diff options
| author | Olivier Certner <olce.freebsd@certner.fr> | 2023-08-17 23:54:37 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mitchell Horne <mhorne@FreeBSD.org> | 2023-10-18 17:59:09 +0000 |
| commit | 63c01c18a8d3feb957a4f91171aaac1f92ce5955 (patch) | |
| tree | 46cd472ff3571aa12fc1a4ffa793b1f431a44414 | |
| parent | 1ffcc2983834accfd21089daa116ec802e90e088 (diff) | |
| download | src-63c01c18a8d3.tar.gz src-63c01c18a8d3.zip | |
cr_canseejailproc(): New privilege, no direct check for UID 0
Use priv_check_cred() with a new privilege (PRIV_SEEJAILPROC) instead of
explicitly testing for UID 0 (the former has been the rule for almost 20
years).
As a consequence, cr_canseejailproc() now abides by the
'security.bsd.suser_enabled' sysctl and MAC policies.
Update the MAC policies Biba and LOMAC, and prison_priv_check() so that
they don't deny this privilege. This preserves the existing behavior
(the 'root' user is not restricted, even when jailed, unless
'security.bsd.suser_enabled' is not 0) and is consistent with what is
done for the related policies/privileges (PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS,
PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS).
Approved by: re (gjb)
Reviewed by: emaste (earlier version), mhorne
Sponsored by: Kumacom SAS
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D40626
(cherry picked from commit 7974ca1cdbee949f5e453eea112be265b425c407)
(cherry picked from commit bedaf8af51c96cef025c13c41ba420163824e8cb)
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/kern_jail.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/kern_prot.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/sys/priv.h | 1 |
5 files changed, 9 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c index 39bdcaf5ef0e..57e6024a9939 100644 --- a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c +++ b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c @@ -3938,6 +3938,7 @@ prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv) */ case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS: case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS: + case PRIV_SEEJAILPROC: /* * Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c index 19e0b78c6709..ed15cb566499 100644 --- a/sys/kern/kern_prot.c +++ b/sys/kern/kern_prot.c @@ -1426,9 +1426,12 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, see_jail_proc, CTLFLAG_RW, int cr_canseejailproc(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2) { - if (u1->cr_uid == 0) + if (see_jail_proc || /* Policy deactivated. */ + u1->cr_prison == u2->cr_prison || /* Same jail. */ + priv_check_cred(u1, PRIV_SEEJAILPROC) == 0) /* Privileged. */ return (0); - return (!see_jail_proc && u1->cr_prison != u2->cr_prison ? ESRCH : 0); + + return (ESRCH); } /*- diff --git a/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c b/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c index 6948548503e1..5d66e2fd4b9b 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c +++ b/sys/security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c @@ -1924,6 +1924,7 @@ biba_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv) */ case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS: case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS: + case PRIV_SEEJAILPROC: break; /* diff --git a/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c b/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c index 05bd0da06960..aa9abf458721 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c +++ b/sys/security/mac_lomac/mac_lomac.c @@ -1702,6 +1702,7 @@ lomac_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv) */ case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS: case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS: + case PRIV_SEEJAILPROC: break; /* diff --git a/sys/sys/priv.h b/sys/sys/priv.h index 45cb5bab4275..a61de8d32fe0 100644 --- a/sys/sys/priv.h +++ b/sys/sys/priv.h @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ #define PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID 58 /* setresgid. */ #define PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS 59 /* Exempt bsd.seeothergids. */ #define PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS 60 /* Exempt bsd.seeotheruids. */ +#define PRIV_SEEJAILPROC 61 /* Exempt from bsd.see_jail_proc. */ /* * Debugging privileges. |