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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c66
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
index 06ae7f0b9e7d..ee9e827afd08 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.44 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.46 2014/12/23 22:42:48 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,12 +34,12 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
-#include "misc.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
const char *server_user)
{
FILE *f;
- char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
+#define RBUFLN 1024
+ char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
int fd;
struct stat st;
@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
return 0;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
- /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
- char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
+ /* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
+ char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
+ char *host, *user, *cp;
int negated;
for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -140,8 +142,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
- auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
- filename);
+ auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
+ "in %.100s.", filename);
continue;
}
/* Verify that host name matches. */
@@ -149,7 +151,8 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
!innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
continue;
- } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
+ } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
+ strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
continue; /* Different hostname. */
/* Verify that user name matches. */
@@ -208,7 +211,8 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
/* Switch to the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/*
- * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
+ * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
+ * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
* failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
* servers.
*/
@@ -223,27 +227,38 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
- /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
+ /*
+ * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
+ * are no system-wide files.
+ */
if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
- stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
+ stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
+ debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
return 0;
+ }
- /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
- if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
+ * shosts.equiv.
+ */
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__);
+ else {
if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
- auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
- hostname, ipaddr);
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+ "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
return 1;
}
if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
- auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
- hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+ "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
return 1;
}
}
+
/*
* Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
* not group or world writable.
@@ -290,20 +305,25 @@ auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostnam
auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
continue;
}
- /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
+ /*
+ * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
+ * and .shosts files.
+ */
if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
- auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
- rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
+ "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
continue;
}
/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
- if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+ if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr,
+ client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
- auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s",
- hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name);
+ auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
+ "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
+ client_user, pw->pw_name);
return 1;
}
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-25 12:08:14 +0000