diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c | 233 |
1 files changed, 233 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c b/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..88a8480cf73a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +/*- + * Copyright 2007-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019 + * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + * + * CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb. + */ + + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> + +/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/crmf.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> + +#include "internal/sizes.h" + +#include "crmf_local.h" + +/*- + * creates and initializes OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER (section 4.4) + * |slen| SHOULD be at least 8 (16 is common) + * |owfnid| e.g., NID_sha256 + * |itercnt| MUST be >= 100 (e.g., 500) and <= OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT + * |macnid| e.g., NID_hmac_sha1 + * returns pointer to OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER on success, NULL on error + */ +OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, size_t slen, + int owfnid, size_t itercnt, + int macnid) +{ + OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + + if ((pbm = OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* + * salt contains a randomly generated value used in computing the key + * of the MAC process. The salt SHOULD be at least 8 octets (64 + * bits) long. + */ + if ((salt = OPENSSL_malloc(slen)) == NULL) + goto err; + if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, salt, slen, 0) <= 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM); + goto err; + } + if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pbm->salt, salt, (int)slen)) + goto err; + + /* + * owf identifies the hash algorithm and associated parameters used to + * compute the key used in the MAC process. All implementations MUST + * support SHA-1. + */ + if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pbm->owf, OBJ_nid2obj(owfnid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_SETTING_OWF_ALGOR_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * iterationCount identifies the number of times the hash is applied + * during the key computation process. The iterationCount MUST be a + * minimum of 100. Many people suggest using values as high as 1000 + * iterations as the minimum value. The trade off here is between + * protection of the password from attacks and the time spent by the + * server processing all of the different iterations in deriving + * passwords. Hashing is generally considered a cheap operation but + * this may not be true with all hash functions in the future. + */ + if (itercnt < 100) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_ITERATIONCOUNT_BELOW_100); + goto err; + } + if (itercnt > OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_BAD_PBM_ITERATIONCOUNT); + goto err; + } + + if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pbm->iterationCount, itercnt)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_CRMFERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC + * function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC]. + * All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11]. + */ + if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pbm->mac, OBJ_nid2obj(macnid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_SETTING_MAC_ALGOR_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(salt); + return pbm; + err: + OPENSSL_free(salt); + OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm); + return NULL; +} + +/*- + * calculates the PBM based on the settings of the given OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER + * |pbmp| identifies the algorithms, salt to use + * |msg| message to apply the PBM for + * |msglen| length of the message + * |sec| key to use + * |seclen| length of the key + * |out| pointer to the computed mac, will be set on success + * |outlen| if not NULL, will set variable to the length of the mac on success + * returns 1 on success, 0 on error + */ +int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, + const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen, + const unsigned char *sec, size_t seclen, + unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen) +{ + int mac_nid, hmac_md_nid = NID_undef; + char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + char hmac_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + EVP_MD *owf = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; + unsigned char basekey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int bklen = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; + int64_t iterations; + unsigned char *mac_res = 0; + int ok = 0; + + if (out == NULL || pbmp == NULL || pbmp->mac == NULL + || pbmp->mac->algorithm == NULL || msg == NULL || sec == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); + goto err; + } + if ((mac_res = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* + * owf identifies the hash algorithm and associated parameters used to + * compute the key used in the MAC process. All implementations MUST + * support SHA-1. + */ + OBJ_obj2txt(mdname, sizeof(mdname), pbmp->owf->algorithm, 0); + if ((owf = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + + if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* compute the basekey of the salted secret */ + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, owf, NULL)) + goto err; + /* first the secret */ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sec, seclen)) + goto err; + /* then the salt */ + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pbmp->salt->data, pbmp->salt->length)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, basekey, &bklen)) + goto err; + if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&iterations, pbmp->iterationCount) + || iterations < 100 /* min from RFC */ + || iterations > OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_BAD_PBM_ITERATIONCOUNT); + goto err; + } + + /* the first iteration was already done above */ + while (--iterations > 0) { + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, owf, NULL)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, basekey, bklen)) + goto err; + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, basekey, &bklen)) + goto err; + } + + /* + * mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC + * function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC]. + * All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11]. + */ + mac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(pbmp->mac->algorithm); + + if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, mac_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, NULL) + || OBJ_obj2txt(hmac_mdname, sizeof(hmac_mdname), + OBJ_nid2obj(hmac_md_nid), 0) <= 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_Q_mac(libctx, "HMAC", propq, hmac_mdname, NULL, basekey, bklen, + msg, msglen, mac_res, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, outlen) == NULL) + goto err; + + ok = 1; + + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(basekey, bklen); + EVP_MD_free(owf); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + + if (ok == 1) { + *out = mac_res; + return 1; + } + + OPENSSL_free(mac_res); + + if (pbmp != NULL && pbmp->mac != NULL) { + char buf[128]; + + if (OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), pbmp->mac->algorithm, 0)) + ERR_add_error_data(1, buf); + } + return 0; +} |