diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/cmp/cmp_client.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/cmp/cmp_client.c | 923 |
1 files changed, 923 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_client.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_client.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8950091b93ee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,923 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2007-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019 + * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "cmp_local.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "e_os.h" /* ossl_sleep() */ + +/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/cmp.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#include <openssl/cmp_util.h> + +#define IS_CREP(t) ((t) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP || (t) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP \ + || (t) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP) + +/*- + * Evaluate whether there's an exception (violating the standard) configured for + * handling negative responses without protection or with invalid protection. + * Returns 1 on acceptance, 0 on rejection, or -1 on (internal) error. + */ +static int unprotected_exception(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, + const OSSL_CMP_MSG *rep, + int invalid_protection, + int expected_type /* ignored here */) +{ + int rcvd_type = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(rep /* may be NULL */); + const char *msg_type = NULL; + + if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && rep != NULL)) + return -1; + + if (!ctx->unprotectedErrors) + return 0; + + switch (rcvd_type) { + case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR: + msg_type = "error response"; + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP: + { + OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si = + ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_pkisi(rep->body->value.rp, + OSSL_CMP_REVREQSID); + + if (si == NULL) + return -1; + if (ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(si) == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection) + msg_type = "revocation response message with rejection status"; + break; + } + case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF: + msg_type = "PKI Confirmation message"; + break; + default: + if (IS_CREP(rcvd_type)) { + int any_rid = OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE; + OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *crepmsg = rep->body->value.ip; + OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = + ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(crepmsg, any_rid); + + if (sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_num(crepmsg->response) > 1) + return -1; + if (crep == NULL) + return -1; + if (ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(crep->status) + == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection) + msg_type = "CertRepMessage with rejection status"; + } + } + if (msg_type == NULL) + return 0; + ossl_cmp_log2(WARN, ctx, "ignoring %s protection of %s", + invalid_protection ? "invalid" : "missing", msg_type); + return 1; +} + +/* Save error info from PKIStatusInfo field of a certresponse into ctx */ +static int save_statusInfo(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si) +{ + int i; + OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *ss; + + if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL)) + return 0; + + ctx->status = ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(si); + if (ctx->status < OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted) + return 0; + + ctx->failInfoCode = ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkifailureinfo(si); + + if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_statusString(ctx, sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) + || (ctx->statusString == NULL)) + return 0; + + ss = si->statusString; /* may be NULL */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(ss); i++) { + ASN1_UTF8STRING *str = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(ss, i); + ASN1_UTF8STRING *dup = ASN1_STRING_dup(str); + + if (dup == NULL || !sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push(ctx->statusString, dup)) { + ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(dup); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/*- + * Perform the generic aspects of sending a request and receiving a response. + * Returns 1 on success and provides the received PKIMESSAGE in *rep. + * Returns 0 on error. + * Regardless of success, caller is responsible for freeing *rep (unless NULL). + */ +static int send_receive_check(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *req, + OSSL_CMP_MSG **rep, int expected_type) +{ + int begin_transaction = + expected_type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP + && expected_type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF; + const char *req_type_str = + ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(req)); + const char *expected_type_str = ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(expected_type); + int bak_msg_timeout = ctx->msg_timeout; + int bt; + time_t now = time(NULL); + int time_left; + OSSL_CMP_transfer_cb_t transfer_cb = ctx->transfer_cb; + + if (transfer_cb == NULL) + transfer_cb = OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform; + *rep = NULL; + + if (ctx->total_timeout != 0 /* not waiting indefinitely */) { + if (begin_transaction) + ctx->end_time = now + ctx->total_timeout; + if (now >= ctx->end_time) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_TOTAL_TIMEOUT); + return 0; + } + if (!ossl_assert(ctx->end_time - now < INT_MAX)) { + /* actually cannot happen due to assignment in initial_certreq() */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + time_left = (int)(ctx->end_time - now); + if (ctx->msg_timeout == 0 || time_left < ctx->msg_timeout) + ctx->msg_timeout = time_left; + } + + /* should print error queue since transfer_cb may call ERR_clear_error() */ + OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); + + ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "sending %s", req_type_str); + + *rep = (*transfer_cb)(ctx, req); + ctx->msg_timeout = bak_msg_timeout; + + if (*rep == NULL) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, + ctx->total_timeout != 0 && time(NULL) >= ctx->end_time ? + CMP_R_TOTAL_TIMEOUT : CMP_R_TRANSFER_ERROR, + "request sent: %s, expected response: %s", + req_type_str, expected_type_str); + return 0; + } + + bt = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(*rep); + /* + * The body type in the 'bt' variable is not yet verified. + * Still we use this preliminary value already for a progress report because + * the following msg verification may also produce log entries and may fail. + */ + ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "received %s", ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(bt)); + + /* copy received extraCerts to ctx->extraCertsIn so they can be retrieved */ + if (bt != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP && bt != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF + && !ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_extraCertsIn(ctx, (*rep)->extraCerts)) + return 0; + + if (!ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(ctx, *rep, unprotected_exception, + expected_type)) + return 0; + + if (bt == expected_type + /* as an answer to polling, there could be IP/CP/KUP: */ + || (IS_CREP(bt) && expected_type == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP)) + return 1; + + /* received message type is not one of the expected ones (e.g., error) */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, bt == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR ? CMP_R_RECEIVED_ERROR : + CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY); /* in next line for mkerr.pl */ + + if (bt != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR) { + ERR_add_error_data(3, "message type is '", + ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(bt), "'"); + } else { + OSSL_CMP_ERRORMSGCONTENT *emc = (*rep)->body->value.error; + OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si = emc->pKIStatusInfo; + char buf[OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN]; + + if (save_statusInfo(ctx, si) + && OSSL_CMP_CTX_snprint_PKIStatus(ctx, buf, + sizeof(buf)) != NULL) + ERR_add_error_data(1, buf); + if (emc->errorCode != NULL + && BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "; errorCode: %08lX", + ASN1_INTEGER_get(emc->errorCode)) > 0) + ERR_add_error_data(1, buf); + if (emc->errorDetails != NULL) { + char *text = ossl_sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING2text(emc->errorDetails, ", ", + OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN - 1); + + if (text != NULL && *text != '\0') + ERR_add_error_data(2, "; errorDetails: ", text); + OPENSSL_free(text); + } + if (ctx->status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKISTATUS); + if (ctx->status == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting) + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/*- + * When a 'waiting' PKIStatus has been received, this function is used to + * poll, which should yield a pollRep or finally a CertRepMessage in ip/cp/kup. + * On receiving a pollRep, which includes a checkAfter value, it return this + * value if sleep == 0, else it sleeps as long as indicated and retries. + * + * A transaction timeout is enabled if ctx->total_timeout is != 0. + * In this case polling will continue until the timeout is reached and then + * polling is done a last time even if this is before the "checkAfter" time. + * + * Returns -1 on receiving pollRep if sleep == 0, setting the checkAfter value. + * Returns 1 on success and provides the received PKIMESSAGE in *rep. + * In this case the caller is responsible for freeing *rep. + * Returns 0 on error (which includes the case that timeout has been reached). + */ +static int poll_for_response(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int sleep, int rid, + OSSL_CMP_MSG **rep, int *checkAfter) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *preq = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_MSG *prep = NULL; + + ossl_cmp_info(ctx, + "received 'waiting' PKIStatus, starting to poll for response"); + *rep = NULL; + for (;;) { + if ((preq = ossl_cmp_pollReq_new(ctx, rid)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!send_receive_check(ctx, preq, &prep, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP)) + goto err; + + /* handle potential pollRep */ + if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(prep) == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP) { + OSSL_CMP_POLLREPCONTENT *prc = prep->body->value.pollRep; + OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *pollRep = NULL; + int64_t check_after; + char str[OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN]; + int len; + + if (sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_num(prc) > 1) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MULTIPLE_RESPONSES_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto err; + } + pollRep = ossl_cmp_pollrepcontent_get0_pollrep(prc, rid); + if (pollRep == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&check_after, pollRep->checkAfter)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_BAD_CHECKAFTER_IN_POLLREP); + goto err; + } + if (check_after < 0 || (uint64_t)check_after + > (sleep ? ULONG_MAX / 1000 : INT_MAX)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CHECKAFTER_OUT_OF_RANGE); + if (BIO_snprintf(str, OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN, "value = %jd", + check_after) >= 0) + ERR_add_error_data(1, str); + goto err; + } + + if (pollRep->reason == NULL + || (len = BIO_snprintf(str, OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN, + " with reason = '")) < 0) { + *str = '\0'; + } else { + char *text = ossl_sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING2text(pollRep->reason, ", ", + sizeof(str) - len - 2); + + if (text == NULL + || BIO_snprintf(str + len, sizeof(str) - len, + "%s'", text) < 0) + *str = '\0'; + OPENSSL_free(text); + } + ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, + "received polling response%s; checkAfter = %ld seconds", + str, check_after); + + if (ctx->total_timeout != 0) { /* timeout is not infinite */ + const int exp = 5; /* expected max time per msg round trip */ + int64_t time_left = (int64_t)(ctx->end_time - exp - time(NULL)); + + if (time_left <= 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_TOTAL_TIMEOUT); + goto err; + } + if (time_left < check_after) + check_after = time_left; + /* poll one last time just when timeout was reached */ + } + + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(preq); + preq = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(prep); + prep = NULL; + if (sleep) { + ossl_sleep((unsigned long)(1000 * check_after)); + } else { + if (checkAfter != NULL) + *checkAfter = (int)check_after; + return -1; /* exits the loop */ + } + } else { + ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "received ip/cp/kup after polling"); + /* any other body type has been rejected by send_receive_check() */ + break; + } + } + if (prep == NULL) + goto err; + + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(preq); + *rep = prep; + + return 1; + err: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(preq); + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(prep); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Send certConf for IR, CR or KUR sequences and check response, + * not modifying ctx->status during the certConf exchange + */ +int ossl_cmp_exchange_certConf(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int certReqId, + int fail_info, const char *txt) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *certConf; + OSSL_CMP_MSG *PKIconf = NULL; + int res = 0; + + /* OSSL_CMP_certConf_new() also checks if all necessary options are set */ + certConf = ossl_cmp_certConf_new(ctx, certReqId, fail_info, txt); + if (certConf == NULL) + goto err; + + res = send_receive_check(ctx, certConf, &PKIconf, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF); + + err: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(certConf); + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(PKIconf); + return res; +} + +/* Send given error and check response */ +int ossl_cmp_exchange_error(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int status, int fail_info, + const char *txt, int errorCode, const char *details) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *error = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_MSG *PKIconf = NULL; + int res = 0; + + /* not overwriting ctx->status on error exchange */ + if ((si = OSSL_CMP_STATUSINFO_new(status, fail_info, txt)) == NULL) + goto err; + /* ossl_cmp_error_new() also checks if all necessary options are set */ + if ((error = ossl_cmp_error_new(ctx, si, errorCode, details, 0)) == NULL) + goto err; + + res = send_receive_check(ctx, error, &PKIconf, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF); + + err: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(error); + OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(si); + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(PKIconf); + return res; +} + +/*- + * Retrieve a copy of the certificate, if any, from the given CertResponse. + * Take into account PKIStatusInfo of CertResponse in ctx, report it on error. + * Returns NULL if not found or on error. + */ +static X509 *get1_cert_status(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype, + OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep) +{ + char buf[OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN]; + X509 *crt = NULL; + + if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && crep != NULL)) + return NULL; + + switch (ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(crep->status)) { + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting: + ossl_cmp_err(ctx, + "received \"waiting\" status for cert when actually aiming to extract cert"); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ENCOUNTERED_WAITING); + goto err; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_grantedWithMods: + ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "received \"grantedWithMods\" for certificate"); + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted: + break; + /* get all information in case of a rejection before going to error */ + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection: + ossl_cmp_err(ctx, "received \"rejection\" status rather than cert"); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_REJECTED_BY_SERVER); + goto err; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_revocationWarning: + ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, + "received \"revocationWarning\" - a revocation of the cert is imminent"); + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_revocationNotification: + ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, + "received \"revocationNotification\" - a revocation of the cert has occurred"); + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_keyUpdateWarning: + if (bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ENCOUNTERED_KEYUPDATEWARNING); + goto err; + } + break; + default: + ossl_cmp_log1(ERROR, ctx, + "received unsupported PKIStatus %d for certificate", + ctx->status); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_PKISTATUS); + goto err; + } + crt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(ctx, crep); + if (crt == NULL) /* according to PKIStatus, we can expect a cert */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); + + return crt; + + err: + if (OSSL_CMP_CTX_snprint_PKIStatus(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL) + ERR_add_error_data(1, buf); + return NULL; +} + +/*- + * Callback fn validating that the new certificate can be verified, using + * ctx->certConf_cb_arg, which has been initialized using opt_out_trusted, and + * ctx->untrusted, which at this point already contains msg->extraCerts. + * Returns 0 on acceptance, else a bit field reflecting PKIFailureInfo. + * Quoting from RFC 4210 section 5.1. Overall PKI Message: + * The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to + * the recipient. For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to + * present an end entity with certificates that it needs to verify its + * own new certificate (if, for example, the CA that issued the end + * entity's certificate is not a root CA for the end entity). Note that + * this field does not necessarily contain a certification path; the + * recipient may have to sort, select from, or otherwise process the + * extra certificates in order to use them. + * Note: While often handy, there is no hard requirement by CMP that + * an EE must be able to validate the certificates it gets enrolled. + */ +int OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int fail_info, + const char **text) +{ + X509_STORE *out_trusted = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_certConf_cb_arg(ctx); + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + (void)text; /* make (artificial) use of var to prevent compiler warning */ + + if (fail_info != 0) /* accept any error flagged by CMP core library */ + return fail_info; + + if (out_trusted == NULL) { + ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "trying to build chain for newly enrolled cert"); + chain = X509_build_chain(cert, ctx->untrusted, out_trusted, + 0, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq); + } else { + X509_STORE_CTX *csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq); + + ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating newly enrolled cert"); + if (csc == NULL) + goto err; + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, out_trusted, cert, ctx->untrusted)) + goto err; + /* disable any cert status/revocation checking etc. */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(csc), + ~(X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME + | X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME + | X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN + | X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)); + if (X509_verify_cert(csc) <= 0) + goto err; + + if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&chain, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(csc), + X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP + | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS)) { + sk_X509_free(chain); + chain = NULL; + } + err: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); + } + + if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) + X509_free(sk_X509_shift(chain)); /* remove leaf (EE) cert */ + if (out_trusted != NULL) { + if (chain == NULL) { + ossl_cmp_err(ctx, "failed to validate newly enrolled cert"); + fail_info = 1 << OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_incorrectData; + } else { + ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, + "success validating newly enrolled cert"); + } + } else if (chain == NULL) { + ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "could not build approximate chain for newly enrolled cert, resorting to received extraCerts"); + chain = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get1_extraCertsIn(ctx); + } else { + ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, + "success building approximate chain for newly enrolled cert"); + } + (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_newChain(ctx, chain); + sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); + + return fail_info; +} + +/*- + * Perform the generic handling of certificate responses for IR/CR/KUR/P10CR. + * |rid| must be OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE if not available, namely for p10cr + * Returns -1 on receiving pollRep if sleep == 0, setting the checkAfter value. + * Returns 1 on success and provides the received PKIMESSAGE in *resp. + * Returns 0 on error (which includes the case that timeout has been reached). + * Regardless of success, caller is responsible for freeing *resp (unless NULL). + */ +static int cert_response(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int sleep, int rid, + OSSL_CMP_MSG **resp, int *checkAfter, + int req_type, int expected_type) +{ + EVP_PKEY *rkey = ossl_cmp_ctx_get0_newPubkey(ctx); + int fail_info = 0; /* no failure */ + const char *txt = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *crepmsg; + OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep; + OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb_t cb; + X509 *cert; + char *subj = NULL; + int ret = 1; + + if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL)) + return 0; + + retry: + crepmsg = (*resp)->body->value.ip; /* same for cp and kup */ + if (sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_num(crepmsg->response) > 1) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MULTIPLE_RESPONSES_NOT_SUPPORTED); + return 0; + } + crep = ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(crepmsg, rid); + if (crep == NULL) + return 0; + if (!save_statusInfo(ctx, crep->status)) + return 0; + if (rid == OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE) { /* used for OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR */ + rid = ossl_cmp_asn1_get_int(crep->certReqId); + if (rid < OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID); + return 0; + } + } + + if (ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(crep->status) == OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting) { + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(*resp); + *resp = NULL; + if ((ret = poll_for_response(ctx, sleep, rid, resp, checkAfter)) != 0) { + if (ret == -1) /* at this point implies sleep == 0 */ + return ret; /* waiting */ + goto retry; /* got ip/cp/kup, which may still indicate 'waiting' */ + } else { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POLLING_FAILED); + return 0; + } + } + + cert = get1_cert_status(ctx, (*resp)->body->type, crep); + if (cert == NULL) { + ERR_add_error_data(1, "; cannot extract certificate from response"); + return 0; + } + if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_newCert(ctx, cert)) { + X509_free(cert); + return 0; + } + + /* + * if the CMP server returned certificates in the caPubs field, copy them + * to the context so that they can be retrieved if necessary + */ + if (crepmsg->caPubs != NULL + && !ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_caPubs(ctx, crepmsg->caPubs)) + return 0; + + subj = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0); + if (rkey != NULL + /* X509_check_private_key() also works if rkey is just public key */ + && !(X509_check_private_key(ctx->newCert, rkey))) { + fail_info = 1 << OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_incorrectData; + txt = "public key in new certificate does not match our enrollment key"; + /*- + * not calling (void)ossl_cmp_exchange_error(ctx, + * OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection, fail_info, txt) + * not throwing CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_ACCEPTED with txt + * not returning 0 + * since we better leave this for the certConf_cb to decide + */ + } + + /* + * Execute the certification checking callback function, + * which can determine whether to accept a newly enrolled certificate. + * It may overrule the pre-decision reflected in 'fail_info' and '*txt'. + */ + cb = ctx->certConf_cb != NULL ? ctx->certConf_cb : OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb; + if ((fail_info = cb(ctx, ctx->newCert, fail_info, &txt)) != 0 + && txt == NULL) + txt = "CMP client did not accept it"; + if (fail_info != 0) /* immediately log error before any certConf exchange */ + ossl_cmp_log1(ERROR, ctx, + "rejecting newly enrolled cert with subject: %s", subj); + if (!ctx->disableConfirm + && !ossl_cmp_hdr_has_implicitConfirm((*resp)->header)) { + if (!ossl_cmp_exchange_certConf(ctx, rid, fail_info, txt)) + ret = 0; + } + + /* not throwing failure earlier as transfer_cb may call ERR_clear_error() */ + if (fail_info != 0) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_ACCEPTED, + "rejecting newly enrolled cert with subject: %s; %s", + subj, txt); + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection; + ret = 0; + } + OPENSSL_free(subj); + return ret; +} + +static int initial_certreq(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, + int req_type, const OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm, + OSSL_CMP_MSG **p_rep, int rep_type) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *req; + int res; + + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_request; + if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_newCert(ctx, NULL)) + return 0; + + /* also checks if all necessary options are set */ + if ((req = ossl_cmp_certreq_new(ctx, req_type, crm)) == NULL) + return 0; + + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_trans; + res = send_receive_check(ctx, req, p_rep, rep_type); + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(req); + return res; +} + +int OSSL_CMP_try_certreq(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int req_type, + const OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm, int *checkAfter) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *rep = NULL; + int is_p10 = req_type == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR; + int rid = is_p10 ? OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE : OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID; + int rep_type = is_p10 ? OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP : req_type + 1; + int res = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting) { /* not polling already */ + if (!initial_certreq(ctx, req_type, crm, &rep, rep_type)) + goto err; + } else { + if (req_type < 0) + return ossl_cmp_exchange_error(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection, + 0, "polling aborted", + 0 /* errorCode */, "by application"); + res = poll_for_response(ctx, 0 /* no sleep */, rid, &rep, checkAfter); + if (res <= 0) /* waiting or error */ + return res; + } + res = cert_response(ctx, 0 /* no sleep */, rid, &rep, checkAfter, + req_type, rep_type); + + err: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(rep); + return res; +} + +/*- + * Do the full sequence CR/IR/KUR/P10CR, CP/IP/KUP/CP, + * certConf, PKIconf, and polling if required. + * Will sleep as long as indicated by the server (according to checkAfter). + * All enrollment options need to be present in the context. + * Returns pointer to received certificate, or NULL if none was received. + */ +X509 *OSSL_CMP_exec_certreq(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int req_type, + const OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm) +{ + + OSSL_CMP_MSG *rep = NULL; + int is_p10 = req_type == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR; + int rid = is_p10 ? OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID_NONE : OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID; + int rep_type = is_p10 ? OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP : req_type + 1; + X509 *result = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); + return NULL; + } + + if (!initial_certreq(ctx, req_type, crm, &rep, rep_type)) + goto err; + + if (cert_response(ctx, 1 /* sleep */, rid, &rep, NULL, req_type, rep_type) + <= 0) + goto err; + + result = ctx->newCert; + err: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(rep); + return result; +} + +int OSSL_CMP_exec_RR_ses(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *rr = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_MSG *rp = NULL; + const int num_RevDetails = 1; + const int rsid = OSSL_CMP_REVREQSID; + OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep = NULL; + OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si = NULL; + char buf[OSSL_CMP_PKISI_BUFLEN]; + int ret = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_request; + if (ctx->oldCert == NULL && ctx->p10CSR == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_REFERENCE_CERT); + return 0; + } + + /* OSSL_CMP_rr_new() also checks if all necessary options are set */ + if ((rr = ossl_cmp_rr_new(ctx)) == NULL) + goto end; + + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_trans; + if (!send_receive_check(ctx, rr, &rp, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP)) + goto end; + + rrep = rp->body->value.rp; +#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + if (sk_OSSL_CMP_PKISI_num(rrep->status) != num_RevDetails) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_RP_COMPONENT_COUNT); + goto end; + } +#else + if (sk_OSSL_CMP_PKISI_num(rrep->status) < 1) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_RP_COMPONENT_COUNT); + goto end; + } +#endif + + /* evaluate PKIStatus field */ + si = ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_pkisi(rrep, rsid); + if (!save_statusInfo(ctx, si)) + goto err; + switch (ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(si)) { + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted: + ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "revocation accepted (PKIStatus=accepted)"); + ret = 1; + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_grantedWithMods: + ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "revocation accepted (PKIStatus=grantedWithMods)"); + ret = 1; + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection: + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_REJECTED_BY_SERVER); + goto err; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_revocationWarning: + ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "revocation accepted (PKIStatus=revocationWarning)"); + ret = 1; + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_revocationNotification: + /* interpretation as warning or error depends on CA */ + ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, + "revocation accepted (PKIStatus=revocationNotification)"); + ret = 1; + break; + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting: + case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_keyUpdateWarning: + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKISTATUS); + goto err; + default: + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_PKISTATUS); + goto err; + } + + /* check any present CertId in optional revCerts field */ + if (sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_num(rrep->revCerts) >= 1) { + OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid; + OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl = + sk_OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_value(rr->body->value.rr, rsid)->certDetails; + const X509_NAME *issuer = OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_get0_issuer(tmpl); + const ASN1_INTEGER *serial = OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_get0_serialNumber(tmpl); + + if (sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_num(rrep->revCerts) != num_RevDetails) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_RP_COMPONENT_COUNT); + ret = 0; + goto err; + } + if ((cid = ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_CertId(rrep, rsid)) == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_CERTID); + ret = 0; + goto err; + } + if (X509_NAME_cmp(issuer, OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_get0_issuer(cid)) != 0) { +#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_CERTID_IN_RP); + ret = 0; + goto err; +#endif + } + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(serial, + OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_get0_serialNumber(cid)) != 0) { +#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_SERIAL_IN_RP); + ret = 0; + goto err; +#endif + } + } + + /* check number of any optionally present crls */ + if (rrep->crls != NULL && sk_X509_CRL_num(rrep->crls) != num_RevDetails) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_RP_COMPONENT_COUNT); + ret = 0; + goto err; + } + + err: + if (ret == 0 + && OSSL_CMP_CTX_snprint_PKIStatus(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL) + ERR_add_error_data(1, buf); + + end: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(rr); + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(rp); + return ret; +} + +STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *OSSL_CMP_exec_GENM_ses(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) +{ + OSSL_CMP_MSG *genm; + OSSL_CMP_MSG *genp = NULL; + STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS); + return NULL; + } + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_request; + + if ((genm = ossl_cmp_genm_new(ctx)) == NULL) + goto err; + + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_trans; + if (!send_receive_check(ctx, genm, &genp, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP)) + goto err; + ctx->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted; + + itavs = genp->body->value.genp; + if (itavs == NULL) + itavs = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_new_null(); + /* received stack of itavs not to be freed with the genp */ + genp->body->value.genp = NULL; + + err: + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(genm); + OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(genp); + + return itavs; /* NULL indicates error case */ +} |