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authorEd Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>2021-02-14 21:00:25 +0000
committerEd Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>2021-02-14 21:00:25 +0000
commit0194e6d04277a638afac6c4a664d3bc6a0d944eb (patch)
treee97a6dcafc6763aea7c804e4e113c2750cb1400d /authfile.c
parentf02e39982452024dafcf0ea6e536ebff586ffce4 (diff)
downloadsrc-0194e6d04277a638afac6c4a664d3bc6a0d944eb.tar.gz
src-0194e6d04277a638afac6c4a664d3bc6a0d944eb.zip
Vendor import of OpenSSH 8.1p1vendor/openssh/8.1p1
Diffstat (limited to 'authfile.c')
-rw-r--r--authfile.c58
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index b1c92f4ad621..37341189cbea 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.131 2018/09/21 12:20:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.135 2019/09/03 08:30:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
{
int fd, oerrno;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0)
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(keybuf),
sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) {
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
int
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
- int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
+ int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
- force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
+ format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
struct stat st;
int r;
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
{
struct stat st;
- if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/*
* if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
@@ -164,10 +164,9 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
return 0;
}
-/* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */
int
sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
+ struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int fd, r;
@@ -176,19 +175,12 @@ sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 0;
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- }
- if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 0;
- r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+
+ r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename);
+ if (r != 0)
goto out;
- }
- if (perm_ok != NULL)
- *perm_ok = 1;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp)
@@ -236,7 +228,7 @@ sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
@@ -387,7 +379,7 @@ sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
/* Load private key and certificate */
int
sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
- struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok)
+ struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
int r;
@@ -410,7 +402,7 @@ sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
- passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 ||
+ passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -536,3 +528,25 @@ sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
}
}
+/*
+ * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
+ * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
+ * unterminated quotes).
+ */
+int
+sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp)
+{
+ char *cp = *cpp;
+ int quoted = 0;
+
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ *cpp = cp;
+ /* return failure for unterminated quotes */
+ return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+