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-rw-r--r--contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c2165
1 files changed, 2165 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6d5429144b47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2165 @@
+/*
+ * ntp_proto.c - NTP version 4 protocol machinery
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#include "ntpd.h"
+#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
+#include "ntp_unixtime.h"
+#include "ntp_control.h"
+#include "ntp_string.h"
+
+#if defined(VMS) && defined(VMS_LOCALUNIT) /*wjm*/
+#include "ntp_refclock.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * System variables are declared here. See Section 3.2 of the
+ * specification.
+ */
+u_char sys_leap; /* system leap indicator */
+u_char sys_stratum; /* stratum of system */
+s_char sys_precision; /* local clock precision */
+double sys_rootdelay; /* distance to current sync source */
+double sys_rootdispersion; /* dispersion of system clock */
+u_int32 sys_refid; /* reference source for local clock */
+static double sys_offset; /* current local clock offset */
+l_fp sys_reftime; /* time we were last updated */
+struct peer *sys_peer; /* our current peer */
+u_long sys_automax; /* maximum session key lifetime */
+
+/*
+ * Nonspecified system state variables.
+ */
+int sys_bclient; /* we set our time to broadcasts */
+double sys_bdelay; /* broadcast client default delay */
+int sys_authenticate; /* requre authentication for config */
+l_fp sys_authdelay; /* authentication delay */
+static u_long sys_authdly[2]; /* authentication delay shift reg */
+static u_char leap_consensus; /* consensus of survivor leap bits */
+static double sys_maxd; /* select error (squares) */
+static double sys_epsil; /* system error (squares) */
+u_long sys_private; /* private value for session seed */
+int sys_manycastserver; /* 1 => respond to manycast client pkts */
+
+/*
+ * Statistics counters
+ */
+u_long sys_stattime; /* time when we started recording */
+u_long sys_badstratum; /* packets with invalid stratum */
+u_long sys_oldversionpkt; /* old version packets received */
+u_long sys_newversionpkt; /* new version packets received */
+u_long sys_unknownversion; /* don't know version packets */
+u_long sys_badlength; /* packets with bad length */
+u_long sys_processed; /* packets processed */
+u_long sys_badauth; /* packets dropped because of auth */
+u_long sys_limitrejected; /* pkts rejected due to client count per net */
+
+static double root_distance P((struct peer *));
+static double clock_combine P((struct peer **, int));
+static void peer_xmit P((struct peer *));
+static void fast_xmit P((struct recvbuf *, int, u_long));
+static void clock_update P((void));
+#ifdef MD5
+static void make_keylist P((struct peer *));
+#endif /* MD5 */
+
+/*
+ * transmit - Transmit Procedure. See Section 3.4.2 of the
+ * specification.
+ */
+void
+transmit(
+ struct peer *peer /* peer structure pointer */
+ )
+{
+ int hpoll;
+
+ hpoll = peer->hpoll;
+ if (peer->burst == 0) {
+ u_char oreach;
+
+ /*
+ * Determine reachability and diddle things if we
+ * haven't heard from the host for a while. If the peer
+ * is not configured and not likely to stay around,
+ * we exhaust it.
+ */
+ oreach = peer->reach;
+ if (oreach & 0x01)
+ peer->valid++;
+ if (oreach & 0x80)
+ peer->valid--;
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) &&
+ peer->valid > NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) &&
+ peer->status < CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND)
+ peer->reach = 0;
+ peer->reach <<= 1;
+ if (peer->reach == 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * If this is an uncofigured association and
+ * has become unreachable, demobilize it.
+ */
+ if (oreach != 0) {
+ report_event(EVNT_UNREACH, peer);
+ peer->timereachable = current_time;
+ peer_clear(peer);
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)) {
+ unpeer(peer);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We would like to respond quickly when the
+ * peer comes back to life. If the probes since
+ * becoming unreachable are less than
+ * NTP_UNREACH, clamp the poll interval to the
+ * minimum. In order to minimize the network
+ * traffic, the interval gradually ramps up the
+ * the maximum after that.
+ */
+ peer->ppoll = peer->maxpoll;
+ if (peer->unreach < NTP_UNREACH) {
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_CLIENT)
+ peer->unreach++;
+ hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ } else {
+ hpoll++;
+ }
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
+ peer->burst = 2;
+
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Here the peer is reachable. If there is no
+ * system peer or if the stratum of the system
+ * peer is greater than this peer, clamp the
+ * poll interval to the minimum. If less than
+ * two samples are in the reachability register,
+ * reduce the interval; if more than six samples
+ * are in the register, increase the interval.
+ */
+ peer->unreach = 0;
+ if (sys_peer == 0)
+ hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ else if (sys_peer->stratum > peer->stratum)
+ hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ if ((peer->reach & 0x03) == 0) {
+ clock_filter(peer, 0., 0., MAXDISPERSE);
+ clock_select();
+ }
+ if (peer->valid <= 2)
+ hpoll--;
+ else if (peer->valid >= NTP_SHIFT - 2)
+ hpoll++;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
+ peer->burst = NTP_SHIFT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ peer->burst--;
+ if (peer->burst == 0) {
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
+ peer->flags &= ~FLAG_BURST;
+ peer->hmode = MODE_BCLIENT;
+ }
+ clock_select();
+ poll_update(peer, hpoll);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to be very careful about honking uncivilized time. If
+ * not operating in broadcast mode, honk in all except broadcast
+ * client mode. If operating in broadcast mode and synchronized
+ * to a real source, honk except when the peer is the local-
+ * clock driver and the prefer flag is not set. In other words,
+ * in broadcast mode we never honk unless known to be
+ * synchronized to real time.
+ */
+ if (peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ if (peer->hmode != MODE_BCLIENT)
+ peer_xmit(peer);
+ } else if (sys_peer != 0 && sys_leap != LEAP_NOTINSYNC) {
+ if (!(sys_peer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK &&
+ !(sys_peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER)))
+ peer_xmit(peer);
+ }
+ peer->outdate = current_time;
+ poll_update(peer, hpoll);
+}
+
+/*
+ * receive - Receive Procedure. See section 3.4.3 in the specification.
+ */
+void
+receive(
+ struct recvbuf *rbufp
+ )
+{
+ register struct peer *peer;
+ register struct pkt *pkt;
+ int hismode;
+ int oflags;
+ int restrict_mask;
+ int has_mac; /* has MAC field */
+ int authlen; /* length of MAC field */
+ int is_authentic; /* cryptosum ok */
+ int is_mystic; /* session key exists */
+ int is_error; /* parse error */
+/* u_long pkeyid; */
+ u_long skeyid, tkeyid;
+ struct peer *peer2;
+ int retcode = AM_NOMATCH;
+
+ /*
+ * Monitor the packet and get restrictions
+ */
+ ntp_monitor(rbufp);
+ restrict_mask = restrictions(&rbufp->recv_srcadr);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf("receive: from %s restrict %02x\n",
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), restrict_mask);
+#endif
+ if (restrict_mask & RES_IGNORE)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Discard packets with invalid version number.
+ */
+ pkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
+ if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_VERSION)
+ sys_newversionpkt++;
+ else if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) >= NTP_OLDVERSION)
+ sys_oldversionpkt++;
+ else {
+ sys_unknownversion++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Restrict control/private mode packets. Note that packet
+ * length has to be checked in the control/private mode protocol
+ * module.
+ */
+ if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_PRIVATE) {
+ if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY)
+ return;
+ process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask & RES_NOMODIFY) ==
+ 0));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_CONTROL) {
+ if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY)
+ return;
+ process_control(rbufp, restrict_mask);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Restrict revenue packets.
+ */
+ if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTSERVE)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * See if we only accept limited number of clients from the net
+ * this guy is from. Note: the flag is determined dynamically
+ * within restrictions()
+ */
+ if (restrict_mask & RES_LIMITED) {
+ sys_limitrejected++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not a broadcast client, ignore broadcast packets.
+ */
+ if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST && !sys_bclient))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * This is really awful ugly. We figure out whether an extension
+ * field is present and then measure the MAC size. If the number
+ * of words following the packet header is less than or equal to
+ * 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute the
+ * MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an extension
+ * field is present and the first word contains the length of
+ * the extension field and the MAC follows that.
+ */
+ has_mac = 0;
+/* pkeyid = 0; */
+ skeyid = tkeyid = 0;
+ authlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
+ has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - authlen;
+ if (has_mac <= 5 * sizeof(u_int32)) {
+ skeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid1) & 0xffffffff;
+ } else {
+ authlen += (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid1) & 0xffffffff;
+ has_mac = rbufp->recv_length - authlen;
+ if (authlen <= 0) {
+ sys_badlength++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note that keyid3 is actually the key ident of the
+ * MAC itself.
+ */
+/* pkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid2) & 0xffffffff; */
+ skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) & 0xffffffff;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Figure out his mode and validate it.
+ */
+ hismode = (int)PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
+ if (PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode) == NTP_OLDVERSION && hismode ==
+ 0) {
+ /*
+ * Easy. If it is from the NTP port it is
+ * a sym act, else client.
+ */
+ if (SRCPORT(&rbufp->recv_srcadr) == NTP_PORT)
+ hismode = MODE_ACTIVE;
+ else
+ hismode = MODE_CLIENT;
+ } else {
+ if (hismode != MODE_ACTIVE && hismode != MODE_PASSIVE &&
+ hismode != MODE_SERVER && hismode != MODE_CLIENT &&
+ hismode != MODE_BROADCAST)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If he included a mac field, decrypt it to see if it is
+ * authentic.
+ */
+ is_authentic = is_mystic = 0;
+ if (has_mac == 0) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("receive: at %ld from %s mode %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
+ hismode);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ is_mystic = authistrusted(skeyid);
+#ifdef MD5
+ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY && !is_mystic) {
+
+ /*
+ * For multicast mode, generate the session key
+ * and install in the key cache. For client mode,
+ * generate the session key for the unicast
+ * address. For server mode, the session key should
+ * already be in the key cache, since it was
+ * generated when the last request was sent.
+ */
+ if (hismode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ tkeyid = session_key(
+ ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
+ ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ skeyid, (u_long)(4 * (1 << pkt->ppoll)));
+ } else if (hismode != MODE_SERVER) {
+ tkeyid = session_key(
+ ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
+ ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ skeyid, (u_long)(4 * (1 << pkt->ppoll)));
+ }
+
+ }
+#endif /* MD5 */
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the cryptosum. Note a clogging attack may
+ * succceed in bloating the key cache.
+ */
+ if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen, has_mac))
+ is_authentic = 1;
+ else
+ sys_badauth++;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "receive: at %ld %s mode %d keyid %08lx mac %d auth %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
+ hismode, skeyid, has_mac, is_authentic);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find the peer. This will return a null if this guy isn't in
+ * the database.
+ */
+ peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd,
+ hismode, &retcode);
+ /*
+ * The new association matching rules are driven by a table specified
+ * in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour of replying
+ * to bogus packets in server mode in this version.
+ * A packet must now match an association in order to be processed.
+ * In the event that no association exists, then an association is
+ * mobilized if need be. Two different associations can be mobilized
+ * a) passive associations
+ * b) client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts.
+ */
+ is_error = 0;
+ switch (retcode) {
+ case AM_FXMIT:
+ /*
+ * If the client is configured purely as a broadcast client and
+ * not as an manycast server, it has no business being a server.
+ * Simply go home. Otherwise, send a MODE_SERVER response and go
+ * home. Note that we don't do a authentication check here,
+ * since we can't set the system clock; but, we do set the
+ * key ID to zero to tell the caller about this.
+ */
+ if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) {
+ if (is_authentic)
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid);
+ else
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so just
+ * toss the key, if appropriate.
+ */
+ if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(skeyid, 0);
+ return;
+
+ case AM_MANYCAST:
+ /*
+ * This could be in response to a multicast packet sent by
+ * the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based on the
+ * originate timestamp in the packet. Note that we don't
+ * mobilize a new association, unless the packet is properly
+ * authenticated. The response must be properly authenticated
+ * and it's darn funny of the manycaster isn't around now.
+ */
+ if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org);
+ if (peer2 == 0) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new association and copy the peer variables to it.
+ * If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new association
+ * away and return its marbles to the candy store.
+ */
+ peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+ rbufp->dstadr, MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ if (peer == 0) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer);
+ break;
+
+ case AM_ERR:
+ /*
+ * Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by the
+ * code at the end of this adventure.
+ */
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case AM_NEWPASS:
+ /*
+ * Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him some
+ * memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is properly
+ * authenticated.
+ */
+ if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+ rbufp->dstadr, MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ break;
+
+ case AM_NEWBCL:
+ /*
+ * Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if the
+ * packet is properly authenticated.
+ */
+ if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient ||
+ (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
+ is_error = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
+ rbufp->dstadr, MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
+ NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
+ if (peer == 0)
+ break;
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST;
+ peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
+ break;
+
+ case AM_POSSBCL:
+ case AM_PROCPKT:
+ /*
+ * It seems like it is okay to process the packet now
+ */
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway!
+ */
+ is_error = 1;
+ }
+ if (is_error) {
+
+ /*
+ * Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We scuttle
+ * the autokey if necessary and sink the ship. This can
+ * occur only upon mobilization, so we can throw the
+ * structure away without fear of breaking anything.
+ */
+ if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(skeyid, 0);
+ if (peer != 0)
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG))
+ unpeer(peer);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n", retcode,
+ peer_associations);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the peer isn't configured, set his keyid and authenable
+ * status based on the packet.
+ */
+ oflags = peer->flags;
+ peer->timereceived = current_time;
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && has_mac) {
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENABLE;
+ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2)
+ peer->keyid = skeyid;
+ else
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_SKEY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Determine if this guy is basically trustable. If not, flush
+ * the bugger. If this is the first packet that is authenticated,
+ * flush the clock filter. This is to foil clogging attacks that
+ * might starve the poor dear.
+ */
+ peer->flash = 0;
+ if (is_authentic)
+ peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
+ else
+ peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST))
+ peer->flash |= TEST10; /* access denied */
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC))
+ peer->flash |= TEST5; /* authentication failed */
+ else if (skeyid == 0)
+ peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not authenticated */
+ else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) {
+ peer_clear(peer);
+ report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((peer->flash & ~(u_int)TEST9) != 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before becoming
+ * a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw the current
+ * association away if it is configured or if it has prior
+ * reachable friends.
+ */
+ if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(skeyid, 0);
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0)
+ unpeer(peer);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "invalid packet 0x%02x code %d assoc %d\n",
+ peer->flash, retcode, peer_associations);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+
+#ifdef MD5
+ /*
+ * The autokey dance. The cha-cha requires that the hash of the
+ * current session key matches the previous key identifier. Heaps
+ * of trouble if the steps falter.
+ */
+ if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * In the case of a new autokey, verify the hash matches
+ * one of the previous four hashes. If not, raise the
+ * authentication flasher and hope the next one works.
+ */
+ if (hismode == MODE_SERVER) {
+ peer->pkeyid = peer->keyid;
+ } else if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
+ if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) {
+ tkeyid = session_key(
+ ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
+ ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ tkeyid, 0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
+ authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) {
+ tkeyid = session_key(
+ ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
+ ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ tkeyid, 0);
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef XXX /* temp until certificate code is mplemented */
+ if (tkeyid != peer->pkeyid)
+ peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not authentic */
+#endif
+ peer->pkeyid = skeyid;
+ }
+#endif /* MD5 */
+
+ /*
+ * Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If something
+ * breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live, toss it.
+ * Be careful in active mode and return a packet anyway.
+ */
+ process_packet(peer, pkt, &(rbufp->recv_time));
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0) {
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_PASSIVE) {
+ if (is_authentic)
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, skeyid);
+ else
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, 0);
+ }
+ unpeer(peer);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * process_packet - Packet Procedure, a la Section 3.4.4 of the
+ * specification. Or almost, at least. If we're in here we have a
+ * reasonable expectation that we will be having a long term
+ * relationship with this host.
+ */
+int
+process_packet(
+ register struct peer *peer,
+ register struct pkt *pkt,
+ l_fp *recv_ts
+ )
+{
+ l_fp t10, t23;
+ double p_offset, p_del, p_disp;
+ double dtemp;
+ l_fp p_rec, p_xmt, p_org, p_reftime;
+ l_fp ci;
+ int pmode;
+
+ /*
+ * Swap header fields and keep the books.
+ */
+ sys_processed++;
+ peer->processed++;
+ p_del = FPTOD(NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdelay));
+ p_disp = FPTOD(NTOHS_FP(pkt->rootdispersion));
+ NTOHL_FP(&pkt->reftime, &p_reftime);
+ NTOHL_FP(&pkt->rec, &p_rec);
+ NTOHL_FP(&pkt->xmt, &p_xmt);
+ if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_BROADCAST)
+ NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &p_org);
+ else
+ p_org = peer->rec;
+ peer->rec = *recv_ts;
+ peer->ppoll = pkt->ppoll;
+ pmode = PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode);
+
+ /*
+ * Test for old or duplicate packets (tests 1 through 3).
+ */
+ if (L_ISHIS(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* count old packets */
+ peer->oldpkt++;
+ if (L_ISEQU(&peer->org, &p_xmt)) /* test 1 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST1; /* duplicate packet */
+ if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ if (!L_ISEQU(&peer->xmt, &p_org)) { /* test 2 */
+ peer->bogusorg++;
+ peer->flash |= TEST2; /* bogus packet */
+ }
+ if (L_ISZERO(&p_rec) || L_ISZERO(&p_org))
+ peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynchronized */
+ } else {
+ if (L_ISZERO(&p_org))
+ peer->flash |= TEST3; /* unsynchronized */
+ }
+ peer->org = p_xmt;
+
+ /*
+ * Test for valid header (tests 5 through 10)
+ */
+ ci = p_xmt;
+ L_SUB(&ci, &p_reftime);
+ LFPTOD(&ci, dtemp);
+ if (PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode) == LEAP_NOTINSYNC || /* test 6 */
+ PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) >= NTP_MAXSTRATUM ||
+ dtemp < 0)
+ peer->flash |= TEST6; /* peer clock unsynchronized */
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && sys_peer != 0) { /* test 7 */
+ if (PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum) > sys_stratum) {
+ peer->flash |= TEST7; /* peer stratum too high */
+ sys_badstratum++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (fabs(p_del) >= MAXDISPERSE /* test 8 */
+ || p_disp >= MAXDISPERSE)
+ peer->flash |= TEST8; /* delay/dispersion too high */
+
+ /*
+ * If the packet header is invalid (tests 5 through 10), exit.
+ * XXX we let TEST9 sneak by until the certificate code is
+ * implemented, but only to mobilize the association.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash & (TEST5 | TEST6 | TEST7 | TEST8 | TEST10)) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "invalid packet header 0x%02x mode %d\n",
+ peer->flash, pmode);
+#endif
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Valid header; update our state.
+ */
+ record_raw_stats(&peer->srcadr, &peer->dstadr->sin,
+ &p_org, &p_rec, &p_xmt, &peer->rec);
+
+ peer->leap = PKT_LEAP(pkt->li_vn_mode);
+ peer->pmode = pmode; /* unspec */
+ peer->stratum = PKT_TO_STRATUM(pkt->stratum);
+ peer->precision = pkt->precision;
+ peer->rootdelay = p_del;
+ peer->rootdispersion = p_disp;
+ peer->refid = pkt->refid;
+ peer->reftime = p_reftime;
+ if (peer->reach == 0) {
+ report_event(EVNT_REACH, peer);
+ peer->timereachable = current_time;
+ }
+ peer->reach |= 1;
+ poll_update(peer, peer->hpoll);
+
+ /*
+ * If running in a client/server association, calculate the
+ * clock offset c, roundtrip delay d and dispersion e. We use
+ * the equations (reordered from those in the spec). Note that,
+ * in a broadcast association, org has been set to the time of
+ * last reception. Note the computation of dispersion includes
+ * the system precision plus that due to the frequency error
+ * since the originate time.
+ *
+ * c = ((t2 - t3) + (t1 - t0)) / 2
+ * d = (t2 - t3) - (t1 - t0)
+ * e = (org - rec) (seconds only)
+ */
+ t10 = p_xmt; /* compute t1 - t0 */
+ L_SUB(&t10, &peer->rec);
+ t23 = p_rec; /* compute t2 - t3 */
+ L_SUB(&t23, &p_org);
+ ci = t10;
+ p_disp = CLOCK_PHI * (peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui);
+
+ /*
+ * If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is (t1
+ * - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't measure
+ * that directly; therefore, we start up in client/server mode,
+ * calculate the clock offset, using the engineered refinement
+ * algorithms, while also receiving broadcasts. When a broadcast
+ * is received in client/server mode, we calculate a correction
+ * factor to use after switching back to broadcast mode. We know
+ * NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which accounts for the simplified ei
+ * calculation.
+ *
+ * If FLAG_MCAST2 is set, we are a broadcast/multicast client.
+ * If FLAG_MCAST1 is set, we haven't calculated the propagation
+ * delay. If hmode is MODE_CLIENT, we haven't set the local
+ * clock in client/server mode. Initially, we come up
+ * MODE_CLIENT. When the clock is first updated and FLAG_MCAST2
+ * is set, we switch from MODE_CLIENT to MODE_BCLIENT.
+ */
+ if (pmode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST1) {
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BCLIENT)
+ peer->flags &= ~FLAG_MCAST1;
+ LFPTOD(&ci, p_offset);
+ peer->estbdelay = peer->offset - p_offset;
+ return (1);
+
+ }
+ DTOLFP(peer->estbdelay, &t10);
+ L_ADD(&ci, &t10);
+ p_del = peer->delay;
+ } else {
+ L_ADD(&ci, &t23);
+ L_RSHIFT(&ci);
+ L_SUB(&t23, &t10);
+ LFPTOD(&t23, p_del);
+ }
+ LFPTOD(&ci, p_offset);
+ if (fabs(p_del) >= MAXDISPERSE || p_disp >= MAXDISPERSE) /* test 4 */
+ peer->flash |= TEST4; /* delay/dispersion too big */
+
+ /*
+ * If the packet data are invalid (tests 1 through 4), exit.
+ */
+ if (peer->flash) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("invalid packet data 0x%02x mode %d\n",
+ peer->flash, pmode);
+#endif
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * This one is valid. Mark it so, give it to clock_filter().
+ */
+ clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, fabs(p_disp));
+ clock_select();
+ record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer),
+ peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp, SQRT(peer->variance));
+ return(1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * clock_update - Called at system process update intervals.
+ */
+static void
+clock_update(void)
+{
+ u_char oleap;
+ u_char ostratum;
+ int i;
+ struct peer *peer;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset/adjust the system clock. Do this only if there is a
+ * system peer and we haven't seen that peer lately. Watch for
+ * timewarps here.
+ */
+ if (sys_peer == 0)
+ return;
+ if (sys_peer->pollsw == FALSE || sys_peer->burst > 0)
+ return;
+ sys_peer->pollsw = FALSE;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("clock_update: at %ld assoc %d \n", current_time,
+ peer_associations);
+#endif
+ oleap = sys_leap;
+ ostratum = sys_stratum;
+ switch (local_clock(sys_peer, sys_offset, sys_epsil)) {
+
+ case -1:
+ /*
+ * Clock is too screwed up. Just exit for now.
+ */
+ report_event(EVNT_SYSFAULT, (struct peer *)0);
+ exit(1);
+ /*NOTREACHED*/
+
+ case 1:
+ /*
+ * Clock was stepped. Clear filter registers
+ * of all peers.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < HASH_SIZE; i++) {
+ for (peer = peer_hash[i]; peer != 0;
+ peer =peer->next)
+ peer_clear(peer);
+ }
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost");
+ sys_peer = 0;
+ sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
+ report_event(EVNT_CLOCKRESET, (struct peer *)0);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Update the system stratum, leap bits, root delay,
+ * root dispersion, reference ID and reference time. We
+ * also update select dispersion and max frequency
+ * error.
+ */
+ sys_stratum = sys_peer->stratum + 1;
+ if (sys_stratum == 1)
+ sys_refid = sys_peer->refid;
+ else
+ sys_refid = sys_peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ sys_reftime = sys_peer->rec;
+ sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay + fabs(sys_peer->delay);
+ sys_leap = leap_consensus;
+ }
+ if (oleap != sys_leap)
+ report_event(EVNT_SYNCCHG, (struct peer *)0);
+ if (ostratum != sys_stratum)
+ report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG, (struct peer *)0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * poll_update - update peer poll interval. See Section 3.4.9 of the
+ * spec.
+ */
+void
+poll_update(
+ struct peer *peer,
+ int hpoll
+ )
+{
+ long update;
+
+ /*
+ * The wiggle-the-poll-interval dance. Broadcasters dance only
+ * the minpoll beat. Reference clock partners sit this one out.
+ * Dancers surviving the clustering algorithm beat to the system
+ * clock. Broadcast clients are usually lead by their broadcast
+ * partner, but faster in the initial mating dance.
+ */
+ if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
+ peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ } else if (peer->flags & FLAG_SYSPEER) {
+ peer->hpoll = sys_poll;
+ } else {
+ if (hpoll > peer->maxpoll)
+ peer->hpoll = peer->maxpoll;
+ else if (hpoll < peer->minpoll)
+ peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ else
+ peer->hpoll = hpoll;
+ }
+ if (peer->burst > 0) {
+ if (peer->nextdate != current_time)
+ return;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_REFCLOCK)
+ peer->nextdate++;
+ else if (peer->reach & 0x1)
+ peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL2);
+ else
+ peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL1);
+ } else {
+ update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll), peer->minpoll);
+ peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(update);
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf("poll_update: at %lu %s poll %d burst %d last %lu next %lu\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll, peer->burst,
+ peer->outdate, peer->nextdate);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * clear - clear peer filter registers. See Section 3.4.8 of the spec.
+ */
+void
+peer_clear(
+ register struct peer *peer
+ )
+{
+ register int i;
+
+ memset(CLEAR_TO_ZERO(peer), 0, LEN_CLEAR_TO_ZERO);
+ peer->estbdelay = sys_bdelay;
+ peer->hpoll = peer->minpoll;
+ peer->pollsw = FALSE;
+ peer->variance = MAXDISPERSE;
+ peer->epoch = current_time;
+ for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
+ peer->filter_order[i] = i;
+ peer->filter_disp[i] = MAXDISPERSE;
+ peer->filter_epoch[i] = current_time;
+ }
+ poll_update(peer, peer->minpoll);
+
+ /*
+ * Since we have a chance to correct possible funniness in
+ * our selection of interfaces on a multihomed host, do so
+ * by setting us to no particular interface.
+ * WARNING: do so only in non-broadcast mode!
+ */
+ if (peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST)
+ peer->dstadr = any_interface;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * clock_filter - add incoming clock sample to filter register and run
+ * the filter procedure to find the best sample.
+ */
+void
+clock_filter(
+ register struct peer *peer,
+ double sample_offset,
+ double sample_delay,
+ double sample_disp
+ )
+{
+ register int i, j, k, n = 0;
+ register u_char *ord;
+ double distance[NTP_SHIFT];
+ double x, y, z, off;
+
+ /*
+ * Update error bounds and calculate distances. Also initialize
+ * sort index vector.
+ */
+ x = CLOCK_PHI * (current_time - peer->update);
+ peer->update = current_time;
+ ord = peer->filter_order;
+ j = peer->filter_nextpt;
+ for (i = 0; i < NTP_SHIFT; i++) {
+ peer->filter_disp[j] += x;
+ if (peer->filter_disp[j] > MAXDISPERSE)
+ peer->filter_disp[j] = MAXDISPERSE;
+ distance[i] = fabs(peer->filter_delay[j]) / 2 +
+ peer->filter_disp[j];
+ ord[i] = j;
+ if (--j < 0)
+ j += NTP_SHIFT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Insert the new sample at the beginning of the register.
+ */
+ peer->filter_offset[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_offset;
+ peer->filter_delay[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_delay;
+ x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) + sample_disp;
+ peer->filter_disp[peer->filter_nextpt] = min(x, MAXDISPERSE);
+ peer->filter_epoch[peer->filter_nextpt] = current_time;
+ distance[0] = min(x + fabs(sample_delay) / 2, MAXDISTANCE);
+ peer->filter_nextpt++;
+ if (peer->filter_nextpt >= NTP_SHIFT)
+ peer->filter_nextpt = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Sort the samples in the register by distance. The winning
+ * sample will be in ord[0]. Sort the samples only if they
+ * are younger than the Allen intercept.
+ */
+ y = min(allan_xpt, NTP_SHIFT * ULOGTOD(sys_poll));
+ for (n = 0; n < NTP_SHIFT && current_time -
+ peer->filter_epoch[ord[n]] <= y; n++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
+ if (distance[j] > distance[n]) {
+ x = distance[j];
+ k = ord[j];
+ distance[j] = distance[n];
+ ord[j] = ord[n];
+ distance[n] = x;
+ ord[n] = k;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the error bound and standard error.
+ */
+ x = y = z = off = 0.;
+ for (i = NTP_SHIFT - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ x = NTP_FWEIGHT * (x + peer->filter_disp[ord[i]]);
+ if (i < n) {
+ z += 1. / distance[i];
+ off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] / distance[i];
+ y += DIFF(peer->filter_offset[ord[i]],
+ peer->filter_offset[ord[0]]);
+ }
+ }
+ peer->delay = peer->filter_delay[ord[0]];
+ peer->variance = min(y / n, MAXDISPERSE);
+ peer->disp = min(x, MAXDISPERSE);
+ peer->epoch = current_time;
+ x = peer->offset;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
+ peer->offset = off / z;
+ else
+ peer->offset = peer->filter_offset[ord[0]];
+
+ /*
+ * A new sample is useful only if it is younger than the last
+ * one used.
+ */
+ if (peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]] > peer->epoch) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("clock_filter: discard %lu\n",
+ peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]] - peer->epoch);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the offset exceeds the dispersion by CLOCK_SGATE and the
+ * interval since the last update is less than twice the system
+ * poll interval, consider the update a popcorn spike and ignore
+ * it.
+ */
+ if (fabs(x - peer->offset) > CLOCK_SGATE &&
+ peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]] - peer->epoch < (1 <<
+ (sys_poll + 1))) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("clock_filter: popcorn spike %.6f\n", x);
+#endif
+ return;
+ }
+ peer->epoch = peer->filter_epoch[ord[0]];
+ peer->pollsw = TRUE;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "clock_filter: offset %.6f delay %.6f disp %.6f std %.6f, age %lu\n",
+ peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
+ SQRT(peer->variance), current_time - peer->epoch);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * clock_select - find the pick-of-the-litter clock
+ */
+void
+clock_select(void)
+{
+ register struct peer *peer;
+ int i;
+ int nlist, nl3;
+ double d, e, f;
+ int j;
+ int n;
+ int allow, found, k;
+ double high, low;
+ double synch[NTP_MAXCLOCK], error[NTP_MAXCLOCK];
+ struct peer *osys_peer;
+ struct peer *typeacts = 0;
+ struct peer *typelocal = 0;
+ struct peer *typepps = 0;
+ struct peer *typeprefer = 0;
+ struct peer *typesystem = 0;
+
+ static int list_alloc = 0;
+ static struct endpoint *endpoint = NULL;
+ static int *index = NULL;
+ static struct peer **peer_list = NULL;
+ static u_int endpoint_size = 0;
+ static u_int index_size = 0;
+ static u_int peer_list_size = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize. If a prefer peer does not survive this thing,
+ * the pps_update switch will remain zero.
+ */
+ pps_update = 0;
+ nlist = 0;
+ low = 1e9;
+ high = -1e9;
+ for (n = 0; n < HASH_SIZE; n++)
+ nlist += peer_hash_count[n];
+ if (nlist > list_alloc) {
+ if (list_alloc > 0) {
+ free(endpoint);
+ free(index);
+ free(peer_list);
+ }
+ while (list_alloc < nlist) {
+ list_alloc += 5;
+ endpoint_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof *endpoint;
+ index_size += 5 * 3 * sizeof *index;
+ peer_list_size += 5 * sizeof *peer_list;
+ }
+ endpoint = (struct endpoint *)emalloc(endpoint_size);
+ index = (int *)emalloc(index_size);
+ peer_list = (struct peer **)emalloc(peer_list_size);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This first chunk of code is supposed to go through all
+ * peers we know about to find the peers which are most likely
+ * to succeed. We run through the list doing the sanity checks
+ * and trying to insert anyone who looks okay.
+ */
+ nlist = nl3 = 0; /* none yet */
+ for (n = 0; n < HASH_SIZE; n++) {
+ for (peer = peer_hash[n]; peer != 0; peer = peer->next) {
+ peer->flags &= ~FLAG_SYSPEER;
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_REJECT;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_NOSELECT)
+ continue; /* noselect (survey only) */
+ if (peer->reach == 0)
+ continue; /* unreachable */
+ if (peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid ==
+ peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr)
+ continue; /* sync loop */
+ if (root_distance(peer) >= MAXDISTANCE + 2 *
+ CLOCK_PHI * ULOGTOD(sys_poll)) {
+ peer->seldisptoolarge++;
+ continue; /* too noisy or broken */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the local-clock or acts drivers
+ * in the kitchen at this point, unless the
+ * prefer peer. Do that later, but only if
+ * nobody else is around.
+ */
+ if (peer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK
+#if defined(VMS) && defined(VMS_LOCALUNIT)
+ /* wjm: local unit VMS_LOCALUNIT taken seriously */
+ && REFCLOCKUNIT(&peer->srcadr) != VMS_LOCALUNIT
+#endif /* VMS && VMS_LOCALUNIT */
+ ) {
+ typelocal = peer;
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER))
+ continue; /* no local clock */
+ }
+ if (peer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE) {
+ typeacts = peer;
+ if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_PREFER))
+ continue; /* no acts */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we get this far, we assume the peer is
+ * acceptable.
+ */
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SANE;
+ peer_list[nlist++] = peer;
+
+ /*
+ * Insert each interval endpoint on the sorted
+ * list.
+ */
+ e = peer->offset; /* Upper end */
+ f = root_distance(peer);
+ e = e + f;
+ for (i = nl3 - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
+ break;
+ index[i + 3] = index[i];
+ }
+ index[i + 3] = nl3;
+ endpoint[nl3].type = 1;
+ endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
+
+ e = e - f; /* Center point */
+ for ( ; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
+ break;
+ index[i + 2] = index[i];
+ }
+ index[i + 2] = nl3;
+ endpoint[nl3].type = 0;
+ endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
+
+ e = e - f; /* Lower end */
+ for ( ; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (e >= endpoint[index[i]].val)
+ break;
+ index[i + 1] = index[i];
+ }
+ index[i + 1] = nl3;
+ endpoint[nl3].type = -1;
+ endpoint[nl3++].val = e;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ for (i = 0; i < nl3; i++)
+ printf("select: endpoint %2d %.6f\n",
+ endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val);
+#endif
+ i = 0;
+ j = nl3 - 1;
+ allow = nlist; /* falsetickers assumed */
+ found = 0;
+ while (allow > 0) {
+ allow--;
+ for (n = 0; i <= j; i++) {
+ n += endpoint[index[i]].type;
+ if (n < 0)
+ break;
+ if (endpoint[index[i]].type == 0)
+ found++;
+ }
+ for (n = 0; i <= j; j--) {
+ n += endpoint[index[j]].type;
+ if (n > 0)
+ break;
+ if (endpoint[index[j]].type == 0)
+ found++;
+ }
+ if (found > allow)
+ break;
+ low = endpoint[index[i++]].val;
+ high = endpoint[index[j--]].val;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no survivors remain at this point, check if the acts or
+ * local clock drivers have been found. If so, nominate one of
+ * them as the only survivor. Otherwise, give up and declare us
+ * unsynchronized.
+ */
+ if ((allow << 1) >= nlist) {
+ if (typeacts != 0) {
+ typeacts->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SANE;
+ peer_list[0] = typeacts;
+ nlist = 1;
+ } else if (typelocal != 0) {
+ typelocal->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SANE;
+ peer_list[0] = typelocal;
+ nlist = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (sys_peer != 0) {
+ report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG,
+ (struct peer *)0);
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost");
+ }
+ sys_peer = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf("select: low %.6f high %.6f\n", low, high);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Clustering algorithm. Process intersection list to discard
+ * outlyers. Construct candidate list in cluster order
+ * determined by the sum of peer synchronization distance plus
+ * scaled stratum. We must find at least one peer.
+ */
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
+ peer = peer_list[i];
+ if (nlist > 1 && (low >= peer->offset ||
+ peer->offset >= high))
+ continue;
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_CORRECT;
+ d = root_distance(peer) + peer->stratum * MAXDISPERSE;
+ if (j >= NTP_MAXCLOCK) {
+ if (d >= synch[j - 1])
+ continue;
+ else
+ j--;
+ }
+ for (k = j; k > 0; k--) {
+ if (d >= synch[k - 1])
+ break;
+ synch[k] = synch[k - 1];
+ peer_list[k] = peer_list[k - 1];
+ }
+ peer_list[k] = peer;
+ synch[k] = d;
+ j++;
+ }
+ nlist = j;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
+ printf("select: %s distance %.6f\n",
+ ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Now, prune outlyers by root dispersion. Continue as long as
+ * there are more than NTP_MINCLOCK survivors and the minimum
+ * select dispersion is greater than the maximum peer
+ * dispersion. Stop if we are about to discard a prefer peer.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++) {
+ peer = peer_list[i];
+ error[i] = peer->variance;
+ if (i < NTP_CANCLOCK)
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SELCAND;
+ else
+ peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_DISTSYSPEER;
+ }
+ while (1) {
+ sys_maxd = 0;
+ d = error[0];
+ for (k = i = nlist - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ double sdisp = 0;
+
+ for (j = nlist - 1; j > 0; j--) {
+ sdisp = NTP_SWEIGHT * (sdisp +
+ DIFF(peer_list[i]->offset,
+ peer_list[j]->offset));
+ }
+ if (sdisp > sys_maxd) {
+ sys_maxd = sdisp;
+ k = i;
+ }
+ if (error[i] < d)
+ d = error[i];
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf(
+ "select: survivors %d select %.6f peer %.6f\n",
+ nlist, SQRT(sys_maxd), SQRT(d));
+#endif
+ if (nlist <= NTP_MINCLOCK || sys_maxd <= d ||
+ peer_list[k]->flags & FLAG_PREFER)
+ break;
+ for (j = k + 1; j < nlist; j++) {
+ peer_list[j - 1] = peer_list[j];
+ error[j - 1] = error[j];
+ }
+ nlist--;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
+ printf(
+ "select: %s offset %.6f, distance %.6f poll %d\n",
+ ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), peer_list[i]->offset,
+ synch[i], peer_list[i]->pollsw);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * What remains is a list of not greater than NTP_MINCLOCK
+ * peers. We want only a peer at the lowest stratum to become
+ * the system peer, although all survivors are eligible for the
+ * combining algorithm. First record their order, diddle the
+ * flags and clamp the poll intervals. Then, consider the peers
+ * at the lowest stratum. Of these, OR the leap bits on the
+ * assumption that, if some of them honk nonzero bits, they must
+ * know what they are doing. Also, check for prefer and pps
+ * peers. If a prefer peer is found within clock_max, update the
+ * pps switch. Of the other peers not at the lowest stratum,
+ * check if the system peer is among them and, if found, zap
+ * him. We note that the head of the list is at the lowest
+ * stratum and that unsynchronized peers cannot survive this
+ * far.
+ */
+ leap_consensus = 0;
+ for (i = nlist - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ peer_list[i]->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND;
+ peer_list[i]->flags |= FLAG_SYSPEER;
+ poll_update(peer_list[i], peer_list[i]->hpoll);
+ if (peer_list[i]->stratum == peer_list[0]->stratum) {
+ leap_consensus |= peer_list[i]->leap;
+ if (peer_list[i]->refclktype == REFCLK_ATOM_PPS)
+ typepps = peer_list[i];
+ if (peer_list[i] == sys_peer)
+ typesystem = peer_list[i];
+ if (peer_list[i]->flags & FLAG_PREFER) {
+ typeprefer = peer_list[i];
+ if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) < clock_max)
+ pps_update = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (peer_list[i] == sys_peer)
+ sys_peer = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Mitigation rules of the game. There are several types of
+ * peers that make a difference here: (1) prefer local peers
+ * (type REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK with FLAG_PREFER) or prefer modem
+ * peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps peers
+ * (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers (flag
+ * FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5) the
+ * head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be
+ * declared prefer. The order of preference is in the order
+ * stated. Note that all of these must be at the lowest stratum,
+ * i.e., the stratum of the head of the survivor list.
+ */
+ osys_peer = sys_peer;
+ if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK ||
+ typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE || !typepps)) {
+ sys_peer = typeprefer;
+ sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER;
+ sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
+ sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n", sys_offset);
+#endif
+ } else if (typepps && pps_update) {
+ sys_peer = typepps;
+ sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_PPS;
+ sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
+ sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance;
+ if (!pps_control)
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYSEVENT) /* conditional syslog */
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "pps sync enabled");
+ pps_control = current_time;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf("select: pps offset %.6f\n", sys_offset);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ if (!typesystem)
+ sys_peer = peer_list[0];
+ sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER;
+ sys_offset = clock_combine(peer_list, nlist);
+ sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance + sys_maxd;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug > 1)
+ printf("select: combine offset %.6f\n",
+ sys_offset);
+#endif
+ }
+ if (osys_peer != sys_peer)
+ report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG, (struct peer *)0);
+ clock_update();
+}
+
+/*
+ * clock_combine - combine offsets from selected peers
+ */
+static double
+clock_combine(
+ struct peer **peers,
+ int npeers
+ )
+{
+ int i;
+ double x, y, z;
+ y = z = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < npeers; i++) {
+ x = root_distance(peers[i]);
+ y += 1. / x;
+ z += peers[i]->offset / x;
+ }
+ return (z / y);
+}
+
+/*
+ * root_distance - compute synchronization distance from peer to root
+ */
+static double
+root_distance(
+ struct peer *peer
+ )
+{
+ return ((fabs(peer->delay) + peer->rootdelay) / 2 +
+ peer->rootdispersion + peer->disp +
+ SQRT(peer->variance) + CLOCK_PHI * (current_time -
+ peer->update));
+}
+
+/*
+ * peer_xmit - send packet for persistent association.
+ */
+static void
+peer_xmit(
+ struct peer *peer /* peer structure pointer */
+ )
+{
+ struct pkt xpkt;
+ int find_rtt = (peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
+ peer->hmode != MODE_BROADCAST;
+ int sendlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize protocol fields.
+ */
+ xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
+ peer->version, peer->hmode);
+ xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
+ xpkt.ppoll = peer->hpoll;
+ xpkt.precision = sys_precision;
+ xpkt.rootdelay = HTONS_FP(DTOFP(sys_rootdelay));
+ xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(DTOUFP(sys_rootdispersion +
+ LOGTOD(sys_precision)));
+ xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
+ HTONL_FP(&sys_reftime, &xpkt.reftime);
+ HTONL_FP(&peer->org, &xpkt.org);
+ HTONL_FP(&peer->rec, &xpkt.rec);
+
+ /*
+ * Authenticate the packet if enabled and either configured or
+ * the previous packet was authenticated. If for some reason the
+ * key associated with the key identifier is not in the key
+ * cache, then honk key zero.
+ */
+ sendlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
+ u_long xkeyid;
+ l_fp xmt_tx;
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit encrypted packet compensated for the
+ * encryption delay.
+ */
+#ifdef MD5
+ if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY) {
+
+ /*
+ * In SKEY mode, allocate and initialize a key list if
+ * not already done. Then, use the list in inverse
+ * order, discarding keys once used. Keep the latest
+ * key around until the next one, so clients can use
+ * client/server packets to compute propagation delay.
+ * Note we have to wait until the receive side of the
+ * socket is bound and the server address confirmed.
+ */
+ if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0 &&
+ ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0)
+ peer->keyid = 0;
+ else {
+ if (peer->keylist == 0) {
+ make_keylist(peer);
+ } else {
+ authtrust(peer->keylist[peer->keynumber], 0);
+ if (peer->keynumber == 0)
+ make_keylist(peer);
+ else {
+ peer->keynumber--;
+ xkeyid = peer->keylist[peer->keynumber];
+ if (!authistrusted(xkeyid))
+ make_keylist(peer);
+ }
+ }
+ peer->keyid = peer->keylist[peer->keynumber];
+ xpkt.keyid1 = htonl(2 * sizeof(u_int32));
+ xpkt.keyid2 = htonl(sys_private);
+ sendlen += 2 * sizeof(u_int32);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MD5 */
+ xkeyid = peer->keyid;
+ get_systime(&peer->xmt);
+ L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
+ HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
+ sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ get_systime(&xmt_tx);
+ sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, find_rtt ? any_interface :
+ peer->dstadr,
+ ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
+ ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -7,
+ &xpkt, sendlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
+ * the latest two samples.
+ */
+ L_SUB(&xmt_tx, &peer->xmt);
+ L_ADD(&xmt_tx, &sys_authdelay);
+ sys_authdly[1] = sys_authdly[0];
+ sys_authdly[0] = xmt_tx.l_uf;
+ if (sys_authdly[0] < sys_authdly[1])
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[0];
+ else
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[1];
+ peer->sent++;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
+ peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Transmit non-authenticated packet.
+ */
+ get_systime(&(peer->xmt));
+ HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
+ sendpkt(&(peer->srcadr), find_rtt ? any_interface :
+ peer->dstadr,
+ ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
+ ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -8,
+ &xpkt, sendlen);
+ peer->sent++;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
+ peer->hmode);
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * fast_xmit - Send packet for nonpersistent association.
+ */
+static void
+fast_xmit(
+ struct recvbuf *rbufp, /* receive packet pointer */
+ int xmode, /* transmit mode */
+ u_long xkeyid /* transmit key ID */
+ )
+{
+ struct pkt xpkt;
+ struct pkt *rpkt;
+ int sendlen;
+ l_fp xmt_ts;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize transmit packet header fields in the receive
+ * buffer provided. We leave some fields intact as received.
+ */
+ rpkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
+ xpkt.li_vn_mode = PKT_LI_VN_MODE(sys_leap,
+ PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode), xmode);
+ xpkt.stratum = STRATUM_TO_PKT(sys_stratum);
+ xpkt.ppoll = rpkt->ppoll;
+ xpkt.precision = sys_precision;
+ xpkt.rootdelay = HTONS_FP(DTOFP(sys_rootdelay));
+ xpkt.rootdispersion = HTONS_FP(DTOUFP(sys_rootdispersion +
+ LOGTOD(sys_precision)));
+ xpkt.refid = sys_refid;
+ HTONL_FP(&sys_reftime, &xpkt.reftime);
+ xpkt.org = rpkt->xmt;
+ HTONL_FP(&rbufp->recv_time, &xpkt.rec);
+ sendlen = LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
+ if (rbufp->recv_length > sendlen) {
+ l_fp xmt_tx;
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit encrypted packet compensated for the
+ * encryption delay.
+ */
+ if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
+ xpkt.keyid1 = htonl(2 * sizeof(u_int32));
+ xpkt.keyid2 = htonl(sys_private);
+ sendlen += 2 * sizeof(u_int32);
+ }
+ get_systime(&xmt_ts);
+ L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay);
+ HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
+ sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
+ get_systime(&xmt_tx);
+ sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -9, &xpkt,
+ sendlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
+ * the latest two samples.
+ */
+ L_SUB(&xmt_tx, &xmt_ts);
+ L_ADD(&xmt_tx, &sys_authdelay);
+ sys_authdly[1] = sys_authdly[0];
+ sys_authdly[0] = xmt_tx.l_uf;
+ if (sys_authdly[0] < sys_authdly[1])
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[0];
+ else
+ sys_authdelay.l_uf = sys_authdly[1];
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
+ xmode, xkeyid);
+#endif
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit non-authenticated packet.
+ */
+ get_systime(&xmt_ts);
+ HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
+ sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -10, &xpkt,
+ sendlen);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf("transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
+ xmode);
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef MD5
+/*
+ * Compute key list
+ */
+static void
+make_keylist(
+ struct peer *peer
+ )
+{
+ int i;
+ u_long keyid;
+ u_long ltemp;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate the key list if necessary.
+ */
+ if (peer->keylist == 0)
+ peer->keylist = (u_long *)emalloc(sizeof(u_long) *
+ NTP_MAXSESSION);
+
+ /*
+ * Generate an initial key ID which is unique and greater than
+ * NTP_MAXKEY.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ keyid = (u_long)RANDOM & 0xffffffff;
+ if (keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY)
+ continue;
+ if (authhavekey(keyid))
+ continue;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate up to NTP_MAXSESSION session keys. Stop if the
+ * next one would not be unique or not a session key ID or if
+ * it would expire before the next poll.
+ */
+ ltemp = sys_automax;
+ for (i = 0; i < NTP_MAXSESSION; i++) {
+ peer->keylist[i] = keyid;
+ peer->keynumber = i;
+ keyid = session_key(
+ ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags &
+ FLAG_MCAST2)) ?
+ ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr):
+ ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr),
+ keyid, ltemp);
+ ltemp -= 1 << peer->hpoll;
+ if (auth_havekey(keyid) || keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY ||
+ ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1)))
+ break;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MD5 */
+
+/*
+ * Find the precision of this particular machine
+ */
+#define DUSECS 1000000 /* us in a s */
+#define HUSECS (1 << 20) /* approx DUSECS for shifting etc */
+#define MINSTEP 5 /* minimum clock increment (us) */
+#define MAXSTEP 20000 /* maximum clock increment (us) */
+#define MINLOOPS 5 /* minimum number of step samples */
+
+/*
+ * This routine calculates the differences between successive calls to
+ * gettimeofday(). If a difference is less than zero, the us field
+ * has rolled over to the next second, so we add a second in us. If
+ * the difference is greater than zero and less than MINSTEP, the
+ * clock has been advanced by a small amount to avoid standing still.
+ * If the clock has advanced by a greater amount, then a timer interrupt
+ * has occurred and this amount represents the precision of the clock.
+ * In order to guard against spurious values, which could occur if we
+ * happen to hit a fat interrupt, we do this for MINLOOPS times and
+ * keep the minimum value obtained.
+ */
+int
+default_get_precision(void)
+{
+ struct timeval tp;
+#if !defined(SYS_WINNT) && !defined(VMS) && !defined(_SEQUENT_)
+ struct timezone tzp;
+#elif defined(VMS) || defined(_SEQUENT_)
+ struct timezone {
+ int tz_minuteswest;
+ int tz_dsttime;
+ } tzp;
+#endif /* defined(VMS) || defined(_SEQUENT_) */
+ long last;
+ int i;
+ long diff;
+ long val;
+ long usec;
+#ifdef HAVE_GETCLOCK
+ struct timespec ts;
+#endif
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ >= 3
+ u_long freq;
+ int j;
+
+ /* Try to see if we can find the frequency of of the counter
+ * which drives our timekeeping
+ */
+ j = sizeof freq;
+ i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency",
+ &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ if (i)
+ i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq",
+ &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ if (i)
+ i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq",
+ &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ if (i)
+ i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq",
+ &freq, &j , 0, 0);
+ if (!i) {
+ for (i = 1; freq ; i--)
+ freq >>= 1;
+ return (i);
+ }
+#endif
+ usec = 0;
+ val = MAXSTEP;
+#ifdef HAVE_GETCLOCK
+ (void) getclock(TIMEOFDAY, &ts);
+ tp.tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
+ tp.tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
+#else /* not HAVE_GETCLOCK */
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tp, &tzp);
+#endif /* not HAVE_GETCLOCK */
+ last = tp.tv_usec;
+ for (i = 0; i < MINLOOPS && usec < HUSECS;) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GETCLOCK
+ (void) getclock(TIMEOFDAY, &ts);
+ tp.tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
+ tp.tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
+#else /* not HAVE_GETCLOCK */
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tp, &tzp);
+#endif /* not HAVE_GETCLOCK */
+ diff = tp.tv_usec - last;
+ last = tp.tv_usec;
+ if (diff < 0)
+ diff += DUSECS;
+ usec += diff;
+ if (diff > MINSTEP) {
+ i++;
+ if (diff < val)
+ val = diff;
+ }
+ }
+ NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO) /* conditional if clause for conditional syslog */
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "precision = %ld usec", val);
+ if (usec >= HUSECS)
+ val = MINSTEP; /* val <= MINSTEP; fast machine */
+ diff = HUSECS;
+ for (i = 0; diff > val; i--)
+ diff >>= 1;
+ return (i);
+}
+
+/*
+ * init_proto - initialize the protocol module's data
+ */
+void
+init_proto(void)
+{
+ l_fp dummy;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill in the sys_* stuff. Default is don't listen to
+ * broadcasting, authenticate.
+ */
+ sys_leap = LEAP_NOTINSYNC;
+ sys_stratum = STRATUM_UNSPEC;
+ sys_precision = (s_char)default_get_precision();
+ sys_rootdelay = 0;
+ sys_rootdispersion = 0;
+ sys_refid = 0;
+ L_CLR(&sys_reftime);
+ sys_peer = 0;
+ get_systime(&dummy);
+ sys_bclient = 0;
+ sys_bdelay = DEFBROADDELAY;
+#if defined(DES) || defined(MD5)
+ sys_authenticate = 1;
+#else
+ sys_authenticate = 0;
+#endif
+ L_CLR(&sys_authdelay);
+ sys_authdly[0] = sys_authdly[1] = 0;
+ sys_stattime = 0;
+ sys_badstratum = 0;
+ sys_oldversionpkt = 0;
+ sys_newversionpkt = 0;
+ sys_badlength = 0;
+ sys_unknownversion = 0;
+ sys_processed = 0;
+ sys_badauth = 0;
+ sys_manycastserver = 0;
+ sys_automax = 1 << NTP_AUTOMAX;
+
+ /*
+ * Default these to enable
+ */
+ ntp_enable = 1;
+#ifndef KERNEL_FLL_BUG
+ kern_enable = 1;
+#endif
+ msyslog(LOG_DEBUG, "kern_enable is %d", kern_enable);
+ stats_control = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Some system clocks should only be adjusted in 10ms increments.
+ */
+#if defined RELIANTUNIX_CLOCK
+ systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */
+#elif defined SCO5_CLOCK
+ if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre- SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */
+ systime_10ms_ticks = 1;
+#endif
+ if (systime_10ms_ticks)
+ msyslog(LOG_INFO, "using 10ms tick adjustments");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * proto_config - configure the protocol module
+ */
+void
+proto_config(
+ int item,
+ u_long value,
+ double dvalue
+ )
+{
+ /*
+ * Figure out what he wants to change, then do it
+ */
+ switch (item) {
+ case PROTO_KERNEL:
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off kernel discipline
+ */
+ kern_enable = (int)value;
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_NTP:
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off clock discipline
+ */
+ ntp_enable = (int)value;
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_MONITOR:
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off monitoring
+ */
+ if (value)
+ mon_start(MON_ON);
+ else
+ mon_stop(MON_ON);
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_FILEGEN:
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off statistics
+ */
+ stats_control = (int)value;
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_BROADCLIENT:
+ /*
+ * Turn on/off facility to listen to broadcasts
+ */
+ sys_bclient = (int)value;
+ if (value)
+ io_setbclient();
+ else
+ io_unsetbclient();
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD:
+ /*
+ * Add muliticast group address
+ */
+ io_multicast_add(value);
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL:
+ /*
+ * Delete multicast group address
+ */
+ io_multicast_del(value);
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_BROADDELAY:
+ /*
+ * Set default broadcast delay
+ */
+ sys_bdelay = dvalue;
+ break;
+
+ case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE:
+ /*
+ * Specify the use of authenticated data
+ */
+ sys_authenticate = (int)value;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Log this error
+ */
+ msyslog(LOG_ERR, "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
+ item, value);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * proto_clr_stats - clear protocol stat counters
+ */
+void
+proto_clr_stats(void)
+{
+ sys_badstratum = 0;
+ sys_oldversionpkt = 0;
+ sys_newversionpkt = 0;
+ sys_unknownversion = 0;
+ sys_badlength = 0;
+ sys_processed = 0;
+ sys_badauth = 0;
+ sys_stattime = current_time;
+ sys_limitrejected = 0;
+}