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+NTP 4.2.8p11 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2018/02/27)
+
+NOTE: this NEWS file will be undergoing more revisions.
+
+Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
+
+Severity: MEDIUM
+
+This release fixes 2 low-/medium-, 1 informational/medum-, and 2 low-severity
+vulnerabilities in ntpd, one medium-severity vulernability in ntpq, and
+provides 65 other non-security fixes and improvements:
+
+* NTP Bug 3454: Unauthenticated packet can reset authenticated interleaved
+ association (LOW/MED)
+ Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p11) 27 Feb 2018
+ References: Sec 3454 / CVE-2018-7185 / VU#961909
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p11.
+ CVSS2: MED 4.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) This could score between
+ 2.9 and 6.8.
+ CVSS3: LOW 3.1 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L This could
+ score between 2.6 and 3.1
+ Summary:
+ The NTP Protocol allows for both non-authenticated and
+ authenticated associations, in client/server, symmetric (peer),
+ and several broadcast modes. In addition to the basic NTP
+ operational modes, symmetric mode and broadcast servers can
+ support an interleaved mode of operation. In ntp-4.2.8p4 a bug
+ was inadvertently introduced into the protocol engine that
+ allows a non-authenticated zero-origin (reset) packet to reset
+ an authenticated interleaved peer association. If an attacker
+ can send a packet with a zero-origin timestamp and the source
+ IP address of the "other side" of an interleaved association,
+ the 'victim' ntpd will reset its association. The attacker must
+ continue sending these packets in order to maintain the
+ disruption of the association. In ntp-4.0.0 thru ntp-4.2.8p6,
+ interleave mode could be entered dynamically. As of ntp-4.2.8p7,
+ interleaved mode must be explicitly configured/enabled.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p11, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
+ If you are unable to upgrade to 4.2.8p11 or later and have
+ 'peer HOST xleave' lines in your ntp.conf file, remove the
+ 'xleave' option.
+ Have enough sources of time.
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
+ If ntpd stops running, auto-restart it without -g .
+ Credit:
+ This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
+
+* NTP Bug 3453: Interleaved symmetric mode cannot recover from bad
+ state (LOW/MED)
+ Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p11) 27 Feb 2018
+ References: Sec 3453 / CVE-2018-7184 / VU#961909
+ Affects: ntpd in ntp-4.2.8p4, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p11.
+ CVSS2: MED 4.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)
+ Could score between 2.9 and 6.8.
+ CVSS3: LOW 3.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+ Could score between 2.6 and 6.0.
+ Summary:
+ The fix for NtpBug2952 was incomplete, and while it fixed one
+ problem it created another. Specifically, it drops bad packets
+ before updating the "received" timestamp. This means a
+ third-party can inject a packet with a zero-origin timestamp,
+ meaning the sender wants to reset the association, and the
+ transmit timestamp in this bogus packet will be saved as the
+ most recent "received" timestamp. The real remote peer does
+ not know this value and this will disrupt the association until
+ the association resets.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to ntp-4.2.8p11 or later from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
+ Use authentication with 'peer' mode.
+ Have enough sources of time.
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
+ If ntpd stops running, auto-restart it without -g .
+ Credit:
+ This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
+
+* NTP Bug 3415: Provide a way to prevent authenticated symmetric passive
+ peering (LOW)
+ Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p11) 27 Feb 2018
+ References: Sec 3415 / CVE-2018-7170 / VU#961909
+ Sec 3012 / CVE-2016-1549 / VU#718152
+ Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
+ 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92. Resolved in 4.2.8p11.
+ CVSS2: LOW 3.5 - (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N)
+ CVSS3: LOW 3.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
+ Summary:
+ ntpd can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. If a system is set up to
+ use a trustedkey and if one is not using the feature introduced in
+ ntp-4.2.8p6 allowing an optional 4th field in the ntp.keys file to
+ specify which IPs can serve time, a malicious authenticated peer
+ -- i.e. one where the attacker knows the private symmetric key --
+ can create arbitrarily-many ephemeral associations in order to win
+ the clock selection of ntpd and modify a victim's clock. Three
+ additional protections are offered in ntp-4.2.8p11. One is the
+ new 'noepeer' directive, which disables symmetric passive
+ ephemeral peering. Another is the new 'ippeerlimit' directive,
+ which limits the number of peers that can be created from an IP.
+ The third extends the functionality of the 4th field in the
+ ntp.keys file to include specifying a subnet range.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to ntp-4.2.8p11 or later from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
+ Use the 'noepeer' directive to prohibit symmetric passive
+ ephemeral associations.
+ Use the 'ippeerlimit' directive to limit the number of peers
+ that can be created from an IP.
+ Use the 4th argument in the ntp.keys file to limit the IPs and
+ subnets that can be time servers.
+ Have enough sources of time.
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
+ If ntpd stops running, auto-restart it without -g .
+ Credit:
+ This weakness was reported as Bug 3012 by Matthew Van Gundy of
+ Cisco ASIG, and separately by Stefan Moser as Bug 3415.
+
+* ntpq Bug 3414: decodearr() can write beyond its 'buf' limits (Medium)
+ Date Resolved: 27 Feb 2018
+ References: Sec 3414 / CVE-2018-7183 / VU#961909
+ Affects: ntpq in ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p11.
+ CVSS2: MED 6.8 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P)
+ CVSS3: MED 5.0 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
+ Summary:
+ ntpq is a monitoring and control program for ntpd. decodearr()
+ is an internal function of ntpq that is used to -- wait for it --
+ decode an array in a response string when formatted data is being
+ displayed. This is a problem in affected versions of ntpq if a
+ maliciously-altered ntpd returns an array result that will trip this
+ bug, or if a bad actor is able to read an ntpq request on its way to
+ a remote ntpd server and forge and send a response before the remote
+ ntpd sends its response. It's potentially possible that the
+ malicious data could become injectable/executable code.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to ntp-4.2.8p11 or later from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
+ Credit:
+ This weakness was discovered by Michael Macnair of Thales e-Security.
+
+* NTP Bug 3412: ctl_getitem(): buffer read overrun leads to undefined
+ behavior and information leak (Info/Medium)
+ Date Resolved: 27 Feb 2018
+ References: Sec 3412 / CVE-2018-7182 / VU#961909
+ Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p11.
+ CVSS2: INFO 0.0 - MED 5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) 0.0 if C:N
+ CVSS3: NONE 0.0 - MED 5.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
+ 0.0 if C:N
+ Summary:
+ ctl_getitem() is used by ntpd to process incoming mode 6 packets.
+ A malicious mode 6 packet can be sent to an ntpd instance, and
+ if the ntpd instance is from 4.2.8p6 thru 4.2.8p10, that will
+ cause ctl_getitem() to read past the end of its buffer.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to ntp-4.2.8p11 or later from the NTP Project Download Page
+ or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
+ Have enough sources of time.
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
+ If ntpd stops running, auto-restart it without -g .
+ Credit:
+ This weakness was discovered by Yihan Lian of Qihoo 360.
+
+* NTP Bug 3012: Sybil vulnerability: ephemeral association attack
+ Also see Bug 3415, above.
+ Date Mitigated: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
+ Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p11) 27 Feb 2018
+ References: Sec 3012 / CVE-2016-1549 / VU#718152
+ Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
+ 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92. Resolved in 4.2.8p11.
+ CVSS2: LOW 3.5 - (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N)
+ CVSS3: MED 5.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
+ Summary:
+ ntpd can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. If a system is set up
+ to use a trustedkey and if one is not using the feature
+ introduced in ntp-4.2.8p6 allowing an optional 4th field in the
+ ntp.keys file to specify which IPs can serve time, a malicious
+ authenticated peer -- i.e. one where the attacker knows the
+ private symmetric key -- can create arbitrarily-many ephemeral
+ associations in order to win the clock selection of ntpd and
+ modify a victim's clock. Two additional protections are
+ offered in ntp-4.2.8p11. One is the 'noepeer' directive, which
+ disables symmetric passive ephemeral peering. The other extends
+ the functionality of the 4th field in the ntp.keys file to
+ include specifying a subnet range.
+ Mitigation:
+ Implement BCP-38.
+ Upgrade to 4.2.8p11, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page or
+ the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
+ Use the 'noepeer' directive to prohibit symmetric passive
+ ephemeral associations.
+ Use the 'ippeerlimit' directive to limit the number of peer
+ associations from an IP.
+ Use the 4th argument in the ntp.keys file to limit the IPs
+ and subnets that can be time servers.
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
+ Credit:
+ This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG.
+
+* Bug fixes:
+ [Bug 3457] OpenSSL FIPS mode regression <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3455] ntpd doesn't use scope id when binding multicast <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - applied patch by Sean Haugh
+ [Bug 3452] PARSE driver prints uninitialized memory. <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3450] Dubious error messages from plausibility checks in get_systime()
+ - removed error log caused by rounding/slew, ensured postcondition <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3447] AES-128-CMAC (fixes) <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - refactoring the MAC code, too
+ [Bug 3441] Validate the assumption that AF_UNSPEC is 0. stenn@ntp.org
+ [Bug 3439] When running multiple commands / hosts in ntpq... <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - applied patch by ggarvey
+ [Bug 3438] Negative values and values > 999 days in... <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - applied patch by ggarvey (with minor mods)
+ [Bug 3437] ntpd tries to open socket with AF_UNSPEC domain
+ - applied patch (with mods) by Miroslav Lichvar <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3435] anchor NTP era alignment <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3433] sntp crashes when run with -a. <stenn@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3430] ntpq dumps core (SIGSEGV) for "keytype md2"
+ - fixed several issues with hash algos in ntpd, sntp, ntpq,
+ ntpdc and the test suites <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3424] Trimble Thunderbolt 1024 week millenium bug <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - initial patch by Daniel Pouzzner
+ [Bug 3423] QNX adjtime() implementation error checking is
+ wrong <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3417] ntpq ifstats packet counters can be negative
+ made IFSTATS counter quantities unsigned <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3411] problem about SIGN(6) packet handling for ntp-4.2.8p10
+ - raised receive buffer size to 1200 <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3408] refclock_jjy.c: Avoid a wrong report of the coverity static
+ analysis tool. <abe@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3405] update-leap.in: general cleanup, HTTPS support. Paul McMath.
+ [Bug 3404] Fix openSSL DLL usage under Windows <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - fix/drop assumptions on OpenSSL libs directory layout
+ [Bug 3399] NTP: linker error in 4.2.8p10 during Linux cross-compilation
+ - initial patch by timeflies@mail2tor.com <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3398] tests fail with core dump <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - patch contributed by Alexander Bluhm
+ [Bug 3397] ctl_putstr() asserts that data fits in its buffer
+ rework of formatting & data transfer stuff in 'ntp_control.c'
+ avoids unecessary buffers and size limitations. <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3394] Leap second deletion does not work on ntpd clients
+ - fixed handling of dynamic deletion w/o leap file <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3391] ntpd segfaults on startup due to small warmup thread stack size
+ - increased mimimum stack size to 32kB <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3367] Faulty LinuxPPS NMEA clock support in 4.2.8 <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ - reverted handling of PPS kernel consumer to 4.2.6 behavior
+ [Bug 3365] Updates driver40(-ja).html and miscopt.html <abe@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 3358] Spurious KoD log messages in .INIT. phase. HStenn.
+ [Bug 3016] wrong error position reported for bad ":config pool"
+ - fixed location counter & ntpq output <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 2900] libntp build order problem. HStenn.
+ [Bug 2878] Tests are cluttering up syslog <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ [Bug 2737] Wrong phone number listed for USNO. ntp-bugs@bodosom.net,
+ perlinger@ntp.org
+ [Bug 2557] Fix Thunderbolt init. ntp-bugs@bodosom.net, perlinger@ntp.
+ [Bug 948] Trustedkey config directive leaks memory. <perlinger@ntp.org>
+ Use strlcpy() to copy strings, not memcpy(). HStenn.
+ Typos. HStenn.
+ test_ntp_scanner_LDADD needs ntpd/ntp_io.o. HStenn.
+ refclock_jjy.c: Add missing "%s" to an msyslog() call. HStenn.
+ Build ntpq and libntpq.a with NTP_HARD_*FLAGS. perlinger@ntp.org
+ Fix trivial warnings from 'make check'. perlinger@ntp.org
+ Fix bug in the override portion of the compiler hardening macro. HStenn.
+ record_raw_stats(): Log entire packet. Log writes. HStenn.
+ AES-128-CMAC support. BInglis, HStenn, JPerlinger.
+ sntp: tweak key file logging. HStenn.
+ sntp: pkt_output(): Improve debug output. HStenn.
+ update-leap: updates from Paul McMath.
+ When using pkg-config, report --modversion. HStenn.
+ Clean up libevent configure checks. HStenn.
+ sntp: show the IP of who sent us a crypto-NAK. HStenn.
+ Allow .../N to specify subnet bits for IPs in ntp.keys. HStenn, JPerlinger.
+ authistrustedip() - use it in more places. HStenn, JPerlinger.
+ New sysstats: sys_lamport, sys_tsrounding. HStenn.
+ Update ntp.keys .../N documentation. HStenn.
+ Distribute testconf.yml. HStenn.
+ Add DPRINTF(2,...) lines to receive() for packet drops. HStenn.
+ Rename the configuration flag fifo variables. HStenn.
+ Improve saveconfig output. HStenn.
+ Decode restrict flags on receive() debug output. HStenn.
+ Decode interface flags on receive() debug output. HStenn.
+ Warn the user if deprecated "driftfile name WanderThreshold" is used. HStenn.
+ Update the documentation in ntp.conf.def . HStenn.
+ restrictions() must return restrict flags and ippeerlimit. HStenn.
+ Update ntpq peer documentation to describe the 'p' type. HStenn.
+ Rename restrict 'flags' to 'rflags. Use an enum for the values. HStenn.
+ Provide dump_restricts() for debugging. HStenn.
+ Use consistent 4th arg type for [gs]etsockopt. JPerlinger.
+
+* Other items:
+
+* update-leap needs the following perl modules:
+ Net::SSLeay
+ IO::Socket::SSL
+
+* New sysstats variables: sys_lamport, sys_tsrounding
+See them with: ntpq -c "rv 0 ss_lamport,ss_tsrounding"
+sys_lamport counts the number of observed Lamport violations, while
+sys_tsrounding counts observed timestamp rounding events.
+
+* New ntp.conf items:
+
+- restrict ... noepeer
+- restrict ... ippeerlimit N
+
+The 'noepeer' directive will disallow all ephemeral/passive peer
+requests.
+
+The 'ippeerlimit' directive limits the number of time associations
+for each IP in the designated set of addresses. This limit does not
+apply to explicitly-configured associations. A value of -1, the current
+default, means an unlimited number of associations may connect from a
+single IP. 0 means "none", etc. Ordinarily the only way multiple
+associations would come from the same IP would be if the remote side
+was using a proxy. But a trusted machine might become compromised,
+in which case an attacker might spin up multiple authenticated sessions
+from different ports. This directive should be helpful in this case.
+
+* New ntp.keys feature: Each IP in the optional list of IPs in the 4th
+field may contain a /subnetbits specification, which identifies the
+scope of IPs that may use this key. This IP/subnet restriction can be
+used to limit the IPs that may use the key in most all situations where
+a key is used.
+--
NTP 4.2.8p10 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2017/03/21)
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
@@ -960,7 +1287,7 @@ following 9 low- and medium-severity vulnerabilities:
Implement BCP-38.
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
- Properly monitor your =ntpd= instances
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Stephen Gray and
Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG.
@@ -1029,7 +1356,7 @@ following 9 low- and medium-severity vulnerabilities:
Implement BCP-38.
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
- Properly monitor your =ntpd= instances
+ Properly monitor your ntpd instances
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yihan Lian of the Cloud
Security Team, Qihoo 360.
@@ -1266,7 +1593,7 @@ following 1 low- and 8 medium-severity vulnerabilities:
Configure 'ntpd' to get time from multiple sources.
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
- Monitor your 'ntpd= instances.
+ Monitor your 'ntpd' instances.
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthey Van Gundy and
Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.