diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c | 855 |
1 files changed, 833 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index 63fd1a6db492..c9c661b1ede9 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@ -1,25 +1,39 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -#include <stdio.h> +/* + * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + #include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +# include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/param_build.h> #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/refcount.h" #include "crypto/bn.h" -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> #include "crypto/evp.h" +#include "crypto/rsa.h" +#include "crypto/security_bits.h" #include "rsa_local.h" +static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx); + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE RSA *RSA_new(void) { - return RSA_new_method(NULL); + return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL); } const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) @@ -49,27 +63,39 @@ int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) { + return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL); +} +#endif + +RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) +{ + return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx); +} + +static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) +{ RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } + ret->libctx = libctx; ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } ret->engine = engine; @@ -79,19 +105,21 @@ RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) if (ret->engine) { ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); if (ret->meth == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); goto err; } } #endif ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { goto err; } +#endif if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); goto err; } @@ -117,11 +145,13 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r) if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) r->meth->finish(r); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); +#endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); @@ -133,11 +163,17 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r) BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); + +#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) + ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test); +#endif + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); - sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free); +#endif BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); - OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); OPENSSL_free(r); } @@ -153,6 +189,17 @@ int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; } +OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r) +{ + return r->libctx; +} + +void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) +{ + r->libctx = libctx; +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); @@ -162,19 +209,184 @@ void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); } +#endif + +/* + * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. + * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code + * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so + * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor + * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers + * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. + */ +static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; +static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); + +/* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ +static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ +static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ +static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ +static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ + +/* + * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. + */ +static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + return a * b / scale; +} + +/* + * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. + * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned + * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a + * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some + * algebraic simplifications. + */ +static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) +{ + uint64_t r = 0; + uint64_t b; + int s; + + for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { + r <<= 1; + b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; + if ((x >> s) >= b) { + x -= b << s; + r++; + } + } + return r * cbrt_scale; +} + +/* + * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. + * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. + * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so + * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be + * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. + */ +static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) +{ + uint32_t i, r = 0; + + /* + * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. + * + * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs + * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and + * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. + */ + while (v >= 2 * scale) { + v >>= 1; + r += scale; + } + for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { + v = mul2(v, v); + if (v >= 2 * scale) { + v >>= 1; + r += i; + } + } + r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; + return r; +} + +/* + * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC + * Modulus Lengths. + * + * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D: + * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe. + * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to + * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in + * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight + * bits". + * + * The formula is: + * + * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} + * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} + * The two cube roots are merged together here. + */ +uint16_t ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n) +{ + uint64_t x; + uint32_t lx; + uint16_t y, cap; + + /* + * Look for common values as listed in standards. + * These values are not exactly equal to the results from the formulae in + * the standards but are defined to be canonical. + */ + switch (n) { + case 2048: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ + return 112; + case 3072: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ + return 128; + case 4096: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ + return 152; + case 6144: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ + return 176; + case 7680: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ + return 192; + case 8192: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ + return 200; + case 15360: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ + return 256; + } + + /* + * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs + * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n + * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is + * 1200 is used instead. + */ + if (n >= 687737) + return 1200; + if (n < 8) + return 0; + + /* + * To ensure that the output is non-decreasing with respect to n, + * a cap needs to be applied to the two values where the function over + * estimates the strength (according to the above fast path). + */ + if (n <= 7680) + cap = 192; + else if (n <= 15360) + cap = 256; + else + cap = 1200; + + x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; + lx = ilog_e(x); + y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) + / log_2); + y = (y + 4) & ~7; + if (y > cap) + y = cap; + return y; +} + + int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) { int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); - if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) + if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits)) return 0; } - return BN_security_bits(bits, -1); +#endif + return ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits); } int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) @@ -200,6 +412,7 @@ int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) r->d = d; BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } + r->dirty_cnt++; return 1; } @@ -223,6 +436,7 @@ int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) r->q = q; BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } + r->dirty_cnt++; return 1; } @@ -252,10 +466,12 @@ int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) r->iqmp = iqmp; BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } + r->dirty_cnt++; return 1; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE /* * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? @@ -278,7 +494,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], old = r->prime_infos; for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { - pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); + pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new(); if (pinfo == NULL) goto err; if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { @@ -292,7 +508,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else { - rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); + ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); goto err; } (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); @@ -300,7 +516,7 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], r->prime_infos = prime_infos; - if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { + if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { r->prime_infos = old; goto err; } @@ -312,17 +528,19 @@ int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent * with other *set0* functions: just free it... */ - sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free); + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free); } r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; + r->dirty_cnt++; return 1; err: /* r, d, t should not be freed */ - sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex); return 0; } +#endif void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) @@ -343,6 +561,7 @@ void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) *q = r->q; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r) { int pnum; @@ -372,6 +591,7 @@ int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) return 1; } +#endif void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, @@ -385,6 +605,7 @@ void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, *iqmp = r->iqmp; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) { @@ -410,6 +631,7 @@ int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], return 1; } +#endif const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) { @@ -453,7 +675,29 @@ const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r) { +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + return NULL; +#else return r->pss; +#endif +} + +/* Internal */ +int ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(RSA *r, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss) +{ +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + return 0; +#else + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); + r->pss = pss; + return 1; +#endif +} + +/* Internal */ +RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r) +{ + return &r->pss_params; } void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) @@ -477,6 +721,7 @@ int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) return r->version; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) { return r->engine; @@ -491,3 +736,569 @@ int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) return -1; return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); } +#endif + +DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) + +int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes, + const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps, + const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs) +{ +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL; +#endif + int pnum; + + if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) + return 0; + + pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes); + if (pnum < 2) + return 0; + + if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0), + sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1))) + return 0; + + if (pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) + && pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) { + + if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0), + sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1), + sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0))) + return 0; + } + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + old_infos = r->prime_infos; +#endif + + if (pnum > 2) { +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + int i; + + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); + if (prime_infos == NULL) + return 0; + + for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) { + BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i); + BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i); + BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1); + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; + + if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL)) + goto err; + + /* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */ + if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + pinfo->r = prime; + pinfo->d = exp; + pinfo->t = coeff; + BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); + } + + r->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { + r->prime_infos = old_infos; + goto err; + } +#else + return 0; +#endif + } + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + if (old_infos != NULL) { + /* + * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could + * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not + * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent + * with other *set0* functions: just free it... + */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free); + } +#endif + + r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT; + r->dirty_cnt++; + + return 1; +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + err: + /* r, d, t should not be freed */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex); + return 0; +#endif +} + +DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) + +int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes, + STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps, + STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs) +{ +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; + int i, pnum; +#endif + + if (r == NULL) + return 0; + + /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */ + if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL) + return 1; + + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r)); + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r); + for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t); + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */ +static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + /* For checks */ + int keytype, int optype, + /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */ + const char *mdkey, const char *mdname, + const char *propkey, const char *mdprops) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; + + if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + switch (keytype) { + case -1: + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") + && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) + return -1; + break; + default: + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype))) + return -1; + break; + } + + /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0); + if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) { + /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0); + } + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); +} + +/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */ +static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + /* For checks */ + int keytype, int optype, + /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */ + const char *mdkey, + char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + + if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + switch (keytype) { + case -1: + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") + && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) + return -1; + break; + default: + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype))) + return -1; + break; + } + + /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode) +{ + return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, + pad_mode, NULL); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode) +{ + return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, + 0, pad_mode); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *mdname, + const char *mdprops) +{ + return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) + return -1; + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, + const char *mdprops) +{ + return + int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname, + OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, + name, namesize); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) +{ + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) + return -1; + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, + const char *mdprops) +{ + return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1, + EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1, + EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *mdname) +{ + return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname, + NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) +{ + return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; + const char *empty = ""; + /* + * Needed as we swap label with empty if it is NULL, and label is + * freed at the end of this function. + */ + void *plabel = label; + int ret; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) + return -1; + + /* Accept NULL for backward compatibility */ + if (label == NULL && llen == 0) + plabel = (void *)empty; + + /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, + (void *)plabel, (size_t)llen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + /* Ownership is supposed to be transfered to the callee. */ + OPENSSL_free(label); + return 1; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; + size_t labellen; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) + return -1; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, + (void **)label, 0); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) + return -1; + + labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size; + if (labellen > INT_MAX) + return -1; + + return (int)labellen; +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) +{ + /* + * For some reason, the optype was set to this: + * + * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY + * + * However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature + * and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this: + * + * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG + */ + return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL); +} + +/* + * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, + * simply because that's easier. + */ +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen) +{ + /* + * Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from: + * + * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY + * + * to: + * + * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG + */ + return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) + return -1; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, + &saltlen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + size_t bits2 = bits; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") + && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) + return -1; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) +{ + int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); + + /* + * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of + * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input + * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success. + */ + if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) { + BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp); + ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp; + } + + return ret; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* + * When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate + * pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway. + */ + if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx)) { + pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp); + if (pubexp == NULL) + return 0; + } + ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); + if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0) + BN_free(pubexp); + return ret; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + size_t primes2 = primes; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") + && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) + return -1; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); +} +#endif |