Import OpenSSL 1.0.1m.vendor/openssl/1.0.1m

1 files changed, 1821 insertions, 1902 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 920066aeba3b..136bfbda617a 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -74,19 +74,19 @@
 
 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL	0x100
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
 
 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE		0x080
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
 
 /* CRL times valid */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME		0x040
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
 
 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME	0x020
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
 
 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
 
@@ -94,21 +94,21 @@
 
 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT	0x018
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
 
 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH	0x008
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
 
 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID		0x004
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
 
 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
 
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA	0x002
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
 
-static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -119,2106 +119,2025 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 
 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
-			unsigned int *preasons,
-			X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-				X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
-			X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
-				X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
+                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
+                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
+                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+                           int *pcrl_score);
 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
-				unsigned int *preasons);
+                           unsigned int *preasons);
 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-			STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
-			STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 
 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
+const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
-	{
-	return ok;
-	}
+{
+    return ok;
+}
 
 #if 0
 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
-	{
-	return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
-	}
+{
+    return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
 #endif
 
 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
-	int bad_chain = 0;
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
-	int depth,i,ok=0;
-	int num;
-	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
-	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-
-	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
-	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
-	if (ctx->chain == NULL)
-		{
-		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
-			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
-			{
-			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto end;
-			}
-		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		ctx->last_untrusted=1;
-		}
-
-	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
-	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
-	    && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
-	depth=param->depth;
-
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		/* If we have enough, we break */
-		if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
-		                         * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
-		                         * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
-		                         * code later.
-		                         */
-
-		/* If we are self signed, we break */
-		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
-
-		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
-		if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
-			{
-			xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
-			if (xtmp != NULL)
-				{
-				if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
-					{
-					X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto end;
-					}
-				CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-				(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
-				ctx->last_untrusted++;
-				x=xtmp;
-				num++;
-				/* reparse the full chain for
-				 * the next one */
-				continue;
-				}
-			}
-		break;
-		}
-
-	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
-	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
-	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
-
-	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
- 	 * is self signed.
- 	 */
-
-	i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
-	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
-		{
-		/* we have a self signed certificate */
-		if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
-			{
-			/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
-			 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
-			 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
-			 */
-			ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-			if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
-				{
-				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
-				ctx->current_cert=x;
-				ctx->error_depth=i-1;
-				if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
-				bad_chain = 1;
-				ok=cb(0,ctx);
-				if (!ok) goto end;
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
-				 * so we get any trust settings.
-				 */
-				X509_free(x);
-				x = xtmp;
-				(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
-				ctx->last_untrusted=0;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
-			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
-			ctx->last_untrusted--;
-			num--;
-			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		/* If we have enough, we break */
-		if (depth < num) break;
-
-		/* If we are self signed, we break */
-		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
-
-		ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-
-		if (ok < 0) return ok;
-		if (ok == 0) break;
-
-		x = xtmp;
-		if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
-			{
-			X509_free(xtmp);
-			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		num++;
-		}
-
-	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
-
-	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
-	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
-		{
-		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
-			{
-			if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
-				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
-			else
-				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
-			ctx->current_cert=x;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-
-			sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
-			num++;
-			ctx->last_untrusted=num;
-			ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
-			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
-			chain_ss=NULL;
-			}
-
-		ctx->error_depth=num-1;
-		bad_chain = 1;
-		ok=cb(0,ctx);
-		if (!ok) goto end;
-		}
-
-	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
-	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
-
-	if (!ok) goto end;
-
-	/* Check name constraints */
-
-	ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
-	
-	if (!ok) goto end;
-
-	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
-
-	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
-
-	if (!ok) goto end;
-
-	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
-	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
-
-	/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
-	 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
-	 */
-
-	ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
-	if(!ok) goto end;
-
-	/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
-	if (ctx->verify != NULL)
-		ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
-	else
-		ok=internal_verify(ctx);
-	if(!ok) goto end;
+{
+    X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL;
+    int bad_chain = 0;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+    int depth, i, ok = 0;
+    int num;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    /*
+     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+     * the first entry is in place
+     */
+    if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
+        if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+            (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+        ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
+    if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+        && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+    depth = param->depth;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /* If we have enough, we break */
+        if (depth < num)
+            break;              /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+                                 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+                                 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
+                                 * later. */
+
+        /* If we are self signed, we break */
+        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+            break;
+
+        /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+        if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
+            xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+            if (xtmp != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
+                    X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+                (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+                ctx->last_untrusted++;
+                x = xtmp;
+                num++;
+                /*
+                 * reparse the full chain for the next one
+                 */
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
+     * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
+     * complain.
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+     */
+
+    i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
+        /* we have a self signed certificate */
+        if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+            /*
+             * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find
+             * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible
+             * impersonation.
+             */
+            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+            if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+                ctx->current_cert = x;
+                ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+                if (ok == 1)
+                    X509_free(xtmp);
+                bad_chain = 1;
+                ok = cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so
+                 * we get any trust settings.
+                 */
+                X509_free(x);
+                x = xtmp;
+                (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+                ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
+             */
+            chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+            ctx->last_untrusted--;
+            num--;
+            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+    for (;;) {
+        /* If we have enough, we break */
+        if (depth < num)
+            break;
+
+        /* If we are self signed, we break */
+        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+            break;
+
+        ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+
+        if (ok < 0)
+            return ok;
+        if (ok == 0)
+            break;
+
+        x = xtmp;
+        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+            X509_free(xtmp);
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        num++;
+    }
+
+    /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+
+    /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+    if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
+        if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
+            if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+            else
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+        } else {
+
+            sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
+            num++;
+            ctx->last_untrusted = num;
+            ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+            chain_ss = NULL;
+        }
+
+        ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
+        bad_chain = 1;
+        ok = cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
+    ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Check name constraints */
+
+    ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
+
+    if (param->trust > 0)
+        ok = check_trust(ctx);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
+    X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+
+    /*
+     * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
+     * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+     */
+
+    ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
+    if (ctx->verify != NULL)
+        ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
+    else
+        ok = internal_verify(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-	/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
-	ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
-	if (!ok) goto end;
-	ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
-	if (!ok) goto end;
+    /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+    ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+    ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
 #endif
 
-	/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
-	if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
-		ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
-	if(!ok) goto end;
-	if (0)
-		{
-end:
-		X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
-		}
-	if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
-	if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
-	return ok;
-	}
-
-
-/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+    if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
+        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+    if (0) {
+ end:
+        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+    }
+    if (sktmp != NULL)
+        sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+    if (chain_ss != NULL)
+        X509_free(chain_ss);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
  */
 
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 {
-	int i;
-	X509 *issuer;
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
-		{
-		issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
-			return issuer;
-		}
-	return NULL;
+    int i;
+    X509 *issuer;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
+            return issuer;
+    }
+    return NULL;
 }
 
 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
 
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 {
-	int ret;
-	ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
-	if (ret == X509_V_OK)
-		return 1;
-	/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
-	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
-		return 0;
-
-	ctx->error = ret;
-	ctx->current_cert = x;
-	ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-	return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-	return 0;
+    int ret;
+    ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+    if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+        return 1;
+    /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx->error = ret;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 
 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 {
-	*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
-	if (*issuer)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		return 1;
-		}
-	else
-		return 0;
+    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+    if (*issuer) {
+        CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        return 0;
 }
-	
 
-/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
- * with the supplied purpose
+/*
+ * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+ * purpose
  */
 
 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
-	return 1;
+    return 1;
 #else
-	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
-	X509 *x;
-	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-	int proxy_path_length = 0;
-	int purpose;
-	int allow_proxy_certs;
-	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-
-	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
-	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
-	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
-	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
-	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
-	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
-	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
-	*/
-	must_be_ca = -1;
-
-	/* CRL path validation */
-	if (ctx->parent)
-		{
-		allow_proxy_certs = 0;
-		purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		allow_proxy_certs =
-			!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
-		/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
-		   software happy */
-		if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
-			allow_proxy_certs = 1;
-		purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
-		}
-
-	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
-	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
-		{
-		int ret;
-		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-		if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-			&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
-			{
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
-			ctx->error_depth = i;
-			ctx->current_cert = x;
-			ok=cb(0,ctx);
-			if (!ok) goto end;
-			}
-		if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
-			{
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
-			ctx->error_depth = i;
-			ctx->current_cert = x;
-			ok=cb(0,ctx);
-			if (!ok) goto end;
-			}
-		ret = X509_check_ca(x);
-		switch(must_be_ca)
-			{
-		case -1:
-			if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
-				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
-				{
-				ret = 0;
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
-				}
-			else
-				ret = 1;
-			break;
-		case 0:
-			if (ret != 0)
-				{
-				ret = 0;
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
-				}
-			else
-				ret = 1;
-			break;
-		default:
-			if ((ret == 0)
-				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
-					&& (ret != 1)))
-				{
-				ret = 0;
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
-				}
-			else
-				ret = 1;
-			break;
-			}
-		if (ret == 0)
-			{
-			ctx->error_depth = i;
-			ctx->current_cert = x;
-			ok=cb(0,ctx);
-			if (!ok) goto end;
-			}
-		if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
-			{
-			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
-			if ((ret == 0)
-				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
-					&& (ret != 1)))
-				{
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
-				ctx->error_depth = i;
-				ctx->current_cert = x;
-				ok=cb(0,ctx);
-				if (!ok) goto end;
-				}
-			}
-		/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
-		if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
-			   && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
-			   && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
-			{
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-			ctx->error_depth = i;
-			ctx->current_cert = x;
-			ok=cb(0,ctx);
-			if (!ok) goto end;
-			}
-		/* Increment path length if not self issued */
-		if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
-			plen++;
-		/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
-		   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
-		   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
-		   CA certificate.  */
-		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
-			{
-			if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
-				{
-				ctx->error =
-					X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-				ctx->error_depth = i;
-				ctx->current_cert = x;
-				ok=cb(0,ctx);
-				if (!ok) goto end;
-				}
-			proxy_path_length++;
-			must_be_ca = 0;
-			}
-		else
-			must_be_ca = 1;
-		}
-	ok = 1;
+    int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
+    X509 *x;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+    int proxy_path_length = 0;
+    int purpose;
+    int allow_proxy_certs;
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    /*-
+     *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+     * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+     *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+     * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
+     *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+     * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
+     *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+     */
+    must_be_ca = -1;
+
+    /* CRL path validation */
+    if (ctx->parent) {
+        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+    } else {
+        allow_proxy_certs =
+            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+        /*
+         * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
+         * happy
+         */
+        if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+            allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+    }
+
+    /* Check all untrusted certificates */
+    for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+        int ret;
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+        switch (must_be_ca) {
+        case -1:
+            if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+                && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        case 0:
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        default:
+            if ((ret == 0)
+                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+                    && (ret != 1))) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
+            ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
+            if ((ret == 0)
+                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+                    && (ret != 1))) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+                ctx->error_depth = i;
+                ctx->current_cert = x;
+                ok = cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
+        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
+            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
+        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            plen++;
+        /*
+         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
+         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
+         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
+         */
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+                ctx->error_depth = i;
+                ctx->current_cert = x;
+                ok = cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            proxy_path_length++;
+            must_be_ca = 0;
+        } else
+            must_be_ca = 1;
+    }
+    ok = 1;
  end:
-	return ok;
+    return ok;
 #endif
 }
 
 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	X509 *x;
-	int i, j, rv;
-	/* Check name constraints for all certificates */
-	for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-		{
-		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-		/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
-		if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
-			continue;
-		/* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
-		 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
-		 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
-		 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
-		 */
-		for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
-			{
-			NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
-			if (nc)
-				{
-				rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
-				if (rv != X509_V_OK)
-					{
-					ctx->error = rv;
-					ctx->error_depth = i;
-					ctx->current_cert = x;
-					if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
-						return 0;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
+{
+    X509 *x;
+    int i, j, rv;
+    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            continue;
+        /*
+         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+         * to be obeyed.
+         */
+        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+            if (nc) {
+                rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+                if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+                    ctx->error = rv;
+                    ctx->error_depth = i;
+                    ctx->current_cert = x;
+                    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                        return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
 
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
-	return 1;
+    return 1;
 #else
-	int i, ok;
-	X509 *x;
-	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+    int i, ok;
+    X509 *x;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
-	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
-	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
-		return 1;
-	ctx->error_depth = i;
-	ctx->current_cert = x;
-	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
-	else
-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
-	ok = cb(0, ctx);
-	return ok;
+    i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+    if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+        return 1;
+    ctx->error_depth = i;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+    else
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+    ok = cb(0, ctx);
+    return ok;
 #endif
 }
 
 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	int i, last, ok;
-	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
-		return 1;
-	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
-		last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-	else
-		{
-		/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
-		if (ctx->parent)
-			return 1;
-		last = 0;
-		}
-	for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
-		{
-		ctx->error_depth = i;
-		ok = check_cert(ctx);
-		if (!ok) return ok;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
+{
+    int i, last, ok;
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+        return 1;
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    else {
+        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+        if (ctx->parent)
+            return 1;
+        last = 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+        ctx->error_depth = i;
+        ok = check_cert(ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return ok;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
 
 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
-	X509 *x;
-	int ok, cnum;
-	unsigned int last_reasons;
-	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
-	ctx->current_cert = x;
-	ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
-	ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
-	ctx->current_reasons = 0;
-	while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
-		{
-		last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
-		/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
-		if (ctx->get_crl)
-			ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
-		else
-			ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
-		/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
-		 * notify callback
-		 */
-		if(!ok)
-			{
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		ctx->current_crl = crl;
-		ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
-		if (!ok)
-			goto err;
-
-		if (dcrl)
-			{
-			ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
-			if (!ok)
-				goto err;
-			ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
-			if (!ok)
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			ok = 1;
-
-		/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
-		if (ok != 2)
-			{
-			ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
-			if (!ok)
-				goto err;
-			}
-
-		X509_CRL_free(crl);
-		X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-		crl = NULL;
-		dcrl = NULL;
-		/* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
-		 * another iteration, so exit loop.
-		 */
-		if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
-			{
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	err:
-	X509_CRL_free(crl);
-	X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-
-	ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-	return ok;
-
-	}
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    int ok, cnum;
+    unsigned int last_reasons;
+    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+        last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+        if (ctx->get_crl)
+            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+        else
+            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+        /*
+         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+         */
+        if (!ok) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ctx->current_crl = crl;
+        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (dcrl) {
+            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        } else
+            ok = 1;
+
+        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+        if (ok != 2) {
+            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        X509_CRL_free(crl);
+        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+        crl = NULL;
+        dcrl = NULL;
+        /*
+         * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
+         * so exit loop.
+         */
+        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+    return ok;
+
+}
 
 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
 
 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
-	{
-	time_t *ptime;
-	int i;
-	if (notify)
-		ctx->current_crl = crl;
-	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
-		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
-	else
-		ptime = NULL;
-
-	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
-	if (i == 0)
-		{
-		if (!notify)
-			return 0;
-		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (i > 0)
-		{
-		if (!notify)
-			return 0;
-		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
-		{
-		i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
-
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			if (!notify)
-				return 0;
-			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
-			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-				return 0;
-			}
-		/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
-		if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
-			{
-			if (!notify)
-				return 0;
-			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
-			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-				return 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (notify)
-		ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
+{
+    time_t *ptime;
+    int i;
+    if (notify)
+        ctx->current_crl = crl;
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+    else
+        ptime = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        if (!notify)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i > 0) {
+        if (!notify)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            if (!notify)
+                return 0;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+            if (!notify)
+                return 0;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (notify)
+        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
 
 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
-			X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
-			STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-	{
-	int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
-	unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
-	X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
-	X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
-	X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
-		{
-		crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-		reasons = *preasons;
-		crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-
-		if (crl_score > best_score)
-			{
-			best_crl = crl;
-			best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
-			best_score = crl_score;
-			best_reasons = reasons;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (best_crl)
-		{
-		if (*pcrl)
-			X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
-		*pcrl = best_crl;
-		*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
-		*pscore = best_score;
-		*preasons = best_reasons;
-		CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
-		if (*pdcrl)
-			{
-			X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
-			*pdcrl = NULL;
-			}
-		get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
-		}
-
-	if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
-		return 1;
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        reasons = *preasons;
+        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+
+        if (crl_score > best_score) {
+            best_crl = crl;
+            best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+            best_score = crl_score;
+            best_reasons = reasons;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (best_crl) {
+        if (*pcrl)
+            X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+        *pcrl = best_crl;
+        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+        *pscore = best_score;
+        *preasons = best_reasons;
+        CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+        if (*pdcrl) {
+            X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+            *pdcrl = NULL;
+        }
+        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+    }
+
+    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
  */
 
 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
-	{
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
-	int i;
-	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
-	if (i >= 0)
-		{
-		/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
-		if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
-			return 0;
-		exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
-		}
-	else
-		exta = NULL;
-
-	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+    int i;
+    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+    if (i >= 0) {
+        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+            return 0;
+        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+    } else
+        exta = NULL;
 
-	if (i >= 0)
-		{
+    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
 
-		if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
-			return 0;
-		extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
-		}
-	else
-		extb = NULL;
+    if (i >= 0) {
 
-	if (!exta && !extb)
-		return 1;
+        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+            return 0;
+        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+    } else
+        extb = NULL;
 
-	if (!exta || !extb)
-		return 0;
+    if (!exta && !extb)
+        return 1;
 
+    if (!exta || !extb)
+        return 0;
 
-	if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
-		return 0;
+    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+        return 0;
 
-	return 1;
-	}
+    return 1;
+}
 
 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
 
 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
-	{
-	/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
-	if (!delta->base_crl_number)
-			return 0;
-	/* Base must have a CRL number */
-	if (!base->crl_number)
-			return 0;
-	/* Issuer names must match */
-	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
-				X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
-		return 0;
-	/* AKID and IDP must match */
-	if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
-			return 0;
-	if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
-			return 0;
-	/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
-	if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
-			return 0;
-	/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
-	if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
-			return 1;
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
- * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
+{
+    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* Base must have a CRL number */
+    if (!base->crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* Issuer names must match */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+        return 0;
+    /* AKID and IDP must match */
+    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+        return 0;
+    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+        return 0;
+    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+ * retrieve a chain of deltas...
  */
 
 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
-			X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-	{
-	X509_CRL *delta;
-	int i;
-	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
-		return;
-	if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
-		return;
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
-		{
-		delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-		if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
-			{
-			if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
-				*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
-			CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
-			*dcrl = delta;
-			return;
-			}
-		}
-	*dcrl = NULL;
-	}
-
-/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
- * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
- * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
- * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
- * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    X509_CRL *delta;
+    int i;
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+        return;
+    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+            CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+            *dcrl = delta;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+    *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+ * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+ * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+ * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+ * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
  */
 
 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
-			unsigned int *preasons,
-			X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-	{
-
-	int crl_score = 0;
-	unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
-
-	/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
-
-	/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
-	if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
-		return 0;
-	/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
-	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
-		{
-		if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
-			return 0;
-		}
-	else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
-		{
-		/* If no new reasons reject */
-		if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
-			return 0;
-		}
-	/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
-	else if (crl->base_crl_number)
-		return 0;
-	/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
-	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
-		{
-		if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
-			return 0;
-		}
-	else
-		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
-
-	if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
-		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
-
-	/* Check expiry */
-	if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
-		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
-
-	/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
-	crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
-
-	/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
-
-	if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
-
-	if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
-		{
-		/* If no new reasons reject */
-		if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
-			return 0;
-		tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
-		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
-		}
-
-	*preasons = tmp_reasons;
-
-	return crl_score;
-
-	}
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+
+    int crl_score = 0;
+    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+        return 0;
+    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+            return 0;
+    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+        /* If no new reasons reject */
+        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+    /* Check expiry */
+    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+        /* If no new reasons reject */
+        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+            return 0;
+        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+    }
+
+    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+    return crl_score;
+
+}
 
 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
-				X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
-	{
-	X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
-	X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-	int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
-	int i;
-
-	if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
-		cidx++;
-
-	crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-
-	if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
-		{
-		if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
-			{
-			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
-			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
-			return;
-			}
-		}
-
-	for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
-		{
-		crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
-			continue;
-		if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
-			{
-			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
-			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
-			return;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
-
-	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
-		return;
-
-	/* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
-	 * set of untrusted certificates.
-	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
-		{
-		crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
-		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
-			continue;
-		if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
-			{
-			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
-			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
-			return;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+{
+    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+    int i;
+
+    if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+        cidx++;
+
+    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+            continue;
+        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+     * untrusted certificates.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+            continue;
+        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
- * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
- * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
- * practice.
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+ * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
  */
 
 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-	{
-	X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
-	int ret;
-	/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
-	if (ctx->parent)
-		return 0;
-	if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
-		return -1;
-
-	crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
-	/* Copy verify params across */
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
-
-	crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
-	crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-	/* Verify CRL issuer */
-	ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
-
-	if (ret <= 0)
-		goto err;
-
-	/* Check chain is acceptable */
-
-	ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
-	err:
-	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
- * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
- * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
- * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
- * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
- * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+    int ret;
+    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+    if (ctx->parent)
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+        return -1;
+
+    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+    /* Copy verify params across */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    /* Verify CRL issuer */
+    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Check chain is acceptable */
+
+    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+ * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
+ * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+ * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+ * RFC5280 version
  */
 
 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-			STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
-			STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
-	{
-	X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
-	cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
-	crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
-	if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+{
+    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
  */
 
-
 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
-	{
-	X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-	GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
-	GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
-	int i, j;
-	if (!a || !b)
-		return 1;
-	if (a->type == 1)
-		{
-		if (!a->dpname)
-			return 0;
-		/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
-		if (b->type == 1)
-			{
-			if (!b->dpname)
-				return 0;
-			if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
-				return 1;
-			else
-				return 0;
-			}
-		/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
-		nm = a->dpname;
-		gens = b->name.fullname;
-		}
-	else if (b->type == 1)
-		{
-		if (!b->dpname)
-			return 0;
-		/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
-		gens = a->name.fullname;
-		nm = b->dpname;
-		}
-
-	/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
-	if (nm)
-		{
-		for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
-			{
-			gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);	
-			if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
-				continue;
-			if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
-				return 1;
-			}
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
-
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
-		{
-		gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
-		for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
-			{
-			genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
-			if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
-				return 1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-
-	}
+{
+    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+    int i, j;
+    if (!a || !b)
+        return 1;
+    if (a->type == 1) {
+        if (!a->dpname)
+            return 0;
+        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+        if (b->type == 1) {
+            if (!b->dpname)
+                return 0;
+            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+                return 1;
+            else
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+        nm = a->dpname;
+        gens = b->name.fullname;
+    } else if (b->type == 1) {
+        if (!b->dpname)
+            return 0;
+        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+        gens = a->name.fullname;
+        nm = b->dpname;
+    }
+
+    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+    if (nm) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+                continue;
+            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+                return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+                return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+}
 
 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
-	{
-	int i;
-	X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-	/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
-	if (!dp->CRLissuer)
-		return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
-		{
-		GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
-		if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
-			continue;
-		if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
-			return 1;
-		}
-	return 0;
-	}
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+            continue;
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
 
 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
 
 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
-				unsigned int *preasons)
-	{
-	int i;
-	if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
-		return 0;
-	if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
-		{
-		if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
-			return 0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
-			return 0;
-		}
-	*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
-		{
-		DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
-		if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
-			{
-			if (!crl->idp ||
-			     idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
-				{
-				*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
-				return 1;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
- * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
+                           unsigned int *preasons)
+{
+    int i;
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+        return 0;
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
+        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+ * to find a delta CRL too
  */
-	
+
 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-				X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	X509 *issuer = NULL;
-	int crl_score = 0;
-	unsigned int reasons;
-	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
-	STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
-	X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-	reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
-	ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
-				&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
-
-	if (ok)
-		goto done;
-
-	/* Lookup CRLs from store */
-
-	skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
-
-	/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
-	if (!skcrl && crl)
-		goto done;
-
-	get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
-
-	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
-
-	done:
-
-	/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
-	if (crl)
-		{
-		ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-		ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
-		ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
-		*pcrl = crl;
-		*pdcrl = dcrl;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
+                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+{
+    int ok;
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    int crl_score = 0;
+    unsigned int reasons;
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+
+    if (ok)
+        goto done;
+
+    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+    if (!skcrl && crl)
+        goto done;
+
+    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ done:
+
+    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+    if (crl) {
+        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+        *pcrl = crl;
+        *pdcrl = dcrl;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
 
 /* Check CRL validity */
 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
-	{
-	X509 *issuer = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
-	int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
-	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-	chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-	/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
-	if (ctx->current_issuer)
-		issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
-
-	/* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
-	 * is next certificate in chain.
-	 */
-	else if (cnum < chnum)
-		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
-	else
-		{
-		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
-		/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
-		if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
-			{
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
-			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-			if(!ok) goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if(issuer)
-		{
-		/* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
-		 * been done
-		 */
-		if (!crl->base_crl_number)
-			{
-			/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
-			if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
-				!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
-				{
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
-				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-				if(!ok) goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
-				{
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
-				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-				if(!ok) goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
-				{
-				if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
-					{
-					ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
-					ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-					if(!ok) goto err;
-					}
-				}
-
-			if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
-				{
-				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-				if(!ok) goto err;
-				}
-
-
-			}
-
-		if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
-			{
-			ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
-			if (!ok)
-				goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
-		ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
-
-		if(!ikey)
-			{
-			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-			if (!ok) goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* Verify CRL signature */
-			if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
-				{
-				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-				if (!ok) goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	ok = 1;
-
-	err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
-	return ok;
-	}
+{
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+    int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+    chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+    if (ctx->current_issuer)
+        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+
+    /*
+     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+     * certificate in chain.
+     */
+    else if (cnum < chnum)
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+    else {
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (issuer) {
+        /*
+         * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+         */
+        if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+            /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+            if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+                !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
+                if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
+                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+                    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                    if (!ok)
+                        goto err;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+        }
+
+        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
+            ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+        ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+        if (!ikey) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            /* Verify CRL signature */
+            if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+    return ok;
+}
 
 /* Check certificate against CRL */
 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	X509_REVOKED *rev;
-	/* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
-	 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
-	 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
-	 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
-	 */
-	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-		&& (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
-		{
-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
-		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-		if(!ok)
-			return 0;
-		}
-	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
-	 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
-	 */
-	if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
-		{
-		if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
-			return 2;
-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
-		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-		if (!ok)
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
+{
+    int ok;
+    X509_REVOKED *rev;
+    /*
+     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
+     */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
+     * is not removeFromCRL.
+     */
+    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+            return 2;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
 
 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	if (ctx->parent)
-		return 1;
-	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
-				ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
-	if (ret == 0)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
-	if (ret == -1)
-		{
-		/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
-		 * callback.
-		 */
-		X509 *x;
-		int i;
-		for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
-			{
-			x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
-				continue;
-			ctx->current_cert = x;
-			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
-			if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-				return 0;
-			}
-		return 1;
-		}
-	if (ret == -2)
-		{
-		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
-		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
-		return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-		}
-
-	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
-		{
-		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
-		ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (ctx->parent)
+        return 1;
+    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+    if (ret == -1) {
+        /*
+         * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
+         */
+        X509 *x;
+        int i;
+        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+                continue;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (ret == -2) {
+        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
 
 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-	{
-	time_t *ptime;
-	int i;
-
-	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
-		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
-	else
-		ptime = NULL;
-
-	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
-	if (i == 0)
-		{
-		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
-		ctx->current_cert=x;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (i > 0)
-		{
-		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
-		ctx->current_cert=x;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
-	if (i == 0)
-		{
-		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
-		ctx->current_cert=x;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
-		ctx->current_cert=x;
-		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
+{
+    time_t *ptime;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+    else
+        ptime = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i > 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i < 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
 
 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	int ok=0,n;
-	X509 *xs,*xi;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-
-	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-
-	n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-	ctx->error_depth=n-1;
-	n--;
-	xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
-
-	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
-		xs=xi;
-	else
-		{
-		if (n <= 0)
-			{
-			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
-			ctx->current_cert=xi;
-			ok=cb(0,ctx);
-			goto end;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			n--;
-			ctx->error_depth=n;
-			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
-			}
-		}
-
-/*	ctx->error=0;  not needed */
-	while (n >= 0)
-		{
-		ctx->error_depth=n;
-
-		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
-		 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
-		 * just wastes time.
-		 */
-		if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
-			{
-			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
-				{
-				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-				ctx->current_cert=xi;
-				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
-				if (!ok) goto end;
-				}
-			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
-				{
-				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-				ctx->current_cert=xs;
-				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
-				if (!ok)
-					{
-					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-					goto end;
-					}
-				}
-			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-			pkey=NULL;
-			}
-
-		xs->valid = 1;
-
-		ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
-		if (!ok)
-			goto end;
-
-		/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
-		ctx->current_issuer=xi;
-		ctx->current_cert=xs;
-		ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
-		if (!ok) goto end;
-
-		n--;
-		if (n >= 0)
-			{
-			xi=xs;
-			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
-			}
-		}
-	ok=1;
-end:
-	return ok;
-	}
+{
+    int ok = 0, n;
+    X509 *xs, *xi;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
+    n--;
+    xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+
+    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+        xs = xi;
+    else {
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+            ctx->current_cert = xi;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+            n--;
+            ctx->error_depth = n;
+            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+        }
+    }
+
+/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
+    while (n >= 0) {
+        ctx->error_depth = n;
+
+        /*
+         * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+         * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
+         * time.
+         */
+        if (!xs->valid
+            && (xs != xi
+                || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
+            if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+                ctx->current_cert = xi;
+                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+                ctx->current_cert = xs;
+                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+                if (!ok) {
+                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+            pkey = NULL;
+        }
+
+        xs->valid = 1;
+
+        ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+
+        /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+        ctx->current_cert = xs;
+        ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+
+        n--;
+        if (n >= 0) {
+            xi = xs;
+            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ end:
+    return ok;
+}
 
 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
 {
-	return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
 }
 
 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
-	{
-	char *str;
-	ASN1_TIME atm;
-	long offset;
-	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
-	int i,j;
-
-	p=buff1;
-	i=ctm->length;
-	str=(char *)ctm->data;
-	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
-		{
-		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
-		memcpy(p,str,10);
-		p+=10;
-		str+=10;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (i < 13) return 0;
-		memcpy(p,str,12);
-		p+=12;
-		str+=12;
-		}
-
-	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
-		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
-	else
-		{ 
-		*(p++)= *(str++);
-		*(p++)= *(str++);
-		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
-		if (*str == '.')
-			{
-			str++;
-			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
-			}
-		
-		}
-	*(p++)='Z';
-	*(p++)='\0';
-
-	if (*str == 'Z')
-		offset=0;
-	else
-		{
-		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
-			return 0;
-		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
-		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
-		if (*str == '-')
-			offset= -offset;
-		}
-	atm.type=ctm->type;
-	atm.flags = 0;
-	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
-	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
-
-	if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
-		{
-		i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
-		if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
-		j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
-		if (j < 50) j+=100;
-
-		if (i < j) return -1;
-		if (i > j) return 1;
-		}
-	i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
-	if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
-		return -1;
-	else
-		return i;
-	}
+{
+    char *str;
+    ASN1_TIME atm;
+    long offset;
+    char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
+    int i, j;
+
+    p = buff1;
+    i = ctm->length;
+    str = (char *)ctm->data;
+    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+        if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(p, str, 10);
+        p += 10;
+        str += 10;
+    } else {
+        if (i < 13)
+            return 0;
+        memcpy(p, str, 12);
+        p += 12;
+        str += 12;
+    }
+
+    if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
+        *(p++) = '0';
+        *(p++) = '0';
+    } else {
+        *(p++) = *(str++);
+        *(p++) = *(str++);
+        /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
+        if (*str == '.') {
+            str++;
+            while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
+                str++;
+        }
+
+    }
+    *(p++) = 'Z';
+    *(p++) = '\0';
+
+    if (*str == 'Z')
+        offset = 0;
+    else {
+        if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+            return 0;
+        offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
+        offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
+        if (*str == '-')
+            offset = -offset;
+    }
+    atm.type = ctm->type;
+    atm.flags = 0;
+    atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
+    atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+    if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+        i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
+        if (i < 50)
+            i += 100;           /* cf. RFC 2459 */
+        j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
+        if (j < 50)
+            j += 100;
+
+        if (i < j)
+            return -1;
+        if (i > j)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
+    if (i == 0)                 /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+        return -1;
+    else
+        return i;
+}
 
 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
 {
-	return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+    return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
 }
 
 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-	{
-	return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
-	}
+{
+    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
 
 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
-				int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-	{
-	time_t t;
-
-	if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
-	else time(&t);
-
-	if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
-		{
-		if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
-			return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
-		if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
-			return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
-								offset_sec);
-		}
-	return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
-	}
+                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+    time_t t;
+
+    if (in_tm)
+        t = *in_tm;
+    else
+        time(&t);
+
+    if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+        if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+            return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+        if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+            return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+    }
+    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
 
 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-	{
-	EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
-	int i,j;
-
-	if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
-
-	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
-		{
-		ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
-		if (ktmp == NULL)
-			{
-			X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
-			break;
-		else
-			{
-			EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
-			ktmp=NULL;
-			}
-		}
-	if (ktmp == NULL)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* first, populate the other certs */
-	for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
-		{
-		ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
-		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
-		}
-	
-	if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-	{
-	/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
-	 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
-	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
-			new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-	}
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
+    int i, j;
+
+    if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+        return 1;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
+        if (ktmp == NULL) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+                    X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+            break;
+        else {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
+            ktmp = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    if (ktmp == NULL) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+                X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* first, populate the other certs */
+    for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+        ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
+    }
+
+    if (pkey != NULL)
+        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+    /*
+     * This function is (usually) called only once, by
+     * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+     */
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
+                                   new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
-	{
-	return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
-	}
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
 
 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
-	{
-	return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
-	}
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->error;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->error;
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
-	{
-	ctx->error=err;
-	}
+{
+    ctx->error = err;
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->error_depth;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->error_depth;
+}
 
 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->current_cert;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->current_cert;
+}
 
 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->chain;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->chain;
+}
 
 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	int i;
-	X509 *x;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
-	if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
-		{
-		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
-		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		}
-	return chain;
-	}
+{
+    int i;
+    X509 *x;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+    if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
+        return NULL;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    }
+    return chain;
+}
 
 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->current_issuer;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->current_issuer;
+}
 
 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->current_crl;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->current_crl;
+}
 
 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->parent;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->parent;
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-	{
-	ctx->cert=x;
-	}
+{
+    ctx->cert = x;
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-	{
-	ctx->untrusted=sk;
-	}
+{
+    ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
-	{
-	ctx->crls=sk;
-	}
+{
+    ctx->crls = sk;
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
-	{
-	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
-	}
+{
+    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
-	{
-	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
-	}
-
-/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
- * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
- * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
- * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
- * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
- * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
- * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
- * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
+{
+    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+ * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+ * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+ * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+ * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+ * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+ * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+ * client/server.
  */
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
-				int purpose, int trust)
-{
-	int idx;
-	/* If purpose not set use default */
-	if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
-	/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
-	if (purpose)
-		{
-		X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
-		idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
-		if (idx == -1)
-			{
-			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
-						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-		if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
-			{
-			idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
-			if (idx == -1)
-				{
-				X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
-						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-			}
-		/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
-		if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
-		}
-	if (trust)
-		{
-		idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
-		if (idx == -1)
-			{
-			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
-						X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
-	if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
-	return 1;
+                                   int purpose, int trust)
+{
+    int idx;
+    /* If purpose not set use default */
+    if (!purpose)
+        purpose = def_purpose;
+    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+    if (purpose) {
+        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+        if (idx == -1) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+            if (idx == -1) {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+                        X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+        }
+        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+        if (!trust)
+            trust = ptmp->trust;
+    }
+    if (trust) {
+        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+        if (idx == -1) {
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+        ctx->param->trust = trust;
+    return 1;
 }
 
 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
 {
-	X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-	ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-	if (!ctx)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return NULL;
-		}
-	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-	return ctx;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+    ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+    if (!ctx) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+    return ctx;
 }
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
-	     STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-	{
-	int ret = 1;
-	ctx->ctx=store;
-	ctx->current_method=0;
-	ctx->cert=x509;
-	ctx->untrusted=chain;
-	ctx->crls = NULL;
-	ctx->last_untrusted=0;
-	ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
-	ctx->valid=0;
-	ctx->chain=NULL;
-	ctx->error=0;
-	ctx->explicit_policy=0;
-	ctx->error_depth=0;
-	ctx->current_cert=NULL;
-	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
-	ctx->current_crl=NULL;
-	ctx->current_crl_score=0;
-	ctx->current_reasons=0;
-	ctx->tree = NULL;
-	ctx->parent = NULL;
-
-	ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-
-	if (!ctx->param)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
-	 * use defaults.
-	 */
-
-
-	if (store)
-		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
-	else
-		ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
-
-	if (store)
-		{
-		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-		ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
-		}
-	else
-		ctx->cleanup = 0;
-
-	if (ret)
-		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
-					X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
-
-	if (ret == 0)
-		{
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (store && store->check_issued)
-		ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
-	else
-		ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
-
-	if (store && store->get_issuer)
-		ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
-	else
-		ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
-
-	if (store && store->verify_cb)
-		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-	else
-		ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
-
-	if (store && store->verify)
-		ctx->verify = store->verify;
-	else
-		ctx->verify = internal_verify;
-
-	if (store && store->check_revocation)
-		ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
-	else
-		ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
-
-	if (store && store->get_crl)
-		ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
-	else
-		ctx->get_crl = NULL;
-
-	if (store && store->check_crl)
-		ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
-	else
-		ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
-
-	if (store && store->cert_crl)
-		ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
-	else
-		ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
-
-	if (store && store->lookup_certs)
-		ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
-	else
-		ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
-
-	if (store && store->lookup_crls)
-		ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
-	else
-		ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
-
-	ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
-
-
-	/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
-	 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
-	 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
-	/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
-	if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
-				&(ctx->ex_data)))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
- * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+    ctx->ctx = store;
+    ctx->current_method = 0;
+    ctx->cert = x509;
+    ctx->untrusted = chain;
+    ctx->crls = NULL;
+    ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+    ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
+    ctx->valid = 0;
+    ctx->chain = NULL;
+    ctx->error = 0;
+    ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
+    ctx->error_depth = 0;
+    ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+    ctx->tree = NULL;
+    ctx->parent = NULL;
+
+    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+
+    if (!ctx->param) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
+     */
+
+    if (store)
+        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+    else
+        ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+    if (store) {
+        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+        ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+    } else
+        ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+    if (ret)
+        ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (store && store->check_issued)
+        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+    else
+        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+    if (store && store->get_issuer)
+        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+    else
+        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+    if (store && store->verify_cb)
+        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+    else
+        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+    if (store && store->verify)
+        ctx->verify = store->verify;
+    else
+        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+    if (store && store->check_revocation)
+        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+    else
+        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+    if (store && store->get_crl)
+        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+    if (store && store->check_crl)
+        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+    if (store && store->cert_crl)
+        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+    if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+    else
+        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+    if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+    else
+        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+    ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+    /*
+     * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
+     * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
+     * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
+     */
+    /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+                            &(ctx->ex_data))) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+ * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
  */
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
 {
-	ctx->other_ctx = sk;
-	ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
 }
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
-	if (ctx->param != NULL)
-		{
-		if (ctx->parent == NULL)
-			X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-		ctx->param=NULL;
-		}
-	if (ctx->tree != NULL)
-		{
-		X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
-		ctx->tree=NULL;
-		}
-	if (ctx->chain != NULL)
-		{
-		sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
-		ctx->chain=NULL;
-		}
-	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
-	memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
-	}
+{
+    if (ctx->cleanup)
+        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+        ctx->param = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
+        X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+        ctx->tree = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+        ctx->chain = NULL;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+    memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
-	{
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
-	}
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
-	{
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
-	}
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
 
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
-	{
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
-	}
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             time_t t)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-	{
-	ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
-	}
+                                  int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
 
 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->tree;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->tree;
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->explicit_policy;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->explicit_policy;
+}
 
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
-	{
-	const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-	param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
-	if (!param)
-		return 0;
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
-	}
+{
+    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+    if (!param)
+        return 0;
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
 
 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->param;
-	}
+{
+    return ctx->param;
+}
 
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-	{
-	if (ctx->param)
-		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-	ctx->param = param;
-	}
+{
+    if (ctx->param)
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+    ctx->param = param;
+}
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
+
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)