diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'MdePkg/Library/DynamicStackCookieEntryPointLib/IA32/DynamicCookieGcc.nasm')
| -rw-r--r-- | MdePkg/Library/DynamicStackCookieEntryPointLib/IA32/DynamicCookieGcc.nasm | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/DynamicStackCookieEntryPointLib/IA32/DynamicCookieGcc.nasm b/MdePkg/Library/DynamicStackCookieEntryPointLib/IA32/DynamicCookieGcc.nasm new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3c3e0e9931c --- /dev/null +++ b/MdePkg/Library/DynamicStackCookieEntryPointLib/IA32/DynamicCookieGcc.nasm @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +; +; Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. +; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +; +; Module Name: +; +; DynamicCookie.nasm +; +; Abstract: +; +; Generates random number through CPU RdRand instruction on a 32-bit platform +; to store a random value in the GCC __stack_check_guard stack cookie. +; The first byte is 0'd to prevent string copy functions from clobbering +; the stack cookie. +; +; Notes: +; +; If RdRand fails, the build time static stack cookie value will be used instead. +; +;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +SECTION .text + +extern ASM_PFX(__stack_chk_guard) +extern ASM_PFX(_CModuleEntryPoint) +global ASM_PFX(_ModuleEntryPoint) + +;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +; VOID +; EFIAPI +; _ModuleEntryPoint ( +; Parameters are passed through +; ); +;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +global _ModuleEntryPoint +_ModuleEntryPoint: + push ebx + push ecx + push edx + + mov eax, 1 ; CPUID function 1 + cpuid + test ecx, 0x40000000 ; Check if the RdRand bit (bit 30) is set in ECX + jz c_entry ; If not set, jump to c_entry + + rdrand eax ; Use rdrand, getting a 32 bit value as on + ; IA32, __stack_chk_guard is a 32 bit value. + ; CF=1 if RN generated ok, otherwise CF=0 + jnc c_entry ; If the cmd fails, don't update __stack_chk_guard, we'll have to move forward + ; with the static value provided at build time. + + lea ebx, [ASM_PFX(__stack_chk_guard)] ; load the address of __stack_chk_guard into ebx + + xor ah, ah ; Zero a byte of the __stack_chk_guard value to protect against string functions + ; (such as strcpy like functions) clobbering past the canary + mov [ebx], eax ; Store our random value, with 0'd first byte to __stack_chk_guard + +c_entry: + pop edx + pop ecx + pop ebx + jmp ASM_PFX(_CModuleEntryPoint) |
