 0, 8);
+		gost_imit_update(ctx, buffer, 8);
+		}
 	if (c->bytes_left)
 		{
 		int i;
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c b/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c
index d2cbe3b83140..8f29bf6f85b9 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost_eng.c
@@ -64,6 +64,13 @@ static int gost_engine_finish(ENGINE *e)
 static int gost_engine_destroy(ENGINE *e)
 	{ 
 	gost_param_free();
+
+	pmeth_GostR3410_94 = NULL;
+	pmeth_GostR3410_2001 = NULL;
+	pmeth_Gost28147_MAC = NULL;
+	ameth_GostR3410_94 = NULL;
+	ameth_GostR3410_2001 = NULL;
+	ameth_Gost28147_MAC = NULL;
 	return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -71,6 +78,11 @@ static int bind_gost (ENGINE *e,const char *id)
 	{
 	int ret = 0;
 	if (id && strcmp(id, engine_gost_id)) return 0;
+	if (ameth_GostR3410_94)
+		{
+		printf("GOST engine already loaded\n");
+		goto end;
+		}
 
 	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_gost_id)) 
 		{
@@ -263,7 +275,10 @@ static ENGINE *engine_gost(void)
 	
 void ENGINE_load_gost(void)
 	{
-	ENGINE *toadd =engine_gost();
+	ENGINE *toadd;
+	if (pmeth_GostR3410_94)
+		return;
+	toadd = engine_gost();
 	if (!toadd) return;
 	ENGINE_add(toadd);
 	ENGINE_free(toadd);
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost_lcl.h b/engines/ccgost/gost_lcl.h
index 437a48cc86ca..00aa42cea434 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost_lcl.h
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost_lcl.h
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern EVP_MD imit_gost_cpa;
 /* Cipher context used for EVP_CIPHER operation */
 struct ossl_gost_cipher_ctx {
 	int paramNID;
-	off_t count;
+	unsigned int count;
 	int key_meshing;
 	gost_ctx cctx;
 };	
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ struct ossl_gost_imit_ctx {
 	gost_ctx cctx;
 	unsigned char buffer[8];
 	unsigned char partial_block[8];
-	off_t count;
+	unsigned int count;
 	int key_meshing;
 	int bytes_left;
 	int key_set;
diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c b/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
index a5c0662ffc32..8c278aa6452e 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gosthash.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static void circle_xor8 (const byte *w, byte *k)
 	byte buf[8];
 	int i;
 	memcpy(buf,w,8);
-	memcpy(k,w+8,24);
+	memmove(k,w+8,24);
 	for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
 		k[i+24]=buf[i]^k[i];
 	}
diff --git a/engines/e_capi.c b/engines/e_capi.c
index bfedde0eb023..c1085b56cdab 100644
--- a/engines/e_capi.c
+++ b/engines/e_capi.c
@@ -1432,10 +1432,13 @@ static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id, HCERTSTORE h
 static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *contname, char *provname, DWORD ptype, DWORD keyspec)
 	{
 	CAPI_KEY *key;
+    DWORD dwFlags = 0; 
 	key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CAPI_KEY));
 	CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_key, contname=%s, provname=%s, type=%d\n", 
 						contname, provname, ptype);
-	if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, 0))
+    if(ctx->store_flags & CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE)
+        dwFlags = CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET;
+    if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, dwFlags)) 
 		{
 		CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR);
 		capi_addlasterror();
diff --git a/ssl/Makefile b/ssl/Makefile
index feaf3e358a3b..debe07405bf8 100644
--- a/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/ssl/Makefile
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
 SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
 LIBSRC=	\
 	s2_meth.c   s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c  s2_lib.c  s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \
-	s3_meth.c   s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c  s3_lib.c  s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c \
+	s3_meth.c   s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c  s3_lib.c  s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c s3_cbc.c \
 	s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c          s23_pkt.c \
 	t1_meth.c   t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c  t1_lib.c  t1_enc.c \
 	d1_meth.c   d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c  d1_lib.c  d1_pkt.c \
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ LIBSRC=	\
 	bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c
 LIBOBJ= \
 	s2_meth.o  s2_srvr.o  s2_clnt.o  s2_lib.o  s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \
-	s3_meth.o  s3_srvr.o  s3_clnt.o  s3_lib.o  s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o \
+	s3_meth.o  s3_srvr.o  s3_clnt.o  s3_lib.o  s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \
 	s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o          s23_pkt.o \
 	t1_meth.o   t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o  t1_lib.o  t1_enc.o \
 	d1_meth.o   d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o  d1_lib.o  d1_pkt.o \
@@ -547,6 +547,26 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index 07a5e97ce5cd..712c4647f24c 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,20 +126,28 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			if (n < 0)
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+			if (mac_size < 0)
 				return -1;
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -164,9 +172,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			if (n < 0)
-				return -1;
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -231,7 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return -1;
+				return 0;
 			}
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -246,43 +253,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-				 */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length-=i;
-
-			rec->data += bs;    /* skip the implicit IV */
-			rec->input += bs;
-			rec->length -= bs;
-			}
+			return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
 	return(1);
 	}
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 987af608358d..0bf87be6d210 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -376,15 +376,11 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
 	int i,al;
-	int clear=0;
 	int enc_err;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size;
+	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess = s->session;
@@ -416,12 +412,16 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		/* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
-		 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
-		 */
-		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		goto err;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -431,45 +431,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(s->read_hash == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 		{
-		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-		int t;
-		t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-		mac_size=t;
-
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif			
 			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length >= mac_size)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
 			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
 		else
-			rr->length = 0;
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
 			{
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
 		}
 
-	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+	if (enc_err < 0)
 		{
 		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
 		rr->length = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index 928935bd8b4c..ab9c41922c46 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -115,11 +115,12 @@
   Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
 */
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
 #include "srtp.h"
 
 
diff --git a/ssl/dtls1.h b/ssl/dtls1.h
index 5008bf608179..e65d5011915b 100644
--- a/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@
  *
  */
 
-#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H 
-#define HEADER_DTLS1_H 
+#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H
+#define HEADER_DTLS1_H
 
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
@@ -72,8 +72,12 @@
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
 #include <sys/timeval.h>
 #else
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+#include <sys/times.h>
+#else
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #endif
+#endif
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index 00ac158f9bbc..03b6cf967380 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -359,12 +359,14 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 					SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
 			return(-1);
 			}
-#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
-		/* The Rhapsody 5.5 (a.k.a. MacOS X) compiler bug
-		 * workaround. <appro@fy.chalmers.se> */
-		s->hit=(i=*(p++))?1:0;
-#else
+#if 0
 		s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
+		/* Some [PPC?] compilers fail to increment p in above
+		   statement, e.g. one provided with Rhapsody 5.5, but
+		   most recent example XL C 11.1 for AIX, even without
+		   optimization flag... */
+#else
+		s->hit=(*p)?1:0; p++;
 #endif
 		s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
 		n2s(p,i);
@@ -937,7 +939,7 @@ static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
 	p += 1;
 
-	if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
 		{
 		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index ac963b2d47d6..8bb6ab8baa33 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
 			ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
-			if (	(memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,
-				(unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) ||
+			if (	(CRYPTO_memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,mac_size) != 0) ||
 				(s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index bc885e8e7f6d..2cba426bb7ef 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -1059,10 +1059,12 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
 		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
 
 		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
-		EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
-				 s->s2->key_material_length);
-		EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL)
+		    || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
+					 s->s2->key_material_length)
+		    || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,
+					 SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH))
+			goto msg_end;
 
 		i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
 		buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
@@ -1073,7 +1075,11 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p2=buf2;
 		i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
-		EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i);
+		if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i))
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(buf2);
+			goto msg_end;
+			}
 		OPENSSL_free(buf2);
 
 		pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
index b63460a56ddd..ead01c82a14a 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
-static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) {
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+	{
 	const char *sender;
 	int slen;
 
@@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) {
 
 	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
 		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-}
+	}
 #endif
 
 int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
@@ -231,8 +232,9 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 	unsigned char *p;
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the change
-	 * cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md. */
+	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
+	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md.
+	 */ 
 #endif
 
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -263,7 +265,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 
-	if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
 		{
 		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
@@ -537,12 +539,14 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 		s->init_num += i;
 		n -= i;
 		}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	/* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
 	 * Finished verification. */
 	if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
 		ssl3_take_mac(s);
 #endif
+
 	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
 	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
 	if (s->msg_callback)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..02edf3f9189e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
+ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+/* Some utility functions are needed:
+ *
+ * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
+ * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
+
+/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+	{
+	a -= b;
+	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
+	}
+
+/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+	{
+	a -= b;
+	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
+	}
+
+/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+	{
+	unsigned c = a ^ b;
+	c--;
+	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
+	}
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
+ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size)
+	{
+	unsigned padding_length, good;
+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+	/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+	 * time. */
+	if (overhead > rec->length)
+		return 0;
+
+	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+	good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
+	/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+	good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
+	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+	rec->length -= padding_length;
+	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
+	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+}
+
+/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
+ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
+ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
+ * padding was removed.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size)
+	{
+	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+		{
+		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
+		 * non-constant time.
+		 */
+		if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+			return 0;
+		/* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
+		rec->data += block_size;
+		rec->input += block_size;
+		rec->length -= block_size;
+		}
+	else if (overhead > rec->length)
+		return 0;
+
+	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+
+	/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
+	 * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
+	 * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
+	 * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
+	 */
+	if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand)
+		{
+		/* First packet is even in size, so check */
+		if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) &&
+		    !(padding_length & 1))
+			{
+			s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+			}
+		if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) &&
+		    padding_length > 0)
+			{
+			padding_length--;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+		{
+		/* padding is already verified */
+		rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length);
+	/* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+	 * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
+	 * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
+	 * bytes of padding.
+	 *
+	 * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
+	 * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+	 * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+	 * public information so we can use it.) */
+	to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
+	if (to_check > rec->length-1)
+		to_check = rec->length-1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+		unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
+		/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+		 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+		good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));
+		}
+
+	/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
+	 * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
+	 * bits. */
+	good &= good >> 4;
+	good &= good >> 2;
+	good &= good >> 1;
+	good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
+	good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+
+	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+	rec->length -= padding_length;
+	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
+
+	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+	}
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
+ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
+ * vary within a 256-byte window).
+ *
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ *
+ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
+ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
+ * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
+ * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
+ * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
+
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+		       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+		       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
+	{
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+	unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64+EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned char *rotated_mac;
+#else
+	unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#endif
+
+	/* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */
+	unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
+	unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+	/* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+	 * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+	unsigned scan_start = 0;
+	unsigned i, j;
+	unsigned div_spoiler;
+	unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+	rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0-(size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);
+#endif
+
+	/* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+	if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+		scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+	/* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
+	 * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
+	 * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
+	 *
+	 * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
+	 * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it
+	 * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
+	div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
+	div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8;
+	rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
+
+	memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+	for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
+		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+		unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
+		rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+		j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
+		}
+
+	/* Now rotate the MAC */
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+		{
+		/* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
+		((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];
+		out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
+		rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+		}
+#else
+	memset(out, 0, md_size);
+	rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
+	rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+	for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+		{
+		for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+			out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+		rotate_offset++;
+		rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
+#define u32toLE(n, p) \
+	(*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+
+/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
+ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
+ * typically does. */
+static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
+	u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
+	u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
+	u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
+	u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
+	}
+
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+	l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
+	}
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		{
+		l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+		}
+	}
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		{
+		l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+		}
+	}
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+#endif
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return 0;
+#endif
+	switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+		case NID_sha1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+		case NID_sha224:
+		case NID_sha256:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+		case NID_sha384:
+		case NID_sha512:
+#endif
+			return 1;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
+ *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
+ *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
+ *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ *   data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
+ *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ *     once the padding has been removed.
+ *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ *     record, including padding.
+ *   is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. ) */
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+	const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+	unsigned char* md_out,
+	size_t* md_out_size,
+	const unsigned char header[13],
+	const unsigned char *data,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+	const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+	unsigned mac_secret_length,
+	char is_sslv3)
+	{
+	union {	double align;
+		unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state;
+	void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
+	void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
+	unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+	unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+		 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
+		 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+	unsigned int bits;	/* at most 18 bits */
+	unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+	/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+	unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+	/* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
+	* the hash. */
+	unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+	char length_is_big_endian = 1;
+
+	/* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+	 * many possible overflows later in this function. */
+	OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);
+
+	switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+			MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
+			md_size = 16;
+			sslv3_pad_length = 48;
+			length_is_big_endian = 0;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha1:
+			SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
+			md_size = 20;
+			break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+		case NID_sha224:
+			SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+			md_size = 224/8;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha256:
+			SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+			md_size = 32;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+		case NID_sha384:
+			SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+			md_size = 384/8;
+			md_block_size = 128;
+			md_length_size = 16;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha512:
+			SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+			md_size = 64;
+			md_block_size = 128;
+			md_length_size = 16;
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
+			 * called first to check that the hash function is
+			 * supported. */
+			OPENSSL_assert(0);
+			if (md_out_size)
+				*md_out_size = -1;
+			return;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+	header_length = 13;
+	if (is_sslv3)
+		{
+		header_length =
+			mac_secret_length +
+			sslv3_pad_length +
+			8 /* sequence number */ +
+			1 /* record type */ +
+			2 /* record length */;
+		}
+
+	/* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+	 * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+	 * padding value.
+	 *
+	 * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
+	 * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
+	 * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
+	 * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
+	 * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
+	 *
+	 * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+	 * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
+	 * can vary based on the padding.
+	 *
+	 * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
+	 * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
+	variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+	/* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+	 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
+	 * (SSLv3) */
+	len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
+	/* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
+	* |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
+	max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+	/* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+	num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
+	/* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
+	 * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
+	 * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
+	 * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
+	 * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
+	 * they are plaintext. */
+	num_starting_blocks = 0;
+	/* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+	 * we start processing. */
+	k = 0;
+	/* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
+	 * MACed. */
+	mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+	/* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
+	 * contains application data. */
+	c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+	/* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+	 * value. */
+	index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+	/* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
+	 * length, in bits. */
+	index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+	/* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
+	 * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
+	 * SSLv3. */
+
+	/* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
+	 * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
+	if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0))
+		{
+		num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
+		k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
+		}
+
+	bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
+	if (!is_sslv3)
+		{
+		/* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
+		 * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
+		 * than a single block. */
+		bits += 8*md_block_size;
+		memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+		memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+		for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+			hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+		md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+		}
+
+	if (length_is_big_endian)
+		{
+		memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits;
+		}
+
+	if (k > 0)
+		{
+		if (is_sslv3)
+			{
+			/* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
+			 * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
+			 * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
+			 * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
+			unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size;
+			md_transform(md_state.c, header);
+			memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
+			memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang);
+			md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+			for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
+				md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+			memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+			memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13);
+			md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+			for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
+				md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
+			}
+		}
+
+	memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+	/* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
+	 * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+	 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+	 * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
+	for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+		unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+		for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++)
+			{
+			unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+			if (k < header_length)
+				b = header[k];
+			else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
+				b = data[k-header_length];
+			k++;
+
+			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
+			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+			/* If this is the block containing the end of the
+			 * application data, and we are at the offset for the
+			 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
+			b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+			/* If this the the block containing the end of the
+			 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
+			 * just write zero. */
+			b = b&~is_past_cp1;
+			/* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
+			 * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
+			 * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
+			 * add an extra block of zeros. */
+			b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+			/* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
+			 * length. */
+			if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
+				{
+				/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+				b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+				}
+			block[j] = b;
+			}
+
+		md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+		md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+		/* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+		for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+			mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
+		}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */);
+	if (is_sslv3)
+		{
+		/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
+		memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
+
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+		for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+			hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+		}
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+	if (md_out_size)
+		*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
+ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases
+ * by digesting additional data.
+ */
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
+	{
+	size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+		return;
+	block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
+	/* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+	 * digests and TLS to deal with.
+	 * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+	 * otherwise.
+	 * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+	 * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+	 * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+	 * So we have:
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+	 * equivalently:
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+	 * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+	 * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+	 * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+	 * otherwise.
+	 */
+	digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
+	blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+	blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+	/* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original
+	 * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a
+	 * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to
+	 * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum
+	 * length TLS buffer. 
+	 */
+	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
+				(blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+	}
+#endif
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index b80d052e1f5f..344e2eb1af8c 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -459,7 +459,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
-
 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 #else
@@ -987,7 +986,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * client authentication.
 	 */
 	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+		{
+		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		goto f_err;
+		}
 	/* lets get the compression algorithm */
 	/* COMPRESSION */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index c5df2cb90ae1..e3cd4f062c5a 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -466,12 +466,21 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
 	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
 	}
 
+/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ *       occured.
+ */
 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i;
+	int bs,i,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
@@ -522,32 +531,16 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				return 0;
-				}
 			/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
 			}
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			i=rec->data[l-1]+1;
-			/* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size;
-			 * padding bytes (except the last one) are arbitrary */
-			if (i > bs)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			/* now i <= bs <= rec->length */
-			rec->length-=i;
-			}
+			return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -716,7 +709,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 	const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
 	unsigned char *p,rec_char;
-	unsigned int md_size;
+	size_t md_size, orig_len;
 	int npad;
 	int t;
 
@@ -741,28 +734,72 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	md_size=t;
 	npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
 
-	/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
-	rec_char=rec->type;
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
-	p=md;
-	s2n(rec->length,p);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	/* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+	rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+	if (!send &&
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
+		{
+		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+		 * timing-oracle. */
+
+		/* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+		 *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+		 *
+		 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+		 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+		 * total size. */
+		unsigned char header[75];
+		unsigned j = 0;
+		memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
+		j += md_size;
+		memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+		j += npad;
+		memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
+		j += 8;
+		header[j++] = rec->type;
+		header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+		header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+			hash,
+			md, &md_size,
+			header, rec->input,
+			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+			mac_sec, md_size,
+			1 /* is SSLv3 */);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		unsigned int md_size_u;
+		/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
+		rec_char=rec->type;
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
+		p=md;
+		s2n(rec->length,p);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u);
+		md_size = md_size_u;
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	}
 
 	ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
 	return(md_size);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index fb60cde8eed6..e7c5dcb809f9 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	0,
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES128GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
@@ -1974,7 +1974,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	0,
 	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_kDHd,
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES256GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
@@ -2669,7 +2669,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
@@ -2685,7 +2685,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA384,
@@ -2799,7 +2799,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES128GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
@@ -2815,7 +2815,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	1,
 	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
 	SSL_aECDH,
 	SSL_AES256GCM,
 	SSL_AEAD,
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index adf8c387cc0a..804291e27c32 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -290,11 +290,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 	short version;
-	int mac_size;
-	int clear=0;
+	unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
 	size_t extra;
-	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess=s->session;
@@ -403,17 +400,15 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		if (enc_err == 0)
-			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
-			goto err;
-
-		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
-		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
-		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
-		 * the MAC computation anyway. */
-		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+		goto f_err;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -423,53 +418,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 		{
-		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif			
 			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
 			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-			rr->length = 0;
-#endif
-			}
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-			{
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
 		}
 
-	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+	if (enc_err < 0)
 		{
 		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
 		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
@@ -744,6 +748,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 	 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
 	 */
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
+				&& !s->renegotiate
 				&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
 		*(p++) = 0x1;
 	else
@@ -1238,7 +1243,7 @@ start:
 				goto f_err;
 				}
 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
-			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+			else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
 				return(0);
 #endif
 			}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 118939fabb1a..bfb84805400c 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
 		{
 		if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
 			{
-			/* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
+			/* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 
+			   we do so if There is no srp login name */
 			ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
 			*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
 			}
@@ -378,6 +379,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				}
 			}
 #endif		
+			
 			s->renegotiate = 2;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -1181,7 +1183,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 		}
-		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
 			goto err;
 		}
@@ -1389,7 +1391,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
 		{
 		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			goto f_err;
+			}
 		}
 	
 	/* we now have the following setup. 
@@ -1403,6 +1408,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
 	 */
 
+	/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+		{
+		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
 	if (ret < 0) ret=1;
 	if (0)
 		{
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 8b0c2a2dac48..593579ed3670 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -493,6 +493,9 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 	char *psk_identity_hint;
 	char *psk_identity;
 #endif
+	/* Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed.
+	 * Applications can also set this bit for a new session via
+	 * not_resumable_session_cb to disable session caching and tickets. */
 	int not_resumable;
 
 	/* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
@@ -535,7 +538,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 	/* RFC4507 info */
 	unsigned char *tlsext_tick;	/* Session ticket */
-	size_t	tlsext_ticklen;		/* Session ticket length */	
+	size_t tlsext_ticklen;		/* Session ticket length */
 	long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;	/* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -927,6 +930,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 	/* Callback for status request */
 	int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
 	void *tlsext_status_arg;
+
 	/* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
 	int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
 	void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
@@ -952,6 +956,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	/* Next protocol negotiation information */
 	/* (for experimental NPN extension). */
@@ -2206,6 +2211,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION			 181
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION			 217
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT			 182
+#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY			 317
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY				 183
 #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER			 184
 #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE			 185
diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index 112e627de08d..247e88c2d631 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -578,8 +578,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A		(0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#endif
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 /* read from server */
@@ -629,8 +631,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#endif
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A		(0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B		(0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 /* write to client */
@@ -655,7 +659,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		16
 #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED			20
 #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS		22
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 #define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO			67
+#endif
 #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3
 
 
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_algs.c b/ssl/ssl_algs.c
index d443143c5935..9c34d19725b1 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_algs.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
 #endif
+
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 917be318760f..5123a89182e5 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -164,14 +164,14 @@ static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
 	{
 	/* Set digest values to defaults */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
+	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
+	cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 	}
 
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 92d1e94d6a9a..0aba8e048c58 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV2,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV2, 0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV3,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV3, 0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1, 0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1_2, 0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* export flag */
 	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP,0,     0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
@@ -1150,9 +1151,9 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 			while (	((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
 				((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
 				((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
-				 (ch == '-'))
+				 (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
 #else
-			while (	isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-'))
+			while (	isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
 #endif
 				 {
 				 ch = *(++l);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 2577c6895abe..370fb57e3b86 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION),	"SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION),	"SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT),	"SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY),	"SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY),	"SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER),	"SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE),	"SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index f82d071d6e75..14d143da0441 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -597,8 +597,10 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         if (s->srtp_profiles)
             sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
 
 	OPENSSL_free(s);
 	}
@@ -1952,8 +1954,10 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
 	a->comp_methods = NULL;
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         if (a->srtp_profiles)
                 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 	if (a->psk_identity_hint)
@@ -2287,7 +2291,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
 #endif
 
 /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
 	CERT *c;
@@ -2342,12 +2346,20 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
 		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
 	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
 		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		return(NULL);
 		}
-	if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
 
-	return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+	return c->pkeys + i;
+	}
+
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+	cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+	if (!cpk)
+		return NULL;
+	return cpk->x509;
 	}
 
 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
@@ -2608,7 +2620,7 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
 		return("TLSv1.2");
 	else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return("TLSv1.1");
-	if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+	else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return("TLSv1");
 	else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return("SSLv3");
@@ -2780,7 +2792,9 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
 /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
 X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
 	{
-	if (s->cert != NULL)
+	if (s->server)
+		return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
+	else if (s->cert != NULL)
 		return(s->cert->key->x509);
 	else
 		return(NULL);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index d87fd51cfa82..1b98947e677b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -215,6 +215,15 @@
 			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
 			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
 
+#define l2n8(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
 #define n2l6(c,l)	(l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
 			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
 			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
@@ -830,7 +839,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
 int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
 int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
 int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *);
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
 int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
@@ -1088,7 +1098,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d,
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
@@ -1131,4 +1142,33 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
 
+/* s3_cbc.c */
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+		       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+		       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len);
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size);
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size);
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+	const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+	unsigned char* md_out,
+	size_t* md_out_size,
+	const unsigned char header[13],
+	const unsigned char *data,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+	const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+	unsigned mac_secret_length,
+	char is_sslv3);
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
index c0960b5712b8..60e7b66859db 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
 
 	ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
 
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+	in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
 	if (in == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
@@ -723,14 +723,16 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
 		goto end;
 		}
 
-	x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+	x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+				ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
 	if (x == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
 		goto end;
 		}
 
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
+	ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+
 	if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
 		ret = 0;  /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
 	if (ret)
@@ -742,13 +744,15 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
 		int r;
 		unsigned long err;
 		
-		if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) 
+		if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
 			{
 			sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
 			ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
 			}
 
-		while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
+		while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
+					ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+					ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
 			!= NULL)
 			{
 			r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 0f8fd3902da5..316bbb0c9582 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -543,8 +543,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	int comp = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 	COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
-#endif
 	STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
 	int test_cipherlist = 0;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	int fips_mode=0;
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index f7bdeb3b9dba..809ad2ee1e53 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	{
         int i;
         for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -667,12 +667,21 @@ err:
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
@@ -729,11 +738,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-		(enc == NULL))
+	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
 		{
 		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
 		rec->input=rec->data;
+		ret = 1;
 		}
 	else
 		{
@@ -797,13 +806,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long ui;
+		unsigned long ui;
 		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+			ds->cipher->iv_len);
 		printf("\t\tIV: ");
 		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
 		printf("\n");
@@ -816,13 +825,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				{
-				if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
-					return -1;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				return 0;
-				}
 			}
 		
 		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -839,68 +842,24 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+		unsigned long i;
+		printf("\trec->data=");
 		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+		ret = 1;
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-			 * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-			 * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-			 * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-			 * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-			 * [steve]
-			 */
-			if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				&& !s->expand)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length -=i;
-			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
-				&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-				{
-				if (bs > (int)rec->length)
-					return -1;
-				rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
-				rec->input += bs;
-				rec->length -= bs;
-				}
-			}
+			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		if (pad && !send)
 			rec->length -= pad;
 		}
-	return(1);
+	return ret;
 	}
+
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
 	{
 	unsigned int ret;
@@ -990,10 +949,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	unsigned char *seq;
 	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	size_t md_size;
+	size_t md_size, orig_len;
 	int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char buf[5]; 
+	unsigned char header[13];
 	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
 	int t;
 
@@ -1014,12 +973,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
 	md_size=t;
 
-	buf[0]=rec->type;
-	buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-	buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
 	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
 	if (stream_mac) 
 		{
@@ -1038,17 +991,55 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
 		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
 
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
 		}
 	else
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-	t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+	rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+	header[8]=rec->type;
+	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+	if (!send &&
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+		{
+		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+		 * timing-oracle. */
+		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+			mac_ctx,
+			md, &md_size,
+			header, rec->input,
+			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+			tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+					mac_ctx, rec->input,
+					rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+		}
 		
-	if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+	if (!stream_mac)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 27c8e3460da9..e08088c57eff 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -649,6 +649,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
                 int el;
@@ -667,6 +668,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 			}
                 ret += el;
                 }
+#endif
 
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
@@ -781,6 +783,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         if(s->srtp_profile)
                 {
                 int el;
@@ -799,6 +802,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 			}
                 ret+=el;
                 }
+#endif
 
 	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
 		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
@@ -1077,7 +1081,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
 			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
-			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1328,12 +1333,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #endif
 
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
-                        {
+			{
 			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
 				return 0;
-                        }
+			}
+#endif
 
 		data+=size;
 		}
@@ -1433,7 +1440,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
-			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
+				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1527,7 +1535,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			unsigned char selected_len;
 
 			/* We must have requested it. */
-			if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
 				return 0;
@@ -1577,12 +1585,14 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
-                        {
+			{
                         if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
                                 return 0;
-                        }
+			}
+#endif
 
 		data+=size;		
 		}
@@ -1763,7 +1773,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1782,42 +1792,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
-	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
- 	 * the certificate has changed.
- 	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int r;
-		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		switch (r)
-			{
-			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* status request response should be sent */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-				else
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* something bad happened */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
  	{
 		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
 		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-		 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+		 * so this has to happen here in
+		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 
 		int r = 1;
 	
@@ -1869,8 +1849,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			}
 	}
 
-#endif
  err:
+#endif
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1888,6 +1868,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+	int al;
+
+	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
+ 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+ 	 */
+	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		{
+		int r;
+		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+		if (certpkey == NULL)
+			{
+			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+		 */
+		s->cert->key = certpkey;
+		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+		switch (r)
+			{
+			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* status request response should be sent */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+				else
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* something bad happened */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+	switch (ret)
+		{
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+			return -1;
+
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+			return 1; 
+
+		default:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -2189,7 +2234,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
 		return 2;
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
@@ -2414,7 +2459,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 	 */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
+		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
@@ -2425,7 +2470,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
+		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 	return 1;
 	}
diff --git a/ssl/tls_srp.c b/ssl/tls_srp.c
index 8512c4daf652..2315a7c0a2e9 100644
--- a/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad)
 		(s->srp_ctx.v == NULL))
 		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
 
-	RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b));
+	if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0)
+		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
 	s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b,sizeof(b),NULL);
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(b,sizeof(b));
 
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index 93f80ba0c64f..6debdb60a89b 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -3510,6 +3510,7 @@ BIO_get_callback_arg                    3902	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BIO_set_callback                        3903	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_ASIdOrRange                         3904	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
 i2d_ASIdentifiers                       3905	EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+CRYPTO_memcmp                           3906	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 SEED_decrypt                            3908	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
 SEED_encrypt                            3909	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
 SEED_cbc_encrypt                        3910	EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED
@@ -3687,7 +3688,7 @@ FIPS_dh_new                             4073	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 FIPS_corrupt_dsa_keygen                 4074	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 FIPS_dh_free                            4075	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 fips_pkey_signature_test                4076	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_add_alg_module                      4077	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_add_alg_module                      4077	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 int_RAND_init_engine_callbacks          4078	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 int_EVP_CIPHER_set_engine_callbacks     4079	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 int_EVP_MD_init_engine_callbacks        4080	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/util/pl/VC-32.pl b/util/pl/VC-32.pl
index c503bd52b9ff..6c550f54aedf 100644
--- a/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+++ b/util/pl/VC-32.pl
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
     $base_cflags.=' -I$(WCECOMPAT)/include'		if (defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'}));
     $base_cflags.=' -I$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/../../include'	if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
     $opt_cflags=' /MC /O1i';	# optimize for space, but with intrinsics...
-    $dbg_clfags=' /MC /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
+    $dbg_cflags=' /MC /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
     $lflags="/nologo /opt:ref $wcelflag";
     }
 else	# Win32