Vendor import of OpenSSH 4.4p1.

250 files changed, 9804 insertions, 2683 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
index 82b9f2210593..eaf105a9119b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
+++ b/crypto/openssh/CREDITS
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
 Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
 Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
+Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
 Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
 Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
@@ -100,5 +101,5 @@ Apologies to anyone I have missed.
 
 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
 
-$Id: CREDITS,v 1.80 2005/08/26 20:15:20 tim Exp $
+$Id: CREDITS,v 1.81 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
index b55b7692c125..9ebc3d69373e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,1672 @@
+20060926
+ - (dtucker) [bufaux.h] nuke bufaux.h; it's already gone from OpenBSD and not
+   referenced any more.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [sftp-server.8] Resync; spotted by djm@
+
+20060924
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Remove CFLAGS hack for UnixWare 1.x/2.x (added
+   to rev 1.308) to work around broken gcc 2.x header file.
+
+20060923
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1234: Put opensc libs into $LIBS rather than
+   $LDFLAGS.  Patch from vapier at gentoo org.
+
+20060922
+ - (dtucker) [packet.c canohost.c] Include arpa/inet.h for htonl macros on
+   some platforms (eg HP-UX 11.00).  From santhi.amirta at gmail com.
+
+20060921
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/09/19 05:52:23
+     [sftp.c]
+     Use S_IS* macros insted of masking with S_IF* flags. The latter may
+     have multiple bits set, which lead to surprising results. Spotted by
+     Paul Stoeber, more to come. ok millert@ pedro@ jaredy@ djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/09/19 21:14:08
+     [packet.c]
+     client NULL deref on protocol error; Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h] Include unistd.h before defining getpgrp; fixes
+   build error on Ultrix.  From Bernhard Simon.
+
+20060918
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] On AIX, check to see if the compiler will allow
+   macro redefinitions, and if not, remove "-qlanglvl=ansi" from the flags.
+   Allows build out of the box with older VAC and XLC compilers.  Found by
+   David Bronder and Bernhard Simon.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-aix.{c,h}] Reduce scope of includes.
+   Prevents macro redefinition warnings of "RDONLY".
+
+20060916
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/09/16 19:53:37
+     [deattack.c deattack.h packet.c]
+     limit maximum work performed by the CRC compensation attack detector,
+     problem reported by Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team;
+     ok markus@ deraadt@
+ - (djm) Add openssh.xml to .cvsignore and sort it
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] Propogate TZ environment variable to PAM auth
+   process so that any logging it does is with the right timezone.  From
+   Scott Strickler, ok djm@.
+ - (dtucker) [monitor.c] Correctly handle auditing of single commands when
+   using Protocol 1.  From jhb at freebsd.
+ - (djm) [sshd.c] Fix warning/API abuse; ok dtucker@
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Add info about audit support.
+
+20060912
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in buildpkg.sh.in configure.ac openssh.xml.in]
+   Support SMF in Solaris Packages if enabled by configure. Patch from
+   Chad Mynhier, tested by dtucker@
+
+20060911
+ - (dtucker) [cipher-aes.c] Include string.h for memcpy and friends.  Noted
+   by Pekka Savola.
+
+20060910
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/aix/buildbff.sh] Ensure that perl is available.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add -lcrypt to let DragonFly build OOTB.
+
+20060909
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Add stdarg.h.
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/aix/buildbff.sh] Always create privsep user.
+ - (dtucker) [buildpkg.sh.in] Always create privsep user.  ok djm@
+
+20060908
+ - (dtucker) [auth-sia.c] Add includes required for build on Tru64.  Patch
+   from Chris Adams.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] The BSM header test needs time.h in some cases.
+
+20060907
+ - (djm) [sshd.c auth.c] Set up fakepw() with privsep uid/gid, so it can
+   be used to drop privilege to; fixes Solaris GSSAPI crash reported by
+   Magnus Abrante; suggestion and feedback dtucker@
+   NB. this change will require that the privilege separation user must
+   exist on all the time, not just when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] s/BROKEN_UPDWTMP/BROKEN_UPDWTMPX/ on SCO OSR6
+ - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Wrap paths.h in HAVE_PATHS_H.
+ - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] stop_client is racy, so give us a better
+   chance of winning.
+
+20060905
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] s/AC_DEFINES/AC_DEFINE/ spotted by Roumen Petrov.
+ - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Include paths.h for _PATH_BTMP.
+
+20060904
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Define BROKEN_UPDWTMP on SCO OSR6 as the native
+   updwdtmp seems to generate invalid wtmp entries.  From Roger Cornelius,
+   ok djm@
+
+20060903
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Check for
+   declaration of writev(2) and declare it ourselves if necessary.  Makes
+   the atomiciov() calls build on really old systems.  ok djm@
+
+20060902
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-irix.c] Add errno.h, found by Iain Morgan.
+ - (dtucker) [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rand-helper.c ssh.c sshconnect.c
+   openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+   openbsd-compat/port-tun.c openbsd-compat/rresvport.c] Include <arpa/inet.h>
+   for hton* and ntoh* macros.  Required on (at least) HP-UX since we define
+   _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED.  Found by santhi.amirta at gmail com.
+
+20060901
+ - (djm) [audit-bsm.c audit.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-pam.c]
+   [auth-rsa.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
+   [auth2-gss.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c]
+   [cipher-3des1.c cipher-aes.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c clientloop.c]
+   [dh.c dns.c entropy.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c]
+   [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c loginrec.c mac.c]
+   [md5crypt.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c readconf.c rsa.c]
+   [scard-opensc.c scard.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
+   [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+   [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-linux.c openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c]
+   Lots of headers for SCO OSR6, mainly adding stdarg.h for log.h;
+   compile problems reported by rac AT tenzing.org
+ - (djm) [includes.h monitor.c openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/rresvport.c] Some more headers: netinet/in.h 
+   sys/socket.h and unistd.h in various places
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] Fix implict declaration
+   warnings for binary_open and binary_close.  Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac includes.h openbsd-compat/glob.{c,h}] Explicitly
+   test for GLOB_NOMATCH and use our glob functions if it's not found.
+   Stops sftp from segfaulting when attempting to get a nonexistent file on
+   Cygwin (previous versions of OpenSSH didn't use the native glob). Partly
+   from and tested by Corinna Vinschen.
+ - (dtucker) [README contrib/{caldera,redhat,suse}/openssh.spec]  Crank
+   versions.
+
+20060831
+ - (djm) [CREDITS LICENCE Makefile.in auth.c configure.ac includes.h ]
+   [platform.c platform.h sshd.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in]
+   [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h] Add support for Solaris process
+   contracts, enabled with --use-solaris-contracts. Patch from Chad
+   Mynhier, tweaked by dtucker@ and myself; ok dtucker@
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Add SeTcbPrivilege privilege
+   while setting up the ssh service account.  Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
+
+20060830
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/21 08:14:01
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     Document HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly.  Corrections from jmc@,
+     ok jmc@ djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/21 08:15:57
+     [sshd.8]
+     Add more detail about what permissions are and aren't accepted for
+     authorized_keys files.  Corrections jmc@, ok djm@, "looks good" jmc@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/29 10:40:19
+     [channels.c session.c]
+     normalise some inconsistent (but harmless) NULL pointer checks
+     spotted by the Stanford SATURN tool, via Isil Dillig;
+     ok markus@ deraadt@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/29 12:02:30
+     [gss-genr.c]
+     Work around a problem in Heimdal that occurs when KRB5CCNAME file is
+     missing, by checking whether or not kerberos allocated us a context
+     before attempting to free it.  Patch from Simon Wilkinson, tested by
+     biorn@, ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/30 00:06:51
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     Fix regression where SSH2 banner is printed at loglevels ERROR and FATAL
+     where previously it weren't.  bz #1221, found by Dean Kopesky, ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/30 00:14:37
+     [version.h]
+     crank to 4.4
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] needs unistd.h
+ - (dtucker) [auth.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] Bug #1207: always call
+   loginsuccess on AIX immediately after authentication to clear the failed
+   login count.  Previously this would only happen when an interactive
+   session starts (ie when a pty is allocated) but this means that accounts
+   that have primarily non-interactive sessions (eg scp's) may gradually
+   accumulate enough failures to lock out an account.  This change may have
+   a side effect of creating two audit records, one with a tty of "ssh"
+   corresponding to the authentication and one with the allocated pty per
+   interactive session.
+
+20060824
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/basename.c] Include errno.h.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Add includes needed for select(2) on
+   older systems.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Include <sys/select.h> for select(2)
+   on POSIX systems.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c] Include for ioctl(2).
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/rresvport.c] Include <stdlib.h> for malloc.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/xmmap.c] Move #define HAVE_MMAP to prevent
+   unused variable warning when we have a broken or missing mmap(2).
+
+20060822
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Bug #1177: fix incorrect path for sshrc in
+   Makefile.  Patch from santhi.amirta at gmail, ok djm.
+
+20060820
+ - (dtucker) [log.c] Move ifdef to prevent unused variable warning.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Save $LIBS during PAM library tests and restore
+   afterward.  Removes the need to mangle $LIBS later to remove -lpam and -ldl.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Relocate --with-pam parts in preparation for
+   fixing bug #1181.  No changes yet.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1181: Explicitly test to see if OpenSSL
+   (0.9.8a and presumably newer) requires -ldl to successfully link.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Remove errant "-".
+
+20060819
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/18 22:41:29
+     [gss-genr.c]
+     GSSAPI error code should be 0 and not -1; from simon@sxw.org.uk
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in] Add $(EXEEXT) and add a
+   single rule for the test progs.
+
+20060818
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c] Resync with
+   closefrom.c from sudo.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c] Comment out rcsid.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c] Newline on error.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in] Use implicit rules for the
+   test progs instead; they work better than what we have.
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/06 01:13:32
+     [compress.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c]
+     "zlib.h" can be <zlib.h>; ok djm@ markus@
+   - miod@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/12 20:46:46
+     [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c]
+     Revert previous include file ordering change, for ssh to compile under
+     gcc2 (or until openssl include files are cleaned of parameter names
+     in function prototypes)
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/14 12:40:25
+     [servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config.5]
+     Add ability to match groups to Match keyword in sshd_config.  Feedback
+     djm@, stevesk@, ok stevesk@.
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/16 11:47:15
+     [sshd.c]
+     factor inetd connection, TCP listen and main TCP accept loop out of
+     main() into separate functions to improve readability; ok markus@
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/18 09:13:26
+     [log.c log.h sshd.c]
+     make signal handler termination path shorter; risky code pointed out by
+     mark dowd; ok djm markus
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/18 09:15:20
+     [auth.h session.c sshd.c]
+     delay authentication related cleanups until we're authenticated and
+     all alarms have been cancelled; ok deraadt
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/18 10:27:16
+     [misc.h]
+     reorder so prototypes are sorted by the files they refer to; no
+     binary change
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/18 13:54:54
+     [gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c]
+     bz #1218 - disable SPNEGO as per RFC4462; diff from simon AT sxw.org.uk
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/18 14:40:34
+     [gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h]
+     constify host argument to match the rest of the GSSAPI functions and
+     unbreak compilation with -Werror
+ - (djm) Disable sigdie() for platforms that cannot safely syslog inside
+   a signal handler (basically all of them, excepting OpenBSD);
+   ok dtucker@
+
+20060817
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c]
+   Include stdlib.h for malloc and friends.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c] Use F_CLOSEM fcntl
+   for closefrom() on AIX.  Pointed out by William Ahern.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/regress/{Makefile.in,closefromtest.c}] Regress
+   test for closefrom() in compat code.
+
+20060816
+ - (djm) [audit-bsm.c] Sprinkle in some headers
+
+20060815
+ - (dtucker) [LICENCE] Add Reyk to the list for the compat dir.
+
+20060806
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c] Add some headers to quiet warnings
+   on Solaris 10
+
+20060806
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h] With the includes.h changes we no longer get the
+   name clash on "YES" so we can remove the workaround for it.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/{bsd-asprintf.c,bsd-openpty.c,bsd-snprintf.c,
+   glob.c}] Include stdlib.h for malloc and friends in compat code.
+
+20060805
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/24 13:58:22
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     disable tunnel forwarding when no strict host key checking
+     and key changed; ok djm@ markus@ dtucker@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/25 02:01:34
+     [scard.c]
+     need #include <string.h>
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/25 02:59:21
+     [channels.c clientloop.c packet.c scp.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c]
+     [sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+     move #include <sys/time.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/26 02:35:17
+     [atomicio.c auth.c dh.c authfile.c buffer.c clientloop.c kex.c]
+     [groupaccess.c gss-genr.c kexgexs.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_mm.c]
+     [packet.c scp.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c]
+     [sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshlogin.c]
+     [uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
+     move #include <sys/param.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/26 13:57:17
+     [authfd.c authfile.c dh.c canohost.c channels.c clientloop.c compat.c]
+     [hostfile.c kex.c log.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c packet.c readpass.c]
+     [scp.c servconf.c session.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
+     [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+     [sshconnect1.c sshd.c xmalloc.c]
+     move #include <stdlib.h> out of includes.h
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/27 08:00:50
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     avoid confusing wording in HashKnownHosts:
+     originally spotted by alan amesbury;
+     ok deraadt
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/27 08:00:50
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     avoid confusing wording in HashKnownHosts:
+     originally spotted by alan amesbury;
+     ok deraadt
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/01 11:34:36
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     Allow fallback to known_hosts entries without port qualifiers for
+     non-standard ports too, so that all existing known_hosts entries will be
+     recognised.  Requested by, feedback and ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/01 23:22:48
+     [auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c]
+     [auth2-chall.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c buffer.c canohost.c]
+     [channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c kex.c kexdhc.c]
+     [kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h log.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c]
+     [monitor_wrap.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c]
+     [servconf.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
+     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+     [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshtty.c uuencode.c]
+     [uuencode.h xmalloc.c]
+     move #include <stdio.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/01 23:36:12
+     [authfile.c channels.c progressmeter.c scard.c servconf.c ssh.c]
+     clean extra spaces
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42
+     [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c]
+     [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
+     [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c]
+     [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ]
+     [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
+     [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c]
+     [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
+     [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c]
+     [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c]
+     [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c]
+     [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c]
+     [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c]
+     [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c]
+     [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h]
+     [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c]
+     [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
+     [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c]
+     [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+     [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
+     [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
+     [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h]
+     almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files"
+     ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
+     makes the pain stop in one easy step
+     NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as
+     that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required
+     for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/04 20:46:05
+     [monitor.c session.c ssh-agent.c]
+     spaces
+ - (djm) [auth-pam.c defines.h] Move PAM related bits to auth-pam.c
+ - (djm) [auth-pam.c auth.c bufaux.h entropy.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.c]
+   remove last traces of bufaux.h - it was merged into buffer.h in the big
+   includes.h commit
+ - (djm) [auth.c loginrec.c] Missing netinet/in.h for loginrec
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c] Add missing includes so they pass
+   compilation with "-Wall -Werror"
+ - (djm) [auth-pam.c auth-shadow.c auth2-none.c cleanup.c sshd.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-tun.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] Sprinkle more
+   includes for Linux in
+ - (dtucker) [cleanup.c] Need defines.h for __dead.
+ - (dtucker) [auth2-gss.c] We still need the #ifdef GSSAPI in -portable.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/{bsd-arc4random.c,port-tun.c,xmmap.c}] Lots of
+   #include stdarg.h, needed for log.h.
+ - (dtucker) [entropy.c] Needs unistd.h too.
+ - (dtucker) [ssh-rand-helper.c] Needs stdarg.h for log.h.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c] Nees stdlib.h for malloc.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/strtonum.c] Include stdlib.h for strtoll,
+   otherwise it is implicitly declared as returning an int.
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/05 07:52:52
+     [auth2-none.c sshd.c monitor_wrap.c]
+     Add headers required to build with KERBEROS5=no.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/05 08:00:33
+     [auth-skey.c]
+     Add headers required to build with -DSKEY.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/05 08:28:24
+     [monitor_wrap.c auth-skey.c auth2-chall.c]
+     Zap unused variables in -DSKEY code.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/05 08:34:04
+     [packet.c]
+     Typo in comment
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] Add headers required to compile
+   on Cygwin.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c] Add headers needed for inet_ntoa.
+ - (dtucker) [auth-skey.c] monitor_wrap.h needs ssh-gss.h.
+ - (dtucker) [audit.c audit.h] Repair headers.
+ - (dtucker) [audit-bsm.c] Add additional headers now required.
+
+20060804
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] The "crippled AES" test does not work on recent
+   versions of Solaris, so use AC_LINK_IFELSE to actually link the test program
+   rather than just compiling it.  Spotted by dlg@.
+
+20060802
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/daemon.c] Add unistd.h for fork() prototype.
+
+20060725
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/xmmap.c] Need fcntl.h for O_RDRW.
+
+20060724
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/12 13:39:55
+     [sshd_config.5]
+      - new sentence, new line
+      - s/The the/The/
+      - kill a bad comma
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/12 22:28:52
+     [auth-options.c canohost.c channels.c includes.h readconf.c]
+     [servconf.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+     move #include <netdb.h> out of includes.h; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/12 22:42:32
+     [includes.h ssh.c ssh-rand-helper.c]
+     move #include <stddef.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/14 01:15:28
+     [monitor_wrap.h]
+     don't need incompletely-typed 'struct passwd' now with
+     #include <pwd.h>; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/17 01:31:10
+     [authfd.c authfile.c channels.c cleanup.c clientloop.c groupaccess.c]
+     [includes.h log.c misc.c msg.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c]
+     [readpass.c scp.c servconf.c sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
+     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c]
+     [sshconnect.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c uidswap.c]
+     move #include <unistd.h> out of includes.h
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/17 12:02:24
+     [auth-options.c]
+     Use '\0' rather than 0 to terminates strings; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/17 12:06:00
+     [channels.c channels.h servconf.c sshd_config.5]
+     Add PermitOpen directive to sshd_config which is equivalent to the
+     "permitopen" key option.  Allows server admin to allow TCP port
+     forwarding only two specific host/port pairs.  Useful when combined
+     with Match.
+     If permitopen is used in both sshd_config and a key option, both
+     must allow a given connection before it will be permitted.
+     Note that users can still use external forwarders such as netcat,
+     so to be those must be controlled too for the limits to be effective.
+     Feedback & ok djm@, man page corrections & ok jmc@.
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/18 07:50:40
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     tweak; ok dtucker
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/18 07:56:28
+     [scp.1]
+     replace DIAGNOSTICS with .Ex;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/18 08:03:09
+     [ssh-agent.1 sshd_config.5]
+     mark up angle brackets;
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/18 08:22:23
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     Clarify description of Match, with minor correction from jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/18 22:27:55
+     [dh.c]
+     remove unneeded includes; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/19 08:56:41
+     [servconf.c sshd_config.5]
+     Add support for X11Forwaring, X11DisplayOffset and X11UseLocalhost to
+     Match.  ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/19 13:07:10
+     [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+     Add ForceCommand keyword to sshd_config, equivalent to the "command="
+     key option, man page entry and example in sshd_config.
+     Feedback & ok djm@, man page corrections & ok jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/20 15:26:15
+     [auth1.c serverloop.c session.c sshconnect2.c]
+     missed some needed #include <unistd.h> when KERBEROS5=no; issue from
+     massimo@cedoc.mo.it
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/21 12:43:36
+     [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config.5]
+     Make PermitOpen take a list of permitted ports and act more like most
+     other keywords (ie the first match is the effective setting). This
+     also makes it easier to override a previously set PermitOpen. ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/21 21:13:30
+     [channels.c]
+     more ARGSUSED (lint) for dispatch table-driven functions; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/21 21:26:55
+     [progressmeter.c]
+     ARGSUSED for signal handler
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 19:08:54
+     [includes.h moduli.c progressmeter.c scp.c sftp-common.c]
+     [sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c sshlogin.c]
+     move #include <time.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 20:48:23
+     [atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
+     [auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-passwd.c auth2.c]
+     [authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c canohost.c channels.c]
+     [cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c clientloop.c]
+     [compat.c deattack.c dh.c dns.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c]
+     [includes.h kex.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c]
+     [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c]
+     [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c rsa.c]
+     [progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c]
+     [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
+     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+     [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+     [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
+     move #include <string.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/23 01:11:05
+     [auth.h dispatch.c kex.h sftp-client.c]
+     #include <signal.h> for sig_atomic_t; need this prior to <sys/param.h>
+     move
+ - (djm) [acss.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c auth-pam.c auth-shadow.c]
+   [canohost.c channels.c cipher-acss.c defines.h dns.c gss-genr.c]
+   [gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c log.h loginrec.c logintest.c readconf.c]
+   [servconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rand-helper.c]
+   [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c openbsd-compat/glob.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/mktemp.c openbsd-compat/port-linux.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-tun.c openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c openbsd-compat/xmmap.c]
+   make the portable tree compile again - sprinkle unistd.h and string.h 
+   back in. Don't redefine __unused, as it turned out to be used in
+   headers on Linux, and replace its use in auth-pam.c with ARGSUSED
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/glob.c]
+   Move get_arg_max() into the ifdef HAVE_GLOB block so that it compiles
+   on OpenBSD (or other platforms with a decent glob implementation) with
+   -Werror
+ - (djm) [uuencode.c]
+   Add resolv.h, is it contains the prototypes for __b64_ntop/__b64_pton on
+   some platforms
+ - (djm) [session.c]
+   fix compile error with -Werror -Wall: 'path' is only used in
+   do_setup_env() if HAVE_LOGIN_CAP is not defined
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/basename.c openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-irix.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/rresvport.c]
+   These look to need string.h and/or unistd.h (based on a grep for function
+   names)
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in]
+   Remove generated openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile in distclean target
+ - (djm) [regress/Makefile regress/agent-getpeereid.sh regress/cfgmatch.sh]
+   [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/forcecommand.sh regress/forwarding.sh]
+   Sync regress tests to -current; include dtucker@'s new cfgmatch and 
+   forcecommand tests. Add cipher-speed.sh test (not linked in yet)
+ - (dtucker) [cleanup.c] Since config.h defines _LARGE_FILES on AIX, including
+   system headers before defines.h will cause conflicting definitions.
+ - (dtucker) [regress/forcecommand.sh] Portablize.
+
+20060713
+ - (dtucker) [auth-krb5.c auth-pam.c] Still more errno.h
+
+20060712
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Only define SHUT_RD (and friends) and
+   O_NONBLOCK if they're really needed.  Fixes build errors on HP-UX, old
+   Linuxes and probably more.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] OpenBSD needs <sys/types.h> before <sys/socket.h>
+   for SHUT_RD.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-tun.c] OpenBSD needs <netinet/in.h> before
+   <netinet/ip.h>.
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 16:01:57
+     [sftp-glob.c sftp-common.h sftp.c]
+     buffer.h only needed in sftp-common.h and remove some unneeded
+     user includes; ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 16:04:21
+     [sshd.8]
+     s/and and/and/
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 16:37:36
+     [readpass.c log.h scp.c fatal.c xmalloc.c includes.h ssh-keyscan.c misc.c
+     auth.c packet.c log.c]
+     move #include <stdarg.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/11 10:12:07
+     [ssh.c]
+     Only copy the part of environment variable that we actually use.  Prevents
+     ssh bailing when SendEnv is used and an environment variable with a really
+     long value exists.  ok djm@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/11 18:50:48
+     [clientloop.c ssh.1 ssh.c channels.c ssh_config.5 readconf.h session.c
+     channels.h readconf.c]
+     add ExitOnForwardFailure: terminate the connection if ssh(1)
+     cannot set up all requested dynamic, local, and remote port
+     forwardings. ok djm, dtucker, stevesk, jmc
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/11 20:07:25
+     [scp.c auth.c monitor.c serverloop.c sftp-server.c sshpty.c readpass.c
+     sshd.c monitor_wrap.c monitor_fdpass.c ssh-agent.c ttymodes.c atomicio.c
+     includes.h session.c sshlogin.c monitor_mm.c packet.c sshconnect2.c
+     sftp-client.c nchan.c clientloop.c sftp.c misc.c canohost.c channels.c
+     ssh-keygen.c progressmeter.c uidswap.c msg.c readconf.c sshconnect.c]
+     move #include <errno.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/11 20:16:43
+     [ssh.c]
+     cast asterisk field precision argument to int to remove warning;
+     ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/11 20:27:56
+     [authfile.c ssh.c]
+     need <errno.h> here also (it's also included in <openssl/err.h>)
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/12 11:34:58
+     [sshd.c servconf.h servconf.c sshd_config.5 auth.c]
+     Add support for conditional directives to sshd_config via a "Match"
+     keyword, which works similarly to the "Host" directive in ssh_config.
+     Lines after a Match line override the default set in the main section
+     if the condition on the Match line is true, eg
+     AllowTcpForwarding yes
+     Match User anoncvs
+             AllowTcpForwarding no
+     will allow port forwarding by all users except "anoncvs".
+     Currently only a very small subset of directives are supported.
+     ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [loginrec.c openbsd-compat/xmmap.c openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+   openbsd-compat/glob.c openbsd-compat/mktemp.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
+   openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c openbsd-compat/strtonum.c] Include <errno.h>.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Include stdarg.h.
+ - (dtucker) [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rand-helper.c] More errno.h here too.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] v*printf needs stdarg.h.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+   openbsd-compat/rresvport.c] More errno.h.
+
+20060711
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-keygen.c openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
+   openbsd-compat/daemon.c] Add includes needed by open(2).  Conditionally
+   include paths.h.  Fixes build error on Solaris.
+ - (dtucker) [entropy.c] More fcntl.h, this time on AIX (and probably
+   others).
+
+20060710
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] New autoconf version: 2.60.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/14 10:50:42
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     limit the number of pre-banner characters we will accept; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/26 10:36:15
+     [clientloop.c]
+     mention optional bind_address in runtime port forwarding setup
+     command-line help. patch from santhi.amirta AT gmail.com
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/02 17:12:58
+     [ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     more details and clarity for tun(4) device forwarding; ok and help
+     jmc@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/02 18:36:47
+     [gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c]
+     no "servconf.h" needed here
+     (gss-serv-krb5.c change not applied, portable needs the server options)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/02 22:45:59
+     [groupaccess.c groupaccess.h includes.h session.c sftp-common.c sshpty.c]
+     move #include <grp.h> out of includes.h
+     (portable needed uidswap.c too)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/02 23:01:55
+     [clientloop.c ssh.1]
+     use -KR[bind_address:]port here; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/03 08:54:20
+     [includes.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+     move #include "version.h" out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/03 17:59:32
+     [channels.c includes.h]
+     move #include <arpa/inet.h> out of includes.h; old ok djm@
+     (portable needed session.c too)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/05 02:42:09
+     [canohost.c hostfile.c includes.h misc.c packet.c readconf.c]
+     [serverloop.c sshconnect.c uuencode.c]
+     move #include <netinet/in.h> out of includes.h; ok deraadt@
+     (also ssh-rand-helper.c logintest.c loginrec.c)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 10:47:05
+     [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config.5]
+     support arguments to Subsystem commands; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 10:47:57
+     [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
+     add commandline options to enable logging of transactions; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 16:03:53
+     [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c]
+     [auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c]
+     [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c includes.h misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
+     [monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h scp.c serverloop.c session.c]
+     [session.h sftp-common.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c]
+     [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshd.c sshpty.c sshpty.h uidswap.c]
+     [uidswap.h]
+     move #include <pwd.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 16:22:39
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     move #include "dns.h" up
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/06 17:36:37
+     [monitor_wrap.h]
+     typo in comment
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/08 21:47:12
+     [authfd.c canohost.c clientloop.c dns.c dns.h includes.h]
+     [monitor_fdpass.c nchan.c packet.c servconf.c sftp.c ssh-agent.c]
+     [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.h sshd.c sshlogin.h]
+     move #include <sys/socket.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/08 21:48:53
+     [monitor.c session.c]
+     missed these from last commit:
+     move #include <sys/socket.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/08 23:30:06
+     [log.c]
+     move user includes after /usr/include files
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/09 15:15:11
+     [auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c includes.h misc.c monitor.c]
+     [readpass.c scp.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c sftp-server.c]
+     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshd.c]
+     [sshlogin.c sshpty.c]
+     move #include <fcntl.h> out of includes.h
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/09 15:27:59
+     [ssh-add.c]
+     use O_RDONLY vs. 0 in open(); no binary change
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 11:24:54
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     remove optind - it isn't used here
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 11:25:53
+     [sftp-server.c]
+     don't log variables that aren't yet set
+ - (djm) [loginrec.c ssh-rand-helper.c sshd.c openbsd-compat/glob.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/mktemp.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-tun.c openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] Fix includes.h fallout, mainly fcntl.h
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 12:03:20
+     [scp.c]
+     duplicate argv at the start of main() because it gets modified later;
+     pointed out by deraadt@ ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 12:08:08
+     [channels.c]
+     fix misparsing of SOCKS 5 packets that could result in a crash;
+     reported by mk@ ok markus@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/10 12:46:51
+     [misc.c misc.h sshd.8 sshconnect.c]
+     Add port identifier to known_hosts for non-default ports, based originally
+     on a patch from Devin Nate in bz#910.
+     For any connection using the default port or using a HostKeyAlias the
+     format is unchanged, otherwise the host name or address is enclosed
+     within square brackets in the same format as sshd's ListenAddress.
+     Tested by many, ok markus@.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Need to include <sys/socket.h>
+   for struct sockaddr on platforms that use the fake-rfc stuff.
+
+20060706
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Try AIX blibpath test in different order when
+   compiling with gcc.  gcc 4.1.x will accept (but ignore) -b flags so
+   configure would not select the correct libpath linker flags.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] A bit more info on autoconf.
+
+20060705
+ - (dtucker) [ssh-rand-helper.c] Don't exit if mkdir fails because the
+   target already exists.
+
+20060630
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] SNPRINTF_CONST for snprintf
+   declaration too.  Patch from russ at sludge.net.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c] Undef _res before defining it,
+   prevents warnings on platforms where _res is in the system headers.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bug #1202: Note when autoconf is required and which
+   version.
+
+20060627
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1203: Add missing '[', which causes problems
+   with autoconf 2.60.  Patch from vapier at gentoo.org.
+
+20060625
+ - (dtucker) [channels.c serverloop.c] Apply the bug #1102 workaround to ptys
+   only, otherwise sshd can hang exiting non-interactive sessions.
+
+20060624
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1193: Define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME on Solaris.
+   Works around limitation in Solaris' passwd program for changing passwords
+   where the username is longer than 8 characters.  ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [serverloop.c] Get ifdef/ifndef the right way around for the bug
+   #1102 workaround.
+
+20060623
+ - (dtucker) [README.platform configure.ac openbsd-compat/port-tun.c] Add
+   tunnel support for Mac OS X/Darwin via a third-party tun driver.  Patch
+   from reyk@, tested by anil@
+ - (dtucker) [channels.c configure.ac serverloop.c] Bug #1102: Around AIX
+   4.3.3 ML3 or so, the AIX pty layer starting passing zero-length writes
+   on the pty slave as zero-length reads on the pty master, which sshd
+   interprets as the descriptor closing.  Since most things don't do zero
+   length writes this rarely matters, but occasionally it happens, and when
+   it does the SSH pty session appears to hang, so we add a special case for
+   this condition.  ok djm@
+
+20060613
+ - (djm) [getput.h] This file has been replaced by functions in misc.c
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/08 10:49:48
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     uint32_t -> u_int32_t (which we use everywhere else)
+     (Id sync only - portable already had this)
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/16 09:00:00
+     [clientloop.c]
+     missing free; from Kylene Hall
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/17 12:43:34
+     [scp.c sftp.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c]
+     fix leak; coverity via Kylene Jo Hall
+   - miod@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/18 21:27:25
+     [kexdhc.c kexgexc.c]
+     paramter -> parameter
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/29 12:54:08
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     Add gssapi-with-mic to PreferredAuthentications default list; ok jmc
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/29 12:56:33
+     [ssh_config]
+     Add GSSAPIAuthentication and GSSAPIDelegateCredentials to examples in
+     sample ssh_config.  ok markus@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/29 16:10:03
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     oops - previous was too long; split the list of auths up
+   - mk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/30 11:46:38
+     [ssh-add.c]
+     Sync usage() with man page and reality.
+     ok deraadt dtucker
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/29 16:13:23
+     [ssh.1]
+     add GSSAPI to the list of authentication methods supported;
+   - mk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/30 11:46:38
+     [ssh-add.c]
+     Sync usage() with man page and reality.
+     ok deraadt dtucker
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/01 09:21:48
+     [sshd.c]
+     call get_remote_ipaddr() early; fixes logging after client disconnects;
+     report mpf@; ok dtucker@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/06 10:20:20
+     [readpass.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect2.c uidswap.c]
+     replace remaining setuid() calls with permanently_set_uid() and
+     check seteuid() return values; report Marcus Meissner; ok dtucker djm
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/08 14:45:49
+     [readpass.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c uidswap.c uidswap.h]
+     do not set the gid, noted by solar; ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/13 01:18:36
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     always use a format string, even when printing a constant
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/06/13 02:17:07
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     revert; i am on drugs. spotted by alexander AT beard.se
+
+20060521
+ - (dtucker) [auth.c monitor.c] Now that we don't log from both the monitor
+   and slave, we can remove the special-case handling in the audit hook in
+   auth_log.
+
+20060517
+ - (dtucker) [ssh-rand-helper.c] Check return code of mkdir and fix file
+   pointer leak.  From kjhall at us.ibm.com, found by coverity.
+
+20060515
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c] Use _compat_res instead of
+   _res, prevents problems on some platforms that have _res as a global but
+   don't have getrrsetbyname(), eg IRIX 5.3.  Found and tested by
+   georg.schwarz at freenet.de, ok djm@.
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h] Find a value for IOV_MAX or use a conservative
+   default.  Patch originally from tim@, ok djm
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] Bug #1188: pass result of do_pam_account back and
+   do not allow kbdint again after the PAM account check fails.  ok djm@
+
+20060506
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/25 08:02:27
+     [authfile.c authfile.h sshconnect2.c ssh.c sshconnect1.c]
+     Prevent ssh from trying to open private keys with bad permissions more than
+     once or prompting for their passphrases (which it subsequently ignores
+     anyway), similar to a previous change in ssh-add.  bz #1186, ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/04 14:55:23
+     [dh.c]
+     tighter DH exponent checks here too; feedback and ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/01 05:37:46
+     [OVERVIEW]
+     $OpenBSD$ in here too
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/05/06 08:35:40
+     [auth-krb5.c]
+     Add $OpenBSD$ in comment here too
+
+20060504
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c groupaccess.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c scard-opensc.c
+   session.c ssh-rand-helper.c sshd.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
+   openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Convert malloc(foo*bar) -> calloc(foo,bar)
+   in Portable-only code; since calloc zeros, remove now-redundant memsets.
+   Also add a couple of sanity checks.  With & ok djm@
+
+20060503
+ - (dtucker) [packet.c] Remove in_systm.h since it's also in includes.h
+   and double including it on IRIX 5.3 causes problems.  From Georg Schwarz,
+   "no objections" tim@
+
+20060423
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/01 05:42:20
+     [scp.c]
+     minimal lint cleanup (unused crud, and some size_t); ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/01 05:50:29
+     [scp.c]
+     xasprintification; ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/01 05:51:34
+     [atomicio.c]
+     ANSIfy; requested deraadt@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/02 08:34:52
+     [ssh-keysign.c]
+     sessionid can be 32 bytes now too when sha256 kex is used; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/03 07:10:38
+     [gss-genr.c]
+     GSSAPI buffers shouldn't be nul-terminated, spotted in bugzilla #1066
+     by dleonard AT vintela.com. use xasprintf() to simplify code while in
+     there; "looks right" deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/16 00:48:52
+     [buffer.c buffer.h channels.c]
+     Fix condition where we could exit with a fatal error when an input
+     buffer became too large and the remote end had advertised a big window.
+     The problem was a mismatch in the backoff math between the channels code
+     and the buffer code, so make a buffer_check_alloc() function that the
+     channels code can use to propsectivly check whether an incremental
+     allocation will succeed.  bz #1131, debugged with the assistance of
+     cove AT wildpackets.com; ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/16 00:52:55
+     [atomicio.c atomicio.h]
+     introduce atomiciov() function that wraps readv/writev to retry
+     interrupted transfers like atomicio() does for read/write;
+     feedback deraadt@ dtucker@ stevesk@ ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/16 00:54:10
+     [sftp-client.c]
+     avoid making a tiny 4-byte write to send the packet length of sftp
+     commands, which would result in a separate tiny packet on the wire by
+     using atomiciov(writev, ...) to write the length and the command in one
+     pass; ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/16 07:59:00
+     [atomicio.c]
+     reorder sanity test so that it cannot dereference past the end of the
+     iov array; well spotted canacar@!
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/18 10:44:28
+     [bufaux.c bufbn.c Makefile.in]
+     Move Buffer bignum functions into their own file, bufbn.c. This means
+     that sftp and sftp-server (which use the Buffer functions in bufaux.c 
+     but not the bignum ones) no longer need to be linked with libcrypto.
+     ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/20 09:27:09
+     [auth.h clientloop.c dispatch.c dispatch.h kex.h]
+     replace the last non-sig_atomic_t flag used in a signal handler with a
+     sig_atomic_t, unfortunately with some knock-on effects in other (non-
+     signal) contexts in which it is used; ok markus@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/20 09:47:59
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     simplify; ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/20 21:53:44
+     [includes.h session.c sftp.c]
+     Switch from using pipes to socketpairs for communication between
+     sftp/scp and ssh, and between sshd and its subprocesses. This saves
+     a file descriptor per session and apparently makes userland ppp over
+     ssh work; ok markus@ deraadt@ (ID Sync only - portable makes this
+     decision on a per-platform basis)
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/22 04:06:51
+     [uidswap.c]
+     use setres[ug]id() to permanently revoke privileges; ok deraadt@
+     (ID Sync only - portable already uses setres[ug]id() whenever possible)
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/04/22 18:29:33
+     [crc32.c]
+     remove extra spaces
+ - (djm) [auth.h dispatch.h kex.h] sprinkle in signal.h to get
+   sig_atomic_t
+
+20060421
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac session.c sshpty.c]
+   [contrib/redhat/sshd.init openbsd-compat/Makefile.in]
+   [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/port-linux.h] Add support for SELinux, setting 
+   the execution and TTY contexts. based on patch from Daniel Walsh,
+   bz #880; ok dtucker@
+
+20060418
+ - (djm) [canohost.c] Reorder IP options check so that it isn't broken
+   by mapped addresses; bz #1179 reported by markw wtech-llc.com;
+   ok dtucker@
+
+20060331
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/27 01:21:18
+     [xmalloc.c]
+     we can do the size & nmemb check before the integer overflow check; 
+     evol
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/27 13:03:54
+     [dh.c]
+     use strtonum() instead of atoi(), limit dhg size to 64k; ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/27 23:15:46
+     [sftp.c]
+     always use a format string for addargs; spotted by mouring@
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/28 00:12:31
+     [README.tun ssh.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/28 01:52:28
+     [channels.c]
+     do not accept unreasonable X ports numbers; ok djm
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/28 01:53:43
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     use strtonum() to parse the pid from the file, and range check it
+     better; ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 09:41:25
+     [channels.c]
+     ARGSUSED for dispatch table-driven functions
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 09:58:16
+     [authfd.c bufaux.c deattack.c gss-serv.c mac.c misc.c misc.h]
+     [monitor_wrap.c msg.c packet.c sftp-client.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
+     replace {GET,PUT}_XXBIT macros with functionally similar functions,
+     silencing a heap of lint warnings. also allows them to use
+     __bounded__ checking which can't be applied to macros; requested
+     by and feedback from deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 10:41:25
+     [ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+     add percent escape chars to the IdentityFile option, bz #1159 based
+     on a patch by imaging AT math.ualberta.ca; feedback and ok dtucker@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 11:05:17
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     Correctly handle truncated files while converting keys; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 11:40:21
+     [auth.c monitor.c]
+     Prevent duplicate log messages when privsep=yes; ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/31 09:09:30
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     kill trailing whitespace;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/31 09:13:56
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     remote user escape is %r not %h; spotted by jmc@
+
+20060326
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/15 08:46:44
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     if no key file are given when printing the DNS host record, use the
+     host key file(s) as default. ok djm@
+   - biorn@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/16 10:31:45
+     [scp.c]
+     Try to display errormessage even if remout == -1
+     ok djm@, markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/17 22:31:50
+     [authfd.c]
+     another unreachable found by lint
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/17 22:31:11
+     [authfd.c]
+     unreachanble statement, found by lint
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 02:22:32
+     [serverloop.c]
+     memory leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     ok deraadt@ dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 02:22:56
+     [sftp.c]
+     more memory leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     deraadt@ ok
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 02:23:26
+     [hostfile.c]
+     FILE* leak detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 02:24:05
+     [dh.c readconf.c servconf.c]
+     potential NULL pointer dereferences detected by Coverity
+     via elad AT netbsd.org; ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 07:41:30
+     [sshconnect2.c]
+     memory leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     deraadt@ ok
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 11:51:52
+     [servconf.c]
+     Correct strdelim null test; ok djm@
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:52:11
+     [auth1.c authfd.c channels.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:53:12
+     [kex.c kex.h monitor.c myproposal.h session.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:56:41
+     [clientloop.c progressmeter.c serverloop.c sshd.c]
+     ARGSUSED for signal handlers
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:59:49
+     [ssh-keyscan.c]
+     please lint
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:59:30
+     [ssh.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:59:09
+     [authfile.c]
+     whoever thought that break after return was a good idea needs to
+     get their head examimed
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 04:09:44
+     [monitor.c]
+     memory leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     deraadt@ ok
+     that should be all of them now
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 11:38:46
+     [key.c]
+     (really) last of the Coverity diffs: avoid possible NULL deref in
+     key_free. via elad AT netbsd.org; markus@ ok
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:10:19
+     [auth.c key.c misc.c packet.c ssh-add.c]
+     in a switch (), break after return or goto is stupid
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:13:16
+     [key.c]
+     djm did a typo
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:17:23
+     [ssh-rsa.c]
+     in a switch (), break after return or goto is stupid
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:14:02
+     [channels.c clientloop.c monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h serverloop.c]
+     [ssh.c sshpty.c sshpty.h]
+     sprinkle u_int throughout pty subsystem, ok markus
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:17:20
+     [auth1.c auth2.c sshd.c]
+     sprinkle some ARGSUSED for table driven functions (which sometimes 
+     must ignore their args)
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:26:55
+     [channels.c monitor.c session.c session.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c]
+     [ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshlogin.c]
+     annoying spacing fixes getting in the way of real diffs
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:27:50
+     [monitor.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:35:12
+     [channels.c]
+     x11_fake_data is only ever used as u_char *
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:41:43
+     [dns.c]
+     cast xstrdup to propert u_char *
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:42:27
+     [canohost.c match.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+     be strict with tolower() casting
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:48:34
+     [channels.c fatal.c kex.c packet.c serverloop.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 21:11:53
+     [ttymodes.c]
+     spacing
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 00:05:41
+     [auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c]
+     [clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c]
+     [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
+     [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c]
+     [xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
+     introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations 
+     functions and use them throughout openssh
+
+     xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
+     dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it 
+     to die
+
+     feedback and ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 01:13:23
+     [buffer.c channels.c deattack.c misc.c scp.c session.c sftp-client.c]
+     [sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-rsa.c xmalloc.c xmalloc.h auth-pam.c]
+     [uidswap.c]
+     change OpenSSH's xrealloc() function from being xrealloc(p, new_size)
+     to xrealloc(p, new_nmemb, new_itemsize).
+
+     realloc is particularly prone to integer overflows because it is
+     almost always allocating "n * size" bytes, so this is a far safer 
+     API; ok deraadt@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 01:30:23
+     [sftp.c]
+     "abormally" is a perfectly cromulent word, but "abnormally" is better
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 13:17:03
+     [atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c]
+     [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c]
+     [auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
+     [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c]
+     [buffer.c canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c]
+     [cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c]
+     [deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c fatal.c groupaccess.c hostfile.c kex.c]
+     [kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c]
+     [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c]
+     [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c]
+     [readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c]
+     [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c]
+     [sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+     [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
+     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
+     [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c]
+     Put $OpenBSD$ tags back (as comments) to replace the RCSID()s that
+     Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:29:35
+     [auth-rsa.c authfd.c packet.c]
+     needed casts (always will be needed)
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:30:55
+     [clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+     spacing
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:36:15
+     [sshlogin.c sshlogin.h]
+     nicer size_t and time_t types
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:40:14
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     cast strtonum() result to right type
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:41:45
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     mark two more signal handlers ARGSUSED
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:43:30
+     [channels.c]
+     use strtonum() instead of atoi() [limit X screens to 400, sorry]
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:56:55
+     [bufaux.c channels.c packet.c]
+     remove (char *) casts to a function that accepts void * for the arg
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 18:58:10
+     [channels.c]
+     delete cast not required
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 22:22:43
+     [atomicio.h auth-options.h auth.h auth2-gss.c authfd.h authfile.h]
+     [bufaux.h buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h]
+     [compat.h compress.h crc32.c crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h]
+     [dns.c dns.h getput.h groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c]
+     [gss-serv.c hostfile.h includes.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h]
+     [misc.h monitor.h monitor_fdpass.h monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.h msg.h]
+     [myproposal.h packet.h pathnames.h progressmeter.h readconf.h rsa.h]
+     [scard.h servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-common.h sftp.h]
+     [ssh-gss.h ssh.h ssh1.h ssh2.h sshconnect.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h]
+     [ttymodes.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h]
+     standardise spacing in $OpenBSD$ tags; requested by deraadt@
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/26 01:31:48
+     [uuencode.c]
+     typo
+
+20060325
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/16 04:24:42
+     [ssh.1]
+     Add RFC4419 (Diffie-Hellman group exchange KEX) to the list of SSH RFCs
+     that OpenSSH supports
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:51:18
+     [atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c]
+     [auth-pam.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
+     [auth-shadow.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
+     [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c]
+     [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.c]
+     [canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-acss.c cipher-aes.c]
+     [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
+     [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c entropy.c fatal.c]
+     [groupaccess.c hostfile.c includes.h kex.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c]
+     [kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c loginrec.c]
+     [loginrec.h logintest.c mac.c match.c md-sha256.c md5crypt.c misc.c]
+     [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c]
+     [nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c]
+     [scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c]
+     [sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c]
+     [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
+     [ssh-rand-helper.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
+     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
+     [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c]
+     [openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]
+     [openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c]
+     [openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c]
+     [openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c]
+     RCSID() can die
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:53:12
+     [kex.h myproposal.h]
+     spacing
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 04:07:22
+     [auth2-gss.c]
+     GSSAPI related leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     reviewed by simon AT sxw.org.uk; deraadt@ ok
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 04:07:49
+     [gss-genr.c]
+     more GSSAPI related leaks detected by Coverity via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     reviewed by simon AT sxw.org.uk; deraadt@ ok
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 04:08:18
+     [gss-serv.c]
+     last lot of GSSAPI related leaks detected by Coverity via
+     elad AT netbsd.org; reviewed by simon AT sxw.org.uk; deraadt@ ok
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:14:02
+     [monitor_wrap.h sshpty.h]
+     sprinkle u_int throughout pty subsystem, ok markus
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:26:55
+     [session.h]
+     annoying spacing fixes getting in the way of real diffs
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:41:43
+     [dns.c]
+     cast xstrdup to propert u_char *
+   - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/22 21:16:24
+     [ssh.1]
+     simplify SSHFP example; ok jmc@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/22 21:27:15
+     [deattack.c deattack.h]
+     remove IV support from the CRC attack detector, OpenSSH has never used
+     it - it only applied to IDEA-CFB, which we don't support.
+     prompted by NetBSD Coverity report via elad AT netbsd.org;
+     feedback markus@ "nuke it" deraadt@
+
+20060318
+ - (djm) [auth-pam.c] Fix memleak in error path, from Coverity via
+   elad AT NetBSD.org
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Bug #1173: make fmtint() take
+   a LLONG rather than a long.  Fixes scp'ing of large files on platforms
+   with missing/broken snprintfs.  Patch from e.borovac at bom.gov.au.
+
+20060316
+ - (dtucker) [entropy.c] Add headers for WIFEXITED and friends.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac md-sha256.c] NetBSD has sha2.h in
+   /usr/include/crypto.  Hint from djm@.
+ - (tim) [kex.c myproposal.h md-sha256.c openbsd-compat/sha2.c,h]
+   Disable sha256 when openssl < 0.9.7. Patch from djm@.
+ - (djm) [kex.c] Slightly more clean deactivation of dhgex-sha256 on old
+   OpenSSL; ok tim
+
+20060315
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync:
+   - msf@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/06 15:54:07
+     [ssh.1]
+     - typo fix
+     ok jmc@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/06 21:44:47
+     [ssh.1]
+     make this a little less ambiguous...
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/07 01:08:04
+     [auth-rhosts.c includes.h]
+     move #include <netgroup.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/07 01:18:09
+     [includes.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c]
+     move #include <sys/queue.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/07 01:42:00
+     [channels.c clientloop.c clientloop.h includes.h packet.h]
+     [serverloop.c sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
+     move #include <termios.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/07 01:52:50
+     [sshtty.c]
+     "log.h" not needed
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/07 03:47:05
+     [hostfile.c]
+     "packet.h" not needed
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/07 03:59:20
+     [deattack.c]
+     duplicate #include
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 12:15:27
+     [auth.c clientloop.c includes.h misc.c monitor.c readpass.c]
+     [session.c sftp.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+     [sshd.c sshpty.c]
+     move #include <paths.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 12:32:49
+     [includes.h misc.c]
+     move #include <netinet/tcp.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 13:15:44
+     [gss-serv.c monitor.c]
+     small KNF
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 14:16:59
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     <openssl/bn.h> not needed
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 14:31:30
+     [includes.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c]
+     move #include <sys/resource.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 14:38:18
+     [includes.h packet.c]
+     move #include <netinet/in_systm.h> and <netinet/ip.h> out of
+     includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/08 23:51:24
+     [includes.h scp.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c]
+     move #include <dirent.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/09 00:32:07
+     [includes.h]
+     #include <sys/endian.h> not needed; ok djm@
+     NB. ID Sync only - we still need this (but it may move later)
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/09 10:10:47
+     [sshd.8]
+     - move some text into a CAVEATS section
+     - merge the COMMAND EXECUTION... section into AUTHENTICATION
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/10 00:27:13
+     [channels.c clientloop.c includes.h misc.c progressmeter.c sftp.c]
+     [ssh.c sshd.c sshpty.c]
+     move #include <sys/ioctl.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/10 01:44:27
+     [includes.h monitor.c readpass.c scp.c serverloop.c session.c]
+     [sftp.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+     move #include <sys/wait.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/11 19:31:18
+     [atomicio.c]
+     type correctness; from Ray Lai in PR 5011; ok millert@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/12 06:45:34
+     [ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+     add a %l expansion code to the ControlPath, which is filled in with the
+     local hostname at runtime. Requested by henning@ to avoid some problems
+     with /home on NFS; ok dtucker@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/12 10:44:18
+     [readconf.c]
+     raise error when the user specifies a RekeyLimit that is smaller than 16
+     (the smallest of our cipher's blocksize) or big enough to cause integer
+     wraparound; ok & feedback dtucker@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/12 10:49:44
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     slight rewording; ok djm
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/12 10:52:41
+     [sshd.8]
+     rework the description of authorized_keys a little;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/12 17:57:19
+     [sshd.8]
+     sort the list of options permissable w/ authorized_keys;
+     ok djm dtucker
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/13 10:16:39
+     [sshd.8]
+     no need to subsection the authorized_keys examples - instead, convert
+     this to look like an actual file. also use proto 2 keys, and use IETF
+     example addresses;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/13 10:21:25
+     [sshd.8]
+     small tweaks for the ssh_known_hosts section;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/13 11:02:26
+     [sshd.8]
+     turn this into an example ssh_known_hosts file; ok djm
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/13 11:08:43
+     [sshd.8]
+     - avoid nasty line split
+     - `*' does not need to be escaped
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/13 11:27:25
+     [sshd.8]
+     sort FILES and use a -compact list;
+   - david@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/15 05:08:24
+     [sftp-client.c]
+     typo in comment; ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/15 16:53:20
+     [ssh.1]
+     remove the IETF draft references and replace them with some updated RFCs;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/15 16:55:33
+     [sshd.8]
+     remove ietf draft references; RFC list now maintained in ssh.1;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/16 09:05:34
+     [sshd.8]
+     sync some of the FILES entries w/ ssh.1;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/19 19:52:10
+     [sshd.8]
+     move the sshrc stuff out of FILES, and into its own section:
+     FILES is not a good place to document how stuff works;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/19 20:02:17
+     [sshd.8]
+     sync the (s)hosts.equiv FILES entries w/ those from ssh.1;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/19 20:05:00
+     [sshd.8]
+     grammar;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/19 20:12:25
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     add some vertical space;
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/20 16:36:15
+     [authfd.c channels.c includes.h session.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c]
+     move #include <sys/un.h> out of includes.h; ok djm@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/20 17:02:44
+     [clientloop.c includes.h monitor.c progressmeter.c scp.c]
+     [serverloop.c session.c sftp.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c sshd.c]
+     move #include <signal.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/20 17:19:54
+     [auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c]
+     [authfile.c clientloop.c includes.h readconf.c scp.c session.c]
+     [sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c]
+     [sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshpty.c]
+     move #include <sys/stat.h> out of includes.h; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/22 00:04:45
+     [canohost.c clientloop.c includes.h match.c readconf.c scp.c ssh.c]
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     move #include <ctype.h> out of includes.h; ok djm@
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 10:25:14
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     add section on patterns;
+     from dtucker + myself
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 10:33:54
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     signpost to PATTERNS;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 10:37:07
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     tidy up the refs to PATTERNS;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 10:39:52
+     [sshd.8]
+     signpost to PATTERNS section;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 20:22:16
+     [ssh-keysign.8 ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     some consistency fixes;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 20:31:31
+     [ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
+     more consistency fixes;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 23:20:07
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     some grammar/wording fixes;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 23:43:57
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     some grammar/wording fixes;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/24 23:51:17
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     oops - bits i missed;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/25 12:26:17
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     document the possible values for KbdInteractiveDevices;
+     help/ok dtucker
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/25 12:28:34
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     document the order in which allow/deny directives are processed;
+     help/ok dtucker
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/26 17:17:18
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     move PATTERNS to the end of the main body; requested by dtucker
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/26 18:01:13
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     subsection is pointless here;
+   - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/26 18:03:10
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     comma;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/02/28 01:10:21
+     [session.c]
+     fix logout recording when privilege separation is disabled, analysis and
+     patch from vinschen at redhat.com; tested by dtucker@ ok deraadt@
+     NB. ID sync only - patch already in portable
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/04 04:12:58
+     [serverloop.c]
+     move a debug() outside of a signal handler; ok markus@ a little while back
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/12 04:23:07
+     [ssh.c]
+     knf nit
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/13 08:16:00
+     [sshd.c]
+     don't log that we are listening on a socket before the listen() call
+     actually succeeds, bz #1162 reported by Senthil Kumar; ok dtucker@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/13 08:33:00
+     [packet.c]
+     Set TCP_NODELAY for all connections not just "interactive" ones.  Fixes
+     poor performance and protocol stalls under some network conditions (mindrot
+     bugs #556 and #981). Patch originally from markus@, ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/13 08:43:16
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     Make ssh-keygen handle CR and CRLF line termination when converting IETF
+     format keys, in adition to vanilla LF.  mindrot #1157, tested by Chris
+     Pepper, ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/13 10:14:29
+     [misc.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     Allow config directives to contain whitespace by surrounding them by double
+     quotes.  mindrot #482, man page help from jmc@, ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/13 10:26:52
+     [authfile.c authfile.h ssh-add.c]
+     Make ssh-add check file permissions before attempting to load private
+     key files multiple times; it will fail anyway and this prevents confusing
+     multiple prompts and warnings.  mindrot #1138, ok djm@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/14 00:15:39
+     [canohost.c]
+     log the originating address and not just the name when a reverse
+     mapping check fails, requested by linux AT linuon.com
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/14 16:32:48
+     [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5]
+     *AliveCountMax applies to protcol v2 only; ok dtucker, djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/07 09:07:40
+     [kex.c kex.h monitor.c myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+     Implement the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key exchange method
+     using the SHA256 code in libc (and wrapper to make it into an OpenSSL
+     EVP), interop tested against CVS PuTTY
+     NB. no portability bits committed yet
+ - (djm) [configure.ac defines.h kex.c md-sha256.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
+   [openbsd-compat/sha2.c] First stab at portability glue for SHA256
+   KEX support, should work with libc SHA256 support or OpenSSL
+   EVP_sha256 if present
+ - (djm) [includes.h] Restore accidentally dropped netinet/in.h
+ - (djm) [Makefile.in openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add added files
+ - (djm) [md-sha256.c configure.ac] md-sha256.c needs sha2.h if present
+ - (djm) [regress/.cvsignore] Ignore Makefile here
+ - (djm) [loginrec.c] Need stat.h
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sha2.h] Avoid include macro clash with
+   system sha2.h
+ - (djm) [ssh-rand-helper.c] Needs a bunch of headers
+ - (djm) [ssh-agent.c] Restore dropped stat.h
+ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/sha2.c] Comment out 
+   SHA384, which we don't need and doesn't compile without tweaks
+ - (djm) [auth-pam.c clientloop.c includes.h monitor.c session.c]
+   [sftp-client.c ssh-keysign.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c]
+   [sshd.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/glob.c openbsd-compat/mktemp.c]
+   [openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c] Lots of include fixes for
+   OpenSolaris
+ - (tim) [includes.h] put sys/stat.h back in to quiet some "macro redefined:"
+ - (tim) [openssh/sshpty.c openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c] put in some
+   includes removed from includes.h
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix glob test conversion to AC_TRY_COMPILE
+ - (djm) [includes.h] Put back paths.h, it is needed in defines.h
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] AIX (at least) needs
+   sys/ioctl.h for struct winsize.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD.
+
+20060313
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1171: Don't use printf("%lld", longlong)
+   since not all platforms support it.  Instead, use internal equivalent while
+   computing LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX.  Remove special case for alpha-dec-osf*
+   as it's no longer required.  Tested by Bernhard Simon, ok djm@
+
+20060304
+ - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Require use of lastlog as a
+   file rather than directory, required as Cygwin will be importing lastlog(1).
+   Also tightens up permissions on the file.  Patch from vinschen@redhat.com.
+ - (dtucker) [gss-serv-krb5.c] Bug #1166: Correct #ifdefs for gssapi_krb5.h
+   includes.  Patch from gentoo.riverrat at gmail.com.
+
+20060226
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1156: QNX apparently needs SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+   patch from kraai at ftbfs.org.
+
+20060223
+ - (dtucker) [sshd_config sshd_config.5] Update UsePAM to reflect current
+   reality.  Pointed out by tryponraj at gmail.com.
+
+20060222
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Minor tidy up: only
+   compile in compat code if required.
+
+20060221
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Prevent warning about
+   redefinition of SSLeay_add_all_algorithms.
+
+20060220
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}]
+   Add optional enabling of OpenSSL's (hardware) Engine support, via
+   configure --with-ssl-engine.  Based in part on a diff by michal at
+   logix.cz.
+
+20060219
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac, added openbsd-compat/regress/]
+   Add first attempt at regress tests for compat library.  ok djm@
+
+20060214
+ - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Make the names consistent.
+   s/pkg_post_make_install_fixes.sh/pkg-post-make-install-fixes.sh/ OK dtucker@
+
+20060212
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] Make loop counter unsigned
+   to silence compiler warning, from vinschen at redhat.com.
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Bug #1149. Disable /etc/default/login check for QNX.
+ - (dtucker) [README version.h contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
+   contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Bump version
+   strings to match 4.3p2 release.
+
+20060208
+ - (tim) [session.c] Logout records were not updated on systems with
+   post auth privsep disabled due to bug 1086 changes. Analysis and patch
+   by vinschen at redhat.com. OK tim@, dtucker@.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Typo in Ultrix and NewsOS sections (NEED_SETPRGP
+   -> NEED_SETPGRP), reported by Bernhard Simon.  ok tim@
+
+20060206
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Remove unnecessary tests for net/if.h and 
+   netinet/in_systm.h. OK dtucker@.
+
+20060205
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Add AC_REVISION. Add sys/time.h to lastlog.h test
+   for Solaris. OK dtucker@.
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Bug #1149. Changes in QNX section only. Patch by
+   kraai at ftbfs.org.
+
+20060203
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] test for egrep (AC_PROG_EGREP) before first
+   AC_CHECK_HEADERS test. Without it, if AC_CHECK_HEADERS is first run
+   by a platform specific check, builtin standard includes tests will be
+   skipped on the other platforms.
+   Analysis and suggestion by vinschen at redhat.com, patch by dtucker@.
+   OK tim@, djm@.
+
+20060202
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1148: Fix "crippled AES" test so that it
+   works with picky compilers.  Patch from alex.kiernan at thus.net.
+
 20060201
  - (djm) [regress/test-exec.sh] Try 'logname' as well as 'whoami' to 
    determine the user's login name - needed for regress tests on Solaris 
@@ -3818,4 +5487,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4117.2.1 2006/02/01 11:33:14 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4558.2.2 2006/09/26 10:57:05 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
index 753d2d06183d..1c784a527a3e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
+++ b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ http://www.openssl.org/
 (OpenSSL 0.9.5a is partially supported, but some ciphers (SSH protocol 1
 Blowfish) do not work correctly.)
 
+The remaining items are optional.
+
 OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system
 supports it. PAM is standard on Redhat and Debian Linux, Solaris and
 HP-UX 11.
@@ -57,13 +59,29 @@ installed.  No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported.
 http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
 
 LibEdit:
-sftp now supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit.  If your
-platform has it available natively you can use that, alternatively
-you might try these multi-platform ports:
+
+sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit.  If your platform
+has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
+these multi-platform ports:
 
 http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
 http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
 
+Autoconf:
+
+If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
+the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.60 to rebuild
+the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf".
+
+http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+
+Basic Security Module (BSM):
+
+Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
+FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X.  Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
+implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
+
+
 2. Building / Installation
 --------------------------
 
@@ -113,6 +131,10 @@ name).
 
 There are a few other options to the configure script:
 
+--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
+Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
+(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
+
 --with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
 also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
 
@@ -165,6 +187,8 @@ created.
 --with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries
 are installed.
 
+--with-ssl-engine enables OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+
 --with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
 real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
 
@@ -208,7 +232,8 @@ for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
 -------------------------
 
 $ make survey
-[check the contents and make sure there's no sensitive information]
+[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
+that you consider sensitive]
 $ make send-survey
 
 This will send configuration information for the currently configured
@@ -225,4 +250,4 @@ Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
 http://www.openssh.com/
 
 
-$Id: INSTALL,v 1.70 2005/04/24 07:52:23 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: INSTALL,v 1.76 2006/09/17 12:55:52 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
index ac3634f221a9..0c2ff067ae1c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
+++ b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 
 	Internet Software Consortium.
 	Todd C. Miller
+	Reyk Floeter
+	Chad Mynhier
 
 	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
 	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
index af881c521209..71f3623f17dd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.274 2006/01/01 08:47:05 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.282 2006/09/12 11:54:10 djm Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ LD=@LD@
 CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
 CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
 LIBS=@LIBS@
+LIBSELINUX=@LIBSELINUX@
+SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
 LIBPAM=@LIBPAM@
 LIBWRAP=@LIBWRAP@
@@ -62,11 +64,11 @@ INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@
 
 TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
 
-LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o \
+LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
-	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
 	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o \
 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
@@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
-	audit.o audit-bsm.o
+	audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o
 
 MANPAGES	= scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
 MANPAGES_IN	= scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
@@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ PATHSUBS	= \
 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
 	-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
 	-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-	-e 's|/etc/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
 	-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
 	-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
 	-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
@@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
 sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
 
 scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
@@ -201,8 +203,9 @@ clean:	regressclean
 
 distclean:	regressclean
 	rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
-	rm -f *.out core opensshd.init
-	rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds survey.sh *~
+	rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
+	rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds
+	rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ 
 	rm -rf autom4te.cache
 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
 	(cd scard && $(MAKE) distclean)
@@ -410,6 +413,9 @@ tests:	$(TARGETS)
 		EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
 		$@
 
+compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
+	(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
+
 regressclean:
 	if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
 		(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW b/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
index d1a768c109fd..2e1cc0ba3bbd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
+++ b/crypto/openssh/OVERVIEW
@@ -162,8 +162,7 @@ these programs.
     - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
       various auxiliary routines:
 	ssh.h	     the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
-	getput.h     byte-order independent storage of integers
-	includes.h   includes most system headers.  Lots of #ifdefs.
-	tildexpand.c expand tilde in file names
 	uidswap.c    uid-swapping
 	xmalloc.c    "safe" malloc routines
+
+$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.11 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README b/crypto/openssh/README
index 924293b663cd..d0bacc564b20 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.3 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.4 for the release notes.
 
 - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
 - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
 [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
 
-$Id: README,v 1.61 2005/12/01 11:21:04 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: README,v 1.63 2006/09/01 11:32:53 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.platform b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
index 4c18a3278a60..b7dc3f91ce58 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.platform
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.platform
@@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
 openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
 
 
+Darwin and MacOS X
+------------------
+Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
+virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
+has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
+
+Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
+MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
+using a third party driver. More information is available at:
+	http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+
+
 Solaris
 -------
 If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
@@ -55,4 +67,4 @@ account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
 return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
 
 
-$Id: README.platform,v 1.6 2005/11/05 05:28:35 dtucker Exp $
+$Id: README.platform,v 1.7 2006/06/23 11:05:13 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.tun b/crypto/openssh/README.tun
index d814f396d5b9..5e1cb074c2ee 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.tun
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.tun
@@ -87,12 +87,12 @@ combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
 | Client |------(  Internet  )-----| access.somewhere.net |
 +--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
     : 192.168.1.78                             |
-    :.............................         +-------+       
+    :.............................         +-------+
      Forwarded ssh connection    :         | dmzgw |
      Layer 2 tunnel              :         +-------+
                                  :             |
                                  :             |
-                                 :      +------------+  
+                                 :      +------------+
                                  :......| sshgateway |
                                       | +------------+
 --- real connection                 Bridge ->  |          +----------+
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
 
 Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using
 the following command:
-	
+
 	ssh sshgateway
 
 It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after
@@ -129,4 +129,4 @@ interconnect corporate networks.
 
 	Reyk Floeter
 
-$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.3 2005/12/08 18:34:10 reyk Exp $
+$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/acss.c b/crypto/openssh/acss.c
index 99efde071ddb..86e2c01a8cc6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/acss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/acss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$Id: acss.c,v 1.3 2005/07/17 07:04:47 djm Exp $ */
+/*	$Id: acss.c,v 1.4 2006/07/24 04:51:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenBSD project
  *
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
 #if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
index 12abbda16bb1..f651a292cbb6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.c
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -25,7 +27,12 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.13 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include "atomicio.h"
 
@@ -33,11 +40,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.13 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
  * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
  */
 size_t
-atomicio(f, fd, _s, n)
-	ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t);
-	int fd;
-	void *_s;
-	size_t n;
+atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
 {
 	char *s = _s;
 	size_t pos = 0;
@@ -58,8 +61,60 @@ atomicio(f, fd, _s, n)
 			errno = EPIPE;
 			return pos;
 		default:
-			pos += (u_int)res;
+			pos += (size_t)res;
 		}
 	}
 	return (pos);
 }
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t
+atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
+{
+	size_t pos = 0, rem;
+	ssize_t res;
+	struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
+
+	if (iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
+	memcpy(iov, _iov, iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
+
+	for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
+		res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
+		switch (res) {
+		case -1:
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+				continue;
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return pos;
+		default:
+			rem = (size_t)res;
+			pos += rem;
+			/* skip completed iov entries */
+			while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
+				rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
+				iov++;
+				iovcnt--;
+			}
+			/* This shouldn't happen... */
+			if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
+				errno = EFAULT;
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (iovcnt == 0)
+				break;
+			/* update pointer in partially complete iov */
+			iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
+			iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
+		}
+	}
+	return pos;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
index 7eccf206b3b8..2fcd25d43269 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/atomicio.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.6 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -25,9 +26,20 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H
+#define _ATOMICIO_H
+
 /*
  * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
  */
 size_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
 
 #define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t	atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int),
+    int, const struct iovec *, int);
+
+#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c b/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
index c2679d3dae2c..d5cf302ce56c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit-bsm.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit-bsm.c,v 1.1 2005/02/20 10:08:00 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit-bsm.c,v 1.4 2006/09/01 05:38:36 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * TODO
@@ -37,8 +37,15 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 #if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT)
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit.c b/crypto/openssh/audit.c
index c77d0c012817..dbea34cb23f6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.3 2005/07/17 07:26:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.c,v 1.5 2006/09/01 05:38:36 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,10 +26,15 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 
 /*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/audit.h b/crypto/openssh/audit.h
index 78e58966fdc3..695f723549ea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/audit.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/audit.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.2 2005/02/08 10:52:48 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: audit.h,v 1.3 2006/08/05 14:05:10 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-#include "auth.h"
-
 #ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
 # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
 enum ssh_audit_event_type {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
index 920c977d85a6..37d527d11a4e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-bsdauth.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -21,13 +22,23 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.6 2005/01/19 13:11:47 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 static void *
@@ -69,9 +80,8 @@ bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
 	*name = xstrdup("");
 	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
 	*numprompts = 1;
-	*prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *));
-	*echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
-	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
 	(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c
index e4f783096cdf..919b1eaa43cf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,11 +24,16 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.9 2003/11/03 09:03:37 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 
 /* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
index 11dbd689e0c3..b3bbfee9a222 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.19 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  *    Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
  *
@@ -28,18 +29,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.16 2005/11/21 09:42:10 dtucker Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 
 #ifdef KRB5
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include <krb5.h>
 
 extern ServerOptions	 options;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
index ad97e612939d..ca5e1c931499 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.40 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -10,18 +11,31 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.33 2005/12/08 18:34:11 reyk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
 int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
@@ -131,7 +145,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				forced_command = NULL;
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
-			forced_command[i] = 0;
+			forced_command[i] = '\0';
 			auth_debug_add("Forced command: %.900s", forced_command);
 			opts++;
 			goto next_option;
@@ -163,7 +177,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				xfree(s);
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
-			s[i] = 0;
+			s[i] = '\0';
 			auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
 			debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
 			opts++;
@@ -200,7 +214,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				xfree(patterns);
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
-			patterns[i] = 0;
+			patterns[i] = '\0';
 			opts++;
 			if (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
 			    patterns) != 1) {
@@ -245,7 +259,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				xfree(patterns);
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
-			patterns[i] = 0;
+			patterns[i] = '\0';
 			opts++;
 			p = patterns;
 			host = hpdelim(&p);
@@ -293,7 +307,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
 				forced_tun_device = -1;
 				goto bad_option;
 			}
-			tun[i] = 0;
+			tun[i] = '\0';
 			forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL);
 			xfree(tun);
 			if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
index 3cd02a71ff0d..853f8b517c17 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-options.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.13 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.16 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
index f9d067ceb1d5..6893d57cffc5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c
@@ -47,7 +47,16 @@
 
 /* Based on $FreeBSD$ */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.128 2006/01/29 05:46:13 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
@@ -63,20 +72,31 @@ RCSID("$Id: auth-pam.c,v 1.128 2006/01/29 05:46:13 dtucker Exp $");
 # define sshpam_const	const	/* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */
 #endif
 
+/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
@@ -146,14 +166,16 @@ sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 		fatal("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-pthread_exit(void *value __unused)
+pthread_exit(void *value)
 {
 	_exit(0);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr __unused,
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
     void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
 {
 	pid_t pid;
@@ -185,8 +207,9 @@ pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
 	return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value __unused)
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
 {
 	int status;
 
@@ -284,7 +307,10 @@ import_environments(Buffer *b)
 
 	/* Import environment from subprocess */
 	num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
-	sshpam_env = xmalloc((num_env + 1) * sizeof(*sshpam_env));
+	if (num_env > 1024)
+		fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
+		    __func__, num_env);
+	sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
 	debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
 	for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++)
 		sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
@@ -331,9 +357,8 @@ sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
 	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
 		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 
-	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
 		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
 
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
 	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
@@ -412,10 +437,16 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	u_int i;
 	const char *pam_user;
 	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+	char *tz = getenv("TZ");
 
 	pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
 	    (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+
 	environ[0] = NULL;
+	if (tz != NULL)
+		if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
+			error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
 
 	if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
 		setproctitle("%s [pam]",
@@ -439,8 +470,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 		goto auth_fail;
 
 	if (compat20) {
-		if (!do_pam_account())
+		if (!do_pam_account()) {
+			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
 			goto auth_fail;
+		}
 		if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
 			sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
 			    PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
@@ -482,7 +515,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
-	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer);
+	else
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
 	buffer_free(&buffer);
 	pthread_exit(NULL);
 
@@ -529,9 +565,8 @@ sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
 	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
 		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 
-	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
 		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
 
 	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
 		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
@@ -638,8 +673,11 @@ sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	int socks[2];
 
 	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
-	/* Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled */
-	if (!options.use_pam)
+	/*
+	 * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
+	 * has previously failed.
+	 */
+	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* Initialize PAM */
@@ -699,7 +737,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
 			*num = 1;
 			len = plen + mlen + 1;
-			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
+			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
 			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
 			plen += mlen;
 			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
@@ -709,21 +747,25 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
 			/* accumulate messages */
 			len = plen + mlen + 2;
-			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
+			**prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
 			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
 			plen += mlen;
 			strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
 			plen++;
 			xfree(msg);
 			break;
+		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+			sshpam_account_status = 0;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
 		case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
-			debug3("PAM: PAM_AUTH_ERR");
+			debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
 			if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
 				*info = **prompts;
 				**prompts = NULL;
 				*num = 0;
 				**echo_on = 0;
 				ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+				xfree(msg);
 				return 0;
 			}
 			/* FALLTHROUGH */
@@ -930,9 +972,8 @@ sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
 	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
 		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
 
-	if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
 		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-	memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
 
 	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
 		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
index 6e6d0d76a10b..be62837961a2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.40 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -36,12 +37,20 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.34 2005/07/19 15:32:26 otto Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
index c31f2b97b6b2..eca75027580c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.42 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -13,18 +14,25 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.38 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
index aaba8557e26a..cd0a7967a244 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.41 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -14,14 +15,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.33 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+# include <netgroup.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 
 /* import */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
index d9c9652dc718..8c43458b0f84 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.71 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -14,23 +15,35 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.63 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "misc.h"
@@ -137,7 +150,7 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
 	/* Wait for a response. */
 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		response[i] = packet_get_char();
+		response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c
index 59737b93cc7e..8b3160aeedb7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-shadow.c
@@ -23,11 +23,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-shadow.c,v 1.7 2005/07/17 07:04:47 djm Exp $");
 
 #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
 #include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
index af7182b4834e..a9e1c258ca61 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-sia.c
@@ -25,14 +25,6 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-sia.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-
 #include <sia.h>
 #include <siad.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
@@ -40,8 +32,19 @@
 #include <setjmp.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-sia.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern int saved_argc;
 extern char **saved_argv;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
index f676dbec9594..25073dbae0d8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.26 2006/08/05 08:28:24 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -21,15 +22,23 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.20 2002/06/30 21:59:45 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #ifdef SKEY
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
 #include <skey.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 static void *
@@ -43,8 +52,7 @@ skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
     u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-	char challenge[1024], *p;
-	int len;
+	char challenge[1024];
 	struct skey skey;
 
 	if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
@@ -54,15 +62,10 @@ skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
 	*name  = xstrdup("");
 	*infotxt  = xstrdup("");
 	*numprompts = 1;
-	*prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *));
-	*echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
-	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
-
-	len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(SKEY_PROMPT) + 1;
-	p = xmalloc(len);
-	strlcpy(p, challenge, len);
-	strlcat(p, SKEY_PROMPT, len);
-	(*prompts)[0] = p;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+
+	xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
index 2dc5c2be6293..db2aa7bf9331 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,39 +24,56 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
 #include <shadow.h>
 #endif
-
 #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
 #include <libgen.h>
 #endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "groupaccess.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
 
 /* Debugging messages */
 Buffer auth_debug;
@@ -231,6 +249,9 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
 	char *authmsg;
 
+	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+		return;
+
 	/* Raise logging level */
 	if (authenticated == 1 ||
 	    !authctxt->valid ||
@@ -259,44 +280,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
 	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
 		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+	if (authenticated)
+		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
+		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
+# endif
 #endif
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
-		ssh_audit_event_t event;
-
-		debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
-		    method, (int)geteuid());
-		/*
-		 * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
-		 * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
-		 * enough privs to write the event.
-		 */
-		event = audit_classify_auth(method);
-		switch(event) {
-		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
-		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
-			if (geteuid() == 0)
-				audit_event(event);
-			break;
-		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-		case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-			/*
-			 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
-			 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
-			 * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
-			 * successful login.
-			 */
-			if (geteuid() == 0)
-				audit_event(event);
-			else
-				PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
-			break;
-		default:
-			error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
-		}
-	}
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -309,7 +301,6 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method)
 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
 	case PERMIT_YES:
 		return 1;
-		break;
 	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
 		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
 			return 1;
@@ -336,7 +327,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method)
 static char *
 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	char *file, *ret;
+	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int i;
 
 	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
 	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
@@ -348,14 +340,11 @@ expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 	if (*file == '/')
 		return (file);
 
-	ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-	if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
-	    strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
-	    strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
 		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
-
 	xfree(file);
-	return (ret);
+	return (xstrdup(ret));
 }
 
 char *
@@ -492,6 +481,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 #endif
 	struct passwd *pw;
 
+	parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
+	    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
+
 	pw = getpwnam(user);
 	if (pw == NULL) {
 		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
@@ -579,6 +571,8 @@ fakepw(void)
 	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
 	fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
 	fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
+	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw->pw_uid;
+	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
 #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
 	fake.pw_class = "";
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
index 8b814ba6a080..8c554b6a6902 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.51 2005/06/06 11:20:36 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.58 2006/08/18 09:15:20 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -28,9 +28,8 @@
 #ifndef AUTH_H
 #define AUTH_H
 
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
@@ -48,7 +47,8 @@ typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
 typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
 
 struct Authctxt {
-	int		 success;
+	sig_atomic_t	 success;
+	int		 authenticated;	/* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
 	int		 postponed;	/* authentication needs another step */
 	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
 	int		 attempt;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
index 4bc2bf76d62d..b9d6b1115f4f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.70 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -10,7 +11,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.62 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -20,10 +28,15 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.62 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 
@@ -77,7 +90,7 @@ static const struct AuthMethod1
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for(i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
+	for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
 		if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
 			return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
 
@@ -96,6 +109,7 @@ get_authname(int type)
 	return (buf);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static int
 auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 {
@@ -120,6 +134,7 @@ auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 	return (authenticated);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static int
 auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 {
@@ -137,6 +152,7 @@ auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 	return (authenticated);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static int
 auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 {
@@ -175,6 +191,7 @@ auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 	return (authenticated);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static int
 auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 {
@@ -193,6 +210,7 @@ auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 	return (-1);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static int
 auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
index b147cadf373e..b78b739cdcaf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.31 2006/08/05 08:28:24 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
@@ -22,14 +23,22 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.24 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
@@ -291,7 +300,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	if (nresp > 100)
 		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
 	if (nresp > 0) {
-		response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char *));
+		response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
 		for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
 			response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
index 95844a05e5ba..c77c841a3a8a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.12 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -28,16 +28,22 @@
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
@@ -100,6 +106,8 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 
 	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+		if (ctxt != NULL)
+			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
 		xfree(doid);
 		return (0);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
index 1111ed67a643..663dec5d9e95 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.11 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,19 +24,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.6 2004/01/19 21:25:15 markus Exp $");
 
-#include "ssh2.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "auth.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
index fa83649755a3..a4fc9e6f73f2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,13 +24,19 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.2 2002/05/31 11:35:15 markus Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
index 1c30a3203e1f..952b448248e9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.13 2006/08/05 07:52:52 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,16 +24,29 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.7 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $");
 
-#include "auth.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
index 2321ef47be38..421c5c25d018 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,12 +24,22 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.5 2003/12/31 00:24:50 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
index a97d0f430b93..9863cd9e6e54 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,23 +24,32 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.9 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "auth.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
index d255242edb07..2d880b57cf41 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.113 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,23 +24,31 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.107 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
 
-#include "ssh2.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 #endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -96,6 +105,7 @@ do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -129,6 +139,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	xfree(service);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
index 8976616b4ff6..61faad12319c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.80 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,16 +36,25 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.66 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
@@ -52,6 +62,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.66 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 static int agent_present = 0;
 
@@ -103,7 +114,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 		close(sock);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
 		close(sock);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -119,7 +130,7 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 
 	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
 	len = buffer_len(request);
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+	put_u32(buf, len);
 
 	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 	}
 
 	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
-	len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+	len = get_u32(buf);
 	if (len > 256 * 1024)
 		fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
 
@@ -335,7 +346,6 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
 		break;
 	default:
 		return NULL;
-		break;
 	}
 	/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
 	auth->howmany--;
@@ -394,7 +404,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 		 * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
 		 */
 		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-			response[i] = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+			response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer);
 	}
 	buffer_free(&buffer);
 	return success;
@@ -517,7 +527,6 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
 	default:
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
-		break;
 	}
 	if (constrained) {
 		if (life != 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
index 0a6a4e3ecdeb..3da2561127e6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.34 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.36 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
 #ifndef AUTHFD_H
 #define AUTHFD_H
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-
 /* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
 #define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES	1
 #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
index 420813f37f86..735c64780964 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.76 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -36,16 +37,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.61 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 
-#include "cipher.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ key_save_private_pem(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *_passphrase,
 		return 0;
 	}
 	fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
-	if (fp == NULL ) {
+	if (fp == NULL) {
 		error("fdopen %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
 		close(fd);
 		return 0;
@@ -211,12 +223,10 @@ key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 		return key_save_private_rsa1(key, filename, passphrase,
 		    comment);
-		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		return key_save_private_pem(key, filename, passphrase,
 		    comment);
-		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -507,7 +517,7 @@ key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
 	return prv;
 }
 
-static int
+int
 key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
 {
 	struct stat st;
@@ -537,7 +547,7 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
 
 Key *
 key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
-    char **commentp)
+    char **commentp, int *perm_ok)
 {
 	int fd;
 
@@ -545,22 +555,24 @@ key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 	if (fd < 0)
 		return NULL;
 	if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
+		if (perm_ok != NULL)
+			*perm_ok = 0;
 		error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
 		close(fd);
 		return NULL;
 	}
+	if (perm_ok != NULL)
+		*perm_ok = 1;
 	switch (type) {
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 		return key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase,
 		    commentp);
 		/* closes fd */
-		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_UNSPEC:
 		return key_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase, commentp);
 		/* closes fd */
-		break;
 	default:
 		close(fd);
 		break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.h b/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
index 7f92701ec055..a6c74934d69a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.10 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.13 2006/04/25 08:02:27 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ int	 key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 Key	*key_load_public(const char *, char **);
 Key	*key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **);
 Key	*key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
-Key	*key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **);
+Key	*key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
 Key	*key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
+int	 key_perm_ok(int, const char *);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
index 106a3a0c70a6..cbdc22c64288 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.44 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -37,176 +38,18 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.37 2005/11/05 05:01:15 djm Exp $");
 
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-/*
- * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
- * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
- */
-int
-buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
-	int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
-	u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size);
-	int oi;
-	char msg[2];
-
-	/* Get the value of in binary */
-	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
-	if (oi != bin_size) {
-		error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
-		    oi, bin_size);
-		xfree(buf);
-		return (-1);
-	}
-
-	/* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
-	PUT_16BIT(msg, bits);
-	buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2);
-	/* Store the binary data. */
-	buffer_append(buffer, (char *)buf, oi);
-
-	memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
-	xfree(buf);
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
-		fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error");
-}
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
-/*
- * Retrieves an BIGNUM from the buffer.
- */
-int
-buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	u_int bits, bytes;
-	u_char buf[2], *bin;
-
-	/* Get the number for bits. */
-	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length");
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	bits = GET_16BIT(buf);
-	/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
-	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
-	if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small");
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
-	BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value);
-	if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed");
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
-		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error");
-}
-
-/*
- * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
- */
-int
-buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	u_int bytes;
-	u_char *buf;
-	int oi;
-	u_int hasnohigh = 0;
-
-	if (BN_is_zero(value)) {
-		buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (value->neg) {
-		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */
-	if (bytes < 2) {
-		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small");
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	buf = xmalloc(bytes);
-	buf[0] = 0x00;
-	/* Get the value of in binary */
-	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
-	if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
-		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
-		    "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
-		xfree(buf);
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
-	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
-	memset(buf, 0, bytes);
-	xfree(buf);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-void
-buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
-		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error");
-}
-
-int
-buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	u_int len;
-	u_char *bin;
-
-	if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum");
-		return (-1);
-	}
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
 
-	if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
-		xfree(bin);
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	if (len > 8 * 1024) {
-		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", len);
-		xfree(bin);
-		return (-1);
-	}
-	BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
-	xfree(bin);
-	return (0);
-}
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
-void
-buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
-{
-	if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
-		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error");
-}
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 /*
  * Returns integers from the buffer (msb first).
@@ -219,7 +62,7 @@ buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *ret, Buffer *buffer)
 
 	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1)
 		return (-1);
-	*ret = GET_16BIT(buf);
+	*ret = get_u16(buf);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -241,7 +84,7 @@ buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer)
 
 	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1)
 		return (-1);
-	*ret = GET_32BIT(buf);
+	*ret = get_u32(buf);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -263,7 +106,7 @@ buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer)
 
 	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1)
 		return (-1);
-	*ret = GET_64BIT(buf);
+	*ret = get_u64(buf);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -286,7 +129,7 @@ buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
 {
 	char buf[2];
 
-	PUT_16BIT(buf, value);
+	put_u16(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2);
 }
 
@@ -295,7 +138,7 @@ buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
 {
 	char buf[4];
 
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, value);
+	put_u32(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
 }
 
@@ -304,7 +147,7 @@ buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
 {
 	char buf[8];
 
-	PUT_64BIT(buf, value);
+	put_u64(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.h b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.h
index f5efaed3edd7..8a5359855fc8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: bufaux.h,v 1.21 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.h,v 1.22 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c b/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6cf65d372ef6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufbn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.3 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $*/
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
+ * Buffers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
+ * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
+ */
+int
+buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
+	int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size);
+	int oi;
+	char msg[2];
+
+	/* Get the value of in binary */
+	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
+	if (oi != bin_size) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
+		    oi, bin_size);
+		xfree(buf);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
+	put_u16(msg, bits);
+	buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2);
+	/* Store the binary data. */
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
+
+	memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
+	xfree(buf);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieves an BIGNUM from the buffer.
+ */
+int
+buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int bits, bytes;
+	u_char buf[2], *bin;
+
+	/* Get the number for bits. */
+	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	bits = get_u16(buf);
+	/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
+	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	if (bytes > 8 * 1024) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
+	BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value);
+	if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
+ */
+int
+buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int bytes;
+	u_char *buf;
+	int oi;
+	u_int hasnohigh = 0;
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(value)) {
+		buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (value->neg) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */
+	if (bytes < 2) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+	buf[0] = 0x00;
+	/* Get the value of in binary */
+	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
+	if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
+		error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
+		    "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
+		xfree(buf);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
+	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
+	memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+	xfree(buf);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error");
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int len;
+	u_char *bin;
+
+	if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
+		xfree(bin);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (len > 8 * 1024) {
+		error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", len);
+		xfree(bin);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
+	xfree(bin);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error");
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
index 487e0810598a..e02e1e35c994 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.31 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,12 +13,21 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.23 2005/03/14 11:46:56 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
+#define	BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK	0x100000
+#define	BUFFER_MAX_LEN		0xa00000
+#define	BUFFER_ALLOCSZ		0x008000
+
 /* Initializes the buffer structure. */
 
 void
@@ -66,6 +76,23 @@ buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, u_int len)
 	memcpy(p, data, len);
 }
 
+static int
+buffer_compact(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
+	 * data to the beginning.
+	 */
+	if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
+		memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
+			buffer->end - buffer->offset);
+		buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
+		buffer->offset = 0;
+		return (1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
 /*
  * Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does
  * not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer
@@ -93,29 +120,43 @@ restart:
 		buffer->end += len;
 		return p;
 	}
-	/*
-	 * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
-	 * data to the beginning and retry.
-	 */
-	if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
-		memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
-			buffer->end - buffer->offset);
-		buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
-		buffer->offset = 0;
+
+	/* Compact data back to the start of the buffer if necessary */
+	if (buffer_compact(buffer))
 		goto restart;
-	}
-	/* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
 
-	newlen = buffer->alloc + len + 32768;
+	/* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
+	newlen = roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ);
 	if (newlen > BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
 		fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
 		    newlen);
-	buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, newlen);
+	buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, 1, newlen);
 	buffer->alloc = newlen;
 	goto restart;
 	/* NOTREACHED */
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check whether an allocation of 'len' will fit in the buffer
+ * This must follow the same math as buffer_append_space
+ */
+int
+buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
+{
+	if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
+		buffer->offset = 0;
+		buffer->end = 0;
+	}
+ restart:
+	if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc)
+		return (1);
+	if (buffer_compact(buffer))
+		goto restart;
+	if (roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ) <= BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
+		return (1);
+	return (0);
+}
+
 /* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */
 
 u_int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buffer.h b/crypto/openssh/buffer.h
index 2b20eed52acf..ecc4aea83193 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/buffer.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buffer.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.13 2005/03/14 11:46:56 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.16 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ typedef struct {
 	u_int	 end;		/* Offset of last byte containing data. */
 }       Buffer;
 
-#define	BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK	0x100000
-#define	BUFFER_MAX_LEN		0xa00000
-
 void	 buffer_init(Buffer *);
 void	 buffer_clear(Buffer *);
 void	 buffer_free(Buffer *);
@@ -36,6 +33,8 @@ void	*buffer_ptr(Buffer *);
 void	 buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
 void	*buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int);
 
+int	 buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int);
+
 void	 buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
 
 void	 buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
@@ -47,4 +46,40 @@ int	 buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
 int	 buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
 int	 buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
 
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void    buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void    buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void	buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+void	buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+
+u_short	buffer_get_short(Buffer *);
+void	buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short);
+
+u_int	buffer_get_int(Buffer *);
+void    buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *);
+void	buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t);
+
+int     buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
+void    buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
+
+void   *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
+void    buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+void	buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
+
+#define buffer_skip_string(b) \
+    do { u_int l = buffer_get_int(b); buffer_consume(b, l); } while (0)
+
+int	buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int	buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *);
+int	buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *);
+int	buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *);
+void	*buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
+int	buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *);
+
 #endif				/* BUFFER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in b/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in
index cb9eb3048712..a3b9014bcf55 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buildpkg.sh.in
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ SSHDGID=67	# Default privsep gid
 SYSVINITSTART=S98
 SYSVINITSTOPT=K30
 # We will source these if they exist
-POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES=./pkg_post_make_install_fixes.sh
+POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES=./pkg-post-make-install-fixes.sh
 POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS=./pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh
 # We'll be one level deeper looking for these
 PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-preinstall.local
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL=../pkg-request.local
 # end of sourced files
 #
 OPENSSHD=opensshd.init
+OPENSSH_MANIFEST=openssh.xml
+OPENSSH_FMRI=svc:/site/openssh:default
 
 PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=@PATH_GROUPADD_PROG@
 PATH_USERADD_PROG=@PATH_USERADD_PROG@
@@ -60,6 +62,10 @@ SYSTEM_DIR="/etc	\
 /etc/rc1.d		\
 /etc/rc2.d		\
 /etc/opt		\
+/lib			\
+/lib/svc		\
+/lib/svc/method		\
+/lib/svc/method/site	\
 /opt			\
 /opt/bin		\
 /usr			\
@@ -82,6 +88,9 @@ SYSTEM_DIR="/etc	\
 /var			\
 /var/opt		\
 /var/run		\
+/var/svc		\
+/var/svc/manifest	\
+/var/svc/manifest/site  \
 /var/tmp		\
 /tmp"
 
@@ -119,6 +128,12 @@ do
 	eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
 done
 
+## Are we using Solaris' SMF?
+DO_SMF=0
+if egrep "^#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS" config.h > /dev/null 2>&1
+then
+	DO_SMF=1
+fi
 
 ## Collect value of privsep user
 for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
@@ -168,10 +183,25 @@ then
 fi
 
 ## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it.
-mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# For Solaris' SMF, /lib/svc/method/site is the preferred place
+	# for start/stop scripts that aren't supplied with the OS, and
+	# similarly /var/svc/manifest/site for manifests.
+	mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/lib/svc/method/site
+	mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site
+
+	cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/lib/svc/method/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+	chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/lib/svc/method/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+
+	cp ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site
+	chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site/${OPENSSH_MANIFEST}
+else
+	mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d
 
-cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
-chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+	cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+	chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+fi
 
 [ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ]  &&  \
 	perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \
@@ -221,15 +251,22 @@ touch depend
 
 ## Build space file
 echo "Building space file..."
-cat > space << _EOF
-# extra space required by start/stop links added by installf in postinstall
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# XXX Is this necessary?  If not, remove space line from mk-proto.awk.
+	touch space
+else
+	cat > space << _EOF
+# extra space required by start/stop links added by installf 
+# in postinstall
 $TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1
 $TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1
 _EOF
-[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
-echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
-[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
-echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
+	[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
+	echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
+	[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
+	echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
+fi
 
 ## Build preinstall file
 echo "Building preinstall file..."
@@ -243,7 +280,16 @@ _EOF
 
 cat >> preinstall << _EOF
 #
-[ "\${PRE_INS_STOP}" = "yes" ]  &&  ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
+if [ "\${PRE_INS_STOP}" = "yes" ]
+then
+	if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] 
+	then
+		svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	else
+		${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
+	fi
+fi
+
 exit 0
 _EOF
 
@@ -265,28 +311,41 @@ cat > postinstall << _EOF
 }
 
 # make rc?.d dirs only if we are doing a test install
-[ -n "${TEST_DIR}" ]  &&  {
+[ -n "${TEST_DIR}" ]  &&  [ $DO_SMF -ne 1 ] && {
 	[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rcS.d
 	mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc0.d
 	[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc1.d
 	mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc2.d
 }
 
-if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ]
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
 then
-	[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
-installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
-	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
-	[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
-	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
-	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+	# Delete the existing service, if it exists, then import the 
+	# new one.
+	if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+		svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	fi
+	# NOTE, if manifest enables sshd by default, this will actually
+	# start the daemon, which may not be what the user wants.
+	svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site/$OPENSSH_MANIFEST
 else
-	[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
-installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
-	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
-	[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
-	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
-	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+	if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ]
+	then
+		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
+	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+	else
+		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
+	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+	fi
 fi
 
 # If piddir doesn't exist we add it. (Ie. --with-pid-dir=/var/opt/ssh)
@@ -311,14 +370,7 @@ then
 	chroot=echo
 fi
 
-if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/$sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null
-then
-	echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation disabled in config, not creating PrivSep user"
-	echo "or group."
-else
-	echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation enabled in config (or defaulting to on)."
-
-	# user required?
+	echo "PrivilegeSeparation user always required."
 	if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
 	then
 		echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
@@ -363,9 +415,18 @@ else
 		\$chroot ${PATH_USERADD_PROG} -c 'SSHD PrivSep User' -s /bin/false -g $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \$sshduid $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
 		\$chroot ${PATH_PASSWD_PROG} -l $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
 	}
-fi
 
-[ "\${POST_INS_START}" = "yes" ]  &&  ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} start
+if [ "\${POST_INS_START}" = "yes" ]
+then
+	if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+	then
+		# See svccfg import note above.  The service may already
+		# be started.
+		svcadm enable $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	else
+		${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} start
+	fi
+fi
 exit 0
 _EOF
 
@@ -374,7 +435,12 @@ echo "Building preremove file..."
 cat > preremove << _EOF
 #! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
 #
-${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] 
+then
+	svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI
+else
+	${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
+fi
 _EOF
 
 # local preremove changes here
@@ -389,6 +455,13 @@ echo "Building postremove file..."
 cat > postremove << _EOF
 #! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
 #
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+		svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	fi
+fi
 _EOF
 
 # local postremove changes here
@@ -454,7 +527,45 @@ done
 
 _EOF
 
-cat >> request << _EOF
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# This could get hairy, as the running sshd may not be under SMF.
+	# We'll assume an earlier version of OpenSSH started via SMF.
+	cat >> request << _EOF
+PRE_INS_STOP=no
+POST_INS_START=no
+# determine if should restart the daemon
+if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid  ] && \
+    /usr/bin/svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI 2>&1 | egrep "^online" > /dev/null 2>&1
+then
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+	case \$ans in
+		[y,Y]*)	PRE_INS_STOP=yes
+			POST_INS_START=yes
+			;;
+	esac
+
+else
+
+# determine if we should start sshd
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \
+-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+	case \$ans in
+		[y,Y]*)	POST_INS_START=yes ;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+# make parameters available to installation service,
+# and so to any other packaging scripts
+cat >\$1 <<!
+PRE_INS_STOP='\$PRE_INS_STOP'
+POST_INS_START='\$POST_INS_START'
+!
+
+_EOF
+else
+	cat >> request << _EOF
 USE_SYM_LINKS=no
 PRE_INS_STOP=no
 POST_INS_START=no
@@ -495,6 +606,7 @@ POST_INS_START='\$POST_INS_START'
 !
 
 _EOF
+fi
 
 # local request changes here
 [ -s "${PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL}" ]  &&  . ${PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
index 6ca60e6b4487..2345cc35c315 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.61 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,10 +13,23 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.48 2005/12/28 22:46:06 stevesk Exp $");
 
-#include "packet.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 
@@ -43,6 +57,9 @@ get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
 		cleanup_exit(255);
 	}
 
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
+		check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
+
 	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
 
 	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
@@ -52,9 +69,6 @@ get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
 	    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
 		fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
 
-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
-		check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
-
 	if (!use_dns)
 		return xstrdup(ntop);
 
@@ -87,7 +101,7 @@ get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
 		if (isupper(name[i]))
-			name[i] = tolower(name[i]);
+			name[i] = (char)tolower(name[i]);
 	/*
 	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
 	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
@@ -102,7 +116,7 @@ get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
 		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
-		    "failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name);
+		    "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
 		return xstrdup(ntop);
 	}
 	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.h b/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
index df1f125e5e34..e33e8941b2cb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.9 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
index 1252f344673b..26b63a1aae90 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.266 2006/08/29 10:40:18 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -39,22 +40,41 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.232 2006/01/30 12:22:22 reyk Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 
 /* -- channel core */
 
@@ -91,11 +111,18 @@ typedef struct {
 	u_short listen_port;		/* Remote side should listen port number. */
 } ForwardPermission;
 
-/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect. */
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */
 static ForwardPermission permitted_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
 
-/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array. */
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */
+static ForwardPermission permitted_adm_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */
 static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */
+static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+
 /*
  * If this is true, all opens are permitted.  This is the case on the server
  * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
@@ -123,7 +150,7 @@ static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
  * Fake X11 authentication data.  This is what the server will be sending us;
  * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
  */
-static char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
+static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
 static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
 
 
@@ -168,7 +195,7 @@ channel_lookup(int id)
 	if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
 		return (NULL);
 
-	switch(c->type) {
+	switch (c->type) {
 	case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
 	case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
 	case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
@@ -178,7 +205,6 @@ channel_lookup(int id)
 	case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
 	case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
 		return (c);
-		break;
 	}
 	logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
 	return (NULL);
@@ -188,7 +214,6 @@ channel_lookup(int id)
  * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
  * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
  */
-
 static void
 channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
     int extusage, int nonblock)
@@ -235,7 +260,6 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
  * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
  * remote_name to be freed.
  */
-
 Channel *
 channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
     u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
@@ -247,7 +271,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 	/* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */
 	if (channels_alloc == 0) {
 		channels_alloc = 10;
-		channels = xmalloc(channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *));
+		channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *));
 		for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
 			channels[i] = NULL;
 	}
@@ -264,16 +288,15 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 		if (channels_alloc > 10000)
 			fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
 			    "too big.", channels_alloc);
-		channels = xrealloc(channels,
-		    (channels_alloc + 10) * sizeof(Channel *));
+		channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
+		    sizeof(Channel *));
 		channels_alloc += 10;
 		debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
 		for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
 			channels[i] = NULL;
 	}
 	/* Initialize and return new channel. */
-	c = channels[found] = xmalloc(sizeof(Channel));
-	memset(c, 0, sizeof(Channel));
+	c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
 	buffer_init(&c->input);
 	buffer_init(&c->output);
 	buffer_init(&c->extended);
@@ -337,7 +360,6 @@ channel_close_fd(int *fdp)
 }
 
 /* Close all channel fd/socket. */
-
 static void
 channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
 {
@@ -352,7 +374,6 @@ channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
 }
 
 /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
-
 void
 channel_free(Channel *c)
 {
@@ -399,7 +420,6 @@ channel_free_all(void)
  * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels.  This is used to close extra file
  * descriptors after a fork.
  */
-
 void
 channel_close_all(void)
 {
@@ -413,7 +433,6 @@ channel_close_all(void)
 /*
  * Stop listening to channels.
  */
-
 void
 channel_stop_listening(void)
 {
@@ -440,7 +459,6 @@ channel_stop_listening(void)
  * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
  * more channel is overfull.
  */
-
 int
 channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void)
 {
@@ -470,7 +488,6 @@ channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void)
 }
 
 /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
-
 int
 channel_still_open(void)
 {
@@ -513,7 +530,6 @@ channel_still_open(void)
 }
 
 /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
-
 int
 channel_find_open(void)
 {
@@ -558,7 +574,6 @@ channel_find_open(void)
  * suitable for sending to the client.  The message contains crlf pairs for
  * newlines.
  */
-
 char *
 channel_open_message(void)
 {
@@ -643,6 +658,7 @@ channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
 	packet_put_cstring(service);
 	packet_put_char(wantconfirm);
 }
+
 void
 channel_register_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *ctx)
 {
@@ -655,6 +671,7 @@ channel_register_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *ctx)
 	c->confirm = fn;
 	c->confirm_ctx = ctx;
 }
+
 void
 channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
 {
@@ -667,6 +684,7 @@ channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
 	c->detach_user = fn;
 	c->detach_close = do_close;
 }
+
 void
 channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
 {
@@ -679,6 +697,7 @@ channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
 	c->detach_user = NULL;
 	c->detach_close = 0;
 }
+
 void
 channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
     channel_outfilter_fn *ofn)
@@ -718,25 +737,27 @@ channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
  * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which
  * have events pending.
  */
-typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset);
+typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
 chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
 chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
 	FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
 }
 
 static void
-channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
 		FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
@@ -745,16 +766,14 @@ channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 }
 
 static void
-channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
 
-	/* check buffer limits */
-	limit = MIN(limit, (BUFFER_MAX_LEN - BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK - CHAN_RBUF));
-
 	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
 	    limit > 0 &&
-	    buffer_len(&c->input) < limit)
+	    buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
+	    buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
 		FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
 	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
 	    c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
@@ -784,8 +803,9 @@ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 		FD_SET(c->ctl_fd, readset);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
 		packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
@@ -796,8 +816,9 @@ channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0)
 		chan_mark_dead(c);
@@ -873,7 +894,7 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
 }
 
 static void
-channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
 
@@ -899,7 +920,7 @@ channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 }
 
 static void
-channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
 
@@ -925,8 +946,9 @@ channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 }
 
 /* try to decode a socks4 header */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	char *p, *host;
 	u_int len, have, i, found;
@@ -990,7 +1012,7 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	s4_rsp.command = 90;			/* cd: req granted */
 	s4_rsp.dest_port = 0;			/* ignored */
 	s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;	/* ignored */
-	buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -1003,8 +1025,9 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT	0x01
 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS	0x00
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	struct {
 		u_int8_t version;
@@ -1014,7 +1037,7 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	} s5_req, s5_rsp;
 	u_int16_t dest_port;
 	u_char *p, dest_addr[255+1];
-	u_int have, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
+	u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
 
 	debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
 	p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
@@ -1030,7 +1053,7 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 			return 0;
 		/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
 		for (found = 0, i = 2 ; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
-			if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH ) {
+			if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
 				found = 1;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1051,7 +1074,7 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
 	if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
 		return 0;			/* need more */
-	memcpy((char *)&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
+	memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
 	if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
 	    s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
 	    s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
@@ -1075,7 +1098,10 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 		debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (have < 4 + addrlen + 2)
+	need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+		need++;
+	if (have < need)
 		return 0;
 	buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req));
 	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
@@ -1099,15 +1125,15 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	((struct in_addr *)&dest_addr)->s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
 	dest_port = 0;				/* ignored */
 
-	buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
-	buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&dest_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
-	buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+	buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
 	return 1;
 }
 
 /* dynamic port forwarding */
 static void
-channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	u_char *p;
 	u_int have;
@@ -1150,8 +1176,9 @@ channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 }
 
 /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	Channel *nc;
 	struct sockaddr addr;
@@ -1275,8 +1302,9 @@ channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
 /*
  * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
  */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	Channel *nc;
 	struct sockaddr addr;
@@ -1332,8 +1360,9 @@ channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
  * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
  * clients.
  */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	Channel *nc;
 	int newsock;
@@ -1365,8 +1394,9 @@ channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
@@ -1411,18 +1441,25 @@ channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
 	int len;
 
 	if (c->rfd != -1 &&
 	    FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) {
+		errno = 0;
 		len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
 		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
 			return 1;
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
 		if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+		if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
+		    (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
 			debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
 			    c->self, c->rfd, len);
 			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
@@ -1451,8 +1488,10 @@ channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	struct termios tio;
 	u_char *data = NULL, *buf;
@@ -1538,8 +1577,9 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
+
 static int
-channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
 	int len;
@@ -1581,8 +1621,10 @@ channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static int
-channel_handle_ctl(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_ctl(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	char buf[16];
 	int len;
@@ -1608,6 +1650,7 @@ channel_handle_ctl(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
+
 static int
 channel_check_window(Channel *c)
 {
@@ -1629,7 +1672,7 @@ channel_check_window(Channel *c)
 }
 
 static void
-channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	if (c->delayed)
 		return;
@@ -1642,8 +1685,9 @@ channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 	channel_check_window(c);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 static void
-channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	int len;
 
@@ -1760,7 +1804,7 @@ channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c)
 }
 
 static void
-channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	static int did_init = 0;
 	u_int i;
@@ -1788,15 +1832,20 @@ void
 channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
     u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
 {
-	u_int n, sz;
+	u_int n, sz, nfdset;
 
 	n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd);
 
-	sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+	nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
+	/* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
+	if (nfdset && SIZE_T_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
+		fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
+	sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
+
 	/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
 	if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
-		*readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, sz);
-		*writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, sz);
+		*readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+		*writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
 		*nallocp = sz;
 	}
 	*maxfdp = n;
@@ -1812,14 +1861,13 @@ channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
  * events pending.
  */
 void
-channel_after_select(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset);
 }
 
 
 /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
-
 void
 channel_output_poll(void)
 {
@@ -1940,6 +1988,7 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
 
 /* -- protocol input */
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -1999,6 +2048,7 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	xfree(data);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2045,6 +2095,7 @@ channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	xfree(data);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2068,6 +2119,7 @@ channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2106,6 +2158,7 @@ channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }
 
 /* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2118,6 +2171,7 @@ channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2134,6 +2188,7 @@ channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	channel_free(c);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2181,6 +2236,7 @@ reason2txt(int reason)
 	return "unknown reason";
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2212,6 +2268,7 @@ channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	channel_free(c);
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2236,6 +2293,7 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	c->remote_window += adjust;
 }
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -2454,7 +2512,7 @@ channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *listen_address,
  * the secure channel to host:port from local side.
  */
 
-void
+int
 channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
     const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect)
 {
@@ -2498,7 +2556,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
 			success = 1;
 			break;
 		case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
-			logit("Warning: Server denied remote port forwarding.");
 			break;
 		default:
 			/* Unknown packet */
@@ -2512,6 +2569,7 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
 		permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = listen_port;
 		num_permitted_opens++;
 	}
+	return (success ? 0 : -1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2551,13 +2609,13 @@ channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port)
 /*
  * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST.  This initates
  * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect
- * message if there was an error).  This never returns if there was an error.
+ * message if there was an error).
  */
-
-void
+int
 channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports)
 {
 	u_short port, host_port;
+	int success = 0;
 	char *hostname;
 
 	/* Get arguments from the packet. */
@@ -2579,11 +2637,13 @@ channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports)
 #endif
 
 	/* Initiate forwarding */
-	channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
+	success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
 	    host_port, gateway_ports);
 
 	/* Free the argument string. */
 	xfree(hostname);
+
+	return (success ? 0 : -1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2602,7 +2662,7 @@ void
 channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
 {
 	if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
-		fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards");
+		fatal("channel_add_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
 	debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
 
 	permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
@@ -2612,6 +2672,19 @@ channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
 	all_opens_permitted = 0;
 }
 
+int
+channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+	if (num_adm_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+		fatal("channel_add_adm_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
+	debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
+	     = xstrdup(host);
+	permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+	return ++num_adm_permitted_opens;
+}
+
 void
 channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
 {
@@ -2621,9 +2694,18 @@ channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
 		if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
 			xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
 	num_permitted_opens = 0;
-
 }
 
+void
+channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+		if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
+			xfree(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+	num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+}
 
 /* return socket to remote host, port */
 static int
@@ -2701,7 +2783,7 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short listen_port)
 int
 channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port)
 {
-	int i, permit;
+	int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
 
 	permit = all_opens_permitted;
 	if (!permit) {
@@ -2710,9 +2792,19 @@ channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port)
 			    permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
 			    strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0)
 				permit = 1;
+	}
 
+	if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
+		permit_adm = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+			if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
+			    permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
+			    strcmp(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, host)
+			    == 0)
+				permit_adm = 1;
 	}
-	if (!permit) {
+
+	if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
 		logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
 		    "but the request was denied.", host, port);
 		return -1;
@@ -2733,10 +2825,10 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
 		if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
 			continue;
 		channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
 		packet_send();
 	}
 }
@@ -2844,7 +2936,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
-	*chanids = xmalloc(sizeof(**chanids) * (num_socks + 1));
+	*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
 	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
 		sock = socks[n];
 		nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
@@ -2873,7 +2965,7 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	snprintf(addr.sun_path, sizeof addr.sun_path, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
 		return sock;
 	close(sock);
 	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
@@ -2883,12 +2975,12 @@ connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 int
 x11_connect_display(void)
 {
-	int display_number, sock = 0;
+	u_int display_number;
 	const char *display;
 	char buf[1024], *cp;
 	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-	int gaierr;
+	int gaierr, sock = 0;
 
 	/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
 	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
@@ -2908,7 +3000,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
 	    display[0] == ':') {
 		/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
-		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) {
+		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
 			error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
 			    display);
 			return -1;
@@ -2933,7 +3025,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	}
 	*cp = 0;
 	/* buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the display number. */
-	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) {
+	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
 		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
 		    display);
 		return -1;
@@ -2943,7 +3035,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", 6000 + display_number);
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, gai_strerror(gaierr));
 		return -1;
@@ -2957,7 +3049,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 		}
 		/* Connect it to the display. */
 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
-			debug2("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf,
+			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
 			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
 			close(sock);
 			continue;
@@ -2967,7 +3059,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 	}
 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
 	if (!ai) {
-		error("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
 		    strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -2981,6 +3073,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
  * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE.
  */
 
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -3024,6 +3117,7 @@ x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }
 
 /* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
 void
 deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -3070,13 +3164,11 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	cp = disp;
-	if (disp)
-		cp = strchr(disp, ':');
+	cp = strchr(disp, ':');
 	if (cp)
 		cp = strchr(cp, '.');
 	if (cp)
-		screen_number = atoi(cp + 1);
+		screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
 	else
 		screen_number = 0;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
index a97dd9007129..2674f096e9a8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.83 2005/12/30 15:56:37 reyk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.88 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@
 #ifndef CHANNEL_H
 #define CHANNEL_H
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-
 /* Definitions for channel types. */
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER	1	/* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER	2	/* Listening on a port. */
@@ -207,11 +205,13 @@ int	 channel_find_open(void);
 void	 channel_set_af(int af);
 void     channel_permit_all_opens(void);
 void	 channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+int	 channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int);
 void	 channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
-void     channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
+void	 channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
+int      channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
 int	 channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short);
 int	 channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short);
-void	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
+int	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
 	     const char *, u_short);
 int	 channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
 	     const char *, u_short, int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
index f815e8ae524e..fc16e20d7e79 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-3des1.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.6 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,9 +24,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.2 2003/12/22 20:29:55 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c
index a95fa674781e..cb0bf736c39d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-acss.c
@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-RCSID("$Id: cipher-acss.c,v 1.3 2005/07/17 07:04:47 djm Exp $");
+#include <string.h>
 
 #if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c
index 228ddb104417..3ea594969eab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-aes.c
@@ -28,9 +28,13 @@
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
 #ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-aes.c,v 1.2 2003/11/26 21:44:29 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "rijndael.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c
index 5af695c17406..292488c5c617 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-bf1.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,9 +24,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.1 2003/05/15 03:08:29 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c
index 8a98f3c42559..b24f3a428866 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher-ctr.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -14,12 +15,16 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.6 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-#include "log.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
 
 /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
index 1434d5524029..b264063c4031 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.81 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,14 +36,18 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.77 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
 /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
index 6bb5719b0b34..49bbc1682b97 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.35 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.36 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c b/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c
index 11d1d4d9aed2..238f965e6446 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cleanup.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -13,8 +14,13 @@
  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.1 2003/09/23 20:17:11 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "log.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
index b76f7cfe0536..88dfb1f32456 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.175 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -59,20 +60,43 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.149 2005/12/30 15:56:37 reyk Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "readconf.h"
@@ -118,7 +142,7 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
 static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
 
 /* Common data for the client loop code. */
-static int quit_pending;	/* Set to non-zero to quit the client loop. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
 static int escape_char;		/* Escape character. */
 static int escape_pending;	/* Last character was the escape character */
 static int last_was_cr;		/* Last character was a newline. */
@@ -178,7 +202,7 @@ enter_non_blocking(void)
  * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH).  This just sets a
  * flag indicating that the window has changed.
  */
-
+/*ARGSUSED */
 static void
 window_change_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -190,7 +214,7 @@ window_change_handler(int sig)
  * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate.  These
  * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
  */
-
+/*ARGSUSED */
 static void
 signal_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -422,10 +446,10 @@ client_check_window_change(void)
 		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
 			return;
 		packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
 		packet_send();
 	}
 }
@@ -569,7 +593,7 @@ client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr)
 }
 
 static void
-client_process_net_input(fd_set * readset)
+client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	int len;
 	char buf[8192];
@@ -677,7 +701,7 @@ client_extra_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
 }
 
 static void
-client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
+client_process_control(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	Channel *c;
@@ -808,8 +832,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	cctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*cctx));
-	memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
+	cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
 	cctx->want_tty = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY) != 0;
 	cctx->want_subsys = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS) != 0;
 	cctx->want_x_fwd = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD) != 0;
@@ -824,7 +847,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 	env_len = MIN(env_len, 4096);
 	debug3("%s: receiving %d env vars", __func__, env_len);
 	if (env_len != 0) {
-		cctx->env = xmalloc(sizeof(*cctx->env) * (env_len + 1));
+		cctx->env = xcalloc(env_len + 1, sizeof(*cctx->env));
 		for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
 			cctx->env[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
 		cctx->env[i] = NULL;
@@ -832,6 +855,7 @@ client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
 
 	debug2("%s: accepted tty %d, subsys %d, cmd %s", __func__,
 	    cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cmd);
+	xfree(cmd);
 
 	/* Gather fds from client */
 	new_fd[0] = mm_receive_fd(client_fd);
@@ -912,12 +936,16 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 
 	if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
 		logit("Commands:");
-		logit("      -Lport:host:hostport    Request local forward");
-		logit("      -Rport:host:hostport    Request remote forward");
-		logit("      -KRhostport             Cancel remote forward");
+		logit("      -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
+		    "Request local forward");
+		logit("      -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
+		    "Request remote forward");
+		logit("      -KR[bind_address:]port                 "
+		    "Cancel remote forward");
 		if (!options.permit_local_command)
 			goto out;
-		logit("      !args                   Execute local command");
+		logit("      !args                                  "
+		    "Execute local command");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -978,9 +1006,12 @@ process_cmdline(void)
 				goto out;
 			}
 		} else {
-			channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
+			if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
 			    fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
-			    fwd.connect_port);
+			    fwd.connect_port) < 0) {
+				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+				goto out;
+			}
 		}
 
 		logit("Forwarding port.");
@@ -1172,7 +1203,7 @@ Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
 }
 
 static void
-client_process_input(fd_set * readset)
+client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	int len;
 	char buf[8192];
@@ -1225,7 +1256,7 @@ client_process_input(fd_set * readset)
 }
 
 static void
-client_process_output(fd_set * writeset)
+client_process_output(fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	int len;
 	char buf[100];
@@ -1869,10 +1900,10 @@ client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
 
 		channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 0);
 		packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
 		tio = get_saved_tio();
 		tty_make_modes(-1, tiop != NULL ? tiop : &tio);
 		packet_send();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
index aed2d918b1d7..beec62f70b0c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.14 2005/07/04 00:58:43 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+#include <termios.h>
+
 /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
 int	 client_loop(int, int, int);
 void	 client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
index 4086e853ed6e..da67f9410d1c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.76 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,11 +24,16 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.71 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "match.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
index cf92dbdeefcc..83d469d539a5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.39 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.40 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compress.c b/crypto/openssh/compress.c
index 0d1c7e55e8ed..c058d222412f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compress.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compress.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.25 2006/08/06 01:13:32 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,11 +13,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.21 2004/01/13 19:45:15 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
 
 #include "log.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "zlib.h"
 #include "compress.h"
 
 z_stream incoming_stream;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compress.h b/crypto/openssh/compress.h
index e364f4bdc582..418d6fd2ca90 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compress.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compress.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.11 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.12 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
index 70e26deeabf8..cfcd0272db25 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.322 2006/01/29 13:22:39 dtucker Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.367 2006/09/24 19:08:59 tim Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.367 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 
 AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ AC_PROG_AWK
 AC_PROG_CPP
 AC_PROG_RANLIB
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
+AC_PROG_EGREP
 AC_PATH_PROG(AR, ar)
 AC_PATH_PROG(CAT, cat)
 AC_PATH_PROG(KILL, kill)
@@ -125,15 +127,45 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(rpath,
 	]
 )
 
+# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
+SIA_MSG="no"
+SPC_MSG="no"
+
 # Check for some target-specific stuff
 case "$host" in
 *-*-aix*)
+	# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
+	# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
+	# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
+	# It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are
+	# not fatal.
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if compiler allows macro redefinitions)
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+	    [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#define testmacro foo
+#define testmacro bar
+int main(void) { exit(0); }
+	    ]])],
+	    [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+	    [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+	      CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	    ]
+	)
+
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
 	if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
 		blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
 	fi
 	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
-	for tryflags in -blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, ;do
+	if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
+		flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
+	else
+		flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
+	fi
+	for tryflags in $flags ;do
 		if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
 			LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
 			AC_TRY_LINK([], [], [blibflags=$tryflags])
@@ -173,6 +205,12 @@ case "$host" in
 		[#include <usersec.h>]
 	)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setauthdb)
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(F_CLOSEM,
+	    AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM, 1, [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
+	    [],
+	    [ #include <limits.h>
+	      #include <fcntl.h> ]
+	)
 	check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH, 1, [Define if you have a broken realpath.])
 	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID, 1,
@@ -188,6 +226,7 @@ case "$host" in
 		supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
 	AC_DEFINE(SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID, 1,
 	    [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
+	AC_DEFINE(PTY_ZEROREAD, 1, [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
 	;;
 *-*-cygwin*)
 	check_for_libcrypt_later=1
@@ -229,6 +268,14 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(BIND_8_COMPAT, 1,
 		[Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
+	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD, 1, [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF, 1,
+	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+	;;
+*-*-dragonfly*)
+	SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
 	;;
 *-*-hpux*)
 	# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
@@ -343,7 +390,7 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
 	fi
 	;;
 mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
-	AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPRGP, 1, [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
+	AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPGRP, 1, [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
 	SONY=1
 	;;
 *-*-netbsd*)
@@ -383,6 +430,8 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__, 1, [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__, 1, [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
 	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD, 1, [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
+	AC_DEFINE(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND, 1,
+	    [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
 	;;
 *-*-solaris*)
 	if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
@@ -402,6 +451,8 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY, 1,
 		[Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
 		after setsid()])
+	AC_DEFINE(PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME, 1, [must supply username to passwd
+		in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
 	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
 	# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
 	conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
@@ -415,6 +466,17 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	else
 		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
 	fi
+	AC_ARG_WITH(solaris-contracts,
+		[  --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
+		[
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(contract, ct_tmpl_activate,
+			[ AC_DEFINE(USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS, 1,
+				[Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
+			  SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract"
+			  AC_SUBST(SSHDLIBS)
+			  SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
+		],
+	)
 	;;
 *-*-sunos4*)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
@@ -452,7 +514,6 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	;;
 # UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
 *-*-sysv4.2*)
-	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Dva_list=_VA_LIST"
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
@@ -474,6 +535,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 		TEST_SHELL=/u95/bin/sh
 		AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_LIBIAF, 1,
 			[ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet])
+		AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX)
 		;;
 	*)	AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
 		;;
@@ -563,6 +625,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 				system's login() call])
 			AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
 			LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+			SIA_MSG="yes"
 		else
 			AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
 			AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR, "Nologin",
@@ -575,18 +638,21 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
 	;;
 
-*-*-nto-qnx)
+*-*-nto-qnx*)
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS)
 	AC_DEFINE(MISSING_NFDBITS, 1, [Define on *nto-qnx systems])
 	AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY, 1, [Define on *nto-qnx systems])
 	AC_DEFINE(MISSING_FD_MASK, 1, [Define on *nto-qnx systems])
+	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+	AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+	enable_etc_default_login=no	# has incompatible /etc/default/login
 	;;
 
 *-*-ultrix*)
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETGROUPS, 1, [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_MMAP, 1, [Ultrix mmap can't map files])
-	AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPRGP)
+	AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPGRP)
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H, 1, [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
 	;;
 
@@ -664,30 +730,30 @@ dnl Checks for header files.
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS( \
 	bstring.h \
 	crypt.h \
+	crypto/sha2.h \
 	dirent.h \
 	endian.h \
 	features.h \
+	fcntl.h \
 	floatingpoint.h \
 	getopt.h \
 	glob.h \
 	ia.h \
 	iaf.h \
-	lastlog.h \
 	limits.h \
 	login.h \
-	login_cap.h \
 	maillock.h \
 	ndir.h \
-	net/if.h \
+	net/if_tun.h \
 	netdb.h \
 	netgroup.h \
-	netinet/in_systm.h \
 	pam/pam_appl.h \
 	paths.h \
 	pty.h \
 	readpassphrase.h \
 	rpc/types.h \
 	security/pam_appl.h \
+	sha2.h \
 	shadow.h \
 	stddef.h \
 	stdint.h \
@@ -723,6 +789,13 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS( \
 	vis.h \
 )
 
+# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(lastlog.h, [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+])
+
 # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/ptms.h, [], [], [
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
@@ -730,6 +803,11 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/ptms.h, [], [], [
 #endif
 ])
 
+# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(login_cap.h, [], [], [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+])
+
 # Checks for libraries.
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(yp_match, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, yp_match))
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt))
@@ -914,11 +992,9 @@ AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT,
 
 # Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
 AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gl_matchc field in glob_t)
-AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT,
-	[
-		#include <glob.h>
-		int main(void){glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;}
-	],
+AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+	[ #include <glob.h> ],
+	[glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;],
 	[
 		AC_DEFINE(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC, 1,
 			[Define if your system glob() function has
@@ -930,6 +1006,8 @@ AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT,
 	]
 )
 
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(GLOB_NOMATCH, , , [#include <glob.h>])
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
 AC_RUN_IFELSE(
 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
@@ -1111,7 +1189,13 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
 		AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
 		dnl    Checks for headers, libs and functions
 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bsm/audit.h, [],
-		    [AC_MSG_ERROR(BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found)])
+		    [AC_MSG_ERROR(BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found)],
+		    [
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+		    ]
+)
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(bsm, getaudit, [],
 		    [AC_MSG_ERROR(BSM enabled and required library not found)])
 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getaudit, [],
@@ -1257,6 +1341,29 @@ AC_CHECK_DECL(tcsendbreak,
 
 AC_CHECK_DECLS(h_errno, , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
 
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(SHUT_RD, , ,
+	[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(O_NONBLOCK, , ,
+	[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(writev, , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+	])
+
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresuid, [
 	dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresuid seems to work)
@@ -1601,6 +1708,7 @@ main(void)
 			AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
 			AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
 		],
+		[
 			AC_MSG_RESULT(cross-compiling, assuming no)
 		]
 	)
@@ -1626,61 +1734,6 @@ fi
 
 AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
 
-# Check for PAM libs
-PAM_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
-	[  --with-pam              Enable PAM support ],
-	[
-		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-			if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
-			   test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
-				AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
-			fi
-
-			AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , )
-			AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing]))
-			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist)
-			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_putenv)
-
-			PAM_MSG="yes"
-
-			AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1,
-				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
-			if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
-				LIBPAM="-lpam -ldl"
-			else
-				LIBPAM="-lpam"
-			fi
-			AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
-		fi
-	]
-)
-
-# Check for older PAM
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
-	# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
-	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
-	AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-		[
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
-#endif
-		],
-		[(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);],
-		[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
-		[
-			AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OLD_PAM, 1,
-				[Define if you have an old version of PAM
-				which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
-			AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-			PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
-		]
-	)
-fi
-
 # Search for OpenSSL
 saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
 saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
@@ -1826,13 +1879,61 @@ Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
 	]
 )
 
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+int main(void) { SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); }
+	]])],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+	],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+		saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+int main(void) { SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); }
+			]])],
+			[
+				AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+			],
+			[
+				AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+				LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+			]
+		)
+	]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(ssl-engine,
+	[  --with-ssl-engine       Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING(for OpenSSL ENGINE support)
+		AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+			[ #include <openssl/engine.h>],
+			[
+int main(void){ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();ENGINE_register_all_complete();}
+			],
+			[ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+			  AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE, 1,
+			     [Enable OpenSSL engine support])
+			],
+			[ AC_MSG_ERROR(OpenSSL ENGINE support not found)]
+		)
+	  fi ]
+)
+
 # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
-int main(void) { exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL)}
+int main(void) { exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);}
 	]])],
 	[
 		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
@@ -1856,6 +1957,9 @@ if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt")
 fi
 
+# Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(SHA256_Update EVP_sha256)
+
 AC_CHECK_LIB(iaf, ia_openinfo)
 
 ### Configure cryptographic random number support
@@ -1886,6 +1990,69 @@ int main(void) { exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); }
 	]
 )
 
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
+	[  --with-pam              Enable PAM support ],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
+			   test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
+			fi
+
+			saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , )
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing]))
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist)
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_putenv)
+			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+			PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+			LIBPAM="-lpam"
+			AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1,
+				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+
+			if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+				case "$LIBS" in
+				*-ldl*)
+					# libdl already in LIBS
+					;;
+				*)
+					LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -ldl"
+					;;
+				esac
+			fi
+			AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+	# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
+	AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+		[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+		],
+		[(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OLD_PAM, 1,
+				[Define if you have an old version of PAM
+				which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+			PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+		]
+	)
+fi
 
 # Do we want to force the use of the rand helper?
 AC_ARG_WITH(rand-helper,
@@ -2105,6 +2272,34 @@ if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
 #define __USE_ISOC99
 #include <limits.h>
 #define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
+
+/*
+ * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
+ * we do this the hard way.
+ */
+static int
+fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
+			return -1;
+	for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
+		l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
+		n /= 10;
+	}
+	do {
+		if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
+			return -1;
+	} while (i != 0);
+	if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int main(void) {
 	FILE *f;
 	long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
@@ -2126,14 +2321,18 @@ int main(void) {
 
 	/* Sanity check */
 	if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
-	    || llmax - 1 > llmax) {
+	    || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
+	    || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
 		fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
 		exit(2);
 	}
 
-	if (fprintf(f ,"%lld %lld", llmin, llmax) < 0)
+	if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
 		exit(3);
-
+	if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
+		exit(4);
+	if (fclose(f) < 0)
+		exit(5);
 	exit(0);
 }
 		]])],
@@ -2141,17 +2340,6 @@ int main(void) {
 			llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
 			llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
 
-			# snprintf on some Tru64s doesn't understand "%lld"
-			case "$host" in
-			alpha-dec-osf*)
-				if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x8" &&
-				  test "x$llong_max" = "xld"; then
-					llong_min="-9223372036854775808"
-					llong_max="9223372036854775807"
-				fi
-				;;
-			esac
-
 			AC_MSG_RESULT($llong_max)
 			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LLONG_MAX, [${llong_max}LL],
 			    [max value of long long calculated by configure])
@@ -2897,7 +3085,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(opensc,
 			LIBOPENSC_CFLAGS=`$OPENSC_CONFIG --cflags`
 			LIBOPENSC_LIBS=`$OPENSC_CONFIG --libs`
 			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $LIBOPENSC_CFLAGS"
-			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $LIBOPENSC_LIBS"
+			LIBS="$LIBS $LIBOPENSC_LIBS"
 			AC_DEFINE(SMARTCARD)
 			AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSC, 1,
 				[Define if you want smartcard support
@@ -2945,6 +3133,23 @@ int main()
 			[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
 	])
 
+# Check whether user wants SELinux support
+SELINUX_MSG="no"
+LIBSELINUX=""
+AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+	[  --with-selinux   Enable SELinux support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX,1,[Define if you want SELinux support.])
+		SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+		AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
+		    AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires selinux.h header))
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
+		    AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
+	fi ]
+)
+AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
+
 # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
 KRB5_MSG="no"
 AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5,
@@ -3707,20 +3912,13 @@ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
 	AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
 fi
 
-dnl remove pam and dl because they are in $LIBPAM
-if test "$PAM_MSG" = yes ; then
-	LIBS=`echo $LIBS | sed 's/-lpam //'`
-fi
-if test "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = yes ; then
-	LIBS=`echo $LIBS | sed 's/-ldl //'`
-fi
-
 dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
 dnl Add now.
 CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
 
 AC_EXEEXT
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openbsd-compat/Makefile \
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
+	openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
 	scard/Makefile ssh_prng_cmds survey.sh])
 AC_OUTPUT
 
@@ -3762,12 +3960,15 @@ echo "          sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
 fi
 echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
 echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
 echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
 echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
 echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
 echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
 echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
 echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
 echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
 echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crc32.c b/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
index ac627b57a563..c192eb4d66da 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/crc32.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.9 2003/02/12 21:39:50 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.11 2006/04/22 18:29:33 stevesk Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ ssh_crc32(const u_char *buf, u_int32_t size)
 	u_int32_t i, crc;
 
 	crc = 0;
-	for (i = 0;  i < size;  i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 		crc = crc32tab[(crc ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8);
 	return crc;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/crc32.h b/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
index a2fb58493a99..5d7131aff2cb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/crc32.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.14 2003/02/12 21:39:50 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.15 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/deattack.c b/crypto/openssh/deattack.c
index 8b55d668681a..1b37e4dabe59 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/deattack.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/deattack.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.30 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
  *
@@ -18,14 +19,36 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.19 2003/09/18 08:49:45 markus Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "deattack.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "crc32.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "deattack.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over
+ * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be 
+ * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack. 
+ * 
+ * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical
+ * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so. 
+ * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks
+ * in a packet.
+ *
+ * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will
+ * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and
+ * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32 
+ * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is
+ * misdetected
+ */
+#define MAX_IDENTICAL	32
 
 /* SSH Constants */
 #define SSH_MAXBLOCKS	(32 * 1024)
@@ -43,7 +66,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.19 2003/09/18 08:49:45 markus Exp $");
 
 
 /* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
-#define HASH(x)		GET_32BIT(x)
+#define HASH(x)		get_u32(x)
 
 #define CMP(a, b)	(memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
 
@@ -51,22 +74,17 @@ static void
 crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
 {
 	b ^= *a;
-	*a = ssh_crc32((u_char *) &b, sizeof(b));
+	*a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b));
 }
 
 /* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
 static int
-check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len,
-	  u_char *IV)
+check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 {
 	u_int32_t crc;
 	u_char *c;
 
 	crc = 0;
-	if (IV && !CMP(S, IV)) {
-		crc_update(&crc, 1);
-		crc_update(&crc, 0);
-	}
 	for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
 		if (!CMP(S, c)) {
 			crc_update(&crc, 1);
@@ -82,12 +100,12 @@ check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len,
 
 /* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
 int
-detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len, u_char *IV)
+detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
 {
 	static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
 	static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
 	u_int32_t i, j;
-	u_int32_t l;
+	u_int32_t l, same;
 	u_char *c;
 	u_char *d;
 
@@ -100,26 +118,20 @@ detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len, u_char *IV)
 
 	if (h == NULL) {
 		debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
-		h = (u_int16_t *) xmalloc(l * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+		h = (u_int16_t *) xcalloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
 		n = l;
 	} else {
 		if (l > n) {
-			h = (u_int16_t *) xrealloc(h, l * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+			h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
 			n = l;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
 		for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
-			if (IV && (!CMP(c, IV))) {
-				if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
-					return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
-				else
-					break;
-			}
 			for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
 				if (!CMP(c, d)) {
-					if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
+					if ((check_crc(c, buf, len)))
 						return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
 					else
 						break;
@@ -130,21 +142,13 @@ detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len, u_char *IV)
 	}
 	memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
 
-	if (IV)
-		h[HASH(IV) & (n - 1)] = HASH_IV;
-
-	for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
+	for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
 		for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
 		    i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
-			if (h[i] == HASH_IV) {
-				if (!CMP(c, IV)) {
-					if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
-						return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
-					else
-						break;
-				}
-			} else if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
-				if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
+			if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+				if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL)
+					return (DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED);
+				if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
 					return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
 				else
 					break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/deattack.h b/crypto/openssh/deattack.h
index ddccdea50594..0316fb28543b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/deattack.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/deattack.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.10 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 /* Return codes */
 #define DEATTACK_OK		0
 #define DEATTACK_DETECTED	1
+#define DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED	2
 
-int	 detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t, u_char[8]);
+int	 detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t);
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/defines.h b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
index f25934176440..8a4e2c73e15c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/defines.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
@@ -25,12 +25,12 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.130 2005/12/17 11:04:09 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.138 2006/09/21 13:13:30 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
 
-#ifndef SHUT_RDWR
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
 enum
 {
   SHUT_RD = 0,		/* No more receptions.  */
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ enum
 #endif
 #endif
 
-#ifndef O_NONBLOCK	/* Non Blocking Open */
-# define O_NONBLOCK      00004
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
+# define O_NONBLOCK      00004	/* Non Blocking Open */
 #endif
 
 #ifndef S_ISDIR
@@ -143,16 +143,11 @@ including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
 #define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
 #endif
 
-#ifndef __unused
-#define __unused
-#endif
-
 /* Types */
 
 /* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
 /* (or die trying) */
 
-
 #ifndef HAVE_U_INT
 typedef unsigned int u_int;
 #endif
@@ -496,6 +491,22 @@ struct winsize {
 # define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
 #endif
 
+/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
+/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
+#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
+# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#  define LITTLE_ENDIAN  1234
+# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
+#  define BIG_ENDIAN     4321
+# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
+# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#  define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
+
 /* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
 
 #if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
@@ -517,19 +528,6 @@ struct winsize {
 # define optarg             BSDoptarg
 #endif
 
-/* In older versions of libpam, pam_strerror takes a single argument */
-#ifdef HAVE_OLD_PAM
-# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((b))
-#else
-# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((a),(b))
-#endif
-
-#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
-# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
-#else
-# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
-#endif
-
 #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
 # undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
 #endif
@@ -544,6 +542,11 @@ struct winsize {
 # undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
 #endif
 
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
+    defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
+# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
 # define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
 #endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
@@ -553,6 +556,7 @@ struct winsize {
 #endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */
 
 #ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# include <unistd.h>
 # define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
 #endif
 
@@ -715,12 +719,14 @@ struct winsize {
 # undef HAVE_MMAP
 #endif
 
-/* some system headers on HP-UX define YES/NO */
-#ifdef YES
-# undef YES
-#endif
-#ifdef NO
-# undef NO
+#ifndef IOV_MAX
+# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		_XOPEN_IOV_MAX
+# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		DEF_IOV_MAX
+# else
+#  define	IOV_MAX		16
+# endif
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.c b/crypto/openssh/dh.c
index 044d869fb883..f6ef05cf66ab 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.42 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,17 +24,17 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.31 2004/08/04 10:37:52 djm Exp $");
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -44,9 +45,11 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
 {
 	char *cp, *arg;
 	char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
 
 	cp = line;
-	arg = strdelim(&cp);
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 	/* Ignore leading whitespace */
 	if (*arg == '\0')
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
@@ -67,7 +70,8 @@ parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
 		goto fail;
 	strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
 	if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
-	    (dhg->size = atoi(strsize)) == 0)
+	    (dhg->size = (u_int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 ||
+	    errstr)
 		goto fail;
 	/* The whole group is one bit larger */
 	dhg->size++;
@@ -178,19 +182,36 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
 	int i;
 	int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
 	int bits_set = 0;
+	BIGNUM *tmp;
 
 	if (dh_pub->neg) {
 		logit("invalid public DH value: negativ");
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) {	/* pub_exp <= 1 */
+		logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+	    BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) {		/* pub_exp > p-2 */
+		BN_clear_free(tmp);
+		logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
 	for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
 		if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
 			bits_set++;
 	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
 
 	/* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */
-	if (bits_set > 1 && (BN_cmp(dh_pub, dh->p) == -1))
+	if (bits_set > 1)
 		return 1;
+
 	logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.h b/crypto/openssh/dh.h
index 723dd08e4f58..8e580ee87ded 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.8 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.9 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
index c5ff65031f25..d6b63be4b7ff 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.21 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -21,8 +22,13 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.16 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -76,7 +82,7 @@ dispatch_set(int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
 	dispatch[type] = fn;
 }
 void
-dispatch_run(int mode, int *done, void *ctxt)
+dispatch_run(int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, void *ctxt)
 {
 	for (;;) {
 		int type;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
index a82e2165b356..3e3d1a1adf65 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dispatch.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.9 2002/01/11 13:39:36 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.11 2006/04/20 09:27:09 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
 enum {
 	DISPATCH_BLOCK,
 	DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
@@ -33,6 +36,6 @@ typedef void dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	 dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *);
 void	 dispatch_set(int, dispatch_fn *);
 void	 dispatch_range(u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
-void	 dispatch_run(int, int *, void *);
+void	 dispatch_run(int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *);
 void	 dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	 dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.c b/crypto/openssh/dns.c
index a71dd9bff120..92623de72863 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dns.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.16 2005/10/17 14:13:35 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -26,9 +26,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.16 2005/10/17 14:13:35 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 
 #include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "key.h"
@@ -122,7 +127,7 @@ dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
 			*digest = (u_char *) xmalloc(*digest_len);
 			memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
 		} else {
-			*digest = xstrdup("");
+			*digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
 		}
 
 		success = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dns.h b/crypto/openssh/dns.h
index 0aa1c28f2845..b2633a1fe984 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/dns.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/dns.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.6 2005/10/17 14:13:35 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-#include "includes.h"
-
 #ifndef DNS_H
 #define DNS_H
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c b/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
index e5b45b0b614f..4f19c8767554 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/entropy.c
@@ -24,6 +24,19 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -35,7 +48,6 @@
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 
 /*
  * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
@@ -48,8 +60,6 @@
  * XXX: we should tell the child how many bytes we need.
  */
 
-RCSID("$Id: entropy.c,v 1.52 2005/09/27 22:26:30 dtucker Exp $");
-
 #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
 #define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
 static uid_t original_uid, original_euid;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/fatal.c b/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
index ae1aaac6edd0..5e5aa3fe18df 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/fatal.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,7 +24,10 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.2 2003/09/23 20:17:11 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "log.h"
 
@@ -33,6 +37,7 @@ void
 fatal(const char *fmt,...)
 {
 	va_list args;
+
 	va_start(args, fmt);
 	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
index f50879f83a9f..e73f62b22fdf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,10 +24,16 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.6 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
 
-#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
@@ -52,8 +59,8 @@ ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
 	ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
 #endif
 
-	groups_bygid = xmalloc(ngroups * sizeof(*groups_bygid));
-	groups_byname = xmalloc(ngroups * sizeof(*groups_byname));
+	groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
+	groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
 
 	if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1)
 		logit("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h
index ede4805c2c24..04b449894016 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@
 #ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
 #define GROUPACCESS_H
 
-#include <grp.h>
-
 int	 ga_init(const char *, gid_t);
 int	 ga_match(char * const *, int);
 void	 ga_free(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
index c2b4f2dd84bb..57f12a2dc8e5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.6 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.17 2006/08/29 12:02:30 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -28,8 +28,15 @@
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
@@ -72,7 +79,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid)
 void
 ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
 {
-	debug("%s", ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL));
+	char *s;
+
+	s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
+	debug("%s", s);
+	xfree(s);
 }
 
 char *
@@ -131,9 +142,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
 void
 ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
 {
-	*ctx = xmalloc(sizeof (Gssctxt));
-	(*ctx)->major = 0;
-	(*ctx)->minor = 0;
+	*ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
 	(*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
 	(*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
 	(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
@@ -203,10 +212,11 @@ OM_uint32
 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
 {
 	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+	char *val;
 
-	gssbuf.length = sizeof("host@") + strlen(host);
-	gssbuf.value = xmalloc(gssbuf.length);
-	snprintf(gssbuf.value, gssbuf.length, "host@%s", host);
+	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
+	gssbuf.value = val;
+	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
 
 	if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
 	    &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
@@ -231,11 +241,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
 	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
 	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
 
-	if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN))
+	if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
 		return (-1);
+	}
 
-	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname)))
+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
 		return (ctx->major);
+	}
 
 	if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
 	    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
@@ -277,4 +291,34 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
 	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
 }
 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+	gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+
+	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+	    (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
+		return 0; /* false */
+
+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+		    NULL);
+		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
+		if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+			gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
+			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+	}
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+	return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+}
+
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c
index 5c5837ffb996..5a625acb89a6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.4 2005/10/13 19:08:08 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -29,11 +29,19 @@
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #ifdef KRB5
 
-#include "auth.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -41,9 +49,9 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 #ifdef HEIMDAL
 # include <krb5.h>
 #else
-# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5
+# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
 #  include <gssapi_krb5.h>
-# elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5
+# elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
 #  include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
 # endif
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
index 26eec25bdc81..e8191a859cb5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.13 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -28,14 +28,21 @@
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
@@ -78,6 +85,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
 			    &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
 		i++;
 	}
+
+	gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
 }
 
 
@@ -151,7 +160,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
 	 * second without.
 	 */
 
-	oidl = GET_16BIT(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
+	oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
 	oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
 
 	/*
@@ -168,14 +177,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
 	if (ename->length < offset+4)
 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
-	name->length = GET_32BIT(tok+offset);
+	name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
 	offset += 4;
 
 	if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
 	name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
-	memcpy(name->value, tok+offset,name->length);
+	memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
 	((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
 
 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
@@ -234,7 +243,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
 {
 	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
 		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
-		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", gssapi_client.store.filename);
+		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
 		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
index 3ed646247873..2cceb352a1fe 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.45 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -36,18 +37,25 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.36 2005/11/22 03:36:03 dtucker Exp $");
 
-#include <resolv.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 
-#include "packet.h"
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 
 static int
 extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, char *salt, size_t salt_len)
@@ -254,8 +262,10 @@ check_host_in_hostfile_by_key_or_type(const char *filename,
 
 		if (key == NULL) {
 			/* we found a key of the requested type */
-			if (found->type == keytype)
+			if (found->type == keytype) {
+				fclose(f);
 				return HOST_FOUND;
+			}
 			continue;
 		}
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
index d6330752ee63..d1983b3e0939 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/hostfile.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.15 2005/03/01 10:40:26 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/includes.h b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
index 520817400b5f..967fcc26c84b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/includes.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/includes.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.22 2006/01/01 08:59:27 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,44 +16,24 @@
 #ifndef INCLUDES_H
 #define INCLUDES_H
 
-#define RCSID(msg) \
-static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
-
 #include "config.h"
 
 #define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */
 
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h> /* For O_NONBLOCK */
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
 # include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX */
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_H
-# include <getopt.h>
-#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
 # include <bstring.h>
 #endif
 #if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
-    defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+    defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && \
+    defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) &&  HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0
 # include <glob.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
-# include <netgroup.h>
-#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
 # include <endian.h>
 #endif
@@ -67,10 +47,11 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 # include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_NEXT
-#  include <libc.h>
+# include <libc.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS
+# include <paths.h>
 #endif
-#include <unistd.h> /* For STDIN_FILENO, etc */
-#include <termios.h> /* Struct winsize */
 
 /*
  *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively
@@ -86,39 +67,22 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 #  include <utmp.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-#  ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
-#    include <sys/time.h>
-#  endif
 #  include <utmpx.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
 #  include <lastlog.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-#  include <paths.h> /* For _PATH_XXX */
-#endif
 
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h> /* For timersub */
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
 # include <sys/select.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
 # include <sys/bsdtty.h>
 #endif
-#include <sys/param.h> /* For MAXPATHLEN and roundup() */
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-# include <sys/un.h> /* For sockaddr_un */
-#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
 # include <stdint.h>
 #endif
+#include <termios.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
 # include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
 #endif
@@ -144,14 +108,8 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 #include <sys/ptms.h>	/* for grantpt() and friends */
 #endif
 
+#include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
-#include <netinet/in.h> /* For IPv6 macros */
-#include <netinet/ip.h> /* For IPTOS macros */
-#include <netinet/tcp.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
-# include <netdb.h>
-#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
 # include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
 #endif
@@ -205,7 +163,7 @@ static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
 
 #include "defines.h"
 
-#include "version.h"
+#include "platform.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
index cd71be9ca778..bfc1c11f977b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.76 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,19 +24,25 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.65 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 
-#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "mac.h"
 #include "match.h"
@@ -44,6 +51,14 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.65 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
 
 #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN	16
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+# else
+extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+# endif
+#endif
+
 /* prototype */
 static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
 static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
@@ -75,7 +90,7 @@ kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows)
 	int i;
 	char **proposal;
 
-	proposal = xmalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX * sizeof(char *));
+	proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *));
 
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw));
@@ -210,8 +225,7 @@ kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
 {
 	Kex *kex;
 
-	kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
-	memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+	kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
 	buffer_init(&kex->peer);
 	buffer_init(&kex->my);
 	kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal);
@@ -254,6 +268,7 @@ choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
 	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
 	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
 }
+
 static void
 choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
 {
@@ -269,6 +284,7 @@ choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
 	mac->key = NULL;
 	mac->enabled = 0;
 }
+
 static void
 choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 {
@@ -286,6 +302,7 @@ choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
 	}
 	comp->name = name;
 }
+
 static void
 choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
 {
@@ -301,6 +318,11 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
 	} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA1) == 0) {
 		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1;
 		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+	} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
+		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+		k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+#endif
 	} else
 		fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
 }
@@ -364,8 +386,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
 
 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
-		newkeys = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkeys));
-		memset(newkeys, 0, sizeof(*newkeys));
+		newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys));
 		kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
 		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
 		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
@@ -420,7 +441,7 @@ derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
 
 	if ((mdsz = EVP_MD_size(kex->evp_md)) <= 0)
 		fatal("bad kex md size %d", mdsz);
- 	digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+	digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
 
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
@@ -473,7 +494,8 @@ kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
 		current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode];
 		kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
-		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
 		current_keys[mode]->enc.iv  = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
 		current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
 		current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
index bbd931e049df..b1b20f50045c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.38 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.44 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -26,14 +26,13 @@
 #ifndef KEX_H
 #define KEX_H
 
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
 
 #define	KEX_DH1			"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
 #define	KEX_DH14		"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
 #define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA1		"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA256	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
 
 #define COMP_NONE	0
 #define COMP_ZLIB	1
@@ -63,6 +62,7 @@ enum kex_exchange {
 	KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
 	KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
 	KEX_MAX
 };
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct Kex {
 	int	kex_type;
 	Buffer	my;
 	Buffer	peer;
-	int	done;
+	sig_atomic_t done;
 	int	flags;
 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
 	char	*client_version_string;
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
 void
 kexgex_hash(const EVP_MD *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
-    int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, 
+    int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
index f79d8781d267..56e22f5bc890 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdh.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,13 +24,17 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.20 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
index d8a2fa3b7d8b..64de7af30884 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhc.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,10 +24,18 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.3 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -82,7 +91,7 @@ kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
 	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
 		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
 
-	/* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
+	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
 	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
 	packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
index 26c8cdfd6950..93ec97f931ea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexdhs.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,15 +24,25 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.3 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
index 705484a4755d..b60ab5c53cc9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgex.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.27 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,12 +25,15 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.24 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
index a6ff8757d653..2c19713e11a7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,10 +25,18 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.3 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -120,7 +129,7 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
 	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
 		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
 
-	/* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
+	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
 	if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
 	packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
index c48b27af9dee..5373a633a4dd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,16 +25,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.2 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c
index 08c158b59c12..f3b3d6b9460f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.67 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * read_bignum():
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -31,17 +32,22 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.58 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "uuencode.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
 Key *
@@ -50,9 +56,8 @@ key_new(int type)
 	Key *k;
 	RSA *rsa;
 	DSA *dsa;
-	k = xmalloc(sizeof(*k));
+	k = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k));
 	k->type = type;
-	k->flags = 0;
 	k->dsa = NULL;
 	k->rsa = NULL;
 	switch (k->type) {
@@ -123,6 +128,8 @@ key_new_private(int type)
 void
 key_free(Key *k)
 {
+	if (k == NULL)
+		fatal("key_free: key is NULL");
 	switch (k->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA:
@@ -155,14 +162,12 @@ key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
 		return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
 		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
 		    BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
-		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
 		    BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
-		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
 		break;
@@ -209,7 +214,6 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
 		break;
 	case KEY_UNSPEC:
 		return retval;
-		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad key type %d", k->type);
 		break;
@@ -233,8 +237,7 @@ key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
 	char *retval;
 	u_int i;
 
-	retval = xmalloc(dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
-	retval[0] = '\0';
+	retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
 	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
 		char hex[4];
 		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
@@ -256,7 +259,7 @@ key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
 	char *retval;
 
 	rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
-	retval = xmalloc(sizeof(char) * (rounds*6));
+	retval = xcalloc((rounds * 6), sizeof(char));
 	retval[j++] = 'x';
 	for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
 		u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
@@ -530,13 +533,10 @@ key_type(const Key *k)
 	switch (k->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 		return "RSA1";
-		break;
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		return "RSA";
-		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		return "DSA";
-		break;
 	}
 	return "unknown";
 }
@@ -547,10 +547,8 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
 	switch (k->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		return "ssh-rsa";
-		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		return "ssh-dss";
-		break;
 	}
 	return "ssh-unknown";
 }
@@ -562,10 +560,8 @@ key_size(const Key *k)
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
-		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
-		break;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -574,6 +570,7 @@ static RSA *
 rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
 {
 	RSA *private;
+
 	private = RSA_generate_key(bits, 35, NULL, NULL);
 	if (private == NULL)
 		fatal("rsa_generate_private_key: key generation failed.");
@@ -584,6 +581,7 @@ static DSA*
 dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
 {
 	DSA *private = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
 	if (private == NULL)
 		fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_parameters failed");
 	if (!DSA_generate_key(private))
@@ -793,14 +791,11 @@ key_sign(
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-		break;
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
-		break;
 	default:
 		error("key_sign: invalid key type %d", key->type);
 		return -1;
-		break;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -820,14 +815,11 @@ key_verify(
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-		break;
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-		break;
 	default:
 		error("key_verify: invalid key type %d", key->type);
 		return -1;
-		break;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -837,7 +829,7 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
 {
 	Key *pk;
 
-	pk = xmalloc(sizeof(*pk));
+	pk = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pk));
 	pk->type = k->type;
 	pk->flags = k->flags;
 	pk->dsa = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.h b/crypto/openssh/key.h
index 50df8500bb99..6873dd7933e9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/key.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.23 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.26 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.c b/crypto/openssh/log.c
index 96ab24b04b43..7f8867482d95 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/log.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.39 2006/08/18 09:13:25 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,16 +35,22 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.29 2003/09/23 20:17:11 markus Exp $");
 
-#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
 # include <vis.h>
 #endif
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
 static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
 static int log_on_stderr = 1;
 static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
@@ -130,6 +137,20 @@ error(const char *fmt,...)
 	va_end(args);
 }
 
+void
+sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+#endif
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+
 /* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/log.h b/crypto/openssh/log.h
index 2b3c3090f930..7a8c57079cca 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/log.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/log.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.11 2004/06/21 22:02:58 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.15 2006/08/18 09:13:25 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
 #ifndef SSH_LOG_H
 #define SSH_LOG_H
 
-#include <syslog.h> /* Needed for LOG_AUTHPRIV (if present) */
-
 /* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
 typedef enum {
 	SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
@@ -55,6 +53,7 @@ LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
 
 void     fatal(const char *, ...) __dead __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     sigdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
index d096346ecb2b..e59127747820 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.c
@@ -147,8 +147,26 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include "ssh.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 #include "loginrec.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -165,8 +183,6 @@
 # include <libutil.h>
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: loginrec.c,v 1.71 2005/11/22 08:55:13 dtucker Exp $");
-
 /**
  ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
  **/
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
index 8e3390178790..859e1a63049b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/loginrec.h
@@ -31,12 +31,6 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-/* RCSID("$Id: loginrec.h,v 1.10 2005/06/19 00:19:44 djm Exp $"); */
-
 /**
  ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
  **/
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/logintest.c b/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
index 95cce5a3ab86..7e9fbbfbbdc1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/logintest.c
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -43,8 +47,6 @@
 
 #include "loginrec.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: logintest.c,v 1.11 2004/07/17 04:07:42 dtucker Exp $");
-
 extern char *__progname;
 
 #define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mac.c b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
index 2bda5a1b9949..e5d5bfa88e76 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/mac.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mac.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,16 +24,23 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.7 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "mac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 struct {
 	char		*name;
@@ -83,7 +91,7 @@ mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
 	if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
 		fatal("mac_compute: mac too long");
 	HMAC_Init(&c, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->md);
-	PUT_32BIT(b, seqno);
+	put_u32(b, seqno);
 	HMAC_Update(&c, b, sizeof(b));
 	HMAC_Update(&c, data, datalen);
 	HMAC_Final(&c, m, NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/mac.h b/crypto/openssh/mac.h
index 43b485dd92be..960cc5c50c4e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/mac.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/mac.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*      $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $   */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.4 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.c b/crypto/openssh/match.c
index 29fb7dab94e2..e3c993073fd8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/match.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.26 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,10 +36,14 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.20 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
-#include "match.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
 
 /*
  * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
@@ -136,7 +141,7 @@ match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len,
 		    i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
 		    subi++, i++)
 			sub[subi] = dolower && isupper(pattern[i]) ?
-			    tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
+			    (char)tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
 		/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
 		if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/match.h b/crypto/openssh/match.h
index a0764e0013f9..d1d53865433a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/match.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/match.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.12 2002/03/01 13:12:10 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.13 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/md-sha256.c b/crypto/openssh/md-sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8c1b3b92da9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/md-sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: md-sha256.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* EVP wrapper for SHA256 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE
+# ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#  include <sha2.h>
+# elif defined(HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H)
+#  include <crypto/sha2.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt)
+{
+	SHA256_Init(ctxt->md_data);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, const void *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+	SHA256_Update(ctxt->md_data, data, len);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, unsigned char *digest)
+{
+	SHA256_Final(digest, ctxt->md_data);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_sha256_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt)
+{
+	memset(ctxt->md_data, 0, sizeof(SHA256_CTX));
+	return (1);
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *
+evp_ssh_sha256(void)
+{
+	static EVP_MD ssh_sha256;
+
+	memset(&ssh_sha256, 0, sizeof(ssh_sha256));
+	ssh_sha256.type = NID_undef;
+	ssh_sha256.md_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	ssh_sha256.init = ssh_sha256_init;
+	ssh_sha256.update = ssh_sha256_update;
+	ssh_sha256.final = ssh_sha256_final;
+	ssh_sha256.cleanup = ssh_sha256_cleanup;
+	ssh_sha256.block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	ssh_sha256.ctx_size = sizeof(SHA256_CTX);
+
+	return (&ssh_sha256);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c b/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c
index 8f2523e62165..22ef9893356e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/md5crypt.c
@@ -11,9 +11,11 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
 
-RCSID("$Id: md5crypt.c,v 1.9 2003/11/21 12:56:47 djm Exp $");
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
 
 /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */
 static unsigned char itoa64[] =
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.c b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
index 29e92888642e..78bca2faefa7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.64 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -24,15 +25,35 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.42 2006/01/31 10:19:02 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#endif
 #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
 #include <net/if.h>
 #endif
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 
 /* remove newline at end of string */
 char *
@@ -123,6 +144,7 @@ set_nodelay(int fd)
 
 /* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
 #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+#define QUOTE	"\""
 
 /* return next token in configuration line */
 char *
@@ -136,15 +158,27 @@ strdelim(char **s)
 
 	old = *s;
 
-	*s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE "=");
+	*s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "=");
 	if (*s == NULL)
 		return (old);
 
+	if (*s[0] == '\"') {
+		memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
+		/* Find matching quote */
+		if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
+			return (NULL);		/* no matching quote */
+		} else {
+			*s[0] = '\0';
+			return (old);
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
 	if (*s[0] == '=')
 		wspace = 1;
 	*s[0] = '\0';
 
+	/* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
 	*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
 	if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
 		*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
@@ -155,9 +189,8 @@ strdelim(char **s)
 struct passwd *
 pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	struct passwd *copy = xmalloc(sizeof(*copy));
+	struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
 
-	memset(copy, 0, sizeof(*copy));
 	copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
 	copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
 	copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
@@ -280,6 +313,7 @@ convtime(const char *s)
 		switch (*endp++) {
 		case '\0':
 			endp--;
+			break;
 		case 's':
 		case 'S':
 			break;
@@ -312,6 +346,23 @@ convtime(const char *s)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	char *hoststr;
+
+	if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
+		return(xstrdup(host));
+	if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0)
+		fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+	debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
+	return hoststr;
+}
+
+/*
  * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
  * Argument may be modified (for termination).
  * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
@@ -408,7 +459,7 @@ addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
 	} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
 		nalloc *= 2;
 
-	args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc * sizeof(char *));
+	args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
 	args->nalloc = nalloc;
 	args->list[args->num++] = cp;
 	args->list[args->num] = NULL;
@@ -673,18 +724,100 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
 }
 
 char *
-tohex(const u_char *d, u_int l)
+tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
 {
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
 	char b[3], *r;
-	u_int i, hl;
+	size_t i, hl;
+
+	if (l > 65536)
+		return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
 
 	hl = l * 2 + 1;
-	r = xmalloc(hl);
-	*r = '\0';
+	r = xcalloc(1, hl);
 	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
-		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", d[i]);
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
 		strlcat(r, b, hl);
 	}
 	return (r);
 }
 
+u_int64_t
+get_u64(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int64_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int32_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int16_t
+get_u16(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int16_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+void
+put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
+	p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+	p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+
+void
+put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/misc.h b/crypto/openssh/misc.h
index 0a1a09a68baa..f175b4426e53 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/misc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/misc.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.29 2006/01/31 10:19:02 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.36 2006/08/18 10:27:16 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
+#ifndef _MISC_H
+#define _MISC_H
+
 /* misc.c */
 
 char	*chop(char *);
@@ -21,13 +24,14 @@ int	 unset_nonblock(int);
 void	 set_nodelay(int);
 int	 a2port(const char *);
 int	 a2tun(const char *, int *);
+char	*put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
 char	*hpdelim(char **);
 char	*cleanhostname(char *);
 char	*colon(char *);
 long	 convtime(const char *);
 char	*tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
 char	*percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
-char	*tohex(const u_char *, u_int);
+char	*tohex(const void *, size_t);
 void	 sanitise_stdfd(void);
 
 struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
@@ -44,17 +48,6 @@ void	 replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
 	     __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
 void	 freeargs(arglist *);
 
-/* readpass.c */
-
-#define RP_ECHO			0x0001
-#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN		0x0002
-#define RP_ALLOW_EOF		0x0004
-#define RP_USE_ASKPASS		0x0008
-
-char	*read_passphrase(const char *, int);
-int	 ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-int	 read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
-
 int	 tun_open(int, int);
 
 /* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
@@ -67,3 +60,31 @@ int	 tun_open(int, int);
 #define SSH_TUNID_ANY		0x7fffffff
 #define SSH_TUNID_ERR		(SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
 #define SSH_TUNID_MAX		(SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
+
+/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
+u_int64_t	get_u64(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+u_int32_t	get_u32(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+u_int16_t	get_u16(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+void		put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+void		put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+void		put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+
+
+/* readpass.c */
+
+#define RP_ECHO			0x0001
+#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN		0x0002
+#define RP_ALLOW_EOF		0x0004
+#define RP_USE_ASKPASS		0x0008
+
+char	*read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+int	 ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+int	 read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
+
+#endif /* _MISC_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
index d53806ea6bda..e18929badd85 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/moduli.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.12 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.18 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
  * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
@@ -38,11 +38,20 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
 /*
  * File output defines
  */
@@ -301,21 +310,10 @@ gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
 		largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
 	}
 
-	TinySieve = calloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
-	if (TinySieve == NULL) {
-		error("Insufficient memory for tiny sieve: need %u bytes",
-		    tinywords << SHIFT_BYTE);
-		exit(1);
-	}
+	TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
 	tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
 
-	SmallSieve = calloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
-	if (SmallSieve == NULL) {
-		error("Insufficient memory for small sieve: need %u bytes",
-		    smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
-		xfree(TinySieve);
-		exit(1);
-	}
+	SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
 	smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index dc26d7d2c6b5..b20d0c726a01 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.88 2006/08/12 20:46:46 miod Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -25,16 +26,38 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.64 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $");
 
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #ifdef SKEY
 #include <skey.h>
 #endif
 
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC	/* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
@@ -55,17 +78,16 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.64 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $");
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
 #include "monitor_mm.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
 #endif
 
@@ -171,6 +193,7 @@ struct mon_table {
 #define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
 #define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
 
 #define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
 
@@ -196,7 +219,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
 #endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
@@ -231,13 +254,13 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
 #endif
 #ifdef SKEY
     {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
@@ -326,6 +349,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
 	while (!authenticated) {
+		auth_method = "unknown";
 		authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
 		if (authenticated) {
 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
@@ -348,7 +372,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 #endif
 		}
 
-		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
 			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
 			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
 			if (!authenticated)
@@ -358,6 +382,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
 	if (!authctxt->valid)
 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+		fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
 
 	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
 	    __func__, authctxt->user);
@@ -537,7 +563,11 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
 	p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
 
-	if (datlen != 20)
+	/*
+	 * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
+	 * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
+	 */
+	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
 		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
 
 	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
@@ -890,6 +920,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		xfree(prompts);
 	if (echo_on != NULL)
 		xfree(echo_on);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
 	return (0);
 }
@@ -905,7 +936,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
 	num = buffer_get_int(m);
 	if (num > 0) {
-		resp = xmalloc(num * sizeof(char *));
+		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
 			resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
 		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
@@ -932,6 +963,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
 	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
 }
 #endif
@@ -977,17 +1009,20 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		case MM_USERKEY:
 			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
 			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+			auth_method = "publickey";
 			break;
 		case MM_HOSTKEY:
 			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
 			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
 			    cuser, chost, key);
+			auth_method = "hostbased";
 			break;
 		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
 			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
 			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
 			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
 			    cuser, chost, key);
+			auth_method = "rsa";
 			break;
 		default:
 			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
@@ -1007,6 +1042,12 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 		key_blobtype = type;
 		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
 		hostbased_chost = chost;
+	} else {
+		/* Log failed attempt */
+		auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+		xfree(blob);
+		xfree(cuser);
+		xfree(chost);
 	}
 
 	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
@@ -1208,7 +1249,7 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
 		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
-			(struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
 			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		}
@@ -1224,7 +1265,7 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
 {
 	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
-		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
 	}
 	s->used = 0;
@@ -1284,7 +1325,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
 	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
 
-	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d",  __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
 
 	return (0);
 
@@ -1371,6 +1412,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
+	auth_method = "rsa";
 	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
 		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
 			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
@@ -1607,8 +1649,7 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
 	void *blob;
 	u_int bloblen;
 
-	kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
-	memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+	kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
 	kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
 	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
 	    (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
@@ -1618,6 +1659,7 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
 	kex->server = 1;
 	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
 	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
@@ -1777,9 +1819,8 @@ monitor_init(void)
 	struct monitor *mon;
 	int pair[2];
 
-	mon = xmalloc(sizeof(*mon));
+	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
 
-	mon->m_pid = 0;
 	monitor_socketpair(pair);
 
 	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
index 13ce3e1ca3e5..464009ad8197 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.13 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.14 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
index dd1a139841da..c5fc4c39702c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -24,10 +25,15 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.6 2004/08/13 02:51:48 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/uio.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
 #include "log.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
index 31d080e21ed6..12c67ec2d1f2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.3 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
index b0ec37cff93a..dab747532a0d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -24,14 +25,20 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.9 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
-#include "ssh.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "monitor_mm.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
index a1323b9a8d25..36a07a06df6b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.4 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 
 #ifndef _MM_H_
 #define _MM_H_
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
 
 struct mm_share {
 	RB_ENTRY(mm_share) next;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
index 3b50753de7f3..3865539dfd1a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.54 2006/08/12 20:46:46 miod Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -25,18 +26,31 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.40 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "dh.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "mac.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -48,21 +62,18 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.40 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
 #include "zlib.h"
 #endif
 #include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "getput.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 
-#include "auth.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-
 /* Imports */
 extern int compat20;
 extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
@@ -91,7 +102,7 @@ mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
 
 	debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
 
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
+	put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
 	buf[4] = (u_char) type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
 		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
@@ -112,7 +123,7 @@ mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m)
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 	}
-	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
 		fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
 	buffer_clear(m);
@@ -637,7 +648,7 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
 }
 
 int
-mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
+mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
 {
 	Buffer m;
 	char *p, *msg;
@@ -776,8 +787,11 @@ mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 	*name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
 	*info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
 	*num = buffer_get_int(&m);
-	*prompts = xmalloc((*num + 1) * sizeof(char *));
-	*echo_on = xmalloc((*num + 1) * sizeof(u_int));
+	if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
+		    __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
+	*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
 	for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
 		(*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
 		(*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
@@ -860,8 +874,8 @@ mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
 	*name = xstrdup("");
 	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
 	*numprompts = 1;
-	*prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *));
-	*echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
 	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
 }
 
@@ -928,9 +942,8 @@ mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
    u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
 	Buffer m;
-	int len;
 	u_int success;
-	char *p, *challenge;
+	char *challenge;
 
 	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
 
@@ -954,11 +967,7 @@ mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
 
 	mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
 
-	len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(SKEY_PROMPT) + 1;
-	p = xmalloc(len);
-	strlcpy(p, challenge, len);
-	strlcat(p, SKEY_PROMPT, len);
-	(*prompts)[0] = p;
+	xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
 	xfree(challenge);
 
 	return (0);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
index 310b425130c3..329189c2ada0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.14 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@
 
 #ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
 #define _MM_WRAP_H_
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
 
 extern int use_privsep;
 #define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
@@ -37,7 +35,6 @@ enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY}
 
 struct monitor;
 struct mm_master;
-struct passwd;
 struct Authctxt;
 
 int mm_is_monitor(void);
@@ -57,7 +54,6 @@ int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
 BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
@@ -82,7 +78,7 @@ void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
 
 struct Session;
 void mm_terminate(void);
-int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
+int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
 void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
 
 /* SSHv1 interfaces */
@@ -111,4 +107,4 @@ void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
 void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
 void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
 
-#endif /* _MM_H_ */
+#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.c b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
index 3e4c2882c5f4..cd5f98c4f6ce 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/msg.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -21,14 +22,23 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.8 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "getput.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "msg.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 int
 ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m)
@@ -38,7 +48,7 @@ ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m)
 
 	debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
 
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
+	put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
 	buf[4] = type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
 	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
 		error("ssh_msg_send: write");
@@ -64,7 +74,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
 			error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
 		return (-1);
 	}
-	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
 		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
 		return (-1);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.h b/crypto/openssh/msg.h
index 0d3ea065826c..b0cb9b52bc2c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/msg.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.3 2003/11/17 09:45:39 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.4 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
index d8cba1caf818..e246e0dd9d8b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.18 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.21 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -23,9 +23,23 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX		"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/* Old OpenSSL doesn't support what we need for DHGEX-sha256 */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX		\
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
 	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
 	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#else
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX		\
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#endif
+
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	"ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
 	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/nchan.c b/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
index aee3f37b0a0e..ad461f4af6a3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/nchan.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.57 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,7 +24,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.51 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index 3a8703bc1a2a..9f06605d7f04 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.37 2005/12/31 05:33:37 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.40 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $
 
 sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
 piddir=@piddir@
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
 INSTALL=@INSTALL@
 LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
 
-OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o vis.o
+OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o vis.o
 
 COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
 
-PORTS=port-irix.o port-aix.o port-uw.o port-tun.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
 
 .c.o:
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c
index ad040e139205..ffa5c898461e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/basename.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 char *
 basename(const char *path)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
index 7f48fd03a251..65afed1e3456 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
@@ -33,8 +33,14 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 
-#include "includes.h"
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #define STARTPORT 600
 #define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
index 1eeb6953bfd6..d45fb182a6fb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
@@ -15,9 +15,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-#include "log.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-arc4random.c,v 1.10 2005/02/16 02:01:28 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
 
 #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
index 5ca01f80f3d9..67480139ebdf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
 
 #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
 #ifndef VA_COPY
 # ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
 #  define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
index 5b7b94ae4aca..9380b33a7247 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -22,9 +22,14 @@
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H
 # include <dirent.h>
 # define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name)
@@ -46,15 +51,20 @@
 # define OPEN_MAX	256
 #endif
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-closefrom.c,v 1.2 2005/11/10 08:29:13 dtucker Exp $");
-
-#ifndef lint
-static const char sudorcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.6 2004/06/01 20:51:56 millert Exp $";
+#if 0
+__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $";
 #endif /* lint */
 
 /*
  * Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd.
  */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    (void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0);
+}
+#else
 void
 closefrom(int lowfd)
 {
@@ -67,7 +77,7 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
 
     /* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */
     len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid());
-    if (len >= 0 && (u_int)len <= sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) {
+    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) {
 	while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
@@ -95,6 +105,5 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
 	    (void) close((int) fd);
     }
 }
-
+#endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
 #endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
index d1f1c059c4be..1532c991c6fe 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* 
- * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.14 2005/02/02 06:10:11 dtucker Exp $
+ * $Id: bsd-cray.c,v 1.16 2006/09/01 05:38:41 djm Exp $
  *
  * bsd-cray.c
  *
@@ -52,7 +52,10 @@
 #include <sys/secstat.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/session.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
index b5e3cc52b5a9..dbf8176b6225 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
@@ -29,15 +29,25 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-cygwin_util.c,v 1.14 2005/05/25 09:42:11 dtucker Exp $");
-
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(open) && open == binary_open
+# undef open
+#endif
+#if defined(pipe) && open == binary_pipe
+# undef pipe
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <sys/vfs.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #include <windows.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #define is_winnt       (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
 
@@ -45,13 +55,6 @@ RCSID("$Id: bsd-cygwin_util.c,v 1.14 2005/05/25 09:42:11 dtucker Exp $");
 #define ntsec_off(c)	((c) && strstr((c),"nontsec"))
 #define ntea_on(c)	((c) && strstr((c),"ntea") && !strstr((c),"nontea"))
 
-#if defined(open) && open == binary_open
-# undef open
-#endif
-#if defined(pipe) && open == binary_pipe
-# undef pipe
-#endif
-
 int 
 binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
 {
@@ -268,9 +271,9 @@ char **
 fetch_windows_environment(void)
 {
 	char **e, **p;
-	int i, idx = 0;
+	unsigned int i, idx = 0;
 
-	p = xmalloc((WENV_SIZ + 1) * sizeof(char *));
+	p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
 	for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
 		for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
 			if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
index fe2edad7101b..bdae8b637f47 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
@@ -16,10 +16,13 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-getpeereid.c,v 1.3 2004/02/17 05:49:55 djm Exp $");
-
 #if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #if defined(SO_PEERCRED)
 int
 getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index d32b054d7227..17d731bd26c5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -16,9 +16,19 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-misc.c,v 1.28 2005/11/01 22:07:31 dtucker Exp $");
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 
 #ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
 char *__progname;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
index bd35a3afc997..8195af88a4ba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-nextstep.c,v 1.6 2003/06/01 03:23:57 mouring Exp $");
-
 #ifdef HAVE_NEXT
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
index 8eb62b7a8b45..9777eb556d2d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 #if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
 #endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
@@ -46,6 +61,10 @@
 # include <sys/stropts.h>
 #endif
 
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
 #define O_NOCTTY 0
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
index e4ba154fdb14..04651e1d438b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
@@ -89,8 +89,6 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-snprintf.c,v 1.11 2005/12/17 11:32:04 dtucker Exp $");
-
 #if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF)		/* For those with broken snprintf() */
 # undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
 # undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
@@ -110,6 +108,11 @@ RCSID("$Id: bsd-snprintf.c,v 1.11 2005/12/17 11:32:04 dtucker Exp $");
 
 #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
 
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
 # define LDOUBLE long double
 #else
@@ -161,7 +164,7 @@ static size_t dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format,
 static void fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
 		    char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
 static void fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
-		    long value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
+		    LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
 static void fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
 		   LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
 static void dopr_outch(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char c);
@@ -468,10 +471,10 @@ static void fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
 /* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
 
 static void fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
-		    long value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+		    LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
 {
 	int signvalue = 0;
-	unsigned long uvalue;
+	unsigned LLONG uvalue;
 	char convert[20];
 	int place = 0;
 	int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
index 93c9ec35eeca..40e6ffaa82d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: bsd-waitpid.c,v 1.5 2003/06/01 03:23:57 mouring Exp $");
-
 #ifndef HAVE_WAITPID 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
index f8a0680bf844..e3a6886bd1c9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
@@ -34,6 +34,20 @@
 
 #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
 int
 daemon(int nochdir, int noclose)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
index 0186b5300612..b6ea3d21e342 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: fake-rfc2553.c,v 1.5 2003/09/22 02:08:23 dtucker Exp $");
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 
 #ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
 int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
index cbcf7f7271c4..5c2ce5b1b7cf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.12 2005/08/03 05:36:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: fake-rfc2553.h,v 1.13 2006/07/24 03:51:52 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@
 #define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
 
 #include "includes.h"
-#include "sys/types.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
 
 /*
  * First, socket and INET6 related definitions 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
index bea6aea3b5bd..6c86e02c2ab0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@
 
 #ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
 
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
 #include "getrrsetbyname.h"
 
 #if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
@@ -60,6 +66,13 @@ extern int h_errno;
 # undef _THREAD_PRIVATE
 #endif
 #define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c)
+
+/* to avoid conflicts where a platform already has _res */
+#ifdef _res
+# undef _res
+#endif
+#define _res	_compat_res
+
 struct __res_state _res;
 
 /* Necessary functions and macros */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
index f6a04ea3f4fe..b3dd2b1718b7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.c
@@ -34,7 +34,21 @@
 /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0
 
 static long
 get_arg_max(void)
@@ -48,9 +62,6 @@ get_arg_max(void)
 #endif
 }
 
-#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
-    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
-
 /*
  * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
index 4fdbfc1eabd8..9ba07f76edaa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/glob.h
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@
 /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
 
 #if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
-    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0
 
 #ifndef _GLOB_H_
 #define	_GLOB_H_
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
index 88e04c5200bc..2285c84dfd72 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
 
 static int _gettemp(char *, int *, int, int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index 1a3027353959..aac2e6cbcdc1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.33 2005/12/31 05:33:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.42 2006/09/03 12:44:50 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
 /* OpenBSD function replacements */
 #include "base64.h"
 #include "sigact.h"
@@ -38,7 +43,7 @@
 #include "readpassphrase.h"
 #include "vis.h"
 #include "getrrsetbyname.h"
-
+#include "sha2.h"
 
 #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
 char *basename(const char *path);
@@ -126,13 +131,16 @@ int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
 int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
 #endif
 
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/uio.h>
+int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
+#endif
 
 /* Home grown routines */
 #include "bsd-misc.h"
 #include "bsd-waitpid.h"
 
-/*#include <sys/types.h> XXX Still needed? * For uid_t, gid_t * */
-
 #ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
 int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
 #endif 
@@ -147,13 +155,14 @@ int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
 #endif 
 
 #ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>	/* for struct winsize */
 int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
 #endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
 
 /* #include <sys/types.h> XXX needed? For size_t */
 
 #ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
-int snprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
 #endif 
 
 #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
@@ -164,6 +173,10 @@ long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
 long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+# include <stdarg.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
 int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
 #endif
@@ -176,16 +189,18 @@ void *xmmap(size_t size);
 char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
 char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
 
-
 /* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
 #include "fake-rfc2553.h"
 
 /* Routines for a single OS platform */
 #include "bsd-cray.h"
 #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
-#include "port-irix.h"
+
 #include "port-aix.h"
-#include "port-uw.h"
+#include "port-irix.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "port-solaris.h"
 #include "port-tun.h"
+#include "port-uw.h"
 
 #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
index b690e8fe6dfa..45ebd3f668c9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.2 2005/06/17 11:15:21 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.4 2006/02/22 11:24:47 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#define SSH_DONT_REDEF_EVP
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
 #include "openssl-compat.h"
 
 #ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
@@ -44,3 +48,15 @@ ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp)
 	return 1;
 }
 #endif
+
+#ifdef	USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+void
+ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(void)
+{
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+	/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 8a015ec438bb..c582cd269f85 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.3 2005/12/19 06:40:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.6 2006/02/22 11:24:47 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -54,21 +54,27 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
  * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and
  * implement the ssh_* equivalents.
  */
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-
-# ifndef SSH_DONT_REDEF_EVP
+#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
 
+# ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
 #  ifdef EVP_Cipher
 #   undef EVP_Cipher
 #  endif
-
 #  define EVP_CipherInit(a,b,c,d,e)	ssh_EVP_CipherInit((a),(b),(c),(d),(e))
 #  define EVP_Cipher(a,b,c,d)		ssh_EVP_Cipher((a),(b),(c),(d))
 #  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a)	ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a))
-# endif
+# endif /* SSH_OLD_EVP */
+
+# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+#  ifdef SSLeay_add_all_algorithms
+#   undef SSLeay_add_all_algorithms
+#  endif
+#  define SSLeay_add_all_algorithms()	ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms()
+#endif
 
 int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *,
     unsigned char *, int);
 int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
 int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
-#endif
+void ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(void);
+#endif	/* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
index 81d8124e0824..b9fabf61f4f1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -25,16 +25,36 @@
  *
  */
 #include "includes.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
 
 #ifdef _AIX
 
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
 #include <uinfo.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# include <login.h>
+# include <userpw.h>
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+# endif
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
 #include "port-aix.h"
 
 # ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
@@ -256,15 +276,17 @@ sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
     Buffer *loginmsg)
 {
 	char *msg = NULL;
+	static int msg_done = 0;
 	int success = 0;
 
 	aix_setauthdb(user);
 	if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
 		success = 1;
-		if (msg != NULL) {
+		if (msg != NULL && loginmsg != NULL && !msg_done) {
 			debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
 			buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
 			xfree(msg);
+			msg_done = 1;
 		}
 	}
 	aix_restoreauthdb();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
index 37b2c12b09fc..5a04bedade74 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.26 2005/05/28 10:28:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: port-aix.h,v 1.27 2006/09/18 13:54:33 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  *
@@ -31,18 +31,6 @@
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
 # include <sys/socket.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-# include <unistd.h>	/* for seteuid() */
-#endif
-
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-# include <login.h>
-# include <userpw.h>
-# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
-#  include <sys/audit.h>
-# endif
-# include <usersec.h>
-#endif
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
index aa6db1cf8c61..ba751a5383f3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
     defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
     defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
 # include <proj.h>
 #endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..77f3a1c1797c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.3 2006/09/01 05:38:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "log.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+static int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+	static int enabled = -1;
+
+	if (enabled == -1) {
+		enabled = is_selinux_enabled();
+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	}
+
+	return (enabled);
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static security_context_t
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t sc;
+	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+#else
+	sename = pwname;
+	lvl = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+#else
+	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+#endif
+
+	if (r != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+			    __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if (sename != NULL)
+		xfree(sename);
+	if (lvl != NULL)
+		xfree(lvl);
+#endif
+
+	return (sc);
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+{
+	security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+	security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+
+	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+
+	if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
+	    SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
+		error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
+		error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ out:
+	if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(new_tty_ctx);
+	if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(old_tty_ctx);
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..05e520e1c2fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.h,v 1.1 2006/04/22 11:26:08 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+#define _PORT_LINUX_H
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f57433e78f3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.c,v 1.2 2006/09/01 05:38:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <libcontract.h>
+#include <sys/contract/process.h>
+#include <sys/ctfs.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define CT_TEMPLATE	CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
+#define CT_LATEST	CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
+
+static int tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+/* Lookup the latest process contract */
+static ctid_t
+get_active_process_contract_id(void)
+{
+	int stat_fd;
+	ctid_t ctid = -1;
+	ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
+
+	if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
+		    "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error reading process contract "
+		    "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ct_status_free(stathdl);
+ out:
+	close(stat_fd);
+	return ctid;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
+{
+	if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* We have to set certain attributes before activating the template */
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd,
+	    CT_PR_EV_HWERR|CT_PR_EV_SIGNAL|CT_PR_EV_CORE) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Now make this the active template for this process. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error activating process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
+{
+	debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* Clear the active template. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
+{
+	ctid_t ctid;
+	char ctl_path[256];
+	int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
+
+	debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	if (tmpl_fd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	/* First clear the active template. */
+	if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
+	 * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
+	 * more do.
+	 */
+	if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
+		return;
+
+	/* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
+	ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
+
+	debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
+
+	snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
+	    CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
+	if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error opening process contract "
+		    "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(ctl_fd);
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+	if (stat_fd != -1)
+		close(stat_fd);
+	if (ctl_fd != -1)
+		close(ctl_fd);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4c324871eb19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $Id: port-solaris.h,v 1.1 2006/08/30 17:24:42 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
index 31921615fac0..276474db87cd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
@@ -16,9 +16,23 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "channels.h"
 
 /*
  * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
@@ -26,6 +40,7 @@
  * settings.
  *
  * SSH_TUN_LINUX	Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD	Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
  * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF	Translate the OpenBSD address family
  * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF	Prepend/remove the address family
  */
@@ -93,7 +108,10 @@ sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
 #ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <net/if.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
 #include <net/if_tun.h>
+#endif
 
 int
 sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
index 86d9272b4e7f..c53df01fceb6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #ifndef _PORT_TUN_H
 #define _PORT_TUN_H
 
-#include "channels.h"
+struct Channel;
 
 #if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD)
 # define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
index c644271218a8..6f3523902590 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
@@ -26,15 +26,26 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LIBIAF
+#include <sys/types.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
-#include <crypt.h>
+# include <crypt.h>
 #endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 
 int nischeck(char *);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
index 919c0174a906..11bd8f646e1d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@
 #ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
 
 #include <termios.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <readpassphrase.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #ifdef TCSASOFT
 # define _T_FLUSH	(TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bcf214bd0217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.4 2006/08/19 09:12:14 dtucker Exp $
+
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
+	strtonumtest$(EXEEXT)
+
+all:	t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
+
+%$(EXEEXT):	%.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS)
+
+t-exec:	$(TESTPROGS)
+	@echo running compat regress tests
+	@for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
+	done
+	@echo finished compat regress tests
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..feb1b567df8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define NUM_OPENS 10
+
+void
+fail(char *msg)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "closefrom: %s\n", msg);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	int i, max, fds[NUM_OPENS];
+	char buf[512];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
+		if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", "r")) == -1)
+			exit(0);	/* can't test */
+	max = i - 1;
+
+	/* should close last fd only */
+	closefrom(fds[max]);
+	if (close(fds[max]) != -1)
+		fail("failed to close highest fd");
+
+	/* make sure we can still use remaining descriptors */
+	for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
+		if (read(fds[i], buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+			fail("closed descriptors it should not have");
+
+	/* should close all fds */
+	closefrom(fds[0]);
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
+		if (close(fds[i]) != -1)
+			fail("failed to close from lowest fd");
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4ca63e18048c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BUFSZ 2048
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int failed = 0;
+
+static void
+fail(const char *m)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "snprintftest: %s\n", m);
+	failed = 1;
+}
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	char b[5];
+	char *src;
+
+	snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+	if (b[4] != '\0')
+		fail("snprintf does not correctly terminate long strings");
+
+	/* check for read overrun on unterminated string */
+	if ((src = malloc(BUFSZ)) == NULL) {
+		fail("malloc failed");
+	} else {
+		memset(src, 'a', BUFSZ);
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.*s", 1, src);
+		if (strcmp(b, "a") != 0)
+			fail("failed with length limit '%%.s'");
+	}
+
+	/* check that snprintf and vsnprintf return sane values */
+	if (snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+		fail("snprintf does not return required length");
+	if (x_snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+		fail("vsnprintf does not return required length");
+
+	return failed;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7f6d779bedb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int fail = 0;
+
+void
+test(const char *a)
+{
+	char *b;
+
+	b = strdup(a);
+	if (b == 0) {
+		fail = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(a, b) != 0)
+		fail = 1;
+	free(b);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	test("");
+	test("a");
+	test("\0");
+	test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz");
+	return fail;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cb85851291a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtonumtest.c,v 1.1 2004/08/03 20:38:36 otto Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: regress/lib/libc/strtonum/strtonumtest.c */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int fail;
+
+void
+test(const char *p, long long lb, long long ub, int ok)
+{
+	long long val;
+	const char *q;
+
+	val = strtonum(p, lb, ub, &q);
+	if (ok && q != NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] ", p, lb, ub);
+		fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER NOT ACCEPTED %s\n", q);
+		fail = 1;
+	} else if (!ok && q == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] %lld ", p, lb, ub, val);
+		fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER ACCEPTED\n");
+		fail = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	test("1", 0, 10, 1);
+	test("0", -2, 5, 1);
+	test("0", 2, 5, 0);
+	test("0", 2, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-2", 0, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("0", -5, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-3", -3, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("9223372036854775807", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-9223372036854775809", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-2", 10, -1, 0);
+	test("-2", -10, -1, 1);
+	test("-20", -10, -1, 0);
+	test("20", -10, -1, 0);
+
+	return (fail);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
index 71cf6e6eb4cc..5b0275ce0632 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@
 
 #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #if 0
 int
 rresvport(int *alport)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
index 6e2b19bb4f58..b511f6649650 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
@@ -35,10 +35,13 @@
 
 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
 #include <sys/pstat.h>
 #endif
+#include <string.h>
 
 #define SPT_NONE	0	/* don't use it at all */
 #define SPT_PSTAT	1	/* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */
@@ -80,7 +83,7 @@ compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[])
 	/* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */
 	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
 		;
-	if ((environ = malloc(sizeof(*environ) * (i + 1))) == NULL) {
+	if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) {
 		environ = envp;	/* put it back */
 		return;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..cf8e0ad667ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,882 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.c
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "sha2.h"
+
+/*
+ * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
+ * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
+ * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
+ * later in this file).  Either define on the command line, for example:
+ *
+ *   cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
+ *
+ * or define below:
+ *
+ *   #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+ *
+ */
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
+/*
+ * BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
+ *
+ * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER.  If your
+ * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
+ * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
+ * equivilent.
+ *
+ * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
+ * hand like this:
+ *
+ *   #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+ *   #define BIG_ENDIAN    4321
+ *
+ * And for little-endian machines, add:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN 
+ *
+ * Or for big-endian machines:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+ *
+ * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
+ * appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
+ * <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
+ * made).
+ */
+#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
+#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
+#endif
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
+#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
+#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+
+/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
+#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24);	\
+} while(0)
+
+#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 56;						\
+        (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 40;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src) >> 32;						\
+	(cp)[4] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[5] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[6] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[7] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[1] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
+ * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
+ * 64-bit words):
+ */
+#define ADDINC128(w,n) do {						\
+	(w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n);					\
+	if ((w)[0] < (n)) {						\
+		(w)[1]++;						\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
+/*
+ * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
+ *
+ *   NOTE:  The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
+ *   S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document
+ *   (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
+ *   same "backwards" definition.
+ */
+/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
+#define R(b,x) 		((x) >> (b))
+/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */
+#define S32(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
+/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
+#define S64(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
+
+/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
+#define Ch(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */
+#define Sigma0_256(x)	(S32(2,  (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_256(x)	(S32(6,  (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
+#define sigma0_256(x)	(S32(7,  (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 ,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_256(x)	(S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10,   (x)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+#define Sigma0_512(x)	(S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_512(x)	(S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
+#define sigma0_512(x)	(S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_512(x)	(S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6,   (x)))
+
+
+/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t K256[64] = {
+	0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
+	0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
+	0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
+	0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
+	0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
+	0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
+	0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
+	0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
+	0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
+	0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
+	0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
+	0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
+	0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
+	0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
+	0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
+	0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
+const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667UL,
+	0xbb67ae85UL,
+	0x3c6ef372UL,
+	0xa54ff53aUL,
+	0x510e527fUL,
+	0x9b05688cUL,
+	0x1f83d9abUL,
+	0x5be0cd19UL
+};
+
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+const static u_int64_t K512[80] = {
+	0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
+	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
+	0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
+	0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
+	0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
+	0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
+	0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
+	0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
+	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
+	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
+	0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
+	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
+	0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
+	0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
+	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
+	0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
+	0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
+	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
+	0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
+	0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
+	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
+	0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
+	0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
+	0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
+	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
+	0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
+	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
+	0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
+	0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
+	0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
+	0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
+	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
+	0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
+	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
+	0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
+	0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
+	0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
+	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
+	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
+	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
+const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
+	0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
+	0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
+	0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
+	0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
+	0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
+	0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
+	0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
+const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
+	0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
+	0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
+	0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
+	0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
+	0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
+	0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
+	0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+};
+
+
+/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount = 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);					    \
+	data += 4;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_256(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_256(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] +	    \
+	     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
+	do {
+		ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, T2, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
+		data += 4;
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
+		s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];	
+		s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + 
+		     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			context->bitcount += freespace << 3;
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			context->bitcount += len << 3;
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA256_Transform(context->state, data);
+		context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
+		len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		context->bitcount += len << 3;
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+			    SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+				    SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+			/* Prepare for last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA256_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+			BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+		memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] =  0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);					    \
+	data += 8;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+
+#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_512(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_512(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] +	    \
+             (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
+	do {
+		ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, T2, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
+		data += 8;
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
+		s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
+		s1 =  sigma1_512(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
+		     (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA512_Transform(context->state, data);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
+		len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+			/* And set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Prepare for final transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount[1]);
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
+	    context->bitcount[0]);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+
+void
+SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+			BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+		memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	}
+}
+
+
+#if 0
+/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+	if (context == NULL)
+		return;
+	memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update);
+__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad);
+
+void
+SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA384_Pad(context);
+
+	/* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		int	i;
+
+		/* Convert TO host byte order */
+		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+			BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]);
+#else
+		memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Zero out state data */
+	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..821f2dd6c510
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.h
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
+
+#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
+#define _SSHSHA2_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH		32
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH		48
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/
+typedef struct _SHA256_CTX {
+	u_int32_t	state[8];
+	u_int64_t	bitcount;
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA256_CTX;
+typedef struct _SHA512_CTX {
+	u_int64_t	state[8];
+	u_int64_t	bitcount[2];
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA512_CTX;
+
+#if 0
+typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX;
+#endif
+
+void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *);
+void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#if 0
+void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *);
+void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *);
+void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) && \
+    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */
+
+#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
index 8ad0d0058bbf..87f2f24b2583 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
@@ -20,8 +20,11 @@
 /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+
 #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
 
 #define INVALID 	1
 #define TOOSMALL 	2
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
index 9afa0b9f268a..14899321fe48 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
 # ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
 #  include <crypt.h>
 # endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
index 74e8a8b13765..0fb23269b700 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/xmmap.c
@@ -23,21 +23,31 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-/* $Id: xmmap.c,v 1.6 2004/10/06 13:15:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: xmmap.c,v 1.12 2006/08/24 09:58:36 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #endif
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "log.h"
 
 void *xmmap(size_t size)
 {
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
 	void *address;
 
-#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
 # ifdef MAP_ANON
 	address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
 	    -1, (off_t)0);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openssh.xml.in b/crypto/openssh/openssh.xml.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..655ee5c9e82d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openssh.xml.in
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+<?xml version='1.0'?>
+<!DOCTYPE service_bundle SYSTEM '/usr/share/lib/xml/dtd/service_bundle.dtd.1'>
+<!--
+    Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+    purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+-->
+
+<service_bundle type='manifest' name='OpenSSH server'>
+
+    <service
+        name='site/openssh'
+        type='service'
+        version='1'>
+
+        <create_default_instance enabled='false'/>
+
+        <single_instance/>
+
+        <dependency
+            name='filesystem-local'
+            grouping='require_all'
+            restart_on='none'
+            type='service'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/system/filesystem/local'/>
+        </dependency>
+
+        <dependency
+            name='network'
+            grouping='require_all'
+            restart_on='none'
+            type='service'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/milestone/network'/>
+        </dependency>
+
+        <dependent
+            name='multi-user-server'
+            restart_on='none'
+            grouping='optional_all'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/milestone/multi-user-server'/>
+        </dependent>
+
+        <exec_method
+            name='start'
+            type='method'
+            exec='/lib/svc/method/site/opensshd start'
+            timeout_seconds='60'>
+            <method_context/>
+        </exec_method>
+
+        <exec_method
+            name='stop'
+            type='method'
+            exec=':kill'
+            timeout_seconds='60'>
+            <method_context/>
+        </exec_method>
+
+        <property_group
+            name='startd'
+            type='framework'>
+            <propval name='ignore_error' type='astring' value='core,signal'/>
+        </property_group>
+
+        <template>
+            <common_name>
+                <loctext xml:lang='C'>OpenSSH server</loctext>
+            </common_name>
+            <documentation>
+                <manpage
+                    title='sshd'
+                    section='1M'
+                    manpath='@prefix@/man'/>
+            </documentation>
+        </template>
+    </service>
+</service_bundle>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
index db2aa24119d1..ab5a01002aac 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.145 2006/09/19 21:14:08 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -37,26 +38,40 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.120 2005/10/30 08:52:17 djm Exp $");
-
+ 
+#include <sys/types.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "crc32.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-
 #include "compress.h"
 #include "deattack.h"
 #include "channels.h"
-
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "mac.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -258,6 +273,7 @@ packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode)
 
 	return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
 }
+
 void
 packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 {
@@ -270,6 +286,7 @@ packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 
 	cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
 }
+
 int
 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
 {
@@ -471,31 +488,37 @@ packet_put_char(int value)
 
 	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_int(u_int value)
 {
 	buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
 {
 	buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
 {
 	buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
 {
 	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
 {
 	buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
 {
@@ -549,7 +572,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
 	/* Add check bytes. */
 	checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
 	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum);
+	put_u32(buf, checksum);
 	buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
@@ -558,7 +581,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
 #endif
 
 	/* Append to output. */
-	PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+	put_u32(buf, len);
 	buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
 	cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
 	cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
@@ -654,7 +677,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 
 /*
  * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
- * This happans on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
  * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
  */
 static void
@@ -669,6 +692,9 @@ packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
 	 */
 	after_authentication = 1;
 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
+		if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+			continue;
 		comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
 		if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
 			packet_init_compression();
@@ -761,7 +787,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
 	packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
-	PUT_32BIT(cp, packet_length);
+	put_u32(cp, packet_length);
 	cp[4] = padlen;
 	DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
 
@@ -778,7 +804,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
 	    buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
 	/* append unencrypted MAC */
 	if (mac && mac->enabled)
-		buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+		buffer_append(&output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
 	buffer_dump(&output);
@@ -868,7 +894,7 @@ packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	char buf[8192];
 	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
 
-	setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) *
+	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS),
 	    sizeof(fd_mask));
 
 	/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
@@ -959,7 +985,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 		return SSH_MSG_NONE;
 	/* Get length of incoming packet. */
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
-	len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+	len = get_u32(cp);
 	if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
 		packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
 	padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
@@ -978,9 +1004,16 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 	 * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
 	 * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
 	 */
-	if (!receive_context.plaintext &&
-	    detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL) == DEATTACK_DETECTED)
-		packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: network attack detected");
+	if (!receive_context.plaintext) {
+		switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len)) {
+		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
+			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
+			    "network attack detected");
+		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
+			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
+			    "service detected");
+		}
+	}
 
 	/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
 	buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
@@ -1007,7 +1040,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
 		    len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
 
 	cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
-	stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(cp);
+	stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
 	if (checksum != stored_checksum)
 		packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
 	buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
@@ -1056,7 +1089,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
 		    block_size);
 		cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
-		packet_length = GET_32BIT(cp);
+		packet_length = get_u32(cp);
 		if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
 			buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
@@ -1187,7 +1220,6 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 				break;
 			default:
 				return type;
-				break;
 			}
 		} else {
 			type = packet_read_poll1();
@@ -1210,7 +1242,6 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 				if (type)
 					DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
 				return type;
-				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -1412,7 +1443,7 @@ packet_write_wait(void)
 {
 	fd_set *setp;
 
-	setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
+	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS),
 	    sizeof(fd_mask));
 	packet_write_poll();
 	while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
@@ -1480,8 +1511,7 @@ packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
 	/* Only set socket options if using a socket.  */
 	if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
 		return;
-	if (interactive)
-		set_nodelay(connection_in);
+	set_nodelay(connection_in);
 	packet_set_tos(interactive);
 }
 
@@ -1542,7 +1572,7 @@ packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
 	for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
 		if (i % 4 == 0)
 			rnd = arc4random();
-		packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff);
+		packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff);
 		rnd >>= 8;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
index 8c23646aaae4..21ff45067391 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.43 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.45 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 #ifndef PACKET_H
 #define PACKET_H
 
+#include <termios.h>
+
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
 void     packet_set_connection(int, int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
index cf42625a4a4d..f2571e2749f7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.15 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/platform.c b/crypto/openssh/platform.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aee4b01e7c6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/platform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.1 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+void
+platform_pre_fork(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_pre_fork();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_child(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/platform.h b/crypto/openssh/platform.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cf93bc57c0ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/platform.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* $Id: platform.h,v 1.1 2006/08/30 17:24:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+void platform_pre_fork(void);
+void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+void platform_post_fork_child(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
index 13c51d87ef70..0f95222d2487 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.37 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,7 +24,17 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.24 2005/06/07 13:25:23 jaredy Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "progressmeter.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -154,7 +165,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
 			len = 0;
 		if (len >= file_len + 1)
 			len = file_len;
-		for (i = len;  i < file_len; i++ )
+		for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
 			buf[i] = ' ';
 		buf[file_len] = '\0';
 	}
@@ -215,6 +226,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
 	last_update = now;
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 update_progress_meter(int ignore)
 {
@@ -269,6 +281,7 @@ stop_progress_meter(void)
 	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 sig_winch(int sig)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
index bfb9a0b770fd..10bab99ba4c7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/progressmeter.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.1 2003/01/10 08:19:07 fgsch Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.2 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
index 1fbf597936d8..4cacf6026385 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.159 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,17 +13,33 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.145 2005/12/08 18:34:11 reyk Exp $");
 
-#include "ssh.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "readconf.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "mac.h"
 
@@ -94,6 +111,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.145 2005/12/08 18:34:11 reyk Exp $");
 typedef enum {
 	oBadOption,
 	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oGatewayPorts,
+	oExitOnForwardFailure,
 	oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
 	oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
 	oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
@@ -124,6 +142,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
 	{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
 	{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
+	{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
 	{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
 	{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
 	{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
@@ -306,7 +325,8 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 		    int *activep)
 {
 	char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, fwdarg[256];
-	int opcode, *intptr, value, value2;
+	int opcode, *intptr, value, value2, scale;
+	long long orig, val64;
 	size_t len;
 	Forward fwd;
 
@@ -319,7 +339,8 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
 
 	s = line;
 	/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
-	keyword = strdelim(&s);
+	if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 	/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
 	if (*keyword == '\0')
 		keyword = strdelim(&s);
@@ -376,6 +397,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case oExitOnForwardFailure:
+		intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case oUsePrivilegedPort:
 		intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -479,22 +504,36 @@ parse_yesnoask:
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
 		if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
-		value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 10);
+		orig = val64 = strtoll(arg, &endofnumber, 10);
 		if (arg == endofnumber)
 			fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
 		switch (toupper(*endofnumber)) {
+		case '\0':
+			scale = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'K':
-			value *= 1<<10;
+			scale = 1<<10;
 			break;
 		case 'M':
-			value *= 1<<20;
+			scale = 1<<20;
 			break;
 		case 'G':
-			value *= 1<<30;
+			scale = 1<<30;
 			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid RekeyLimit suffix",
+			    filename, linenum);
 		}
+		val64 *= scale;
+		/* detect integer wrap and too-large limits */
+		if ((val64 / scale) != orig || val64 > INT_MAX)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (val64 < 16)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+			    filename, linenum);
 		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
-			*intptr = value;
+			*intptr = (int)val64;
 		break;
 
 	case oIdentityFile:
@@ -963,6 +1002,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->forward_agent = -1;
 	options->forward_x11 = -1;
 	options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
+	options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
 	options->xauth_location = NULL;
 	options->gateway_ports = -1;
 	options->use_privileged_port = -1;
@@ -1043,6 +1083,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->forward_x11 = 0;
 	if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
 		options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+	if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
+		options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0;
 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
 		options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
index 4565b2c2ceda..d484f258ea5e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.68 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.71 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
 #ifndef READCONF_H
 #define READCONF_H
 
-#include "key.h"
-
 /* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -34,6 +32,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     forward_agent;	/* Forward authentication agent. */
 	int     forward_x11;	/* Forward X11 display. */
 	int     forward_x11_trusted;	/* Trust Forward X11 display. */
+	int     exit_on_forward_failure;	/* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location for xauth program */
 	int     gateway_ports;	/* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
 	int     use_privileged_port;	/* Don't use privileged port if false. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
index 7914799a4965..bd144c2e3917 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readpass.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.47 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,13 +24,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.33 2005/05/02 21:13:22 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 
 static char *
 ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
@@ -53,8 +68,7 @@ ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	if (pid == 0) {
-		seteuid(getuid());
-		setuid(getuid());
+		permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
 		close(p[0]);
 		if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
 			fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
index 4f47bc3fdbb5..53995639834d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.36 2005/03/04 08:48:46 djm Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.42 2006/07/19 13:34:52 dtucker Exp $
 
 REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t-exec
 tests:		$(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		forwarding \
 		multiplex \
 		reexec \
-		brokenkeys
+		brokenkeys \
+		cfgmatch \
+		forcecommand
 
 USER!=		id -un
 CLEANFILES=	t2.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
@@ -49,8 +51,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	t2.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
 		rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \
 		rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \
 		ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \
-		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass \
-		remote_pid
+		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \
+		sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
 
 #LTESTS +=	ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
index 6186a8d489e9..e5fcedda78ef 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.2 2005/11/14 21:25:56 grunk Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.3 2006/07/06 12:01:53 grunk Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ then
 	echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
 	exit 0
 fi
+if [ -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+	echo "skipped: need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
 
 trace "start agent"
 eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d987dcb972ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.2 2006/07/22 01:50:00 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd_config match"
+
+pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
+fwdport=3301
+fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+
+stop_client()
+{
+	pid=`cat $pidfile`
+	if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
+		kill $pid
+		sleep 1
+	fi
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+start_sshd
+
+#set -x
+
+# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config.  This should be permitted
+for p in 1 2; do
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p $fwd -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost \
+	    "echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ||\
+	    fail "match permitopen proto $p sshd failed"
+	sleep 1;
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+	    fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+# Same but from different source.  This should not be permitted
+for p in 1 2; do
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	trace "match permitopen proxy proto $p"
+	${SSH} -q -$p $fwd -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -f somehost \
+	    "echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ||\
+	    fail "match permitopen proxy proto $p sshd failed"
+	sleep 1;
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+	    fail "match permitopen deny proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
+echo -n 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/rsa.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+echo -n 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/rsa1.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for p in 1 2; do
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+	${SSH} -q -$p $fwd -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -f somehost \
+	    "echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ||\
+	    fail "match permitopen w/key opt proto $p sshd failed"
+	sleep 1;
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+	    fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
+# Should be permitted.
+for p in 1 2; do
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p $fwd -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost \
+	    "echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ||\
+	    fail "match permitopen proto $p sshd failed"
+	sleep 1;
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+	    fail "match permitopen permit proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section
+for p in 1 2; do
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p"
+	${SSH} -q -$p $fwd -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -f somehost \
+	    "echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 ||\
+	    fail "match override permitopen proto $p sshd failed"
+	sleep 1;
+	${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+	    fail "match override permitopen proto $p"
+	stop_client
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5925111438ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.2 2005/05/24 04:09:54 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="cipher speed"
+
+getbytes ()
+{
+	sed -n '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p'
+}
+
+tries="1 2"
+DATA=/bin/ls
+DATA=/bsd
+
+macs="hmac-sha1 hmac-md5 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+ciphers="aes128-cbc 3des-cbc blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc 
+	arcfour128 arcfour256 arcfour aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr"
+
+for c in $ciphers; do for m in $macs; do
+	trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m"
+	for x in $tries; do
+		echo -n "$c/$m:\t"
+		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \
+			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+		< ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+		fi
+	done
+done; done
+
+ciphers="3des blowfish"
+for c in $ciphers; do
+	trace "proto 1 cipher $c"
+	for x in $tries; do
+		echo -n "$c:\t"
+		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \
+			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+		< ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c"
+		fi
+	done
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/forcecommand.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/forcecommand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..99e51a60ffd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/forcecommand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.1 2006/07/19 13:09:28 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="forced command"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+echon 'command="true" ' >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/rsa.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+echon 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/rsa1.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+for p in 1 2; do
+	trace "forced command in key option proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+	    fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
+
+echon 'command="false" ' >$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/rsa.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+echon 'command="false" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/rsa1.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in 1 2; do
+	trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+	    fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "    ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+for p in 1 2; do
+	trace "forced command with match proto $p"
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ ||
+	    fail "forced command in key proto $p"
+done
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh b/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
index 3b171144fb03..9ffbb3dd4712 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/forwarding.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.5 2005/03/10 10:20:39 dtucker Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.6 2006/07/11 18:51:21 markus Exp $
 #	Placed in the Public Domain.
 
 tid="local and remote forwarding"
@@ -34,6 +34,36 @@ for p in 1 2; do
 done
 
 for p in 1 2; do
+for d in L R; do
+	trace "exit on -$d forward failure, proto $p"
+
+	# this one should succeed
+	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+	    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		fail "connection failed, should not"
+	else
+		# this one should fail
+		${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+		    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r != 255 ]; then
+			fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)"
+		fi
+	fi
+done
+done
+
+for p in 1 2; do
 	trace "simple clear forwarding proto $p"
 	${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
index 66561a4213b5..08cc82007162 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rsa.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.28 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -60,11 +61,15 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.24 2001/12/27 18:22:16 markus Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 
 void
 rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/rsa.h b/crypto/openssh/rsa.h
index 957d865522d2..b841ea4e10f9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/rsa.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.15 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c b/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c
index dd2c28df250c..4751ea295ff2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard-opensc.c
@@ -26,9 +26,13 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 #if defined(SMARTCARD) && defined(USE_OPENSC)
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
 #include <opensc/opensc.h>
 #include <opensc/pkcs15.h>
 
@@ -455,7 +459,9 @@ sc_get_keys(const char *id, const char *pin)
 		}
 		key_count = r;
 	}
-	keys = xmalloc(sizeof(Key *) * (key_count*2+1));
+	if (key_count > 1024)
+		fatal("Too many keys (%u), expected <= 1024", key_count);
+	keys = xcalloc(key_count * 2 + 1, sizeof(Key *));
 	for (i = 0; i < key_count; i++) {
 		sc_pkcs15_object_t *tmp_obj = NULL;
 		cert_id = ((sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *)(certs[i]->data))->id;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard.c b/crypto/openssh/scard.c
index b3d25058ae18..328655eddb1c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scard.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.35 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -24,14 +25,18 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #if defined(SMARTCARD) && defined(USE_SECTOK)
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.29 2004/05/08 00:21:31 djm Exp $");
 
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
 #include <sectok.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "scard.h"
 
@@ -125,7 +130,7 @@ sc_init(void)
 	if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) {
 		return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD;
 	}
-	if (status < 0 ) {
+	if (status < 0) {
 		error("sc_open failed");
 		return status;
 	}
@@ -215,7 +220,7 @@ sc_private_decrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
 	olen = len = sw = 0;
 	if (sc_fd < 0) {
 		status = sc_init();
-		if (status < 0 )
+		if (status < 0)
 			goto err;
 	}
 	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
@@ -255,7 +260,7 @@ sc_private_encrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
 	len = sw = 0;
 	if (sc_fd < 0) {
 		status = sc_init();
-		if (status < 0 )
+		if (status < 0)
 			goto err;
 	}
 	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
@@ -378,12 +383,12 @@ sc_get_keys(const char *id, const char *pin)
 		key_free(k);
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if (status < 0 ) {
+	if (status < 0) {
 		error("sc_read_pubkey failed");
 		key_free(k);
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	keys = xmalloc((nkeys+1) * sizeof(Key *));
+	keys = xcalloc((nkeys+1), sizeof(Key *));
 
 	n = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
 	BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard.h b/crypto/openssh/scard.h
index 9ba20a361ba0..82efe4839220 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scard.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.12 2003/06/12 19:12:03 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.14 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@
 #ifndef SCARD_H
 #define SCARD_H
 
-#include "key.h"
-
 #define SCARD_ERROR_FAIL	-1
 #define SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD	-2
 #define SCARD_ERROR_APPLET	-3
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.1 b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
index d9b1f8e8fa58..43662abeab8e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 .\"
 .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.39 2006/01/20 00:14:55 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.40 2006/07/18 07:56:28 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SCP 1
@@ -198,9 +198,8 @@ to print debugging messages about their progress.
 This is helpful in
 debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
 .El
-.Sh DIAGNOSTICS
-.Nm
-exits with 0 on success or >0 if an error occurred.
+.Pp
+.Ex -std scp
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr rcp 1 ,
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.c b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
index 620024ea78a3..56a3e79ffa2b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.155 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@@ -71,7 +72,30 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -82,6 +106,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");
 
 extern char *__progname;
 
+int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
+
 void bwlimit(int);
 
 /* Struct for addargs */
@@ -167,7 +193,7 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
  */
 
 int
-do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
+do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
 {
 	int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
 
@@ -181,7 +207,8 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
 	 * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
 	 * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
 	 */
-	pipe(reserved);
+	if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
 
 	/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
 	if (pipe(pin) < 0)
@@ -234,7 +261,6 @@ typedef struct {
 
 BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
 void lostconn(int);
-void nospace(void);
 int okname(char *);
 void run_err(const char *,...);
 void verifydir(char *);
@@ -258,15 +284,21 @@ void usage(void);
 int
 main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-	int ch, fflag, tflag, status;
+	int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
 	double speed;
-	char *targ, *endp;
+	char *targ, *endp, **newargv;
 	extern char *optarg;
 	extern int optind;
 
 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
 	sanitise_stdfd();
 
+	/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+	newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
+	for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
+		newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
+	argv = newargv;
+
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 
 	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
@@ -409,9 +441,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 void
 toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
 {
-	int i, len;
 	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg;
 	arglist alist;
+	int i;
 
 	memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
 	alist.list = NULL;
@@ -476,12 +508,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
 				errs = 1;
 		} else {	/* local to remote */
 			if (remin == -1) {
-				len = strlen(targ) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
-				bp = xmalloc(len);
-				(void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
+				xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
 				host = cleanhostname(thost);
 				if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin,
-				    &remout, argc) < 0)
+				    &remout) < 0)
 					exit(1);
 				if (response() < 0)
 					exit(1);
@@ -490,14 +520,15 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
 			source(1, argv + i);
 		}
 	}
+	xfree(arg);
 }
 
 void
 tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-	int i, len;
 	char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
 	arglist alist;
+	int i;
 
 	memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
 	alist.list = NULL;
@@ -529,10 +560,8 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
 				suser = pwd->pw_name;
 		}
 		host = cleanhostname(host);
-		len = strlen(src) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
-		bp = xmalloc(len);
-		(void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
-		if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout, argc) < 0) {
+		xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
+		if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
 			(void) xfree(bp);
 			++errs;
 			continue;
@@ -777,7 +806,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
 	BUF *bp;
 	off_t i;
 	size_t j, count;
-	int amt, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode;
+	int amt, exists, first, ofd;
+	mode_t mode, omode, mask;
 	off_t size, statbytes;
 	int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
 	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
@@ -1097,15 +1127,15 @@ run_err(const char *fmt,...)
 	va_list ap;
 
 	++errs;
-	if (fp == NULL && !(fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))
-		return;
-	(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
-	(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
-	va_start(ap, fmt);
-	(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
-	va_end(ap);
-	(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
-	(void) fflush(fp);
+	if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
+		va_start(ap, fmt);
+		(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
+		(void) fflush(fp);
+	}
 
 	if (!iamremote) {
 		va_start(ap, fmt);
@@ -1181,7 +1211,7 @@ allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
 	if (bp->buf == NULL)
 		bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
 	else
-		bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, size);
+		bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size);
 	memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
 	bp->cnt = size;
 	return (bp);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index 81953bb80aac..1f80de22d3ec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.165 2006/08/14 12:40:25 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -10,24 +11,41 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.146 2005/12/08 18:34:11 reyk Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
 
 static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 
 /* Use of privilege separation or not */
 extern int use_privsep;
+extern Buffer cfg;
 
 /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
 
@@ -102,9 +120,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL;
 	options->num_accept_env = 0;
 	options->permit_tun = -1;
-
-	/* Needs to be accessable in many places */
-	use_privsep = -1;
+	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
+	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
 }
 
 void
@@ -274,110 +291,119 @@ typedef enum {
 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand,
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+
 /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
 static struct {
 	const char *name;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+	u_int flags;
 } keywords[] = {
 	/* Portable-specific options */
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	{ "usepam", sUsePAM },
+	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #else
-	{ "usepam", sUnsupported },
+	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
-	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated },
+	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	/* Standard Options */
-	{ "port", sPort },
-	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile },
-	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile },					/* alias */
-	{ "pidfile", sPidFile },
-	{ "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits },
-	{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime },
-	{ "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime },
-	{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin },
-	{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility },
-	{ "loglevel", sLogLevel },
-	{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated },
-	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication },
-	{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication },
-	{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly },
-	{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication },
-	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },
-	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },			/* alias */
+	{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
+	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },	/* alias */
 #ifdef KRB5
-	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication },
-	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd },
-	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup },
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #ifdef USE_AFS
-	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken },
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #else
-	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
 #else
-	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported },
-	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported },
-	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported },
-	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
-	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported },
-	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication },
-	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds },
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #else
-	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported },
-	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
-	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication },
-	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
-	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication },
-	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
-	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated },
-	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress },
-	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily },
-	{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd },
-	{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog },
-	{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts },
-	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts },
-	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding },
-	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset },
-	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost },
-	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation },
-	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes },
-	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd },
-	{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment },
-	{ "uselogin", sUseLogin },
-	{ "compression", sCompression },
-	{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive },
-	{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive },				/* obsolete alias */
-	{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding },
-	{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers },
-	{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers },
-	{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups },
-	{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups },
-	{ "ciphers", sCiphers },
-	{ "macs", sMacs },
-	{ "protocol", sProtocol },
-	{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts },
-	{ "subsystem", sSubsystem },
-	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups },
-	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries },
-	{ "banner", sBanner },
-	{ "usedns", sUseDNS },
-	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated },
-	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated },
-	{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval },
-	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax },
-	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile },
-	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2 },
-	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation},
-	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv },
-	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel },
-	{ NULL, sBadOption }
+	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },	/* obsolete alias */
+	{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
 
 /*
@@ -386,13 +412,15 @@ static struct {
 
 static ServerOpCodes
 parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
-	    int linenum)
+	    int linenum, u_int *flags)
 {
 	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
-		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
+		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
+			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
 			return keywords[i].opcode;
+		}
 
 	error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
 	    filename, linenum, cp);
@@ -437,18 +465,171 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 	options->listen_addrs = aitop;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
+ *
+ * The first time is at startup.  activep is initialized to 1 and the
+ * directives in the global context are processed and acted on.  Hitting a
+ * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
+ * checked for syntax only.
+ *
+ * The second time is after a connection has been established but before
+ * authentication.  activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
+ * are ignored since they have already been processed.  If the criteria in a
+ * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
+ * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it.  Any
+ * options set are copied into the main server config.
+ *
+ * Potential additions/improvements:
+ *  - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers.
+ *
+ *  - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
+ *	Match Address 192.168.0.*
+ *		Tag trusted
+ *	Match Group wheel
+ *		Tag trusted
+ *	Match Tag trusted
+ *		AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ *		GatewayPorts clientspecified
+ *		[...]
+ *
+ *  - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
+ *	Match Group shell
+ *		PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
+ */
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	u_int ngrps = 0;
+	char *arg, *p, *cp, *grplist[MAX_MATCH_GROUPS];
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	/*
+	 * Even if we do not have a user yet, we still need to check for
+	 * valid syntax.
+	 */
+	arg = cp = xstrdup(grps);
+	while ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")) != NULL && *p != '\0') {
+		if (ngrps >= MAX_MATCH_GROUPS) {
+			error("line %d: too many groups in Match Group", line);
+			result = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		grplist[ngrps++] = p;
+	}
+
+	if (user == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+		debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
+		    "not exist", line, user);
+	} else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+		debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
+		    "at line %d", user, line);
+	} else if (ga_match(grplist, ngrps) != 1) {
+		debug("user %.100s does not match group %.100s at line %d",
+		    user, arg, line);
+	} else {
+		debug("user %.100s matched group %.100s at line %d", user,
+		    arg, line);
+		result = 1;
+	}
+out:
+	ga_free();
+	xfree(arg);
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, const char *user, const char *host,
+    const char *address)
+{
+	int result = 1;
+	char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (user == NULL)
+		debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
+	else
+		debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s", cp,
+		    user ? user : "(null)", host ? host : "(null)",
+		    address ? address : "(null)");
+
+	while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		len = strlen(arg);
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+			if (!user) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (match_pattern_list(user, arg, len, 0) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
+				    "line %d", user, arg, line);
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
+			switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, user)) {
+			case -1:
+				return -1;
+			case 0:
+				result = 0;
+			}
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+			if (!host) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (match_hostname(host, arg, len) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
+				    "%.100s' at line %d", host, arg, line);
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
+			debug("address '%s' arg '%s'", address, arg);
+			if (!address) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (match_hostname(address, arg, len) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
+				    "%.100s' at line %d", address, arg, line);
+		} else {
+			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (user != NULL)
+		debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+	*condition = cp;
+	return result;
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
 int
 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-    const char *filename, int linenum)
+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, const char *user,
+    const char *host, const char *address)
 {
 	char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
-	int *intptr, value, n;
+	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, n;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
 	u_short port;
-	u_int i;
+	u_int i, flags = 0;
+	size_t len;
 
 	cp = line;
-	arg = strdelim(&cp);
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 	/* Ignore leading whitespace */
 	if (*arg == '\0')
 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
@@ -456,7 +637,25 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 		return 0;
 	intptr = NULL;
 	charptr = NULL;
-	opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum);
+	opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
+
+	if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+		cmdline = 1;
+		activep = &cmdline;
+	}
+	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
+	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
+		if (user == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
+			    "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
+		} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
+			while (arg)
+				arg = strdelim(&cp);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
 	switch (opcode) {
 	/* Portable-specific options */
 	case sUsePAM:
@@ -494,7 +693,7 @@ parse_int:
 			fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		value = atoi(arg);
-		if (*intptr == -1)
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
@@ -574,7 +773,7 @@ parse_filename:
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
 			    filename, linenum);
-		if (*charptr == NULL) {
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
 			/* increase optional counter */
 			if (intptr != NULL)
@@ -625,7 +824,7 @@ parse_flag:
 		else
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
 				filename, linenum, arg);
-		if (*intptr == -1)
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
@@ -820,7 +1019,7 @@ parse_flag:
 	case sDenyUsers:
 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
 			if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
-				fatal( "%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
 				    filename, linenum);
 			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
 			    xstrdup(arg);
@@ -890,6 +1089,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
 			    filename, linenum);
+		if (!*activep) {
+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
+			break;
+		}
 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
 			if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
 				fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
@@ -900,6 +1103,17 @@ parse_flag:
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+
+		/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
+		p = xstrdup(arg);
+		len = strlen(p) + 1;
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+			len += 1 + strlen(arg);
+			p = xrealloc(p, 1, len);
+			strlcat(p, " ", len);
+			strlcat(p, arg, len);
+		}
+		options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
 		options->num_subsystems++;
 		break;
 
@@ -940,7 +1154,7 @@ parse_flag:
 	 */
 	case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
 	case sAuthorizedKeysFile2:
-		charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile ) ?
+		charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile) ?
 		    &options->authorized_keys_file :
 		    &options->authorized_keys_file2;
 		goto parse_filename;
@@ -961,6 +1175,8 @@ parse_flag:
 			if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV)
 				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.",
 				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep)
+				break;
 			options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] =
 			    xstrdup(arg);
 		}
@@ -988,6 +1204,55 @@ parse_flag:
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+			   "option");
+		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, user, host, address);
+		if (value < 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		*activep = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sPermitOpen:
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+			if (*activep) {
+				channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+				options->num_permitted_opens = 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+		for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
+			p = hpdelim(&arg);
+			if (p == NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			p = cleanhostname(p);
+			if (arg == NULL || (port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
+				fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
+				    "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
+			if (*activep && options->num_permitted_opens == -1) {
+				channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+				options->num_permitted_opens =
+				    channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sForceCommand:
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+		if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
+			options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+		return 0;
+
 	case sDeprecated:
 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
 		    filename, linenum, arg);
@@ -1044,18 +1309,52 @@ load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
 }
 
 void
-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
+parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *user,
+    const char *host, const char *address)
+{
+	ServerOptions mo;
+
+	initialize_server_options(&mo);
+	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, user, host, address);
+	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo);
+}
+
+/* Copy any (supported) values that are set */
+void
+copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src)
+{
+	if (src->allow_tcp_forwarding != -1)
+		dst->allow_tcp_forwarding = src->allow_tcp_forwarding;
+	if (src->gateway_ports != -1)
+		dst->gateway_ports = src->gateway_ports;
+	if (src->adm_forced_command != NULL) {
+		if (dst->adm_forced_command != NULL)
+			xfree(dst->adm_forced_command);
+		dst->adm_forced_command = src->adm_forced_command;
+	}
+	if (src->x11_display_offset != -1)
+		dst->x11_display_offset = src->x11_display_offset;
+	if (src->x11_forwarding != -1)
+		dst->x11_forwarding = src->x11_forwarding;
+	if (src->x11_use_localhost != -1)
+		dst->x11_use_localhost = src->x11_use_localhost;
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf,
+    const char *user, const char *host, const char *address)
 {
-	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
+	int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
 	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
 
 	debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf));
 
 	obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf));
+	active = user ? 0 : 1;
 	linenum = 1;
 	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
 		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
-		    linenum++) != 0)
+		    linenum++, &active, user, host, address) != 0)
 			bad_options++;
 	}
 	xfree(obuf);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
index ab82c8f57a68..ad496f64b9ba 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.72 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.79 2006/08/14 12:40:25 dtucker Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
 #ifndef SERVCONF_H
 #define SERVCONF_H
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-
 #define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
 
 #define MAX_ALLOW_USERS		256	/* Max # users on allow list. */
@@ -27,6 +25,7 @@
 #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
 #define MAX_HOSTKEYS		256	/* Max # hostkeys. */
 #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV		256	/* Max # of env vars. */
+#define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS	256	/* Max # of groups for Match. */
 
 /* permit_root_login */
 #define	PERMIT_NOT_SET		-1
@@ -111,6 +110,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	u_int num_subsystems;
 	char   *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
 	char   *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+	char   *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
 
 	u_int num_accept_env;
 	char   *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV];
@@ -134,15 +134,24 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *authorized_keys_file;	/* File containing public keys */
 	char   *authorized_keys_file2;
 
+	char   *adm_forced_command;
+
 	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
 
 	int	permit_tun;
+
+	int	num_permitted_opens;
 }       ServerOptions;
 
 void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
 void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
-int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int);
+int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
+	     int *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 void	 load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *);
-void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *);
+void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *,
+	     const char *, const char *, const char *);
+void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *,
+	     const char *);
+void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *);
 
 #endif				/* SERVCONF_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index 3d8e7cfb5a5c..6e5fdc2d8c89 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.144 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,7 +36,25 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.124 2005/12/13 15:03:02 reyk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -48,13 +67,16 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.124 2005/12/13 15:03:02 reyk Exp $");
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "serverloop.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "kex.h"
 
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
@@ -142,11 +164,11 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 sigchld_handler(int sig)
 {
 	int save_errno = errno;
-	debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
 	child_terminated = 1;
 #ifndef _UNICOS
 	mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
@@ -155,6 +177,7 @@ sigchld_handler(int sig)
 	errno = save_errno;
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 sigterm_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -348,7 +371,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
  * in buffers and processed later.
  */
 static void
-process_input(fd_set * readset)
+process_input(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	int len;
 	char buf[16384];
@@ -380,10 +403,16 @@ process_input(fd_set * readset)
 
 	/* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
 	if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
+		errno = 0;
 		len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
 		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
 			/* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
 		} else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+		} else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) ||
+		    (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
 			fdout_eof = 1;
 		} else {
 			buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
@@ -392,10 +421,16 @@ process_input(fd_set * readset)
 	}
 	/* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
 	if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
+		errno = 0;
 		len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
 		if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
 			/* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
 		} else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+		} else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) ||
+		    (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
 			fderr_eof = 1;
 		} else {
 			buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
@@ -407,7 +442,7 @@ process_input(fd_set * readset)
  * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
  */
 static void
-process_output(fd_set * writeset)
+process_output(fd_set *writeset)
 {
 	struct termios tio;
 	u_char *data;
@@ -749,6 +784,7 @@ collect_children(void)
 	sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
 	sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
 	if (child_terminated) {
+		debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
 		while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
 		    (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
 			if (pid > 0)
@@ -873,10 +909,10 @@ server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 static void
 server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
-	int row = packet_get_int();
-	int col = packet_get_int();
-	int xpixel = packet_get_int();
-	int ypixel = packet_get_int();
+	u_int row = packet_get_int();
+	u_int col = packet_get_int();
+	u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
+	u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
 
 	debug("Window change received.");
 	packet_check_eom();
@@ -937,7 +973,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
 
 	tun = packet_get_int();
 	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
-	 	if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
 			goto done;
 		tun = forced_tun_device;
 	}
@@ -1085,6 +1121,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 		success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(cancel_address,
 		    cancel_port);
+		xfree(cancel_address);
 	}
 	if (want_reply) {
 		packet_start(success ?
@@ -1094,6 +1131,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	xfree(rtype);
 }
+
 static void
 server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h
index f419198d1ce7..7311558f9493 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.5 2001/06/27 02:12:53 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index 2bf9044048b6..15c5ca9a02ac 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.219 2006/08/29 10:40:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -33,12 +34,35 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.191 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "sshpty.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -46,7 +70,12 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.191 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "channels.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
@@ -63,10 +92,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.191 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
 #include <kafs.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-
 /* func */
 
 Session *session_new(void);
@@ -175,7 +200,7 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
 	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
 
-	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
 		packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 
 	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
@@ -322,7 +347,11 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				break;
 			}
 			debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
-			channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, options.gateway_ports);
+			if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
+			    options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
+				debug("Port forwarding failed.");
+				break;
+			}
 			success = 1;
 			break;
 
@@ -632,7 +661,7 @@ do_pre_login(Session *s)
 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
 	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
 		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
-		    (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
 			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 			cleanup_exit(255);
 		}
@@ -651,10 +680,14 @@ do_pre_login(Session *s)
 void
 do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 {
-	if (forced_command) {
+	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+		original_command = command;
+		command = options.adm_forced_command;
+		debug("Forced command (config) '%.900s'", command);
+	} else if (forced_command) {
 		original_command = command;
 		command = forced_command;
-		debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
+		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
 	}
 
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -826,7 +859,7 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 			if (envsize >= 1000)
 				fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
 			envsize += 50;
-			env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize * sizeof(char *));
+			env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
 			*envsizep = envsize;
 		}
 		/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
@@ -967,12 +1000,15 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
 {
 	char buf[256];
 	u_int i, envsize;
-	char **env, *laddr, *path = NULL;
+	char **env, *laddr;
 	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+#ifndef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	char *path = NULL;
+#endif
 
 	/* Initialize the environment. */
 	envsize = 100;
-	env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *));
+	env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
 	env[0] = NULL;
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
@@ -1340,6 +1376,10 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 #endif
 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
 		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1559,7 +1599,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 		do_rc_files(s, shell);
 
 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-	signal(SIGPIPE,  SIG_DFL);
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
 
 	if (options.use_login) {
 		launch_login(pw, hostname);
@@ -1823,7 +1863,7 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
 	struct stat st;
 	u_int len;
 	int success = 0;
-	char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+	char *prog, *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
 	u_int i;
 
 	packet_check_eom();
@@ -1831,9 +1871,10 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
 		if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
-			cmd = options.subsystem_command[i];
-			if (stat(cmd, &st) < 0) {
-				error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", cmd,
+			prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
+			cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
+			if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) {
+				error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog,
 				    strerror(errno));
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1930,8 +1971,8 @@ session_env_req(Session *s)
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
 		if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
 			debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
-			s->env = xrealloc(s->env, sizeof(*s->env) *
-			    (s->num_env + 1));
+			s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
+			    sizeof(*s->env));
 			s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
 			s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
 			s->num_env++;
@@ -2176,11 +2217,10 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
 
 	/* disconnect channel */
 	debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid);
-	s->pid = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
-	 * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed 
+	 * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
 	 * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
 	 */
 	channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
@@ -2216,12 +2256,13 @@ session_close(Session *s)
 	if (s->auth_proto)
 		xfree(s->auth_proto);
 	s->used = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
-		xfree(s->env[i].name);
-		xfree(s->env[i].val);
-	}
-	if (s->env != NULL)
+	if (s->env != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
+			xfree(s->env[i].name);
+			xfree(s->env[i].val);
+		}
 		xfree(s->env);
+	}
 	session_proctitle(s);
 }
 
@@ -2238,6 +2279,7 @@ session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status)
 		session_exit_message(s, status);
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+	s->pid = 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2436,7 +2478,7 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		return;
 	called = 1;
 
-	if (authctxt == NULL)
+	if (authctxt == NULL || !authctxt->authenticated)
 		return;
 #ifdef KRB5
 	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.h b/crypto/openssh/session.h
index a2598a99c2ec..ee9338e4f5e7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.25 2005/07/17 06:49:04 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.29 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -34,11 +34,13 @@ struct Session {
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	Authctxt *authctxt;
 	pid_t	pid;
+
 	/* tty */
 	char	*term;
 	int	ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
 	u_int	row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
 	char	tty[TTYSZ];
+
 	/* X11 */
 	u_int	display_number;
 	char	*display;
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ struct Session {
 	char	*auth_proto;
 	char	*auth_data;
 	int	single_connection;
+
 	/* proto 2 */
 	int	chanid;
 	int	*x11_chanids;
@@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ struct Session {
 	struct {
 		char	*name;
 		char	*val;
-	}	*env;
+	} *env;
 };
 
 void	 do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
index 05bce3368ea8..e31b2cfafa6c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.74 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -20,17 +21,32 @@
 /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.58 2006/01/02 01:20:31 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "getput.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 #include "sftp.h"
 #include "sftp-common.h"
@@ -39,7 +55,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.58 2006/01/02 01:20:31 djm Exp $");
 extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
 extern int showprogress;
 
-/* Minimum amount of data to read at at time */
+/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
 #define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
 
 struct sftp_conn {
@@ -55,16 +71,19 @@ static void
 send_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
 {
 	u_char mlen[4];
+	struct iovec iov[2];
 
 	if (buffer_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
 		fatal("Outbound message too long %u", buffer_len(m));
 
 	/* Send length first */
-	PUT_32BIT(mlen, buffer_len(m));
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, mlen, sizeof(mlen)) != sizeof(mlen))
-		fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	put_u32(mlen, buffer_len(m));
+	iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
+	iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
+	iov[1].iov_base = buffer_ptr(m);
+	iov[1].iov_len = buffer_len(m);
 
-	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m))
+	if (atomiciov(writev, fd, iov, 2) != buffer_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
 		fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
 
 	buffer_clear(m);
@@ -388,8 +407,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
 				printf("%s\n", longname);
 
 			if (dir) {
-				*dir = xrealloc(*dir, sizeof(**dir) *
-				    (ents + 2));
+				*dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
 				(*dir)[ents] = xmalloc(sizeof(***dir));
 				(*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
 				(*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
index 4cea3c3056a4..7ebadcc53b0f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,12 +25,21 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.10 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 
 #include "sftp.h"
 #include "sftp-common.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h
index 2b1995a2de7e..9b5848462a2e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.6 2006/01/02 01:20:31 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
index 16c5e206aa01..cdc270827972 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-glob.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.22 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -15,14 +16,18 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.15 2004/02/17 07:17:29 djm Exp $");
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
 
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "sftp.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "sftp-common.h"
 #include "sftp-client.h"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8 b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
index 42f5d437cd5e..199c4f30eec0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.10 2003/10/08 08:27:36 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.11 2006/07/06 10:47:57 djm Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 .\"
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 .Nd SFTP server subsystem
 .Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm sftp-server
+.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+.Op Fl l Ar log_level
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
 .Nm
 is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
@@ -40,9 +42,36 @@ is not intended to be called directly, but from
 using the
 .Cm Subsystem
 option.
+.Pp
+Command-line flags to
+.Nm
+should be specified in the
+.Cm Subsystem
+declaration.
 See
 .Xr sshd_config 5
 for more information.
+.Pp
+Valid options are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl f Ar log_facility
+Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Fl l Ar log_level
+Specifies which messages will be logged by
+.Nm .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
+.Nm
+performs on behalf of the client.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+The default is ERROR.
+.El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr sftp 1 ,
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
@@ -56,8 +85,9 @@ for more information.
 .%D January 2001
 .%O work in progress material
 .Re
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.An Markus Friedl Aq markus@openbsd.org
 .Sh HISTORY
 .Nm
-first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8 .
+first appeared in
+.Ox 2.8 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
index 7060c44ad083..c57958b0f327 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.70 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -13,15 +14,33 @@
  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.50 2006/01/02 01:20:31 djm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "getput.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 
 #include "sftp.h"
 #include "sftp-common.h"
@@ -30,9 +49,13 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.50 2006/01/02 01:20:31 djm Exp $");
 #define get_int64()			buffer_get_int64(&iqueue);
 #define get_int()			buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
 #define get_string(lenp)		buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
-#define TRACE				debug
 
-extern char *__progname;
+/* Our verbosity */
+LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+
+/* Our client */
+struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+char *client_addr = NULL;
 
 /* input and output queue */
 Buffer iqueue;
@@ -104,6 +127,33 @@ flags_from_portable(int pflags)
 	return flags;
 }
 
+static const char *
+string_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+	static char ret[128];
+
+	*ret = '\0';
+
+#define PAPPEND(str)	{				\
+		if (*ret != '\0')			\
+			strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret));	\
+		strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret));		\
+	}
+
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
+		PAPPEND("READ")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
+		PAPPEND("WRITE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+		PAPPEND("CREATE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+		PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+		PAPPEND("EXCL")
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static Attrib *
 get_attrib(void)
 {
@@ -118,6 +168,7 @@ struct Handle {
 	DIR *dirp;
 	int fd;
 	char *name;
+	u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
 };
 
 enum {
@@ -148,6 +199,7 @@ handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, DIR *dirp)
 			handles[i].dirp = dirp;
 			handles[i].fd = fd;
 			handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
+			handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
 			return i;
 		}
 	}
@@ -167,7 +219,7 @@ handle_to_string(int handle, char **stringp, int *hlenp)
 	if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
 		return -1;
 	*stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
-	PUT_32BIT(*stringp, handle);
+	put_u32(*stringp, handle);
 	*hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -179,7 +231,7 @@ handle_from_string(const char *handle, u_int hlen)
 
 	if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
 		return -1;
-	val = GET_32BIT(handle);
+	val = get_u32(handle);
 	if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
 	    handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
 		return val;
@@ -211,6 +263,36 @@ handle_to_fd(int handle)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+static void
+handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+		handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+		handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_read(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_write(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 handle_close(int handle)
 {
@@ -230,6 +312,31 @@ handle_close(int handle)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void
+handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+		logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
+		    emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+		    handle_to_name(handle),
+		    handle_bytes_read(handle), handle_bytes_write(handle));
+	} else {
+		logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
+		    emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+		    handle_to_name(handle));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_exit(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++)
+		if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
+			handle_log_close(i, "forced");
+}
+
 static int
 get_handle(void)
 {
@@ -256,10 +363,9 @@ send_msg(Buffer *m)
 	buffer_consume(m, mlen);
 }
 
-static void
-send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
+static const char *
+status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
 {
-	Buffer msg;
 	const char *status_messages[] = {
 		"Success",			/* SSH_FX_OK */
 		"End of file",			/* SSH_FX_EOF */
@@ -272,15 +378,24 @@ send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
 		"Operation unsupported",	/* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
 		"Unknown error"			/* Others */
 	};
+	return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
 
-	TRACE("sent status id %u error %u", id, status);
+	debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
+	if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
+	    (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
+		logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, status);
 	if (version >= 3) {
-		buffer_put_cstring(&msg,
-		    status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, status_to_message(status));
 		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
 	}
 	send_msg(&msg);
@@ -302,7 +417,7 @@ send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen)
 static void
 send_data(u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen)
 {
-	TRACE("sent data id %u len %d", id, dlen);
+	debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
 	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
 }
 
@@ -313,7 +428,7 @@ send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
 	int hlen;
 
 	handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
-	TRACE("sent handle id %u handle %d", id, handle);
+	debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
 	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
 	xfree(string);
 }
@@ -328,7 +443,7 @@ send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, count);
-	TRACE("sent names id %u count %d", id, count);
+	debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name);
 		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name);
@@ -343,7 +458,7 @@ send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
 
-	TRACE("sent attrib id %u have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
+	debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
@@ -360,7 +475,7 @@ process_init(void)
 	Buffer msg;
 
 	version = get_int();
-	TRACE("client version %d", version);
+	verbose("received client version %d", version);
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
@@ -379,10 +494,12 @@ process_open(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
 	pflags = get_int();		/* portable flags */
+	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
 	a = get_attrib();
 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
 	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
-	TRACE("open id %u name %s flags %d mode 0%o", id, name, pflags, mode);
+	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
 	fd = open(name, flags, mode);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -408,7 +525,8 @@ process_close(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
-	TRACE("close id %u handle %d", id, handle);
+	debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
+	handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
 	ret = handle_close(handle);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -427,11 +545,11 @@ process_read(void)
 	off = get_int64();
 	len = get_int();
 
-	TRACE("read id %u handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
-	    (unsigned long long)off, len);
+	debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
 	if (len > sizeof buf) {
 		len = sizeof buf;
-		logit("read change len %d", len);
+		debug2("read change len %d", len);
 	}
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
 	if (fd >= 0) {
@@ -447,6 +565,7 @@ process_read(void)
 			} else {
 				send_data(id, buf, ret);
 				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				handle_update_read(handle, ret);
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -468,8 +587,8 @@ process_write(void)
 	off = get_int64();
 	data = get_string(&len);
 
-	TRACE("write id %u handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
-	    (unsigned long long)off, len);
+	debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
 	if (fd >= 0) {
 		if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
@@ -483,8 +602,9 @@ process_write(void)
 				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 			} else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
 				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				handle_update_write(handle, ret);
 			} else {
-				logit("nothing at all written");
+				debug2("nothing at all written");
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -503,7 +623,8 @@ process_do_stat(int do_lstat)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("%sstat id %u name %s", do_lstat ? "l" : "", id, name);
+	debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
+	verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
 	ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -539,7 +660,8 @@ process_fstat(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
-	TRACE("fstat id %u handle %d", id, handle);
+	debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
 	if (fd  >= 0) {
 		ret = fstat(fd, &st);
@@ -578,23 +700,33 @@ process_setstat(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
 	a = get_attrib();
-	TRACE("setstat id %u name %s", id, name);
+	debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
 	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, a->size);
 		ret = truncate(name, a->size);
 		if (ret == -1)
 			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 	}
 	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm);
 		ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 0777);
 		if (ret == -1)
 			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 	}
 	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		char buf[64];
+		time_t t = a->mtime;
+
+		strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+		    localtime(&t));
+		logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
 		ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
 		if (ret == -1)
 			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 	}
 	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+		    (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid);
 		ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
 		if (ret == -1)
 			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -610,23 +742,25 @@ process_fsetstat(void)
 	u_int32_t id;
 	int handle, fd, ret;
 	int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
-	char *name;
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
 	a = get_attrib();
-	TRACE("fsetstat id %u handle %d", id, handle);
+	debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
-	name = handle_to_name(handle);
-	if (fd < 0 || name == NULL) {
+	if (fd < 0) {
 		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
 	} else {
+		char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
+
 		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, a->size);
 			ret = ftruncate(fd, a->size);
 			if (ret == -1)
 				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 		}
 		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm);
 #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
 			ret = fchmod(fd, a->perm & 0777);
 #else
@@ -636,6 +770,12 @@ process_fsetstat(void)
 				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 		}
 		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+			char buf[64];
+			time_t t = a->mtime;
+
+			strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+			    localtime(&t));
+			logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
 #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
 			ret = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(a));
 #else
@@ -645,6 +785,8 @@ process_fsetstat(void)
 				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
 		}
 		if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+			    (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid);
 #ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
 			ret = fchown(fd, a->uid, a->gid);
 #else
@@ -667,7 +809,8 @@ process_opendir(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	path = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("opendir id %u path %s", id, path);
+	debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
+	logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
 	dirp = opendir(path);
 	if (dirp == NULL) {
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -697,22 +840,23 @@ process_readdir(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
-	TRACE("readdir id %u handle %d", id, handle);
+	debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
+	    handle_to_name(handle), handle);
 	dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
 	path = handle_to_name(handle);
 	if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
 		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
 	} else {
 		struct stat st;
-		char pathname[1024];
+		char pathname[MAXPATHLEN];
 		Stat *stats;
 		int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
 
-		stats = xmalloc(nstats * sizeof(Stat));
+		stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
 		while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
 			if (count >= nstats) {
 				nstats *= 2;
-				stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats * sizeof(Stat));
+				stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
 			}
 /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
 			snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
@@ -751,7 +895,8 @@ process_remove(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("remove id %u name %s", id, name);
+	debug3("request %u: remove", id);
+	logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
 	ret = unlink(name);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -771,7 +916,8 @@ process_mkdir(void)
 	a = get_attrib();
 	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
 	    a->perm & 0777 : 0777;
-	TRACE("mkdir id %u name %s mode 0%o", id, name, mode);
+	debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
+	logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
 	ret = mkdir(name, mode);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -787,7 +933,8 @@ process_rmdir(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("rmdir id %u name %s", id, name);
+	debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
+	logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
 	ret = rmdir(name);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -807,7 +954,8 @@ process_realpath(void)
 		xfree(path);
 		path = xstrdup(".");
 	}
-	TRACE("realpath id %u path %s", id, path);
+	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
+	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
 	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
 	} else {
@@ -830,7 +978,8 @@ process_rename(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
 	newpath = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("rename id %u old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
+	debug3("request %u: rename", id);
+	logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
 	status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
 	if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -885,7 +1034,8 @@ process_readlink(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	path = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("readlink id %u path %s", id, path);
+	debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
+	verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
 	if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
 	else {
@@ -909,7 +1059,8 @@ process_symlink(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
 	newpath = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("symlink id %u old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
+	debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
+	logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
 	/* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
 	ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
@@ -945,10 +1096,11 @@ process(void)
 	if (buf_len < 5)
 		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue);
-	msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+	msg_len = get_u32(cp);
 	if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
-		error("bad message ");
-		exit(11);
+		error("bad message from %s local user %s",
+		    client_addr, pw->pw_name);
+		cleanup_exit(11);
 	}
 	if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
 		return;
@@ -1022,7 +1174,7 @@ process(void)
 	}
 	/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
 	if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue))
-		fatal("iqueue grows");
+		fatal("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
 	consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue);
 	if (msg_len < consumed)
 		fatal("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
@@ -1030,24 +1182,93 @@ process(void)
 		buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed);
 }
 
+/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
+		handle_log_exit();
+		logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
+		    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+	}
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-he] [-l log_level] [-f log_facility]\n", __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
 int
-main(int ac, char **av)
+main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
-	int in, out, max;
+	int in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
 	ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
+	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	char *cp;
+
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern char *__progname;
 
 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
 	sanitise_stdfd();
 
-	/* XXX should use getopt */
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "C:f:l:che")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'c':
+			/*
+			 * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
+			 * shell using "sftp-server -c command"
+			 */
+			skipargs = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+				error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+				error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
 
-	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-	handle_init();
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
 
-#ifdef DEBUG_SFTP_SERVER
-	log_init("sftp-server", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
-#endif
+	if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
+		client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
+		if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL)
+			fatal("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
+			    getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
+		*cp = '\0';
+	} else
+		client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+
+	if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+		fatal("No user found for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+	logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
+	    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+
+	handle_init();
 
 	in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
 	out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
@@ -1082,7 +1303,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
 			if (errno == EINTR)
 				continue;
-			exit(2);
+			error("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+			cleanup_exit(2);
 		}
 
 		/* copy stdin to iqueue */
@@ -1091,10 +1313,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
 			if (len == 0) {
 				debug("read eof");
-				exit(0);
+				cleanup_exit(0);
 			} else if (len < 0) {
-				error("read error");
-				exit(1);
+				error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+				cleanup_exit(1);
 			} else {
 				buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len);
 			}
@@ -1103,8 +1325,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
 			len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen);
 			if (len < 0) {
-				error("write error");
-				exit(1);
+				error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+				cleanup_exit(1);
 			} else {
 				buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
 			}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
index a2e3f6aad65f..c018615ae61b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.92 2006/09/19 05:52:23 otto Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -16,21 +17,39 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.70 2006/01/31 10:19:02 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
 
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
 #include <histedit.h>
 #else
 typedef void EditLine;
 #endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 
 #include "sftp.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "sftp-common.h"
 #include "sftp-client.h"
 
@@ -235,7 +254,7 @@ local_do_shell(const char *args)
 		if (errno != EINTR)
 			fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
 	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
-		error("Shell exited abormally");
+		error("Shell exited abnormally");
 	else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
 		error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
 }
@@ -474,7 +493,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
 	if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
 		return(0);
 
-	return(sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR);
+	return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
 }
 
 static int
@@ -498,7 +517,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
 		return(0);
 	if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
 		return(0);
-	return(a->perm & S_IFDIR);
+	return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
 }
 
 static int
@@ -538,6 +557,7 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag)
 
 		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
 			/* If directory specified, append filename */
+			xfree(tmp);
 			if (is_dir(dst)) {
 				if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) {
 					err = 1;
@@ -562,8 +582,6 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag)
 
 out:
 	xfree(abs_src);
-	if (abs_dst)
-		xfree(abs_dst);
 	globfree(&g);
 	return(err);
 }
@@ -1280,6 +1298,7 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 			if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, 1) != 0) {
 				xfree(dir);
 				xfree(pwd);
+				xfree(conn);
 				return (-1);
 			}
 		} else {
@@ -1292,6 +1311,7 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 			err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, 1);
 			xfree(dir);
 			xfree(pwd);
+			xfree(conn);
 			return (err);
 		}
 		xfree(dir);
@@ -1356,6 +1376,7 @@ interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
 			break;
 	}
 	xfree(pwd);
+	xfree(conn);
 
 #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
 	if (el != NULL)
@@ -1455,7 +1476,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
 	args.list = NULL;
-	addargs(&args, ssh_program);
+	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
 	addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
 	addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
 	addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp.h
index 675c6086e952..610c0b758e22 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.4 2002/02/13 00:59:23 djm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.5 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
index 2b01e6f13c91..4dc46f6db6ef 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.89 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,15 +36,27 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.74 2005/11/12 18:37:59 deraadt Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
@@ -124,16 +137,25 @@ delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
 static int
 add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
 {
-	struct stat st;
 	Key *private;
 	char *comment = NULL;
 	char msg[1024];
-	int ret = -1;
+	int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1;
 
-	if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
 		perror(filename);
 		return -1;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
+	 * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
+	 */
+	perms_ok = key_perm_ok(fd, filename);
+	close(fd);
+	if (!perms_ok)
+		return -1;
+
 	/* At first, try empty passphrase */
 	private = key_load_private(filename, "", &comment);
 	if (comment == NULL)
@@ -287,7 +309,7 @@ do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, char *file)
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname);
 	fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -l          List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -L          List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
@@ -335,13 +357,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			if (list_identities(ac, ch == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
 				ret = 1;
 			goto done;
-			break;
 		case 'x':
 		case 'X':
 			if (lock_agent(ac, ch == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
 				ret = 1;
 			goto done;
-			break;
 		case 'c':
 			confirm = 1;
 			break;
@@ -352,7 +372,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			if (delete_all(ac) == -1)
 				ret = 1;
 			goto done;
-			break;
 		case 's':
 			sc_reader_id = optarg;
 			break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
index fd6bd3f6cc2b..f1b877790949 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.43 2005/11/28 06:02:56 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.44 2006/07/18 08:03:09 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ The options are as follows:
 Bind the agent to the unix-domain socket
 .Ar bind_address .
 The default is
-.Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid> .
+.Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
 .It Fl c
 Generate C-shell commands on
 .Dv stdout .
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
 Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
+.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
 Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
 authentication agent.
 These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index a69c25eec6be..08b07212e048 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.152 2006/08/04 20:46:05 stevesk Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,18 +35,40 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.124 2005/10/30 08:52:18 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "compat.h"
@@ -99,8 +122,8 @@ int max_fd = 0;
 pid_t parent_pid = -1;
 
 /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
-char socket_name[1024];
-char socket_dir[1024];
+char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
+char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
 
 /* locking */
 int locked = 0;
@@ -305,8 +328,8 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
 		Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, 2);
 		if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0))
 			ok = key_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
+		key_free(key);
 	}
-	key_free(key);
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	if (ok == 0) {
 		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
@@ -681,7 +704,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 	if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
 		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input);
-	msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+	msg_len = get_u32(cp);
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
 		close_socket(e);
 		return;
@@ -793,10 +816,7 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
 		}
 	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
 	new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
-	if (sockets)
-		sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
-	else
-		sockets = xmalloc(new_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
+	sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
 	for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
 		sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 	sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
@@ -877,7 +897,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 			if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
 				slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
 				sock = accept(sockets[i].fd,
-				    (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, &slen);
+				    (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
 				if (sock < 0) {
 					error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s",
 					    strerror(errno));
@@ -954,6 +974,7 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 	_exit(i);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 cleanup_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -961,6 +982,7 @@ cleanup_handler(int sig)
 	_exit(2);
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 check_parent_exists(int sig)
 {
@@ -994,7 +1016,7 @@ int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
 	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
-	int sock, fd,  ch;
+	int sock, fd, ch;
 	u_int nalloc;
 	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
 	fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
@@ -1067,20 +1089,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
-		if (shell != NULL && strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+		if (shell != NULL &&
+		    strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
 			c_flag = 1;
 	}
 	if (k_flag) {
+		const char *errstr = NULL;
+
 		pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
 		if (pidstr == NULL) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
 			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
 			exit(1);
 		}
-		pid = atoi(pidstr);
-		if (pid < 1) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID\n",
-			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr);
+		pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
 			exit(1);
 		}
 		if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
@@ -1124,7 +1150,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
 	prev_mask = umask(0177);
-	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
 		perror("bind");
 		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
 		umask(prev_mask);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
index 381b7dedb055..fbc078e84dc8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,14 +24,17 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.19 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "key.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
index 52fb49a6f3ea..1ef66e48261d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.5 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.9 2006/08/18 14:40:34 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-
 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
 #include <gssapi.h>
 #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
@@ -120,6 +118,7 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
 
 /* In the server */
 int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
index 64fadc7a1d7f..969bd235905c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.154 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,28 +13,44 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.135 2005/11/29 02:04:55 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "uuencode.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
+#include "dns.h"
 
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
 #include "scard.h"
 #endif
-#include "dns.h"
 
 /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key.  This value can be set on the command line. */
 #define DEFAULT_BITS		2048
@@ -103,7 +120,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
 
 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
 		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
-	else
+	else {
 		switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
 		case KEY_RSA1:
 			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY;
@@ -119,7 +136,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
 			exit(1);
 			break;
 		}
-
+	}
 	snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
 	if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
@@ -302,13 +319,44 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen)
 	return key;
 }
 
+static int
+get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
+{
+	int c;
+	size_t pos = 0;
+
+	line[0] = '\0';
+	while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
+		if (pos >= len - 1) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\r':
+			c = fgetc(fp);
+			if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return pos;
+		case '\n':
+			return pos;
+		}
+		line[pos++] = c;
+		line[pos] = '\0';
+	}
+	if (c == EOF)
+		return -1;
+	return pos;
+}
+
 static void
 do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	Key *k;
 	int blen;
 	u_int len;
-	char line[1024], *p;
+	char line[1024];
 	u_char blob[8096];
 	char encoded[8096];
 	struct stat st;
@@ -327,12 +375,8 @@ do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	encoded[0] = '\0';
-	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) {
-		if (!(p = strchr(line, '\n'))) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n");
-			exit(1);
-		}
-		if (p > line && p[-1] == '\\')
+	while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
+		if (line[blen - 1] == '\\')
 			escaped++;
 		if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
 		    strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
@@ -349,7 +393,6 @@ do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
 			/* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
 			continue;
 		}
-		*p = '\0';
 		strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
 	}
 	len = strlen(encoded);
@@ -485,8 +528,10 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 		xfree(fp);
 		exit(0);
 	}
-	if (comment)
+	if (comment) {
 		xfree(comment);
+		comment = NULL;
+	}
 
 	f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
 	if (f != NULL) {
@@ -832,30 +877,32 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 /*
  * Print the SSHFP RR.
  */
-static void
-do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *hname)
+static int
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname)
 {
 	Key *public;
 	char *comment = NULL;
 	struct stat st;
 
-	if (!have_identity)
+	if (fname == NULL)
 		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
-	if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
-		perror(identity_file);
+	if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) {
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+			return 0;
+		perror(fname);
 		exit(1);
 	}
-	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
+	public = key_load_public(fname, &comment);
 	if (public != NULL) {
 		export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
 		key_free(public);
 		xfree(comment);
-		exit(0);
+		return 1;
 	}
 	if (comment)
 		xfree(comment);
 
-	printf("failed to read v2 public key from %s.\n", identity_file);
+	printf("failed to read v2 public key from %s.\n", fname);
 	exit(1);
 }
 
@@ -1046,7 +1093,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case 'b':
-			bits = strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr);
+			bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr);
 			if (errstr)
 				fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
 					optarg, errstr);
@@ -1116,6 +1163,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			break;
 		case 'D':
 			download = 1;
+			/*FALLTHROUGH*/
 		case 'U':
 			reader_id = optarg;
 			break;
@@ -1132,19 +1180,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			rr_hostname = optarg;
 			break;
 		case 'W':
-			generator_wanted = strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
+			    UINT_MAX, &errstr);
 			if (errstr)
 				fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)",
 					optarg, errstr);
 			break;
 		case 'a':
-			trials = strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			trials = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
 			if (errstr)
 				fatal("Invalid number of trials: %s (%s)",
 					optarg, errstr);
 			break;
 		case 'M':
-			memory = strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
 			if (errstr) {
 				fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
 			}
@@ -1198,7 +1247,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (print_public)
 		do_print_public(pw);
 	if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
-		do_print_resource_record(pw, rr_hostname);
+		unsigned int n = 0;
+
+		if (have_identity) {
+			n = do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    identity_file, rr_hostname);
+			if (n == 0) {
+				perror(identity_file);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			exit(0);
+		} else {
+
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname);
+
+			if (n == 0)
+				fatal("no keys found.");
+			exit(0);
+		}
 	}
 	if (reader_id != NULL) {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
index 6915102ddf3b..416d3f5c14d7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.73 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
  *
@@ -7,24 +8,39 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.57 2005/10/30 04:01:03 djm Exp $");
-
+ 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <setjmp.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "myproposal.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "misc.h"
@@ -54,7 +70,7 @@ int maxfd;
 
 extern char *__progname;
 fd_set *read_wait;
-size_t read_wait_size;
+size_t read_wait_nfdset;
 int ncon;
 int nonfatal_fatal = 0;
 jmp_buf kexjmp;
@@ -128,7 +144,7 @@ Linebuf_alloc(const char *filename, void (*errfun) (const char *,...))
 		lb->stream = stdin;
 	}
 
-	if (!(lb->buf = malloc(lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE))) {
+	if (!(lb->buf = malloc((lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE)))) {
 		if (errfun)
 			(*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename);
 		xfree(lb);
@@ -350,6 +366,7 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
 	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
 	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
 	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+	c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
 	c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump;
 
 	if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) {
@@ -602,7 +619,6 @@ conread(int s)
 			keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c));
 			confree(s);
 			return;
-			break;
 		default:
 			fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
 			break;
@@ -634,10 +650,10 @@ conloop(void)
 	} else
 		seltime.tv_sec = seltime.tv_usec = 0;
 
-	r = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
-	memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_size);
-	e = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
-	memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_size);
+	r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
+	memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
 
 	while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
 	    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
@@ -804,12 +820,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
-	fdcon = xmalloc(maxfd * sizeof(con));
-	memset(fdcon, 0, maxfd * sizeof(con));
+	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
 
-	read_wait_size = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
-	read_wait = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
-	memset(read_wait, 0, read_wait_size);
+	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
 
 	if (fopt_count) {
 		Linebuf *lb;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
index a17e8d5cf234..4cdcb7a43d95 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.7 2003/06/10 09:12:11 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.8 2006/02/24 20:22:16 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 .\"
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
 .Nm ssh-keysign
-.Nd ssh helper program for hostbased authentication
+.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
 .Sh SYNOPSIS
 .Nm
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 is used by
 .Xr ssh 1
 to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
-required during hostbased authentication with SSH protocol version 2.
+required during host-based authentication with SSH protocol version 2.
 .Pp
 .Nm
 is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ See
 .Xr ssh 1
 and
 .Xr sshd 8
-for more information about hostbased authentication.
+for more information about host-based authentication.
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
 accessible to others.
 Since they are readable only by root,
 .Nm
-must be set-uid root if hostbased authentication is used.
+must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
 .El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
index dae3a2e8c91b..c4bc7e56e56f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.29 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -21,21 +22,30 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.19 2005/09/13 23:40:07 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
@@ -64,9 +74,9 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, Key **ret, u_char *data,
 	buffer_init(&b);
 	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
 
-	/* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) */
+	/* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
-	if (len != 20)
+	if (len != 20 && len != 32)
 		fail++;
 	xfree(p);
 
@@ -140,7 +150,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	Buffer b;
 	Options options;
-	Key *keys[2], *key;
+	Key *keys[2], *key = NULL;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int key_fd[2], i, found, version = 2, fd;
 	u_char *signature, *data;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c
index 87e52cf75c8e..8520c3a62ee5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rand-helper.c
@@ -24,6 +24,29 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
@@ -39,8 +62,6 @@
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "log.h"
 
-RCSID("$Id: ssh-rand-helper.c,v 1.26 2005/07/17 07:26:44 djm Exp $");
-
 /* Number of bytes we write out */
 #define OUTPUT_SEED_SIZE	48
 
@@ -564,7 +585,8 @@ prng_write_seedfile(void)
 	/* Try to ensure that the parent directory is there */
 	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
 	    _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
-	mkdir(filename, 0700);
+	if (mkdir(filename, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
+		fatal("mkdir %.200s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
 
 	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
 	    SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
@@ -665,8 +687,7 @@ prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename)
 	}
 
 	num_cmds = 64;
-	entcmd = xmalloc(num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
-	memset(entcmd, '\0', num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
+	entcmd = xcalloc(num_cmds, sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
 
 	/* Read in file */
 	cur_cmd = linenum = 0;
@@ -759,7 +780,7 @@ prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename)
 		 */
 		if (cur_cmd == num_cmds) {
 			num_cmds *= 2;
-			entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds *
+			entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds,
 			    sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
 		}
 	}
@@ -768,12 +789,13 @@ prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename)
 	memset(&entcmd[cur_cmd], '\0', sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
 
 	/* trim to size */
-	entropy_cmds = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd + 1) *
+	entropy_cmds = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd + 1),
 	    sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
 
 	debug("Loaded %d entropy commands from %.100s", cur_cmd,
 	    cmdfilename);
 
+	fclose(f);
 	return cur_cmd < MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES ? -1 : 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
index eb422d07e9c7..0e16ff85f1d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.39 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -13,16 +14,20 @@
  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
+
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.32 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -62,6 +67,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 
 	if (ok != 1) {
 		int ecode = ERR_get_error();
+
 		error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s",
 		    ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
 		xfree(sig);
@@ -144,7 +150,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
 		u_int diff = modlen - len;
 		debug("ssh_rsa_verify: add padding: modlen %u > len %u",
 		    modlen, len);
-		sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, modlen);
+		sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen);
 		memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
 		memset(sigblob, 0, diff);
 		len = modlen;
@@ -220,7 +226,6 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto done;
-		break;
 	}
 	if (hashlen != hlen) {
 		error("bad hashlen");
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
index f4c677628ce2..6e41bcd8baea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.253 2006/01/30 13:37:49 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.263 2006/07/11 18:50:48 markus Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@
 .Oc
 .Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
 .Bk -words
-.Op Fl w Ar tunnel : Ns Ar tunnel
+.Oo Fl w Ar local_tun Ns
+.Op : Ns Ar remote_tun Oc
 .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname
 .Op Ar command
 .Ek
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
 .It ControlPath
 .It DynamicForward
 .It EscapeChar
+.It ExitOnForwardFailure
 .It ForwardAgent
 .It ForwardX11
 .It ForwardX11Trusted
@@ -569,7 +571,7 @@ Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
 Force pseudo-tty allocation.
 This can be used to execute arbitrary
 screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
-e.g., when implementing menu services.
+e.g. when implementing menu services.
 Multiple
 .Fl t
 options force tty allocation, even if
@@ -588,24 +590,35 @@ Multiple
 .Fl v
 options increase the verbosity.
 The maximum is 3.
-.It Fl w Ar tunnel : Ns Ar tunnel
-Requests a
+.It Fl w Xo
+.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Xc
+Requests
+tunnel
+device forwarding with the specified
 .Xr tun 4
-device on the client
-(first
-.Ar tunnel
-arg)
-and server
-(second
-.Ar tunnel
-arg).
+devices between the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
 The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
 .Dq any ,
 which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
 See also the
 .Cm Tunnel
-directive in
+and
+.Cm TunnelDevice
+directives in
 .Xr ssh_config 5 .
+If the
+.Cm Tunnel
+directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
 .It Fl X
 Enables X11 forwarding.
 This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
@@ -666,6 +679,7 @@ Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the
 integrity of the connection.
 .Pp
 The methods available for authentication are:
+GSSAPI-based authentication,
 host-based authentication,
 public key authentication,
 challenge-response authentication,
@@ -872,7 +886,9 @@ and
 options (see above).
 It also allows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings
 using
-.Fl KR Ar hostport .
+.Sm off
+.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
+.Sm on
 .Ic !\& Ns Ar command
 allows the user to execute a local command if the
 .Ic PermitLocalCommand
@@ -1025,8 +1041,7 @@ In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
 The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
 host.example.com:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
-$ ssh-keygen -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub -r host.example.com.
-$ ssh-keygen -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub -r host.example.com.
+$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
 .Ed
 .Pp
 The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
@@ -1075,11 +1090,11 @@ Client access may be more finely tuned via the
 file (see below) and the
 .Cm PermitRootLogin
 server option.
-The following entry would permit connections on the first
+The following entry would permit connections on
 .Xr tun 4
-device from user
+device 1 from user
 .Dq jane
-and on the second device from user
+and on tun device 2 from user
 .Dq john ,
 if
 .Cm PermitRootLogin
@@ -1087,7 +1102,7 @@ is set to
 .Dq forced-commands-only :
 .Bd -literal -offset 2n
 tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
-tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... john
+tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
 .Ed
 .Pp
 Since a SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
@@ -1178,7 +1193,7 @@ If the current session has no tty,
 this variable is not set.
 .It Ev TZ
 This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
-was set when the daemon was started (i.e., the daemon passes the value
+was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
 on to new connections).
 .It Ev USER
 Set to the name of the user logging in.
@@ -1339,15 +1354,59 @@ manual page for more information.
 .Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
 .Xr sshd 8
 .Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A T. Kivinen
-.%A M. Saarinen
-.%A T. Rinne
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-12.txt
-.%D January 2002
-.%O work in progress material
+.%R RFC 4250
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4251
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4252
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4253
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4254
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4255
+.%T "Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4256
+.%T "Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4335
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4344
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4345
+.%T "Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
 .Re
 .Sh AUTHORS
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index 3940dabfd716..efc4af6d4368 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.293 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -40,20 +41,46 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.257 2005/12/20 04:41:07 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
@@ -72,6 +99,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.257 2005/12/20 04:41:07 dtucker Exp $");
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "version.h"
 
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
 #include "scard.h"
@@ -162,7 +190,7 @@ usage(void)
 "           [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]\n"
 "           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
 "           [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path]\n"
-"           [-w tunnel:tunnel] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
+"           [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
 	);
 	exit(255);
 }
@@ -242,7 +270,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
 	host = NULL;
 
-again:
+ again:
 	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
 	    "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XY")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
@@ -616,7 +644,7 @@ again:
 	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
 		for (p = options.host_key_alias; *p; p++)
 			if (isupper(*p))
-				*p = tolower(*p);
+				*p = (char)tolower(*p);
 	}
 
 	/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
@@ -633,11 +661,15 @@ again:
 		options.control_path = NULL;
 
 	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+		char thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+		if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+			fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", options.port);
 		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
 		    original_real_uid);
 		options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "p", buf, "h", host,
-		    "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+		    "r", options.user, "l", thishost, (char *)NULL);
 		xfree(cp);
 	}
 	if (mux_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
@@ -670,16 +702,16 @@ again:
 	if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
 	    options.hostbased_authentication) {
 		sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
-		sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys *
+		sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
 		    sizeof(Key));
 
 		PRIV_START;
 		sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
-		    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+		    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
 		sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
-		    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+		    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
 		sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
-		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
 		PRIV_END;
 
 		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
@@ -795,6 +827,8 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void)
 		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port,
 		    options.gateway_ports);
 	}
+	if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+		fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
 	if (i > 0 && success == 0)
 		error("Could not request local forwarding.");
 
@@ -807,11 +841,17 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void)
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
-		channel_request_remote_forwarding(
+		if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
 		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
-		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port) < 0) {
+			if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+				fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+			else
+				logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
+				    "forwarding.");
+		}
 	}
 }
 
@@ -872,10 +912,10 @@ ssh_session(void)
 		/* Store window size in the packet. */
 		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
 			memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
-		packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+		packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
 
 		/* Store tty modes in the packet. */
 		tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
@@ -993,9 +1033,16 @@ client_global_request_reply_fwd(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
 	    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
 	    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
-	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)
-		logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen "
-		    "port %d", options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed for "
+			    "listen port %d",
+			    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
+		else
+			logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for "
+			    "listen port %d",
+			    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
+	}
 }
 
 static void
@@ -1024,7 +1071,7 @@ ssh_control_listener(void)
 		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 
 	old_umask = umask(0177);
-	if (bind(control_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+	if (bind(control_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
 		control_fd = -1;
 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE)
 			fatal("ControlSocket %s already exists",
@@ -1176,15 +1223,16 @@ ssh_session2(void)
 static void
 load_public_identity_files(void)
 {
-	char *filename;
+	char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
 	int i = 0;
 	Key *public;
+	struct passwd *pw;
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
 	Key **keys;
 
 	if (options.smartcard_device != NULL &&
 	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
-	    (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL ) {
+	    (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL) {
 		int count = 0;
 		for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
 			count++;
@@ -1202,9 +1250,18 @@ load_public_identity_files(void)
 		xfree(keys);
 	}
 #endif /* SMARTCARD */
+	if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
+		fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed");
+	if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+		fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
 	for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
-		filename = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
 		    original_real_uid);
+		filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
+		    "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host,
+		    "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+		xfree(cp);
 		public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
 		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
 		    public ? public->type : -1);
@@ -1230,14 +1287,14 @@ control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
 static int
 env_permitted(char *env)
 {
-	int i;
+	int i, ret;
 	char name[1024], *cp;
 
-	strlcpy(name, env, sizeof(name));
-	if ((cp = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL)
+	if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
 		return (0);
-
-	*cp = '\0';
+	ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
+	if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name))
+		fatal("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
 		if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
@@ -1282,29 +1339,29 @@ control_client(const char *path)
 	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
 		fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
 		if (mux_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN) {
 			fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
 			    strerror(errno));
 		}
 		if (errno == ENOENT)
-	 		debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
 		else {
-	 		error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
 			    strerror(errno));
 		}
- 		close(sock);
- 		return;
- 	}
-
- 	if (stdin_null_flag) {
- 		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- 			fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- 		if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- 			fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- 		if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
- 			close(fd);
- 	}
+		close(sock);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (stdin_null_flag) {
+		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+			fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+			fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+			close(fd);
+	}
 
 	term = getenv("TERM");
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
index 07592415b157..186cfff9642f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.76 2004/12/06 11:41:03 dtucker Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.78 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -12,18 +12,6 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
-#ifndef SSH_H
-#define SSH_H
-
-#include <netinet/in.h> /* For struct sockaddr_in */
-#include <pwd.h> /* For struct pw */
-#include <stdarg.h> /* For va_list */
-#include <syslog.h> /* For LOG_AUTH and friends */
-#include <sys/socket.h> /* For struct sockaddr_storage */
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
-# include <sys/select.h>
-#endif
-
 /* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
 #define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER	SSH_CIPHER_3DES
 
@@ -112,5 +100,3 @@
 
 /* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
 #define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG		128
-
-#endif				/* SSH_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h
index 1741c229a09b..353d930415f7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh1.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.5 2004/10/20 11:48:53 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
index fb491c918579..cf56bc4ee135 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh2.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.9 2003/05/14 00:52:59 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.10 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
index 7bc8762d6b8f..177521caaa11 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.21 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.22 2006/05/29 12:56:33 dtucker Exp $
 
 # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
 # ssh_config(5) for more information.  This file provides defaults for
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 #   RSAAuthentication yes
 #   PasswordAuthentication yes
 #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+#   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
 #   BatchMode no
 #   CheckHostIP yes
 #   AddressFamily any
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
index 5c94ffc9cdb5..20c58934add9 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.76 2006/01/20 11:21:45 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.97 2006/07/27 08:00:50 jmc Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -47,9 +47,10 @@
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
 .El
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 obtains configuration data from the following sources in
 the following order:
+.Pp
 .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
 .It
 command-line options
@@ -78,7 +79,6 @@ The configuration file has the following format:
 Empty lines and lines starting with
 .Ql #
 are comments.
-.Pp
 Otherwise a line is of the format
 .Dq keyword arguments .
 Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
@@ -87,11 +87,14 @@ optional whitespace and exactly one
 the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
 when specifying configuration options using the
 .Nm ssh ,
-.Nm scp
+.Nm scp ,
 and
 .Nm sftp
 .Fl o
 option.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
 .Pp
 The possible
 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
@@ -102,25 +105,24 @@ Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
 .Cm Host
 keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
 given after the keyword.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as wildcards in the
-patterns.
 A single
-.Ql \&*
+.Ql *
 as a pattern can be used to provide global
 defaults for all hosts.
 The host is the
 .Ar hostname
-argument given on the command line (i.e., the name is not converted to
+argument given on the command line (i.e. the name is not converted to
 a canonicalized host name before matching).
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm AddressFamily
 Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
 Valid arguments are
 .Dq any ,
 .Dq inet
-(use IPv4 only) or
+(use IPv4 only), or
 .Dq inet6
 (use IPv6 only).
 .It Cm BatchMode
@@ -144,7 +146,7 @@ Note that this option does not work if
 is set to
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether to use challenge response authentication.
+Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
 The argument to this keyword must be
 .Dq yes
 or
@@ -154,7 +156,8 @@ The default is
 .It Cm CheckHostIP
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
-ssh will additionally check the host IP address in the
+.Xr ssh 1
+will additionally check the host IP address in the
 .Pa known_hosts
 file.
 This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.
@@ -174,7 +177,7 @@ and
 are supported.
 .Ar des
 is only supported in the
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
 that do not support the
 .Ar 3des
@@ -200,18 +203,18 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq blowfish-cbc ,
 and
 .Dq cast128-cbc .
-The default is
-.Bd -literal
-  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
-    arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
-    aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 .Ed
 .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings
+Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
 specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
 cleared.
 This option is primarily useful when used from the
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 command line to clear port forwardings set in
 configuration files, and is automatically set by
 .Xr scp 1
@@ -244,15 +247,15 @@ The argument must be an integer.
 This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
 The default is 1.
 .It Cm ConnectTimeout
-Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the ssh
-server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
 This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
 not when it refuses the connection.
 .It Cm ControlMaster
 Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
 When set to
-.Dq yes
-.Nm ssh
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
 .Cm ControlPath
 argument.
@@ -269,8 +272,7 @@ if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
 .Pp
 Setting this to
 .Dq ask
-will cause
-.Nm ssh
+will cause ssh
 to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the
 .Ev SSH_ASKPASS
 program before they are accepted (see
@@ -278,9 +280,8 @@ program before they are accepted (see
 for details).
 If the
 .Cm ControlPath
-can not be opened,
-.Nm ssh
-will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+cannot be opened,
+ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance.
 .Pp
 X11 and
 .Xr ssh-agent 1
@@ -306,16 +307,18 @@ section above or the string
 .Dq none
 to disable connection sharing.
 In the path,
+.Ql %l
+will be substituted by the local host name,
 .Ql %h
 will be substituted by the target host name,
 .Ql %p
-the port and
+the port, and
 .Ql %r
 by the remote login username.
 It is recommended that any
 .Cm ControlPath
 used for opportunistic connection sharing include
-all three of these escape sequences.
+at least %h, %p, and %r.
 This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
 .It Cm DynamicForward
 Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
@@ -346,7 +349,7 @@ empty address or
 indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
 .Pp
 Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 will act as a SOCKS server.
 Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
 additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
@@ -382,6 +385,17 @@ followed by a letter, or
 to disable the escape
 character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
 data).
+.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
+dynamic, local, and remote port forwardings.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
 .It Cm ForwardAgent
 Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
 will be forwarded to the remote machine.
@@ -421,12 +435,12 @@ if the
 option is also enabled.
 .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
 If this option is set to
-.Dq yes
-then remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+.Dq yes ,
+remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
-.Dq no
-then remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+.Dq no ,
+remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
 from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
 clients.
 Furthermore, the
@@ -443,12 +457,11 @@ the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
 Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
 forwarded ports.
 By default,
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
 This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
 .Cm GatewayPorts
-can be used to specify that
-.Nm ssh
+can be used to specify that ssh
 should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
 thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
 The argument must be
@@ -473,19 +486,20 @@ The default is
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
 Indicates that
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
 .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
 These hashed names may be used normally by
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 and
-.Nm sshd ,
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
 but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
 be disclosed.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
-Note that hashing of names and addresses will not be retrospectively applied
-to existing known hosts files, but these may be manually hashed using
+Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+will not be converted automatically,
+but may be manually hashed using
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
@@ -508,30 +522,29 @@ The default for this option is:
 Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
 real host name when looking up or saving the host key
 in the host key database files.
-This option is useful for tunneling ssh connections
+This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
 or for multiple servers running on a single host.
 .It Cm HostName
 Specifies the real host name to log into.
 This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
-Default is the name given on the command line.
+The default is the name given on the command line.
 Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
 .Cm HostName
 specifications).
 .It Cm IdentitiesOnly
 Specifies that
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 should only use the authentication identity files configured in the
 .Nm
 files,
-even if the
-.Nm ssh-agent
+even if
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
 offers more identities.
 The argument to this keyword must be
 .Dq yes
 or
 .Dq no .
-This option is intended for situations where
-.Nm ssh-agent
+This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
 offers many different identities.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
@@ -547,8 +560,21 @@ and
 for protocol version 2.
 Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
 will be used for authentication.
+.Pp
 The file name may use the tilde
-syntax to refer to a user's home directory.
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
+escape characters:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %u
+(local user name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name) or
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name).
+.Pp
 It is possible to have
 multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
 identities will be tried in sequence.
@@ -556,6 +582,13 @@ identities will be tried in sequence.
 Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
 Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
 The default is to use the server specified list.
+The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
+For an OpenSSH server,
+it may be zero or more of:
+.Dq bsdauth ,
+.Dq pam ,
+and
+.Dq skey .
 .It Cm LocalCommand
 Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
 connecting to the server.
@@ -597,9 +630,9 @@ empty address or
 indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
 .It Cm LogLevel
 Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm ssh .
+.Xr ssh 1 .
 The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2 and DEBUG3.
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
 The default is INFO.
 DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
 DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
@@ -609,7 +642,7 @@ in order of preference.
 The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
 for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The default is
+The default is:
 .Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
 .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
 This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
@@ -624,7 +657,7 @@ The default is to check the host key for localhost.
 .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
 Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
 The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
-Default is 3.
+The default is 3.
 .It Cm PasswordAuthentication
 Specifies whether to use password authentication.
 The argument to this keyword must be
@@ -648,7 +681,7 @@ The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm Port
 Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
-Default is 22.
+The default is 22.
 .It Cm PreferredAuthentications
 Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
 authentication methods.
@@ -657,20 +690,24 @@ This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
 over another method (e.g.\&
 .Cm password )
 The default for this option is:
-.Dq hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password .
+.Do gssapi-with-mic ,
+hostbased,
+publickey,
+keyboard-interactive,
+password
+.Dc .
 .It Cm Protocol
 Specifies the protocol versions
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 should support in order of preference.
 The possible values are
-.Dq 1
+.Sq 1
 and
-.Dq 2 .
+.Sq 2 .
 Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
 The default is
 .Dq 2,1 .
-This means that
-.Nm ssh
+This means that ssh
 tries version 2 and falls back to version 1
 if version 2 is not available.
 .It Cm ProxyCommand
@@ -728,9 +765,9 @@ or
 .Sq G
 to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
 The default is between
-.Dq 1G
+.Sq 1G
 and
-.Dq 4G ,
+.Sq 4G ,
 depending on the cipher.
 This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm RemoteForward
@@ -776,7 +813,7 @@ or
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 to be setuid root.
 .It Cm RSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.
@@ -794,31 +831,31 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
 Specifies what variables from the local
 .Xr environ 7
 should be sent to the server.
-Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, the
-server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
+Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
+The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
 accept these environment variables.
 Refer to
 .Cm AcceptEnv
 in
 .Xr sshd_config 5
 for how to configure the server.
-Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&? .
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
 Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
 across multiple
 .Cm SendEnv
 directives.
 The default is not to send any environment variables.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
 Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
 sent without
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 receiving any messages back from the server.
 If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
-.Nm ssh
-will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
+ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
 It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
 different from
 .Cm TCPKeepAlive
@@ -834,14 +871,15 @@ server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
 The default value is 3.
 If, for example,
 .Cm ServerAliveInterval
-(see below) is set to 15, and
+(see below) is set to 15 and
 .Cm ServerAliveCountMax
-is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive ssh
-will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
+ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm ServerAliveInterval
 Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
 from the server,
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 will send a message through the encrypted
 channel to request a response from the server.
 The default
@@ -850,41 +888,39 @@ This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm SmartcardDevice
 Specifies which smartcard device to use.
 The argument to this keyword is the device
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
 private RSA key.
 By default, no device is specified and smartcard support is not activated.
 .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq yes ,
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
 will never automatically add host keys to the
 .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
 This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
-however, can be annoying when the
+though it can be annoying when the
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-file is poorly maintained, or connections to new hosts are
+file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
 frequently made.
 This option forces the user to manually
 add all new hosts.
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq no ,
-.Nm ssh
-will automatically add new host keys to the
+ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
 user known hosts files.
 If this flag is set to
 .Dq ask ,
 new host keys
 will be added to the user known host files only after the user
 has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
-.Nm ssh
-will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
 The host keys of
 known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
 The argument must be
 .Dq yes ,
-.Dq no
+.Dq no ,
 or
 .Dq ask .
 The default is
@@ -907,24 +943,44 @@ This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
 To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm Tunnel
-Request starting
+Request
 .Xr tun 4
 device forwarding between the client and the server.
-This option also allows requesting layer 2 (ethernet)
-instead of layer 3 (point-to-point) tunneling from the server.
 The argument must be
 .Dq yes ,
-.Dq point-to-point ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
 .Dq ethernet
+(layer 2),
 or
 .Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+requests the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm TunnelDevice
-Force a specified
+Specifies the
 .Xr tun 4
-device on the client.
-Without this option, the next available device will be used.
+devices to open on the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
+.Sm on
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+The default is
+.Dq any:any .
 .It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
 Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
 The argument must be
@@ -934,8 +990,8 @@ or
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 If set to
-.Dq yes
-.Nm ssh
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
 must be setuid root.
 Note that this option must be set to
 .Dq yes
@@ -968,12 +1024,17 @@ need to confirm new host keys according to the
 option.
 The argument must be
 .Dq yes ,
-.Dq no
+.Dq no ,
 or
 .Dq ask .
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.Pp
+See also
+.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
 .It Cm XAuthLocation
 Specifies the full pathname of the
 .Xr xauth 1
@@ -981,14 +1042,47 @@ program.
 The default is
 .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
 .El
+.Sh PATTERNS
+A
+.Em pattern
+consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
+.Sq *
+(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
+or
+.Sq ?\&
+(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
+For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
+.Dq .co.uk
+set of domains,
+the following pattern could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host *.co.uk
+.Pp
+The following pattern
+would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
+.Pp
+A
+.Em pattern-list
+is a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
+by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+For example,
+to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organisation
+except from the
+.Dq dialup
+pool,
+the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Pa ~/.ssh/config
 This is the per-user configuration file.
 The format of this file is described above.
-This file is used by the
-.Nm ssh
-client.
+This file is used by the SSH client.
 Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
 read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index 64ffec240c16..a7a4e8a9691b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.199 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -13,12 +14,35 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.171 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $");
 
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
-#include "ssh.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -32,6 +56,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.171 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $");
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "dns.h"
+#include "version.h"
 
 char *client_version_string = NULL;
 char *server_version_string = NULL;
@@ -62,7 +87,6 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 	int pin[2], pout[2];
 	pid_t pid;
 	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-	size_t len;
 
 	/* Convert the port number into a string. */
 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
@@ -74,10 +98,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 	 * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
 	 * (e.g. Solaris)
 	 */
-	len = strlen(proxy_command) + 6;
-	tmp = xmalloc(len);
-	strlcpy(tmp, "exec ", len);
-	strlcat(tmp, proxy_command, len);
+	xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
 	command_string = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host,
 	    "p", strport, (char *)NULL);
 	xfree(tmp);
@@ -94,8 +115,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 		char *argv[10];
 
 		/* Child.  Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
-		seteuid(original_real_uid);
-		setuid(original_real_uid);
+		permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
 
 		/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
 		close(pin[1]);
@@ -205,7 +225,7 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
 	fd_set *fdset;
 	struct timeval tv;
 	socklen_t optlen;
-	int fdsetsz, optval, rc, result = -1;
+	int optval, rc, result = -1;
 
 	if (timeout <= 0)
 		return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen));
@@ -219,10 +239,8 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
 	if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
 		return (-1);
 
-	fdsetsz = howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
-	fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
-
-	memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
+	fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+	    sizeof(fd_mask));
 	FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
 	tv.tv_sec = timeout;
 	tv.tv_usec = 0;
@@ -305,17 +323,14 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 		fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host,
 		    gai_strerror(gaierr));
 
-	/*
-	 * Try to connect several times.  On some machines, the first time
-	 * will sometimes fail.  In general socket code appears to behave
-	 * quite magically on many machines.
-		 */
-	for (attempt = 0; ;) {
+	for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
 		if (attempt > 0)
 			debug("Trying again...");
 
-		/* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
-		   sequence until the connection succeeds. */
+		/*
+		 * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
+		 * sequence until the connection succeeds.
+		 */
 		for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
 			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
 				continue;
@@ -342,21 +357,13 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 			} else {
 				debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
 				    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
-				/*
-				 * Close the failed socket; there appear to
-				 * be some problems when reusing a socket for
-				 * which connect() has already returned an
-				 * error.
-				 */
 				close(sock);
+				sock = -1;
 			}
 		}
-		if (ai)
+		if (sock != -1)
 			break;	/* Successful connection. */
 
-		attempt++;
-		if (attempt >= connection_attempts)
-			break;
 		/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
 		sleep(1);
 	}
@@ -364,7 +371,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
 
 	/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
-	if (attempt >= connection_attempts) {
+	if (sock == -1) {
 		error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
 		    host, strport, strerror(errno));
 		return (-1);
@@ -396,10 +403,10 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
 	int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
 	int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
 	int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
-	u_int i;
+	u_int i, n;
 
 	/* Read other side's version identification. */
-	for (;;) {
+	for (n = 0;;) {
 		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
 			size_t len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
 
@@ -416,6 +423,8 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
 				buf[i + 1] = 0;
 				break;
 			}
+			if (++n > 65536)
+				fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: No banner received");
 		}
 		buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
 		if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
@@ -517,13 +526,17 @@ confirm(const char *prompt)
  * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
  * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
  */
+#define RDRW	0
+#define RDONLY	1
+#define ROQUIET	2
 static int
-check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
-    int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile)
+check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+    Key *host_key, int readonly, const char *user_hostfile,
+    const char *system_hostfile)
 {
 	Key *file_key;
 	const char *type = key_type(host_key);
-	char *ip = NULL;
+	char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
 	char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
 	HostStatus host_status;
 	HostStatus ip_status;
@@ -574,7 +587,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 		if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
 		    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
 			fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
-		ip = xstrdup(ntop);
+		ip = put_host_port(ntop, port);
 	} else {
 		ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
 	}
@@ -582,18 +595,21 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 	 * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
 	 * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
 	 */
-	if (options.check_host_ip &&
-	    (local || strcmp(host, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+	if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
+	    strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
 		options.check_host_ip = 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * Allow the user to record the key under a different name. This is
-	 * useful for ssh tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run
-	 * multiple sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+	 * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
+	 * differentiate a non-standard port.  This is useful for ssh
+	 * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
+	 * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
 	 */
 	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
-		host = options.host_key_alias;
+		host = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
 		debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host);
+	} else {
+		host = put_host_port(hostname, port);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -662,6 +678,15 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 		}
 		break;
 	case HOST_NEW:
+		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
+		    port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
+			debug("checking without port identifier");
+			if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, 2,
+			    user_hostfile, system_hostfile) == 0) {
+				debug("found matching key w/out port");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 		if (readonly)
 			goto fail;
 		/* The host is new. */
@@ -741,6 +766,8 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			    "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
 		break;
 	case HOST_CHANGED:
+		if (readonly == ROQUIET)
+			goto fail;
 		if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
 			char *key_msg;
 			if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
@@ -779,7 +806,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 		/*
 		 * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
 		 * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
-		 * agent forwarding.
+		 * forwarding.
 		 */
 		if (options.password_authentication) {
 			error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
@@ -814,6 +841,11 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			options.num_local_forwards =
 			    options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
 		}
+		if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+			error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+		}
 		/*
 		 * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
 		 * This could be done by converting the host key to an
@@ -855,10 +887,12 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 	}
 
 	xfree(ip);
+	xfree(host);
 	return 0;
 
 fail:
 	xfree(ip);
+	xfree(host);
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -892,12 +926,13 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
 	/* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
 	if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
 	    stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) {
-		if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 1,
-		    options.user_hostfile2, options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
+		if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+		    RDONLY, options.user_hostfile2,
+		    options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
 			return 0;
 	}
-	return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 0,
-	    options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
+	return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+	    RDRW, options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -921,7 +956,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 	host = xstrdup(orighost);
 	for (cp = host; *cp; cp++)
 		if (isupper(*cp))
-			*cp = tolower(*cp);
+			*cp = (char)tolower(*cp);
 
 	/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
 	ssh_exchange_identification();
@@ -938,6 +973,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 		ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
 		ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
 	}
+	xfree(local_user);
 }
 
 void
@@ -951,8 +987,7 @@ ssh_put_password(char *password)
 		return;
 	}
 	size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
-	padded = xmalloc(size);
-	memset(padded, 0, size);
+	padded = xcalloc(1, size);
 	strlcpy(padded, password, size);
 	packet_put_string(padded, size);
 	memset(padded, 0, size);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
index e7c7a2b340de..4e66bbffc974 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.18 2005/12/06 22:38:28 reyk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@
  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
-#ifndef SSHCONNECT_H
-#define SSHCONNECT_H
 
 typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
 struct Sensitive {
@@ -54,16 +52,18 @@ int	 ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
 /*
  * Macros to raise/lower permissions.
  */
-#define PRIV_START do {				\
-	int save_errno = errno;			\
-	(void)seteuid(original_effective_uid);	\
-	errno = save_errno;			\
+#define PRIV_START do {					\
+	int save_errno = errno;				\
+	if (seteuid(original_effective_uid) != 0)	\
+		fatal("PRIV_START: seteuid: %s",	\
+		    strerror(errno));			\
+	errno = save_errno;				\
 } while (0)
 
-#define PRIV_END do {				\
-	int save_errno = errno;			\
-	(void)seteuid(original_real_uid);	\
-	errno = save_errno;			\
+#define PRIV_END do {					\
+	int save_errno = errno;				\
+	if (seteuid(original_real_uid) != 0)		\
+		fatal("PRIV_END: seteuid: %s",		\
+		    strerror(errno));			\
+	errno = save_errno;				\
 } while (0)
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
index 440d7c5bdb07..90fcb344fc4f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.69 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -13,28 +14,38 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.62 2005/10/30 08:52:18 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "readconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "sshconnect.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 
 /* Session id for the current session. */
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
 	Key *public, *private;
 	char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile;
-	int i, type, quit;
+	int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
 
 	public = options.identity_keys[idx];
 	authfile = options.identity_files[idx];
@@ -243,15 +254,16 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 	if (public->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
 		private = public;
 	else
-		private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL);
-	if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode) {
+		private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL,
+		    &perm_ok);
+	if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) {
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
 		    "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
 		for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
 			passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
 			if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
 				private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
-				    authfile, passphrase, NULL);
+				    authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
 				quit = 0;
 			} else {
 				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
@@ -268,7 +280,7 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
 	xfree(comment);
 
 	if (private == NULL) {
-		if (!options.batch_mode)
+		if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok)
 			error("Bad passphrase.");
 
 		/* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index adf967281944..dd971a9f9bb4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.162 2006/08/30 00:06:51 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,18 +24,30 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.143 2005/10/14 02:17:59 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "myproposal.h"
 #include "sshconnect.h"
@@ -49,6 +62,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.143 2005/10/14 02:17:59 stevesk Exp $");
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -122,6 +136,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
 	kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
@@ -363,7 +378,7 @@ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	debug3("input_userauth_banner");
 	msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
 	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	if (options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+	if (options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
 		fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
 	xfree(msg);
 	xfree(lang);
@@ -494,15 +509,10 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 	/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
 	while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
-		if (gssctxt)
-			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
-		ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&gssctxt);
-		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(gssctxt, &gss_supported->elements[mech]);
-
 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
-		    !GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(gssctxt,
-		    authctxt->host))) {
+		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
 		} else {
 			mech++;
@@ -963,14 +973,16 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename)
 {
 	Key *private;
 	char prompt[300], *passphrase;
-	int quit, i;
+	int perm_ok, quit, i;
 	struct stat st;
 
 	if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
 		debug3("no such identity: %s", filename);
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL);
+	private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
+	if (!perm_ok)
+		return NULL;
 	if (private == NULL) {
 		if (options.batch_mode)
 			return NULL;
@@ -979,8 +991,8 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename)
 		for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
 			passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
 			if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
-				private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename,
-				    passphrase, NULL);
+				private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
+				    filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
 				quit = 0;
 			} else {
 				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
@@ -1023,8 +1035,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
 			continue;
 		options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
-		id = xmalloc(sizeof(*id));
-		memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
 		id->key = key;
 		id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
 		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
@@ -1048,8 +1059,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				}
 			}
 			if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
-				id = xmalloc(sizeof(*id));
-				memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+				id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
 				id->key = key;
 				id->filename = comment;
 				id->ac = ac;
@@ -1245,8 +1255,7 @@ ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (pid == 0) {
-		seteuid(getuid());
-		setuid(getuid());
+		permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
 		close(from[0]);
 		if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
 			fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
@@ -1326,12 +1335,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	if (p == NULL) {
 		error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
 		key_free(private);
+		xfree(blob);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	len = strlen(p) + 2;
-	chost = xmalloc(len);
-	strlcpy(chost, p, len);
-	strlcat(chost, ".", len);
+	xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", p);
 	debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
 	xfree(p);
 
@@ -1364,6 +1372,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		error("key_sign failed");
 		xfree(chost);
 		xfree(pkalg);
+		xfree(blob);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
@@ -1379,6 +1388,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	xfree(signature);
 	xfree(chost);
 	xfree(pkalg);
+	xfree(blob);
 
 	packet_send();
 	return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
index 51d339b65814..522279ee351d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.215 2006/02/01 09:11:41 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.234 2006/08/21 08:15:57 dtucker Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ configuration file.
 .Nm
 rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
 .Dv SIGHUP ,
-by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.,
+by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
 .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
 .Pp
 The options are as follows:
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ is normally not run
 from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
 respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds.
 Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
-However, with small key sizes (e.g., 512) using
+However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using
 .Nm
 from inetd may
 be feasible.
@@ -308,17 +308,6 @@ or
 .Ql \&*NP\&*
 ).
 .Pp
-System security is not improved unless
-.Nm rshd ,
-.Nm rlogind ,
-and
-.Nm rexecd
-are disabled (thus completely disabling
-.Xr rlogin
-and
-.Xr rsh
-into the machine).
-.Sh COMMAND EXECUTION AND DATA FORWARDING
 If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
 preparing the session is entered.
 At this time the client may request
@@ -326,7 +315,7 @@ things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
 forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
 connection over the secure channel.
 .Pp
-Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
+After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
 The sides then enter session mode.
 In this mode, either side may send
 data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
@@ -381,31 +370,73 @@ The
 .Dq rc
 files are given the X11
 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
+See
+.Sx SSHRC ,
+below.
 .It
 Runs user's shell or command.
 .El
+.Sh SSHRC
+If the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists,
+.Xr sh 1
+runs it after reading the
+environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
+It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
+instead.
+If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
+its standard input (and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+in its environment).
+The script must call
+.Xr xauth 1
+because
+.Nm
+will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+.Pp
+The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
+accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.Pp
+This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+something similar to:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+	if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+		# X11UseLocalhost=yes
+		echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+		    cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+	else
+		# X11UseLocalhost=no
+		echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+	fi | xauth -q -
+fi
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If this file does not exist,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+is run, and if that
+does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
 .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-is the default file that lists the public keys that are
-permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1
-and for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication)
-in protocol version 2.
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-may be used to specify an alternative file.
-.Pp
+specifies the file containing public keys for
+public key authentication;
+if none is specified, the default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
 Each line of the file contains one
 key (empty lines and lines starting with a
 .Ql #
 are ignored as
 comments).
-Each RSA public key consists of the following fields, separated by
-spaces: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
-Each protocol version 2 public key consists of:
-options, keytype, base64 encoded key, comment.
-The options field
-is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts
+Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
+options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+Protocol 2 public key consist of:
+options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
+The options field is optional;
+its presence is determined by whether the line starts
 with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number).
-The bits, exponent, modulus and comment fields give the RSA key for
+The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for
 protocol version 1; the
 comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
 user to identify the key).
@@ -420,7 +451,7 @@ Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
 keys up to 16 kilobits.
 You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
 .Pa identity.pub ,
-.Pa id_dsa.pub
+.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
 or the
 .Pa id_rsa.pub
 file and edit it.
@@ -435,26 +466,6 @@ No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
 The following option specifications are supported (note
 that option keywords are case-insensitive):
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm from="pattern-list"
-Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, the canonical name
-of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of
-patterns
-.Pf ( Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-serve as wildcards).
-The list may also contain
-patterns negated by prefixing them with
-.Ql \&! ;
-if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not accepted.
-The purpose
-of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication
-by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but
-the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
-permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
-This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
-servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
-just the key).
 .It Cm command="command"
 Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
 authentication.
@@ -470,6 +481,9 @@ to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
 An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
 Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
 Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
 .It Cm environment="NAME=value"
 Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
@@ -484,20 +498,38 @@ option.
 This option is automatically disabled if
 .Cm UseLogin
 is enabled.
+.It Cm from="pattern-list"
+Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, the canonical name
+of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of
+patterns.
+The purpose
+of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication
+by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but
+the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
+permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
+This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
+servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
+just the key).
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
+Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+authentication.
 .It Cm no-port-forwarding
 Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
 Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
-This might be used, e.g., in connection with the
+This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
 .Cm command
 option.
+.It Cm no-pty
+Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
 .It Cm no-X11-forwarding
 Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
 Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
-.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
-Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
-authentication.
-.It Cm no-pty
-Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
 .It Cm permitopen="host:port"
 Limit local
 .Li ``ssh -L''
@@ -517,16 +549,20 @@ device on the server.
 Without this option, the next available device will be used if
 the client requests a tunnel.
 .El
-.Ss Examples
-1024 33 12121...312314325 ylo@foo.bar
 .Pp
-from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23...2334 ylo@niksula
-.Pp
-command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23...2323 backup.hut.fi
-.Pp
-permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23...2323
-.Pp
-tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== reyk@openbsd.org
+An example authorized_keys file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
+from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
+AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
+command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
+AAAAC3...51R== example.net
+permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
+AAAAB5...21S==
+tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
+jane@example.net
+.Ed
 .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
 The
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
@@ -535,7 +571,7 @@ and
 files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
 The global file should
 be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
-maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
 its key is added to the per-user file.
 .Pp
 Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames,
@@ -543,7 +579,7 @@ bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
 The fields are separated by spaces.
 .Pp
 Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
-.Pf ( Ql \&*
+.Pf ( Ql *
 and
 .Ql \&?
 act as
@@ -555,6 +591,13 @@ A pattern may also be preceded by
 to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
 pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
 pattern on the line.
+A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
+.Ql \&[
+and
+.Ql \&]
+brackets then followed by
+.Ql \&:
+and a non-standard port number.
 .Pp
 Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
 and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
@@ -565,7 +608,7 @@ Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
 negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
 .Pp
 Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
-can be obtained, e.g., from
+can be obtained, for example, from
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
 The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
 .Pp
@@ -590,88 +633,19 @@ Rather, generate them by a script
 or by taking
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
 and adding the host names at the front.
-.Ss Examples
-.Bd -literal
-closenet,...,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159...93 closenet.hut.fi
-cvs.openbsd.org,199.185.137.3 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
-.Ed
-.Bd -literal
+.Pp
+An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
+cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
 # A hashed hostname
 |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
 AAAA1234.....=
 .Ed
 .Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-Contains configuration data for
-.Nm sshd .
-The file format and configuration options are described in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
-These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
-accessible to others.
-Note that
-.Nm
-does not start if this file is group/world-accessible.
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
-These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
-These files should be world-readable but writable only by
-root.
-Their contents should match the respective private parts.
-These files are not
-really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
-the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
-These files are created using
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Pa /etc/moduli
-Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
-The file format is described in
-.Xr moduli 5 .
-.It Pa /var/empty
-.Xr chroot 2
-directory used by
-.Nm
-during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
-The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
-and not group or world-writable.
-.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
-Contains the process ID of the
-.Nm
-listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
-concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
-started last).
-The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account.
-This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply
-it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS
-volume).
-It is recommended that it not be accessible by others.
-The format of this file is described above.
-Users will place the contents of their
-.Pa identity.pub ,
-.Pa id_dsa.pub
-and/or
-.Pa id_rsa.pub
-files into this file, as described in
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Pa "/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts", "~/.ssh/known_hosts"
-These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host
-authentication or protocol version 2 hostbased authentication
-to check the public key of the host.
-The key must be listed in one of these files to be accepted.
-The client uses the same files
-to verify that it is connecting to the correct remote host.
-These files should be writable only by root/the owner.
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-should be world-readable, and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-can, but need not be, world-readable.
-.It Pa /etc/motd
-See
-.Xr motd 5 .
-.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It ~/.hushlogin
 This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
 .Pa /etc/motd ,
 if
@@ -682,86 +656,49 @@ respectively,
 are enabled.
 It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
 .Cm Banner .
-.It Pa /etc/nologin
-If this file exists,
+.Pp
+.It ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1
+for more information).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
 .Nm
-refuses to let anyone except root log in.
-The contents of the file
-are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
-refused.
-The file should be world-readable.
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny
-Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
-Further details are described in
-.Xr hosts_access 5 .
-.It Pa ~/.rhosts
-This file is used during
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-and
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-and contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per
-line.
-The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in
-without a password.
-The same file is used by rlogind and rshd.
-The file must
-be writable only by the user; it is recommended that it not be
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
 accessible by others.
 .Pp
-It is also possible to use netgroups in the file.
-Either host or user
-name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or all users
-in the group.
-.It Pa ~/.shosts
-For ssh,
-this file is exactly the same as for
-.Pa .rhosts .
-However, this file is
-not used by rlogin and rshd, so using this permits access using SSH only.
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-This file is used during
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-and
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-authentication.
-In the simplest form, this file contains host names, one per line.
-Users on
-those hosts are permitted to log in without a password, provided they
-have the same user name on both machines.
-The host name may also be
-followed by a user name; such users are permitted to log in as
-.Em any
-user on this machine (except root).
-Additionally, the syntax
-.Dq +@group
-can be used to specify netgroups.
-Negated entries start with
-.Ql \&- .
-.Pp
-If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, login is
-automatically permitted provided the client and server user names are the
-same.
-Additionally, successful client host key authentication is required.
-This file must be writable only by root; it is recommended
-that it be world-readable.
-.Pp
-.Sy "Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user names in"
-.Pa hosts.equiv .
-Beware that it really means that the named user(s) can log in as
-.Em anybody ,
-which includes bin, daemon, adm, and other accounts that own critical
-binaries and directories.
-Using a user name practically grants the user root access.
-The only valid use for user names that I can think
-of is in negative entries.
-.Pp
-Note that this warning also applies to rsh/rlogin.
-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-This is processed exactly as
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv .
-However, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both
-rsh/rlogin and ssh.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+.It ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described above.
+The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+If this file, the
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+directory, or the user's home directory are writable
+by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
+users.
+In this case,
+.Nm
+will not allow it to be used unless the
+.Cm StrictModes
+option has been set to
+.Dq no .
+The recommended permissions can be set by executing
+.Dq chmod go-w ~/ ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/environment
 This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
 It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
 .Ql # ) ,
@@ -772,55 +709,115 @@ Environment processing is disabled by default and is
 controlled via the
 .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
 option.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-If this file exists, it is run with
-.Pa /bin/sh
-after reading the
-environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
-It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
-instead.
-If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
-its standard input (and
-.Ev DISPLAY
-in its environment).
-The script must call
-.Xr xauth 1
-because
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+can, but need not be, world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/rc
+Contains initialization routines to be run before
+the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+readable by anyone else.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.allow
+.It /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/motd
+See
+.Xr motd 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/nologin
+If this file exists,
 .Nm
-will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+The contents of the file
+are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+refused.
+The file should be world-readable.
 .Pp
-The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
-which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
-accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.It /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+should be world-readable.
 .Pp
-This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
-something similar to:
-.Bd -literal
-if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
-	if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
-		# X11UseLocalhost=yes
-		echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
-		    cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
-	else
-		# X11UseLocalhost=no
-		echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
-	fi | xauth -q -
-fi
-.Ed
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
+These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
 .Pp
-If this file does not exist,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-is run, and if that
-does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
+These files should be world-readable but writable only by
+root.
+Their contents should match the respective private parts.
+These files are not
+really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
+the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
+These files are created using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 .Pp
-This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
-readable by anyone else.
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-Like
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
-This can be used to specify
+.It /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Nm sshd .
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Similar to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
+it can be used to specify
 machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
 This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It /var/empty
+.Xr chroot 2
+directory used by
+.Nm
+during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
+The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
+and not group or world-writable.
+.Pp
+.It /var/run/sshd.pid
+Contains the process ID of the
+.Nm
+listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+started last).
+The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
 .El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr scp 1 ,
@@ -836,26 +833,6 @@ This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
 .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
 .Xr inetd 8 ,
 .Xr sftp-server 8
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A T. Kivinen
-.%A M. Saarinen
-.%A T. Rinne
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-12.txt
-.%D January 2002
-.%O work in progress material
-.Re
-.Rs
-.%A M. Friedl
-.%A N. Provos
-.%A W. A. Simpson
-.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-02.txt
-.%D January 2002
-.%O work in progress material
-.Re
 .Sh AUTHORS
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
 ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
@@ -867,3 +844,14 @@ Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
 protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
 for privilege separation.
+.Sh CAVEATS
+System security is not improved unless
+.Nm rshd ,
+.Nm rlogind ,
+and
+.Nm rexecd
+are disabled (thus completely disabling
+.Xr rlogin
+and
+.Xr rsh
+into the machine).
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index def90d827a2b..6159a5b6afd1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.347 2006/08/18 09:15:20 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -42,7 +43,33 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.318 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -53,28 +80,28 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.318 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
 #include <prot.h>
 #endif
 
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "sshpty.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
 #include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "myproposal.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "msg.h"
@@ -83,8 +110,12 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.318 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
 #include "session.h"
 #include "monitor_mm.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "version.h"
 
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 #include <tcpd.h>
@@ -201,15 +232,21 @@ int *startup_pipes = NULL;
 int startup_pipe;		/* in child */
 
 /* variables used for privilege separation */
-int use_privsep;
+int use_privsep = -1;
 struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
 
 /* global authentication context */
 Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
 
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+Buffer cfg;
+
 /* message to be displayed after login */
 Buffer loginmsg;
 
+/* Unprivileged user */
+struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
@@ -246,6 +283,8 @@ close_startup_pipes(void)
  * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
  * the server key).
  */
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 sighup_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -275,6 +314,7 @@ sighup_restart(void)
 /*
  * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
  */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 sigterm_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -285,6 +325,7 @@ sigterm_handler(int sig)
  * SIGCHLD handler.  This is called whenever a child dies.  This will then
  * reap any zombies left by exited children.
  */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 {
@@ -303,16 +344,15 @@ main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 /*
  * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
  */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
 {
-	/* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
-
 	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
 		kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
 
 	/* Log error and exit. */
-	fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -345,6 +385,7 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
 	arc4random_stir();
 }
 
+/*ARGSUSED*/
 static void
 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
 {
@@ -541,7 +582,6 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 {
 	u_int32_t rnd[256];
 	gid_t gidset[1];
-	struct passwd *pw;
 	int i;
 
 	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
@@ -554,12 +594,6 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
 	demote_sensitive_data();
 
-	if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
-		fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
-		    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
-	memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
-	endpwent();
-
 	/* Change our root directory */
 	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
@@ -568,16 +602,16 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 		fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
 
 	/* Drop our privileges */
-	debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-	    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+	debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
+	    (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
 #if 0
 	/* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
-	do_setusercontext(pw);
+	do_setusercontext(privsep_pw);
 #else
-	gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
+	gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
 	if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
 		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+	permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -866,6 +900,325 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
 }
 
+/* Accept a connection from inetd */
+static void
+server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	startup_pipe = -1;
+	if (rexeced_flag) {
+		close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		if (!debug_flag) {
+			startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+			close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+		}
+	} else {
+		*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+	 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
+	 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+	 */
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+		dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+		dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
+			close(fd);
+	}
+	debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Listen for TCP connections
+ */
+static void
+server_listen(void)
+{
+	int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+	for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+		if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
+			fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
+			    "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
+		if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+		    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+			error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+			    (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+			    strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Create socket for listening. */
+		listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+		    ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (listen_sock < 0) {
+			/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+			verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Set socket options.
+		 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
+		 */
+		if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+		    &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+			error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
+		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+			    strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
+		num_listen_socks++;
+
+		/* Start listening on the port. */
+		if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
+			fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+			    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+		logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
+
+	if (!num_listen_socks)
+		fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
+ * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+ */
+static void
+server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+{
+	fd_set *fdset;
+	int i, j, ret, maxfd;
+	int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* setup fd set for accept */
+	fdset = NULL;
+	maxfd = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+		if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
+			maxfd = listen_socks[i];
+	/* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
+	startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+	for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+		startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+	 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		if (received_sighup)
+			sighup_restart();
+		if (fdset != NULL)
+			xfree(fdset);
+		fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+		    sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+			FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+				FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
+
+		/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
+		ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+			error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (received_sigterm) {
+			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+			    (int) received_sigterm);
+			close_listen_socks();
+			unlink(options.pid_file);
+			exit(255);
+		}
+		if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+			key_used = 0;
+			key_do_regen = 0;
+		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
+			    FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
+				/*
+				 * the read end of the pipe is ready
+				 * if the child has closed the pipe
+				 * after successful authentication
+				 * or if the child has died
+				 */
+				close(startup_pipes[i]);
+				startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+				startups--;
+			}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+			if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
+				continue;
+			fromlen = sizeof(from);
+			*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
+			    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
+			if (*newsock < 0) {
+				if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+					error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
+				debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+			    SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
+				error("reexec socketpair: %s",
+				    strerror(errno));
+				close(*newsock);
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+						maxfd = startup_p[0];
+					startups++;
+					break;
+				}
+
+			/*
+			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+			 * we are in debugging mode.
+			 */
+			if (debug_flag) {
+				/*
+				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening
+				 * socket, and start processing the
+				 * connection without forking.
+				 */
+				debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
+				close_listen_socks();
+				*sock_in = *newsock;
+				*sock_out = *newsock;
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				startup_pipe = -1;
+				pid = getpid();
+				if (rexec_flag) {
+					send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
+					    &cfg);
+					close(config_s[0]);
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Normal production daemon.  Fork, and have
+			 * the child process the connection. The
+			 * parent continues listening.
+			 */
+			platform_pre_fork();
+			if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+				/*
+				 * Child.  Close the listening and
+				 * max_startup sockets.  Start using
+				 * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
+				 * logging (since our pid has changed).
+				 * We break out of the loop to handle
+				 * the connection.
+				 */
+				platform_post_fork_child();
+				startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
+				close_startup_pipes();
+				close_listen_socks();
+				*sock_in = *newsock;
+				*sock_out = *newsock;
+				log_init(__progname,
+				    options.log_level,
+				    options.log_facility,
+				    log_stderr);
+				if (rexec_flag)
+					close(config_s[0]);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* Parent.  Stay in the loop. */
+			platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
+			if (pid < 0)
+				error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			else
+				debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
+
+			close(startup_p[1]);
+
+			if (rexec_flag) {
+				send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
+				close(config_s[0]);
+				close(config_s[1]);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Mark that the key has been used (it
+			 * was "given" to the child).
+			 */
+			if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+			    key_used == 0) {
+				/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
+				signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+				alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+				key_used = 1;
+			}
+
+			close(*newsock);
+
+			/*
+			 * Ensure that our random state differs
+			 * from that of the child
+			 */
+			arc4random_stir();
+		}
+
+		/* child process check (or debug mode) */
+		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+}
+
+
 /*
  * Main program for the daemon.
  */
@@ -874,25 +1227,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 {
 	extern char *optarg;
 	extern int optind;
-	int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+	int opt, i, on = 1;
 	int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
-	pid_t pid;
-	socklen_t fromlen;
-	fd_set *fdset;
-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 	const char *remote_ip;
 	int remote_port;
-	FILE *f;
-	struct addrinfo *ai;
-	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 	char *line;
-	int listen_sock, maxfd;
-	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
-	int startups = 0;
+	int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
 	Key *key;
 	Authctxt *authctxt;
-	int ret, key_used = 0;
-	Buffer cfg;
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
@@ -903,7 +1245,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
 	saved_argc = ac;
 	rexec_argc = ac;
-	saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
+	saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
 	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
 		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
 	saved_argv[i] = NULL;
@@ -965,7 +1307,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
 			break;
 		case 'b':
-			options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
+			options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
+			    32768, NULL);
 			break;
 		case 'p':
 			options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
@@ -1002,7 +1345,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			test_flag = 1;
 			break;
 		case 'u':
-			utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
+			utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL);
 			if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
 				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
 				exit(1);
@@ -1011,7 +1354,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		case 'o':
 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
 			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
-			    "command-line", 0) != 0)
+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
 				exit(1);
 			xfree(line);
 			break;
@@ -1069,11 +1412,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	else
 		load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
 
-	parse_server_config(&options,
-	    rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg);
-
-	if (!rexec_flag)
-		buffer_free(&cfg);
+	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+	    &cfg, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 
 	seed_rng();
 
@@ -1091,8 +1431,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
 
+	/* Store privilege separation user for later use */
+	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+		fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+		    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+	memset(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
+	privsep_pw->pw_passwd = "*";
+	privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
+	endpwent();
+
 	/* load private host keys */
-	sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
+	sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
 	    sizeof(Key *));
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
@@ -1158,12 +1507,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 
 	if (use_privsep) {
-		struct passwd *pw;
 		struct stat st;
 
-		if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
-			fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
-			    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
 		if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
 		    (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
 			fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
@@ -1195,7 +1540,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
 
 	if (rexec_flag) {
-		rexec_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc + 2));
+		rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
 		for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
 			debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
 			rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
@@ -1243,121 +1588,31 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* ignore SIGPIPE */
 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
 
-	/* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
+	/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
 	if (inetd_flag) {
-		int fd;
+		server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
 
-		startup_pipe = -1;
-		if (rexeced_flag) {
-			close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
-			sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
-			if (!debug_flag) {
-				startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
-				close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
-			}
-		} else {
-			sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
-			sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
-		}
-		/*
-		 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
-		 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
-		 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
-		 */
-		if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
-			dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
-			dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
-			if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
-				close(fd);
-		}
-		debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
 		if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
 		    sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
 			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
 	} else {
-		for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
-			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
-				continue;
-			if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
-				fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
-				    "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
-			if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
-			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
-			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
-				error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
-				    (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
-				    strerror(errno));
-				continue;
-			}
-			/* Create socket for listening. */
-			listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
-			    ai->ai_protocol);
-			if (listen_sock < 0) {
-				/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
-				verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-				continue;
-			}
-			if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
-				close(listen_sock);
-				continue;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * Set socket options.
-			 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
-			 */
-			if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
-			    &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
-				error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
-
-			debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
-
-			/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
-			if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
-				if (!ai->ai_next)
-				    error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
-					    strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
-				close(listen_sock);
-				continue;
-			}
-			listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
-			num_listen_socks++;
-
-			/* Start listening on the port. */
-			logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
-			if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
-				fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
-		}
-		freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
-
-		if (!num_listen_socks)
-			fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+		server_listen();
 
 		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
 			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
 
-		/*
-		 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP.  The handler needs
-		 * listen_sock.
-		 */
 		signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
-
+		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
 		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
 		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
 
-		/* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
-		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
-
-		/* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
+		/*
+		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+		 */
 		if (!debug_flag) {
-			/*
-			 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
-			 * easier to kill the correct sshd.  We don't want to
-			 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
-			 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
-			 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
-			 */
-			f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
+			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+
 			if (f == NULL) {
 				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
 				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
@@ -1367,194 +1622,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			}
 		}
 
-		/* setup fd set for listen */
-		fdset = NULL;
-		maxfd = 0;
-		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
-			if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
-				maxfd = listen_socks[i];
-		/* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
-		startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
-		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
-			startup_pipes[i] = -1;
-
-		/*
-		 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
-		 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
-		 */
-		for (;;) {
-			if (received_sighup)
-				sighup_restart();
-			if (fdset != NULL)
-				xfree(fdset);
-			fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
-			fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
-			memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
-
-			for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
-				FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
-			for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
-				if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
-					FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
-
-			/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
-			ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-			if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
-				error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-			if (received_sigterm) {
-				logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
-				    (int) received_sigterm);
-				close_listen_socks();
-				unlink(options.pid_file);
-				exit(255);
-			}
-			if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
-				generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-				key_used = 0;
-				key_do_regen = 0;
-			}
-			if (ret < 0)
-				continue;
-
-			for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
-				if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
-				    FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
-					/*
-					 * the read end of the pipe is ready
-					 * if the child has closed the pipe
-					 * after successful authentication
-					 * or if the child has died
-					 */
-					close(startup_pipes[i]);
-					startup_pipes[i] = -1;
-					startups--;
-				}
-			for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
-				if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
-					continue;
-				fromlen = sizeof(from);
-				newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
-				    &fromlen);
-				if (newsock < 0) {
-					if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
-						error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-					continue;
-				}
-				if (unset_nonblock(newsock) == -1) {
-					close(newsock);
-					continue;
-				}
-				if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
-					debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
-					close(newsock);
-					continue;
-				}
-				if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
-					close(newsock);
-					continue;
-				}
-
-				if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
-				    SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
-					error("reexec socketpair: %s",
-					    strerror(errno));
-					close(newsock);
-					close(startup_p[0]);
-					close(startup_p[1]);
-					continue;
-				}
-
-				for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
-					if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
-						startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
-						if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
-							maxfd = startup_p[0];
-						startups++;
-						break;
-					}
-
-				/*
-				 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
-				 * we are in debugging mode.
-				 */
-				if (debug_flag) {
-					/*
-					 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening
-					 * socket, and start processing the
-					 * connection without forking.
-					 */
-					debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
-					close_listen_socks();
-					sock_in = newsock;
-					sock_out = newsock;
-					close(startup_p[0]);
-					close(startup_p[1]);
-					startup_pipe = -1;
-					pid = getpid();
-					if (rexec_flag) {
-						send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
-						    &cfg);
-						close(config_s[0]);
-					}
-					break;
-				} else {
-					/*
-					 * Normal production daemon.  Fork, and have
-					 * the child process the connection. The
-					 * parent continues listening.
-					 */
-					if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
-						/*
-						 * Child.  Close the listening and max_startup
-						 * sockets.  Start using the accepted socket.
-						 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
-						 * changed).  We break out of the loop to handle
-						 * the connection.
-						 */
-						startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
-						close_startup_pipes();
-						close_listen_socks();
-						sock_in = newsock;
-						sock_out = newsock;
-						log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-						if (rexec_flag)
-							close(config_s[0]);
-						break;
-					}
-				}
-
-				/* Parent.  Stay in the loop. */
-				if (pid < 0)
-					error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-				else
-					debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
-
-				close(startup_p[1]);
-
-				if (rexec_flag) {
-					send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
-					close(config_s[0]);
-					close(config_s[1]);
-				}
-
-				/* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
-				if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
-				    key_used == 0) {
-					/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
-					signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
-					alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
-					key_used = 1;
-				}
-
-				arc4random_stir();
-
-				/* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
-				close(newsock);
-			}
-			/* child process check (or debug mode) */
-			if (num_listen_socks < 0)
-				break;
-		}
+		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+		    &newsock, config_s);
 	}
 
 	/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
@@ -1649,7 +1719,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
 	 * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
 	 */
-	remote_ip = get_canonical_hostname(0);
+	(void) get_canonical_hostname(0);
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
+	 * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+	 * the socket goes away.
+	 */
+	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
@@ -1691,8 +1767,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
 	/* allocate authentication context */
-	authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
-	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+	authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
 
 	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
 
@@ -1731,6 +1806,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 */
 	alarm(0);
 	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	authctxt->authenticated = 1;
 	if (startup_pipe != -1) {
 		close(startup_pipe);
 		startup_pipe = -1;
@@ -1783,11 +1859,14 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
 {
 	int rsafail = 0;
 
-	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+	    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
 		/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
 		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+			    "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
 			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
 			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
 			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
@@ -1802,8 +1881,10 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
 	} else {
 		/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
 		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+			    "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
 			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
 			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
 			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
@@ -2024,7 +2105,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
 	}
-	
+
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
 
 	/* start key exchange */
@@ -2032,6 +2113,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
 	kex->server = 1;
 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
index 4957dd1a69ec..6a3cad886716 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.73 2005/12/06 22:38:28 reyk Exp $
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.74 2006/07/19 13:07:10 dtucker Exp $
 
 # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
 # sshd_config(5) for more information.
@@ -71,12 +71,13 @@
 
 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
-# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication mechanism. 
-# Depending on your PAM configuration, this may bypass the setting of 
-# PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, and 
-# "PermitRootLogin without-password". If you just want the PAM account and 
-# session checks to run without PAM authentication, then enable this but set 
-# ChallengeResponseAuthentication=no
+# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+# PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
 #UsePAM no
 
 #AllowTcpForwarding yes
@@ -103,3 +104,9 @@
 
 # override default of no subsystems
 Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+
+# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+#Match User anoncvs
+#	X11Forwarding no
+#	AllowTcpForwarding no
+#	ForceCommand cvs server
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
index 71a293ffb223..2bcaf2245426 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.48 2006/01/02 17:09:49 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.70 2006/08/21 08:14:01 dtucker Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
 .El
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 reads configuration data from
 .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
 (or the file specified with
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
 Lines starting with
 .Ql #
 and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
 .Pp
 The possible
 keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
@@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ in
 for how to configure the client.
 Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
 Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
-.Ql \&*
+.Ql *
 and
 .Ql \&? .
 Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
@@ -85,11 +88,11 @@ For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
 The default is not to accept any environment variables.
 .It Cm AddressFamily
 Specifies which address family should be used by
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
 Valid arguments are
 .Dq any ,
 .Dq inet
-(use IPv4 only) or
+(use IPv4 only), or
 .Dq inet6
 (use IPv6 only).
 The default is
@@ -99,13 +102,20 @@ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
 If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
 group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as
-wildcards in the patterns.
 Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
 By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
 Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
 The default is
@@ -118,24 +128,31 @@ This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
 If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
 match one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as
-wildcards in the patterns.
 Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
 By default, login is allowed for all users.
 If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
 are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
 users from particular hosts.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
 for user authentication.
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
 may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
-set-up.
+setup.
 The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
-%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated and
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
 %u is replaced by the username of that user.
 After expansion,
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
@@ -151,7 +168,7 @@ authentication is allowed.
 This option is only available for protocol version 2.
 By default, no banner is displayed.
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether challenge response authentication is allowed.
+Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed.
 All authentication styles from
 .Xr login.conf 5
 are supported.
@@ -174,20 +191,19 @@ The supported ciphers are
 .Dq blowfish-cbc ,
 and
 .Dq cast128-cbc .
-The default is
-.Bd -literal
-  ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
-    arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
-    aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
 .Ed
 .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
 Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
 sent without
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 receiving any messages back from the client.
 If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
-.Nm sshd
-will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
 It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
 different from
 .Cm TCPKeepAlive
@@ -205,12 +221,13 @@ If
 .Cm ClientAliveInterval
 (see below) is set to 15, and
 .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-is left at the default, unresponsive ssh clients
+is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
 will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm ClientAliveInterval
 Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
 from the client,
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 will send a message through the encrypted
 channel to request a response from the client.
 The default
@@ -231,36 +248,62 @@ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
 Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
 group list matches one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as
-wildcards in the patterns.
 Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
 By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
 .It Cm DenyUsers
 This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
 by spaces.
 Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as wildcards in the patterns.
 Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
 By default, login is allowed for all users.
 If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
 are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
 users from particular hosts.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm ForceCommand
+Forces the execution of the command specified by
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+ignoring any command supplied by the client.
+The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
+This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
+It is most useful inside a
+.Cm Match
+block.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
 .It Cm GatewayPorts
 Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
 forwarded for the client.
 By default,
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
 This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
 .Cm GatewayPorts
-can be used to specify that
-.Nm sshd
+can be used to specify that sshd
 should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
 allowing other hosts to connect.
 The argument may be
@@ -286,12 +329,29 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
 with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
-(hostbased authentication).
+(host-based authentication).
 This option is similar to
 .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 and applies to protocol version 2 only.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
+.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
+name lookup when matching the name in the
+.Pa ~/.shosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+files during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+A setting of
+.Dq yes
+means that
+.Xr sshd 8
+uses the name supplied by the client rather than
+attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
 .It Cm HostKey
 Specifies a file containing a private host key
 used by SSH.
@@ -303,7 +363,7 @@ and
 .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
 for protocol version 2.
 Note that
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible.
 It is possible to have multiple host key files.
 .Dq rsa1
@@ -330,7 +390,7 @@ The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should ignore the user's
 .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
 during
@@ -345,24 +405,24 @@ Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
 will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
 To use this option, the server needs a
 Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
-Default is
+The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
 If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
 an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
-Default is
+The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
-If set then if password authentication through Kerberos fails then
+If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
 the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
 such as
 .Pa /etc/passwd .
-Default is
+The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
 Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
 file on logout.
-Default is
+The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
 In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
@@ -375,7 +435,7 @@ If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
 The default is 3600 (seconds).
 .It Cm ListenAddress
 Specifies the local addresses
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should listen on.
 The following forms may be used:
 .Pp
@@ -401,8 +461,7 @@ The following forms may be used:
 If
 .Ar port
 is not specified,
-.Nm sshd
-will listen on the address and all prior
+sshd will listen on the address and all prior
 .Cm Port
 options specified.
 The default is to listen on all local addresses.
@@ -411,7 +470,7 @@ Multiple
 options are permitted.
 Additionally, any
 .Cm Port
-options must precede this option for non port qualified addresses.
+options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses.
 .It Cm LoginGraceTime
 The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
 successfully logged in.
@@ -419,9 +478,9 @@ If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
 The default is 120 seconds.
 .It Cm LogLevel
 Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
 The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2 and DEBUG3.
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
 The default is INFO.
 DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
 DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
@@ -431,8 +490,37 @@ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
 The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
 for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The default is
+The default is:
 .Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
+.It Cm Match
+Introduces a conditional block.
+If all of the criteria on the
+.Cm Match
+line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
+set in the global section of the config file, until either another
+.Cm Match
+line or the end of the file.
+The arguments to
+.Cm Match
+are one or more criteria-pattern pairs.
+The available criteria are
+.Cm User ,
+.Cm Group ,
+.Cm Host ,
+and
+.Cm Address .
+Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+.Cm Match
+keyword.
+Available keywords are
+.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+.Cm GatewayPorts ,
+.Cm PermitOpen ,
+.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11Forwarding ,
+and
+.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
 .It Cm MaxAuthTries
 Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
 connection.
@@ -441,8 +529,7 @@ additional failures are logged.
 The default is 6.
 .It Cm MaxStartups
 Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
-.Nm sshd
-daemon.
+SSH daemon.
 Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
 .Cm LoginGraceTime
 expires for a connection.
@@ -451,8 +538,8 @@ The default is 10.
 Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
 the three colon separated values
 .Dq start:rate:full
-(e.g., "10:30:60").
-.Nm sshd
+(e.g. "10:30:60").
+.Xr sshd 8
 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
 .Dq rate/100
 (30%)
@@ -473,24 +560,51 @@ When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
 server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
 The default is
 .Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Dq any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
 .It Cm PermitRootLogin
 Specifies whether root can log in using
 .Xr ssh 1 .
 The argument must be
 .Dq yes ,
 .Dq without-password ,
-.Dq forced-commands-only
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
 or
 .Dq no .
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
-.Dq without-password
+.Dq without-password ,
 password authentication is disabled for root.
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
-.Dq forced-commands-only
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
 root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
 but only if the
 .Ar command
@@ -500,7 +614,7 @@ normally not allowed).
 All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
 .Pp
 If this option is set to
-.Dq no
+.Dq no ,
 root is not allowed to log in.
 .It Cm PermitTunnel
 Specifies whether
@@ -508,10 +622,17 @@ Specifies whether
 device forwarding is allowed.
 The argument must be
 .Dq yes ,
-.Dq point-to-point ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
 .Dq ethernet
-or
+(layer 2), or
 .Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+permits both
+.Dq point-to-point
+and
+.Dq ethernet .
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
@@ -522,7 +643,7 @@ and
 options in
 .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 are processed by
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
@@ -530,13 +651,12 @@ restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
 .Ev LD_PRELOAD .
 .It Cm PidFile
 Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
-.Nm sshd
-daemon.
+SSH daemon.
 The default is
 .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
 .It Cm Port
 Specifies the port number that
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 listens on.
 The default is 22.
 Multiple options of this type are permitted.
@@ -544,14 +664,14 @@ See also
 .Cm ListenAddress .
 .It Cm PrintLastLog
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
 in interactively.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm PrintMotd
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should print
 .Pa /etc/motd
 when a user logs in interactively.
@@ -562,12 +682,12 @@ The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm Protocol
 Specifies the protocol versions
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 supports.
 The possible values are
-.Dq 1
+.Sq 1
 and
-.Dq 2 .
+.Sq 2 .
 Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
 The default is
 .Dq 2,1 .
@@ -599,7 +719,7 @@ Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
 The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
 .It Cm StrictModes
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should check file modes and ownership of the
 user's files and home directory before accepting login.
 This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
@@ -607,9 +727,9 @@ directory or files world-writable.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm Subsystem
-Configures an external subsystem (e.g., file transfer daemon).
-Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command to execute upon subsystem
-request.
+Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
+to execute upon subsystem request.
 The command
 .Xr sftp-server 8
 implements the
@@ -619,7 +739,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
 Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
 .It Cm SyslogFacility
 Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
 The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
 LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
 The default is AUTH.
@@ -646,7 +766,7 @@ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm UseDNS
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should look up the remote host name and check that
 the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
 very same IP address.
@@ -677,7 +797,10 @@ If set to
 .Dq yes
 this will enable PAM authentication using
 .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-and PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types.
+and
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+authentication types.
 .Pp
 Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
 role to password authentication, you should disable either
@@ -694,7 +817,7 @@ The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
 to deal with incoming network traffic.
 After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
@@ -705,11 +828,9 @@ The default is
 .Dq yes .
 .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
 Specifies the first display number available for
-.Nm sshd Ns 's
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
 X11 forwarding.
-This prevents
-.Nm sshd
-from interfering with real X11 servers.
+This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
 The default is 10.
 .It Cm X11Forwarding
 Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
@@ -722,14 +843,14 @@ The default is
 .Pp
 When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
 the server and to client displays if the
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
 .Cm X11UseLocalhost
-below), however this is not the default.
+below), though this is not the default.
 Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
 verification and substitution occur on the client side.
 The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
-display server may be exposed to attack when the ssh client requests
+display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
 forwarding (see the warnings for
 .Cm ForwardX11
 in
@@ -747,12 +868,11 @@ X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if
 is enabled.
 .It Cm X11UseLocalhost
 Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
 the wildcard address.
 By default,
-.Nm sshd
-binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
+sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
 hostname part of the
 .Ev DISPLAY
 environment variable to
@@ -778,8 +898,8 @@ program.
 The default is
 .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
 .El
-.Ss Time Formats
-.Nm sshd
+.Sh TIME FORMATS
+.Xr sshd 8
 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
 may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
 .Sm off
@@ -792,7 +912,7 @@ is a positive integer value and
 is one of the following:
 .Pp
 .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
-.It Cm <none>
+.It Aq Cm none
 seconds
 .It Cm s | Cm S
 seconds
@@ -823,7 +943,7 @@ Time format examples:
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
 Contains configuration data for
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
 This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
 (though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
 .El
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
index 15eb916d162b..0059ff8d0393 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.25 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -39,7 +40,20 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.13 2004/08/12 09:18:24 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "loginrec.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -54,15 +68,15 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  * information is not available.  This must be called before record_login.
  * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
  */
-u_long
+time_t
 get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
-    char *buf, u_int bufsize)
+    char *buf, size_t bufsize)
 {
 	struct logininfo li;
 
 	login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
 	strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
-	return li.tv_sec;
+	return (time_t)li.tv_sec;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -103,7 +117,7 @@ store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
  */
 void
 record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
-    const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+    const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
 {
 	struct logininfo *li;
 
@@ -119,7 +133,7 @@ record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
 #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
 void
 record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
-		 const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+		 const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
 {
 	struct logininfo *li;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h
index 1c8bfad3233b..500d3fefd653 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.4 2002/08/29 15:57:25 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -11,18 +11,13 @@
  * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
-#ifndef SSHLOGIN_H
-#define SSHLOGIN_H
 
-void
-record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t,
+void	record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t,
     const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
 void   record_logout(pid_t, const char *, const char *);
-u_long         get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, u_int);
+time_t	get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, u_int);
 
 #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
 void	record_utmp_only(pid_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
 		struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
 #endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
index 36788c4d794a..79c62ee9cd8e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.26 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,11 +13,26 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.12 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
-#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "sshpty.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -38,7 +54,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.12 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
  */
 
 int
-pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
+pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
 {
 	/* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
 	char *name;
@@ -161,11 +177,12 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
 /* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
 
 void
-pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, int row, int col,
-	int xpixel, int ypixel)
+pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
+	u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel)
 {
 	struct winsize w;
 
+	/* may truncate u_int -> u_short */
 	w.ws_row = row;
 	w.ws_col = col;
 	w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
@@ -200,6 +217,10 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
 		fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
 		    strerror(errno));
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+#endif
+
 	if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
 		if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
 			if (errno == EROFS &&
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h
index c0678de2219d..7fac622d9be1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.5 2004/05/08 00:01:37 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -14,17 +14,14 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
-#ifndef SSHPTY_H
-#define SSHPTY_H
+#include <termios.h>
 
 struct termios get_saved_tio(void);
 void	 leave_raw_mode(void);
 void	 enter_raw_mode(void);
 
-int	 pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
+int	 pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
 void	 pty_release(const char *);
 void	 pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
-void	 pty_change_window_size(int, int, int, int, int);
+void	 pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
 void	 pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
-
-#endif				/* SSHPTY_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c
index 0b17c3e2d839..04567669b13b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshtty.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,10 +36,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.6 2004/05/08 00:01:37 deraadt Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
 
 #include "sshpty.h"
-#include "log.h"
 
 static struct termios _saved_tio;
 static int _in_raw_mode = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
index cf4c7d5c6c83..d8e2c553abd6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.26 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -43,14 +44,19 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.19 2003/04/08 20:21:29 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 
 #define TTY_OP_END		0
 /*
@@ -384,7 +390,8 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
 			n_bytes += 4;
 			baud = packet_get_int();
 			debug3("tty_parse_modes: ispeed %d", baud);
-			if (failure != -1 && cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+			if (failure != -1 &&
+			    cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
 				error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
 			break;
 
@@ -394,7 +401,8 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
 			n_bytes += 4;
 			baud = packet_get_int();
 			debug3("tty_parse_modes: ospeed %d", baud);
-			if (failure != -1 && cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+			if (failure != -1 &&
+			    cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
 				error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
 			break;
 
@@ -442,11 +450,12 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
 					/*
 					 * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255).
 					 * We have no idea about its arguments.  So we
-					 * must stop parsing.  Note that some data may be
-					 * left in the packet; hopefully there is nothing
-					 * more coming after the mode data.
+					 * must stop parsing.  Note that some data
+					 * may be left in the packet; hopefully there
+					 * is nothing more coming after the mode data.
 					 */
-					logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", opcode);
+					logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
+					    opcode);
 					goto set;
 				}
 			} else {
@@ -462,7 +471,8 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
 					(void) packet_get_int();
 					break;
 				} else {
-					logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", opcode);
+					logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d",
+					    opcode);
 					goto set;
 				}
 			}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h
index 481282cd707b..4d848fe3a9ef 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ttymodes.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.13 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.14 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
index aab7064eb16d..91d878c30e1b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.35 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -12,7 +13,15 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.24 2003/05/29 16:58:45 deraadt Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
 
 #include "log.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
@@ -77,7 +86,7 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
 		fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 	if (saved_egroupslen > 0) {
 		saved_egroups = xrealloc(saved_egroups,
-		    saved_egroupslen * sizeof(gid_t));
+		    saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
 		if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
 			fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 	} else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */
@@ -96,7 +105,7 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
 			fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		if (user_groupslen > 0) {
 			user_groups = xrealloc(user_groups,
-			    user_groupslen * sizeof(gid_t));
+			    user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
 			if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
 				fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		} else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */
@@ -123,6 +132,41 @@ temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
 		    strerror(errno));
 }
 
+void
+permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	uid_t old_uid = getuid();
+
+	debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid);
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+	if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	if (setreuid(uid, uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setreuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+#else
+# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+	if (seteuid(uid) < 0)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+# endif
+	if (setuid(uid) < 0)
+		fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
+	if (old_uid != uid &&
+	    (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
+		fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify UID drop was successful */
+	if (getuid() != uid || geteuid() != uid) {
+		fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
+		    __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)uid);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
  */
@@ -169,6 +213,8 @@ permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
 	uid_t old_uid = getuid();
 	gid_t old_gid = getgid();
 
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given");
 	if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
 		fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
 	debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h
index 0726980d087d..1c1163d7545f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uidswap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -12,11 +12,7 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
-#ifndef UIDSWAP_H
-#define UIDSWAP_H
-
 void	 temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *);
 void	 restore_uid(void);
 void	 permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *);
-
-#endif				/* UIDSWAP_H */
+void	 permanently_drop_suid(uid_t);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
index 0a7c8d16af25..a13949585f8e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.24 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,7 +24,11 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.17 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "uuencode.h"
@@ -58,9 +63,14 @@ uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
 void
 dump_base64(FILE *fp, u_char *data, u_int len)
 {
-	char *buf = xmalloc(2*len);
+	char *buf;
 	int i, n;
 
+	if (len > 65536) {
+		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	buf = xmalloc(2*len);
 	n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
index 08e87c4bcc68..fec55b491294 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/uuencode.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.10 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-#ifndef UUENCODE_H
-#define UUENCODE_H
 int	 uuencode(const u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t);
 int	 uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t);
 void	 dump_base64(FILE *, u_char *, u_int);
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index 2b729524e220..363e510ba884 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.46 2006/02/01 11:27:22 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.47 2006/08/30 00:14:37 djm Exp $ */
 
-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_4.3"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_4.4"
 
 #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
 #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
index 99c6ac3301ae..9985b4cc2a34 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.27 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -13,7 +14,12 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.16 2001/07/23 18:21:46 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -32,18 +38,38 @@ xmalloc(size_t size)
 }
 
 void *
-xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t new_size)
+xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+
+	if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
+		fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
+	if (SIZE_T_MAX / nmemb < size)
+		fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX");
+	ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %lu bytes)",
+		    (u_long)(size * nmemb));
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
 {
 	void *new_ptr;
+	size_t new_size = nmemb * size;
 
 	if (new_size == 0)
 		fatal("xrealloc: zero size");
+	if (SIZE_T_MAX / nmemb < size)
+		fatal("xrealloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_T_MAX");
 	if (ptr == NULL)
 		new_ptr = malloc(new_size);
 	else
 		new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size);
 	if (new_ptr == NULL)
-		fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %lu bytes)", (u_long) new_size);
+		fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %lu bytes)",
+		    (u_long) new_size);
 	return new_ptr;
 }
 
@@ -66,3 +92,19 @@ xstrdup(const char *str)
 	strlcpy(cp, str, len);
 	return cp;
 }
+
+int
+xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int i;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
+		fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory");
+
+	return (i);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
index 7ac4b13d64c9..fb217a45c903 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.9 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,12 +16,11 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  */
 
-#ifndef XMALLOC_H
-#define XMALLOC_H
-
 void	*xmalloc(size_t);
-void	*xrealloc(void *, size_t);
+void	*xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
+void	*xrealloc(void *, size_t, size_t);
 void     xfree(void *);
 char	*xstrdup(const char *);
-
-#endif				/* XMALLOC_H */
+int	 xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
+                __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
+                __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));