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diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt b/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a8a34c7abc51 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +<DRAFT!> + HOWTO certificates + +1. Introduction + +How you handle certificates depend a great deal on what your role is. +Your role can be one or several of: + + - User of some client software + - User of some server software + - Certificate authority + +This file is for users who wish to get a certificate of their own. +Certificate authorities should read ca.txt. + +In all the cases shown below, the standard configuration file, as +compiled into openssl, will be used. You may find it in /etc/, +/usr/local/ssl/ or somewhere else. The name is openssl.cnf, and +is better described in another HOWTO <config.txt?>. If you want to +use a different configuration file, use the argument '-config {file}' +with the command shown below. + + +2. Relationship with keys + +Certificates are related to public key cryptography by containing a +public key. To be useful, there must be a corresponding private key +somewhere. With OpenSSL, public keys are easily derived from private +keys, so before you create a certificate or a certificate request, you +need to create a private key. + +Private keys are generated with 'openssl genrsa' if you want a RSA +private key, or 'openssl gendsa' if you want a DSA private key. +Further information on how to create private keys can be found in +another HOWTO <keys.txt?>. The rest of this text assumes you have +a private key in the file privkey.pem. + + +3. Creating a certificate request + +To create a certificate, you need to start with a certificate +request (or, as some certificate authorities like to put +it, "certificate signing request", since that's exactly what they do, +they sign it and give you the result back, thus making it authentic +according to their policies). A certificate request can then be sent +to a certificate authority to get it signed into a certificate, or if +you have your own certificate authority, you may sign it yourself, or +if you need a self-signed certificate (because you just want a test +certificate or because you are setting up your own CA). + +The certificate request is created like this: + + openssl req -new -key privkey.pem -out cert.csr + +Now, cert.csr can be sent to the certificate authority, if they can +handle files in PEM format. If not, use the extra argument '-outform' +followed by the keyword for the format to use (see another HOWTO +<formats.txt?>). In some cases, that isn't sufficient and you will +have to be more creative. + +When the certificate authority has then done the checks the need to +do (and probably gotten payment from you), they will hand over your +new certificate to you. + +Section 5 will tell you more on how to handle the certificate you +received. + + +4. Creating a self-signed test certificate + +If you don't want to deal with another certificate authority, or just +want to create a test certificate for yourself. This is similar to +creating a certificate request, but creates a certificate instead of +a certificate request. This is NOT the recommended way to create a +CA certificate, see ca.txt. + + openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095 + + +5. What to do with the certificate + +If you created everything yourself, or if the certificate authority +was kind enough, your certificate is a raw DER thing in PEM format. +Your key most definitely is if you have followed the examples above. +However, some (most?) certificate authorities will encode them with +things like PKCS7 or PKCS12, or something else. Depending on your +applications, this may be perfectly OK, it all depends on what they +know how to decode. If not, There are a number of OpenSSL tools to +convert between some (most?) formats. + +So, depending on your application, you may have to convert your +certificate and your key to various formats, most often also putting +them together into one file. The ways to do this is described in +another HOWTO <formats.txt?>, I will just mention the simplest case. +In the case of a raw DER thing in PEM format, and assuming that's all +right for yor applications, simply concatenating the certificate and +the key into a new file and using that one should be enough. With +some applications, you don't even have to do that. + + +By now, you have your cetificate and your private key and can start +using the software that depend on it. + +-- +Richard Levitte diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7ae2a3a11833 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +<DRAFT!> + HOWTO keys + +1. Introduction + +Keys are the basis of public key algorithms and PKI. Keys usually +come in pairs, with one half being the public key and the other half +being the private key. With OpenSSL, the private key contains the +public key information as well, so a public key doesn't need to be +generated separately. + +Public keys come in several flavors, using different cryptographic +algorithms. The most popular ones associated with certificates are +RSA and DSA, and this HOWTO will show how to generate each of them. + + +2. To generate a RSA key + +A RSA key can be used both for encryption and for signing. + +Generating a key for the RSA algorithm is quite easy, all you have to +do is the following: + + openssl genrsa -des3 -out privkey.pem 2048 + +With this variant, you will be prompted for a protecting password. If +you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag +'-des3' from the command line above. + + NOTE: if you intend to use the key together with a server + certificate, it may be a good thing to avoid protecting it + with a password, since that would mean someone would have to + type in the password every time the server needs to access + the key. + +The number 2048 is the size of the key, in bits. Today, 2048 or +higher is recommended for RSA keys, as fewer amount of bits is +consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon. + + +3. To generate a DSA key + +A DSA key can be used for signing only. This is important to keep +in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with a +DSA key can really be used for. + +Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process. First, +you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key: + + openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048 + +The number 2048 is the size of the key, in bits. Today, 2048 or +higher is recommended for DSA keys, as fewer amount of bits is +consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon. + +When that is done, you can generate a key using the parameters in +question (actually, several keys can be generated from the same +parameters): + + openssl gendsa -des3 -out privkey.pem dsaparam.pem + +With this variant, you will be prompted for a protecting password. If +you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag +'-des3' from the command line above. + + NOTE: if you intend to use the key together with a server + certificate, it may be a good thing to avoid protecting it + with a password, since that would mean someone would have to + type in the password every time the server needs to access + the key. + +-- +Richard Levitte diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt b/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3d36b02f6b31 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +<DRAFT!> + HOWTO proxy certificates + +0. WARNING + +NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAVE BEEN CHECKED! They are just an +example to show you how things can be done. There may be typos or +type conflicts, and you will have to resolve them. + +1. Introduction + +Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual +certificates with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo. + +Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), +either directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by +extension through an already issued proxy certificate.. They are used +to extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, +or sometimes to the user itself), so it can perform operations in the +name of the owner of the EE certificate. + +See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information. + + +2. A warning about proxy certificates + +Noone seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind. +Basically, to this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only +been used in a world that's highly aware of them. What would happen +if an unsuspecting application is to validate a chain of certificates +that contains proxy certificates? It would usually consider the leaf +to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, and since proxy +certificates are controlled by the EE certificate owner alone, it's +would be normal to consider what the EE certificate owner could do +with them. + +subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, +and this is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the +issuer, with one commonName added on. + +Possible threats are, as far as has been imagined so far: + + - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates). + - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in + certain environments, that would grant extra or different + authorisation rights. + +For this reason, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates +be explicitely allowed. Currently, this can be done using the +following methods: + + - if the application calls X509_verify_cert() itself, it can do the + following prior to that call (ctx is the pointer passed in the call + to X509_verify_cert()): + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); + + - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled + before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable + OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY with some non-empty value. + +There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the +default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future. + + +3. How to create proxy cerificates + +It's quite easy to create proxy certificates, by taking advantage of +the lack of checks of the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). But +first, you need to create a configuration section that contains a +definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this: + + [ v3_proxy ] + # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate. + basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + + # Usual authority key ID + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always + + # Now, for the extension that marks this certificate as a proxy one + proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB + +It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section: + + proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext + + [ proxy_ext ] + language=id-ppl-anyLanguage + pathlen=0 + policy=text:BC + +The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the +syntag determines what will be done with the string. The recognised +syntags are as follows: + + text indicates that the string is simply the bytes, not + encoded in any kind of way: + + policy=text:räksmörgås + + Previous versions of this design had a specific tag + for UTF-8 text. However, since the bytes are copied + as-is anyway, there's no need for it. Instead, use + the text: tag, like this: + + policy=text:räksmörgÃ¥s + + hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons + between each byte (every second hex digit): + + policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73 + + Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a + complete DER blob. However, the only legal use for + this would be to surround the bytes that would go with + the hex: tag with what's needed to construct a correct + OCTET STRING. Since hex: does that, the DER tag felt + superfluous, and was therefore removed. + + file indicates that the text of the policy should really be + taken from a file. The string is then really a file + name. This is useful for policies that are large + (more than a few of lines) XML documents, for example. + +The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this: + + 0.policy=This is + 1.polisy= a multi- + 2.policy=line policy. + +NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part that determines the rights +granted to the process using the proxy certificate. The value is +completely dependent on the application reading and interpretting it! + +Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy +certificate, you can now easily create a proxy certificate like this: + + openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \ + -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key + openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 \ + -out proxy.crt -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key \ + -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy + +It's just as easy to create a proxy certificate using another proxy +certificate as issuer (note that I'm using a different configuration +section for it): + + openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \ + -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key + openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 \ + -out proxy2.crt -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key \ + -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2 + + +4. How to have your application interpret the policy? + +The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to prepare some default +rights, then do a check of the proxy certificate against the a chain +of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates, and see +what rights came out by the end. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is. + +The slightly complicated part is how to pass data between your +application and the certificate validation procedure. + +You need the following ingredients: + + - a callback routing that will be called for every certificate that's + validated. It will be called several times for each certificates, + so you must be attentive to when it's a good time to do the proxy + policy interpretation and check, as well as to fill in the defaults + when the EE certificate is checked. + + - a structure of data that's shared between your application code and + the callback. + + - a wrapper function that sets it all up. + + - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic + ex_data store that's attached to an X509 validation context. + +This is some cookbook code for you to fill in: + + /* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit + array, one bit for each possible right. */ + typedef struct your_rights { + unsigned char rights[total_rights / 8]; + } YOUR_RIGHTS; + + /* The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data + store in the X509 validation context the first time it's called. + Subsequent calls will return the same index. */ + static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void) + { + static volatile int idx = -1; + if (idx < 0) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + if (idx < 0) + { + idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, + "for verify callback", + NULL,NULL,NULL); + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + } + return idx; + } + + /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure. */ + static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy + check within this secion. It's important to know + that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked + from top to bottom. You get the CA root first, + followed by the possible chain of intermediate + CAs, followed by the EE certificate, followed by + the possible proxy certificates. */ + { + X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert; + + if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) + { + YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = + (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx()); + PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = + X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL); + + switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) + { + case NID_Independent: + /* Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights to + this particular proxy certificate, usually by + pulling them from some database. If there are none + to be found, clear all rights (making this and any + subsequent proxy certificate void of any rights). + */ + memset(rights->rights, 0, sizeof(rights->rights)); + break; + case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll: + /* This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current + rights stand as they are. */ + break; + default: + /* This is usually the most complex section of code. + You really do whatever you want as long as you + follow RFC 3820. In the example we use here, the + simplest thing to do is to build another, temporary + bit array and fill it with the rights granted by + the current proxy certificate, then use it as a + mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and + voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit + array. */ + { + int i; + YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights; + memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights)); + + /* process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure + that takes a string and it's length, interprets + it and sets the bits in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed + at by the third argument. */ + process_rights((char *) pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data, + pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length, + &tmp_rights); + + for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++) + rights->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i]; + } + break; + } + PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); + } + else if (!(xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) + { + /* We have a EE certificate, let's use it to set default! + */ + YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = + (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx()); + + /* The following procedure finds out what rights the owner + of the current certificate has, and sets them in the + YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the second + argument. */ + set_default_rights(xs, rights); + } + } + return ok; + } + + static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, + YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights) + { + int i; + int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) = ctx->verify_cb; + YOUR_RIGHTS rights; + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(), &rights); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); + ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + + if (ok == 1) + { + ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights); + } + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb); + + return ok; + } + +If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the +certificates checked properly, using the code above: + + SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights); + + +-- +Richard Levitte diff --git a/doc/README b/doc/README new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6ecc14d99457 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/README @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + + apps/openssl.pod .... Documentation of OpenSSL `openssl' command + crypto/crypto.pod ... Documentation of OpenSSL crypto.h+libcrypto.a + ssl/ssl.pod ......... Documentation of OpenSSL ssl.h+libssl.a + openssl.txt ......... Assembled documentation files for OpenSSL [not final] + ssleay.txt .......... Assembled documentation of ancestor SSLeay [obsolete] + standards.txt ....... Assembled pointers to standards, RFCs or internet drafts + that are related to OpenSSL. + + An archive of HTML documents for the SSLeay library is available from + http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/ + diff --git a/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod b/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ed69952f3799 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +CA.pl - friendlier interface for OpenSSL certificate programs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<CA.pl> +[B<-?>] +[B<-h>] +[B<-help>] +[B<-newcert>] +[B<-newreq>] +[B<-newreq-nodes>] +[B<-newca>] +[B<-xsign>] +[B<-sign>] +[B<-signreq>] +[B<-signcert>] +[B<-verify>] +[B<files>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<CA.pl> script is a perl script that supplies the relevant command line +arguments to the B<openssl> command for some common certificate operations. +It is intended to simplify the process of certificate creation and management +by the use of some simple options. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<?>, B<-h>, B<-help> + +prints a usage message. + +=item B<-newcert> + +creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are +written to the file "newreq.pem". + +=item B<-newreq> + +creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are +written to the file "newreq.pem". + +=item B<-newreq-nodes> + +is like B<-newreq> except that the private key will not be encrypted. + +=item B<-newca> + +creates a new CA hierarchy for use with the B<ca> program (or the B<-signcert> +and B<-xsign> options). The user is prompted to enter the filename of the CA +certificates (which should also contain the private key) or by hitting ENTER +details of the CA will be prompted for. The relevant files and directories +are created in a directory called "demoCA" in the current directory. + +=item B<-pkcs12> + +create a PKCS#12 file containing the user certificate, private key and CA +certificate. It expects the user certificate and private key to be in the +file "newcert.pem" and the CA certificate to be in the file demoCA/cacert.pem, +it creates a file "newcert.p12". This command can thus be called after the +B<-sign> option. The PKCS#12 file can be imported directly into a browser. +If there is an additional argument on the command line it will be used as the +"friendly name" for the certificate (which is typically displayed in the browser +list box), otherwise the name "My Certificate" is used. + +=item B<-sign>, B<-signreq>, B<-xsign> + +calls the B<ca> program to sign a certificate request. It expects the request +to be in the file "newreq.pem". The new certificate is written to the file +"newcert.pem" except in the case of the B<-xsign> option when it is written +to standard output. + + +=item B<-signCA> + +this option is the same as the B<-signreq> option except it uses the configuration +file section B<v3_ca> and so makes the signed request a valid CA certificate. This +is useful when creating intermediate CA from a root CA. + +=item B<-signcert> + +this option is the same as B<-sign> except it expects a self signed certificate +to be present in the file "newreq.pem". + +=item B<-verify> + +verifies certificates against the CA certificate for "demoCA". If no certificates +are specified on the command line it tries to verify the file "newcert.pem". + +=item B<files> + +one or more optional certificate file names for use with the B<-verify> command. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Create a CA hierarchy: + + CA.pl -newca + +Complete certificate creation example: create a CA, create a request, sign +the request and finally create a PKCS#12 file containing it. + + CA.pl -newca + CA.pl -newreq + CA.pl -signreq + CA.pl -pkcs12 "My Test Certificate" + +=head1 DSA CERTIFICATES + +Although the B<CA.pl> creates RSA CAs and requests it is still possible to +use it with DSA certificates and requests using the L<req(1)|req(1)> command +directly. The following example shows the steps that would typically be taken. + +Create some DSA parameters: + + openssl dsaparam -out dsap.pem 1024 + +Create a DSA CA certificate and private key: + + openssl req -x509 -newkey dsa:dsap.pem -keyout cacert.pem -out cacert.pem + +Create the CA directories and files: + + CA.pl -newca + +enter cacert.pem when prompted for the CA file name. + +Create a DSA certificate request and private key (a different set of parameters +can optionally be created first): + + openssl req -out newreq.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem + +Sign the request: + + CA.pl -signreq + +=head1 NOTES + +Most of the filenames mentioned can be modified by editing the B<CA.pl> script. + +If the demoCA directory already exists then the B<-newca> command will not +overwrite it and will do nothing. This can happen if a previous call using +the B<-newca> option terminated abnormally. To get the correct behaviour +delete the demoCA directory if it already exists. + +Under some environments it may not be possible to run the B<CA.pl> script +directly (for example Win32) and the default configuration file location may +be wrong. In this case the command: + + perl -S CA.pl + +can be used and the B<OPENSSL_CONF> environment variable changed to point to +the correct path of the configuration file "openssl.cnf". + +The script is intended as a simple front end for the B<openssl> program for use +by a beginner. Its behaviour isn't always what is wanted. For more control over the +behaviour of the certificate commands call the B<openssl> command directly. + +=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES + +The variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> if defined allows an alternative configuration +file location to be specified, it should contain the full path to the +configuration file, not just its directory. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<pkcs12(1)|pkcs12(1)>, +L<config(5)|config(5)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod b/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..542d96906626 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +asn1parse - ASN.1 parsing tool + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<asn1parse> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-offset number>] +[B<-length number>] +[B<-i>] +[B<-oid filename>] +[B<-strparse offset>] +[B<-genstr string>] +[B<-genconf file>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<asn1parse> command is a diagnostic utility that can parse ASN.1 +structures. It can also be used to extract data from ASN.1 formatted data. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform> B<DER|PEM> + +the input format. B<DER> is binary format and B<PEM> (the default) is base64 +encoded. + +=item B<-in filename> + +the input file, default is standard input + +=item B<-out filename> + +output file to place the DER encoded data into. If this +option is not present then no data will be output. This is most useful when +combined with the B<-strparse> option. + +=item B<-noout> + +don't output the parsed version of the input file. + +=item B<-offset number> + +starting offset to begin parsing, default is start of file. + +=item B<-length number> + +number of bytes to parse, default is until end of file. + +=item B<-i> + +indents the output according to the "depth" of the structures. + +=item B<-oid filename> + +a file containing additional OBJECT IDENTIFIERs (OIDs). The format of this +file is described in the NOTES section below. + +=item B<-strparse offset> + +parse the contents octets of the ASN.1 object starting at B<offset>. This +option can be used multiple times to "drill down" into a nested structure. + +=item B<-genstr string>, B<-genconf file> + +generate encoded data based on B<string>, B<file> or both using +ASN1_generate_nconf() format. If B<file> only is present then the string +is obtained from the default section using the name B<asn1>. The encoded +data is passed through the ASN1 parser and printed out as though it came +from a file, the contents can thus be examined and written to a file +using the B<out> option. + +=back + +=head2 OUTPUT + +The output will typically contain lines like this: + + 0:d=0 hl=4 l= 681 cons: SEQUENCE + +..... + + 229:d=3 hl=3 l= 141 prim: BIT STRING + 373:d=2 hl=3 l= 162 cons: cont [ 3 ] + 376:d=3 hl=3 l= 159 cons: SEQUENCE + 379:d=4 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE + 381:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Subject Key Identifier + 386:d=5 hl=2 l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING + 410:d=4 hl=2 l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE + 412:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Authority Key Identifier + 417:d=5 hl=2 l= 105 prim: OCTET STRING + 524:d=4 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE + +..... + +This example is part of a self signed certificate. Each line starts with the +offset in decimal. B<d=XX> specifies the current depth. The depth is increased +within the scope of any SET or SEQUENCE. B<hl=XX> gives the header length +(tag and length octets) of the current type. B<l=XX> gives the length of +the contents octets. + +The B<-i> option can be used to make the output more readable. + +Some knowledge of the ASN.1 structure is needed to interpret the output. + +In this example the BIT STRING at offset 229 is the certificate public key. +The contents octets of this will contain the public key information. This can +be examined using the option B<-strparse 229> to yield: + + 0:d=0 hl=3 l= 137 cons: SEQUENCE + 3:d=1 hl=3 l= 129 prim: INTEGER :E5D21E1F5C8D208EA7A2166C7FAF9F6BDF2059669C60876DDB70840F1A5AAFA59699FE471F379F1DD6A487E7D5409AB6A88D4A9746E24B91D8CF55DB3521015460C8EDE44EE8A4189F7A7BE77D6CD3A9AF2696F486855CF58BF0EDF2B4068058C7A947F52548DDF7E15E96B385F86422BEA9064A3EE9E1158A56E4A6F47E5897 + 135:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :010001 + +=head1 NOTES + +If an OID is not part of OpenSSL's internal table it will be represented in +numerical form (for example 1.2.3.4). The file passed to the B<-oid> option +allows additional OIDs to be included. Each line consists of three columns, +the first column is the OID in numerical format and should be followed by white +space. The second column is the "short name" which is a single word followed +by white space. The final column is the rest of the line and is the +"long name". B<asn1parse> displays the long name. Example: + +C<1.2.3.4 shortName A long name> + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Parse a file: + + openssl asn1parse -in file.pem + +Parse a DER file: + + openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in file.der + +Generate a simple UTF8String: + + openssl asn1parse -genstr 'UTF8:Hello World' + +Generate and write out a UTF8String, don't print parsed output: + + openssl asn1parse -genstr 'UTF8:Hello World' -noout -out utf8.der + +Generate using a config file: + + openssl asn1parse -genconf asn1.cnf -noout -out asn1.der + +Example config file: + + asn1=SEQUENCE:seq_sect + + [seq_sect] + + field1=BOOL:TRUE + field2=EXP:0, UTF8:some random string + + +=head1 BUGS + +There should be options to change the format of output lines. The output of some +ASN.1 types is not well handled (if at all). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/ca.pod b/doc/apps/ca.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5618c2dc9d2e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/ca.pod @@ -0,0 +1,671 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ca - sample minimal CA application + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<ca> +[B<-verbose>] +[B<-config filename>] +[B<-name section>] +[B<-gencrl>] +[B<-revoke file>] +[B<-crl_reason reason>] +[B<-crl_hold instruction>] +[B<-crl_compromise time>] +[B<-crl_CA_compromise time>] +[B<-crldays days>] +[B<-crlhours hours>] +[B<-crlexts section>] +[B<-startdate date>] +[B<-enddate date>] +[B<-days arg>] +[B<-md arg>] +[B<-policy arg>] +[B<-keyfile arg>] +[B<-key arg>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-cert file>] +[B<-selfsign>] +[B<-in file>] +[B<-out file>] +[B<-notext>] +[B<-outdir dir>] +[B<-infiles>] +[B<-spkac file>] +[B<-ss_cert file>] +[B<-preserveDN>] +[B<-noemailDN>] +[B<-batch>] +[B<-msie_hack>] +[B<-extensions section>] +[B<-extfile section>] +[B<-engine id>] +[B<-subj arg>] +[B<-utf8>] +[B<-multivalue-rdn>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<ca> command is a minimal CA application. It can be used +to sign certificate requests in a variety of forms and generate +CRLs it also maintains a text database of issued certificates +and their status. + +The options descriptions will be divided into each purpose. + +=head1 CA OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-config filename> + +specifies the configuration file to use. + +=item B<-name section> + +specifies the configuration file section to use (overrides +B<default_ca> in the B<ca> section). + +=item B<-in filename> + +an input filename containing a single certificate request to be +signed by the CA. + +=item B<-ss_cert filename> + +a single self signed certificate to be signed by the CA. + +=item B<-spkac filename> + +a file containing a single Netscape signed public key and challenge +and additional field values to be signed by the CA. See the B<SPKAC FORMAT> +section for information on the required format. + +=item B<-infiles> + +if present this should be the last option, all subsequent arguments +are assumed to the the names of files containing certificate requests. + +=item B<-out filename> + +the output file to output certificates to. The default is standard +output. The certificate details will also be printed out to this +file. + +=item B<-outdir directory> + +the directory to output certificates to. The certificate will be +written to a filename consisting of the serial number in hex with +".pem" appended. + +=item B<-cert> + +the CA certificate file. + +=item B<-keyfile filename> + +the private key to sign requests with. + +=item B<-key password> + +the password used to encrypt the private key. Since on some +systems the command line arguments are visible (e.g. Unix with +the 'ps' utility) this option should be used with caution. + +=item B<-selfsign> + +indicates the issued certificates are to be signed with the key +the certificate requests were signed with (given with B<-keyfile>). +Cerificate requests signed with a different key are ignored. If +B<-spkac>, B<-ss_cert> or B<-gencrl> are given, B<-selfsign> is +ignored. + +A consequence of using B<-selfsign> is that the self-signed +certificate appears among the entries in the certificate database +(see the configuration option B<database>), and uses the same +serial number counter as all other certificates sign with the +self-signed certificate. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-verbose> + +this prints extra details about the operations being performed. + +=item B<-notext> + +don't output the text form of a certificate to the output file. + +=item B<-startdate date> + +this allows the start date to be explicitly set. The format of the +date is YYMMDDHHMMSSZ (the same as an ASN1 UTCTime structure). + +=item B<-enddate date> + +this allows the expiry date to be explicitly set. The format of the +date is YYMMDDHHMMSSZ (the same as an ASN1 UTCTime structure). + +=item B<-days arg> + +the number of days to certify the certificate for. + +=item B<-md alg> + +the message digest to use. Possible values include md5, sha1 and mdc2. +This option also applies to CRLs. + +=item B<-policy arg> + +this option defines the CA "policy" to use. This is a section in +the configuration file which decides which fields should be mandatory +or match the CA certificate. Check out the B<POLICY FORMAT> section +for more information. + +=item B<-msie_hack> + +this is a legacy option to make B<ca> work with very old versions of +the IE certificate enrollment control "certenr3". It used UniversalStrings +for almost everything. Since the old control has various security bugs +its use is strongly discouraged. The newer control "Xenroll" does not +need this option. + +=item B<-preserveDN> + +Normally the DN order of a certificate is the same as the order of the +fields in the relevant policy section. When this option is set the order +is the same as the request. This is largely for compatibility with the +older IE enrollment control which would only accept certificates if their +DNs match the order of the request. This is not needed for Xenroll. + +=item B<-noemailDN> + +The DN of a certificate can contain the EMAIL field if present in the +request DN, however it is good policy just having the e-mail set into +the altName extension of the certificate. When this option is set the +EMAIL field is removed from the certificate' subject and set only in +the, eventually present, extensions. The B<email_in_dn> keyword can be +used in the configuration file to enable this behaviour. + +=item B<-batch> + +this sets the batch mode. In this mode no questions will be asked +and all certificates will be certified automatically. + +=item B<-extensions section> + +the section of the configuration file containing certificate extensions +to be added when a certificate is issued (defaults to B<x509_extensions> +unless the B<-extfile> option is used). If no extension section is +present then, a V1 certificate is created. If the extension section +is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created. + +=item B<-extfile file> + +an additional configuration file to read certificate extensions from +(using the default section unless the B<-extensions> option is also +used). + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=item B<-subj arg> + +supersedes subject name given in the request. +The arg must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>, +characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. + +=item B<-utf8> + +this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by +default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field +values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a +configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings. + +=item B<-multivalue-rdn> + +this option causes the -subj argument to be interpretedt with full +support for multivalued RDNs. Example: + +I</DC=org/DC=OpenSSL/DC=users/UID=123456+CN=John Doe> + +If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>. + +=back + +=head1 CRL OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-gencrl> + +this option generates a CRL based on information in the index file. + +=item B<-crldays num> + +the number of days before the next CRL is due. That is the days from +now to place in the CRL nextUpdate field. + +=item B<-crlhours num> + +the number of hours before the next CRL is due. + +=item B<-revoke filename> + +a filename containing a certificate to revoke. + +=item B<-crl_reason reason> + +revocation reason, where B<reason> is one of: B<unspecified>, B<keyCompromise>, +B<CACompromise>, B<affiliationChanged>, B<superseded>, B<cessationOfOperation>, +B<certificateHold> or B<removeFromCRL>. The matching of B<reason> is case +insensitive. Setting any revocation reason will make the CRL v2. + +In practive B<removeFromCRL> is not particularly useful because it is only used +in delta CRLs which are not currently implemented. + +=item B<-crl_hold instruction> + +This sets the CRL revocation reason code to B<certificateHold> and the hold +instruction to B<instruction> which must be an OID. Although any OID can be +used only B<holdInstructionNone> (the use of which is discouraged by RFC2459) +B<holdInstructionCallIssuer> or B<holdInstructionReject> will normally be used. + +=item B<-crl_compromise time> + +This sets the revocation reason to B<keyCompromise> and the compromise time to +B<time>. B<time> should be in GeneralizedTime format that is B<YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ>. + +=item B<-crl_CA_compromise time> + +This is the same as B<crl_compromise> except the revocation reason is set to +B<CACompromise>. + +=item B<-crlexts section> + +the section of the configuration file containing CRL extensions to +include. If no CRL extension section is present then a V1 CRL is +created, if the CRL extension section is present (even if it is +empty) then a V2 CRL is created. The CRL extensions specified are +CRL extensions and B<not> CRL entry extensions. It should be noted +that some software (for example Netscape) can't handle V2 CRLs. + +=back + +=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE OPTIONS + +The section of the configuration file containing options for B<ca> +is found as follows: If the B<-name> command line option is used, +then it names the section to be used. Otherwise the section to +be used must be named in the B<default_ca> option of the B<ca> section +of the configuration file (or in the default section of the +configuration file). Besides B<default_ca>, the following options are +read directly from the B<ca> section: + RANDFILE + preserve + msie_hack +With the exception of B<RANDFILE>, this is probably a bug and may +change in future releases. + +Many of the configuration file options are identical to command line +options. Where the option is present in the configuration file +and the command line the command line value is used. Where an +option is described as mandatory then it must be present in +the configuration file or the command line equivalent (if +any) used. + +=over 4 + +=item B<oid_file> + +This specifies a file containing additional B<OBJECT IDENTIFIERS>. +Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the +object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed +by white space and finally the long name. + +=item B<oid_section> + +This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra +object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the +object identifier followed by B<=> and the numerical form. The short +and long names are the same when this option is used. + +=item B<new_certs_dir> + +the same as the B<-outdir> command line option. It specifies +the directory where new certificates will be placed. Mandatory. + +=item B<certificate> + +the same as B<-cert>. It gives the file containing the CA +certificate. Mandatory. + +=item B<private_key> + +same as the B<-keyfile> option. The file containing the +CA private key. Mandatory. + +=item B<RANDFILE> + +a file used to read and write random number seed information, or +an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). + +=item B<default_days> + +the same as the B<-days> option. The number of days to certify +a certificate for. + +=item B<default_startdate> + +the same as the B<-startdate> option. The start date to certify +a certificate for. If not set the current time is used. + +=item B<default_enddate> + +the same as the B<-enddate> option. Either this option or +B<default_days> (or the command line equivalents) must be +present. + +=item B<default_crl_hours default_crl_days> + +the same as the B<-crlhours> and the B<-crldays> options. These +will only be used if neither command line option is present. At +least one of these must be present to generate a CRL. + +=item B<default_md> + +the same as the B<-md> option. The message digest to use. Mandatory. + +=item B<database> + +the text database file to use. Mandatory. This file must be present +though initially it will be empty. + +=item B<unique_subject> + +if the value B<yes> is given, the valid certificate entries in the +database must have unique subjects. if the value B<no> is given, +several valid certificate entries may have the exact same subject. +The default value is B<yes>, to be compatible with older (pre 0.9.8) +versions of OpenSSL. However, to make CA certificate roll-over easier, +it's recommended to use the value B<no>, especially if combined with +the B<-selfsign> command line option. + +=item B<serial> + +a text file containing the next serial number to use in hex. Mandatory. +This file must be present and contain a valid serial number. + +=item B<crlnumber> + +a text file containing the next CRL number to use in hex. The crl number +will be inserted in the CRLs only if this file exists. If this file is +present, it must contain a valid CRL number. + +=item B<x509_extensions> + +the same as B<-extensions>. + +=item B<crl_extensions> + +the same as B<-crlexts>. + +=item B<preserve> + +the same as B<-preserveDN> + +=item B<email_in_dn> + +the same as B<-noemailDN>. If you want the EMAIL field to be removed +from the DN of the certificate simply set this to 'no'. If not present +the default is to allow for the EMAIL filed in the certificate's DN. + +=item B<msie_hack> + +the same as B<-msie_hack> + +=item B<policy> + +the same as B<-policy>. Mandatory. See the B<POLICY FORMAT> section +for more information. + +=item B<name_opt>, B<cert_opt> + +these options allow the format used to display the certificate details +when asking the user to confirm signing. All the options supported by +the B<x509> utilities B<-nameopt> and B<-certopt> switches can be used +here, except the B<no_signame> and B<no_sigdump> are permanently set +and cannot be disabled (this is because the certificate signature cannot +be displayed because the certificate has not been signed at this point). + +For convenience the values B<ca_default> are accepted by both to produce +a reasonable output. + +If neither option is present the format used in earlier versions of +OpenSSL is used. Use of the old format is B<strongly> discouraged because +it only displays fields mentioned in the B<policy> section, mishandles +multicharacter string types and does not display extensions. + +=item B<copy_extensions> + +determines how extensions in certificate requests should be handled. +If set to B<none> or this option is not present then extensions are +ignored and not copied to the certificate. If set to B<copy> then any +extensions present in the request that are not already present are copied +to the certificate. If set to B<copyall> then all extensions in the +request are copied to the certificate: if the extension is already present +in the certificate it is deleted first. See the B<WARNINGS> section before +using this option. + +The main use of this option is to allow a certificate request to supply +values for certain extensions such as subjectAltName. + +=back + +=head1 POLICY FORMAT + +The policy section consists of a set of variables corresponding to +certificate DN fields. If the value is "match" then the field value +must match the same field in the CA certificate. If the value is +"supplied" then it must be present. If the value is "optional" then +it may be present. Any fields not mentioned in the policy section +are silently deleted, unless the B<-preserveDN> option is set but +this can be regarded more of a quirk than intended behaviour. + +=head1 SPKAC FORMAT + +The input to the B<-spkac> command line option is a Netscape +signed public key and challenge. This will usually come from +the B<KEYGEN> tag in an HTML form to create a new private key. +It is however possible to create SPKACs using the B<spkac> utility. + +The file should contain the variable SPKAC set to the value of +the SPKAC and also the required DN components as name value pairs. +If you need to include the same component twice then it can be +preceded by a number and a '.'. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Note: these examples assume that the B<ca> directory structure is +already set up and the relevant files already exist. This usually +involves creating a CA certificate and private key with B<req>, a +serial number file and an empty index file and placing them in +the relevant directories. + +To use the sample configuration file below the directories demoCA, +demoCA/private and demoCA/newcerts would be created. The CA +certificate would be copied to demoCA/cacert.pem and its private +key to demoCA/private/cakey.pem. A file demoCA/serial would be +created containing for example "01" and the empty index file +demoCA/index.txt. + + +Sign a certificate request: + + openssl ca -in req.pem -out newcert.pem + +Sign a certificate request, using CA extensions: + + openssl ca -in req.pem -extensions v3_ca -out newcert.pem + +Generate a CRL + + openssl ca -gencrl -out crl.pem + +Sign several requests: + + openssl ca -infiles req1.pem req2.pem req3.pem + +Certify a Netscape SPKAC: + + openssl ca -spkac spkac.txt + +A sample SPKAC file (the SPKAC line has been truncated for clarity): + + SPKAC=MIG0MGAwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAn7PDhCeV/xIxUg8V70YRxK2A5 + CN=Steve Test + emailAddress=steve@openssl.org + 0.OU=OpenSSL Group + 1.OU=Another Group + +A sample configuration file with the relevant sections for B<ca>: + + [ ca ] + default_ca = CA_default # The default ca section + + [ CA_default ] + + dir = ./demoCA # top dir + database = $dir/index.txt # index file. + new_certs_dir = $dir/newcerts # new certs dir + + certificate = $dir/cacert.pem # The CA cert + serial = $dir/serial # serial no file + private_key = $dir/private/cakey.pem# CA private key + RANDFILE = $dir/private/.rand # random number file + + default_days = 365 # how long to certify for + default_crl_days= 30 # how long before next CRL + default_md = md5 # md to use + + policy = policy_any # default policy + email_in_dn = no # Don't add the email into cert DN + + name_opt = ca_default # Subject name display option + cert_opt = ca_default # Certificate display option + copy_extensions = none # Don't copy extensions from request + + [ policy_any ] + countryName = supplied + stateOrProvinceName = optional + organizationName = optional + organizationalUnitName = optional + commonName = supplied + emailAddress = optional + +=head1 FILES + +Note: the location of all files can change either by compile time options, +configuration file entries, environment variables or command line options. +The values below reflect the default values. + + /usr/local/ssl/lib/openssl.cnf - master configuration file + ./demoCA - main CA directory + ./demoCA/cacert.pem - CA certificate + ./demoCA/private/cakey.pem - CA private key + ./demoCA/serial - CA serial number file + ./demoCA/serial.old - CA serial number backup file + ./demoCA/index.txt - CA text database file + ./demoCA/index.txt.old - CA text database backup file + ./demoCA/certs - certificate output file + ./demoCA/.rnd - CA random seed information + +=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES + +B<OPENSSL_CONF> reflects the location of master configuration file it can +be overridden by the B<-config> command line option. + +=head1 RESTRICTIONS + +The text database index file is a critical part of the process and +if corrupted it can be difficult to fix. It is theoretically possible +to rebuild the index file from all the issued certificates and a current +CRL: however there is no option to do this. + +V2 CRL features like delta CRLs are not currently supported. + +Although several requests can be input and handled at once it is only +possible to include one SPKAC or self signed certificate. + +=head1 BUGS + +The use of an in memory text database can cause problems when large +numbers of certificates are present because, as the name implies +the database has to be kept in memory. + +The B<ca> command really needs rewriting or the required functionality +exposed at either a command or interface level so a more friendly utility +(perl script or GUI) can handle things properly. The scripts B<CA.sh> and +B<CA.pl> help a little but not very much. + +Any fields in a request that are not present in a policy are silently +deleted. This does not happen if the B<-preserveDN> option is used. To +enforce the absence of the EMAIL field within the DN, as suggested by +RFCs, regardless the contents of the request' subject the B<-noemailDN> +option can be used. The behaviour should be more friendly and +configurable. + +Cancelling some commands by refusing to certify a certificate can +create an empty file. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +The B<ca> command is quirky and at times downright unfriendly. + +The B<ca> utility was originally meant as an example of how to do things +in a CA. It was not supposed to be used as a full blown CA itself: +nevertheless some people are using it for this purpose. + +The B<ca> command is effectively a single user command: no locking is +done on the various files and attempts to run more than one B<ca> command +on the same database can have unpredictable results. + +The B<copy_extensions> option should be used with caution. If care is +not taken then it can be a security risk. For example if a certificate +request contains a basicConstraints extension with CA:TRUE and the +B<copy_extensions> value is set to B<copyall> and the user does not spot +this when the certificate is displayed then this will hand the requestor +a valid CA certificate. + +This situation can be avoided by setting B<copy_extensions> to B<copy> +and including basicConstraints with CA:FALSE in the configuration file. +Then if the request contains a basicConstraints extension it will be +ignored. + +It is advisable to also include values for other extensions such +as B<keyUsage> to prevent a request supplying its own values. + +Additional restrictions can be placed on the CA certificate itself. +For example if the CA certificate has: + + basicConstraints = CA:TRUE, pathlen:0 + +then even if a certificate is issued with CA:TRUE it will not be valid. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<spkac(1)|spkac(1)>, L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, L<CA.pl(1)|CA.pl(1)>, +L<config(5)|config(5)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/doc/apps/ciphers.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e16eadef21ee --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/ciphers.pod @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ciphers - SSL cipher display and cipher list tool. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<ciphers> +[B<-v>] +[B<-ssl2>] +[B<-ssl3>] +[B<-tls1>] +[B<cipherlist>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<cipherlist> command converts OpenSSL cipher lists into ordered +SSL cipher preference lists. It can be used as a test tool to determine +the appropriate cipherlist. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-v> + +verbose option. List ciphers with a complete description of +protocol version (SSLv2 or SSLv3; the latter includes TLS), key exchange, +authentication, encryption and mac algorithms used along with any key size +restrictions and whether the algorithm is classed as an "export" cipher. +Note that without the B<-v> option, ciphers may seem to appear twice +in a cipher list; this is when similar ciphers are available for +SSL v2 and for SSL v3/TLS v1. + +=item B<-ssl3> + +only include SSL v3 ciphers. + +=item B<-ssl2> + +only include SSL v2 ciphers. + +=item B<-tls1> + +only include TLS v1 ciphers. + +=item B<-h>, B<-?> + +print a brief usage message. + +=item B<cipherlist> + +a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included +then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below. + +=back + +=head1 CIPHER LIST FORMAT + +The cipher list consists of one or more I<cipher strings> separated by colons. +Commas or spaces are also acceptable separators but colons are normally used. + +The actual cipher string can take several different forms. + +It can consist of a single cipher suite such as B<RC4-SHA>. + +It can represent a list of cipher suites containing a certain algorithm, or +cipher suites of a certain type. For example B<SHA1> represents all ciphers +suites using the digest algorithm SHA1 and B<SSLv3> represents all SSL v3 +algorithms. + +Lists of cipher suites can be combined in a single cipher string using the +B<+> character. This is used as a logical B<and> operation. For example +B<SHA1+DES> represents all cipher suites containing the SHA1 B<and> the DES +algorithms. + +Each cipher string can be optionally preceded by the characters B<!>, +B<-> or B<+>. + +If B<!> is used then the ciphers are permanently deleted from the list. +The ciphers deleted can never reappear in the list even if they are +explicitly stated. + +If B<-> is used then the ciphers are deleted from the list, but some or +all of the ciphers can be added again by later options. + +If B<+> is used then the ciphers are moved to the end of the list. This +option doesn't add any new ciphers it just moves matching existing ones. + +If none of these characters is present then the string is just interpreted +as a list of ciphers to be appended to the current preference list. If the +list includes any ciphers already present they will be ignored: that is they +will not moved to the end of the list. + +Additionally the cipher string B<@STRENGTH> can be used at any point to sort +the current cipher list in order of encryption algorithm key length. + +=head1 CIPHER STRINGS + +The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings. + +=over 4 + +=item B<DEFAULT> + +the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and is normally +B<ALL:!ADH:RC4+RSA:+SSLv2:@STRENGTH>. This must be the first cipher string +specified. + +=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT> + +the ciphers included in B<ALL>, but not enabled by default. Currently +this is B<ADH>. Note that this rule does not cover B<eNULL>, which is +not included by B<ALL> (use B<COMPLEMENTOFALL> if necessary). + +=item B<ALL> + +all ciphers suites except the B<eNULL> ciphers which must be explicitly enabled. + +=item B<COMPLEMENTOFALL> + +the cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently being B<eNULL>. + +=item B<HIGH> + +"high" encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths larger +than 128 bits, and some cipher suites with 128-bit keys. + +=item B<MEDIUM> + +"medium" encryption cipher suites, currently some of those using 128 bit encryption. + +=item B<LOW> + +"low" encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit encryption algorithms +but excluding export cipher suites. + +=item B<EXP>, B<EXPORT> + +export encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms. + +=item B<EXPORT40> + +40 bit export encryption algorithms + +=item B<EXPORT56> + +56 bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of +56 bit export ciphers is empty unless OpenSSL has been explicitly configured +with support for experimental ciphers. + +=item B<eNULL>, B<NULL> + +the "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no +encryption at all and are a security risk they are disabled unless explicitly +included. + +=item B<aNULL> + +the cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous +DH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable to a "man in the middle" +attack and so their use is normally discouraged. + +=item B<kRSA>, B<RSA> + +cipher suites using RSA key exchange. + +=item B<kEDH> + +cipher suites using ephemeral DH key agreement. + +=item B<kDHr>, B<kDHd> + +cipher suites using DH key agreement and DH certificates signed by CAs with RSA +and DSS keys respectively. Not implemented. + +=item B<aRSA> + +cipher suites using RSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry RSA keys. + +=item B<aDSS>, B<DSS> + +cipher suites using DSS authentication, i.e. the certificates carry DSS keys. + +=item B<aDH> + +cipher suites effectively using DH authentication, i.e. the certificates carry +DH keys. Not implemented. + +=item B<kFZA>, B<aFZA>, B<eFZA>, B<FZA> + +ciphers suites using FORTEZZA key exchange, authentication, encryption or all +FORTEZZA algorithms. Not implemented. + +=item B<TLSv1>, B<SSLv3>, B<SSLv2> + +TLS v1.0, SSL v3.0 or SSL v2.0 cipher suites respectively. + +=item B<DH> + +cipher suites using DH, including anonymous DH. + +=item B<ADH> + +anonymous DH cipher suites. + +=item B<AES> + +cipher suites using AES. + +=item B<3DES> + +cipher suites using triple DES. + +=item B<DES> + +cipher suites using DES (not triple DES). + +=item B<RC4> + +cipher suites using RC4. + +=item B<RC2> + +cipher suites using RC2. + +=item B<IDEA> + +cipher suites using IDEA. + +=item B<MD5> + +cipher suites using MD5. + +=item B<SHA1>, B<SHA> + +cipher suites using SHA1. + +=item B<Camellia> + +cipher suites using Camellia. + +=back + +=head1 CIPHER SUITE NAMES + +The following lists give the SSL or TLS cipher suites names from the +relevant specification and their OpenSSL equivalents. It should be noted, +that several cipher suite names do not include the authentication used, +e.g. DES-CBC3-SHA. In these cases, RSA authentication is used. + +=head2 SSL v3.0 cipher suites. + + SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5 + SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA + SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5 + SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5 + SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA + SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 + SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA + SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA + + SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA + SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA + SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA + + SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5 + SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5 + SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA + SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA + + SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA Not implemented. + +=head2 TLS v1.0 cipher suites. + + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5 + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA + TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5 + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5 + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA + TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 + TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA + TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA + + TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA + + TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5 + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5 + TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA + +=head2 AES ciphersuites from RFC3268, extending TLS v1.0 + + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AES128-SHA + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AES256-SHA + + TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DH-DSS-AES128-SHA + TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DH-DSS-AES256-SHA + TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DH-RSA-AES128-SHA + TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DH-RSA-AES256-SHA + + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA + + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ADH-AES128-SHA + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ADH-AES256-SHA + +=head2 Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132, extending TLS v1.0 + + TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA128-SHA + TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA256-SHA + + TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented. + + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA + + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA + +=head2 Additional Export 1024 and other cipher suites + +Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3. + + TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA EXP1024-RC4-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA + +=head2 SSL v2.0 cipher suites. + + SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 RC4-MD5 + SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5 + SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-MD5 + SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC2-MD5 + SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 IDEA-CBC-MD5 + SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC-MD5 + SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC3-MD5 + +=head1 NOTES + +The non-ephemeral DH modes are currently unimplemented in OpenSSL +because there is no support for DH certificates. + +Some compiled versions of OpenSSL may not include all the ciphers +listed here because some ciphers were excluded at compile time. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Verbose listing of all OpenSSL ciphers including NULL ciphers: + + openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL' + +Include all ciphers except NULL and anonymous DH then sort by +strength: + + openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!ADH:@STRENGTH' + +Include only 3DES ciphers and then place RSA ciphers last: + + openssl ciphers -v '3DES:+RSA' + +Include all RC4 ciphers but leave out those without authentication: + + openssl ciphers -v 'RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT' + +Include all chiphers with RSA authentication but leave out ciphers without +encryption. + + openssl ciphers -v 'RSA:!COMPLEMENTOFALL' + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<COMPLENTOFALL> and B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT> selection options were +added in version 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/config.pod b/doc/apps/config.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ace34b62bd2e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/config.pod @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ + +=pod + +=for comment openssl_manual_section:5 + +=head1 NAME + +config - OpenSSL CONF library configuration files + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The OpenSSL CONF library can be used to read configuration files. +It is used for the OpenSSL master configuration file B<openssl.cnf> +and in a few other places like B<SPKAC> files and certificate extension +files for the B<x509> utility. OpenSSL applications can also use the +CONF library for their own purposes. + +A configuration file is divided into a number of sections. Each section +starts with a line B<[ section_name ]> and ends when a new section is +started or end of file is reached. A section name can consist of +alphanumeric characters and underscores. + +The first section of a configuration file is special and is referred +to as the B<default> section this is usually unnamed and is from the +start of file until the first named section. When a name is being looked up +it is first looked up in a named section (if any) and then the +default section. + +The environment is mapped onto a section called B<ENV>. + +Comments can be included by preceding them with the B<#> character + +Each section in a configuration file consists of a number of name and +value pairs of the form B<name=value> + +The B<name> string can contain any alphanumeric characters as well as +a few punctuation symbols such as B<.> B<,> B<;> and B<_>. + +The B<value> string consists of the string following the B<=> character +until end of line with any leading and trailing white space removed. + +The value string undergoes variable expansion. This can be done by +including the form B<$var> or B<${var}>: this will substitute the value +of the named variable in the current section. It is also possible to +substitute a value from another section using the syntax B<$section::name> +or B<${section::name}>. By using the form B<$ENV::name> environment +variables can be substituted. It is also possible to assign values to +environment variables by using the name B<ENV::name>, this will work +if the program looks up environment variables using the B<CONF> library +instead of calling B<getenv()> directly. + +It is possible to escape certain characters by using any kind of quote +or the B<\> character. By making the last character of a line a B<\> +a B<value> string can be spread across multiple lines. In addition +the sequences B<\n>, B<\r>, B<\b> and B<\t> are recognized. + +=head1 OPENSSL LIBRARY CONFIGURATION + +In OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later applications can automatically configure certain +aspects of OpenSSL using the master OpenSSL configuration file, or optionally +an alternative configuration file. The B<openssl> utility includes this +functionality: any sub command uses the master OpenSSL configuration file +unless an option is used in the sub command to use an alternative configuration +file. + +To enable library configuration the default section needs to contain an +appropriate line which points to the main configuration section. The default +name is B<openssl_conf> which is used by the B<openssl> utility. Other +applications may use an alternative name such as B<myapplicaton_conf>. + +The configuration section should consist of a set of name value pairs which +contain specific module configuration information. The B<name> represents +the name of the I<configuration module> the meaning of the B<value> is +module specific: it may, for example, represent a further configuration +section containing configuration module specific information. E.g. + + openssl_conf = openssl_init + + [openssl_init] + + oid_section = new_oids + engines = engine_section + + [new_oids] + + ... new oids here ... + + [engine_section] + + ... engine stuff here ... + +Currently there are two configuration modules. One for ASN1 objects another +for ENGINE configuration. + +=head2 ASN1 OBJECT CONFIGURATION MODULE + +This module has the name B<oid_section>. The value of this variable points +to a section containing name value pairs of OIDs: the name is the OID short +and long name, the value is the numerical form of the OID. Although some of +the B<openssl> utility sub commands already have their own ASN1 OBJECT section +functionality not all do. By using the ASN1 OBJECT configuration module +B<all> the B<openssl> utility sub commands can see the new objects as well +as any compliant applications. For example: + + [new_oids] + + some_new_oid = 1.2.3.4 + some_other_oid = 1.2.3.5 + +In OpenSSL 0.9.8 it is also possible to set the value to the long name followed +by a comma and the numerical OID form. For example: + + shortName = some object long name, 1.2.3.4 + +=head2 ENGINE CONFIGURATION MODULE + +This ENGINE configuration module has the name B<engines>. The value of this +variable points to a section containing further ENGINE configuration +information. + +The section pointed to by B<engines> is a table of engine names (though see +B<engine_id> below) and further sections containing configuration informations +specific to each ENGINE. + +Each ENGINE specific section is used to set default algorithms, load +dynamic, perform initialization and send ctrls. The actual operation performed +depends on the I<command> name which is the name of the name value pair. The +currently supported commands are listed below. + +For example: + + [engine_section] + + # Configure ENGINE named "foo" + foo = foo_section + # Configure ENGINE named "bar" + bar = bar_section + + [foo_section] + ... foo ENGINE specific commands ... + + [bar_section] + ... "bar" ENGINE specific commands ... + +The command B<engine_id> is used to give the ENGINE name. If used this +command must be first. For example: + + [engine_section] + # This would normally handle an ENGINE named "foo" + foo = foo_section + + [foo_section] + # Override default name and use "myfoo" instead. + engine_id = myfoo + +The command B<dynamic_path> loads and adds an ENGINE from the given path. It +is equivalent to sending the ctrls B<SO_PATH> with the path argument followed +by B<LIST_ADD> with value 2 and B<LOAD> to the dynamic ENGINE. If this is +not the required behaviour then alternative ctrls can be sent directly +to the dynamic ENGINE using ctrl commands. + +The command B<init> determines whether to initialize the ENGINE. If the value +is B<0> the ENGINE will not be initialized, if B<1> and attempt it made to +initialized the ENGINE immediately. If the B<init> command is not present +then an attempt will be made to initialize the ENGINE after all commands in +its section have been processed. + +The command B<default_algorithms> sets the default algorithms an ENGINE will +supply using the functions B<ENGINE_set_default_string()> + +If the name matches none of the above command names it is assumed to be a +ctrl command which is sent to the ENGINE. The value of the command is the +argument to the ctrl command. If the value is the string B<EMPTY> then no +value is sent to the command. + +For example: + + + [engine_section] + + # Configure ENGINE named "foo" + foo = foo_section + + [foo_section] + # Load engine from DSO + dynamic_path = /some/path/fooengine.so + # A foo specific ctrl. + some_ctrl = some_value + # Another ctrl that doesn't take a value. + other_ctrl = EMPTY + # Supply all default algorithms + default_algorithms = ALL + +=head1 NOTES + +If a configuration file attempts to expand a variable that doesn't exist +then an error is flagged and the file will not load. This can happen +if an attempt is made to expand an environment variable that doesn't +exist. For example in a previous version of OpenSSL the default OpenSSL +master configuration file used the value of B<HOME> which may not be +defined on non Unix systems and would cause an error. + +This can be worked around by including a B<default> section to provide +a default value: then if the environment lookup fails the default value +will be used instead. For this to work properly the default value must +be defined earlier in the configuration file than the expansion. See +the B<EXAMPLES> section for an example of how to do this. + +If the same variable exists in the same section then all but the last +value will be silently ignored. In certain circumstances such as with +DNs the same field may occur multiple times. This is usually worked +around by ignoring any characters before an initial B<.> e.g. + + 1.OU="My first OU" + 2.OU="My Second OU" + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Here is a sample configuration file using some of the features +mentioned above. + + # This is the default section. + + HOME=/temp + RANDFILE= ${ENV::HOME}/.rnd + configdir=$ENV::HOME/config + + [ section_one ] + + # We are now in section one. + + # Quotes permit leading and trailing whitespace + any = " any variable name " + + other = A string that can \ + cover several lines \ + by including \\ characters + + message = Hello World\n + + [ section_two ] + + greeting = $section_one::message + +This next example shows how to expand environment variables safely. + +Suppose you want a variable called B<tmpfile> to refer to a +temporary filename. The directory it is placed in can determined by +the the B<TEMP> or B<TMP> environment variables but they may not be +set to any value at all. If you just include the environment variable +names and the variable doesn't exist then this will cause an error when +an attempt is made to load the configuration file. By making use of the +default section both values can be looked up with B<TEMP> taking +priority and B</tmp> used if neither is defined: + + TMP=/tmp + # The above value is used if TMP isn't in the environment + TEMP=$ENV::TMP + # The above value is used if TEMP isn't in the environment + tmpfile=${ENV::TEMP}/tmp.filename + +=head1 BUGS + +Currently there is no way to include characters using the octal B<\nnn> +form. Strings are all null terminated so nulls cannot form part of +the value. + +The escaping isn't quite right: if you want to use sequences like B<\n> +you can't use any quote escaping on the same line. + +Files are loaded in a single pass. This means that an variable expansion +will only work if the variables referenced are defined earlier in the +file. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/crl.pod b/doc/apps/crl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a40c873b9568 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/crl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +crl - CRL utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<crl> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-hash>] +[B<-issuer>] +[B<-lastupdate>] +[B<-nextupdate>] +[B<-CAfile file>] +[B<-CApath dir>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<crl> command processes CRL files in DER or PEM format. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. B<DER> format is DER encoded CRL +structure. B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of +the DER form with header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this +option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by +default. + +=item B<-text> + +print out the CRL in text form. + +=item B<-noout> + +don't output the encoded version of the CRL. + +=item B<-hash> + +output a hash of the issuer name. This can be use to lookup CRLs in +a directory by issuer name. + +=item B<-issuer> + +output the issuer name. + +=item B<-lastupdate> + +output the lastUpdate field. + +=item B<-nextupdate> + +output the nextUpdate field. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in +B<file> + +=item B<-CApath dir> + +verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in +B<dir>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that +is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked +to each certificate. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM CRL format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- + -----END X509 CRL----- + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Convert a CRL file from PEM to DER: + + openssl crl -in crl.pem -outform DER -out crl.der + +Output the text form of a DER encoded certificate: + + openssl crl -in crl.der -text -noout + +=head1 BUGS + +Ideally it should be possible to create a CRL using appropriate options +and files too. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<crl2pkcs7(1)|crl2pkcs7(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<x509(1)|x509(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod b/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3797bc0df4ef --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +crl2pkcs7 - Create a PKCS#7 structure from a CRL and certificates. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<crl2pkcs7> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-certfile filename>] +[B<-nocrl>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<crl2pkcs7> command takes an optional CRL and one or more +certificates and converts them into a PKCS#7 degenerate "certificates +only" structure. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the CRL input format. B<DER> format is DER encoded CRL +structure.B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of +the DER form with header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the PKCS#7 structure output format. B<DER> format is DER +encoded PKCS#7 structure.B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of +the DER form with header and footer lines. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a CRL from or standard input if this +option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +specifies the output filename to write the PKCS#7 structure to or standard +output by default. + +=item B<-certfile filename> + +specifies a filename containing one or more certificates in B<PEM> format. +All certificates in the file will be added to the PKCS#7 structure. This +option can be used more than once to read certificates form multiple +files. + +=item B<-nocrl> + +normally a CRL is included in the output file. With this option no CRL is +included in the output file and a CRL is not read from the input file. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Create a PKCS#7 structure from a certificate and CRL: + + openssl crl2pkcs7 -in crl.pem -certfile cert.pem -out p7.pem + +Creates a PKCS#7 structure in DER format with no CRL from several +different certificates: + + openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile newcert.pem + -certfile demoCA/cacert.pem -outform DER -out p7.der + +=head1 NOTES + +The output file is a PKCS#7 signed data structure containing no signers and +just certificates and an optional CRL. + +This utility can be used to send certificates and CAs to Netscape as part of +the certificate enrollment process. This involves sending the DER encoded output +as MIME type application/x-x509-user-cert. + +The B<PEM> encoded form with the header and footer lines removed can be used to +install user certificates and CAs in MSIE using the Xenroll control. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<pkcs7(1)|pkcs7(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/dgst.pod b/doc/apps/dgst.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b0d198724c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/dgst.pod @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +dgst, md5, md4, md2, sha1, sha, mdc2, ripemd160 - message digests + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<dgst> +[B<-md5|-md4|-md2|-sha1|-sha|-mdc2|-ripemd160|-dss1>] +[B<-c>] +[B<-d>] +[B<-hex>] +[B<-binary>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-sign filename>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-verify filename>] +[B<-prverify filename>] +[B<-signature filename>] +[B<file...>] + +[B<md5|md4|md2|sha1|sha|mdc2|ripemd160>] +[B<-c>] +[B<-d>] +[B<file...>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The digest functions output the message digest of a supplied file or files +in hexadecimal form. They can also be used for digital signing and verification. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-c> + +print out the digest in two digit groups separated by colons, only relevant if +B<hex> format output is used. + +=item B<-d> + +print out BIO debugging information. + +=item B<-hex> + +digest is to be output as a hex dump. This is the default case for a "normal" +digest as opposed to a digital signature. + +=item B<-binary> + +output the digest or signature in binary form. + +=item B<-out filename> + +filename to output to, or standard output by default. + +=item B<-sign filename> + +digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename". + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-verify filename> + +verify the signature using the the public key in "filename". +The output is either "Verification OK" or "Verification Failure". + +=item B<-prverify filename> + +verify the signature using the the private key in "filename". + +=item B<-signature filename> + +the actual signature to verify. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<file...> + +file or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is +used. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The digest of choice for all new applications is SHA1. Other digests are +however still widely used. + +If you wish to sign or verify data using the DSA algorithm then the dss1 +digest must be used. + +A source of random numbers is required for certain signing algorithms, in +particular DSA. + +The signing and verify options should only be used if a single file is +being signed or verified. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/dhparam.pod b/doc/apps/dhparam.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c31db95a4732 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/dhparam.pod @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +dhparam - DH parameter manipulation and generation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl dhparam> +[B<-inform DER|PEM>] +[B<-outform DER|PEM>] +[B<-in> I<filename>] +[B<-out> I<filename>] +[B<-dsaparam>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-C>] +[B<-2>] +[B<-5>] +[B<-rand> I<file(s)>] +[B<-engine id>] +[I<numbits>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This command is used to manipulate DH parameter files. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded +form compatible with the PKCS#3 DHparameter structure. The PEM form is the +default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with +additional header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in> I<filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if +this option is not specified. + +=item B<-out> I<filename> + +This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used +if this option is not present. The output filename should B<not> be the same +as the input filename. + +=item B<-dsaparam> + +If this option is used, DSA rather than DH parameters are read or created; +they are converted to DH format. Otherwise, "strong" primes (such +that (p-1)/2 is also prime) will be used for DH parameter generation. + +DH parameter generation with the B<-dsaparam> option is much faster, +and the recommended exponent length is shorter, which makes DH key +exchange more efficient. Beware that with such DSA-style DH +parameters, a fresh DH key should be created for each use to +avoid small-subgroup attacks that may be possible otherwise. + +=item B<-2>, B<-5> + +The generator to use, either 2 or 5. 2 is the default. If present then the +input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. + +=item B<-rand> I<file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item I<numbits> + +this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size +I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If not present then a value of 512 +is used. If this option is present then the input file is ignored and +parameters are generated instead. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters. + +=item B<-text> + +this option prints out the DH parameters in human readable form. + +=item B<-C> + +this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then +be loaded by calling the B<get_dh>I<numbits>B<()> function. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 WARNINGS + +The program B<dhparam> combines the functionality of the programs B<dh> and +B<gendh> in previous versions of OpenSSL and SSLeay. The B<dh> and B<gendh> +programs are retained for now but may have different purposes in future +versions of OpenSSL. + +=head1 NOTES + +PEM format DH parameters use the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- + -----END DH PARAMETERS----- + +OpenSSL currently only supports the older PKCS#3 DH, not the newer X9.42 +DH. + +This program manipulates DH parameters not keys. + +=head1 BUGS + +There should be a way to generate and manipulate DH keys. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsaparam(1)|dsaparam(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<dhparam> command was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. +The B<-dsaparam> option was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/dsa.pod b/doc/apps/dsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ed06b8806d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/dsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +dsa - DSA key processing + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<dsa> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-idea>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-modulus>] +[B<-pubin>] +[B<-pubout>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<dsa> command processes DSA keys. They can be converted between various +forms and their components printed out. B<Note> This command uses the +traditional SSLeay compatible format for private key encryption: newer +applications should use the more secure PKCS#8 format using the B<pkcs8> + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option with a private key uses +an ASN1 DER encoded form of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE consisting of the values of +version (currently zero), p, q, g, the public and private key components +respectively as ASN.1 INTEGERs. When used with a public key it uses a +SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure: it is an error if the key is not DSA. + +The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 +encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key +PKCS#8 format is also accepted. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this +option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be +prompted for. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by +is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be +prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input +filename. + +=item B<-passout arg> + +the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-des|-des3|-idea> + +These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the +IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for. +If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This +means that using the B<dsa> utility to read in an encrypted key with no +encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by +setting the encryption options it can be use to add or change the pass phrase. +These options can only be used with PEM format output files. + +=item B<-text> + +prints out the public, private key components and parameters. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key. + +=item B<-modulus> + +this option prints out the value of the public key component of the key. + +=item B<-pubin> + +by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a +public key is read instead. + +=item B<-pubout> + +by default a private key is output. With this option a public +key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if the input is +a public key. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- + -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- + +The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- + -----END PUBLIC KEY----- + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +To remove the pass phrase on a DSA private key: + + openssl dsa -in key.pem -out keyout.pem + +To encrypt a private key using triple DES: + + openssl dsa -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem + +To convert a private key from PEM to DER format: + + openssl dsa -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der + +To print out the components of a private key to standard output: + + openssl dsa -in key.pem -text -noout + +To just output the public part of a private key: + + openssl dsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsaparam(1)|dsaparam(1)>, L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>, +L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod b/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b9b1b93b42ec --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +dsaparam - DSA parameter manipulation and generation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl dsaparam> +[B<-inform DER|PEM>] +[B<-outform DER|PEM>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-C>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] +[B<-genkey>] +[B<-engine id>] +[B<numbits>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This command is used to manipulate or generate DSA parameter files. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded +form compatible with RFC2459 (PKIX) DSS-Parms that is a SEQUENCE consisting +of p, q and g respectively. The PEM form is the default format: it consists +of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if +this option is not specified. If the B<numbits> parameter is included then +this option will be ignored. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used +if this option is not present. The output filename should B<not> be the same +as the input filename. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters. + +=item B<-text> + +this option prints out the DSA parameters in human readable form. + +=item B<-C> + +this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then +be loaded by calling the B<get_dsaXXX()> function. + +=item B<-genkey> + +this option will generate a DSA either using the specified or generated +parameters. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<numbits> + +this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size +B<numbits>. It must be the last option. If this option is included then +the input file (if any) is ignored. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +PEM format DSA parameters use the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS----- + -----END DSA PARAMETERS----- + +DSA parameter generation is a slow process and as a result the same set of +DSA parameters is often used to generate several distinct keys. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, +L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/ec.pod b/doc/apps/ec.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1d4a36dbf403 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/ec.pod @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ec - EC key processing + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<ec> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-idea>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-param_out>] +[B<-pubin>] +[B<-pubout>] +[B<-conv_form arg>] +[B<-param_enc arg>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<ec> command processes EC keys. They can be converted between various +forms and their components printed out. B<Note> OpenSSL uses the +private key format specified in 'SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography' +(http://www.secg.org/). To convert a OpenSSL EC private key into the +PKCS#8 private key format use the B<pkcs8> command. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option with a private key uses +an ASN.1 DER encoded SEC1 private key. When used with a public key it +uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structur as specified in RFC 3280. +The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 +encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key +PKCS#8 format is also accepted. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this +option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be +prompted for. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by +is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be +prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input +filename. + +=item B<-passout arg> + +the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-des|-des3|-idea> + +These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, IDEA or +any other cipher supported by OpenSSL before outputting it. A pass phrase is +prompted for. +If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This +means that using the B<ec> utility to read in an encrypted key with no +encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by +setting the encryption options it can be use to add or change the pass phrase. +These options can only be used with PEM format output files. + +=item B<-text> + +prints out the public, private key components and parameters. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key. + +=item B<-modulus> + +this option prints out the value of the public key component of the key. + +=item B<-pubin> + +by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a +public key is read instead. + +=item B<-pubout> + +by default a private key is output. With this option a public +key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if the input is +a public key. + +=item B<-conv_form> + +This specifies how the points on the elliptic curve are converted +into octet strings. Possible values are: B<compressed> (the default +value), B<uncompressed> and B<hybrid>. For more information regarding +the point conversion forms please read the X9.62 standard. +B<Note> Due to patent issues the B<compressed> option is disabled +by default for binary curves and can be enabled by defining +the preprocessor macro B<OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP> at compile time. + +=item B<-param_enc arg> + +This specifies how the elliptic curve parameters are encoded. +Possible value are: B<named_curve>, i.e. the ec parameters are +specified by a OID, or B<explicit> where the ec parameters are +explicitly given (see RFC 3279 for the definition of the +EC parameters structures). The default value is B<named_curve>. +B<Note> the B<implicitlyCA> alternative ,as specified in RFC 3279, +is currently not implemented in OpenSSL. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- + -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- + +The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- + -----END PUBLIC KEY----- + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +To encrypt a private key using triple DES: + + openssl ec -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem + +To convert a private key from PEM to DER format: + + openssl ec -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der + +To print out the components of a private key to standard output: + + openssl ec -in key.pem -text -noout + +To just output the public part of a private key: + + openssl ec -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem + +To change the parameters encoding to B<explicit>: + + openssl ec -in key.pem -param_enc explicit -out keyout.pem + +To change the point conversion form to B<compressed>: + + openssl ec -in key.pem -conv_form compressed -out keyout.pem + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ecparam(1)|ecparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The ec command was first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8. + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project (http://www.openssl.org). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/ecparam.pod b/doc/apps/ecparam.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1a12105da733 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/ecparam.pod @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ecparam - EC parameter manipulation and generation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl ecparam> +[B<-inform DER|PEM>] +[B<-outform DER|PEM>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-C>] +[B<-check>] +[B<-name arg>] +[B<-list_curve>] +[B<-conv_form arg>] +[B<-param_enc arg>] +[B<-no_seed>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] +[B<-genkey>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This command is used to manipulate or generate EC parameter files. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN.1 DER encoded +form compatible with RFC 3279 EcpkParameters. The PEM form is the default +format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional +header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if +this option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used +if this option is not present. The output filename should B<not> be the same +as the input filename. + +=item B<-noout> + +This option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters. + +=item B<-text> + +This option prints out the EC parameters in human readable form. + +=item B<-C> + +This option converts the EC parameters into C code. The parameters can then +be loaded by calling the B<get_ec_group_XXX()> function. + +=item B<-check> + +Validate the elliptic curve parameters. + +=item B<-name arg> + +Use the EC parameters with the specified 'short' name. Use B<-list_curves> +to get a list of all currently implemented EC parameters. + +=item B<-list_curves> + +If this options is specified B<ecparam> will print out a list of all +currently implemented EC parameters names and exit. + +=item B<-conv_form> + +This specifies how the points on the elliptic curve are converted +into octet strings. Possible values are: B<compressed> (the default +value), B<uncompressed> and B<hybrid>. For more information regarding +the point conversion forms please read the X9.62 standard. +B<Note> Due to patent issues the B<compressed> option is disabled +by default for binary curves and can be enabled by defining +the preprocessor macro B<OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP> at compile time. + +=item B<-param_enc arg> + +This specifies how the elliptic curve parameters are encoded. +Possible value are: B<named_curve>, i.e. the ec parameters are +specified by a OID, or B<explicit> where the ec parameters are +explicitly given (see RFC 3279 for the definition of the +EC parameters structures). The default value is B<named_curve>. +B<Note> the B<implicitlyCA> alternative ,as specified in RFC 3279, +is currently not implemented in OpenSSL. + +=item B<-no_seed> + +This option inhibits that the 'seed' for the parameter generation +is included in the ECParameters structure (see RFC 3279). + +=item B<-genkey> + +This option will generate a EC private key using the specified parameters. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +PEM format EC parameters use the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS----- + -----END EC PARAMETERS----- + +OpenSSL is currently not able to generate new groups and therefore +B<ecparam> can only create EC parameters from known (named) curves. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +To create EC parameters with the group 'prime192v1': + + openssl ecparam -out ec_param.pem -name prime192v1 + +To create EC parameters with explicit parameters: + + openssl ecparam -out ec_param.pem -name prime192v1 -param_enc explicit + +To validate given EC parameters: + + openssl ecparam -in ec_param.pem -check + +To create EC parameters and a private key: + + openssl ecparam -out ec_key.pem -name prime192v1 -genkey + +To change the point encoding to 'compressed': + + openssl ecparam -in ec_in.pem -out ec_out.pem -conv_form compressed + +To print out the EC parameters to standard output: + + openssl ecparam -in ec_param.pem -noout -text + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ec(1)|ec(1)>, L<dsaparam(1)|dsaparam(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The ecparam command was first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8. + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project (http://www.openssl.org) + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/enc.pod b/doc/apps/enc.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c43da5b3f1ee --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/enc.pod @@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +enc - symmetric cipher routines + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl enc -ciphername> +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-pass arg>] +[B<-e>] +[B<-d>] +[B<-a>] +[B<-A>] +[B<-k password>] +[B<-kfile filename>] +[B<-K key>] +[B<-iv IV>] +[B<-p>] +[B<-P>] +[B<-bufsize number>] +[B<-nopad>] +[B<-debug>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The symmetric cipher commands allow data to be encrypted or decrypted +using various block and stream ciphers using keys based on passwords +or explicitly provided. Base64 encoding or decoding can also be performed +either by itself or in addition to the encryption or decryption. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-in filename> + +the input filename, standard input by default. + +=item B<-out filename> + +the output filename, standard output by default. + +=item B<-pass arg> + +the password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-salt> + +use a salt in the key derivation routines. This option should B<ALWAYS> +be used unless compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL or SSLeay +is required. This option is only present on OpenSSL versions 0.9.5 or +above. + +=item B<-nosalt> + +don't use a salt in the key derivation routines. This is the default for +compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL and SSLeay. + +=item B<-e> + +encrypt the input data: this is the default. + +=item B<-d> + +decrypt the input data. + +=item B<-a> + +base64 process the data. This means that if encryption is taking place +the data is base64 encoded after encryption. If decryption is set then +the input data is base64 decoded before being decrypted. + +=item B<-A> + +if the B<-a> option is set then base64 process the data on one line. + +=item B<-k password> + +the password to derive the key from. This is for compatibility with previous +versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by the B<-pass> argument. + +=item B<-kfile filename> + +read the password to derive the key from the first line of B<filename>. +This is for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by +the B<-pass> argument. + +=item B<-S salt> + +the actual salt to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only +of hex digits. + +=item B<-K key> + +the actual key to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only +of hex digits. If only the key is specified, the IV must additionally specified +using the B<-iv> option. When both a key and a password are specified, the +key given with the B<-K> option will be used and the IV generated from the +password will be taken. It probably does not make much sense to specify +both key and password. + +=item B<-iv IV> + +the actual IV to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only +of hex digits. When only the key is specified using the B<-K> option, the +IV must explicitly be defined. When a password is being specified using +one of the other options, the IV is generated from this password. + +=item B<-p> + +print out the key and IV used. + +=item B<-P> + +print out the key and IV used then immediately exit: don't do any encryption +or decryption. + +=item B<-bufsize number> + +set the buffer size for I/O + +=item B<-nopad> + +disable standard block padding + +=item B<-debug> + +debug the BIOs used for I/O. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The program can be called either as B<openssl ciphername> or +B<openssl enc -ciphername>. + +A password will be prompted for to derive the key and IV if necessary. + +The B<-salt> option should B<ALWAYS> be used if the key is being derived +from a password unless you want compatibility with previous versions of +OpenSSL and SSLeay. + +Without the B<-salt> option it is possible to perform efficient dictionary +attacks on the password and to attack stream cipher encrypted data. The reason +for this is that without the salt the same password always generates the same +encryption key. When the salt is being used the first eight bytes of the +encrypted data are reserved for the salt: it is generated at random when +encrypting a file and read from the encrypted file when it is decrypted. + +Some of the ciphers do not have large keys and others have security +implications if not used correctly. A beginner is advised to just use +a strong block cipher in CBC mode such as bf or des3. + +All the block ciphers normally use PKCS#5 padding also known as standard block +padding: this allows a rudimentary integrity or password check to be +performed. However since the chance of random data passing the test is +better than 1 in 256 it isn't a very good test. + +If padding is disabled then the input data must be a multiple of the cipher +block length. + +All RC2 ciphers have the same key and effective key length. + +Blowfish and RC5 algorithms use a 128 bit key. + +=head1 SUPPORTED CIPHERS + + base64 Base 64 + + bf-cbc Blowfish in CBC mode + bf Alias for bf-cbc + bf-cfb Blowfish in CFB mode + bf-ecb Blowfish in ECB mode + bf-ofb Blowfish in OFB mode + + cast-cbc CAST in CBC mode + cast Alias for cast-cbc + cast5-cbc CAST5 in CBC mode + cast5-cfb CAST5 in CFB mode + cast5-ecb CAST5 in ECB mode + cast5-ofb CAST5 in OFB mode + + des-cbc DES in CBC mode + des Alias for des-cbc + des-cfb DES in CBC mode + des-ofb DES in OFB mode + des-ecb DES in ECB mode + + des-ede-cbc Two key triple DES EDE in CBC mode + des-ede Two key triple DES EDE in ECB mode + des-ede-cfb Two key triple DES EDE in CFB mode + des-ede-ofb Two key triple DES EDE in OFB mode + + des-ede3-cbc Three key triple DES EDE in CBC mode + des-ede3 Three key triple DES EDE in ECB mode + des3 Alias for des-ede3-cbc + des-ede3-cfb Three key triple DES EDE CFB mode + des-ede3-ofb Three key triple DES EDE in OFB mode + + desx DESX algorithm. + + idea-cbc IDEA algorithm in CBC mode + idea same as idea-cbc + idea-cfb IDEA in CFB mode + idea-ecb IDEA in ECB mode + idea-ofb IDEA in OFB mode + + rc2-cbc 128 bit RC2 in CBC mode + rc2 Alias for rc2-cbc + rc2-cfb 128 bit RC2 in CFB mode + rc2-ecb 128 bit RC2 in ECB mode + rc2-ofb 128 bit RC2 in OFB mode + rc2-64-cbc 64 bit RC2 in CBC mode + rc2-40-cbc 40 bit RC2 in CBC mode + + rc4 128 bit RC4 + rc4-64 64 bit RC4 + rc4-40 40 bit RC4 + + rc5-cbc RC5 cipher in CBC mode + rc5 Alias for rc5-cbc + rc5-cfb RC5 cipher in CFB mode + rc5-ecb RC5 cipher in ECB mode + rc5-ofb RC5 cipher in OFB mode + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Just base64 encode a binary file: + + openssl base64 -in file.bin -out file.b64 + +Decode the same file + + openssl base64 -d -in file.b64 -out file.bin + +Encrypt a file using triple DES in CBC mode using a prompted password: + + openssl des3 -salt -in file.txt -out file.des3 + +Decrypt a file using a supplied password: + + openssl des3 -d -salt -in file.des3 -out file.txt -k mypassword + +Encrypt a file then base64 encode it (so it can be sent via mail for example) +using Blowfish in CBC mode: + + openssl bf -a -salt -in file.txt -out file.bf + +Base64 decode a file then decrypt it: + + openssl bf -d -salt -a -in file.bf -out file.txt + +Decrypt some data using a supplied 40 bit RC4 key: + + openssl rc4-40 -in file.rc4 -out file.txt -K 0102030405 + +=head1 BUGS + +The B<-A> option when used with large files doesn't work properly. + +There should be an option to allow an iteration count to be included. + +The B<enc> program only supports a fixed number of algorithms with +certain parameters. So if, for example, you want to use RC2 with a +76 bit key or RC4 with an 84 bit key you can't use this program. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/errstr.pod b/doc/apps/errstr.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b3c6ccfc9cbd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/errstr.pod @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +errstr - lookup error codes + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl errstr error_code> + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Sometimes an application will not load error message and only +numerical forms will be available. The B<errstr> utility can be used to +display the meaning of the hex code. The hex code is the hex digits after the +second colon. + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +The error code: + + 27594:error:2006D080:lib(32):func(109):reason(128):bss_file.c:107: + +can be displayed with: + + openssl errstr 2006D080 + +to produce the error message: + + error:2006D080:BIO routines:BIO_new_file:no such file + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, +L<ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)|ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)>, +L<SSL_load_error_strings(3)|SSL_load_error_strings(3)> + + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/gendsa.pod b/doc/apps/gendsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2c56cc788897 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/gendsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +gendsa - generate a DSA private key from a set of parameters + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<gendsa> +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-idea>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] +[B<-engine id>] +[B<paramfile>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<gendsa> command generates a DSA private key from a DSA parameter file +(which will be typically generated by the B<openssl dsaparam> command). + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-des|-des3|-idea> + +These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the +IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for. +If none of these options is specified no encryption is used. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=item B<paramfile> + +This option specifies the DSA parameter file to use. The parameters in this +file determine the size of the private key. DSA parameters can be generated +and examined using the B<openssl dsaparam> command. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +DSA key generation is little more than random number generation so it is +much quicker that RSA key generation for example. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsaparam(1)|dsaparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, +L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/genrsa.pod b/doc/apps/genrsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25af4d1475cd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/genrsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +genrsa - generate an RSA private key + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<genrsa> +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-idea>] +[B<-f4>] +[B<-3>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] +[B<-engine id>] +[B<numbits>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<genrsa> command generates an RSA private key. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-out filename> + +the output filename. If this argument is not specified then standard output is +used. + +=item B<-passout arg> + +the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-des|-des3|-idea> + +These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the +IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. If none of these options is +specified no encryption is used. If encryption is used a pass phrase is prompted +for if it is not supplied via the B<-passout> argument. + +=item B<-F4|-3> + +the public exponent to use, either 65537 or 3. The default is 65537. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=item B<numbits> + +the size of the private key to generate in bits. This must be the last option +specified. The default is 512. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two prime +numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to +indicate the progress of the generation. A B<.> represents each number which +has passed an initial sieve test, B<+> means a number has passed a single +round of the Miller-Rabin primality test. A newline means that the number has +passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size). + +Because key generation is a random process the time taken to generate a key +may vary somewhat. + +=head1 BUGS + +A quirk of the prime generation algorithm is that it cannot generate small +primes. Therefore the number of bits should not be less that 64. For typical +private keys this will not matter because for security reasons they will +be much larger (typically 1024 bits). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)> + +=cut + diff --git a/doc/apps/nseq.pod b/doc/apps/nseq.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..989c3108fb83 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/nseq.pod @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +nseq - create or examine a netscape certificate sequence + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<nseq> +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-toseq>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<nseq> command takes a file containing a Netscape certificate +sequence and prints out the certificates contained in it or takes a +file of certificates and converts it into a Netscape certificate +sequence. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read or standard input if this +option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +specifies the output filename or standard output by default. + +=item B<-toseq> + +normally a Netscape certificate sequence will be input and the output +is the certificates contained in it. With the B<-toseq> option the +situation is reversed: a Netscape certificate sequence is created from +a file of certificates. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Output the certificates in a Netscape certificate sequence + + openssl nseq -in nseq.pem -out certs.pem + +Create a Netscape certificate sequence + + openssl nseq -in certs.pem -toseq -out nseq.pem + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<PEM> encoded form uses the same headers and footers as a certificate: + + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- + -----END CERTIFICATE----- + +A Netscape certificate sequence is a Netscape specific form that can be sent +to browsers as an alternative to the standard PKCS#7 format when several +certificates are sent to the browser: for example during certificate enrollment. +It is used by Netscape certificate server for example. + +=head1 BUGS + +This program needs a few more options: like allowing DER or PEM input and +output files and allowing multiple certificate files to be used. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/doc/apps/ocsp.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4f266058e536 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/ocsp.pod @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ocsp - Online Certificate Status Protocol utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<ocsp> +[B<-out file>] +[B<-issuer file>] +[B<-cert file>] +[B<-serial n>] +[B<-signer file>] +[B<-signkey file>] +[B<-sign_other file>] +[B<-no_certs>] +[B<-req_text>] +[B<-resp_text>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-reqout file>] +[B<-respout file>] +[B<-reqin file>] +[B<-respin file>] +[B<-nonce>] +[B<-no_nonce>] +[B<-url URL>] +[B<-host host:n>] +[B<-path>] +[B<-CApath dir>] +[B<-CAfile file>] +[B<-VAfile file>] +[B<-validity_period n>] +[B<-status_age n>] +[B<-noverify>] +[B<-verify_other file>] +[B<-trust_other>] +[B<-no_intern>] +[B<-no_signature_verify>] +[B<-no_cert_verify>] +[B<-no_chain>] +[B<-no_cert_checks>] +[B<-port num>] +[B<-index file>] +[B<-CA file>] +[B<-rsigner file>] +[B<-rkey file>] +[B<-rother file>] +[B<-resp_no_certs>] +[B<-nmin n>] +[B<-ndays n>] +[B<-resp_key_id>] +[B<-nrequest n>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to +determine the (revocation) state of an identified certificate (RFC 2560). + +The B<ocsp> command performs many common OCSP tasks. It can be used +to print out requests and responses, create requests and send queries +to an OCSP responder and behave like a mini OCSP server itself. + +=head1 OCSP CLIENT OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-out filename> + +specify output filename, default is standard output. + +=item B<-issuer filename> + +This specifies the current issuer certificate. This option can be used +multiple times. The certificate specified in B<filename> must be in +PEM format. + +=item B<-cert filename> + +Add the certificate B<filename> to the request. The issuer certificate +is taken from the previous B<issuer> option, or an error occurs if no +issuer certificate is specified. + +=item B<-serial num> + +Same as the B<cert> option except the certificate with serial number +B<num> is added to the request. The serial number is interpreted as a +decimal integer unless preceded by B<0x>. Negative integers can also +be specified by preceding the value by a B<-> sign. + +=item B<-signer filename>, B<-signkey filename> + +Sign the OCSP request using the certificate specified in the B<signer> +option and the private key specified by the B<signkey> option. If +the B<signkey> option is not present then the private key is read +from the same file as the certificate. If neither option is specified then +the OCSP request is not signed. + +=item B<-sign_other filename> + +Additional certificates to include in the signed request. + +=item B<-nonce>, B<-no_nonce> + +Add an OCSP nonce extension to a request or disable OCSP nonce addition. +Normally if an OCSP request is input using the B<respin> option no +nonce is added: using the B<nonce> option will force addition of a nonce. +If an OCSP request is being created (using B<cert> and B<serial> options) +a nonce is automatically added specifying B<no_nonce> overrides this. + +=item B<-req_text>, B<-resp_text>, B<-text> + +print out the text form of the OCSP request, response or both respectively. + +=item B<-reqout file>, B<-respout file> + +write out the DER encoded certificate request or response to B<file>. + +=item B<-reqin file>, B<-respin file> + +read OCSP request or response file from B<file>. These option are ignored +if OCSP request or response creation is implied by other options (for example +with B<serial>, B<cert> and B<host> options). + +=item B<-url responder_url> + +specify the responder URL. Both HTTP and HTTPS (SSL/TLS) URLs can be specified. + +=item B<-host hostname:port>, B<-path pathname> + +if the B<host> option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host +B<hostname> on port B<port>. B<path> specifies the HTTP path name to use +or "/" by default. + +=item B<-CAfile file>, B<-CApath pathname> + +file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify +the signature on the OCSP response. + +=item B<-verify_other file> + +file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate +the OCSP response signing certificate. Some responders omit the actual signer's +certificate from the response: this option can be used to supply the necessary +certificate in such cases. + +=item B<-trust_other> + +the certificates specified by the B<-verify_certs> option should be explicitly +trusted and no additional checks will be performed on them. This is useful +when the complete responder certificate chain is not available or trusting a +root CA is not appropriate. + +=item B<-VAfile file> + +file containing explicitly trusted responder certificates. Equivalent to the +B<-verify_certs> and B<-trust_other> options. + +=item B<-noverify> + +don't attempt to verify the OCSP response signature or the nonce values. This +option will normally only be used for debugging since it disables all verification +of the responders certificate. + +=item B<-no_intern> + +ignore certificates contained in the OCSP response when searching for the +signers certificate. With this option the signers certificate must be specified +with either the B<-verify_certs> or B<-VAfile> options. + +=item B<-no_signature_verify> + +don't check the signature on the OCSP response. Since this option tolerates invalid +signatures on OCSP responses it will normally only be used for testing purposes. + +=item B<-no_cert_verify> + +don't verify the OCSP response signers certificate at all. Since this option allows +the OCSP response to be signed by any certificate it should only be used for +testing purposes. + +=item B<-no_chain> + +do not use certificates in the response as additional untrusted CA +certificates. + +=item B<-no_cert_checks> + +don't perform any additional checks on the OCSP response signers certificate. +That is do not make any checks to see if the signers certificate is authorised +to provide the necessary status information: as a result this option should +only be used for testing purposes. + +=item B<-validity_period nsec>, B<-status_age age> + +these options specify the range of times, in seconds, which will be tolerated +in an OCSP response. Each certificate status response includes a B<notBefore> time and +an optional B<notAfter> time. The current time should fall between these two values, but +the interval between the two times may be only a few seconds. In practice the OCSP +responder and clients clocks may not be precisely synchronised and so such a check +may fail. To avoid this the B<-validity_period> option can be used to specify an +acceptable error range in seconds, the default value is 5 minutes. + +If the B<notAfter> time is omitted from a response then this means that new status +information is immediately available. In this case the age of the B<notBefore> field +is checked to see it is not older than B<age> seconds old. By default this additional +check is not performed. + +=back + +=head1 OCSP SERVER OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-index indexfile> + +B<indexfile> is a text index file in B<ca> format containing certificate revocation +information. + +If the B<index> option is specified the B<ocsp> utility is in responder mode, otherwise +it is in client mode. The request(s) the responder processes can be either specified on +the command line (using B<issuer> and B<serial> options), supplied in a file (using the +B<respin> option) or via external OCSP clients (if B<port> or B<url> is specified). + +If the B<index> option is present then the B<CA> and B<rsigner> options must also be +present. + +=item B<-CA file> + +CA certificate corresponding to the revocation information in B<indexfile>. + +=item B<-rsigner file> + +The certificate to sign OCSP responses with. + +=item B<-rother file> + +Additional certificates to include in the OCSP response. + +=item B<-resp_no_certs> + +Don't include any certificates in the OCSP response. + +=item B<-resp_key_id> + +Identify the signer certificate using the key ID, default is to use the subject name. + +=item B<-rkey file> + +The private key to sign OCSP responses with: if not present the file specified in the +B<rsigner> option is used. + +=item B<-port portnum> + +Port to listen for OCSP requests on. The port may also be specified using the B<url> +option. + +=item B<-nrequest number> + +The OCSP server will exit after receiving B<number> requests, default unlimited. + +=item B<-nmin minutes>, B<-ndays days> + +Number of minutes or days when fresh revocation information is available: used in the +B<nextUpdate> field. If neither option is present then the B<nextUpdate> field is +omitted meaning fresh revocation information is immediately available. + +=back + +=head1 OCSP Response verification. + +OCSP Response follows the rules specified in RFC2560. + +Initially the OCSP responder certificate is located and the signature on +the OCSP request checked using the responder certificate's public key. + +Then a normal certificate verify is performed on the OCSP responder certificate +building up a certificate chain in the process. The locations of the trusted +certificates used to build the chain can be specified by the B<CAfile> +and B<CApath> options or they will be looked for in the standard OpenSSL +certificates directory. + +If the initial verify fails then the OCSP verify process halts with an +error. + +Otherwise the issuing CA certificate in the request is compared to the OCSP +responder certificate: if there is a match then the OCSP verify succeeds. + +Otherwise the OCSP responder certificate's CA is checked against the issuing +CA certificate in the request. If there is a match and the OCSPSigning +extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder certificate then the +OCSP verify succeeds. + +Otherwise the root CA of the OCSP responders CA is checked to see if it +is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP verify succeeds. + +If none of these checks is successful then the OCSP verify fails. + +What this effectively means if that if the OCSP responder certificate is +authorised directly by the CA it is issuing revocation information about +(and it is correctly configured) then verification will succeed. + +If the OCSP responder is a "global responder" which can give details about +multiple CAs and has its own separate certificate chain then its root +CA can be trusted for OCSP signing. For example: + + openssl x509 -in ocspCA.pem -addtrust OCSPSigning -out trustedCA.pem + +Alternatively the responder certificate itself can be explicitly trusted +with the B<-VAfile> option. + +=head1 NOTES + +As noted, most of the verify options are for testing or debugging purposes. +Normally only the B<-CApath>, B<-CAfile> and (if the responder is a 'global +VA') B<-VAfile> options need to be used. + +The OCSP server is only useful for test and demonstration purposes: it is +not really usable as a full OCSP responder. It contains only a very +simple HTTP request handling and can only handle the POST form of OCSP +queries. It also handles requests serially meaning it cannot respond to +new requests until it has processed the current one. The text index file +format of revocation is also inefficient for large quantities of revocation +data. + +It is possible to run the B<ocsp> application in responder mode via a CGI +script using the B<respin> and B<respout> options. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Create an OCSP request and write it to a file: + + openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem -reqout req.der + +Send a query to an OCSP responder with URL http://ocsp.myhost.com/ save the +response to a file and print it out in text form + + openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem \ + -url http://ocsp.myhost.com/ -resp_text -respout resp.der + +Read in an OCSP response and print out text form: + + openssl ocsp -respin resp.der -text + +OCSP server on port 8888 using a standard B<ca> configuration, and a separate +responder certificate. All requests and responses are printed to a file. + + openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem + -text -out log.txt + +As above but exit after processing one request: + + openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem + -nrequest 1 + +Query status information using internally generated request: + + openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem + -issuer demoCA/cacert.pem -serial 1 + +Query status information using request read from a file, write response to a +second file. + + openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem + -reqin req.der -respout resp.der diff --git a/doc/apps/openssl.pod b/doc/apps/openssl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dc0f49ddca63 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/openssl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +openssl - OpenSSL command line tool + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> +I<command> +[ I<command_opts> ] +[ I<command_args> ] + +B<openssl> [ B<list-standard-commands> | B<list-message-digest-commands> | B<list-cipher-commands> ] + +B<openssl> B<no->I<XXX> [ I<arbitrary options> ] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +OpenSSL is a cryptography toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL +v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) network protocols and related +cryptography standards required by them. + +The B<openssl> program is a command line tool for using the various +cryptography functions of OpenSSL's B<crypto> library from the shell. +It can be used for + + o Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters + o Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs + o Calculation of Message Digests + o Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers + o SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests + o Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail + +=head1 COMMAND SUMMARY + +The B<openssl> program provides a rich variety of commands (I<command> in the +SYNOPSIS above), each of which often has a wealth of options and arguments +(I<command_opts> and I<command_args> in the SYNOPSIS). + +The pseudo-commands B<list-standard-commands>, B<list-message-digest-commands>, +and B<list-cipher-commands> output a list (one entry per line) of the names +of all standard commands, message digest commands, or cipher commands, +respectively, that are available in the present B<openssl> utility. + +The pseudo-command B<no->I<XXX> tests whether a command of the +specified name is available. If no command named I<XXX> exists, it +returns 0 (success) and prints B<no->I<XXX>; otherwise it returns 1 +and prints I<XXX>. In both cases, the output goes to B<stdout> and +nothing is printed to B<stderr>. Additional command line arguments +are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the +same name, this provides an easy way for shell scripts to test for the +availability of ciphers in the B<openssl> program. (B<no->I<XXX> is +not able to detect pseudo-commands such as B<quit>, +B<list->I<...>B<-commands>, or B<no->I<XXX> itself.) + +=head2 STANDARD COMMANDS + +=over 10 + +=item L<B<asn1parse>|asn1parse(1)> + +Parse an ASN.1 sequence. + +=item L<B<ca>|ca(1)> + +Certificate Authority (CA) Management. + +=item L<B<ciphers>|ciphers(1)> + +Cipher Suite Description Determination. + +=item L<B<crl>|crl(1)> + +Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Management. + +=item L<B<crl2pkcs7>|crl2pkcs7(1)> + +CRL to PKCS#7 Conversion. + +=item L<B<dgst>|dgst(1)> + +Message Digest Calculation. + +=item B<dh> + +Diffie-Hellman Parameter Management. +Obsoleted by L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>. + +=item L<B<dsa>|dsa(1)> + +DSA Data Management. + +=item L<B<dsaparam>|dsaparam(1)> + +DSA Parameter Generation. + +=item L<B<enc>|enc(1)> + +Encoding with Ciphers. + +=item L<B<errstr>|errstr(1)> + +Error Number to Error String Conversion. + +=item L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)> + +Generation and Management of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. + +=item B<gendh> + +Generation of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. +Obsoleted by L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>. + +=item L<B<gendsa>|gendsa(1)> + +Generation of DSA Parameters. + +=item L<B<genrsa>|genrsa(1)> + +Generation of RSA Parameters. + +=item L<B<ocsp>|ocsp(1)> + +Online Certificate Status Protocol utility. + +=item L<B<passwd>|passwd(1)> + +Generation of hashed passwords. + +=item L<B<pkcs12>|pkcs12(1)> + +PKCS#12 Data Management. + +=item L<B<pkcs7>|pkcs7(1)> + +PKCS#7 Data Management. + +=item L<B<rand>|rand(1)> + +Generate pseudo-random bytes. + +=item L<B<req>|req(1)> + +X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Management. + +=item L<B<rsa>|rsa(1)> + +RSA Data Management. + +=item L<B<rsautl>|rsautl(1)> + +RSA utility for signing, verification, encryption, and decryption. + +=item L<B<s_client>|s_client(1)> + +This implements a generic SSL/TLS client which can establish a transparent +connection to a remote server speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing +purposes only and provides only rudimentary interface functionality but +internally uses mostly all functionality of the OpenSSL B<ssl> library. + +=item L<B<s_server>|s_server(1)> + +This implements a generic SSL/TLS server which accepts connections from remote +clients speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing purposes only and provides +only rudimentary interface functionality but internally uses mostly all +functionality of the OpenSSL B<ssl> library. It provides both an own command +line oriented protocol for testing SSL functions and a simple HTTP response +facility to emulate an SSL/TLS-aware webserver. + +=item L<B<s_time>|s_time(1)> + +SSL Connection Timer. + +=item L<B<sess_id>|sess_id(1)> + +SSL Session Data Management. + +=item L<B<smime>|smime(1)> + +S/MIME mail processing. + +=item L<B<speed>|speed(1)> + +Algorithm Speed Measurement. + +=item L<B<verify>|verify(1)> + +X.509 Certificate Verification. + +=item L<B<version>|version(1)> + +OpenSSL Version Information. + +=item L<B<x509>|x509(1)> + +X.509 Certificate Data Management. + +=back + +=head2 MESSAGE DIGEST COMMANDS + +=over 10 + +=item B<md2> + +MD2 Digest + +=item B<md5> + +MD5 Digest + +=item B<mdc2> + +MDC2 Digest + +=item B<rmd160> + +RMD-160 Digest + +=item B<sha> + +SHA Digest + +=item B<sha1> + +SHA-1 Digest + +=back + +=head2 ENCODING AND CIPHER COMMANDS + +=over 10 + +=item B<base64> + +Base64 Encoding + +=item B<bf bf-cbc bf-cfb bf-ecb bf-ofb> + +Blowfish Cipher + +=item B<cast cast-cbc> + +CAST Cipher + +=item B<cast5-cbc cast5-cfb cast5-ecb cast5-ofb> + +CAST5 Cipher + +=item B<des des-cbc des-cfb des-ecb des-ede des-ede-cbc des-ede-cfb des-ede-ofb des-ofb> + +DES Cipher + +=item B<des3 desx des-ede3 des-ede3-cbc des-ede3-cfb des-ede3-ofb> + +Triple-DES Cipher + +=item B<idea idea-cbc idea-cfb idea-ecb idea-ofb> + +IDEA Cipher + +=item B<rc2 rc2-cbc rc2-cfb rc2-ecb rc2-ofb> + +RC2 Cipher + +=item B<rc4> + +RC4 Cipher + +=item B<rc5 rc5-cbc rc5-cfb rc5-ecb rc5-ofb> + +RC5 Cipher + +=back + +=head1 PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS + +Several commands accept password arguments, typically using B<-passin> +and B<-passout> for input and output passwords respectively. These allow +the password to be obtained from a variety of sources. Both of these +options take a single argument whose format is described below. If no +password argument is given and a password is required then the user is +prompted to enter one: this will typically be read from the current +terminal with echoing turned off. + +=over 10 + +=item B<pass:password> + +the actual password is B<password>. Since the password is visible +to utilities (like 'ps' under Unix) this form should only be used +where security is not important. + +=item B<env:var> + +obtain the password from the environment variable B<var>. Since +the environment of other processes is visible on certain platforms +(e.g. ps under certain Unix OSes) this option should be used with caution. + +=item B<file:pathname> + +the first line of B<pathname> is the password. If the same B<pathname> +argument is supplied to B<-passin> and B<-passout> arguments then the first +line will be used for the input password and the next line for the output +password. B<pathname> need not refer to a regular file: it could for example +refer to a device or named pipe. + +=item B<fd:number> + +read the password from the file descriptor B<number>. This can be used to +send the data via a pipe for example. + +=item B<stdin> + +read the password from standard input. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<asn1parse(1)|asn1parse(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<config(5)|config(5)>, +L<crl(1)|crl(1)>, L<crl2pkcs7(1)|crl2pkcs7(1)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>, +L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<dsaparam(1)|dsaparam(1)>, +L<enc(1)|enc(1)>, L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, +L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, L<nseq(1)|nseq(1)>, L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>, +L<passwd(1)|passwd(1)>, +L<pkcs12(1)|pkcs12(1)>, L<pkcs7(1)|pkcs7(1)>, L<pkcs8(1)|pkcs8(1)>, +L<rand(1)|rand(1)>, L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>, +L<rsautl(1)|rsautl(1)>, L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, +L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<s_time(1)|s_time(1)>, +L<smime(1)|smime(1)>, L<spkac(1)|spkac(1)>, +L<verify(1)|verify(1)>, L<version(1)|version(1)>, L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, +L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The openssl(1) document appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.2. +The B<list->I<XXX>B<-commands> pseudo-commands were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3; +the B<no->I<XXX> pseudo-commands were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5a. +For notes on the availability of other commands, see their individual +manual pages. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/passwd.pod b/doc/apps/passwd.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f44982549bf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/passwd.pod @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +passwd - compute password hashes + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl passwd> +[B<-crypt>] +[B<-1>] +[B<-apr1>] +[B<-salt> I<string>] +[B<-in> I<file>] +[B<-stdin>] +[B<-noverify>] +[B<-quiet>] +[B<-table>] +{I<password>} + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<passwd> command computes the hash of a password typed at +run-time or the hash of each password in a list. The password list is +taken from the named file for option B<-in file>, from stdin for +option B<-stdin>, or from the command line, or from the terminal otherwise. +The Unix standard algorithm B<crypt> and the MD5-based BSD password +algorithm B<1> and its Apache variant B<apr1> are available. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-crypt> + +Use the B<crypt> algorithm (default). + +=item B<-1> + +Use the MD5 based BSD password algorithm B<1>. + +=item B<-apr1> + +Use the B<apr1> algorithm (Apache variant of the BSD algorithm). + +=item B<-salt> I<string> + +Use the specified salt. +When reading a password from the terminal, this implies B<-noverify>. + +=item B<-in> I<file> + +Read passwords from I<file>. + +=item B<-stdin> + +Read passwords from B<stdin>. + +=item B<-noverify> + +Don't verify when reading a password from the terminal. + +=item B<-quiet> + +Don't output warnings when passwords given at the command line are truncated. + +=item B<-table> + +In the output list, prepend the cleartext password and a TAB character +to each password hash. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +B<openssl passwd -crypt -salt xx password> prints B<xxj31ZMTZzkVA>. + +B<openssl passwd -1 -salt xxxxxxxx password> prints B<$1$xxxxxxxx$UYCIxa628.9qXjpQCjM4a.>. + +B<openssl passwd -apr1 -salt xxxxxxxx password> prints B<$apr1$xxxxxxxx$dxHfLAsjHkDRmG83UXe8K0>. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d84146293d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +pkcs12 - PKCS#12 file utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<pkcs12> +[B<-export>] +[B<-chain>] +[B<-inkey filename>] +[B<-certfile filename>] +[B<-name name>] +[B<-caname name>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-nomacver>] +[B<-nocerts>] +[B<-clcerts>] +[B<-cacerts>] +[B<-nokeys>] +[B<-info>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-idea>] +[B<-nodes>] +[B<-noiter>] +[B<-maciter>] +[B<-twopass>] +[B<-descert>] +[B<-certpbe>] +[B<-keypbe>] +[B<-keyex>] +[B<-keysig>] +[B<-password arg>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<pkcs12> command allows PKCS#12 files (sometimes referred to as +PFX files) to be created and parsed. PKCS#12 files are used by several +programs including Netscape, MSIE and MS Outlook. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +There are a lot of options the meaning of some depends of whether a PKCS#12 file +is being created or parsed. By default a PKCS#12 file is parsed a PKCS#12 +file can be created by using the B<-export> option (see below). + +=head1 PARSING OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies filename of the PKCS#12 file to be parsed. Standard input is used +by default. + +=item B<-out filename> + +The filename to write certificates and private keys to, standard output by default. +They are all written in PEM format. + +=item B<-pass arg>, B<-passin arg> + +the PKCS#12 file (i.e. input file) password source. For more information about the +format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in +L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-passout arg> + +pass phrase source to encrypt any outputed private keys with. For more information +about the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in +L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option inhibits output of the keys and certificates to the output file version +of the PKCS#12 file. + +=item B<-clcerts> + +only output client certificates (not CA certificates). + +=item B<-cacerts> + +only output CA certificates (not client certificates). + +=item B<-nocerts> + +no certificates at all will be output. + +=item B<-nokeys> + +no private keys will be output. + +=item B<-info> + +output additional information about the PKCS#12 file structure, algorithms used and +iteration counts. + +=item B<-des> + +use DES to encrypt private keys before outputting. + +=item B<-des3> + +use triple DES to encrypt private keys before outputting, this is the default. + +=item B<-idea> + +use IDEA to encrypt private keys before outputting. + +=item B<-nodes> + +don't encrypt the private keys at all. + +=item B<-nomacver> + +don't attempt to verify the integrity MAC before reading the file. + +=item B<-twopass> + +prompt for separate integrity and encryption passwords: most software +always assumes these are the same so this option will render such +PKCS#12 files unreadable. + +=back + +=head1 FILE CREATION OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-export> + +This option specifies that a PKCS#12 file will be created rather than +parsed. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies filename to write the PKCS#12 file to. Standard output is used +by default. + +=item B<-in filename> + +The filename to read certificates and private keys from, standard input by default. +They must all be in PEM format. The order doesn't matter but one private key and +its corresponding certificate should be present. If additional certificates are +present they will also be included in the PKCS#12 file. + +=item B<-inkey filename> + +file to read private key from. If not present then a private key must be present +in the input file. + +=item B<-name friendlyname> + +This specifies the "friendly name" for the certificate and private key. This name +is typically displayed in list boxes by software importing the file. + +=item B<-certfile filename> + +A filename to read additional certificates from. + +=item B<-caname friendlyname> + +This specifies the "friendly name" for other certificates. This option may be +used multiple times to specify names for all certificates in the order they +appear. Netscape ignores friendly names on other certificates whereas MSIE +displays them. + +=item B<-pass arg>, B<-passout arg> + +the PKCS#12 file (i.e. output file) password source. For more information about +the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in +L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-passin password> + +pass phrase source to decrypt any input private keys with. For more information +about the format of B<arg> see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in +L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-chain> + +if this option is present then an attempt is made to include the entire +certificate chain of the user certificate. The standard CA store is used +for this search. If the search fails it is considered a fatal error. + +=item B<-descert> + +encrypt the certificate using triple DES, this may render the PKCS#12 +file unreadable by some "export grade" software. By default the private +key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2. + +=item B<-keypbe alg>, B<-certpbe alg> + +these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and +certificates to be selected. Although any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 algorithms +can be selected it is advisable only to use PKCS#12 algorithms. See the list +in the B<NOTES> section for more information. + +=item B<-keyex|-keysig> + +specifies that the private key is to be used for key exchange or just signing. +This option is only interpreted by MSIE and similar MS software. Normally +"export grade" software will only allow 512 bit RSA keys to be used for +encryption purposes but arbitrary length keys for signing. The B<-keysig> +option marks the key for signing only. Signing only keys can be used for +S/MIME signing, authenticode (ActiveX control signing) and SSL client +authentication, however due to a bug only MSIE 5.0 and later support +the use of signing only keys for SSL client authentication. + +=item B<-nomaciter>, B<-noiter> + +these options affect the iteration counts on the MAC and key algorithms. +Unless you wish to produce files compatible with MSIE 4.0 you should leave +these options alone. + +To discourage attacks by using large dictionaries of common passwords the +algorithm that derives keys from passwords can have an iteration count applied +to it: this causes a certain part of the algorithm to be repeated and slows it +down. The MAC is used to check the file integrity but since it will normally +have the same password as the keys and certificates it could also be attacked. +By default both MAC and encryption iteration counts are set to 2048, using +these options the MAC and encryption iteration counts can be set to 1, since +this reduces the file security you should not use these options unless you +really have to. Most software supports both MAC and key iteration counts. +MSIE 4.0 doesn't support MAC iteration counts so it needs the B<-nomaciter> +option. + +=item B<-maciter> + +This option is included for compatibility with previous versions, it used +to be needed to use MAC iterations counts but they are now used by default. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +Although there are a large number of options most of them are very rarely +used. For PKCS#12 file parsing only B<-in> and B<-out> need to be used +for PKCS#12 file creation B<-export> and B<-name> are also used. + +If none of the B<-clcerts>, B<-cacerts> or B<-nocerts> options are present +then all certificates will be output in the order they appear in the input +PKCS#12 files. There is no guarantee that the first certificate present is +the one corresponding to the private key. Certain software which requires +a private key and certificate and assumes the first certificate in the +file is the one corresponding to the private key: this may not always +be the case. Using the B<-clcerts> option will solve this problem by only +outputting the certificate corresponding to the private key. If the CA +certificates are required then they can be output to a separate file using +the B<-nokeys -cacerts> options to just output CA certificates. + +The B<-keypbe> and B<-certpbe> algorithms allow the precise encryption +algorithms for private keys and certificates to be specified. Normally +the defaults are fine but occasionally software can't handle triple DES +encrypted private keys, then the option B<-keypbe PBE-SHA1-RC2-40> can +be used to reduce the private key encryption to 40 bit RC2. A complete +description of all algorithms is contained in the B<pkcs8> manual page. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Parse a PKCS#12 file and output it to a file: + + openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -out file.pem + +Output only client certificates to a file: + + openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -clcerts -out file.pem + +Don't encrypt the private key: + + openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -out file.pem -nodes + +Print some info about a PKCS#12 file: + + openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -info -noout + +Create a PKCS#12 file: + + openssl pkcs12 -export -in file.pem -out file.p12 -name "My Certificate" + +Include some extra certificates: + + openssl pkcs12 -export -in file.pem -out file.p12 -name "My Certificate" \ + -certfile othercerts.pem + +=head1 BUGS + +Some would argue that the PKCS#12 standard is one big bug :-) + +Versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.6a had a bug in the PKCS#12 key generation +routines. Under rare circumstances this could produce a PKCS#12 file encrypted +with an invalid key. As a result some PKCS#12 files which triggered this bug +from other implementations (MSIE or Netscape) could not be decrypted +by OpenSSL and similarly OpenSSL could produce PKCS#12 files which could +not be decrypted by other implementations. The chances of producing such +a file are relatively small: less than 1 in 256. + +A side effect of fixing this bug is that any old invalidly encrypted PKCS#12 +files cannot no longer be parsed by the fixed version. Under such circumstances +the B<pkcs12> utility will report that the MAC is OK but fail with a decryption +error when extracting private keys. + +This problem can be resolved by extracting the private keys and certificates +from the PKCS#12 file using an older version of OpenSSL and recreating the PKCS#12 +file from the keys and certificates using a newer version of OpenSSL. For example: + + old-openssl -in bad.p12 -out keycerts.pem + openssl -in keycerts.pem -export -name "My PKCS#12 file" -out fixed.p12 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<pkcs8(1)|pkcs8(1)> + diff --git a/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod b/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a0a636328b59 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +pkcs7 - PKCS#7 utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<pkcs7> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-print_certs>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<pkcs7> command processes PKCS#7 files in DER or PEM format. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. B<DER> format is DER encoded PKCS#7 +v1.5 structure.B<PEM> (the default) is a base64 encoded version of +the DER form with header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this +option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by +default. + +=item B<-print_certs> + +prints out any certificates or CRLs contained in the file. They are +preceded by their subject and issuer names in one line format. + +=item B<-text> + +prints out certificates details in full rather than just subject and +issuer names. + +=item B<-noout> + +don't output the encoded version of the PKCS#7 structure (or certificates +is B<-print_certs> is set). + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Convert a PKCS#7 file from PEM to DER: + + openssl pkcs7 -in file.pem -outform DER -out file.der + +Output all certificates in a file: + + openssl pkcs7 -in file.pem -print_certs -out certs.pem + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM PKCS#7 format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN PKCS7----- + -----END PKCS7----- + +For compatibility with some CAs it will also accept: + + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- + -----END CERTIFICATE----- + +=head1 RESTRICTIONS + +There is no option to print out all the fields of a PKCS#7 file. + +This PKCS#7 routines only understand PKCS#7 v 1.5 as specified in RFC2315 they +cannot currently parse, for example, the new CMS as described in RFC2630. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<crl2pkcs7(1)|crl2pkcs7(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod b/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..68ecd65b1019 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +pkcs8 - PKCS#8 format private key conversion tool + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<pkcs8> +[B<-topk8>] +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-noiter>] +[B<-nocrypt>] +[B<-nooct>] +[B<-embed>] +[B<-nsdb>] +[B<-v2 alg>] +[B<-v1 alg>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<pkcs8> command processes private keys in PKCS#8 format. It can handle +both unencrypted PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo format and EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo +format with a variety of PKCS#5 (v1.5 and v2.0) and PKCS#12 algorithms. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-topk8> + +Normally a PKCS#8 private key is expected on input and a traditional format +private key will be written. With the B<-topk8> option the situation is +reversed: it reads a traditional format private key and writes a PKCS#8 +format key. + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. If a PKCS#8 format key is expected on input +then either a B<DER> or B<PEM> encoded version of a PKCS#8 key will be +expected. Otherwise the B<DER> or B<PEM> format of the traditional format +private key is used. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this +option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be +prompted for. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by +default. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be +prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input +filename. + +=item B<-passout arg> + +the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-nocrypt> + +PKCS#8 keys generated or input are normally PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo +structures using an appropriate password based encryption algorithm. With +this option an unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo structure is expected or output. +This option does not encrypt private keys at all and should only be used +when absolutely necessary. Certain software such as some versions of Java +code signing software used unencrypted private keys. + +=item B<-nooct> + +This option generates RSA private keys in a broken format that some software +uses. Specifically the private key should be enclosed in a OCTET STRING +but some software just includes the structure itself without the +surrounding OCTET STRING. + +=item B<-embed> + +This option generates DSA keys in a broken format. The DSA parameters are +embedded inside the PrivateKey structure. In this form the OCTET STRING +contains an ASN1 SEQUENCE consisting of two structures: a SEQUENCE containing +the parameters and an ASN1 INTEGER containing the private key. + +=item B<-nsdb> + +This option generates DSA keys in a broken format compatible with Netscape +private key databases. The PrivateKey contains a SEQUENCE consisting of +the public and private keys respectively. + +=item B<-v2 alg> + +This option enables the use of PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms. Normally PKCS#8 +private keys are encrypted with the password based encryption algorithm +called B<pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC> this uses 56 bit DES encryption but it +was the strongest encryption algorithm supported in PKCS#5 v1.5. Using +the B<-v2> option PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms are used which can use any +encryption algorithm such as 168 bit triple DES or 128 bit RC2 however +not many implementations support PKCS#5 v2.0 yet. If you are just using +private keys with OpenSSL then this doesn't matter. + +The B<alg> argument is the encryption algorithm to use, valid values include +B<des>, B<des3> and B<rc2>. It is recommended that B<des3> is used. + +=item B<-v1 alg> + +This option specifies a PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 algorithm to use. A complete +list of possible algorithms is included below. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The encrypted form of a PEM encode PKCS#8 files uses the following +headers and footers: + + -----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- + -----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- + +The unencrypted form uses: + + -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- + -----END PRIVATE KEY----- + +Private keys encrypted using PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms and high iteration +counts are more secure that those encrypted using the traditional +SSLeay compatible formats. So if additional security is considered +important the keys should be converted. + +The default encryption is only 56 bits because this is the encryption +that most current implementations of PKCS#8 will support. + +Some software may use PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithms +with PKCS#8 format private keys: these are handled automatically +but there is no option to produce them. + +It is possible to write out DER encoded encrypted private keys in +PKCS#8 format because the encryption details are included at an ASN1 +level whereas the traditional format includes them at a PEM level. + +=head1 PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 algorithms. + +Various algorithms can be used with the B<-v1> command line option, +including PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12. These are described in more detail +below. + +=over 4 + +=item B<PBE-MD2-DES PBE-MD5-DES> + +These algorithms were included in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification. +They only offer 56 bits of protection since they both use DES. + +=item B<PBE-SHA1-RC2-64 PBE-MD2-RC2-64 PBE-MD5-RC2-64 PBE-SHA1-DES> + +These algorithms are not mentioned in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification +but they use the same key derivation algorithm and are supported by some +software. They are mentioned in PKCS#5 v2.0. They use either 64 bit RC2 or +56 bit DES. + +=item B<PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 PBE-SHA1-RC4-40 PBE-SHA1-3DES PBE-SHA1-2DES PBE-SHA1-RC2-128 PBE-SHA1-RC2-40> + +These algorithms use the PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithm and +allow strong encryption algorithms like triple DES or 128 bit RC2 to be used. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Convert a private from traditional to PKCS#5 v2.0 format using triple +DES: + + openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -v2 des3 -out enckey.pem + +Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#5 1.5 compatible algorithm +(DES): + + openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -out enckey.pem + +Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#12 compatible algorithm +(3DES): + + openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -out enckey.pem -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES + +Read a DER unencrypted PKCS#8 format private key: + + openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -nocrypt -in key.der -out key.pem + +Convert a private key from any PKCS#8 format to traditional format: + + openssl pkcs8 -in pk8.pem -out key.pem + +=head1 STANDARDS + +Test vectors from this PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation were posted to the +pkcs-tng mailing list using triple DES, DES and RC2 with high iteration +counts, several people confirmed that they could decrypt the private +keys produced and Therefore it can be assumed that the PKCS#5 v2.0 +implementation is reasonably accurate at least as far as these +algorithms are concerned. + +The format of PKCS#8 DSA (and other) private keys is not well documented: +it is hidden away in PKCS#11 v2.01, section 11.9. OpenSSL's default DSA +PKCS#8 private key format complies with this standard. + +=head1 BUGS + +There should be an option that prints out the encryption algorithm +in use and other details such as the iteration count. + +PKCS#8 using triple DES and PKCS#5 v2.0 should be the default private +key format for OpenSSL: for compatibility several of the utilities use +the old format at present. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, +L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/rand.pod b/doc/apps/rand.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..75745ca0023c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/rand.pod @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +rand - generate pseudo-random bytes + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl rand> +[B<-out> I<file>] +[B<-rand> I<file(s)>] +[B<-base64>] +I<num> + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<rand> command outputs I<num> pseudo-random bytes after seeding +the random number generator once. As in other B<openssl> command +line tools, PRNG seeding uses the file I<$HOME/>B<.rnd> or B<.rnd> +in addition to the files given in the B<-rand> option. A new +I<$HOME>/B<.rnd> or B<.rnd> file will be written back if enough +seeding was obtained from these sources. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-out> I<file> + +Write to I<file> instead of standard output. + +=item B<-rand> I<file(s)> + +Use specified file or files or EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>) +for seeding the random number generator. +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<-base64> + +Perform base64 encoding on the output. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<RAND_bytes(3)|RAND_bytes(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/req.pod b/doc/apps/req.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82b565c9d4f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/req.pod @@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +req - PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<req> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-pubkey>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-verify>] +[B<-modulus>] +[B<-new>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] +[B<-newkey rsa:bits>] +[B<-newkey dsa:file>] +[B<-nodes>] +[B<-key filename>] +[B<-keyform PEM|DER>] +[B<-keyout filename>] +[B<-[md5|sha1|md2|mdc2]>] +[B<-config filename>] +[B<-subj arg>] +[B<-multivalue-rdn>] +[B<-x509>] +[B<-days n>] +[B<-set_serial n>] +[B<-asn1-kludge>] +[B<-newhdr>] +[B<-extensions section>] +[B<-reqexts section>] +[B<-utf8>] +[B<-nameopt>] +[B<-batch>] +[B<-verbose>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<req> command primarily creates and processes certificate requests +in PKCS#10 format. It can additionally create self signed certificates +for use as root CAs for example. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded +form compatible with the PKCS#10. The B<PEM> form is the default format: it +consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional header and +footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a request from or standard input +if this option is not specified. A request is only read if the creation +options (B<-new> and B<-newkey>) are not specified. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by +default. + +=item B<-passout arg> + +the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-text> + +prints out the certificate request in text form. + +=item B<-pubkey> + +outputs the public key. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request. + +=item B<-modulus> + +this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key +contained in the request. + +=item B<-verify> + +verifies the signature on the request. + +=item B<-new> + +this option generates a new certificate request. It will prompt +the user for the relevant field values. The actual fields +prompted for and their maximum and minimum sizes are specified +in the configuration file and any requested extensions. + +If the B<-key> option is not used it will generate a new RSA private +key using information specified in the configuration file. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<-newkey arg> + +this option creates a new certificate request and a new private +key. The argument takes one of two forms. B<rsa:nbits>, where +B<nbits> is the number of bits, generates an RSA key B<nbits> +in size. B<dsa:filename> generates a DSA key using the parameters +in the file B<filename>. + +=item B<-key filename> + +This specifies the file to read the private key from. It also +accepts PKCS#8 format private keys for PEM format files. + +=item B<-keyform PEM|DER> + +the format of the private key file specified in the B<-key> +argument. PEM is the default. + +=item B<-keyout filename> + +this gives the filename to write the newly created private key to. +If this option is not specified then the filename present in the +configuration file is used. + +=item B<-nodes> + +if this option is specified then if a private key is created it +will not be encrypted. + +=item B<-[md5|sha1|md2|mdc2]> + +this specifies the message digest to sign the request with. This +overrides the digest algorithm specified in the configuration file. +This option is ignored for DSA requests: they always use SHA1. + +=item B<-config filename> + +this allows an alternative configuration file to be specified, +this overrides the compile time filename or any specified in +the B<OPENSSL_CONF> environment variable. + +=item B<-subj arg> + +sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name +when processing a request. +The arg must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>, +characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. + +=item B<-multivalue-rdn> + +this option causes the -subj argument to be interpreted with full +support for multivalued RDNs. Example: + +I</DC=org/DC=OpenSSL/DC=users/UID=123456+CN=John Doe> + +If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>. + +=item B<-x509> + +this option outputs a self signed certificate instead of a certificate +request. This is typically used to generate a test certificate or +a self signed root CA. The extensions added to the certificate +(if any) are specified in the configuration file. Unless specified +using the B<set_serial> option B<0> will be used for the serial +number. + +=item B<-days n> + +when the B<-x509> option is being used this specifies the number of +days to certify the certificate for. The default is 30 days. + +=item B<-set_serial n> + +serial number to use when outputting a self signed certificate. This +may be specified as a decimal value or a hex value if preceded by B<0x>. +It is possible to use negative serial numbers but this is not recommended. + +=item B<-extensions section> + +=item B<-reqexts section> + +these options specify alternative sections to include certificate +extensions (if the B<-x509> option is present) or certificate +request extensions. This allows several different sections to +be used in the same configuration file to specify requests for +a variety of purposes. + +=item B<-utf8> + +this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by +default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field +values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a +configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings. + +=item B<-nameopt option> + +option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The +B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by +commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to +set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)|x509(1)> manual page for details. + +=item B<-asn1-kludge> + +by default the B<req> command outputs certificate requests containing +no attributes in the correct PKCS#10 format. However certain CAs will only +accept requests containing no attributes in an invalid form: this +option produces this invalid format. + +More precisely the B<Attributes> in a PKCS#10 certificate request +are defined as a B<SET OF Attribute>. They are B<not OPTIONAL> so +if no attributes are present then they should be encoded as an +empty B<SET OF>. The invalid form does not include the empty +B<SET OF> whereas the correct form does. + +It should be noted that very few CAs still require the use of this option. + +=item B<-newhdr> + +Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputed +request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this. + +=item B<-batch> + +non-interactive mode. + +=item B<-verbose> + +print extra details about the operations being performed. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT + +The configuration options are specified in the B<req> section of +the configuration file. As with all configuration files if no +value is specified in the specific section (i.e. B<req>) then +the initial unnamed or B<default> section is searched too. + +The options available are described in detail below. + +=over 4 + +=item B<input_password output_password> + +The passwords for the input private key file (if present) and +the output private key file (if one will be created). The +command line options B<passin> and B<passout> override the +configuration file values. + +=item B<default_bits> + +This specifies the default key size in bits. If not specified then +512 is used. It is used if the B<-new> option is used. It can be +overridden by using the B<-newkey> option. + +=item B<default_keyfile> + +This is the default filename to write a private key to. If not +specified the key is written to standard output. This can be +overridden by the B<-keyout> option. + +=item B<oid_file> + +This specifies a file containing additional B<OBJECT IDENTIFIERS>. +Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the +object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed +by white space and finally the long name. + +=item B<oid_section> + +This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra +object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the +object identifier followed by B<=> and the numerical form. The short +and long names are the same when this option is used. + +=item B<RANDFILE> + +This specifies a filename in which random number seed information is +placed and read from, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +It is used for private key generation. + +=item B<encrypt_key> + +If this is set to B<no> then if a private key is generated it is +B<not> encrypted. This is equivalent to the B<-nodes> command line +option. For compatibility B<encrypt_rsa_key> is an equivalent option. + +=item B<default_md> + +This option specifies the digest algorithm to use. Possible values +include B<md5 sha1 mdc2>. If not present then MD5 is used. This +option can be overridden on the command line. + +=item B<string_mask> + +This option masks out the use of certain string types in certain +fields. Most users will not need to change this option. + +It can be set to several values B<default> which is also the default +option uses PrintableStrings, T61Strings and BMPStrings if the +B<pkix> value is used then only PrintableStrings and BMPStrings will +be used. This follows the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459. If the +B<utf8only> option is used then only UTF8Strings will be used: this +is the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459 after 2003. Finally the B<nombstr> +option just uses PrintableStrings and T61Strings: certain software has +problems with BMPStrings and UTF8Strings: in particular Netscape. + +=item B<req_extensions> + +this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of +extensions to add to the certificate request. It can be overridden +by the B<-reqexts> command line switch. + +=item B<x509_extensions> + +this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of +extensions to add to certificate generated when the B<-x509> switch +is used. It can be overridden by the B<-extensions> command line switch. + +=item B<prompt> + +if set to the value B<no> this disables prompting of certificate fields +and just takes values from the config file directly. It also changes the +expected format of the B<distinguished_name> and B<attributes> sections. + +=item B<utf8> + +if set to the value B<yes> then field values to be interpreted as UTF8 +strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that +the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a +configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings. + +=item B<attributes> + +this specifies the section containing any request attributes: its format +is the same as B<distinguished_name>. Typically these may contain the +challengePassword or unstructuredName types. They are currently ignored +by OpenSSL's request signing utilities but some CAs might want them. + +=item B<distinguished_name> + +This specifies the section containing the distinguished name fields to +prompt for when generating a certificate or certificate request. The format +is described in the next section. + +=back + +=head1 DISTINGUISHED NAME AND ATTRIBUTE SECTION FORMAT + +There are two separate formats for the distinguished name and attribute +sections. If the B<prompt> option is set to B<no> then these sections +just consist of field names and values: for example, + + CN=My Name + OU=My Organization + emailAddress=someone@somewhere.org + +This allows external programs (e.g. GUI based) to generate a template file +with all the field names and values and just pass it to B<req>. An example +of this kind of configuration file is contained in the B<EXAMPLES> section. + +Alternatively if the B<prompt> option is absent or not set to B<no> then the +file contains field prompting information. It consists of lines of the form: + + fieldName="prompt" + fieldName_default="default field value" + fieldName_min= 2 + fieldName_max= 4 + +"fieldName" is the field name being used, for example commonName (or CN). +The "prompt" string is used to ask the user to enter the relevant +details. If the user enters nothing then the default value is used if no +default value is present then the field is omitted. A field can +still be omitted if a default value is present if the user just +enters the '.' character. + +The number of characters entered must be between the fieldName_min and +fieldName_max limits: there may be additional restrictions based +on the field being used (for example countryName can only ever be +two characters long and must fit in a PrintableString). + +Some fields (such as organizationName) can be used more than once +in a DN. This presents a problem because configuration files will +not recognize the same name occurring twice. To avoid this problem +if the fieldName contains some characters followed by a full stop +they will be ignored. So for example a second organizationName can +be input by calling it "1.organizationName". + +The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or +long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual +values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName, +organizationUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress +is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier. + +Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or +B<oid_section> options in the configuration file. Any additional fields +will be treated as though they were a DirectoryString. + + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Examine and verify certificate request: + + openssl req -in req.pem -text -verify -noout + +Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it: + + openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024 + openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem + +The same but just using req: + + openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem + +Generate a self signed root certificate: + + openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem + +Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option: + + 1.2.3.4 shortName A longer Name + 1.2.3.6 otherName Other longer Name + +Example of a section pointed to by B<oid_section> making use of variable +expansion: + + testoid1=1.2.3.5 + testoid2=${testoid1}.6 + +Sample configuration file prompting for field values: + + [ req ] + default_bits = 1024 + default_keyfile = privkey.pem + distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name + attributes = req_attributes + x509_extensions = v3_ca + + dirstring_type = nobmp + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) + countryName_default = AU + countryName_min = 2 + countryName_max = 2 + + localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) + + organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) + + commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) + commonName_max = 64 + + emailAddress = Email Address + emailAddress_max = 40 + + [ req_attributes ] + challengePassword = A challenge password + challengePassword_min = 4 + challengePassword_max = 20 + + [ v3_ca ] + + subjectKeyIdentifier=hash + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always + basicConstraints = CA:true + +Sample configuration containing all field values: + + + RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd + + [ req ] + default_bits = 1024 + default_keyfile = keyfile.pem + distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name + attributes = req_attributes + prompt = no + output_password = mypass + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + C = GB + ST = Test State or Province + L = Test Locality + O = Organization Name + OU = Organizational Unit Name + CN = Common Name + emailAddress = test@email.address + + [ req_attributes ] + challengePassword = A challenge password + + +=head1 NOTES + +The header and footer lines in the B<PEM> format are normally: + + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- + -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- + +some software (some versions of Netscape certificate server) instead needs: + + -----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- + -----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- + +which is produced with the B<-newhdr> option but is otherwise compatible. +Either form is accepted transparently on input. + +The certificate requests generated by B<Xenroll> with MSIE have extensions +added. It includes the B<keyUsage> extension which determines the type of +key (signature only or general purpose) and any additional OIDs entered +by the script in an extendedKeyUsage extension. + +=head1 DIAGNOSTICS + +The following messages are frequently asked about: + + Using configuration from /some/path/openssl.cnf + Unable to load config info + +This is followed some time later by... + + unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config + problems making Certificate Request + +The first error message is the clue: it can't find the configuration +file! Certain operations (like examining a certificate request) don't +need a configuration file so its use isn't enforced. Generation of +certificates or requests however does need a configuration file. This +could be regarded as a bug. + +Another puzzling message is this: + + Attributes: + a0:00 + +this is displayed when no attributes are present and the request includes +the correct empty B<SET OF> structure (the DER encoding of which is 0xa0 +0x00). If you just see: + + Attributes: + +then the B<SET OF> is missing and the encoding is technically invalid (but +it is tolerated). See the description of the command line option B<-asn1-kludge> +for more information. + +=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES + +The variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> if defined allows an alternative configuration +file location to be specified, it will be overridden by the B<-config> command +line switch if it is present. For compatibility reasons the B<SSLEAY_CONF> +environment variable serves the same purpose but its use is discouraged. + +=head1 BUGS + +OpenSSL's handling of T61Strings (aka TeletexStrings) is broken: it effectively +treats them as ISO-8859-1 (Latin 1), Netscape and MSIE have similar behaviour. +This can cause problems if you need characters that aren't available in +PrintableStrings and you don't want to or can't use BMPStrings. + +As a consequence of the T61String handling the only correct way to represent +accented characters in OpenSSL is to use a BMPString: unfortunately Netscape +currently chokes on these. If you have to use accented characters with Netscape +and MSIE then you currently need to use the invalid T61String form. + +The current prompting is not very friendly. It doesn't allow you to confirm what +you've just entered. Other things like extensions in certificate requests are +statically defined in the configuration file. Some of these: like an email +address in subjectAltName should be input by the user. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, +L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<config(5)|config(5)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/rsa.pod b/doc/apps/rsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4d7640995ede --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/rsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +rsa - RSA key processing tool + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<rsa> +[B<-inform PEM|NET|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|NET|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-passout arg>] +[B<-sgckey>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-idea>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-modulus>] +[B<-check>] +[B<-pubin>] +[B<-pubout>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<rsa> command processes RSA keys. They can be converted between various +forms and their components printed out. B<Note> this command uses the +traditional SSLeay compatible format for private key encryption: newer +applications should use the more secure PKCS#8 format using the B<pkcs8> +utility. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|NET|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded +form compatible with the PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey or SubjectPublicKeyInfo format. +The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> format base64 +encoded with additional header and footer lines. On input PKCS#8 format private +keys are also accepted. The B<NET> form is a format is described in the B<NOTES> +section. + +=item B<-outform DER|NET|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this +option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be +prompted for. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output if this +option is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase +will be prompted for. The output filename should B<not> be the same as the input +filename. + +=item B<-passout password> + +the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-sgckey> + +use the modified NET algorithm used with some versions of Microsoft IIS and SGC +keys. + +=item B<-des|-des3|-idea> + +These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the +IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for. +If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This +means that using the B<rsa> utility to read in an encrypted key with no +encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by +setting the encryption options it can be use to add or change the pass phrase. +These options can only be used with PEM format output files. + +=item B<-text> + +prints out the various public or private key components in +plain text in addition to the encoded version. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key. + +=item B<-modulus> + +this option prints out the value of the modulus of the key. + +=item B<-check> + +this option checks the consistency of an RSA private key. + +=item B<-pubin> + +by default a private key is read from the input file: with this +option a public key is read instead. + +=item B<-pubout> + +by default a private key is output: with this option a public +key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if +the input is a public key. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- + -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- + +The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- + -----END PUBLIC KEY----- + +The B<NET> form is a format compatible with older Netscape servers +and Microsoft IIS .key files, this uses unsalted RC4 for its encryption. +It is not very secure and so should only be used when necessary. + +Some newer version of IIS have additional data in the exported .key +files. To use these with the utility, view the file with a binary editor +and look for the string "private-key", then trace back to the byte +sequence 0x30, 0x82 (this is an ASN1 SEQUENCE). Copy all the data +from this point onwards to another file and use that as the input +to the B<rsa> utility with the B<-inform NET> option. If you get +an error after entering the password try the B<-sgckey> option. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +To remove the pass phrase on an RSA private key: + + openssl rsa -in key.pem -out keyout.pem + +To encrypt a private key using triple DES: + + openssl rsa -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem + +To convert a private key from PEM to DER format: + + openssl rsa -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der + +To print out the components of a private key to standard output: + + openssl rsa -in key.pem -text -noout + +To just output the public part of a private key: + + openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem + +=head1 BUGS + +The command line password arguments don't currently work with +B<NET> format. + +There should be an option that automatically handles .key files, +without having to manually edit them. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<pkcs8(1)|pkcs8(1)>, L<dsa(1)|dsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, +L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/rsautl.pod b/doc/apps/rsautl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a7c1681d9859 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/rsautl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +rsautl - RSA utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<rsautl> +[B<-in file>] +[B<-out file>] +[B<-inkey file>] +[B<-pubin>] +[B<-certin>] +[B<-sign>] +[B<-verify>] +[B<-encrypt>] +[B<-decrypt>] +[B<-pkcs>] +[B<-ssl>] +[B<-raw>] +[B<-hexdump>] +[B<-asn1parse>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<rsautl> command can be used to sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt +data using the RSA algorithm. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input +if this option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by +default. + +=item B<-inkey file> + +the input key file, by default it should be an RSA private key. + +=item B<-pubin> + +the input file is an RSA public key. + +=item B<-certin> + +the input is a certificate containing an RSA public key. + +=item B<-sign> + +sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires +and RSA private key. + +=item B<-verify> + +verify the input data and output the recovered data. + +=item B<-encrypt> + +encrypt the input data using an RSA public key. + +=item B<-decrypt> + +decrypt the input data using an RSA private key. + +=item B<-pkcs, -oaep, -ssl, -raw> + +the padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP, +special padding used in SSL v2 backwards compatible handshakes, +or no padding, respectively. +For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used. + +=item B<-hexdump> + +hex dump the output data. + +=item B<-asn1parse> + +asn1parse the output data, this is useful when combined with the +B<-verify> option. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +B<rsautl> because it uses the RSA algorithm directly can only be +used to sign or verify small pieces of data. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Sign some data using a private key: + + openssl rsautl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig + +Recover the signed data + + openssl rsautl -verify -in sig -inkey key.pem + +Examine the raw signed data: + + openssl rsautl -verify -in file -inkey key.pem -raw -hexdump + + 0000 - 00 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0010 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0020 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0030 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0040 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0050 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0060 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ + 0070 - ff ff ff ff 00 68 65 6c-6c 6f 20 77 6f 72 6c 64 .....hello world + +The PKCS#1 block formatting is evident from this. If this was done using +encrypt and decrypt the block would have been of type 2 (the second byte) +and random padding data visible instead of the 0xff bytes. + +It is possible to analyse the signature of certificates using this +utility in conjunction with B<asn1parse>. Consider the self signed +example in certs/pca-cert.pem . Running B<asn1parse> as follows yields: + + openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem + + 0:d=0 hl=4 l= 742 cons: SEQUENCE + 4:d=1 hl=4 l= 591 cons: SEQUENCE + 8:d=2 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ] + 10:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02 + 13:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :00 + 16:d=2 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE + 18:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :md5WithRSAEncryption + 29:d=3 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL + 31:d=2 hl=2 l= 92 cons: SEQUENCE + 33:d=3 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET + 35:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE + 37:d=5 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :countryName + 42:d=5 hl=2 l= 2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :AU + .... + 599:d=1 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE + 601:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :md5WithRSAEncryption + 612:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL + 614:d=1 hl=3 l= 129 prim: BIT STRING + + +The final BIT STRING contains the actual signature. It can be extracted with: + + openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out sig -noout -strparse 614 + +The certificate public key can be extracted with: + + openssl x509 -in test/testx509.pem -pubout -noout >pubkey.pem + +The signature can be analysed with: + + openssl rsautl -in sig -verify -asn1parse -inkey pubkey.pem -pubin + + 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE + 2:d=1 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE + 4:d=2 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :md5 + 14:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL + 16:d=1 hl=2 l= 16 prim: OCTET STRING + 0000 - f3 46 9e aa 1a 4a 73 c9-37 ea 93 00 48 25 08 b5 .F...Js.7...H%.. + +This is the parsed version of an ASN1 DigestInfo structure. It can be seen that +the digest used was md5. The actual part of the certificate that was signed can +be extracted with: + + openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out tbs -noout -strparse 4 + +and its digest computed with: + + openssl md5 -c tbs + MD5(tbs)= f3:46:9e:aa:1a:4a:73:c9:37:ea:93:00:48:25:08:b5 + +which it can be seen agrees with the recovered value above. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>, L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)> diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c17a83a22581 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +s_client - SSL/TLS client program + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<s_client> +[B<-connect host:port>] +[B<-verify depth>] +[B<-cert filename>] +[B<-certform DER|PEM>] +[B<-key filename>] +[B<-keyform DER|PEM>] +[B<-pass arg>] +[B<-CApath directory>] +[B<-CAfile filename>] +[B<-reconnect>] +[B<-pause>] +[B<-showcerts>] +[B<-debug>] +[B<-msg>] +[B<-nbio_test>] +[B<-state>] +[B<-nbio>] +[B<-crlf>] +[B<-ign_eof>] +[B<-quiet>] +[B<-ssl2>] +[B<-ssl3>] +[B<-tls1>] +[B<-no_ssl2>] +[B<-no_ssl3>] +[B<-no_tls1>] +[B<-bugs>] +[B<-cipher cipherlist>] +[B<-starttls protocol>] +[B<-engine id>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<s_client> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects +to a remote host using SSL/TLS. It is a I<very> useful diagnostic tool for +SSL servers. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-connect host:port> + +This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. If not specified +then an attempt is made to connect to the local host on port 4433. + +=item B<-cert certname> + +The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is +not to use a certificate. + +=item B<-certform format> + +The certificate format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. + +=item B<-key keyfile> + +The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will +be used. + +=item B<-keyform format> + +The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. + +=item B<-pass arg> + +the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-verify depth> + +The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the +server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification. +Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems +with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection +will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure. + +=item B<-CApath directory> + +The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory +must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are +also used when building the client certificate chain. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication +and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain. + +=item B<-reconnect> + +reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can +be used as a test that session caching is working. + +=item B<-pause> + +pauses 1 second between each read and write call. + +=item B<-showcerts> + +display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server +certificate itself is displayed. + +=item B<-prexit> + +print session information when the program exits. This will always attempt +to print out information even if the connection fails. Normally information +will only be printed out once if the connection succeeds. This option is useful +because the cipher in use may be renegotiated or the connection may fail +because a client certificate is required or is requested only after an +attempt is made to access a certain URL. Note: the output produced by this +option is not always accurate because a connection might never have been +established. + +=item B<-state> + +prints out the SSL session states. + +=item B<-debug> + +print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic. + +=item B<-msg> + +show all protocol messages with hex dump. + +=item B<-nbio_test> + +tests non-blocking I/O + +=item B<-nbio> + +turns on non-blocking I/O + +=item B<-crlf> + +this option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF as required +by some servers. + +=item B<-ign_eof> + +inhibit shutting down the connection when end of file is reached in the +input. + +=item B<-quiet> + +inhibit printing of session and certificate information. This implicitly +turns on B<-ign_eof> as well. + +=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> + +these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default +the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all +servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate. + +Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which +cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only +work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only +support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option. + +=item B<-bugs> + +there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this +option enables various workarounds. + +=item B<-cipher cipherlist> + +this allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although +the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first +supported cipher in the list sent by the client. See the B<ciphers> +command for more information. + +=item B<-starttls protocol> + +send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication. +B<protocol> is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only +supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", and "ftp". + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_client> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=back + +=head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS + +If a connection is established with an SSL server then any data received +from the server is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the +server. When used interactively (which means neither B<-quiet> nor B<-ign_eof> +have been given), the session will be renegotiated if the line begins with an +B<R>, and if the line begins with a B<Q> or if end of file is reached, the +connection will be closed down. + +=head1 NOTES + +B<s_client> can be used to debug SSL servers. To connect to an SSL HTTP +server the command: + + openssl s_client -connect servername:443 + +would typically be used (https uses port 443). If the connection succeeds +then an HTTP command can be given such as "GET /" to retrieve a web page. + +If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is +nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>, B<-ssl2>, +B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> options can be tried +in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these +options B<before> submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list. + +A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working +is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty +list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending +the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it +requests a certificate. By using B<s_client> the CA list can be viewed +and checked. However some servers only request client authentication +after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it +is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option and send an HTTP request +for an appropriate page. + +If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert> +option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests +a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate +on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. + +If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the +B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain. + +=head1 BUGS + +Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of +the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_client is rather +hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical +SSL client program would be much simpler. + +The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification +fails. + +The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report +information whenever a session is renegotiated. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<sess_id(1)|sess_id(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/doc/apps/s_server.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7c1a9581d961 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/s_server.pod @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +s_server - SSL/TLS server program + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<s_server> +[B<-accept port>] +[B<-context id>] +[B<-verify depth>] +[B<-Verify depth>] +[B<-cert filename>] +[B<-certform DER|PEM>] +[B<-key keyfile>] +[B<-keyform DER|PEM>] +[B<-pass arg>] +[B<-dcert filename>] +[B<-dcertform DER|PEM>] +[B<-dkey keyfile>] +[B<-dkeyform DER|PEM>] +[B<-dpass arg>] +[B<-dhparam filename>] +[B<-nbio>] +[B<-nbio_test>] +[B<-crlf>] +[B<-debug>] +[B<-msg>] +[B<-state>] +[B<-CApath directory>] +[B<-CAfile filename>] +[B<-nocert>] +[B<-cipher cipherlist>] +[B<-quiet>] +[B<-no_tmp_rsa>] +[B<-ssl2>] +[B<-ssl3>] +[B<-tls1>] +[B<-no_ssl2>] +[B<-no_ssl3>] +[B<-no_tls1>] +[B<-no_dhe>] +[B<-bugs>] +[B<-hack>] +[B<-www>] +[B<-WWW>] +[B<-HTTP>] +[B<-engine id>] +[B<-id_prefix arg>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<s_server> command implements a generic SSL/TLS server which listens +for connections on a given port using SSL/TLS. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-accept port> + +the TCP port to listen on for connections. If not specified 4433 is used. + +=item B<-context id> + +sets the SSL context id. It can be given any string value. If this option +is not present a default value will be used. + +=item B<-cert certname> + +The certificate to use, most servers cipher suites require the use of a +certificate and some require a certificate with a certain public key type: +for example the DSS cipher suites require a certificate containing a DSS +(DSA) key. If not specified then the filename "server.pem" will be used. + +=item B<-certform format> + +The certificate format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. + +=item B<-key keyfile> + +The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will +be used. + +=item B<-keyform format> + +The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. + +=item B<-pass arg> + +the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-dcert filename>, B<-dkey keyname> + +specify an additional certificate and private key, these behave in the +same manner as the B<-cert> and B<-key> options except there is no default +if they are not specified (no additional certificate and key is used). As +noted above some cipher suites require a certificate containing a key of +a certain type. Some cipher suites need a certificate carrying an RSA key +and some a DSS (DSA) key. By using RSA and DSS certificates and keys +a server can support clients which only support RSA or DSS cipher suites +by using an appropriate certificate. + +=item B<-dcertform format>, B<-dkeyform format>, B<-dpass arg> + +addtional certificate and private key format and passphrase respectively. + +=item B<-nocert> + +if this option is set then no certificate is used. This restricts the +cipher suites available to the anonymous ones (currently just anonymous +DH). + +=item B<-dhparam filename> + +the DH parameter file to use. The ephemeral DH cipher suites generate keys +using a set of DH parameters. If not specified then an attempt is made to +load the parameters from the server certificate file. If this fails then +a static set of parameters hard coded into the s_server program will be used. + +=item B<-no_dhe> + +if this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively +disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites. + +=item B<-no_tmp_rsa> + +certain export cipher suites sometimes use a temporary RSA key, this option +disables temporary RSA key generation. + +=item B<-verify depth>, B<-Verify depth> + +The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the +client certificate chain and makes the server request a certificate from +the client. With the B<-verify> option a certificate is requested but the +client does not have to send one, with the B<-Verify> option the client +must supply a certificate or an error occurs. + +=item B<-CApath directory> + +The directory to use for client certificate verification. This directory +must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are +also used when building the server certificate chain. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +A file containing trusted certificates to use during client authentication +and to use when attempting to build the server certificate chain. The list +is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when +a certificate is requested. + +=item B<-state> + +prints out the SSL session states. + +=item B<-debug> + +print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic. + +=item B<-msg> + +show all protocol messages with hex dump. + +=item B<-nbio_test> + +tests non blocking I/O + +=item B<-nbio> + +turns on non blocking I/O + +=item B<-crlf> + +this option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF. + +=item B<-quiet> + +inhibit printing of session and certificate information. + +=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> + +these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default +the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all +servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate. + +=item B<-bugs> + +there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this +option enables various workarounds. + +=item B<-hack> + +this option enables a further workaround for some some early Netscape +SSL code (?). + +=item B<-cipher cipherlist> + +this allows the cipher list used by the server to be modified. When +the client sends a list of supported ciphers the first client cipher +also included in the server list is used. Because the client specifies +the preference order, the order of the server cipherlist irrelevant. See +the B<ciphers> command for more information. + +=item B<-www> + +sends a status message back to the client when it connects. This includes +lots of information about the ciphers used and various session parameters. +The output is in HTML format so this option will normally be used with a +web browser. + +=item B<-WWW> + +emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the +current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is +requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. + +=item B<-HTTP> + +emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the +current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is +requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. The files loaded are +assumed to contain a complete and correct HTTP response (lines that +are part of the HTTP response line and headers must end with CRLF). + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_server> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=item B<-id_prefix arg> + +generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by B<arg>. This is mostly useful +for testing any SSL/TLS code (eg. proxies) that wish to deal with multiple +servers, when each of which might be generating a unique range of session +IDs (eg. with a certain prefix). + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=back + +=head1 CONNECTED COMMANDS + +If a connection request is established with an SSL client and neither the +B<-www> nor the B<-WWW> option has been used then normally any data received +from the client is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the client. + +Certain single letter commands are also recognized which perform special +operations: these are listed below. + +=over 4 + +=item B<q> + +end the current SSL connection but still accept new connections. + +=item B<Q> + +end the current SSL connection and exit. + +=item B<r> + +renegotiate the SSL session. + +=item B<R> + +renegotiate the SSL session and request a client certificate. + +=item B<P> + +send some plain text down the underlying TCP connection: this should +cause the client to disconnect due to a protocol violation. + +=item B<S> + +print out some session cache status information. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +B<s_server> can be used to debug SSL clients. To accept connections from +a web browser the command: + + openssl s_server -accept 443 -www + +can be used for example. + +Most web browsers (in particular Netscape and MSIE) only support RSA cipher +suites, so they cannot connect to servers which don't use a certificate +carrying an RSA key or a version of OpenSSL with RSA disabled. + +Although specifying an empty list of CAs when requesting a client certificate +is strictly speaking a protocol violation, some SSL clients interpret this to +mean any CA is acceptable. This is useful for debugging purposes. + +The session parameters can printed out using the B<sess_id> program. + +=head1 BUGS + +Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of +the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_server is rather +hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical +SSL server program would be much simpler. + +The output of common ciphers is wrong: it just gives the list of ciphers that +OpenSSL recognizes and the client supports. + +There should be a way for the B<s_server> program to print out details of any +unknown cipher suites a client says it supports. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<sess_id(1)|sess_id(1)>, L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/s_time.pod b/doc/apps/s_time.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5a38aa2e0394 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/s_time.pod @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +s_time - SSL/TLS performance timing program + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<s_time> +[B<-connect host:port>] +[B<-www page>] +[B<-cert filename>] +[B<-key filename>] +[B<-CApath directory>] +[B<-CAfile filename>] +[B<-reuse>] +[B<-new>] +[B<-verify depth>] +[B<-nbio>] +[B<-time seconds>] +[B<-ssl2>] +[B<-ssl3>] +[B<-bugs>] +[B<-cipher cipherlist>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<s_client> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a +remote host using SSL/TLS. It can request a page from the server and includes +the time to transfer the payload data in its timing measurements. It measures +the number of connections within a given timeframe, the amount of data +transferred (if any), and calculates the average time spent for one connection. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-connect host:port> + +This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. + +=item B<-www page> + +This specifies the page to GET from the server. A value of '/' gets the +index.htm[l] page. If this parameter is not specified, then B<s_time> will only +perform the handshake to establish SSL connections but not transfer any +payload data. + +=item B<-cert certname> + +The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is +not to use a certificate. The file is in PEM format. + +=item B<-key keyfile> + +The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will +be used. The file is in PEM format. + +=item B<-verify depth> + +The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the +server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification. +Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems +with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection +will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure. + +=item B<-CApath directory> + +The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory +must be in "hash format", see B<verify> for more information. These are +also used when building the client certificate chain. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication +and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain. + +=item B<-new> + +performs the timing test using a new session ID for each connection. +If neither B<-new> nor B<-reuse> are specified, they are both on by default +and executed in sequence. + +=item B<-reuse> + +performs the timing test using the same session ID; this can be used as a test +that session caching is working. If neither B<-new> nor B<-reuse> are +specified, they are both on by default and executed in sequence. + +=item B<-nbio> + +turns on non-blocking I/O. + +=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3> + +these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default +the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all +servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate. +The timing program is not as rich in options to turn protocols on and off as +the L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)> program and may not connect to all servers. + +Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which +cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only +work if TLS is turned off with the B<-ssl3> option; others +will only support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option. + +=item B<-bugs> + +there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this +option enables various workarounds. + +=item B<-cipher cipherlist> + +this allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although +the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first +supported cipher in the list sent by the client. +See the L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> command for more information. + +=item B<-time length> + +specifies how long (in seconds) B<s_time> should establish connections and +optionally transfer payload data from a server. Server and client performance +and the link speed determine how many connections B<s_time> can establish. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +B<s_client> can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection. +To connect to an SSL HTTP server and get the default page the command + + openssl s_time -connect servername:443 -www / -CApath yourdir -CAfile yourfile.pem -cipher commoncipher [-ssl3] + +would typically be used (https uses port 443). 'commoncipher' is a cipher to +which both client and server can agree, see the L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> command +for details. + +If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is +nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>, B<-ssl2>, +B<-ssl3> options can be tried +in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these +options B<before> submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list. + +A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working +is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty +list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending +the clients certificate authority in its "acceptable CA list" when it +requests a certificate. By using L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)> the CA list can be +viewed and checked. However some servers only request client authentication +after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it +is necessary to use the B<-prexit> option of L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)> and +send an HTTP request for an appropriate page. + +If a certificate is specified on the command line using the B<-cert> +option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests +a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate +on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. + +=head1 BUGS + +Because this program does not have all the options of the +L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)> program to turn protocols on and off, you may not be +able to measure the performance of all protocols with all servers. + +The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification +fails. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/sess_id.pod b/doc/apps/sess_id.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9988d2cd3d5d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/sess_id.pod @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +sess_id - SSL/TLS session handling utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<sess_id> +[B<-inform PEM|DER>] +[B<-outform PEM|DER>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-context ID>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<sess_id> process the encoded version of the SSL session structure +and optionally prints out SSL session details (for example the SSL session +master key) in human readable format. Since this is a diagnostic tool that +needs some knowledge of the SSL protocol to use properly, most users will +not need to use it. + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded +format containing session details. The precise format can vary from one version +to the next. The B<PEM> form is the default format: it consists of the B<DER> +format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read session information from or standard +input by default. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write session information to or standard +output if this option is not specified. + +=item B<-text> + +prints out the various public or private key components in +plain text in addition to the encoded version. + +=item B<-cert> + +if a certificate is present in the session it will be output using this option, +if the B<-text> option is also present then it will be printed out in text form. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option prevents output of the encoded version of the session. + +=item B<-context ID> + +this option can set the session id so the output session information uses the +supplied ID. The ID can be any string of characters. This option wont normally +be used. + +=back + +=head1 OUTPUT + +Typical output: + + SSL-Session: + Protocol : TLSv1 + Cipher : 0016 + Session-ID: 871E62626C554CE95488823752CBD5F3673A3EF3DCE9C67BD916C809914B40ED + Session-ID-ctx: 01000000 + Master-Key: A7CEFC571974BE02CAC305269DC59F76EA9F0B180CB6642697A68251F2D2BB57E51DBBB4C7885573192AE9AEE220FACD + Key-Arg : None + Start Time: 948459261 + Timeout : 300 (sec) + Verify return code 0 (ok) + +Theses are described below in more detail. + +=over 4 + +=item B<Protocol> + +this is the protocol in use TLSv1, SSLv3 or SSLv2. + +=item B<Cipher> + +the cipher used this is the actual raw SSL or TLS cipher code, see the SSL +or TLS specifications for more information. + +=item B<Session-ID> + +the SSL session ID in hex format. + +=item B<Session-ID-ctx> + +the session ID context in hex format. + +=item B<Master-Key> + +this is the SSL session master key. + +=item B<Key-Arg> + +the key argument, this is only used in SSL v2. + +=item B<Start Time> + +this is the session start time represented as an integer in standard Unix format. + +=item B<Timeout> + +the timeout in seconds. + +=item B<Verify return code> + +this is the return code when an SSL client certificate is verified. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM encoded session format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN SSL SESSION PARAMETERS----- + -----END SSL SESSION PARAMETERS----- + +Since the SSL session output contains the master key it is possible to read the contents +of an encrypted session using this information. Therefore appropriate security precautions +should be taken if the information is being output by a "real" application. This is +however strongly discouraged and should only be used for debugging purposes. + +=head1 BUGS + +The cipher and start time should be printed out in human readable form. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/smime.pod b/doc/apps/smime.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..caf2d2689e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/smime.pod @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +smime - S/MIME utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<smime> +[B<-encrypt>] +[B<-decrypt>] +[B<-sign>] +[B<-verify>] +[B<-pk7out>] +[B<-des>] +[B<-des3>] +[B<-rc2-40>] +[B<-rc2-64>] +[B<-rc2-128>] +[B<-aes128>] +[B<-aes192>] +[B<-aes256>] +[B<-camellia128>] +[B<-camellia192>] +[B<-camellia256>] +[B<-in file>] +[B<-certfile file>] +[B<-signer file>] +[B<-recip file>] +[B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-inkey file>] +[B<-out file>] +[B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>] +[B<-content file>] +[B<-to addr>] +[B<-from ad>] +[B<-subject s>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-rand file(s)>] +[cert.pem]... + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<smime> command handles S/MIME mail. It can encrypt, decrypt, sign and +verify S/MIME messages. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +There are five operation options that set the type of operation to be performed. +The meaning of the other options varies according to the operation type. + +=over 4 + +=item B<-encrypt> + +encrypt mail for the given recipient certificates. Input file is the message +to be encrypted. The output file is the encrypted mail in MIME format. + +=item B<-decrypt> + +decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an +encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail +is written to the output file. + +=item B<-sign> + +sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is +the message to be signed. The signed message in MIME format is written +to the output file. + +=item B<-verify> + +verify signed mail. Expects a signed mail message on input and outputs +the signed data. Both clear text and opaque signing is supported. + +=item B<-pk7out> + +takes an input message and writes out a PEM encoded PKCS#7 structure. + +=item B<-in filename> + +the input message to be encrypted or signed or the MIME message to +be decrypted or verified. + +=item B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER> + +this specifies the input format for the PKCS#7 structure. The default +is B<SMIME> which reads an S/MIME format message. B<PEM> and B<DER> +format change this to expect PEM and DER format PKCS#7 structures +instead. This currently only affects the input format of the PKCS#7 +structure, if no PKCS#7 structure is being input (for example with +B<-encrypt> or B<-sign>) this option has no effect. + +=item B<-out filename> + +the message text that has been decrypted or verified or the output MIME +format message that has been signed or verified. + +=item B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER> + +this specifies the output format for the PKCS#7 structure. The default +is B<SMIME> which write an S/MIME format message. B<PEM> and B<DER> +format change this to write PEM and DER format PKCS#7 structures +instead. This currently only affects the output format of the PKCS#7 +structure, if no PKCS#7 structure is being output (for example with +B<-verify> or B<-decrypt>) this option has no effect. + +=item B<-content filename> + +This specifies a file containing the detached content, this is only +useful with the B<-verify> command. This is only usable if the PKCS#7 +structure is using the detached signature form where the content is +not included. This option will override any content if the input format +is S/MIME and it uses the multipart/signed MIME content type. + +=item B<-text> + +this option adds plain text (text/plain) MIME headers to the supplied +message if encrypting or signing. If decrypting or verifying it strips +off text headers: if the decrypted or verified message is not of MIME +type text/plain then an error occurs. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +a file containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>. + +=item B<-CApath dir> + +a directory containing trusted CA certificates, only used with +B<-verify>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that +is a hash of each subject name (using B<x509 -hash>) should be linked +to each certificate. + +=item B<-des -des3 -rc2-40 -rc2-64 -rc2-128 -aes128 -aes192 -aes256 -camellia128 -camellia192 -camellia256> + +the encryption algorithm to use. DES (56 bits), triple DES (168 bits), +40, 64 or 128 bit RC2, 128, 192 or 256 bit AES, or 128, 192 or 256 bit Camellia respectively. If not +specified 40 bit RC2 is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>. + +=item B<-nointern> + +when verifying a message normally certificates (if any) included in +the message are searched for the signing certificate. With this option +only the certificates specified in the B<-certfile> option are used. +The supplied certificates can still be used as untrusted CAs however. + +=item B<-noverify> + +do not verify the signers certificate of a signed message. + +=item B<-nochain> + +do not do chain verification of signers certificates: that is don't +use the certificates in the signed message as untrusted CAs. + +=item B<-nosigs> + +don't try to verify the signatures on the message. + +=item B<-nocerts> + +when signing a message the signer's certificate is normally included +with this option it is excluded. This will reduce the size of the +signed message but the verifier must have a copy of the signers certificate +available locally (passed using the B<-certfile> option for example). + +=item B<-noattr> + +normally when a message is signed a set of attributes are included which +include the signing time and supported symmetric algorithms. With this +option they are not included. + +=item B<-binary> + +normally the input message is converted to "canonical" format which is +effectively using CR and LF as end of line: as required by the S/MIME +specification. When this option is present no translation occurs. This +is useful when handling binary data which may not be in MIME format. + +=item B<-nodetach> + +when signing a message use opaque signing: this form is more resistant +to translation by mail relays but it cannot be read by mail agents that +do not support S/MIME. Without this option cleartext signing with +the MIME type multipart/signed is used. + +=item B<-certfile file> + +allows additional certificates to be specified. When signing these will +be included with the message. When verifying these will be searched for +the signers certificates. The certificates should be in PEM format. + +=item B<-signer file> + +the signers certificate when signing a message. If a message is +being verified then the signers certificates will be written to this +file if the verification was successful. + +=item B<-recip file> + +the recipients certificate when decrypting a message. This certificate +must match one of the recipients of the message or an error occurs. + +=item B<-inkey file> + +the private key to use when signing or decrypting. This must match the +corresponding certificate. If this option is not specified then the +private key must be included in the certificate file specified with +the B<-recip> or B<-signer> file. + +=item B<-passin arg> + +the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-rand file(s)> + +a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number +generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>). +Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. +The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for +all others. + +=item B<cert.pem...> + +one or more certificates of message recipients: used when encrypting +a message. + +=item B<-to, -from, -subject> + +the relevant mail headers. These are included outside the signed +portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing +then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email +address matches that specified in the From: address. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The MIME message must be sent without any blank lines between the +headers and the output. Some mail programs will automatically add +a blank line. Piping the mail directly to sendmail is one way to +achieve the correct format. + +The supplied message to be signed or encrypted must include the +necessary MIME headers or many S/MIME clients wont display it +properly (if at all). You can use the B<-text> option to automatically +add plain text headers. + +A "signed and encrypted" message is one where a signed message is +then encrypted. This can be produced by encrypting an already signed +message: see the examples section. + +This version of the program only allows one signer per message but it +will verify multiple signers on received messages. Some S/MIME clients +choke if a message contains multiple signers. It is possible to sign +messages "in parallel" by signing an already signed message. + +The options B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> reflect common usage in S/MIME +clients. Strictly speaking these process PKCS#7 enveloped data: PKCS#7 +encrypted data is used for other purposes. + +=head1 EXIT CODES + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +the operation was completely successfully. + +=item 1 + +an error occurred parsing the command options. + +=item 2 + +one of the input files could not be read. + +=item 3 + +an error occurred creating the PKCS#7 file or when reading the MIME +message. + +=item 4 + +an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message. + +=item 5 + +the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out +the signers certificates. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Create a cleartext signed message: + + openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ + -signer mycert.pem + +Create and opaque signed message + + openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg -nodetach \ + -signer mycert.pem + +Create a signed message, include some additional certificates and +read the private key from another file: + + openssl smime -sign -in in.txt -text -out mail.msg \ + -signer mycert.pem -inkey mykey.pem -certfile mycerts.pem + +Send a signed message under Unix directly to sendmail, including headers: + + openssl smime -sign -in in.txt -text -signer mycert.pem \ + -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \ + -subject "Signed message" | sendmail someone@somewhere + +Verify a message and extract the signer's certificate if successful: + + openssl smime -verify -in mail.msg -signer user.pem -out signedtext.txt + +Send encrypted mail using triple DES: + + openssl smime -encrypt -in in.txt -from steve@openssl.org \ + -to someone@somewhere -subject "Encrypted message" \ + -des3 user.pem -out mail.msg + +Sign and encrypt mail: + + openssl smime -sign -in ml.txt -signer my.pem -text \ + | openssl smime -encrypt -out mail.msg \ + -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \ + -subject "Signed and Encrypted message" -des3 user.pem + +Note: the encryption command does not include the B<-text> option because the message +being encrypted already has MIME headers. + +Decrypt mail: + + openssl smime -decrypt -in mail.msg -recip mycert.pem -inkey key.pem + +The output from Netscape form signing is a PKCS#7 structure with the +detached signature format. You can use this program to verify the +signature by line wrapping the base64 encoded structure and surrounding +it with: + + -----BEGIN PKCS7----- + -----END PKCS7----- + +and using the command, + + openssl smime -verify -inform PEM -in signature.pem -content content.txt + +alternatively you can base64 decode the signature and use + + openssl smime -verify -inform DER -in signature.der -content content.txt + +Create an encrypted message using 128 bit Camellia: + + openssl smime -encrypt -in plain.txt -camellia128 -out mail.msg cert.pem + +=head1 BUGS + +The MIME parser isn't very clever: it seems to handle most messages that I've thrown +at it but it may choke on others. + +The code currently will only write out the signer's certificate to a file: if the +signer has a separate encryption certificate this must be manually extracted. There +should be some heuristic that determines the correct encryption certificate. + +Ideally a database should be maintained of a certificates for each email address. + +The code doesn't currently take note of the permitted symmetric encryption +algorithms as supplied in the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute. this means the +user has to manually include the correct encryption algorithm. It should store +the list of permitted ciphers in a database and only use those. + +No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate. + +The current code can only handle S/MIME v2 messages, the more complex S/MIME v3 +structures may cause parsing errors. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/speed.pod b/doc/apps/speed.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0dcdba873e0c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/speed.pod @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +speed - test library performance + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl speed> +[B<-engine id>] +[B<md2>] +[B<mdc2>] +[B<md5>] +[B<hmac>] +[B<sha1>] +[B<rmd160>] +[B<idea-cbc>] +[B<rc2-cbc>] +[B<rc5-cbc>] +[B<bf-cbc>] +[B<des-cbc>] +[B<des-ede3>] +[B<rc4>] +[B<rsa512>] +[B<rsa1024>] +[B<rsa2048>] +[B<rsa4096>] +[B<dsa512>] +[B<dsa1024>] +[B<dsa2048>] +[B<idea>] +[B<rc2>] +[B<des>] +[B<rsa>] +[B<blowfish>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This command is used to test the performance of cryptographic algorithms. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<speed> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=item B<[zero or more test algorithms]> + +If any options are given, B<speed> tests those algorithms, otherwise all of +the above are tested. + +=back + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/spkac.pod b/doc/apps/spkac.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3f1ff9c6441 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/spkac.pod @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +spkac - SPKAC printing and generating utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<spkac> +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-key keyfile>] +[B<-passin arg>] +[B<-challenge string>] +[B<-pubkey>] +[B<-spkac spkacname>] +[B<-spksect section>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-verify>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<spkac> command processes Netscape signed public key and challenge +(SPKAC) files. It can print out their contents, verify the signature and +produce its own SPKACs from a supplied private key. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this +option is not specified. Ignored if the B<-key> option is used. + +=item B<-out filename> + +specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by +default. + +=item B<-key keyfile> + +create an SPKAC file using the private key in B<keyfile>. The +B<-in>, B<-noout>, B<-spksect> and B<-verify> options are ignored if +present. + +=item B<-passin password> + +the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg> +see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>. + +=item B<-challenge string> + +specifies the challenge string if an SPKAC is being created. + +=item B<-spkac spkacname> + +allows an alternative name form the variable containing the +SPKAC. The default is "SPKAC". This option affects both +generated and input SPKAC files. + +=item B<-spksect section> + +allows an alternative name form the section containing the +SPKAC. The default is the default section. + +=item B<-noout> + +don't output the text version of the SPKAC (not used if an +SPKAC is being created). + +=item B<-pubkey> + +output the public key of an SPKAC (not used if an SPKAC is +being created). + +=item B<-verify> + +verifies the digital signature on the supplied SPKAC. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Print out the contents of an SPKAC: + + openssl spkac -in spkac.cnf + +Verify the signature of an SPKAC: + + openssl spkac -in spkac.cnf -noout -verify + +Create an SPKAC using the challenge string "hello": + + openssl spkac -key key.pem -challenge hello -out spkac.cnf + +Example of an SPKAC, (long lines split up for clarity): + + SPKAC=MIG5MGUwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA1cCoq2Wa3Ixs47uI7F\ + PVwHVIPDx5yso105Y6zpozam135a8R0CpoRvkkigIyXfcCjiVi5oWk+6FfPaD03u\ + PFoQIDAQABFgVoZWxsbzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAFpQtY/FojdwkJh1bEIYuc\ + 2EeM2KHTWPEepWYeawvHD0gQ3DngSC75YCWnnDdq+NQ3F+X4deMx9AaEglZtULwV\ + 4= + +=head1 NOTES + +A created SPKAC with suitable DN components appended can be fed into +the B<ca> utility. + +SPKACs are typically generated by Netscape when a form is submitted +containing the B<KEYGEN> tag as part of the certificate enrollment +process. + +The challenge string permits a primitive form of proof of possession +of private key. By checking the SPKAC signature and a random challenge +string some guarantee is given that the user knows the private key +corresponding to the public key being certified. This is important in +some applications. Without this it is possible for a previous SPKAC +to be used in a "replay attack". + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ca(1)|ca(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/verify.pod b/doc/apps/verify.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ea5c29c15021 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/verify.pod @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +verify - Utility to verify certificates. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<verify> +[B<-CApath directory>] +[B<-CAfile file>] +[B<-purpose purpose>] +[B<-untrusted file>] +[B<-help>] +[B<-issuer_checks>] +[B<-verbose>] +[B<->] +[certificates] + + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<verify> command verifies certificate chains. + +=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-CApath directory> + +A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names +of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this +form ("hash" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the B<-hash> option +of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically +create symbolic links to a directory of certificates. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates +in PEM format concatenated together. + +=item B<-untrusted file> + +A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates + +=item B<-purpose purpose> + +the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification +will be done. Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, +B<nssslserver>, B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> +section for more information. + +=item B<-help> + +prints out a usage message. + +=item B<-verbose> + +print extra information about the operations being performed. + +=item B<-issuer_checks> + +print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate +of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer +certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages +does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal +verify process several rejections may take place. + +=item B<-> + +marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be +certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins +with a B<->. + +=item B<certificates> + +one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included +then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should +all be in PEM format. + + +=back + +=head1 VERIFY OPERATION + +The B<verify> program uses the same functions as the internal SSL and S/MIME +verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations +too. + +There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed +by the B<verify> program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue +after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the +first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be +determined. + +The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps. + +Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate +and ending in the root CA. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built +up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current +certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed +to be the root CA. + +The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number +of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose +subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be +the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates +whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are +subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components +of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier +(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition +the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit +certificate signing. + +The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match +is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA +is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to +verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted +list. + +The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for +consistency with the supplied purpose. If the B<-purpose> option is not included +then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have extensions +compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid +CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in +the B<CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS> section of the B<x509> utility. + +The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root +CA should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous +versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered +to be valid for all purposes. + +The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity +period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter +dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this +point. + +If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If +any operation fails then the certificate is not valid. + +=head1 DIAGNOSTICS + +When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The +general form of the error message is: + + server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit) + error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate + +The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by +the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number +and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a +problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself +then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version +of the error number is presented. + +An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also +includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h +Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described +as "unused". + +=over 4 + +=item B<0 X509_V_OK: ok> + +the operation was successful. + +=item B<2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate> + +the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate +of an untrusted certificate cannot be found. + +=item B<3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL unable to get certificate CRL> + +the CRL of a certificate could not be found. Unused. + +=item B<4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature> + +the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value +could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only +meaningful for RSA keys. + +=item B<5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature> + +the CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value +could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused. + +=item B<6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key> + +the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read. + +=item B<7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure> + +the signature of the certificate is invalid. + +=item B<8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure> + +the signature of the certificate is invalid. Unused. + +=item B<9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid> + +the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time. + +=item B<10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired> + +the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time. + +=item B<11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid> + +the CRL is not yet valid. Unused. + +=item B<12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired> + +the CRL has expired. Unused. + +=item B<13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field> + +the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time. + +=item B<14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field> + +the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time. + +=item B<15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field> + +the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused. + +=item B<16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field> + +the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused. + +=item B<17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory> + +an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen. + +=item B<18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate> + +the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of +trusted certificates. + +=item B<19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain> + +the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not +be found locally. + +=item B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate> + +the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means +the list of trusted certificates is not complete. + +=item B<21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate> + +no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not +self signed. + +=item B<22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long> + +the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused. + +=item B<23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked> + +the certificate has been revoked. Unused. + +=item B<24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate> + +a CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent +with the supplied purpose. + +=item B<25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded> + +the basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded. + +=item B<26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose> + +the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose. + +=item B<27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted> + +the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose. + +=item B<28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected> + +the root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose. + +=item B<29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch> + +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name +did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when +the B<-issuer_checks> option is set. + +=item B<30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch> + +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key +identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current +certificate. Only displayed when the B<-issuer_checks> option is set. + +=item B<31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch> + +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name +and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier +of the current certificate. Only displayed when the B<-issuer_checks> option is set. + +=item B<32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing> + +the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension +does not permit certificate signing. + +=item B<50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure> + +an application specific error. Unused. + +=back + +=head1 BUGS + +Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still +suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that +trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the +B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only +the certificates in the file will be recognised. + +Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and +mishandled them. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<x509(1)|x509(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/version.pod b/doc/apps/version.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e00324c446cd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/version.pod @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +version - print OpenSSL version information + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl version> +[B<-a>] +[B<-v>] +[B<-b>] +[B<-o>] +[B<-f>] +[B<-p>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This command is used to print out version information about OpenSSL. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-a> + +all information, this is the same as setting all the other flags. + +=item B<-v> + +the current OpenSSL version. + +=item B<-b> + +the date the current version of OpenSSL was built. + +=item B<-o> + +option information: various options set when the library was built. + +=item B<-c> + +compilation flags. + +=item B<-p> + +platform setting. + +=item B<-d> + +OPENSSLDIR setting. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +The output of B<openssl version -a> would typically be used when sending +in a bug report. + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<-d> option was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/x509.pod b/doc/apps/x509.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a925da41f16a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/x509.pod @@ -0,0 +1,832 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +x509 - Certificate display and signing utility + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +B<openssl> B<x509> +[B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>] +[B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>] +[B<-keyform DER|PEM>] +[B<-CAform DER|PEM>] +[B<-CAkeyform DER|PEM>] +[B<-in filename>] +[B<-out filename>] +[B<-serial>] +[B<-hash>] +[B<-subject_hash>] +[B<-issuer_hash>] +[B<-subject>] +[B<-issuer>] +[B<-nameopt option>] +[B<-email>] +[B<-startdate>] +[B<-enddate>] +[B<-purpose>] +[B<-dates>] +[B<-modulus>] +[B<-fingerprint>] +[B<-alias>] +[B<-noout>] +[B<-trustout>] +[B<-clrtrust>] +[B<-clrreject>] +[B<-addtrust arg>] +[B<-addreject arg>] +[B<-setalias arg>] +[B<-days arg>] +[B<-set_serial n>] +[B<-signkey filename>] +[B<-x509toreq>] +[B<-req>] +[B<-CA filename>] +[B<-CAkey filename>] +[B<-CAcreateserial>] +[B<-CAserial filename>] +[B<-text>] +[B<-C>] +[B<-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2>] +[B<-clrext>] +[B<-extfile filename>] +[B<-extensions section>] +[B<-engine id>] + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<x509> command is a multi purpose certificate utility. It can be +used to display certificate information, convert certificates to +various forms, sign certificate requests like a "mini CA" or edit +certificate trust settings. + +Since there are a large number of options they will split up into +various sections. + +=head1 OPTIONS + +=head2 INPUT, OUTPUT AND GENERAL PURPOSE OPTIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<-inform DER|PEM|NET> + +This specifies the input format normally the command will expect an X509 +certificate but this can change if other options such as B<-req> are +present. The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM +is the base64 encoding of the DER encoding with header and footer lines +added. The NET option is an obscure Netscape server format that is now +obsolete. + +=item B<-outform DER|PEM|NET> + +This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the +B<-inform> option. + +=item B<-in filename> + +This specifies the input filename to read a certificate from or standard input +if this option is not specified. + +=item B<-out filename> + +This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by +default. + +=item B<-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2> + +the digest to use. This affects any signing or display option that uses a message +digest, such as the B<-fingerprint>, B<-signkey> and B<-CA> options. If not +specified then SHA1 is used. If the key being used to sign with is a DSA key +then this option has no effect: SHA1 is always used with DSA keys. + +=item B<-engine id> + +specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req> +to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, +thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default +for all available algorithms. + +=back + +=head2 DISPLAY OPTIONS + +Note: the B<-alias> and B<-purpose> options are also display options +but are described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS> section. + +=over 4 + +=item B<-text> + +prints out the certificate in text form. Full details are output including the +public key, signature algorithms, issuer and subject names, serial number +any extensions present and any trust settings. + +=item B<-certopt option> + +customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be +a single option or multiple options separated by commas. The B<-certopt> switch +may be also be used more than once to set multiple options. See the B<TEXT OPTIONS> +section for more information. + +=item B<-noout> + +this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request. + +=item B<-modulus> + +this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key +contained in the certificate. + +=item B<-serial> + +outputs the certificate serial number. + +=item B<-subject_hash> + +outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name. This is used in OpenSSL to +form an index to allow certificates in a directory to be looked up by subject +name. + +=item B<-issuer_hash> + +outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name. + +=item B<-hash> + +synonym for "-hash" for backward compatibility reasons. + +=item B<-subject> + +outputs the subject name. + +=item B<-issuer> + +outputs the issuer name. + +=item B<-nameopt option> + +option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The +B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by +commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to +set multiple options. See the B<NAME OPTIONS> section for more information. + +=item B<-email> + +outputs the email address(es) if any. + +=item B<-startdate> + +prints out the start date of the certificate, that is the notBefore date. + +=item B<-enddate> + +prints out the expiry date of the certificate, that is the notAfter date. + +=item B<-dates> + +prints out the start and expiry dates of a certificate. + +=item B<-fingerprint> + +prints out the digest of the DER encoded version of the whole certificate +(see digest options). + +=item B<-C> + +this outputs the certificate in the form of a C source file. + +=back + +=head2 TRUST SETTINGS + +Please note these options are currently experimental and may well change. + +A B<trusted certificate> is an ordinary certificate which has several +additional pieces of information attached to it such as the permitted +and prohibited uses of the certificate and an "alias". + +Normally when a certificate is being verified at least one certificate +must be "trusted". By default a trusted certificate must be stored +locally and must be a root CA: any certificate chain ending in this CA +is then usable for any purpose. + +Trust settings currently are only used with a root CA. They allow a finer +control over the purposes the root CA can be used for. For example a CA +may be trusted for SSL client but not SSL server use. + +See the description of the B<verify> utility for more information on the +meaning of trust settings. + +Future versions of OpenSSL will recognize trust settings on any +certificate: not just root CAs. + + +=over 4 + +=item B<-trustout> + +this causes B<x509> to output a B<trusted> certificate. An ordinary +or trusted certificate can be input but by default an ordinary +certificate is output and any trust settings are discarded. With the +B<-trustout> option a trusted certificate is output. A trusted +certificate is automatically output if any trust settings are modified. + +=item B<-setalias arg> + +sets the alias of the certificate. This will allow the certificate +to be referred to using a nickname for example "Steve's Certificate". + +=item B<-alias> + +outputs the certificate alias, if any. + +=item B<-clrtrust> + +clears all the permitted or trusted uses of the certificate. + +=item B<-clrreject> + +clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate. + +=item B<-addtrust arg> + +adds a trusted certificate use. Any object name can be used here +but currently only B<clientAuth> (SSL client use), B<serverAuth> +(SSL server use) and B<emailProtection> (S/MIME email) are used. +Other OpenSSL applications may define additional uses. + +=item B<-addreject arg> + +adds a prohibited use. It accepts the same values as the B<-addtrust> +option. + +=item B<-purpose> + +this option performs tests on the certificate extensions and outputs +the results. For a more complete description see the B<CERTIFICATE +EXTENSIONS> section. + +=back + +=head2 SIGNING OPTIONS + +The B<x509> utility can be used to sign certificates and requests: it +can thus behave like a "mini CA". + +=over 4 + +=item B<-signkey filename> + +this option causes the input file to be self signed using the supplied +private key. + +If the input file is a certificate it sets the issuer name to the +subject name (i.e. makes it self signed) changes the public key to the +supplied value and changes the start and end dates. The start date is +set to the current time and the end date is set to a value determined +by the B<-days> option. Any certificate extensions are retained unless +the B<-clrext> option is supplied. + +If the input is a certificate request then a self signed certificate +is created using the supplied private key using the subject name in +the request. + +=item B<-clrext> + +delete any extensions from a certificate. This option is used when a +certificate is being created from another certificate (for example with +the B<-signkey> or the B<-CA> options). Normally all extensions are +retained. + +=item B<-keyform PEM|DER> + +specifies the format (DER or PEM) of the private key file used in the +B<-signkey> option. + +=item B<-days arg> + +specifies the number of days to make a certificate valid for. The default +is 30 days. + +=item B<-x509toreq> + +converts a certificate into a certificate request. The B<-signkey> option +is used to pass the required private key. + +=item B<-req> + +by default a certificate is expected on input. With this option a +certificate request is expected instead. + +=item B<-set_serial n> + +specifies the serial number to use. This option can be used with either +the B<-signkey> or B<-CA> options. If used in conjunction with the B<-CA> +option the serial number file (as specified by the B<-CAserial> or +B<-CAcreateserial> options) is not used. + +The serial number can be decimal or hex (if preceded by B<0x>). Negative +serial numbers can also be specified but their use is not recommended. + +=item B<-CA filename> + +specifies the CA certificate to be used for signing. When this option is +present B<x509> behaves like a "mini CA". The input file is signed by this +CA using this option: that is its issuer name is set to the subject name +of the CA and it is digitally signed using the CAs private key. + +This option is normally combined with the B<-req> option. Without the +B<-req> option the input is a certificate which must be self signed. + +=item B<-CAkey filename> + +sets the CA private key to sign a certificate with. If this option is +not specified then it is assumed that the CA private key is present in +the CA certificate file. + +=item B<-CAserial filename> + +sets the CA serial number file to use. + +When the B<-CA> option is used to sign a certificate it uses a serial +number specified in a file. This file consist of one line containing +an even number of hex digits with the serial number to use. After each +use the serial number is incremented and written out to the file again. + +The default filename consists of the CA certificate file base name with +".srl" appended. For example if the CA certificate file is called +"mycacert.pem" it expects to find a serial number file called "mycacert.srl". + +=item B<-CAcreateserial> + +with this option the CA serial number file is created if it does not exist: +it will contain the serial number "02" and the certificate being signed will +have the 1 as its serial number. Normally if the B<-CA> option is specified +and the serial number file does not exist it is an error. + +=item B<-extfile filename> + +file containing certificate extensions to use. If not specified then +no extensions are added to the certificate. + +=item B<-extensions section> + +the section to add certificate extensions from. If this option is not +specified then the extensions should either be contained in the unnamed +(default) section or the default section should contain a variable called +"extensions" which contains the section to use. + +=back + +=head2 NAME OPTIONS + +The B<nameopt> command line switch determines how the subject and issuer +names are displayed. If no B<nameopt> switch is present the default "oneline" +format is used which is compatible with previous versions of OpenSSL. +Each option is described in detail below, all options can be preceded by +a B<-> to turn the option off. Only the first four will normally be used. + +=over 4 + +=item B<compat> + +use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no name options at all. + +=item B<RFC2253> + +displays names compatible with RFC2253 equivalent to B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, +B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>, B<dump_unknown>, B<dump_der>, +B<sep_comma_plus>, B<dn_rev> and B<sname>. + +=item B<oneline> + +a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to +specifying the B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>, +B<dump_der>, B<use_quote>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<space_eq> and B<sname> +options. + +=item B<multiline> + +a multiline format. It is equivalent B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<sep_multiline>, +B<space_eq>, B<lname> and B<align>. + +=item B<esc_2253> + +escape the "special" characters required by RFC2253 in a field That is +B<,+"E<lt>E<gt>;>. Additionally B<#> is escaped at the beginning of a string +and a space character at the beginning or end of a string. + +=item B<esc_ctrl> + +escape control characters. That is those with ASCII values less than +0x20 (space) and the delete (0x7f) character. They are escaped using the +RFC2253 \XX notation (where XX are two hex digits representing the +character value). + +=item B<esc_msb> + +escape characters with the MSB set, that is with ASCII values larger than +127. + +=item B<use_quote> + +escapes some characters by surrounding the whole string with B<"> characters, +without the option all escaping is done with the B<\> character. + +=item B<utf8> + +convert all strings to UTF8 format first. This is required by RFC2253. If +you are lucky enough to have a UTF8 compatible terminal then the use +of this option (and B<not> setting B<esc_msb>) may result in the correct +display of multibyte (international) characters. Is this option is not +present then multibyte characters larger than 0xff will be represented +using the format \UXXXX for 16 bits and \WXXXXXXXX for 32 bits. +Also if this option is off any UTF8Strings will be converted to their +character form first. + +=item B<no_type> + +this option does not attempt to interpret multibyte characters in any +way. That is their content octets are merely dumped as though one octet +represents each character. This is useful for diagnostic purposes but +will result in rather odd looking output. + +=item B<show_type> + +show the type of the ASN1 character string. The type precedes the +field contents. For example "BMPSTRING: Hello World". + +=item B<dump_der> + +when this option is set any fields that need to be hexdumped will +be dumped using the DER encoding of the field. Otherwise just the +content octets will be displayed. Both options use the RFC2253 +B<#XXXX...> format. + +=item B<dump_nostr> + +dump non character string types (for example OCTET STRING) if this +option is not set then non character string types will be displayed +as though each content octet represents a single character. + +=item B<dump_all> + +dump all fields. This option when used with B<dump_der> allows the +DER encoding of the structure to be unambiguously determined. + +=item B<dump_unknown> + +dump any field whose OID is not recognised by OpenSSL. + +=item B<sep_comma_plus>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<sep_semi_plus_space>, +B<sep_multiline> + +these options determine the field separators. The first character is +between RDNs and the second between multiple AVAs (multiple AVAs are +very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in +"space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it +more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for +the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also +indents the fields by four characters. + +=item B<dn_rev> + +reverse the fields of the DN. This is required by RFC2253. As a side +effect this also reverses the order of multiple AVAs but this is +permissible. + +=item B<nofname>, B<sname>, B<lname>, B<oid> + +these options alter how the field name is displayed. B<nofname> does +not display the field at all. B<sname> uses the "short name" form +(CN for commonName for example). B<lname> uses the long form. +B<oid> represents the OID in numerical form and is useful for +diagnostic purpose. + +=item B<align> + +align field values for a more readable output. Only usable with +B<sep_multiline>. + +=item B<space_eq> + +places spaces round the B<=> character which follows the field +name. + +=back + +=head2 TEXT OPTIONS + +As well as customising the name output format, it is also possible to +customise the actual fields printed using the B<certopt> options when +the B<text> option is present. The default behaviour is to print all fields. + +=over 4 + +=item B<compatible> + +use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no output options at all. + +=item B<no_header> + +don't print header information: that is the lines saying "Certificate" and "Data". + +=item B<no_version> + +don't print out the version number. + +=item B<no_serial> + +don't print out the serial number. + +=item B<no_signame> + +don't print out the signature algorithm used. + +=item B<no_validity> + +don't print the validity, that is the B<notBefore> and B<notAfter> fields. + +=item B<no_subject> + +don't print out the subject name. + +=item B<no_issuer> + +don't print out the issuer name. + +=item B<no_pubkey> + +don't print out the public key. + +=item B<no_sigdump> + +don't give a hexadecimal dump of the certificate signature. + +=item B<no_aux> + +don't print out certificate trust information. + +=item B<no_extensions> + +don't print out any X509V3 extensions. + +=item B<ext_default> + +retain default extension behaviour: attempt to print out unsupported certificate extensions. + +=item B<ext_error> + +print an error message for unsupported certificate extensions. + +=item B<ext_parse> + +ASN1 parse unsupported extensions. + +=item B<ext_dump> + +hex dump unsupported extensions. + +=item B<ca_default> + +the value used by the B<ca> utility, equivalent to B<no_issuer>, B<no_pubkey>, B<no_header>, +B<no_version>, B<no_sigdump> and B<no_signame>. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Note: in these examples the '\' means the example should be all on one +line. + +Display the contents of a certificate: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text + +Display the certificate serial number: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -serial + +Display the certificate subject name: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject + +Display the certificate subject name in RFC2253 form: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt RFC2253 + +Display the certificate subject name in oneline form on a terminal +supporting UTF8: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt oneline,-esc_msb + +Display the certificate MD5 fingerprint: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint + +Display the certificate SHA1 fingerprint: + + openssl x509 -sha1 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint + +Convert a certificate from PEM to DER format: + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER + +Convert a certificate to a certificate request: + + openssl x509 -x509toreq -in cert.pem -out req.pem -signkey key.pem + +Convert a certificate request into a self signed certificate using +extensions for a CA: + + openssl x509 -req -in careq.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca \ + -signkey key.pem -out cacert.pem + +Sign a certificate request using the CA certificate above and add user +certificate extensions: + + openssl x509 -req -in req.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_usr \ + -CA cacert.pem -CAkey key.pem -CAcreateserial + + +Set a certificate to be trusted for SSL client use and change set its alias to +"Steve's Class 1 CA" + + openssl x509 -in cert.pem -addtrust clientAuth \ + -setalias "Steve's Class 1 CA" -out trust.pem + +=head1 NOTES + +The PEM format uses the header and footer lines: + + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- + -----END CERTIFICATE----- + +it will also handle files containing: + + -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE----- + -----END X509 CERTIFICATE----- + +Trusted certificates have the lines + + -----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- + -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE----- + +The conversion to UTF8 format used with the name options assumes that +T61Strings use the ISO8859-1 character set. This is wrong but Netscape +and MSIE do this as do many certificates. So although this is incorrect +it is more likely to display the majority of certificates correctly. + +The B<-fingerprint> option takes the digest of the DER encoded certificate. +This is commonly called a "fingerprint". Because of the nature of message +digests the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and +two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same. + +The Netscape fingerprint uses MD5 whereas MSIE uses SHA1. + +The B<-email> option searches the subject name and the subject alternative +name extension. Only unique email addresses will be printed out: it will +not print the same address more than once. + +=head1 CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS + +The B<-purpose> option checks the certificate extensions and determines +what the certificate can be used for. The actual checks done are rather +complex and include various hacks and workarounds to handle broken +certificates and software. + +The same code is used when verifying untrusted certificates in chains +so this section is useful if a chain is rejected by the verify code. + +The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the +certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA, +if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. B<All> CAs should have the +CA flag set to true. + +If the basicConstraints extension is absent then the certificate is +considered to be a "possible CA" other extensions are checked according +to the intended use of the certificate. A warning is given in this case +because the certificate should really not be regarded as a CA: however +it is allowed to be a CA to work around some broken software. + +If the certificate is a V1 certificate (and thus has no extensions) and +it is self signed it is also assumed to be a CA but a warning is again +given: this is to work around the problem of Verisign roots which are V1 +self signed certificates. + +If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are +made on the uses of the certificate. A CA certificate B<must> have the +keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present. + +The extended key usage extension places additional restrictions on the +certificate uses. If this extension is present (whether critical or not) +the key can only be used for the purposes specified. + +A complete description of each test is given below. The comments about +basicConstraints and keyUsage and V1 certificates above apply to B<all> +CA certificates. + + +=over 4 + +=item B<SSL Client> + +The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client +authentication" OID. keyUsage must be absent or it must have the +digitalSignature bit set. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must +have the SSL client bit set. + +=item B<SSL Client CA> + +The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client +authentication" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must have +the SSL CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints +extension is absent. + +=item B<SSL Server> + +The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server +authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. keyUsage must be absent or it +must have the digitalSignature, the keyEncipherment set or both bits set. +Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL server bit set. + +=item B<SSL Server CA> + +The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server +authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. Netscape certificate type must +be absent or the SSL CA bit must be set: this is used as a work around if the +basicConstraints extension is absent. + +=item B<Netscape SSL Server> + +For Netscape SSL clients to connect to an SSL server it must have the +keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage extension is present. This isn't +always valid because some cipher suites use the key for digital signing. +Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server. + +=item B<Common S/MIME Client Tests> + +The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email +protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or should have the +S/MIME bit set. If the S/MIME bit is not set in netscape certificate type +then the SSL client bit is tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown: +this is because some Verisign certificates don't set the S/MIME bit. + +=item B<S/MIME Signing> + +In addition to the common S/MIME client tests the digitalSignature bit must +be set if the keyUsage extension is present. + +=item B<S/MIME Encryption> + +In addition to the common S/MIME tests the keyEncipherment bit must be set +if the keyUsage extension is present. + +=item B<S/MIME CA> + +The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email +protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or must have the +S/MIME CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints +extension is absent. + +=item B<CRL Signing> + +The keyUsage extension must be absent or it must have the CRL signing bit +set. + +=item B<CRL Signing CA> + +The normal CA tests apply. Except in this case the basicConstraints extension +must be present. + +=back + +=head1 BUGS + +Extensions in certificates are not transferred to certificate requests and +vice versa. + +It is possible to produce invalid certificates or requests by specifying the +wrong private key or using inconsistent options in some cases: these should +be checked. + +There should be options to explicitly set such things as start and end +dates rather than an offset from the current time. + +The code to implement the verify behaviour described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS> +is currently being developed. It thus describes the intended behaviour rather +than the current behaviour. It is hoped that it will represent reality in +OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>, +L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<verify(1)|verify(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +Before OpenSSL 0.9.8, the default digest for RSA keys was MD5. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod b/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..38c46e85c461 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod @@ -0,0 +1,456 @@ +=pod + +=for comment openssl_manual_section:5 + +=head1 NAME + +x509v3_config - X509 V3 certificate extension configuration format + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several of the OpenSSL utilities can add extensions to a certificate or +certificate request based on the contents of a configuration file. + +Typically the application will contain an option to point to an extension +section. Each line of the extension section takes the form: + + extension_name=[critical,] extension_options + +If B<critical> is present then the extension will be critical. + +The format of B<extension_options> depends on the value of B<extension_name>. + +There are four main types of extension: I<string> extensions, I<multi-valued> +extensions, I<raw> and I<arbitrary> extensions. + +String extensions simply have a string which contains either the value itself +or how it is obtained. + +For example: + + nsComment="This is a Comment" + +Multi-valued extensions have a short form and a long form. The short form +is a list of names and values: + + basicConstraints=critical,CA:true,pathlen:1 + +The long form allows the values to be placed in a separate section: + + basicConstraints=critical,@bs_section + + [bs_section] + + CA=true + pathlen=1 + +Both forms are equivalent. + +The syntax of raw extensions is governed by the extension code: it can +for example contain data in multiple sections. The correct syntax to +use is defined by the extension code itself: check out the certificate +policies extension for an example. + +If an extension type is unsupported then the I<arbitrary> extension syntax +must be used, see the L<ARBITRART EXTENSIONS|/"ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS"> section for more details. + +=head1 STANDARD EXTENSIONS + +The following sections describe each supported extension in detail. + +=head2 Basic Constraints. + +This is a multi valued extension which indicates whether a certificate is +a CA certificate. The first (mandatory) name is B<CA> followed by B<TRUE> or +B<FALSE>. If B<CA> is B<TRUE> then an optional B<pathlen> name followed by an +non-negative value can be included. + +For example: + + basicConstraints=CA:TRUE + + basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + + basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE, pathlen:0 + +A CA certificate B<must> include the basicConstraints value with the CA field +set to TRUE. An end user certificate must either set CA to FALSE or exclude the +extension entirely. Some software may require the inclusion of basicConstraints +with CA set to FALSE for end entity certificates. + +The pathlen parameter indicates the maximum number of CAs that can appear +below this one in a chain. So if you have a CA with a pathlen of zero it can +only be used to sign end user certificates and not further CAs. + + +=head2 Key Usage. + +Key usage is a multi valued extension consisting of a list of names of the +permitted key usages. + +The supporte names are: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment, +dataEncipherment, keyAgreement, keyCertSign, cRLSign, encipherOnly +and decipherOnly. + +Examples: + + keyUsage=digitalSignature, nonRepudiation + + keyUsage=critical, keyCertSign + + +=head2 Extended Key Usage. + +This extensions consists of a list of usages indicating purposes for which +the certificate public key can be used for, + +These can either be object short names of the dotted numerical form of OIDs. +While any OID can be used only certain values make sense. In particular the +following PKIX, NS and MS values are meaningful: + + Value Meaning + ----- ------- + serverAuth SSL/TLS Web Server Authentication. + clientAuth SSL/TLS Web Client Authentication. + codeSigning Code signing. + emailProtection E-mail Protection (S/MIME). + timeStamping Trusted Timestamping + msCodeInd Microsoft Individual Code Signing (authenticode) + msCodeCom Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (authenticode) + msCTLSign Microsoft Trust List Signing + msSGC Microsoft Server Gated Crypto + msEFS Microsoft Encrypted File System + nsSGC Netscape Server Gated Crypto + +Examples: + + extendedKeyUsage=critical,codeSigning,1.2.3.4 + extendedKeyUsage=nsSGC,msSGC + + +=head2 Subject Key Identifier. + +This is really a string extension and can take two possible values. Either +the word B<hash> which will automatically follow the guidelines in RFC3280 +or a hex string giving the extension value to include. The use of the hex +string is strongly discouraged. + +Example: + + subjectKeyIdentifier=hash + + +=head2 Authority Key Identifier. + +The authority key identifier extension permits two options. keyid and issuer: +both can take the optional value "always". + +If the keyid option is present an attempt is made to copy the subject key +identifier from the parent certificate. If the value "always" is present +then an error is returned if the option fails. + +The issuer option copies the issuer and serial number from the issuer +certificate. This will only be done if the keyid option fails or +is not included unless the "always" flag will always include the value. + +Example: + + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer + + +=head2 Subject Alternative Name. + +The subject alternative name extension allows various literal values to be +included in the configuration file. These include B<email> (an email address) +B<URI> a uniform resource indicator, B<DNS> (a DNS domain name), B<RID> (a +registered ID: OBJECT IDENTIFIER), B<IP> (an IP address), B<dirName> +(a distinguished name) and otherName. + +The email option include a special 'copy' value. This will automatically +include and email addresses contained in the certificate subject name in +the extension. + +The IP address used in the B<IP> options can be in either IPv4 or IPv6 format. + +The value of B<dirName> should point to a section containing the distinguished +name to use as a set of name value pairs. Multi values AVAs can be formed by +preceeding the name with a B<+> character. + +otherName can include arbitrary data associated with an OID: the value +should be the OID followed by a semicolon and the content in standard +ASN1_generate_nconf() format. + +Examples: + + subjectAltName=email:copy,email:my@other.address,URI:http://my.url.here/ + subjectAltName=IP:192.168.7.1 + subjectAltName=IP:13::17 + subjectAltName=email:my@other.address,RID:1.2.3.4 + subjectAltName=otherName:1.2.3.4;UTF8:some other identifier + + subjectAltName=dirName:dir_sect + + [dir_sect] + C=UK + O=My Organization + OU=My Unit + CN=My Name + + +=head2 Issuer Alternative Name. + +The issuer alternative name option supports all the literal options of +subject alternative name. It does B<not> support the email:copy option because +that would not make sense. It does support an additional issuer:copy option +that will copy all the subject alternative name values from the issuer +certificate (if possible). + +Example: + + issuserAltName = issuer:copy + + +=head2 Authority Info Access. + +The authority information access extension gives details about how to access +certain information relating to the CA. Its syntax is accessOID;location +where I<location> has the same syntax as subject alternative name (except +that email:copy is not supported). accessOID can be any valid OID but only +certain values are meaningful, for example OCSP and caIssuers. + +Example: + + authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.my.host/ + authorityInfoAccess = caIssuers;URI:http://my.ca/ca.html + + +=head2 CRL distribution points. + +This is a multi-valued extension that supports all the literal options of +subject alternative name. Of the few software packages that currently interpret +this extension most only interpret the URI option. + +Currently each option will set a new DistributionPoint with the fullName +field set to the given value. + +Other fields like cRLissuer and reasons cannot currently be set or displayed: +at this time no examples were available that used these fields. + +Examples: + + crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://myhost.com/myca.crl + crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://my.com/my.crl,URI:http://oth.com/my.crl + +=head2 Certificate Policies. + +This is a I<raw> extension. All the fields of this extension can be set by +using the appropriate syntax. + +If you follow the PKIX recommendations and just using one OID then you just +include the value of that OID. Multiple OIDs can be set separated by commas, +for example: + + certificatePolicies= 1.2.4.5, 1.1.3.4 + +If you wish to include qualifiers then the policy OID and qualifiers need to +be specified in a separate section: this is done by using the @section syntax +instead of a literal OID value. + +The section referred to must include the policy OID using the name +policyIdentifier, cPSuri qualifiers can be included using the syntax: + + CPS.nnn=value + +userNotice qualifiers can be set using the syntax: + + userNotice.nnn=@notice + +The value of the userNotice qualifier is specified in the relevant section. +This section can include explicitText, organization and noticeNumbers +options. explicitText and organization are text strings, noticeNumbers is a +comma separated list of numbers. The organization and noticeNumbers options +(if included) must BOTH be present. If you use the userNotice option with IE5 +then you need the 'ia5org' option at the top level to modify the encoding: +otherwise it will not be interpreted properly. + +Example: + + certificatePolicies=ia5org,1.2.3.4,1.5.6.7.8,@polsect + + [polsect] + + policyIdentifier = 1.3.5.8 + CPS.1="http://my.host.name/" + CPS.2="http://my.your.name/" + userNotice.1=@notice + + [notice] + + explicitText="Explicit Text Here" + organization="Organisation Name" + noticeNumbers=1,2,3,4 + +The B<ia5org> option changes the type of the I<organization> field. In RFC2459 +it can only be of type DisplayText. In RFC3280 IA5Strring is also permissible. +Some software (for example some versions of MSIE) may require ia5org. + +=head2 Policy Constraints + +This is a multi-valued extension which consisting of the names +B<requireExplicitPolicy> or B<inhibitPolicyMapping> and a non negative intger +value. At least one component must be present. + +Example: + + policyConstraints = requireExplicitPolicy:3 + + +=head2 Inhibit Any Policy + +This is a string extension whose value must be a non negative integer. + +Example: + + inhibitAnyPolicy = 2 + + +=head2 Name Constraints + +The name constraints extension is a multi-valued extension. The name should +begin with the word B<permitted> or B<excluded> followed by a B<;>. The rest of +the name and the value follows the syntax of subjectAltName except email:copy +is not supported and the B<IP> form should consist of an IP addresses and +subnet mask separated by a B</>. + +Examples: + + nameConstraints=permitted;IP:192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0 + + nameConstraints=permitted;email:.somedomain.com + + nameConstraints=excluded;email:.com + +=head1 DEPRECATED EXTENSIONS + +The following extensions are non standard, Netscape specific and largely +obsolete. Their use in new applications is discouraged. + +=head2 Netscape String extensions. + +Netscape Comment (B<nsComment>) is a string extension containing a comment +which will be displayed when the certificate is viewed in some browsers. + +Example: + + nsComment = "Some Random Comment" + +Other supported extensions in this category are: B<nsBaseUrl>, +B<nsRevocationUrl>, B<nsCaRevocationUrl>, B<nsRenewalUrl>, B<nsCaPolicyUrl> +and B<nsSslServerName>. + + +=head2 Netscape Certificate Type + +This is a multi-valued extensions which consists of a list of flags to be +included. It was used to indicate the purposes for which a certificate could +be used. The basicConstraints, keyUsage and extended key usage extensions are +now used instead. + +Acceptable values for nsCertType are: B<client>, B<server>, B<email>, +B<objsign>, B<reserved>, B<sslCA>, B<emailCA>, B<objCA>. + + +=head1 ARBITRARY EXTENSIONS + +If an extension is not supported by the OpenSSL code then it must be encoded +using the arbitrary extension format. It is also possible to use the arbitrary +format for supported extensions. Extreme care should be taken to ensure that +the data is formatted correctly for the given extension type. + +There are two ways to encode arbitrary extensions. + +The first way is to use the word ASN1 followed by the extension content +using the same syntax as ASN1_generate_nconf(). For example: + + 1.2.3.4=critical,ASN1:UTF8String:Some random data + + 1.2.3.4=ASN1:SEQUENCE:seq_sect + + [seq_sect] + + field1 = UTF8:field1 + field2 = UTF8:field2 + +It is also possible to use the word DER to include the raw encoded data in any +extension. + + 1.2.3.4=critical,DER:01:02:03:04 + 1.2.3.4=DER:01020304 + +The value following DER is a hex dump of the DER encoding of the extension +Any extension can be placed in this form to override the default behaviour. +For example: + + basicConstraints=critical,DER:00:01:02:03 + +=head1 WARNING + +There is no guarantee that a specific implementation will process a given +extension. It may therefore be sometimes possible to use certificates for +purposes prohibited by their extensions because a specific application does +not recognize or honour the values of the relevant extensions. + +The DER and ASN1 options should be used with caution. It is possible to create +totally invalid extensions if they are not used carefully. + + +=head1 NOTES + +If an extension is multi-value and a field value must contain a comma the long +form must be used otherwise the comma would be misinterpreted as a field +separator. For example: + + subjectAltName=URI:ldap://somehost.com/CN=foo,OU=bar + +will produce an error but the equivalent form: + + subjectAltName=@subject_alt_section + + [subject_alt_section] + subjectAltName=URI:ldap://somehost.com/CN=foo,OU=bar + +is valid. + +Due to the behaviour of the OpenSSL B<conf> library the same field name +can only occur once in a section. This means that: + + subjectAltName=@alt_section + + [alt_section] + + email=steve@here + email=steve@there + +will only recognize the last value. This can be worked around by using the form: + + [alt_section] + + email.1=steve@here + email.2=steve@there + +=head1 HISTORY + +The X509v3 extension code was first added to OpenSSL 0.9.2. + +Policy mappings, inhibit any policy and name constraints support was added in +OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +The B<directoryName> and B<otherName> option as well as the B<ASN1> option +for arbitrary extensions was added in OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<x509(1)|x509(1)> + + +=cut diff --git a/doc/c-indentation.el b/doc/c-indentation.el new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cbf01cb1720a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/c-indentation.el @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +; This Emacs Lisp file defines a C indentation style that closely +; follows most aspects of the one that is used throughout SSLeay, +; and hence in OpenSSL. +; +; This definition is for the "CC mode" package, which is the default +; mode for editing C source files in Emacs 20, not for the older +; c-mode.el (which was the default in less recent releaes of Emacs 19). +; +; Copy the definition in your .emacs file or use M-x eval-buffer. +; To activate this indentation style, visit a C file, type +; M-x c-set-style <RET> (or C-c . for short), and enter "eay". +; To toggle the auto-newline feature of CC mode, type C-c C-a. +; +; Apparently statement blocks that are not introduced by a statement +; such as "if" and that are not the body of a function cannot +; be handled too well by CC mode with this indentation style, +; so you have to indent them manually (you can use C-q tab). +; +; For suggesting improvements, please send e-mail to bodo@openssl.org. + +(c-add-style "eay" + '((c-basic-offset . 8) + (c-comment-only-line-offset . 0) + (c-hanging-braces-alist) + (c-offsets-alist . ((defun-open . +) + (defun-block-intro . 0) + (class-open . +) + (class-close . +) + (block-open . 0) + (block-close . 0) + (substatement-open . +) + (statement . 0) + (statement-block-intro . 0) + (statement-case-open . +) + (statement-case-intro . +) + (case-label . -) + (label . -) + (arglist-cont-nonempty . +) + (topmost-intro . -) + (brace-list-close . 0) + (brace-list-intro . 0) + (brace-list-open . +) + )))) + diff --git a/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod b/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51679bfcd97c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ASN1_OBJECT_new, ASN1_OBJECT_free, - object allocation functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void); + void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The ASN1_OBJECT allocation routines, allocate and free an +ASN1_OBJECT structure, which represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. + +ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates and initializes a ASN1_OBJECT structure. + +ASN1_OBJECT_free() frees up the B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure B<a>. + +=head1 NOTES + +Although ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates a new ASN1_OBJECT structure it +is almost never used in applications. The ASN1 object utility functions +such as OBJ_nid2obj() are used instead. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +If the allocation fails, ASN1_OBJECT_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error +code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. +Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +ASN1_OBJECT_free() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(3)|d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ASN1_OBJECT_new() and ASN1_OBJECT_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod b/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c4ec693f17bd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ASN1_STRING_dup, ASN1_STRING_cmp, ASN1_STRING_set, ASN1_STRING_length, +ASN1_STRING_length_set, ASN1_STRING_type, ASN1_STRING_data - +ASN1_STRING utility functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + int ASN1_STRING_length(ASN1_STRING *x); + unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x); + + ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_dup(ASN1_STRING *a); + + int ASN1_STRING_cmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b); + + int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len); + + int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x); + + int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions allow an B<ASN1_STRING> structure to be manipulated. + +ASN1_STRING_length() returns the length of the content of B<x>. + +ASN1_STRING_data() returns an internal pointer to the data of B<x>. +Since this is an internal pointer it should B<not> be freed or +modified in any way. + +ASN1_STRING_dup() returns a copy of the structure B<a>. + +ASN1_STRING_cmp() compares B<a> and B<b> returning 0 if the two +are identical. The string types and content are compared. + +ASN1_STRING_set() sets the data of string B<str> to the buffer +B<data> or length B<len>. The supplied data is copied. If B<len> +is -1 then the length is determined by strlen(data). + +ASN1_STRING_type() returns the type of B<x>, using standard constants +such as B<V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING>. + +ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() converts the string B<in> to UTF8 format, the +converted data is allocated in a buffer in B<*out>. The length of +B<out> is returned or a negative error code. The buffer B<*out> +should be free using OPENSSL_free(). + +=head1 NOTES + +Almost all ASN1 types in OpenSSL are represented as an B<ASN1_STRING> +structure. Other types such as B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> are simply typedefed +to B<ASN1_STRING> and the functions call the B<ASN1_STRING> equivalents. +B<ASN1_STRING> is also used for some B<CHOICE> types which consist +entirely of primitive string types such as B<DirectoryString> and +B<Time>. + +These functions should B<not> be used to examine or modify B<ASN1_INTEGER> +or B<ASN1_ENUMERATED> types: the relevant B<INTEGER> or B<ENUMERATED> +utility functions should be used instead. + +In general it cannot be assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() +is null terminated or does not contain embedded nulls. The actual format +of the data will depend on the actual string type itself: for example +for and IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per +character in big endian format, UTF8String will be in UTF8 format. + +Similar care should be take to ensure the data is in the correct format +when calling ASN1_STRING_set(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod b/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5b1bbb7eb21f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ASN1_STRING_new, ASN1_STRING_type_new, ASN1_STRING_free - +ASN1_STRING allocation functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_new(void); + ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type); + void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ASN1_STRING_new() returns an allocated B<ASN1_STRING> structure. Its type +is undefined. + +ASN1_STRING_type_new() returns an allocated B<ASN1_STRING> structure of +type B<type>. + +ASN1_STRING_free() frees up B<a>. + +=head1 NOTES + +Other string types call the B<ASN1_STRING> functions. For example +ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() calls ASN1_STRING_type(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ASN1_STRING_new() and ASN1_STRING_type_new() return a valid +ASN1_STRING structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred. + +ASN1_STRING_free() does not return a value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod b/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3891b88791dd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ASN1_STRING_print_ex, ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp - ASN1_STRING output routines. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/asn1.h> + + int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); + int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); + int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str); + + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions output an B<ASN1_STRING> structure. B<ASN1_STRING> is used to +represent all the ASN1 string types. + +ASN1_STRING_print_ex() outputs B<str> to B<out>, the format is determined by +the options B<flags>. ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp() is identical except it outputs +to B<fp> instead. + +ASN1_STRING_print() prints B<str> to B<out> but using a different format to +ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). It replaces unprintable characters (other than CR, LF) +with '.'. + +=head1 NOTES + +ASN1_STRING_print() is a legacy function which should be avoided in new applications. + +Although there are a large number of options frequently B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253> is +suitable, or on UTF8 terminals B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB>. + +The complete set of supported options for B<flags> is listed below. + +Various characters can be escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253> is set the characters +determined by RFC2253 are escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL> is set control +characters are escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> is set characters with the +MSB set are escaped: this option should B<not> be used if the terminal correctly +interprets UTF8 sequences. + +Escaping takes several forms. + +If the character being escaped is a 16 bit character then the form "\UXXXX" is used +using exactly four characters for the hex representation. If it is 32 bits then +"\WXXXXXXXX" is used using eight characters of its hex representation. These forms +will only be used if UTF8 conversion is not set (see below). + +Printable characters are normally escaped using the backslash '\' character. If +B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE> is set then the whole string is instead surrounded by +double quote characters: this is arguably more readable than the backslash +notation. Other characters use the "\XX" using exactly two characters of the hex +representation. + +If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT> is set then characters are converted to UTF8 +format first. If the terminal supports the display of UTF8 sequences then this +option will correctly display multi byte characters. + +If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE> is set then the string type is not interpreted at +all: everything is assumed to be one byte per character. This is primarily for +debugging purposes and can result in confusing output in multi character strings. + +If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE> is set then the string type itself is printed out +before its value (for example "BMPSTRING"), this actually uses ASN1_tag2str(). + +The content of a string instead of being interpreted can be "dumped": this just +outputs the value of the string using the form #XXXX using hex format for each +octet. + +If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL> is set then any type is dumped. + +Normally non character string types (such as OCTET STRING) are assumed to be +one byte per character, if B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN> is set then they will +be dumped instead. + +When a type is dumped normally just the content octets are printed, if +B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER> is set then the complete encoding is dumped +instead (including tag and length octets). + +B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253> includes all the flags required by RFC2253. It is +equivalent to: + ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | + ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)|X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>, +L<ASN1_tag2str(3)|ASN1_tag2str(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod b/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ba6e3c2e8140 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ASN1_generate_nconf, ASN1_generate_v3 - ASN1 generation functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf); + ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions generate the ASN1 encoding of a string +in an B<ASN1_TYPE> structure. + +B<str> contains the string to encode B<nconf> or B<cnf> contains +the optional configuration information where additional strings +will be read from. B<nconf> will typically come from a config +file wherease B<cnf> is obtained from an B<X509V3_CTX> structure +which will typically be used by X509 v3 certificate extension +functions. B<cnf> or B<nconf> can be set to B<NULL> if no additional +configuration will be used. + +=head1 GENERATION STRING FORMAT + +The actual data encoded is determined by the string B<str> and +the configuration information. The general format of the string +is: + + B<[modifier,]type[:value]> + +That is zero or more comma separated modifiers followed by a type +followed by an optional colon and a value. The formats of B<type>, +B<value> and B<modifier> are explained below. + +=head2 SUPPORTED TYPES + +The supported types are listed below. Unless otherwise specified +only the B<ASCII> format is permissible. + +=over 2 + +=item B<BOOLEAN>, B<BOOL> + +This encodes a boolean type. The B<value> string is mandatory and +should be B<TRUE> or B<FALSE>. Additionally B<TRUE>, B<true>, B<Y>, +B<y>, B<YES>, B<yes>, B<FALSE>, B<false>, B<N>, B<n>, B<NO> and B<no> +are acceptable. + +=item B<NULL> + +Encode the B<NULL> type, the B<value> string must not be present. + +=item B<INTEGER>, B<INT> + +Encodes an ASN1 B<INTEGER> type. The B<value> string represents +the value of the integer, it can be preceeded by a minus sign and +is normally interpreted as a decimal value unless the prefix B<0x> +is included. + +=item B<ENUMERATED>, B<ENUM> + +Encodes the ASN1 B<ENUMERATED> type, it is otherwise identical to +B<INTEGER>. + +=item B<OBJECT>, B<OID> + +Encodes an ASN1 B<OBJECT IDENTIFIER>, the B<value> string can be +a short name, a long name or numerical format. + +=item B<UTCTIME>, B<UTC> + +Encodes an ASN1 B<UTCTime> structure, the value should be in +the format B<YYMMDDHHMMSSZ>. + +=item B<GENERALIZEDTIME>, B<GENTIME> + +Encodes an ASN1 B<GeneralizedTime> structure, the value should be in +the format B<YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ>. + +=item B<OCTETSTRING>, B<OCT> + +Emcodes an ASN1 B<OCTET STRING>. B<value> represents the contents +of this structure, the format strings B<ASCII> and B<HEX> can be +used to specify the format of B<value>. + +=item B<BITSRING>, B<BITSTR> + +Emcodes an ASN1 B<BIT STRING>. B<value> represents the contents +of this structure, the format strings B<ASCII>, B<HEX> and B<BITLIST> +can be used to specify the format of B<value>. + +If the format is anything other than B<BITLIST> the number of unused +bits is set to zero. + +=item B<UNIVERSALSTRING>, B<UNIV>, B<IA5>, B<IA5STRING>, B<UTF8>, +B<UTF8String>, B<BMP>, B<BMPSTRING>, B<VISIBLESTRING>, +B<VISIBLE>, B<PRINTABLESTRING>, B<PRINTABLE>, B<T61>, +B<T61STRING>, B<TELETEXSTRING>, B<GeneralString> + +These encode the corresponding string types. B<value> represents the +contents of this structure. The format can be B<ASCII> or B<UTF8>. + +=item B<SEQUENCE>, B<SEQ>, B<SET> + +Formats the result as an ASN1 B<SEQUENCE> or B<SET> type. B<value> +should be a section name which will contain the contents. The +field names in the section are ignored and the values are in the +generated string format. If B<value> is absent then an empty SEQUENCE +will be encoded. + +=back + +=head2 MODIFIERS + +Modifiers affect the following structure, they can be used to +add EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT tagging, add wrappers or to change +the string format of the final type and value. The supported +formats are documented below. + +=over 2 + +=item B<EXPLICIT>, B<EXP> + +Add an explicit tag to the following structure. This string +should be followed by a colon and the tag value to use as a +decimal value. + +By following the number with B<U>, B<A>, B<P> or B<C> UNIVERSAL, +APPLICATION, PRIVATE or CONTEXT SPECIFIC tagging can be used, +the default is CONTEXT SPECIFIC. + +=item B<IMPLICIT>, B<IMP> + +This is the same as B<EXPLICIT> except IMPLICIT tagging is used +instead. + +=item B<OCTWRAP>, B<SEQWRAP>, B<SETWRAP>, B<BITWRAP> + +The following structure is surrounded by an OCTET STRING, a SEQUENCE, +a SET or a BIT STRING respectively. For a BIT STRING the number of unused +bits is set to zero. + +=item B<FORMAT> + +This specifies the format of the ultimate value. It should be followed +by a colon and one of the strings B<ASCII>, B<UTF8>, B<HEX> or B<BITLIST>. + +If no format specifier is included then B<ASCII> is used. If B<UTF8> is specified +then the value string must be a valid B<UTF8> string. For B<HEX> the output must +be a set of hex digits. B<BITLIST> (which is only valid for a BIT STRING) is a +comma separated list of set bits. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +A simple IA5String: + + IA5STRING:Hello World + +An IA5String explicitly tagged: + + EXPLICIT:0,IA5STRING:Hello World + +An IA5String explicitly tagged using APPLICATION tagging: + + EXPLICIT:0A,IA5STRING:Hello World + +A more complex example using a config file to produce a +SEQUENCE consiting of a BOOL an OID and a UTF8String: + +asn1 = SEQUENCE:seq_section + +[seq_section] + +field1 = BOOLEAN:TRUE +field2 = OID:commonName +field3 = UTF8:Third field + +This example produces an RSAPrivateKey structure, this is the +key contained in the file client.pem in all OpenSSL distributions +(note: the field names such as 'coeff' are ignored and are present just +for clarity): + + asn1=SEQUENCE:private_key + [private_key] + version=INTEGER:0 + + n=INTEGER:0xBB6FE79432CC6EA2D8F970675A5A87BFBE1AFF0BE63E879F2AFFB93644\ + D4D2C6D000430DEC66ABF47829E74B8C5108623A1C0EE8BE217B3AD8D36D5EB4FCA1D9 + + e=INTEGER:0x010001 + + d=INTEGER:0x6F05EAD2F27FFAEC84BEC360C4B928FD5F3A9865D0FCAAD291E2A52F4A\ + F810DC6373278C006A0ABBA27DC8C63BF97F7E666E27C5284D7D3B1FFFE16B7A87B51D + + p=INTEGER:0xF3929B9435608F8A22C208D86795271D54EBDFB09DDEF539AB083DA912\ + D4BD57 + + q=INTEGER:0xC50016F89DFF2561347ED1186A46E150E28BF2D0F539A1594BBD7FE467\ + 46EC4F + + exp1=INTEGER:0x9E7D4326C924AFC1DEA40B45650134966D6F9DFA3A7F9D698CD4ABEA\ + 9C0A39B9 + + exp2=INTEGER:0xBA84003BB95355AFB7C50DF140C60513D0BA51D637272E355E397779\ + E7B2458F + + coeff=INTEGER:0x30B9E4F2AFA5AC679F920FC83F1F2DF1BAF1779CF989447FABC2F5\ + 628657053A + +This example is the corresponding public key in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo +structure: + + # Start with a SEQUENCE + asn1=SEQUENCE:pubkeyinfo + + # pubkeyinfo contains an algorithm identifier and the public key wrapped + # in a BIT STRING + [pubkeyinfo] + algorithm=SEQUENCE:rsa_alg + pubkey=BITWRAP,SEQUENCE:rsapubkey + + # algorithm ID for RSA is just an OID and a NULL + [rsa_alg] + algorithm=OID:rsaEncryption + parameter=NULL + + # Actual public key: modulus and exponent + [rsapubkey] + n=INTEGER:0xBB6FE79432CC6EA2D8F970675A5A87BFBE1AFF0BE63E879F2AFFB93644\ + D4D2C6D000430DEC66ABF47829E74B8C5108623A1C0EE8BE217B3AD8D36D5EB4FCA1D9 + + e=INTEGER:0x010001 + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ASN1_generate_nconf() and ASN1_generate_v3() return the encoded +data as an B<ASN1_TYPE> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred. + +The error codes that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ASN1_generate_nconf() and ASN1_generate_v3() were added to OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..722e8b8f46c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_ctrl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_ctrl, BIO_callback_ctrl, BIO_ptr_ctrl, BIO_int_ctrl, BIO_reset, +BIO_seek, BIO_tell, BIO_flush, BIO_eof, BIO_set_close, BIO_get_close, +BIO_pending, BIO_wpending, BIO_ctrl_pending, BIO_ctrl_wpending, +BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback - BIO control operations + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,void *parg); + long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, void (*fp)(struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long)); + char * BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg); + long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,int iarg); + + int BIO_reset(BIO *b); + int BIO_seek(BIO *b, int ofs); + int BIO_tell(BIO *b); + int BIO_flush(BIO *b); + int BIO_eof(BIO *b); + int BIO_set_close(BIO *b,long flag); + int BIO_get_close(BIO *b); + int BIO_pending(BIO *b); + int BIO_wpending(BIO *b); + size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b); + size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b); + + int BIO_get_info_callback(BIO *b,bio_info_cb **cbp); + int BIO_set_info_callback(BIO *b,bio_info_cb *cb); + + typedef void bio_info_cb(BIO *b, int oper, const char *ptr, int arg1, long arg2, long arg3); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_ctrl(), BIO_callback_ctrl(), BIO_ptr_ctrl() and BIO_int_ctrl() +are BIO "control" operations taking arguments of various types. +These functions are not normally called directly, various macros +are used instead. The standard macros are described below, macros +specific to a particular type of BIO are described in the specific +BIOs manual page as well as any special features of the standard +calls. + +BIO_reset() typically resets a BIO to some initial state, in the case +of file related BIOs for example it rewinds the file pointer to the +start of the file. + +BIO_seek() resets a file related BIO's (that is file descriptor and +FILE BIOs) file position pointer to B<ofs> bytes from start of file. + +BIO_tell() returns the current file position of a file related BIO. + +BIO_flush() normally writes out any internally buffered data, in some +cases it is used to signal EOF and that no more data will be written. + +BIO_eof() returns 1 if the BIO has read EOF, the precise meaning of +"EOF" varies according to the BIO type. + +BIO_set_close() sets the BIO B<b> close flag to B<flag>. B<flag> can +take the value BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. Typically BIO_CLOSE is used +in a source/sink BIO to indicate that the underlying I/O stream should +be closed when the BIO is freed. + +BIO_get_close() returns the BIOs close flag. + +BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() +return the number of pending characters in the BIOs read and write buffers. +Not all BIOs support these calls. BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() +return a size_t type and are functions, BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() are +macros which call BIO_ctrl(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_reset() normally returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. File +BIOs are an exception, they return 0 for success and -1 for failure. + +BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() both return the current file position on success +and -1 for failure, except file BIOs which for BIO_seek() always return 0 +for success and -1 for failure. + +BIO_flush() returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. + +BIO_eof() returns 1 if EOF has been reached 0 otherwise. + +BIO_set_close() always returns 1. + +BIO_get_close() returns the close flag value: BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. + +BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() +return the amount of pending data. + +=head1 NOTES + +BIO_flush(), because it can write data may return 0 or -1 indicating +that the call should be retried later in a similar manner to BIO_write(). +The BIO_should_retry() call should be used and appropriate action taken +is the call fails. + +The return values of BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() may not reliably +determine the amount of pending data in all cases. For example in the +case of a file BIO some data may be available in the FILE structures +internal buffers but it is not possible to determine this in a +portably way. For other types of BIO they may not be supported. + +Filter BIOs if they do not internally handle a particular BIO_ctrl() +operation usually pass the operation to the next BIO in the chain. +This often means there is no need to locate the required BIO for +a particular operation, it can be called on a chain and it will +be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However this can cause +unexpected results: for example no current filter BIOs implement +BIO_seek(), but this may still succeed if the chain ends in a FILE +or file descriptor BIO. + +Source/sink BIOs return an 0 if they do not recognize the BIO_ctrl() +operation. + +=head1 BUGS + +Some of the return values are ambiguous and care should be taken. In +particular a return value of 0 can be returned if an operation is not +supported, if an error occurred, if EOF has not been reached and in +the case of BIO_seek() on a file BIO for a successful operation. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..438af3b6b66c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_f_base64 - base64 BIO filter + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_base64(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. This is a filter +BIO that base64 encodes any data written through it and decodes +any data read through it. + +Base64 BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts(). + +BIO_flush() on a base64 BIO that is being written through is +used to signal that no more data is to be encoded: this is used +to flush the final block through the BIO. + +The flag BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL can be set with BIO_set_flags() +to encode the data all on one line or expect the data to be all +on one line. + +=head1 NOTES + +Because of the format of base64 encoding the end of the encoded +block cannot always be reliably determined. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Base64 encode the string "Hello World\n" and write the result +to standard output: + + BIO *bio, *b64; + char message[] = "Hello World \n"; + + b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); + bio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + bio = BIO_push(b64, bio); + BIO_write(bio, message, strlen(message)); + BIO_flush(bio); + + BIO_free_all(bio); + +Read Base64 encoded data from standard input and write the decoded +data to standard output: + + BIO *bio, *b64, *bio_out; + char inbuf[512]; + int inlen; + + b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); + bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); + bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + bio = BIO_push(b64, bio); + while((inlen = BIO_read(bio, inbuf, 512)) > 0) + BIO_write(bio_out, inbuf, inlen); + + BIO_free_all(bio); + +=head1 BUGS + +The ambiguity of EOF in base64 encoded data can cause additional +data following the base64 encoded block to be misinterpreted. + +There should be some way of specifying a test that the BIO can perform +to reliably determine EOF (for example a MIME boundary). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c9093c6a576c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_buffer.pod @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_f_buffer - buffering BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_buffer(void); + + #define BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES,0,NULL) + #define BIO_set_read_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,0) + #define BIO_set_write_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,1) + #define BIO_set_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,NULL) + #define BIO_set_buffer_read_data(b,buf,num) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA,num,buf) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_f_buffer() returns the buffering BIO method. + +Data written to a buffering BIO is buffered and periodically written +to the next BIO in the chain. Data read from a buffering BIO comes from +an internal buffer which is filled from the next BIO in the chain. +Both BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() are supported. + +Calling BIO_reset() on a buffering BIO clears any buffered data. + +BIO_get_buffer_num_lines() returns the number of lines currently buffered. + +BIO_set_read_buffer_size(), BIO_set_write_buffer_size() and BIO_set_buffer_size() +set the read, write or both read and write buffer sizes to B<size>. The initial +buffer size is DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE, currently 1024. Any attempt to reduce the +buffer size below DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE is ignored. Any buffered data is cleared +when the buffer is resized. + +BIO_set_buffer_read_data() clears the read buffer and fills it with B<num> +bytes of B<buf>. If B<num> is larger than the current buffer size the buffer +is expanded. + +=head1 NOTES + +Buffering BIOs implement BIO_gets() by using BIO_read() operations on the +next BIO in the chain. By prepending a buffering BIO to a chain it is therefore +possible to provide BIO_gets() functionality if the following BIOs do not +support it (for example SSL BIOs). + +Data is only written to the next BIO in the chain when the write buffer fills +or when BIO_flush() is called. It is therefore important to call BIO_flush() +whenever any pending data should be written such as when removing a buffering +BIO using BIO_pop(). BIO_flush() may need to be retried if the ultimate +source/sink BIO is non blocking. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_f_buffer() returns the buffering BIO method. + +BIO_get_buffer_num_lines() returns the number of lines buffered (may be 0). + +BIO_set_read_buffer_size(), BIO_set_write_buffer_size() and BIO_set_buffer_size() +return 1 if the buffer was successfully resized or 0 for failure. + +BIO_set_buffer_read_data() returns 1 if the data was set correctly or 0 if +there was an error. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02439cea94a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_cipher.pod @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_f_cipher, BIO_set_cipher, BIO_get_cipher_status, BIO_get_cipher_ctx - cipher BIO filter + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_cipher(void); + void BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b,const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, + unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc); + int BIO_get_cipher_status(BIO *b) + int BIO_get_cipher_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **pctx) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_f_cipher() returns the cipher BIO method. This is a filter +BIO that encrypts any data written through it, and decrypts any data +read from it. It is a BIO wrapper for the cipher routines +EVP_CipherInit(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal(). + +Cipher BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts(). + +BIO_flush() on an encryption BIO that is being written through is +used to signal that no more data is to be encrypted: this is used +to flush and possibly pad the final block through the BIO. + +BIO_set_cipher() sets the cipher of BIO B<b> to B<cipher> using key B<key> +and IV B<iv>. B<enc> should be set to 1 for encryption and zero for +decryption. + +When reading from an encryption BIO the final block is automatically +decrypted and checked when EOF is detected. BIO_get_cipher_status() +is a BIO_ctrl() macro which can be called to determine whether the +decryption operation was successful. + +BIO_get_cipher_ctx() is a BIO_ctrl() macro which retrieves the internal +BIO cipher context. The retrieved context can be used in conjunction +with the standard cipher routines to set it up. This is useful when +BIO_set_cipher() is not flexible enough for the applications needs. + +=head1 NOTES + +When encrypting BIO_flush() B<must> be called to flush the final block +through the BIO. If it is not then the final block will fail a subsequent +decrypt. + +When decrypting an error on the final block is signalled by a zero +return value from the read operation. A successful decrypt followed +by EOF will also return zero for the final read. BIO_get_cipher_status() +should be called to determine if the decrypt was successful. + +As always, if BIO_gets() or BIO_puts() support is needed then it can +be achieved by preceding the cipher BIO with a buffering BIO. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_f_cipher() returns the cipher BIO method. + +BIO_set_cipher() does not return a value. + +BIO_get_cipher_status() returns 1 for a successful decrypt and 0 +for failure. + +BIO_get_cipher_ctx() currently always returns 1. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +TBA + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0d24083e6db8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_md.pod @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_f_md, BIO_set_md, BIO_get_md, BIO_get_md_ctx - message digest BIO filter + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_md(void); + int BIO_set_md(BIO *b,EVP_MD *md); + int BIO_get_md(BIO *b,EVP_MD **mdp); + int BIO_get_md_ctx(BIO *b,EVP_MD_CTX **mdcp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_f_md() returns the message digest BIO method. This is a filter +BIO that digests any data passed through it, it is a BIO wrapper +for the digest routines EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestUpdate() +and EVP_DigestFinal(). + +Any data written or read through a digest BIO using BIO_read() and +BIO_write() is digested. + +BIO_gets(), if its B<size> parameter is large enough finishes the +digest calculation and returns the digest value. BIO_puts() is +not supported. + +BIO_reset() reinitialises a digest BIO. + +BIO_set_md() sets the message digest of BIO B<b> to B<md>: this +must be called to initialize a digest BIO before any data is +passed through it. It is a BIO_ctrl() macro. + +BIO_get_md() places the a pointer to the digest BIOs digest method +in B<mdp>, it is a BIO_ctrl() macro. + +BIO_get_md_ctx() returns the digest BIOs context into B<mdcp>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The context returned by BIO_get_md_ctx() can be used in calls +to EVP_DigestFinal() and also the signature routines EVP_SignFinal() +and EVP_VerifyFinal(). + +The context returned by BIO_get_md_ctx() is an internal context +structure. Changes made to this context will affect the digest +BIO itself and the context pointer will become invalid when the digest +BIO is freed. + +After the digest has been retrieved from a digest BIO it must be +reinitialized by calling BIO_reset(), or BIO_set_md() before any more +data is passed through it. + +If an application needs to call BIO_gets() or BIO_puts() through +a chain containing digest BIOs then this can be done by prepending +a buffering BIO. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_f_md() returns the digest BIO method. + +BIO_set_md(), BIO_get_md() and BIO_md_ctx() return 1 for success and +0 for failure. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +The following example creates a BIO chain containing an SHA1 and MD5 +digest BIO and passes the string "Hello World" through it. Error +checking has been omitted for clarity. + + BIO *bio, *mdtmp; + char message[] = "Hello World"; + bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); + mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); + BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1()); + /* For BIO_push() we want to append the sink BIO and keep a note of + * the start of the chain. + */ + bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); + mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); + BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5()); + bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); + /* Note: mdtmp can now be discarded */ + BIO_write(bio, message, strlen(message)); + +The next example digests data by reading through a chain instead: + + BIO *bio, *mdtmp; + char buf[1024]; + int rdlen; + bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb"); + mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); + BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1()); + bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); + mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); + BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5()); + bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio); + do { + rdlen = BIO_read(bio, buf, sizeof(buf)); + /* Might want to do something with the data here */ + } while(rdlen > 0); + +This next example retrieves the message digests from a BIO chain and +outputs them. This could be used with the examples above. + + BIO *mdtmp; + unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int mdlen; + int i; + mdtmp = bio; /* Assume bio has previously been set up */ + do { + EVP_MD *md; + mdtmp = BIO_find_type(mdtmp, BIO_TYPE_MD); + if(!mdtmp) break; + BIO_get_md(mdtmp, &md); + printf("%s digest", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(md))); + mdlen = BIO_gets(mdtmp, mdbuf, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + for(i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) printf(":%02X", mdbuf[i]); + printf("\n"); + mdtmp = BIO_next(mdtmp); + } while(mdtmp); + + BIO_free_all(bio); + +=head1 BUGS + +The lack of support for BIO_puts() and the non standard behaviour of +BIO_gets() could be regarded as anomalous. It could be argued that BIO_gets() +and BIO_puts() should be passed to the next BIO in the chain and digest +the data passed through and that digests should be retrieved using a +separate BIO_ctrl() call. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b057c1840832 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_null.pod @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_f_null - null filter + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_null(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_f_null() returns the null filter BIO method. This is a filter BIO +that does nothing. + +All requests to a null filter BIO are passed through to the next BIO in +the chain: this means that a BIO chain containing a null filter BIO +behaves just as though the BIO was not there. + +=head1 NOTES + +As may be apparent a null filter BIO is not particularly useful. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_f_null() returns the null filter BIO method. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f0b731731f50 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_f_ssl, BIO_set_ssl, BIO_get_ssl, BIO_set_ssl_mode, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes, +BIO_get_num_renegotiates, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout, BIO_new_ssl, +BIO_new_ssl_connect, BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect, BIO_ssl_copy_session_id, +BIO_ssl_shutdown - SSL BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); + + #define BIO_set_ssl(b,ssl,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL,c,(char *)ssl) + #define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp) + #define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL) + #define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \ + BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL); + #define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \ + BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL); + #define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \ + BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL); + + BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client); + BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); + BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); + int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to,BIO *from); + void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *bio); + + #define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_f_ssl() returns the SSL BIO method. This is a filter BIO which +is a wrapper round the OpenSSL SSL routines adding a BIO "flavour" to +SSL I/O. + +I/O performed on an SSL BIO communicates using the SSL protocol with +the SSLs read and write BIOs. If an SSL connection is not established +then an attempt is made to establish one on the first I/O call. + +If a BIO is appended to an SSL BIO using BIO_push() it is automatically +used as the SSL BIOs read and write BIOs. + +Calling BIO_reset() on an SSL BIO closes down any current SSL connection +by calling SSL_shutdown(). BIO_reset() is then sent to the next BIO in +the chain: this will typically disconnect the underlying transport. +The SSL BIO is then reset to the initial accept or connect state. + +If the close flag is set when an SSL BIO is freed then the internal +SSL structure is also freed using SSL_free(). + +BIO_set_ssl() sets the internal SSL pointer of BIO B<b> to B<ssl> using +the close flag B<c>. + +BIO_get_ssl() retrieves the SSL pointer of BIO B<b>, it can then be +manipulated using the standard SSL library functions. + +BIO_set_ssl_mode() sets the SSL BIO mode to B<client>. If B<client> +is 1 client mode is set. If B<client> is 0 server mode is set. + +BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes() sets the renegotiate byte count +to B<num>. When set after every B<num> bytes of I/O (read and write) +the SSL session is automatically renegotiated. B<num> must be at +least 512 bytes. + +BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout() sets the renegotiate timeout to +B<seconds>. When the renegotiate timeout elapses the session is +automatically renegotiated. + +BIO_get_num_renegotiates() returns the total number of session +renegotiations due to I/O or timeout. + +BIO_new_ssl() allocates an SSL BIO using SSL_CTX B<ctx> and using +client mode if B<client> is non zero. + +BIO_new_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting of an +SSL BIO (using B<ctx>) followed by a connect BIO. + +BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting +of a buffering BIO, an SSL BIO (using B<ctx>) and a connect +BIO. + +BIO_ssl_copy_session_id() copies an SSL session id between +BIO chains B<from> and B<to>. It does this by locating the +SSL BIOs in each chain and calling SSL_copy_session_id() on +the internal SSL pointer. + +BIO_ssl_shutdown() closes down an SSL connection on BIO +chain B<bio>. It does this by locating the SSL BIO in the +chain and calling SSL_shutdown() on its internal SSL +pointer. + +BIO_do_handshake() attempts to complete an SSL handshake on the +supplied BIO and establish the SSL connection. It returns 1 +if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative +value is returned if the connection could not be established, the +call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs +to determine if the call should be retried. If an SSL connection has +already been established this call has no effect. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL BIOs are exceptional in that if the underlying transport +is non blocking they can still request a retry in exceptional +circumstances. Specifically this will happen if a session +renegotiation takes place during a BIO_read() operation, one +case where this happens is when SGC or step up occurs. + +In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later the SSL flag SSL_AUTO_RETRY can be +set to disable this behaviour. That is when this flag is set +an SSL BIO using a blocking transport will never request a +retry. + +Since unknown BIO_ctrl() operations are sent through filter +BIOs the servers name and port can be set using BIO_set_host() +on the BIO returned by BIO_new_ssl_connect() without having +to locate the connect BIO first. + +Applications do not have to call BIO_do_handshake() but may wish +to do so to separate the handshake process from other I/O +processing. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +TBA + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +This SSL/TLS client example, attempts to retrieve a page from an +SSL/TLS web server. The I/O routines are identical to those of the +unencrypted example in L<BIO_s_connect(3)|BIO_s_connect(3)>. + + BIO *sbio, *out; + int len; + char tmpbuf[1024]; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + ERR_load_SSL_strings(); + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + /* We would seed the PRNG here if the platform didn't + * do it automatically + */ + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); + + /* We'd normally set some stuff like the verify paths and + * mode here because as things stand this will connect to + * any server whose certificate is signed by any CA. + */ + + sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx); + + BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); + + if(!ssl) { + fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); + /* whatever ... */ + } + + /* Don't want any retries */ + SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); + + /* We might want to do other things with ssl here */ + + BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, "localhost:https"); + + out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + if(BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + /* whatever ... */ + } + + if(BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + /* whatever ... */ + } + + /* Could examine ssl here to get connection info */ + + BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); + for(;;) { + len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); + if(len <= 0) break; + BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); + } + BIO_free_all(sbio); + BIO_free(out); + +Here is a simple server example. It makes use of a buffering +BIO to allow lines to be read from the SSL BIO using BIO_gets. +It creates a pseudo web page containing the actual request from +a client and also echoes the request to standard output. + + BIO *sbio, *bbio, *acpt, *out; + int len; + char tmpbuf[1024]; + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + ERR_load_SSL_strings(); + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + /* Might seed PRNG here */ + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()); + + if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx,"server.pem",SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) + || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx,"server.pem",SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) + || !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { + + fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up SSL_CTX\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return 0; + } + + /* Might do other things here like setting verify locations and + * DH and/or RSA temporary key callbacks + */ + + /* New SSL BIO setup as server */ + sbio=BIO_new_ssl(ctx,0); + + BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); + + if(!ssl) { + fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); + /* whatever ... */ + } + + /* Don't want any retries */ + SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); + + /* Create the buffering BIO */ + + bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); + + /* Add to chain */ + sbio = BIO_push(bbio, sbio); + + acpt=BIO_new_accept("4433"); + + /* By doing this when a new connection is established + * we automatically have sbio inserted into it. The + * BIO chain is now 'swallowed' by the accept BIO and + * will be freed when the accept BIO is freed. + */ + + BIO_set_accept_bios(acpt,sbio); + + out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + + /* Setup accept BIO */ + if(BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept BIO\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return 0; + } + + /* Now wait for incoming connection */ + if(BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error in connection\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return 0; + } + + /* We only want one connection so remove and free + * accept BIO + */ + + sbio = BIO_pop(acpt); + + BIO_free_all(acpt); + + if(BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error in SSL handshake\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return 0; + } + + BIO_puts(sbio, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); + BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\nConnection Established\r\nRequest headers:\r\n"); + BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n"); + + for(;;) { + len = BIO_gets(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); + if(len <= 0) break; + BIO_write(sbio, tmpbuf, len); + BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); + /* Look for blank line signifying end of headers*/ + if((tmpbuf[0] == '\r') || (tmpbuf[0] == '\n')) break; + } + + BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n"); + BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\n"); + + /* Since there is a buffering BIO present we had better flush it */ + BIO_flush(sbio); + + BIO_free_all(sbio); + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bd3b25619617 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_find_type.pod @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_find_type, BIO_next - BIO chain traversal + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO * BIO_find_type(BIO *b,int bio_type); + BIO * BIO_next(BIO *b); + + #define BIO_method_type(b) ((b)->method->type) + + #define BIO_TYPE_NONE 0 + #define BIO_TYPE_MEM (1|0x0400) + #define BIO_TYPE_FILE (2|0x0400) + + #define BIO_TYPE_FD (4|0x0400|0x0100) + #define BIO_TYPE_SOCKET (5|0x0400|0x0100) + #define BIO_TYPE_NULL (6|0x0400) + #define BIO_TYPE_SSL (7|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_MD (8|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_BUFFER (9|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_CIPHER (10|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_BASE64 (11|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_CONNECT (12|0x0400|0x0100) + #define BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT (13|0x0400|0x0100) + #define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_CLIENT (14|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_SERVER (15|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST (16|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER (17|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_BER (18|0x0200) + #define BIO_TYPE_BIO (19|0x0400) + + #define BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 0x0100 + #define BIO_TYPE_FILTER 0x0200 + #define BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK 0x0400 + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The BIO_find_type() searches for a BIO of a given type in a chain, starting +at BIO B<b>. If B<type> is a specific type (such as BIO_TYPE_MEM) then a search +is made for a BIO of that type. If B<type> is a general type (such as +B<BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK>) then the next matching BIO of the given general type is +searched for. BIO_find_type() returns the next matching BIO or NULL if none is +found. + +Note: not all the B<BIO_TYPE_*> types above have corresponding BIO implementations. + +BIO_next() returns the next BIO in a chain. It can be used to traverse all BIOs +in a chain or used in conjunction with BIO_find_type() to find all BIOs of a +certain type. + +BIO_method_type() returns the type of a BIO. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_find_type() returns a matching BIO or NULL for no match. + +BIO_next() returns the next BIO in a chain. + +BIO_method_type() returns the type of the BIO B<b>. + +=head1 NOTES + +BIO_next() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.6 to provide a 'clean' way to traverse a BIO +chain or find multiple matches using BIO_find_type(). Previous versions had to +use: + + next = bio->next_bio; + +=head1 BUGS + +BIO_find_type() in OpenSSL 0.9.5a and earlier could not be safely passed a +NULL pointer for the B<b> argument. + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +Traverse a chain looking for digest BIOs: + + BIO *btmp; + btmp = in_bio; /* in_bio is chain to search through */ + + do { + btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD); + if(btmp == NULL) break; /* Not found */ + /* btmp is a digest BIO, do something with it ...*/ + ... + + btmp = BIO_next(btmp); + } while(btmp); + + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2a245fc8de83 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_new, BIO_set, BIO_free, BIO_vfree, BIO_free_all - BIO allocation and freeing functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO * BIO_new(BIO_METHOD *type); + int BIO_set(BIO *a,BIO_METHOD *type); + int BIO_free(BIO *a); + void BIO_vfree(BIO *a); + void BIO_free_all(BIO *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The BIO_new() function returns a new BIO using method B<type>. + +BIO_set() sets the method of an already existing BIO. + +BIO_free() frees up a single BIO, BIO_vfree() also frees up a single BIO +but it does not return a value. Calling BIO_free() may also have some effect +on the underlying I/O structure, for example it may close the file being +referred to under certain circumstances. For more details see the individual +BIO_METHOD descriptions. + +BIO_free_all() frees up an entire BIO chain, it does not halt if an error +occurs freeing up an individual BIO in the chain. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_new() returns a newly created BIO or NULL if the call fails. + +BIO_set(), BIO_free() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. + +BIO_free_all() and BIO_vfree() do not return values. + +=head1 NOTES + +Some BIOs (such as memory BIOs) can be used immediately after calling +BIO_new(). Others (such as file BIOs) need some additional initialization, +and frequently a utility function exists to create and initialize such BIOs. + +If BIO_free() is called on a BIO chain it will only free one BIO resulting +in a memory leak. + +Calling BIO_free_all() a single BIO has the same effect as calling BIO_free() +on it other than the discarded return value. + +Normally the B<type> argument is supplied by a function which returns a +pointer to a BIO_METHOD. There is a naming convention for such functions: +a source/sink BIO is normally called BIO_s_*() and a filter BIO +BIO_f_*(); + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +Create a memory BIO: + + BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8af1d3c09751 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_push.pod @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_push, BIO_pop - add and remove BIOs from a chain. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO * BIO_push(BIO *b,BIO *append); + BIO * BIO_pop(BIO *b); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The BIO_push() function appends the BIO B<append> to B<b>, it returns +B<b>. + +BIO_pop() removes the BIO B<b> from a chain and returns the next BIO +in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. The removed BIO then +becomes a single BIO with no association with the original chain, +it can thus be freed or attached to a different chain. + +=head1 NOTES + +The names of these functions are perhaps a little misleading. BIO_push() +joins two BIO chains whereas BIO_pop() deletes a single BIO from a chain, +the deleted BIO does not need to be at the end of a chain. + +The process of calling BIO_push() and BIO_pop() on a BIO may have additional +consequences (a control call is made to the affected BIOs) any effects will +be noted in the descriptions of individual BIOs. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +For these examples suppose B<md1> and B<md2> are digest BIOs, B<b64> is +a base64 BIO and B<f> is a file BIO. + +If the call: + + BIO_push(b64, f); + +is made then the new chain will be B<b64-chain>. After making the calls + + BIO_push(md2, b64); + BIO_push(md1, md2); + +the new chain is B<md1-md2-b64-f>. Data written to B<md1> will be digested +by B<md1> and B<md2>, B<base64> encoded and written to B<f>. + +It should be noted that reading causes data to pass in the reverse +direction, that is data is read from B<f>, base64 B<decoded> and digested +by B<md1> and B<md2>. If the call: + + BIO_pop(md2); + +The call will return B<b64> and the new chain will be B<md1-b64-f> data can +be written to B<md1> as before. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_push() returns the end of the chain, B<b>. + +BIO_pop() returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next +BIO. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b34528104ddf --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len); + int BIO_gets(BIO *b,char *buf, int size); + int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len); + int BIO_puts(BIO *b,const char *buf); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_read() attempts to read B<len> bytes from BIO B<b> and places +the data in B<buf>. + +BIO_gets() performs the BIOs "gets" operation and places the data +in B<buf>. Usually this operation will attempt to read a line of data +from the BIO of maximum length B<len>. There are exceptions to this +however, for example BIO_gets() on a digest BIO will calculate and +return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all. + +BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>. + +BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b> + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +All these functions return either the amount of data successfully read or +written (if the return value is positive) or that no data was successfully +read or written if the result is 0 or -1. If the return value is -2 then +the operation is not implemented in the specific BIO type. + +=head1 NOTES + +A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In +particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type +it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that +the application should retry the operation later. + +One technique sometimes used with blocking sockets is to use a system call +(such as select(), poll() or equivalent) to determine when data is available +and then call read() to read the data. The equivalent with BIOs (that is call +select() on the underlying I/O structure and then call BIO_read() to +read the data) should B<not> be used because a single call to BIO_read() +can cause several reads (and writes in the case of SSL BIOs) on the underlying +I/O structure and may block as a result. Instead select() (or equivalent) +should be combined with non blocking I/O so successive reads will request +a retry instead of blocking. + +See L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)> for details of how to +determine the cause of a retry and other I/O issues. + +If the BIO_gets() function is not supported by a BIO then it possible to +work around this by adding a buffering BIO L<BIO_f_buffer(3)|BIO_f_buffer(3)> +to the chain. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)> + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7b63e4621b66 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_accept.pod @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_accept, BIO_set_accept_port, BIO_get_accept_port, +BIO_set_nbio_accept, BIO_set_accept_bios, BIO_set_bind_mode, +BIO_get_bind_mode, BIO_do_accept - accept BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void); + + long BIO_set_accept_port(BIO *b, char *name); + char *BIO_get_accept_port(BIO *b); + + BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port); + + long BIO_set_nbio_accept(BIO *b, int n); + long BIO_set_accept_bios(BIO *b, char *bio); + + long BIO_set_bind_mode(BIO *b, long mode); + long BIO_get_bind_mode(BIO *b, long dummy); + + #define BIO_BIND_NORMAL 0 + #define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED 1 + #define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR 2 + + int BIO_do_accept(BIO *b); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_accept() returns the accept BIO method. This is a wrapper +round the platform's TCP/IP socket accept routines. + +Using accept BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be accepted and data +transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform +specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction. + +Read and write operations on an accept BIO will perform I/O +on the underlying connection. If no connection is established +and the port (see below) is set up properly then the BIO +waits for an incoming connection. + +Accept BIOs support BIO_puts() but not BIO_gets(). + +If the close flag is set on an accept BIO then any active +connection on that chain is shutdown and the socket closed when +the BIO is freed. + +Calling BIO_reset() on a accept BIO will close any active +connection and reset the BIO into a state where it awaits another +incoming connection. + +BIO_get_fd() and BIO_set_fd() can be called to retrieve or set +the accept socket. See L<BIO_s_fd(3)|BIO_s_fd(3)> + +BIO_set_accept_port() uses the string B<name> to set the accept +port. The port is represented as a string of the form "host:port", +where "host" is the interface to use and "port" is the port. +Either or both values can be "*" which is interpreted as meaning +any interface or port respectively. "port" has the same syntax +as the port specified in BIO_set_conn_port() for connect BIOs, +that is it can be a numerical port string or a string to lookup +using getservbyname() and a string table. + +BIO_new_accept() combines BIO_new() and BIO_set_accept_port() into +a single call: that is it creates a new accept BIO with port +B<host_port>. + +BIO_set_nbio_accept() sets the accept socket to blocking mode +(the default) if B<n> is 0 or non blocking mode if B<n> is 1. + +BIO_set_accept_bios() can be used to set a chain of BIOs which +will be duplicated and prepended to the chain when an incoming +connection is received. This is useful if, for example, a +buffering or SSL BIO is required for each connection. The +chain of BIOs must not be freed after this call, they will +be automatically freed when the accept BIO is freed. + +BIO_set_bind_mode() and BIO_get_bind_mode() set and retrieve +the current bind mode. If BIO_BIND_NORMAL (the default) is set +then another socket cannot be bound to the same port. If +BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR is set then other sockets can bind to the +same port. If BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED is set then and +attempt is first made to use BIO_BIN_NORMAL, if this fails +and the port is not in use then a second attempt is made +using BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR. + +BIO_do_accept() serves two functions. When it is first +called, after the accept BIO has been setup, it will attempt +to create the accept socket and bind an address to it. Second +and subsequent calls to BIO_do_accept() will await an incoming +connection, or request a retry in non blocking mode. + +=head1 NOTES + +When an accept BIO is at the end of a chain it will await an +incoming connection before processing I/O calls. When an accept +BIO is not at then end of a chain it passes I/O calls to the next +BIO in the chain. + +When a connection is established a new socket BIO is created for +the connection and appended to the chain. That is the chain is now +accept->socket. This effectively means that attempting I/O on +an initial accept socket will await an incoming connection then +perform I/O on it. + +If any additional BIOs have been set using BIO_set_accept_bios() +then they are placed between the socket and the accept BIO, +that is the chain will be accept->otherbios->socket. + +If a server wishes to process multiple connections (as is normally +the case) then the accept BIO must be made available for further +incoming connections. This can be done by waiting for a connection and +then calling: + + connection = BIO_pop(accept); + +After this call B<connection> will contain a BIO for the recently +established connection and B<accept> will now be a single BIO +again which can be used to await further incoming connections. +If no further connections will be accepted the B<accept> can +be freed using BIO_free(). + +If only a single connection will be processed it is possible to +perform I/O using the accept BIO itself. This is often undesirable +however because the accept BIO will still accept additional incoming +connections. This can be resolved by using BIO_pop() (see above) +and freeing up the accept BIO after the initial connection. + +If the underlying accept socket is non-blocking and BIO_do_accept() is +called to await an incoming connection it is possible for +BIO_should_io_special() with the reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT. If this happens +then it is an indication that an accept attempt would block: the application +should take appropriate action to wait until the underlying socket has +accepted a connection and retry the call. + +BIO_set_accept_port(), BIO_get_accept_port(), BIO_set_nbio_accept(), +BIO_set_accept_bios(), BIO_set_bind_mode(), BIO_get_bind_mode() and +BIO_do_accept() are macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +TBA + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +This example accepts two connections on port 4444, sends messages +down each and finally closes both down. + + BIO *abio, *cbio, *cbio2; + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + abio = BIO_new_accept("4444"); + + /* First call to BIO_accept() sets up accept BIO */ + if(BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + exit(0); + } + + /* Wait for incoming connection */ + if(BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + exit(0); + } + fprintf(stderr, "Connection 1 established\n"); + /* Retrieve BIO for connection */ + cbio = BIO_pop(abio); + BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Sending out Data on initial connection\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 1\n"); + /* Wait for another connection */ + if(BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + exit(0); + } + fprintf(stderr, "Connection 2 established\n"); + /* Close accept BIO to refuse further connections */ + cbio2 = BIO_pop(abio); + BIO_free(abio); + BIO_puts(cbio2, "Connection 2: Sending out Data on second\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 2\n"); + + BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Second connection established\n"); + /* Close the two established connections */ + BIO_free(cbio); + BIO_free(cbio2); + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8d0a55a025c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_bio.pod @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_bio, BIO_make_bio_pair, BIO_destroy_bio_pair, BIO_shutdown_wr, +BIO_set_write_buf_size, BIO_get_write_buf_size, BIO_new_bio_pair, +BIO_get_write_guarantee, BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee, BIO_get_read_request, +BIO_ctrl_get_read_request, BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request - BIO pair BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void); + + #define BIO_make_bio_pair(b1,b2) (int)BIO_ctrl(b1,BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR,0,b2) + #define BIO_destroy_bio_pair(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR,0,NULL) + + #define BIO_shutdown_wr(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR, 0, NULL) + + #define BIO_set_write_buf_size(b,size) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL) + #define BIO_get_write_buf_size(b,size) (size_t)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL) + + int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1, BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2); + + #define BIO_get_write_guarantee(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE,0,NULL) + size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b); + + #define BIO_get_read_request(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST,0,NULL) + size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b); + + int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_bio() returns the method for a BIO pair. A BIO pair is a pair of source/sink +BIOs where data written to either half of the pair is buffered and can be read from +the other half. Both halves must usually by handled by the same application thread +since no locking is done on the internal data structures. + +Since BIO chains typically end in a source/sink BIO it is possible to make this +one half of a BIO pair and have all the data processed by the chain under application +control. + +One typical use of BIO pairs is to place TLS/SSL I/O under application control, this +can be used when the application wishes to use a non standard transport for +TLS/SSL or the normal socket routines are inappropriate. + +Calls to BIO_read() will read data from the buffer or request a retry if no +data is available. + +Calls to BIO_write() will place data in the buffer or request a retry if the +buffer is full. + +The standard calls BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() can be used to +determine the amount of pending data in the read or write buffer. + +BIO_reset() clears any data in the write buffer. + +BIO_make_bio_pair() joins two separate BIOs into a connected pair. + +BIO_destroy_pair() destroys the association between two connected BIOs. Freeing +up any half of the pair will automatically destroy the association. + +BIO_shutdown_wr() is used to close down a BIO B<b>. After this call no further +writes on BIO B<b> are allowed (they will return an error). Reads on the other +half of the pair will return any pending data or EOF when all pending data has +been read. + +BIO_set_write_buf_size() sets the write buffer size of BIO B<b> to B<size>. +If the size is not initialized a default value is used. This is currently +17K, sufficient for a maximum size TLS record. + +BIO_get_write_buf_size() returns the size of the write buffer. + +BIO_new_bio_pair() combines the calls to BIO_new(), BIO_make_bio_pair() and +BIO_set_write_buf_size() to create a connected pair of BIOs B<bio1>, B<bio2> +with write buffer sizes B<writebuf1> and B<writebuf2>. If either size is +zero then the default size is used. BIO_new_bio_pair() does not check whether +B<bio1> or B<bio2> do point to some other BIO, the values are overwritten, +BIO_free() is not called. + +BIO_get_write_guarantee() and BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() return the maximum +length of data that can be currently written to the BIO. Writes larger than this +value will return a value from BIO_write() less than the amount requested or if the +buffer is full request a retry. BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() is a function +whereas BIO_get_write_guarantee() is a macro. + +BIO_get_read_request() and BIO_ctrl_get_read_request() return the +amount of data requested, or the buffer size if it is less, if the +last read attempt at the other half of the BIO pair failed due to an +empty buffer. This can be used to determine how much data should be +written to the BIO so the next read will succeed: this is most useful +in TLS/SSL applications where the amount of data read is usually +meaningful rather than just a buffer size. After a successful read +this call will return zero. It also will return zero once new data +has been written satisfying the read request or part of it. +Note that BIO_get_read_request() never returns an amount larger +than that returned by BIO_get_write_guarantee(). + +BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request() can also be used to reset the value returned by +BIO_get_read_request() to zero. + +=head1 NOTES + +Both halves of a BIO pair should be freed. That is even if one half is implicit +freed due to a BIO_free_all() or SSL_free() call the other half needs to be freed. + +When used in bidirectional applications (such as TLS/SSL) care should be taken to +flush any data in the write buffer. This can be done by calling BIO_pending() +on the other half of the pair and, if any data is pending, reading it and sending +it to the underlying transport. This must be done before any normal processing +(such as calling select() ) due to a request and BIO_should_read() being true. + +To see why this is important consider a case where a request is sent using +BIO_write() and a response read with BIO_read(), this can occur during an +TLS/SSL handshake for example. BIO_write() will succeed and place data in the write +buffer. BIO_read() will initially fail and BIO_should_read() will be true. If +the application then waits for data to be available on the underlying transport +before flushing the write buffer it will never succeed because the request was +never sent! + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_new_bio_pair() returns 1 on success, with the new BIOs available in +B<bio1> and B<bio2>, or 0 on failure, with NULL pointers stored into the +locations for B<bio1> and B<bio2>. Check the error stack for more information. + +[XXXXX: More return values need to be added here] + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +The BIO pair can be used to have full control over the network access of an +application. The application can call select() on the socket as required +without having to go through the SSL-interface. + + BIO *internal_bio, *network_bio; + ... + BIO_new_bio_pair(internal_bio, 0, network_bio, 0); + SSL_set_bio(ssl, internal_bio, internal_bio); + SSL_operations(); + ... + + application | TLS-engine + | | + +----------> SSL_operations() + | /\ || + | || \/ + | BIO-pair (internal_bio) + +----------< BIO-pair (network_bio) + | | + socket | + + ... + SSL_free(ssl); /* implicitly frees internal_bio */ + BIO_free(network_bio); + ... + +As the BIO pair will only buffer the data and never directly access the +connection, it behaves non-blocking and will return as soon as the write +buffer is full or the read buffer is drained. Then the application has to +flush the write buffer and/or fill the read buffer. + +Use the BIO_ctrl_pending(), to find out whether data is buffered in the BIO +and must be transfered to the network. Use BIO_ctrl_get_read_request() to +find out, how many bytes must be written into the buffer before the +SSL_operation() can successfully be continued. + +=head1 WARNING + +As the data is buffered, SSL_operation() may return with a ERROR_SSL_WANT_READ +condition, but there is still data in the write buffer. An application must +not rely on the error value of SSL_operation() but must assure that the +write buffer is always flushed first. Otherwise a deadlock may occur as +the peer might be waiting for the data before being able to continue. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_set_bio(3)|SSL_set_bio(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)>, +L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)>, L<BIO_read(3)|BIO_read(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bcf7d8dcac7d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_connect.pod @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_connect, BIO_set_conn_hostname, BIO_set_conn_port, +BIO_set_conn_ip, BIO_set_conn_int_port, BIO_get_conn_hostname, +BIO_get_conn_port, BIO_get_conn_ip, BIO_get_conn_int_port, +BIO_set_nbio, BIO_do_connect - connect BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_connect(void); + + BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *name); + + long BIO_set_conn_hostname(BIO *b, char *name); + long BIO_set_conn_port(BIO *b, char *port); + long BIO_set_conn_ip(BIO *b, char *ip); + long BIO_set_conn_int_port(BIO *b, char *port); + char *BIO_get_conn_hostname(BIO *b); + char *BIO_get_conn_port(BIO *b); + char *BIO_get_conn_ip(BIO *b, dummy); + long BIO_get_conn_int_port(BIO *b, int port); + + long BIO_set_nbio(BIO *b, long n); + + int BIO_do_connect(BIO *b); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_connect() returns the connect BIO method. This is a wrapper +round the platform's TCP/IP socket connection routines. + +Using connect BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be made and data +transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform +specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction. + +Read and write operations on a connect BIO will perform I/O +on the underlying connection. If no connection is established +and the port and hostname (see below) is set up properly then +a connection is established first. + +Connect BIOs support BIO_puts() but not BIO_gets(). + +If the close flag is set on a connect BIO then any active +connection is shutdown and the socket closed when the BIO +is freed. + +Calling BIO_reset() on a connect BIO will close any active +connection and reset the BIO into a state where it can connect +to the same host again. + +BIO_get_fd() places the underlying socket in B<c> if it is not NULL, +it also returns the socket . If B<c> is not NULL it should be of +type (int *). + +BIO_set_conn_hostname() uses the string B<name> to set the hostname. +The hostname can be an IP address. The hostname can also include the +port in the form hostname:port . It is also acceptable to use the +form "hostname/any/other/path" or "hostname:port/any/other/path". + +BIO_set_conn_port() sets the port to B<port>. B<port> can be the +numerical form or a string such as "http". A string will be looked +up first using getservbyname() on the host platform but if that +fails a standard table of port names will be used. Currently the +list is http, telnet, socks, https, ssl, ftp, gopher and wais. + +BIO_set_conn_ip() sets the IP address to B<ip> using binary form, +that is four bytes specifying the IP address in big-endian form. + +BIO_set_conn_int_port() sets the port using B<port>. B<port> should +be of type (int *). + +BIO_get_conn_hostname() returns the hostname of the connect BIO or +NULL if the BIO is initialized but no hostname is set. +This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified. + +BIO_get_conn_port() returns the port as a string. + +BIO_get_conn_ip() returns the IP address in binary form. + +BIO_get_conn_int_port() returns the port as an int. + +BIO_set_nbio() sets the non blocking I/O flag to B<n>. If B<n> is +zero then blocking I/O is set. If B<n> is 1 then non blocking I/O +is set. Blocking I/O is the default. The call to BIO_set_nbio() +should be made before the connection is established because +non blocking I/O is set during the connect process. + +BIO_new_connect() combines BIO_new() and BIO_set_conn_hostname() into +a single call: that is it creates a new connect BIO with B<name>. + +BIO_do_connect() attempts to connect the supplied BIO. It returns 1 +if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative +value is returned if the connection could not be established, the +call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs +to determine if the call should be retried. + +=head1 NOTES + +If blocking I/O is set then a non positive return value from any +I/O call is caused by an error condition, although a zero return +will normally mean that the connection was closed. + +If the port name is supplied as part of the host name then this will +override any value set with BIO_set_conn_port(). This may be undesirable +if the application does not wish to allow connection to arbitrary +ports. This can be avoided by checking for the presence of the ':' +character in the passed hostname and either indicating an error or +truncating the string at that point. + +The values returned by BIO_get_conn_hostname(), BIO_get_conn_port(), +BIO_get_conn_ip() and BIO_get_conn_int_port() are updated when a +connection attempt is made. Before any connection attempt the values +returned are those set by the application itself. + +Applications do not have to call BIO_do_connect() but may wish to do +so to separate the connection process from other I/O processing. + +If non blocking I/O is set then retries will be requested as appropriate. + +It addition to BIO_should_read() and BIO_should_write() it is also +possible for BIO_should_io_special() to be true during the initial +connection process with the reason BIO_RR_CONNECT. If this is returned +then this is an indication that a connection attempt would block, +the application should then take appropriate action to wait until +the underlying socket has connected and retry the call. + +BIO_set_conn_hostname(), BIO_set_conn_port(), BIO_set_conn_ip(), +BIO_set_conn_int_port(), BIO_get_conn_hostname(), BIO_get_conn_port(), +BIO_get_conn_ip(), BIO_get_conn_int_port(), BIO_set_nbio() and +BIO_do_connect() are macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_s_connect() returns the connect BIO method. + +BIO_get_fd() returns the socket or -1 if the BIO has not +been initialized. + +BIO_set_conn_hostname(), BIO_set_conn_port(), BIO_set_conn_ip() and +BIO_set_conn_int_port() always return 1. + +BIO_get_conn_hostname() returns the connected hostname or NULL is +none was set. + +BIO_get_conn_port() returns a string representing the connected +port or NULL if not set. + +BIO_get_conn_ip() returns a pointer to the connected IP address in +binary form or all zeros if not set. + +BIO_get_conn_int_port() returns the connected port or 0 if none was +set. + +BIO_set_nbio() always returns 1. + +BIO_do_connect() returns 1 if the connection was successfully +established and 0 or -1 if the connection failed. + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +This is example connects to a webserver on the local host and attempts +to retrieve a page and copy the result to standard output. + + + BIO *cbio, *out; + int len; + char tmpbuf[1024]; + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + cbio = BIO_new_connect("localhost:http"); + out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + if(BIO_do_connect(cbio) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + /* whatever ... */ + } + BIO_puts(cbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); + for(;;) { + len = BIO_read(cbio, tmpbuf, 1024); + if(len <= 0) break; + BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); + } + BIO_free(cbio); + BIO_free(out); + + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1de1d101549 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_fd.pod @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_fd, BIO_set_fd, BIO_get_fd, BIO_new_fd - file descriptor BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_fd(void); + + #define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd) + #define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c) + + BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. This is a wrapper +round the platforms file descriptor routines such as read() and write(). + +BIO_read() and BIO_write() read or write the underlying descriptor. +BIO_puts() is supported but BIO_gets() is not. + +If the close flag is set then then close() is called on the underlying +file descriptor when the BIO is freed. + +BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file +using lseek(fd, 0, 0). + +BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B<ofs> from start of file +using lseek(fd, ofs, 0). + +BIO_tell() returns the current file position by calling lseek(fd, 0, 1). + +BIO_set_fd() sets the file descriptor of BIO B<b> to B<fd> and the close +flag to B<c>. + +BIO_get_fd() places the file descriptor in B<c> if it is not NULL, it also +returns the file descriptor. If B<c> is not NULL it should be of type +(int *). + +BIO_new_fd() returns a file descriptor BIO using B<fd> and B<close_flag>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The behaviour of BIO_read() and BIO_write() depends on the behavior of the +platforms read() and write() calls on the descriptor. If the underlying +file descriptor is in a non blocking mode then the BIO will behave in the +manner described in the L<BIO_read(3)|BIO_read(3)> and L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)> +manual pages. + +File descriptor BIOs should not be used for socket I/O. Use socket BIOs +instead. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_s_fd() returns the file descriptor BIO method. + +BIO_reset() returns zero for success and -1 if an error occurred. +BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() return the current file position or -1 +is an error occurred. These values reflect the underlying lseek() +behaviour. + +BIO_set_fd() always returns 1. + +BIO_get_fd() returns the file descriptor or -1 if the BIO has not +been initialized. + +BIO_new_fd() returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error +occurred. + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +This is a file descriptor BIO version of "Hello World": + + BIO *out; + out = BIO_new_fd(fileno(stdout), BIO_NOCLOSE); + BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); + BIO_free(out); + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<BIO_seek(3)|BIO_seek(3)>, L<BIO_tell(3)|BIO_tell(3)>, +L<BIO_reset(3)|BIO_reset(3)>, L<BIO_read(3)|BIO_read(3)>, +L<BIO_write(3)|BIO_write(3)>, L<BIO_puts(3)|BIO_puts(3)>, +L<BIO_gets(3)|BIO_gets(3)>, L<BIO_printf(3)|BIO_printf(3)>, +L<BIO_set_close(3)|BIO_set_close(3)>, L<BIO_get_close(3)|BIO_get_close(3)> diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b2a29263f4cd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_file, BIO_new_file, BIO_new_fp, BIO_set_fp, BIO_get_fp, +BIO_read_filename, BIO_write_filename, BIO_append_filename, +BIO_rw_filename - FILE bio + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_file(void); + BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode); + BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int flags); + + BIO_set_fp(BIO *b,FILE *fp, int flags); + BIO_get_fp(BIO *b,FILE **fpp); + + int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, char *name) + int BIO_write_filename(BIO *b, char *name) + int BIO_append_filename(BIO *b, char *name) + int BIO_rw_filename(BIO *b, char *name) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_file() returns the BIO file method. As its name implies it +is a wrapper round the stdio FILE structure and it is a +source/sink BIO. + +Calls to BIO_read() and BIO_write() read and write data to the +underlying stream. BIO_gets() and BIO_puts() are supported on file BIOs. + +BIO_flush() on a file BIO calls the fflush() function on the wrapped +stream. + +BIO_reset() attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file +using fseek(stream, 0, 0). + +BIO_seek() sets the file pointer to position B<ofs> from start of file +using fseek(stream, ofs, 0). + +BIO_eof() calls feof(). + +Setting the BIO_CLOSE flag calls fclose() on the stream when the BIO +is freed. + +BIO_new_file() creates a new file BIO with mode B<mode> the meaning +of B<mode> is the same as the stdio function fopen(). The BIO_CLOSE +flag is set on the returned BIO. + +BIO_new_fp() creates a file BIO wrapping B<stream>. Flags can be: +BIO_CLOSE, BIO_NOCLOSE (the close flag) BIO_FP_TEXT (sets the underlying +stream to text mode, default is binary: this only has any effect under +Win32). + +BIO_set_fp() set the fp of a file BIO to B<fp>. B<flags> has the same +meaning as in BIO_new_fp(), it is a macro. + +BIO_get_fp() retrieves the fp of a file BIO, it is a macro. + +BIO_seek() is a macro that sets the position pointer to B<offset> bytes +from the start of file. + +BIO_tell() returns the value of the position pointer. + +BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and +BIO_rw_filename() set the file BIO B<b> to use file B<name> for +reading, writing, append or read write respectively. + +=head1 NOTES + +When wrapping stdout, stdin or stderr the underlying stream should not +normally be closed so the BIO_NOCLOSE flag should be set. + +Because the file BIO calls the underlying stdio functions any quirks +in stdio behaviour will be mirrored by the corresponding BIO. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +File BIO "hello world": + + BIO *bio_out; + bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); + BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n"); + +Alternative technique: + + BIO *bio_out; + bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + if(bio_out == NULL) /* Error ... */ + if(!BIO_set_fp(bio_out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE)) /* Error ... */ + BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n"); + +Write to a file: + + BIO *out; + out = BIO_new_file("filename.txt", "w"); + if(!out) /* Error occurred */ + BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); + BIO_free(out); + +Alternative technique: + + BIO *out; + out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); + if(out == NULL) /* Error ... */ + if(!BIO_write_filename(out, "filename.txt")) /* Error ... */ + BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n"); + BIO_free(out); + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_s_file() returns the file BIO method. + +BIO_new_file() and BIO_new_fp() return a file BIO or NULL if an error +occurred. + +BIO_set_fp() and BIO_get_fp() return 1 for success or 0 for failure +(although the current implementation never return 0). + +BIO_seek() returns the same value as the underlying fseek() function: +0 for success or -1 for failure. + +BIO_tell() returns the current file position. + +BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and +BIO_rw_filename() return 1 for success or 0 for failure. + +=head1 BUGS + +BIO_reset() and BIO_seek() are implemented using fseek() on the underlying +stream. The return value for fseek() is 0 for success or -1 if an error +occurred this differs from other types of BIO which will typically return +1 for success and a non positive value if an error occurred. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<BIO_seek(3)|BIO_seek(3)>, L<BIO_tell(3)|BIO_tell(3)>, +L<BIO_reset(3)|BIO_reset(3)>, L<BIO_flush(3)|BIO_flush(3)>, +L<BIO_read(3)|BIO_read(3)>, +L<BIO_write(3)|BIO_write(3)>, L<BIO_puts(3)|BIO_puts(3)>, +L<BIO_gets(3)|BIO_gets(3)>, L<BIO_printf(3)|BIO_printf(3)>, +L<BIO_set_close(3)|BIO_set_close(3)>, L<BIO_get_close(3)|BIO_get_close(3)> diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..19648acfae0f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_mem, BIO_set_mem_eof_return, BIO_get_mem_data, BIO_set_mem_buf, +BIO_get_mem_ptr, BIO_new_mem_buf - memory BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_mem(void); + + BIO_set_mem_eof_return(BIO *b,int v) + long BIO_get_mem_data(BIO *b, char **pp) + BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *b,BUF_MEM *bm,int c) + BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *b,BUF_MEM **pp) + + BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_mem() return the memory BIO method function. + +A memory BIO is a source/sink BIO which uses memory for its I/O. Data +written to a memory BIO is stored in a BUF_MEM structure which is extended +as appropriate to accommodate the stored data. + +Any data written to a memory BIO can be recalled by reading from it. +Unless the memory BIO is read only any data read from it is deleted from +the BIO. + +Memory BIOs support BIO_gets() and BIO_puts(). + +If the BIO_CLOSE flag is set when a memory BIO is freed then the underlying +BUF_MEM structure is also freed. + +Calling BIO_reset() on a read write memory BIO clears any data in it. On a +read only BIO it restores the BIO to its original state and the read only +data can be read again. + +BIO_eof() is true if no data is in the BIO. + +BIO_ctrl_pending() returns the number of bytes currently stored. + +BIO_set_mem_eof_return() sets the behaviour of memory BIO B<b> when it is +empty. If the B<v> is zero then an empty memory BIO will return EOF (that is +it will return zero and BIO_should_retry(b) will be false. If B<v> is non +zero then it will return B<v> when it is empty and it will set the read retry +flag (that is BIO_read_retry(b) is true). To avoid ambiguity with a normal +positive return value B<v> should be set to a negative value, typically -1. + +BIO_get_mem_data() sets B<pp> to a pointer to the start of the memory BIOs data +and returns the total amount of data available. It is implemented as a macro. + +BIO_set_mem_buf() sets the internal BUF_MEM structure to B<bm> and sets the +close flag to B<c>, that is B<c> should be either BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. +It is a macro. + +BIO_get_mem_ptr() places the underlying BUF_MEM structure in B<pp>. It is +a macro. + +BIO_new_mem_buf() creates a memory BIO using B<len> bytes of data at B<buf>, +if B<len> is -1 then the B<buf> is assumed to be null terminated and its +length is determined by B<strlen>. The BIO is set to a read only state and +as a result cannot be written to. This is useful when some data needs to be +made available from a static area of memory in the form of a BIO. The +supplied data is read directly from the supplied buffer: it is B<not> copied +first, so the supplied area of memory must be unchanged until the BIO is freed. + +=head1 NOTES + +Writes to memory BIOs will always succeed if memory is available: that is +their size can grow indefinitely. + +Every read from a read write memory BIO will remove the data just read with +an internal copy operation, if a BIO contains a lots of data and it is +read in small chunks the operation can be very slow. The use of a read only +memory BIO avoids this problem. If the BIO must be read write then adding +a buffering BIO to the chain will speed up the process. + +=head1 BUGS + +There should be an option to set the maximum size of a memory BIO. + +There should be a way to "rewind" a read write BIO without destroying +its contents. + +The copying operation should not occur after every small read of a large BIO +to improve efficiency. + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +Create a memory BIO and write some data to it: + + BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + BIO_puts(mem, "Hello World\n"); + +Create a read only memory BIO: + + char data[] = "Hello World"; + BIO *mem; + mem = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, -1); + +Extract the BUF_MEM structure from a memory BIO and then free up the BIO: + + BUF_MEM *bptr; + BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bptr); + BIO_set_close(mem, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* So BIO_free() leaves BUF_MEM alone */ + BIO_free(mem); + + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e5514f723898 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_null.pod @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_null - null data sink + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_null(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_null() returns the null sink BIO method. Data written to +the null sink is discarded, reads return EOF. + +=head1 NOTES + +A null sink BIO behaves in a similar manner to the Unix /dev/null +device. + +A null bio can be placed on the end of a chain to discard any data +passed through it. + +A null sink is useful if, for example, an application wishes to digest some +data by writing through a digest bio but not send the digested data anywhere. +Since a BIO chain must normally include a source/sink BIO this can be achieved +by adding a null sink BIO to the end of the chain + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_s_null() returns the null sink BIO method. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_socket.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_socket.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c8d3a911027 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_socket.pod @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_s_socket, BIO_new_socket - socket BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void); + + long BIO_set_fd(BIO *b, int fd, long close_flag); + long BIO_get_fd(BIO *b, int *c); + + BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_s_socket() returns the socket BIO method. This is a wrapper +round the platform's socket routines. + +BIO_read() and BIO_write() read or write the underlying socket. +BIO_puts() is supported but BIO_gets() is not. + +If the close flag is set then the socket is shut down and closed +when the BIO is freed. + +BIO_set_fd() sets the socket of BIO B<b> to B<fd> and the close +flag to B<close_flag>. + +BIO_get_fd() places the socket in B<c> if it is not NULL, it also +returns the socket. If B<c> is not NULL it should be of type (int *). + +BIO_new_socket() returns a socket BIO using B<sock> and B<close_flag>. + +=head1 NOTES + +Socket BIOs also support any relevant functionality of file descriptor +BIOs. + +The reason for having separate file descriptor and socket BIOs is that on some +platforms sockets are not file descriptors and use distinct I/O routines, +Windows is one such platform. Any code mixing the two will not work on +all platforms. + +BIO_set_fd() and BIO_get_fd() are macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BIO_s_socket() returns the socket BIO method. + +BIO_set_fd() always returns 1. + +BIO_get_fd() returns the socket or -1 if the BIO has not been +initialized. + +BIO_new_socket() returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error +occurred. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..47595562457b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_set_callback.pod @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_set_callback, BIO_get_callback, BIO_set_callback_arg, BIO_get_callback_arg, +BIO_debug_callback - BIO callback functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + #define BIO_set_callback(b,cb) ((b)->callback=(cb)) + #define BIO_get_callback(b) ((b)->callback) + #define BIO_set_callback_arg(b,arg) ((b)->cb_arg=(char *)(arg)) + #define BIO_get_callback_arg(b) ((b)->cb_arg) + + long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio,int cmd,const char *argp,int argi, + long argl,long ret); + + typedef long (*callback)(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, + int argi, long argl, long retvalue); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BIO_set_callback() and BIO_get_callback() set and retrieve the BIO callback, +they are both macros. The callback is called during most high level BIO +operations. It can be used for debugging purposes to trace operations on +a BIO or to modify its operation. + +BIO_set_callback_arg() and BIO_get_callback_arg() are macros which can be +used to set and retrieve an argument for use in the callback. + +BIO_debug_callback() is a standard debugging callback which prints +out information relating to each BIO operation. If the callback +argument is set if is interpreted as a BIO to send the information +to, otherwise stderr is used. + +callback() is the callback function itself. The meaning of each +argument is described below. + +The BIO the callback is attached to is passed in B<b>. + +B<oper> is set to the operation being performed. For some operations +the callback is called twice, once before and once after the actual +operation, the latter case has B<oper> or'ed with BIO_CB_RETURN. + +The meaning of the arguments B<argp>, B<argi> and B<argl> depends on +the value of B<oper>, that is the operation being performed. + +B<retvalue> is the return value that would be returned to the +application if no callback were present. The actual value returned +is the return value of the callback itself. In the case of callbacks +called before the actual BIO operation 1 is placed in retvalue, if +the return value is not positive it will be immediately returned to +the application and the BIO operation will not be performed. + +The callback should normally simply return B<retvalue> when it has +finished processing, unless if specifically wishes to modify the +value returned to the application. + +=head1 CALLBACK OPERATIONS + +=over 4 + +=item B<BIO_free(b)> + +callback(b, BIO_CB_FREE, NULL, 0L, 0L, 1L) is called before the +free operation. + +=item B<BIO_read(b, out, outl)> + +callback(b, BIO_CB_READ, out, outl, 0L, 1L) is called before +the read and callback(b, BIO_CB_READ|BIO_CB_RETURN, out, outl, 0L, retvalue) +after. + +=item B<BIO_write(b, in, inl)> + +callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, in, inl, 0L, 1L) is called before +the write and callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN, in, inl, 0L, retvalue) +after. + +=item B<BIO_gets(b, out, outl)> + +callback(b, BIO_CB_GETS, out, outl, 0L, 1L) is called before +the operation and callback(b, BIO_CB_GETS|BIO_CB_RETURN, out, outl, 0L, retvalue) +after. + +=item B<BIO_puts(b, in)> + +callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE, in, 0, 0L, 1L) is called before +the operation and callback(b, BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN, in, 0, 0L, retvalue) +after. + +=item B<BIO_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)> + +callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,parg,cmd,larg,1L) is called before the call and +callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL|BIO_CB_RETURN,parg,cmd, larg,ret) after. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +The BIO_debug_callback() function is a good example, its source is +in crypto/bio/bio_cb.c + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..539c3912728c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_should_retry.pod @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BIO_should_retry, BIO_should_read, BIO_should_write, +BIO_should_io_special, BIO_retry_type, BIO_should_retry, +BIO_get_retry_BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason - BIO retry functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + + #define BIO_should_read(a) ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_READ) + #define BIO_should_write(a) ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_WRITE) + #define BIO_should_io_special(a) ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL) + #define BIO_retry_type(a) ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_RWS) + #define BIO_should_retry(a) ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY) + + #define BIO_FLAGS_READ 0x01 + #define BIO_FLAGS_WRITE 0x02 + #define BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL 0x04 + #define BIO_FLAGS_RWS (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL) + #define BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY 0x08 + + BIO * BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason); + int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions determine why a BIO is not able to read or write data. +They will typically be called after a failed BIO_read() or BIO_write() +call. + +BIO_should_retry() is true if the call that produced this condition +should then be retried at a later time. + +If BIO_should_retry() is false then the cause is an error condition. + +BIO_should_read() is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO +needs to read data. + +BIO_should_write() is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO +needs to read data. + +BIO_should_io_special() is true if some "special" condition, that is a +reason other than reading or writing is the cause of the condition. + +BIO_get_retry_reason() returns a mask of the cause of a retry condition +consisting of the values B<BIO_FLAGS_READ>, B<BIO_FLAGS_WRITE>, +B<BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL> though current BIO types will only set one of +these. + +BIO_get_retry_BIO() determines the precise reason for the special +condition, it returns the BIO that caused this condition and if +B<reason> is not NULL it contains the reason code. The meaning of +the reason code and the action that should be taken depends on +the type of BIO that resulted in this condition. + +BIO_get_retry_reason() returns the reason for a special condition if +passed the relevant BIO, for example as returned by BIO_get_retry_BIO(). + +=head1 NOTES + +If BIO_should_retry() returns false then the precise "error condition" +depends on the BIO type that caused it and the return code of the BIO +operation. For example if a call to BIO_read() on a socket BIO returns +0 and BIO_should_retry() is false then the cause will be that the +connection closed. A similar condition on a file BIO will mean that it +has reached EOF. Some BIO types may place additional information on +the error queue. For more details see the individual BIO type manual +pages. + +If the underlying I/O structure is in a blocking mode almost all current +BIO types will not request a retry, because the underlying I/O +calls will not. If the application knows that the BIO type will never +signal a retry then it need not call BIO_should_retry() after a failed +BIO I/O call. This is typically done with file BIOs. + +SSL BIOs are the only current exception to this rule: they can request a +retry even if the underlying I/O structure is blocking, if a handshake +occurs during a call to BIO_read(). An application can retry the failed +call immediately or avoid this situation by setting SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY +on the underlying SSL structure. + +While an application may retry a failed non blocking call immediately +this is likely to be very inefficient because the call will fail +repeatedly until data can be processed or is available. An application +will normally wait until the necessary condition is satisfied. How +this is done depends on the underlying I/O structure. + +For example if the cause is ultimately a socket and BIO_should_read() +is true then a call to select() may be made to wait until data is +available and then retry the BIO operation. By combining the retry +conditions of several non blocking BIOs in a single select() call +it is possible to service several BIOs in a single thread, though +the performance may be poor if SSL BIOs are present because long delays +can occur during the initial handshake process. + +It is possible for a BIO to block indefinitely if the underlying I/O +structure cannot process or return any data. This depends on the behaviour of +the platforms I/O functions. This is often not desirable: one solution +is to use non blocking I/O and use a timeout on the select() (or +equivalent) call. + +=head1 BUGS + +The OpenSSL ASN1 functions cannot gracefully deal with non blocking I/O: +that is they cannot retry after a partial read or write. This is usually +worked around by only passing the relevant data to ASN1 functions when +the entire structure can be read or written. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +TBA diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7b087f7288f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_BLINDING_new, BN_BLINDING_free, BN_BLINDING_update, BN_BLINDING_convert, +BN_BLINDING_invert, BN_BLINDING_convert_ex, BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, +BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id, BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id, BN_BLINDING_get_flags, +BN_BLINDING_set_flags, BN_BLINDING_create_param - blinding related BIGNUM +functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, + BIGNUM *mod); + void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b); + int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b,BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, + BN_CTX *ctx); + unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(const BN_BLINDING *); + void BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); + unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *); + void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); + BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, + const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), + BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_BLINDING_new() allocates a new B<BN_BLINDING> structure and copies +the B<A> and B<Ai> values into the newly created B<BN_BLINDING> object. + +BN_BLINDING_free() frees the B<BN_BLINDING> structure. + +BN_BLINDING_update() updates the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters by squaring +the B<A> and B<Ai> or, after specific number of uses and if the +necessary parameters are set, by re-creating the blinding parameters. + +BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the blinding factor B<A>. +If B<r> is not NULL a copy the inverse blinding factor B<Ai> will be +returned in B<r> (this is useful if a B<RSA> object is shared amoung +several threads). BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() multiplies B<n> with the +inverse blinding factor B<Ai>. If B<r> is not NULL it will be used as +the inverse blinding. + +BN_BLINDING_convert() and BN_BLINDING_invert() are wrapper +functions for BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() +with B<r> set to NULL. + +BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id() and BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id() +set and get the "thread id" value of the B<BN_BLINDING> structure, +a field provided to users of B<BN_BLINDING> structure to help them +provide proper locking if needed for multi-threaded use. The +"thread id" of a newly allocated B<BN_BLINDING> structure is zero. + +BN_BLINDING_get_flags() returns the BN_BLINDING flags. Currently +there are two supported flags: B<BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE> and +B<BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE>. B<BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE> inhibits the +automatic update of the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters after each use +and B<BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE> inhibits the automatic re-creation +of the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently +32). In newly allocated B<BN_BLINDING> objects no flags are set. +BN_BLINDING_set_flags() sets the B<BN_BLINDING> parameters flags. + +BN_BLINDING_create_param() creates new B<BN_BLINDING> parameters +using the exponent B<e> and the modulus B<m>. B<bn_mod_exp> and +B<m_ctx> can be used to pass special functions for exponentiation +(normally BN_mod_exp_mont() and B<BN_MONT_CTX>). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_BLINDING_new() returns the newly allocated B<BN_BLINDING> structure +or NULL in case of an error. + +BN_BLINDING_update(), BN_BLINDING_convert(), BN_BLINDING_invert(), +BN_BLINDING_convert_ex() and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex() return 1 on +success and 0 if an error occured. + +BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id() returns the thread id (a B<unsigned long> +value) or 0 if not set. + +BN_BLINDING_get_flags() returns the currently set B<BN_BLINDING> flags +(a B<unsigned long> value). + +BN_BLINDING_create_param() returns the newly created B<BN_BLINDING> +parameters or NULL on error. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_BLINDING_convert_ex, BN_BLINDIND_invert_ex, BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id, +BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id, BN_BLINDING_set_flags, BN_BLINDING_get_flags +and BN_BLINDING_create_param were first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project (http://www.openssl.org). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ad8d07db89af --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_CTX_new, BN_CTX_init, BN_CTX_free - allocate and free BN_CTX structures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void); + + void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c); + + void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A B<BN_CTX> is a structure that holds B<BIGNUM> temporary variables used by +library functions. Since dynamic memory allocation to create B<BIGNUM>s +is rather expensive when used in conjunction with repeated subroutine +calls, the B<BN_CTX> structure is used. + +BN_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_CTX> +structure. BN_CTX_init() initializes an existing uninitialized +B<BN_CTX>. + +BN_CTX_free() frees the components of the B<BN_CTX>, and if it was +created by BN_CTX_new(), also the structure itself. +If L<BN_CTX_start(3)|BN_CTX_start(3)> has been used on the B<BN_CTX>, +L<BN_CTX_end(3)|BN_CTX_end(3)> must be called before the B<BN_CTX> +may be freed by BN_CTX_free(). + + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_CTX_new() returns a pointer to the B<BN_CTX>. If the allocation fails, +it returns B<NULL> and sets an error code that can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +BN_CTX_init() and BN_CTX_free() have no return values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)>, +L<BN_CTX_start(3)|BN_CTX_start(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_CTX_new() and BN_CTX_free() are available in all versions on SSLeay +and OpenSSL. BN_CTX_init() was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dfcefe1a8876 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_CTX_start.pod @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_CTX_start, BN_CTX_get, BN_CTX_end - use temporary BIGNUM variables + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx); + + BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx); + + void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions are used to obtain temporary B<BIGNUM> variables from +a B<BN_CTX> (which can been created by using L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)>) +in order to save the overhead of repeatedly creating and +freeing B<BIGNUM>s in functions that are called from inside a loop. + +A function must call BN_CTX_start() first. Then, BN_CTX_get() may be +called repeatedly to obtain temporary B<BIGNUM>s. All BN_CTX_get() +calls must be made before calling any other functions that use the +B<ctx> as an argument. + +Finally, BN_CTX_end() must be called before returning from the function. +When BN_CTX_end() is called, the B<BIGNUM> pointers obtained from +BN_CTX_get() become invalid. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_CTX_start() and BN_CTX_end() return no values. + +BN_CTX_get() returns a pointer to the B<BIGNUM>, or B<NULL> on error. +Once BN_CTX_get() has failed, the subsequent calls will return B<NULL> +as well, so it is sufficient to check the return value of the last +BN_CTX_get() call. In case of an error, an error code is set, which +can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BN_CTX_end() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..88c7a799eea5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_add.pod @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add, +BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd - +arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); + + int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); + + int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_add() adds I<a> and I<b> and places the result in I<r> (C<r=a+b>). +I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>. + +BN_sub() subtracts I<b> from I<a> and places the result in I<r> (C<r=a-b>). + +BN_mul() multiplies I<a> and I<b> and places the result in I<r> (C<r=a*b>). +I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>. +For multiplication by powers of 2, use L<BN_lshift(3)|BN_lshift(3)>. + +BN_sqr() takes the square of I<a> and places the result in I<r> +(C<r=a^2>). I<r> and I<a> may be the same B<BIGNUM>. +This function is faster than BN_mul(r,a,a). + +BN_div() divides I<a> by I<d> and places the result in I<dv> and the +remainder in I<rem> (C<dv=a/d, rem=a%d>). Either of I<dv> and I<rem> may +be B<NULL>, in which case the respective value is not returned. +The result is rounded towards zero; thus if I<a> is negative, the +remainder will be zero or negative. +For division by powers of 2, use BN_rshift(3). + +BN_mod() corresponds to BN_div() with I<dv> set to B<NULL>. + +BN_nnmod() reduces I<a> modulo I<m> and places the non-negative +remainder in I<r>. + +BN_mod_add() adds I<a> to I<b> modulo I<m> and places the non-negative +result in I<r>. + +BN_mod_sub() subtracts I<b> from I<a> modulo I<m> and places the +non-negative result in I<r>. + +BN_mod_mul() multiplies I<a> by I<b> and finds the non-negative +remainder respective to modulus I<m> (C<r=(a*b) mod m>). I<r> may be +the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or I<b>. For more efficient algorithms for +repeated computations using the same modulus, see +L<BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)|BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)> and +L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)|BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>. + +BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the +result in I<r>. + +BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r> +(C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of +BN_mul(). + +BN_mod_exp() computes I<a> to the I<p>-th power modulo I<m> (C<r=a^p % +m>). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp(). + +BN_gcd() computes the greatest common divisor of I<a> and I<b> and +places the result in I<r>. I<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as I<a> or +I<b>. + +For all functions, I<ctx> is a previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for +temporary variables; see L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)>. + +Unless noted otherwise, the result B<BIGNUM> must be different from +the arguments. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return +value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>). +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)>, +L<BN_add_word(3)|BN_add_word(3)>, L<BN_set_bit(3)|BN_set_bit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_add(), BN_sub(), BN_sqr(), BN_div(), BN_mod(), BN_mod_mul(), +BN_mod_exp() and BN_gcd() are available in all versions of SSLeay and +OpenSSL. The I<ctx> argument to BN_mul() was added in SSLeay +0.9.1b. BN_exp() appeared in SSLeay 0.9.0. +BN_nnmod(), BN_mod_add(), BN_mod_sub(), and BN_mod_sqr() were added in +OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..70667d289345 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_add_word, BN_sub_word, BN_mul_word, BN_div_word, BN_mod_word - arithmetic +functions on BIGNUMs with integers + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + + int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + + int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + + BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + + BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions perform arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs with unsigned +integers. They are much more efficient than the normal BIGNUM +arithmetic operations. + +BN_add_word() adds B<w> to B<a> (C<a+=w>). + +BN_sub_word() subtracts B<w> from B<a> (C<a-=w>). + +BN_mul_word() multiplies B<a> and B<w> (C<a*=w>). + +BN_div_word() divides B<a> by B<w> (C<a/=w>) and returns the remainder. + +BN_mod_word() returns the remainder of B<a> divided by B<w> (C<a%w>). + +For BN_div_word() and BN_mod_word(), B<w> must not be 0. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_add_word(), BN_sub_word() and BN_mul_word() return 1 for success, 0 +on error. The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +BN_mod_word() and BN_div_word() return B<a>%B<w> on success and +B<(BN_ULONG)-1> if an error occurred. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_add_word() and BN_mod_word() are available in all versions of +SSLeay and OpenSSL. BN_div_word() was added in SSLeay 0.8, and +BN_sub_word() and BN_mul_word() in SSLeay 0.9.0. + +Before 0.9.8a the return value for BN_div_word() and BN_mod_word() +in case of an error was 0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a4b17ca60a89 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_bn2bin, BN_bin2bn, BN_bn2hex, BN_bn2dec, BN_hex2bn, BN_dec2bn, +BN_print, BN_print_fp, BN_bn2mpi, BN_mpi2bn - format conversions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); + BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); + + char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a); + char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); + int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); + + int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); + BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_bn2bin() converts the absolute value of B<a> into big-endian form +and stores it at B<to>. B<to> must point to BN_num_bytes(B<a>) bytes of +memory. + +BN_bin2bn() converts the positive integer in big-endian form of length +B<len> at B<s> into a B<BIGNUM> and places it in B<ret>. If B<ret> is +NULL, a new B<BIGNUM> is created. + +BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return printable strings containing the +hexadecimal and decimal encoding of B<a> respectively. For negative +numbers, the string is prefaced with a leading '-'. The string must be +freed later using OPENSSL_free(). + +BN_hex2bn() converts the string B<str> containing a hexadecimal number +to a B<BIGNUM> and stores it in **B<bn>. If *B<bn> is NULL, a new +B<BIGNUM> is created. If B<bn> is NULL, it only computes the number's +length in hexadecimal digits. If the string starts with '-', the +number is negative. BN_dec2bn() is the same using the decimal system. + +BN_print() and BN_print_fp() write the hexadecimal encoding of B<a>, +with a leading '-' for negative numbers, to the B<BIO> or B<FILE> +B<fp>. + +BN_bn2mpi() and BN_mpi2bn() convert B<BIGNUM>s from and to a format +that consists of the number's length in bytes represented as a 4-byte +big-endian number, and the number itself in big-endian format, where +the most significant bit signals a negative number (the representation +of numbers with the MSB set is prefixed with null byte). + +BN_bn2mpi() stores the representation of B<a> at B<to>, where B<to> +must be large enough to hold the result. The size can be determined by +calling BN_bn2mpi(B<a>, NULL). + +BN_mpi2bn() converts the B<len> bytes long representation at B<s> to +a B<BIGNUM> and stores it at B<ret>, or in a newly allocated B<BIGNUM> +if B<ret> is NULL. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_bn2bin() returns the length of the big-endian number placed at B<to>. +BN_bin2bn() returns the B<BIGNUM>, NULL on error. + +BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return a null-terminated string, or NULL +on error. BN_hex2bn() and BN_dec2bn() return the number's length in +hexadecimal or decimal digits, and 0 on error. + +BN_print_fp() and BN_print() return 1 on success, 0 on write errors. + +BN_bn2mpi() returns the length of the representation. BN_mpi2bn() +returns the B<BIGNUM>, and NULL on error. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_zero(3)|BN_zero(3)>, +L<ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(3)|ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(3)>, +L<BN_num_bytes(3)|BN_num_bytes(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_bn2bin(), BN_bin2bn(), BN_print_fp() and BN_print() are available +in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +BN_bn2hex(), BN_bn2dec(), BN_hex2bn(), BN_dec2bn(), BN_bn2mpi() and +BN_mpi2bn() were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..23e9ed0b4f95 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_cmp.pod @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_cmp, BN_ucmp, BN_is_zero, BN_is_one, BN_is_word, BN_is_odd - BIGNUM comparison and test functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + + int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a); + int BN_is_one(BIGNUM *a); + int BN_is_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + int BN_is_odd(BIGNUM *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_cmp() compares the numbers B<a> and B<b>. BN_ucmp() compares their +absolute values. + +BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() and BN_is_word() test if B<a> equals 0, 1, +or B<w> respectively. BN_is_odd() tests if a is odd. + +BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), BN_is_word() and BN_is_odd() are macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_cmp() returns -1 if B<a> E<lt> B<b>, 0 if B<a> == B<b> and 1 if +B<a> E<gt> B<b>. BN_ucmp() is the same using the absolute values +of B<a> and B<b>. + +BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() BN_is_word() and BN_is_odd() return 1 if +the condition is true, 0 otherwise. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_cmp(), BN_ucmp(), BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one() and BN_is_word() are +available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +BN_is_odd() was added in SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..388dd7df2653 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_copy.pod @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_copy, BN_dup - copy BIGNUMs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *to, const BIGNUM *from); + + BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *from); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_copy() copies B<from> to B<to>. BN_dup() creates a new B<BIGNUM> +containing the value B<from>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_copy() returns B<to> on success, NULL on error. BN_dup() returns +the new B<BIGNUM>, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained +by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_copy() and BN_dup() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7dccacbc1e55 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_generate_prime.pod @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_generate_prime, BN_is_prime, BN_is_prime_fasttest - generate primes and test for primality + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int num, int safe, BIGNUM *add, + BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); + + int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int, + void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg); + + int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, + void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg, + int do_trial_division); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_generate_prime() generates a pseudo-random prime number of B<num> +bits. +If B<ret> is not B<NULL>, it will be used to store the number. + +If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, it is called as follows: + +=over 4 + +=item * + +B<callback(0, i, cb_arg)> is called after generating the i-th +potential prime number. + +=item * + +While the number is being tested for primality, B<callback(1, j, +cb_arg)> is called as described below. + +=item * + +When a prime has been found, B<callback(2, i, cb_arg)> is called. + +=back + +The prime may have to fulfill additional requirements for use in +Diffie-Hellman key exchange: + +If B<add> is not B<NULL>, the prime will fulfill the condition p % B<add> +== B<rem> (p % B<add> == 1 if B<rem> == B<NULL>) in order to suit a given +generator. + +If B<safe> is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime p so +that (p-1)/2 is also prime). + +The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_generate_prime(). +The prime number generation has a negligible error probability. + +BN_is_prime() and BN_is_prime_fasttest() test if the number B<a> is +prime. The following tests are performed until one of them shows that +B<a> is composite; if B<a> passes all these tests, it is considered +prime. + +BN_is_prime_fasttest(), when called with B<do_trial_division == 1>, +first attempts trial division by a number of small primes; +if no divisors are found by this test and B<callback> is not B<NULL>, +B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called. +If B<do_trial_division == 0>, this test is skipped. + +Both BN_is_prime() and BN_is_prime_fasttest() perform a Miller-Rabin +probabilistic primality test with B<checks> iterations. If +B<checks == BN_prime_checks>, a number of iterations is used that +yields a false positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. + +If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, B<callback(1, j, cb_arg)> is called +after the j-th iteration (j = 0, 1, ...). B<ctx> is a +pre-allocated B<BN_CTX> (to save the overhead of allocating and +freeing the structure in a loop), or B<NULL>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_generate_prime() returns the prime number on success, B<NULL> otherwise. + +BN_is_prime() returns 0 if the number is composite, 1 if it is +prime with an error probability of less than 0.25^B<checks>, and +-1 on error. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<cb_arg> arguments to BN_generate_prime() and to BN_is_prime() +were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. The B<ret> argument to BN_generate_prime() +was added in SSLeay 0.9.1. +BN_is_prime_fasttest() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3ea3975c7422 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_inverse.pod @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_mod_inverse - compute inverse modulo n + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, + BN_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_mod_inverse() computes the inverse of B<a> modulo B<n> +places the result in B<r> (C<(a*r)%n==1>). If B<r> is NULL, +a new B<BIGNUM> is created. + +B<ctx> is a previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for temporary +variables. B<r> may be the same B<BIGNUM> as B<a> or B<n>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_mod_inverse() returns the B<BIGNUM> containing the inverse, and +NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_mod_inverse() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6b16351b92e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_montgomery.pod @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_mod_mul_montgomery, BN_MONT_CTX_new, BN_MONT_CTX_init, +BN_MONT_CTX_free, BN_MONT_CTX_set, BN_MONT_CTX_copy, +BN_from_montgomery, BN_to_montgomery - Montgomery multiplication + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void); + void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx); + void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); + + int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from); + + int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, + BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions implement Montgomery multiplication. They are used +automatically when L<BN_mod_exp(3)|BN_mod_exp(3)> is called with suitable input, +but they may be useful when several operations are to be performed +using the same modulus. + +BN_MONT_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_MONT_CTX> structure. +BN_MONT_CTX_init() initializes an existing uninitialized B<BN_MONT_CTX>. + +BN_MONT_CTX_set() sets up the I<mont> structure from the modulus I<m> +by precomputing its inverse and a value R. + +BN_MONT_CTX_copy() copies the B<BN_MONT_CTX> I<from> to I<to>. + +BN_MONT_CTX_free() frees the components of the B<BN_MONT_CTX>, and, if +it was created by BN_MONT_CTX_new(), also the structure itself. + +BN_mod_mul_montgomery() computes Mont(I<a>,I<b>):=I<a>*I<b>*R^-1 and places +the result in I<r>. + +BN_from_montgomery() performs the Montgomery reduction I<r> = I<a>*R^-1. + +BN_to_montgomery() computes Mont(I<a>,R^2), i.e. I<a>*R. +Note that I<a> must be non-negative and smaller than the modulus. + +For all functions, I<ctx> is a previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for +temporary variables. + +The B<BN_MONT_CTX> structure is defined as follows: + + typedef struct bn_mont_ctx_st + { + int ri; /* number of bits in R */ + BIGNUM RR; /* R^2 (used to convert to Montgomery form) */ + BIGNUM N; /* The modulus */ + BIGNUM Ni; /* R*(1/R mod N) - N*Ni = 1 + * (Ni is only stored for bignum algorithm) */ + BN_ULONG n0; /* least significant word of Ni */ + int flags; + } BN_MONT_CTX; + +BN_to_montgomery() is a macro. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_MONT_CTX_new() returns the newly allocated B<BN_MONT_CTX>, and NULL +on error. + +BN_MONT_CTX_init() and BN_MONT_CTX_free() have no return values. + +For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 WARNING + +The inputs must be reduced modulo B<m>, otherwise the result will be +outside the expected range. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)>, +L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_MONT_CTX_new(), BN_MONT_CTX_free(), BN_MONT_CTX_set(), +BN_mod_mul_montgomery(), BN_from_montgomery() and BN_to_montgomery() +are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +BN_MONT_CTX_init() and BN_MONT_CTX_copy() were added in SSLeay 0.9.1b. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..74a216ddc2ad --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, BN_div_recp, BN_RECP_CTX_new, BN_RECP_CTX_init, +BN_RECP_CTX_free, BN_RECP_CTX_set - modular multiplication using +reciprocal + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void); + void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); + void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); + + int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *a, BN_RECP_CTX *recp, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, + BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_mod_mul_reciprocal() can be used to perform an efficient +L<BN_mod_mul(3)|BN_mod_mul(3)> operation when the operation will be performed +repeatedly with the same modulus. It computes B<r>=(B<a>*B<b>)%B<m> +using B<recp>=1/B<m>, which is set as described below. B<ctx> is a +previously allocated B<BN_CTX> used for temporary variables. + +BN_RECP_CTX_new() allocates and initializes a B<BN_RECP> structure. +BN_RECP_CTX_init() initializes an existing uninitialized B<BN_RECP>. + +BN_RECP_CTX_free() frees the components of the B<BN_RECP>, and, if it +was created by BN_RECP_CTX_new(), also the structure itself. + +BN_RECP_CTX_set() stores B<m> in B<recp> and sets it up for computing +1/B<m> and shifting it left by BN_num_bits(B<m>)+1 to make it an +integer. The result and the number of bits it was shifted left will +later be stored in B<recp>. + +BN_div_recp() divides B<a> by B<m> using B<recp>. It places the quotient +in B<dv> and the remainder in B<rem>. + +The B<BN_RECP_CTX> structure is defined as follows: + + typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st + { + BIGNUM N; /* the divisor */ + BIGNUM Nr; /* the reciprocal */ + int num_bits; + int shift; + int flags; + } BN_RECP_CTX; + +It cannot be shared between threads. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_RECP_CTX_new() returns the newly allocated B<BN_RECP_CTX>, and NULL +on error. + +BN_RECP_CTX_init() and BN_RECP_CTX_free() have no return values. + +For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)>, +L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +B<BN_RECP_CTX> was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. Before that, the function +BN_reciprocal() was used instead, and the BN_mod_mul_reciprocal() +arguments were different. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ab7a105e3ad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_new, BN_init, BN_clear, BN_free, BN_clear_free - allocate and free BIGNUMs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BIGNUM *BN_new(void); + + void BN_init(BIGNUM *); + + void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a); + + void BN_free(BIGNUM *a); + + void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_new() allocates and initializes a B<BIGNUM> structure. BN_init() +initializes an existing uninitialized B<BIGNUM>. + +BN_clear() is used to destroy sensitive data such as keys when they +are no longer needed. It erases the memory used by B<a> and sets it +to the value 0. + +BN_free() frees the components of the B<BIGNUM>, and if it was created +by BN_new(), also the structure itself. BN_clear_free() additionally +overwrites the data before the memory is returned to the system. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_new() returns a pointer to the B<BIGNUM>. If the allocation fails, +it returns B<NULL> and sets an error code that can be obtained +by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +BN_init(), BN_clear(), BN_free() and BN_clear_free() have no return +values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_new(), BN_clear(), BN_free() and BN_clear_free() are available in +all versions on SSLeay and OpenSSL. BN_init() was added in SSLeay +0.9.1b. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a6a2e3f81988 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_num_bytes.pod @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_num_bits, BN_num_bytes, BN_num_bits_word - get BIGNUM size + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG w); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_num_bytes() returns the size of a B<BIGNUM> in bytes. + +BN_num_bits_word() returns the number of significant bits in a word. +If we take 0x00000432 as an example, it returns 11, not 16, not 32. +Basically, except for a zero, it returns I<floor(log2(w))+1>. + +BN_num_bits() returns the number of significant bits in a B<BIGNUM>, +following the same principle as BN_num_bits_word(). + +BN_num_bytes() is a macro. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The size. + +=head1 NOTES + +Some have tried using BN_num_bits() on individual numbers in RSA keys, +DH keys and DSA keys, and found that they don't always come up with +the number of bits they expected (something like 512, 1024, 2048, +...). This is because generating a number with some specific number +of bits doesn't always set the highest bits, thereby making the number +of I<significant> bits a little lower. If you want to know the "key +size" of such a key, either use functions like RSA_size(), DH_size() +and DSA_size(), or use BN_num_bytes() and multiply with 8 (although +there's no real guarantee that will match the "key size", just a lot +more probability). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<DH_size(3)|DH_size(3)>, L<DSA_size(3)|DSA_size(3)>, +L<RSA_size(3)|RSA_size(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_num_bytes(), BN_num_bits() and BN_num_bits_word() are available in +all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..81f93c2eb3a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand - generate pseudo-random number + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); + + int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); + + int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); + + int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of +B<bits> bits in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the +most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0, +it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of +the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random +numbers will always have 2*B<bits> length. If B<bottom> is true, the +number will be odd. + +BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by +this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for +non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic +protocols, but usually not for key generation etc. + +BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random +number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>. +BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(), +and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable. + +The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)|RAND_bytes(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_rand() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +BN_pseudo_rand() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. The B<top> == -1 case +and the function BN_rand_range() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.6a. +BN_pseudo_rand_range() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6c. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b7c47b9b0158 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_set_bit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_set_bit, BN_clear_bit, BN_is_bit_set, BN_mask_bits, BN_lshift, +BN_lshift1, BN_rshift, BN_rshift1 - bit operations on BIGNUMs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); + + int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n); + + int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n); + + int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_set_bit() sets bit B<n> in B<a> to 1 (C<a|=(1E<lt>E<lt>n)>). The +number is expanded if necessary. + +BN_clear_bit() sets bit B<n> in B<a> to 0 (C<a&=~(1E<lt>E<lt>n)>). An +error occurs if B<a> is shorter than B<n> bits. + +BN_is_bit_set() tests if bit B<n> in B<a> is set. + +BN_mask_bits() truncates B<a> to an B<n> bit number +(C<a&=~((~0)E<gt>E<gt>n)>). An error occurs if B<a> already is +shorter than B<n> bits. + +BN_lshift() shifts B<a> left by B<n> bits and places the result in +B<r> (C<r=a*2^n>). BN_lshift1() shifts B<a> left by one and places +the result in B<r> (C<r=2*a>). + +BN_rshift() shifts B<a> right by B<n> bits and places the result in +B<r> (C<r=a/2^n>). BN_rshift1() shifts B<a> right by one and places +the result in B<r> (C<r=a/2>). + +For the shift functions, B<r> and B<a> may be the same variable. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_is_bit_set() returns 1 if the bit is set, 0 otherwise. + +All other functions return 1 for success, 0 on error. The error codes +can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<BN_num_bytes(3)|BN_num_bytes(3)>, L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_set_bit(), BN_clear_bit(), BN_is_bit_set(), BN_mask_bits(), +BN_lshift(), BN_lshift1(), BN_rshift(), and BN_rshift1() are available +in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79efaa144634 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_swap.pod @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_swap - exchange BIGNUMs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_swap() exchanges the values of I<a> and I<b>. + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_swap was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b555ec398859 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/BN_zero.pod @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BN_zero, BN_one, BN_value_one, BN_set_word, BN_get_word - BIGNUM assignment +operations + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a); + int BN_one(BIGNUM *a); + + const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void); + + int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w); + unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() set B<a> to the values 0, 1 and +B<w> respectively. BN_zero() and BN_one() are macros. + +BN_value_one() returns a B<BIGNUM> constant of value 1. This constant +is useful for use in comparisons and assignment. + +BN_get_word() returns B<a>, if it can be represented as an unsigned +long. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BN_get_word() returns the value B<a>, and 0xffffffffL if B<a> cannot +be represented as an unsigned long. + +BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. +BN_value_one() returns the constant. + +=head1 BUGS + +Someone might change the constant. + +If a B<BIGNUM> is equal to 0xffffffffL it can be represented as an +unsigned long but this value is also returned on error. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<BN_bn2bin(3)|BN_bn2bin(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BN_zero(), BN_one() and BN_set_word() are available in all versions of +SSLeay and OpenSSL. BN_value_one() and BN_get_word() were added in +SSLeay 0.8. + +BN_value_one() was changed to return a true const BIGNUM * in OpenSSL +0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod b/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..87bc7b783c9e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + + CONF_modules_free, CONF_modules_finish, CONF_modules_unload - + OpenSSL configuration cleanup functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/conf.h> + + void CONF_modules_free(void); + void CONF_modules_finish(void); + void CONF_modules_unload(int all); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +CONF_modules_free() closes down and frees up all memory allocated by all +configuration modules. + +CONF_modules_finish() calls each configuration modules B<finish> handler +to free up any configuration that module may have performed. + +CONF_modules_unload() finishes and unloads configuration modules. If +B<all> is set to B<0> only modules loaded from DSOs will be unloads. If +B<all> is B<1> all modules, including builtin modules will be unloaded. + +=head1 NOTES + +Normally applications will only call CONF_modules_free() at application to +tidy up any configuration performed. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +None of the functions return a value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>, +L<CONF_modules_load_file(3), CONF_modules_load_file(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +CONF_modules_free(), CONF_modules_unload(), and CONF_modules_finish() +first appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod b/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9965d69bf2ec --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + + CONF_modules_load_file, CONF_modules_load - OpenSSL configuration functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/conf.h> + + int CONF_modules_load_file(const char *filename, const char *appname, + unsigned long flags); + int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname, + unsigned long flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The function CONF_modules_load_file() configures OpenSSL using file +B<filename> and application name B<appname>. If B<filename> is NULL +the standard OpenSSL configuration file is used. If B<appname> is +NULL the standard OpenSSL application name B<openssl_conf> is used. +The behaviour can be cutomized using B<flags>. + +CONF_modules_load() is idential to CONF_modules_load_file() except it +read configuration information from B<cnf>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The following B<flags> are currently recognized: + +B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS> if set errors returned by individual +configuration modules are ignored. If not set the first module error is +considered fatal and no further modules are loads. + +Normally any modules errors will add error information to the error queue. If +B<CONF_MFLAGS_SILENT> is set no error information is added. + +If B<CONF_MFLAGS_NO_DSO> is set configuration module loading from DSOs is +disabled. + +B<CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE> if set will make CONF_load_modules_file() +ignore missing configuration files. Normally a missing configuration file +return an error. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +These functions return 1 for success and a zero or negative value for +failure. If module errors are not ignored the return code will reflect the +return value of the failing module (this will always be zero or negative). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>, +L<CONF_free(3), CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3),err(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +CONF_modules_load_file and CONF_modules_load first appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_set_ex_data.pod b/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_set_ex_data.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1bd5bed67d70 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/CRYPTO_set_ex_data.pod @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +CRYPTO_set_ex_data, CRYPTO_get_ex_data - internal application specific data functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx, void *arg); + + void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. +These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application +specific data attached to a specific structure. + +These functions should only be used by applications to manipulate +B<CRYPTO_EX_DATA> structures passed to the B<new_func()>, B<free_func()> and +B<dup_func()> callbacks: as passed to B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> for example. + +B<CRYPTO_set_ex_data()> is used to set application specific data, the data is +supplied in the B<arg> parameter and its precise meaning is up to the +application. + +B<CRYPTO_get_ex_data()> is used to retrieve application specific data. The data +is returned to the application, this will be the same value as supplied to +a previous B<CRYPTO_set_ex_data()> call. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +B<CRYPTO_set_ex_data()> returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + +B<CRYPTO_get_ex_data()> returns the application data or 0 on failure. 0 may also +be valid application data but currently it can only fail if given an invalid B<idx> +parameter. + +On failure an error code can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<DSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|DSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<DH_get_ex_new_index(3)|DH_get_ex_new_index(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +CRYPTO_set_ex_data() and CRYPTO_get_ex_data() have been available since SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..81f09fdf45ea --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_generate_key.pod @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DH_generate_key, DH_compute_key - perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + int DH_generate_key(DH *dh); + + int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DH_generate_key() performs the first step of a Diffie-Hellman key +exchange by generating private and public DH values. By calling +DH_compute_key(), these are combined with the other party's public +value to compute the shared key. + +DH_generate_key() expects B<dh> to contain the shared parameters +B<dh-E<gt>p> and B<dh-E<gt>g>. It generates a random private DH value +unless B<dh-E<gt>priv_key> is already set, and computes the +corresponding public value B<dh-E<gt>pub_key>, which can then be +published. + +DH_compute_key() computes the shared secret from the private DH value +in B<dh> and the other party's public value in B<pub_key> and stores +it in B<key>. B<key> must point to B<DH_size(dh)> bytes of memory. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +DH_generate_key() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. + +DH_compute_key() returns the size of the shared secret on success, -1 +on error. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<DH_size(3)|DH_size(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_generate_key() and DH_compute_key() are available in all versions +of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9081e9ea7cf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_generate_parameters.pod @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DH_generate_parameters, DH_check - generate and check Diffie-Hellman parameters + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator, + void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); + + int DH_check(DH *dh, int *codes); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DH_generate_parameters() generates Diffie-Hellman parameters that can +be shared among a group of users, and returns them in a newly +allocated B<DH> structure. The pseudo-random number generator must be +seeded prior to calling DH_generate_parameters(). + +B<prime_len> is the length in bits of the safe prime to be generated. +B<generator> is a small number E<gt> 1, typically 2 or 5. + +A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress +of the key generation. If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, it will be +called as described in L<BN_generate_prime(3)|BN_generate_prime(3)> while a random prime +number is generated, and when a prime has been found, B<callback(3, +0, cb_arg)> is called. + +DH_check() validates Diffie-Hellman parameters. It checks that B<p> is +a safe prime, and that B<g> is a suitable generator. In the case of an +error, the bit flags DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME or +DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR are set in B<*codes>. +DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR is set if the generator cannot be +checked, i.e. it does not equal 2 or 5. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +DH_generate_parameters() returns a pointer to the DH structure, or +NULL if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be +obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +DH_check() returns 1 if the check could be performed, 0 otherwise. + +=head1 NOTES + +DH_generate_parameters() may run for several hours before finding a +suitable prime. + +The parameters generated by DH_generate_parameters() are not to be +used in signature schemes. + +=head1 BUGS + +If B<generator> is not 2 or 5, B<dh-E<gt>g>=B<generator> is not +a usable generator. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<DH_free(3)|DH_free(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_check() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +The B<cb_arg> argument to DH_generate_parameters() was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. + +In versions before OpenSSL 0.9.5, DH_CHECK_P_NOT_STRONG_PRIME is used +instead of DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_get_ex_new_index.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fa5eab26502a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DH_get_ex_new_index, DH_set_ex_data, DH_get_ex_data - add application specific data to DH structures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg); + + char *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions handle application specific data in DH +structures. Their usage is identical to that of +RSA_get_ex_new_index(), RSA_set_ex_data() and RSA_get_ex_data() +as described in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, L<dh(3)|dh(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_get_ex_new_index(), DH_set_ex_data() and DH_get_ex_data() are +available since OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..60c930093e02 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DH_new, DH_free - allocate and free DH objects + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + DH* DH_new(void); + + void DH_free(DH *dh); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DH_new() allocates and initializes a B<DH> structure. + +DH_free() frees the B<DH> structure and its components. The values are +erased before the memory is returned to the system. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +If the allocation fails, DH_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error +code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns +a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +DH_free() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<DH_generate_parameters(3)|DH_generate_parameters(3)>, +L<DH_generate_key(3)|DH_generate_key(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_new() and DH_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..73261fc4675d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_set_method.pod @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DH_set_default_method, DH_get_default_method, +DH_set_method, DH_new_method, DH_OpenSSL - select DH method + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + #include <openssl/engine.h> + + void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth); + + const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void); + + int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth); + + DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine); + + const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A B<DH_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for Diffie-Hellman +operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations +such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for +important information about how these DH API functions are affected by the use +of B<ENGINE> API calls. + +Initially, the default DH_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as +returned by DH_OpenSSL(). + +DH_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the default method for all DH +structures created later. B<NB>: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set +as a default for DH, so this function is no longer recommended. + +DH_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default DH_METHOD. +However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the ENGINE +API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. + +DH_set_method() selects B<meth> to perform all operations using the key B<dh>. +This will replace the DH_METHOD used by the DH key and if the previous method +was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the +change. It is possible to have DH keys that only work with certain DH_METHOD +implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded +hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DH_METHOD +for the key can have unexpected results. + +DH_new_method() allocates and initializes a DH structure so that B<engine> will +be used for the DH operations. If B<engine> is NULL, the default ENGINE for DH +operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DH_METHOD controlled by +DH_set_default_method() is used. + +=head1 THE DH_METHOD STRUCTURE + + typedef struct dh_meth_st + { + /* name of the implementation */ + const char *name; + + /* generate private and public DH values for key agreement */ + int (*generate_key)(DH *dh); + + /* compute shared secret */ + int (*compute_key)(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + + /* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */ + int (*bn_mod_exp)(DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); + + /* called at DH_new */ + int (*init)(DH *dh); + + /* called at DH_free */ + int (*finish)(DH *dh); + + int flags; + + char *app_data; /* ?? */ + + } DH_METHOD; + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +DH_OpenSSL() and DH_get_default_method() return pointers to the respective +B<DH_METHOD>s. + +DH_set_default_method() returns no value. + +DH_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B<meth> was successfully set as +the method for B<dh> (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous +method was supplied by an ENGINE). + +DH_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> if the allocation fails. Otherwise it +returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +=head1 NOTES + +As of version 0.9.7, DH_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other +algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA_METHOD, EVP_CIPHER, etc) in B<ENGINE> modules. If a +default ENGINE is specified for DH functionality using an ENGINE API function, +that will override any DH defaults set using the DH API (ie. +DH_set_default_method()). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way +to control default implementations for use in DH and other cryptographic +algorithms. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<DH_new(3)|DH_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_set_default_method(), DH_get_default_method(), DH_set_method(), +DH_new_method() and DH_OpenSSL() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.4. + +DH_set_default_openssl_method() and DH_get_default_openssl_method() replaced +DH_set_default_method() and DH_get_default_method() respectively, and +DH_set_method() and DH_new_method() were altered to use B<ENGINE>s rather than +B<DH_METHOD>s during development of the engine version of OpenSSL 0.9.6. For +0.9.7, the handling of defaults in the ENGINE API was restructured so that this +change was reversed, and behaviour of the other functions resembled more closely +the previous behaviour. The behaviour of defaults in the ENGINE API now +transparently overrides the behaviour of defaults in the DH API without +requiring changing these function prototypes. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod b/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..97f26fda7855 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DH_size.pod @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DH_size - get Diffie-Hellman prime size + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + int DH_size(DH *dh); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This function returns the Diffie-Hellman size in bytes. It can be used +to determine how much memory must be allocated for the shared secret +computed by DH_compute_key(). + +B<dh-E<gt>p> must not be B<NULL>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +The size in bytes. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<DH_generate_key(3)|DH_generate_key(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DH_size() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3ac614003816 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_SIG_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_SIG_new, DSA_SIG_free - allocate and free DSA signature objects + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void); + + void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_SIG_new() allocates and initializes a B<DSA_SIG> structure. + +DSA_SIG_free() frees the B<DSA_SIG> structure and its components. The +values are erased before the memory is returned to the system. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +If the allocation fails, DSA_SIG_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an +error code that can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns a pointer +to the newly allocated structure. + +DSA_SIG_free() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<DSA_do_sign(3)|DSA_do_sign(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_SIG_new() and DSA_SIG_free() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5dfc733b20e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_do_sign.pod @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_do_sign, DSA_do_verify - raw DSA signature operations + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); + + int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_do_sign() computes a digital signature on the B<len> byte message +digest B<dgst> using the private key B<dsa> and returns it in a +newly allocated B<DSA_SIG> structure. + +L<DSA_sign_setup(3)|DSA_sign_setup(3)> may be used to precompute part +of the signing operation in case signature generation is +time-critical. + +DSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B<sig> matches a given +message digest B<dgst> of size B<len>. B<dsa> is the signer's public +key. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +DSA_do_sign() returns the signature, NULL on error. DSA_do_verify() +returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 +on error. The error codes can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<DSA_SIG_new(3)|DSA_SIG_new(3)>, +L<DSA_sign(3)|DSA_sign(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_do_sign() and DSA_do_verify() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7f6f0d1115ad --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_dup_DH.pod @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_dup_DH - create a DH structure out of DSA structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + DH * DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_dup_DH() duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys. q +is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters +contain its length. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +DSA_dup_DH() returns the new B<DH> structure, and NULL on error. The +error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 NOTE + +Be careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_dup_DH() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.4. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..af83ccfaa16b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_key.pod @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_generate_key - generate DSA key pair + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_generate_key() expects B<a> to contain DSA parameters. It generates +a new key pair and stores it in B<a-E<gt>pub_key> and B<a-E<gt>priv_key>. + +The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling DSA_generate_key(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +DSA_generate_key() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)|DSA_generate_parameters(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_generate_key() is available since SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..be7c924ff8f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_generate_parameters - generate DSA parameters + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed, + int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, + void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_generate_parameters() generates primes p and q and a generator g +for use in the DSA. + +B<bits> is the length of the prime to be generated; the DSS allows a +maximum of 1024 bits. + +If B<seed> is B<NULL> or B<seed_len> E<lt> 20, the primes will be +generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate +them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random +seed is chosen and placed at B<seed>. + +DSA_generate_parameters() places the iteration count in +*B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in +*B<h_ret>, unless these are B<NULL>. + +A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress +of the key generation. If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, it will be +called as follows: + +=over 4 + +=item * + +When a candidate for q is generated, B<callback(0, m++, cb_arg)> is called +(m is 0 for the first candidate). + +=item * + +When a candidate for q has passed a test by trial division, +B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called. +While a candidate for q is tested by Miller-Rabin primality tests, +B<callback(1, i, cb_arg)> is called in the outer loop +(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime); +i is the loop counter (starting at 0). + +=item * + +When a prime q has been found, B<callback(2, 0, cb_arg)> and +B<callback(3, 0, cb_arg)> are called. + +=item * + +Before a candidate for p (other than the first) is generated and tested, +B<callback(0, counter, cb_arg)> is called. + +=item * + +When a candidate for p has passed the test by trial division, +B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called. +While it is tested by the Miller-Rabin primality test, +B<callback(1, i, cb_arg)> is called in the outer loop +(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime). +i is the loop counter (starting at 0). + +=item * + +When p has been found, B<callback(2, 1, cb_arg)> is called. + +=item * + +When the generator has been found, B<callback(3, 1, cb_arg)> is called. + +=back + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +DSA_generate_parameters() returns a pointer to the DSA structure, or +B<NULL> if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be +obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 BUGS + +Seed lengths E<gt> 20 are not supported. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<DSA_free(3)|DSA_free(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_generate_parameters() appeared in SSLeay 0.8. The B<cb_arg> +argument was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. +In versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.4, B<callback(1, ...)> was called +in the inner loop of the Miller-Rabin test whenever it reached the +squaring step (the parameters to B<callback> did not reveal how many +witnesses had been tested); since OpenSSL 0.9.5, B<callback(1, ...)> +is called as in BN_is_prime(3), i.e. once for each witness. +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_get_ex_new_index.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4612e708ecc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_get_ex_new_index, DSA_set_ex_data, DSA_get_ex_data - add application specific data to DSA structures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/DSA.h> + + int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg); + + char *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions handle application specific data in DSA +structures. Their usage is identical to that of +RSA_get_ex_new_index(), RSA_set_ex_data() and RSA_get_ex_data() +as described in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_get_ex_new_index(), DSA_set_ex_data() and DSA_get_ex_data() are +available since OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..48e9b82a09c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_new, DSA_free - allocate and free DSA objects + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + DSA* DSA_new(void); + + void DSA_free(DSA *dsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_new() allocates and initializes a B<DSA> structure. It is equivalent to +calling DSA_new_method(NULL). + +DSA_free() frees the B<DSA> structure and its components. The values are +erased before the memory is returned to the system. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +If the allocation fails, DSA_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error +code that can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns a pointer +to the newly allocated structure. + +DSA_free() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)|DSA_generate_parameters(3)>, +L<DSA_generate_key(3)|DSA_generate_key(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_new() and DSA_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bc3cfb1f0a78 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_set_method.pod @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_set_default_method, DSA_get_default_method, +DSA_set_method, DSA_new_method, DSA_OpenSSL - select DSA method + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + #include <openssl/engine.h> + + void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth); + + const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void); + + int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth); + + DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); + + DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A B<DSA_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for DSA +operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations +such as hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for +important information about how these DSA API functions are affected by the use +of B<ENGINE> API calls. + +Initially, the default DSA_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, +as returned by DSA_OpenSSL(). + +DSA_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the default method for all DSA +structures created later. B<NB>: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has +been set as a default for DSA, so this function is no longer recommended. + +DSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default +DSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on +whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer +recommended. + +DSA_set_method() selects B<meth> to perform all operations using the key +B<rsa>. This will replace the DSA_METHOD used by the DSA key and if the +previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will +be released during the change. It is possible to have DSA keys that only +work with certain DSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module +that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases +attempting to change the DSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected +results. + +DSA_new_method() allocates and initializes a DSA structure so that B<engine> +will be used for the DSA operations. If B<engine> is NULL, the default engine +for DSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DSA_METHOD +controlled by DSA_set_default_method() is used. + +=head1 THE DSA_METHOD STRUCTURE + +struct + { + /* name of the implementation */ + const char *name; + + /* sign */ + DSA_SIG *(*dsa_do_sign)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, + DSA *dsa); + + /* pre-compute k^-1 and r */ + int (*dsa_sign_setup)(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + BIGNUM **rp); + + /* verify */ + int (*dsa_do_verify)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + + /* compute rr = a1^p1 * a2^p2 mod m (May be NULL for some + implementations) */ + int (*dsa_mod_exp)(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, + BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); + + /* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */ + int (*bn_mod_exp)(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); + + /* called at DSA_new */ + int (*init)(DSA *DSA); + + /* called at DSA_free */ + int (*finish)(DSA *DSA); + + int flags; + + char *app_data; /* ?? */ + + } DSA_METHOD; + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +DSA_OpenSSL() and DSA_get_default_method() return pointers to the respective +B<DSA_METHOD>s. + +DSA_set_default_method() returns no value. + +DSA_set_method() returns non-zero if the provided B<meth> was successfully set as +the method for B<dsa> (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous +method was supplied by an ENGINE). + +DSA_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be +obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> if the allocation +fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +=head1 NOTES + +As of version 0.9.7, DSA_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other +algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA_METHOD, EVP_CIPHER, etc) in B<ENGINE> modules. If a +default ENGINE is specified for DSA functionality using an ENGINE API function, +that will override any DSA defaults set using the DSA API (ie. +DSA_set_default_method()). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way +to control default implementations for use in DSA and other cryptographic +algorithms. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<DSA_new(3)|DSA_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_set_default_method(), DSA_get_default_method(), DSA_set_method(), +DSA_new_method() and DSA_OpenSSL() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.4. + +DSA_set_default_openssl_method() and DSA_get_default_openssl_method() replaced +DSA_set_default_method() and DSA_get_default_method() respectively, and +DSA_set_method() and DSA_new_method() were altered to use B<ENGINE>s rather than +B<DSA_METHOD>s during development of the engine version of OpenSSL 0.9.6. For +0.9.7, the handling of defaults in the ENGINE API was restructured so that this +change was reversed, and behaviour of the other functions resembled more closely +the previous behaviour. The behaviour of defaults in the ENGINE API now +transparently overrides the behaviour of defaults in the DSA API without +requiring changing these function prototypes. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..97389e8ec885 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_sign.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_sign, DSA_sign_setup, DSA_verify - DSA signatures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa); + + int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp, + BIGNUM **rp); + + int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, + unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +DSA_sign() computes a digital signature on the B<len> byte message +digest B<dgst> using the private key B<dsa> and places its ASN.1 DER +encoding at B<sigret>. The length of the signature is places in +*B<siglen>. B<sigret> must point to DSA_size(B<dsa>) bytes of memory. + +DSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute part of the signing +operation in case signature generation is time-critical. It expects +B<dsa> to contain DSA parameters. It places the precomputed values +in newly allocated B<BIGNUM>s at *B<kinvp> and *B<rp>, after freeing +the old ones unless *B<kinvp> and *B<rp> are NULL. These values may +be passed to DSA_sign() in B<dsa-E<gt>kinv> and B<dsa-E<gt>r>. +B<ctx> is a pre-allocated B<BN_CTX> or NULL. + +DSA_verify() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf> of size B<siglen> +matches a given message digest B<dgst> of size B<len>. +B<dsa> is the signer's public key. + +The B<type> parameter is ignored. + +The PRNG must be seeded before DSA_sign() (or DSA_sign_setup()) +is called. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +DSA_sign() and DSA_sign_setup() return 1 on success, 0 on error. +DSA_verify() returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect +signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature +Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<DSA_do_sign(3)|DSA_do_sign(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_sign() and DSA_verify() are available in all versions of SSLeay. +DSA_sign_setup() was added in SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod b/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ba4f650361c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/DSA_size.pod @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DSA_size - get DSA signature size + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This function returns the size of an ASN.1 encoded DSA signature in +bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated +for a DSA signature. + +B<dsa-E<gt>q> must not be B<NULL>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +The size in bytes. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<DSA_sign(3)|DSA_sign(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +DSA_size() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2a129da036cc --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_GET_LIB.pod @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_GET_LIB, ERR_GET_FUNC, ERR_GET_REASON - get library, function and +reason code + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + int ERR_GET_LIB(unsigned long e); + + int ERR_GET_FUNC(unsigned long e); + + int ERR_GET_REASON(unsigned long e); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The error code returned by ERR_get_error() consists of a library +number, function code and reason code. ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC() +and ERR_GET_REASON() can be used to extract these. + +The library number and function code describe where the error +occurred, the reason code is the information about what went wrong. + +Each sub-library of OpenSSL has a unique library number; function and +reason codes are unique within each sub-library. Note that different +libraries may use the same value to signal different functions and +reasons. + +B<ERR_R_...> reason codes such as B<ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE> are globally +unique. However, when checking for sub-library specific reason codes, +be sure to also compare the library number. + +ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC() and ERR_GET_REASON() are macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The library number, function code and reason code respectively. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_GET_LIB(), ERR_GET_FUNC() and ERR_GET_REASON() are available in +all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..566e1f4e317f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_clear_error.pod @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_clear_error - clear the error queue + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + void ERR_clear_error(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_clear_error() empties the current thread's error queue. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ERR_clear_error() has no return value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_clear_error() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cdfa7fe1fe72 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_error_string, ERR_error_string_n, ERR_lib_error_string, +ERR_func_error_string, ERR_reason_error_string - obtain human-readable +error message + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf); + void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len); + + const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e); + const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e); + const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_error_string() generates a human-readable string representing the +error code I<e>, and places it at I<buf>. I<buf> must be at least 120 +bytes long. If I<buf> is B<NULL>, the error string is placed in a +static buffer. +ERR_error_string_n() is a variant of ERR_error_string() that writes +at most I<len> characters (including the terminating 0) +and truncates the string if necessary. +For ERR_error_string_n(), I<buf> may not be B<NULL>. + +The string will have the following format: + + error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string] + +I<error code> is an 8 digit hexadecimal number, I<library name>, +I<function name> and I<reason string> are ASCII text. + +ERR_lib_error_string(), ERR_func_error_string() and +ERR_reason_error_string() return the library name, function +name and reason string respectively. + +The OpenSSL error strings should be loaded by calling +L<ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)|ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)> or, for SSL +applications, L<SSL_load_error_strings(3)|SSL_load_error_strings(3)> +first. +If there is no text string registered for the given error code, +the error string will contain the numeric code. + +L<ERR_print_errors(3)|ERR_print_errors(3)> can be used to print +all error codes currently in the queue. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ERR_error_string() returns a pointer to a static buffer containing the +string if I<buf> B<== NULL>, I<buf> otherwise. + +ERR_lib_error_string(), ERR_func_error_string() and +ERR_reason_error_string() return the strings, and B<NULL> if +none is registered for the error code. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)|ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)>, +L<SSL_load_error_strings(3)|SSL_load_error_strings(3)> +L<ERR_print_errors(3)|ERR_print_errors(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_error_string() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +ERR_error_string_n() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..34443045fc0d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_get_error, ERR_peek_error, ERR_peek_last_error, +ERR_get_error_line, ERR_peek_error_line, ERR_peek_last_error_line, +ERR_get_error_line_data, ERR_peek_error_line_data, +ERR_peek_last_error_line_data - obtain error code and data + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + unsigned long ERR_get_error(void); + unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void); + unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void); + + unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line); + unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line); + unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line); + + unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, + const char **data, int *flags); + unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, + const char **data, int *flags); + unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, + const char **data, int *flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_get_error() returns the earliest error code from the thread's error +queue and removes the entry. This function can be called repeatedly +until there are no more error codes to return. + +ERR_peek_error() returns the earliest error code from the thread's +error queue without modifying it. + +ERR_peek_last_error() returns the latest error code from the thread's +error queue without modifying it. + +See L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)|ERR_GET_LIB(3)> for obtaining information about +location and reason of the error, and +L<ERR_error_string(3)|ERR_error_string(3)> for human-readable error +messages. + +ERR_get_error_line(), ERR_peek_error_line() and +ERR_peek_last_error_line() are the same as the above, but they +additionally store the file name and line number where +the error occurred in *B<file> and *B<line>, unless these are B<NULL>. + +ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and +ERR_get_last_error_line_data() store additional data and flags +associated with the error code in *B<data> +and *B<flags>, unless these are B<NULL>. *B<data> contains a string +if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING>. If it has been allocated by OPENSSL_malloc(), +*B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_MALLOCED> is true. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The error code, or 0 if there is no error in the queue. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_error_string(3)|ERR_error_string(3)>, +L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)|ERR_GET_LIB(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_get_error(), ERR_peek_error(), ERR_get_error_line() and +ERR_peek_error_line() are available in all versions of SSLeay and +OpenSSL. ERR_get_error_line_data() and ERR_peek_error_line_data() +were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. +ERR_peek_last_error(), ERR_peek_last_error_line() and +ERR_peek_last_error_line_data() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9bdec75a4638 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_load_crypto_strings.pod @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_load_crypto_strings, SSL_load_error_strings, ERR_free_strings - +load and free error strings + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void); + void ERR_free_strings(void); + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_load_error_strings(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_load_crypto_strings() registers the error strings for all +B<libcrypto> functions. SSL_load_error_strings() does the same, +but also registers the B<libssl> error strings. + +One of these functions should be called before generating +textual error messages. However, this is not required when memory +usage is an issue. + +ERR_free_strings() frees all previously loaded error strings. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings() and +ERR_free_strings() return no values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_error_string(3)|ERR_error_string(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_load_error_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings() and +ERR_free_strings() are available in all versions of SSLeay and +OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5acdd0edbc5e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_load_strings.pod @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_load_strings, ERR_PACK, ERR_get_next_error_library - load +arbitrary error strings + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + void ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]); + + int ERR_get_next_error_library(void); + + unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_load_strings() registers error strings for library number B<lib>. + +B<str> is an array of error string data: + + typedef struct ERR_string_data_st + { + unsigned long error; + char *string; + } ERR_STRING_DATA; + +The error code is generated from the library number and a function and +reason code: B<error> = ERR_PACK(B<lib>, B<func>, B<reason>). +ERR_PACK() is a macro. + +The last entry in the array is {0,0}. + +ERR_get_next_error_library() can be used to assign library numbers +to user libraries at runtime. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +ERR_load_strings() returns no value. ERR_PACK() return the error code. +ERR_get_next_error_library() returns a new library number. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_load_strings(3)|ERR_load_strings(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_load_error_strings() and ERR_PACK() are available in all versions +of SSLeay and OpenSSL. ERR_get_next_error_library() was added in +SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b100a5fa2b30 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_print_errors.pod @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_print_errors, ERR_print_errors_fp - print error messages + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp); + void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_print_errors() is a convenience function that prints the error +strings for all errors that OpenSSL has recorded to B<bp>, thus +emptying the error queue. + +ERR_print_errors_fp() is the same, except that the output goes to a +B<FILE>. + + +The error strings will have the following format: + + [pid]:error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]:[file name]:[line]:[optional text message] + +I<error code> is an 8 digit hexadecimal number. I<library name>, +I<function name> and I<reason string> are ASCII text, as is I<optional +text message> if one was set for the respective error code. + +If there is no text string registered for the given error code, +the error string will contain the numeric code. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ERR_print_errors() and ERR_print_errors_fp() return no values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_error_string(3)|ERR_error_string(3)>, +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)|ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)>, +L<SSL_load_error_strings(3)|SSL_load_error_strings(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_print_errors() and ERR_print_errors_fp() +are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..acd241fbe476 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_put_error.pod @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_put_error, ERR_add_error_data - record an error + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, + int line); + + void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_put_error() adds an error code to the thread's error queue. It +signals that the error of reason code B<reason> occurred in function +B<func> of library B<lib>, in line number B<line> of B<file>. +This function is usually called by a macro. + +ERR_add_error_data() associates the concatenation of its B<num> string +arguments with the error code added last. + +L<ERR_load_strings(3)|ERR_load_strings(3)> can be used to register +error strings so that the application can a generate human-readable +error messages for the error code. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ERR_put_error() and ERR_add_error_data() return +no values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<ERR_load_strings(3)|ERR_load_strings(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_put_error() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +ERR_add_error_data() was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..72925fb9f474 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_remove_state - free a thread's error queue + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_remove_state() frees the error queue associated with thread B<pid>. +If B<pid> == 0, the current thread will have its error queue removed. + +Since error queue data structures are allocated automatically for new +threads, they must be freed when threads are terminated in order to +avoid memory leaks. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +ERR_remove_state() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_remove_state() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d3ca4f2e770b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ERR_set_mark, ERR_pop_to_mark - set marks and pop errors until mark + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + int ERR_set_mark(void); + + int ERR_pop_to_mark(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +ERR_set_mark() sets a mark on the current topmost error record if there +is one. + +ERR_pop_to_mark() will pop the top of the error stack until a mark is found. +The mark is then removed. If there is no mark, the whole stack is removed. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ERR_set_mark() returns 0 if the error stack is empty, otherwise 1. + +ERR_pop_to_mark() returns 0 if there was no mark in the error stack, which +implies that the stack became empty, otherwise 1. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<err(3)|err(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d375c46e03d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_BytesToKey - password based encryption routine + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type,const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *salt, + const unsigned char *data, int datal, int count, + unsigned char *key,unsigned char *iv); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +EVP_BytesToKey() derives a key and IV from various parameters. B<type> is +the cipher to derive the key and IV for. B<md> is the message digest to use. +The B<salt> paramter is used as a salt in the derivation: it should point to +an 8 byte buffer or NULL if no salt is used. B<data> is a buffer containing +B<datal> bytes which is used to derive the keying data. B<count> is the +iteration count to use. The derived key and IV will be written to B<key> +and B<iv> respectively. + +=head1 NOTES + +A typical application of this function is to derive keying material for an +encryption algorithm from a password in the B<data> parameter. + +Increasing the B<count> parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it +harder for an attacker to peform a brute force attack using a large number +of candidate passwords. + +If the total key and IV length is less than the digest length and +B<MD5> is used then the derivation algorithm is compatible with PKCS#5 v1.5 +otherwise a non standard extension is used to derive the extra data. + +Newer applications should use more standard algorithms such as PKCS#5 +v2.0 for key derivation. + +=head1 KEY DERIVATION ALGORITHM + +The key and IV is derived by concatenating D_1, D_2, etc until +enough data is available for the key and IV. D_i is defined as: + + D_i = HASH^count(D_(i-1) || data || salt) + +where || denotes concatentaion, D_0 is empty, HASH is the digest +algorithm in use, HASH^1(data) is simply HASH(data), HASH^2(data) +is HASH(HASH(data)) and so on. + +The initial bytes are used for the key and the subsequent bytes for +the IV. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_BytesToKey() returns the size of the derived key in bytes. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..130cd7f60adb --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_MD_CTX_init, EVP_MD_CTX_create, EVP_DigestInit_ex, EVP_DigestUpdate, +EVP_DigestFinal_ex, EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup, EVP_MD_CTX_destroy, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, +EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex, EVP_MD_CTX_copy, EVP_MD_type, EVP_MD_pkey_type, EVP_MD_size, +EVP_MD_block_size, EVP_MD_CTX_md, EVP_MD_CTX_size, EVP_MD_CTX_block_size, EVP_MD_CTX_type, +EVP_md_null, EVP_md2, EVP_md5, EVP_sha, EVP_sha1, EVP_dss, EVP_dss1, EVP_mdc2, +EVP_ripemd160, EVP_get_digestbyname, EVP_get_digestbynid, EVP_get_digestbyobj - +EVP digest routines + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void); + + int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl); + int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, size_t cnt); + int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, + unsigned int *s); + + int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + + int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out,const EVP_MD_CTX *in); + + int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type); + int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, + unsigned int *s); + + int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out,EVP_MD_CTX *in); + + #define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE (16+20) /* The SSLv3 md5+sha1 type */ + + + #define EVP_MD_type(e) ((e)->type) + #define EVP_MD_pkey_type(e) ((e)->pkey_type) + #define EVP_MD_size(e) ((e)->md_size) + #define EVP_MD_block_size(e) ((e)->block_size) + + #define EVP_MD_CTX_md(e) (e)->digest) + #define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e) EVP_MD_size((e)->digest) + #define EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(e) EVP_MD_block_size((e)->digest) + #define EVP_MD_CTX_type(e) EVP_MD_type((e)->digest) + + const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_sha(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_dss(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_dss1(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void); + const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void); + + const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name); + #define EVP_get_digestbynid(a) EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a)) + #define EVP_get_digestbyobj(a) EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a)) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP digest routines are a high level interface to message digests. + +EVP_MD_CTX_init() initializes digest contet B<ctx>. + +EVP_MD_CTX_create() allocates, initializes and returns a digest contet. + +EVP_DigestInit_ex() sets up digest context B<ctx> to use a digest +B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized before calling this +function. B<type> will typically be supplied by a functionsuch as EVP_sha1(). +If B<impl> is NULL then the default implementation of digest B<type> is used. + +EVP_DigestUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the +digest context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the +same B<ctx> to hash additional data. + +EVP_DigestFinal_ex() retrieves the digest value from B<ctx> and places +it in B<md>. If the B<s> parameter is not NULL then the number of +bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the digest) will be written +to the integer at B<s>, at most B<EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE> bytes will be written. +After calling EVP_DigestFinal_ex() no additional calls to EVP_DigestUpdate() +can be made, but EVP_DigestInit_ex() can be called to initialize a new +digest operation. + +EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() cleans up digest context B<ctx>, it should be called +after a digest context is no longer needed. + +EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() cleans up digest context B<ctx> and frees up the +space allocated to it, it should be called only on a context created +using EVP_MD_CTX_create(). + +EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() can be used to copy the message digest state from +B<in> to B<out>. This is useful if large amounts of data are to be +hashed which only differ in the last few bytes. B<out> must be initialized +before calling this function. + +EVP_DigestInit() behaves in the same way as EVP_DigestInit_ex() except +the passed context B<ctx> does not have to be initialized, and it always +uses the default digest implementation. + +EVP_DigestFinal() is similar to EVP_DigestFinal_ex() except the digest +contet B<ctx> is automatically cleaned up. + +EVP_MD_CTX_copy() is similar to EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() except the destination +B<out> does not have to be initialized. + +EVP_MD_size() and EVP_MD_CTX_size() return the size of the message digest +when passed an B<EVP_MD> or an B<EVP_MD_CTX> structure, i.e. the size of the +hash. + +EVP_MD_block_size() and EVP_MD_CTX_block_size() return the block size of the +message digest when passed an B<EVP_MD> or an B<EVP_MD_CTX> structure. + +EVP_MD_type() and EVP_MD_CTX_type() return the NID of the OBJECT IDENTIFIER +representing the given message digest when passed an B<EVP_MD> structure. +For example EVP_MD_type(EVP_sha1()) returns B<NID_sha1>. This function is +normally used when setting ASN1 OIDs. + +EVP_MD_CTX_md() returns the B<EVP_MD> structure corresponding to the passed +B<EVP_MD_CTX>. + +EVP_MD_pkey_type() returns the NID of the public key signing algorithm associated +with this digest. For example EVP_sha1() is associated with RSA so this will +return B<NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption>. This "link" between digests and signature +algorithms may not be retained in future versions of OpenSSL. + +EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha(), EVP_sha1(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160() +return B<EVP_MD> structures for the MD2, MD5, SHA, SHA1, MDC2 and RIPEMD160 digest +algorithms respectively. The associated signature algorithm is RSA in each case. + +EVP_dss() and EVP_dss1() return B<EVP_MD> structures for SHA and SHA1 digest +algorithms but using DSS (DSA) for the signature algorithm. + +EVP_md_null() is a "null" message digest that does nothing: i.e. the hash it +returns is of zero length. + +EVP_get_digestbyname(), EVP_get_digestbynid() and EVP_get_digestbyobj() +return an B<EVP_MD> structure when passed a digest name, a digest NID or +an ASN1_OBJECT structure respectively. The digest table must be initialized +using, for example, OpenSSL_add_all_digests() for these functions to work. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestUpdate() and EVP_DigestFinal_ex() return 1 for +success and 0 for failure. + +EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() returns 1 if successful or 0 for failure. + +EVP_MD_type(), EVP_MD_pkey_type() and EVP_MD_type() return the NID of the +corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID_undef if none exists. + +EVP_MD_size(), EVP_MD_block_size(), EVP_MD_CTX_size(e), EVP_MD_size(), +EVP_MD_CTX_block_size() and EVP_MD_block_size() return the digest or block +size in bytes. + +EVP_md_null(), EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha(), EVP_sha1(), EVP_dss(), +EVP_dss1(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160() return pointers to the +corresponding EVP_MD structures. + +EVP_get_digestbyname(), EVP_get_digestbynid() and EVP_get_digestbyobj() +return either an B<EVP_MD> structure or NULL if an error occurs. + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<EVP> interface to message digests should almost always be used in +preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +transparent to the digest used and much more flexible. + +SHA1 is the digest of choice for new applications. The other digest algorithms +are still in common use. + +For most applications the B<impl> parameter to EVP_DigestInit_ex() will be +set to NULL to use the default digest implementation. + +The functions EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestFinal() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy() are +obsolete but are retained to maintain compatibility with existing code. New +applications should use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and +EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() because they can efficiently reuse a digest context +instead of initializing and cleaning it up on each call and allow non default +implementations of digests to be specified. + +In OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if digest contexts are not cleaned up after use +memory leaks will occur. + +=head1 EXAMPLE + +This example digests the data "Test Message\n" and "Hello World\n", using the +digest name passed on the command line. + + #include <stdio.h> + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + EVP_MD_CTX mdctx; + const EVP_MD *md; + char mess1[] = "Test Message\n"; + char mess2[] = "Hello World\n"; + unsigned char md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int md_len, i; + + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); + + if(!argv[1]) { + printf("Usage: mdtest digestname\n"); + exit(1); + } + + md = EVP_get_digestbyname(argv[1]); + + if(!md) { + printf("Unknown message digest %s\n", argv[1]); + exit(1); + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdctx); + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mdctx, md, NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, mess1, strlen(mess1)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, mess2, strlen(mess2)); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdctx, md_value, &md_len); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdctx); + + printf("Digest is: "); + for(i = 0; i < md_len; i++) printf("%02x", md_value[i]); + printf("\n"); + } + +=head1 BUGS + +The link between digests and signing algorithms results in a situation where +EVP_sha1() must be used with RSA and EVP_dss1() must be used with DSS +even though they are identical digests. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>, +L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>, +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +EVP_DigestInit(), EVP_DigestUpdate() and EVP_DigestFinal() are +available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +EVP_MD_CTX_init(), EVP_MD_CTX_create(), EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(), +EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(), EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(), EVP_DigestInit_ex() +and EVP_DigestFinal_ex() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +EVP_md_null(), EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha(), EVP_sha1(), +EVP_dss(), EVP_dss1(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160() were +changed to return truely const EVP_MD * in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8271d3dfc417 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,511 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init, EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate, +EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, EVP_DecryptInit_ex, EVP_DecryptUpdate, +EVP_DecryptFinal_ex, EVP_CipherInit_ex, EVP_CipherUpdate, +EVP_CipherFinal_ex, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length, +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup, EVP_EncryptInit, +EVP_EncryptFinal, EVP_DecryptInit, EVP_DecryptFinal, +EVP_CipherInit, EVP_CipherFinal, EVP_get_cipherbyname, +EVP_get_cipherbynid, EVP_get_cipherbyobj, EVP_CIPHER_nid, +EVP_CIPHER_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length, +EVP_CIPHER_flags, EVP_CIPHER_mode, EVP_CIPHER_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher, +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length, +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data, +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags, +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode, EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param, +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding - EVP cipher routines + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a); + + int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); + int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); + int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl); + + int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); + int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); + int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, + int *outl); + + int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc); + int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); + int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, + int *outl); + + int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); + int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl); + + int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv); + int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, + int *outl); + + int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc); + int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, + int *outl); + + int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int padding); + int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen); + int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr); + int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a); + + const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name); + #define EVP_get_cipherbynid(a) EVP_get_cipherbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a)) + #define EVP_get_cipherbyobj(a) EVP_get_cipherbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a)) + + #define EVP_CIPHER_nid(e) ((e)->nid) + #define EVP_CIPHER_block_size(e) ((e)->block_size) + #define EVP_CIPHER_key_length(e) ((e)->key_len) + #define EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(e) ((e)->iv_len) + #define EVP_CIPHER_flags(e) ((e)->flags) + #define EVP_CIPHER_mode(e) ((e)->flags) & EVP_CIPH_MODE) + int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx); + + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(e) ((e)->cipher) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(e) ((e)->cipher->nid) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(e) ((e)->cipher->block_size) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(e) ((e)->key_len) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(e) ((e)->cipher->iv_len) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e) ((e)->app_data) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(e,d) ((e)->app_data=(char *)(d)) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(c) EVP_CIPHER_type(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c)) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(e) ((e)->cipher->flags) + #define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(e) ((e)->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE) + + int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); + int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP cipher routines are a high level interface to certain +symmetric ciphers. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() initializes cipher contex B<ctx>. + +EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B<ctx> for encryption +with cipher B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized +before calling this function. B<type> is normally supplied +by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the +default implementation is used. B<key> is the symmetric key to use +and B<iv> is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes +used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set +all parameters to NULL except B<type> in an initial call and supply +the remaining parameters in subsequent calls, all of which have B<type> +set to NULL. This is done when the default cipher parameters are not +appropriate. + +EVP_EncryptUpdate() encrypts B<inl> bytes from the buffer B<in> and +writes the encrypted version to B<out>. This function can be called +multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount +of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data: +as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes +to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) so B<outl> should contain sufficient +room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B<outl>. + +If padding is enabled (the default) then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() encrypts +the "final" data, that is any data that remains in a partial block. +It uses L<standard block padding|/NOTES> (aka PKCS padding). The encrypted +final data is written to B<out> which should have sufficient space for +one cipher block. The number of bytes written is placed in B<outl>. After +this function is called the encryption operation is finished and no further +calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate() should be made. + +If padding is disabled then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() will not encrypt any more +data and it will return an error if any data remains in a partial block: +that is if the total data length is not a multiple of the block size. + +EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() are the +corresponding decryption operations. EVP_DecryptFinal() will return an +error code if padding is enabled and the final block is not correctly +formatted. The parameters and restrictions are identical to the encryption +operations except that if padding is enabled the decrypted data buffer B<out> +passed to EVP_DecryptUpdate() should have sufficient room for +(B<inl> + cipher_block_size) bytes unless the cipher block size is 1 in +which case B<inl> bytes is sufficient. + +EVP_CipherInit_ex(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() are +functions that can be used for decryption or encryption. The operation +performed depends on the value of the B<enc> parameter. It should be set +to 1 for encryption, 0 for decryption and -1 to leave the value unchanged +(the actual value of 'enc' being supplied in a previous call). + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() clears all information from a cipher context +and free up any allocated memory associate with it. It should be called +after all operations using a cipher are complete so sensitive information +does not remain in memory. + +EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit() and EVP_CipherInit() behave in a +similar way to EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex and +EVP_CipherInit_ex() except the B<ctx> paramter does not need to be +initialized and they always use the default cipher implementation. + +EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_CipherFinal() behave in a +similar way to EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() and +EVP_CipherFinal_ex() except B<ctx> is automatically cleaned up +after the call. + +EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() +return an EVP_CIPHER structure when passed a cipher name, a NID or an +ASN1_OBJECT structure. + +EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return the NID of a cipher when +passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> structure. The actual NID +value is an internal value which may not have a corresponding OBJECT +IDENTIFIER. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() enables or disables padding. By default +encryption operations are padded using standard block padding and the +padding is checked and removed when decrypting. If the B<pad> parameter +is zero then no padding is performed, the total amount of data encrypted +or decrypted must then be a multiple of the block size or an error will +occur. + +EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key +length of a cipher when passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> +structure. The constant B<EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH> is the maximum key length +for all ciphers. Note: although EVP_CIPHER_key_length() is fixed for a +given cipher, the value of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() may be different +for variable key length ciphers. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() sets the key length of the cipher ctx. +If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then attempting to set the key +length to any value other than the fixed value is an error. + +EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV +length of a cipher when passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX>. +It will return zero if the cipher does not use an IV. The constant +B<EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH> is the maximum IV length for all ciphers. + +EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block +size of a cipher when passed an B<EVP_CIPHER> or B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> +structure. The constant B<EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH> is also the maximum block +length for all ciphers. + +EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the type of the passed +cipher or context. This "type" is the actual NID of the cipher OBJECT +IDENTIFIER as such it ignores the cipher parameters and 40 bit RC2 and +128 bit RC2 have the same NID. If the cipher does not have an object +identifier or does not have ASN1 support this function will return +B<NID_undef>. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns the B<EVP_CIPHER> structure when passed +an B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> structure. + +EVP_CIPHER_mode() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode() return the block cipher mode: +EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE or +EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE. If the cipher is a stream cipher then +EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER is returned. + +EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() sets the AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter" based +on the passed cipher. This will typically include any parameters and an +IV. The cipher IV (if any) must be set when this call is made. This call +should be made before the cipher is actually "used" (before any +EVP_EncryptUpdate(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() calls for example). This function +may fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support. + +EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() sets the cipher parameters based on an ASN1 +AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter". The precise effect depends on the cipher +In the case of RC2, for example, it will set the IV and effective key length. +This function should be called after the base cipher type is set but before +the key is set. For example EVP_CipherInit() will be called with the IV and +key set to NULL, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() will be called and finally +EVP_CipherInit() again with all parameters except the key set to NULL. It is +possible for this function to fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support +or the parameters cannot be set (for example the RC2 effective key length +is not supported. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() allows various cipher specific parameters to be determined +and set. Currently only the RC2 effective key length and the number of rounds of +RC5 can be set. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() +return 1 for success and 0 for failure. + +EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and EVP_DecryptUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. +EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success. + +EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. +EVP_CipherFinal_ex() returns 0 for a decryption failure or 1 for success. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. + +EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() +return an B<EVP_CIPHER> structure or NULL on error. + +EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return a NID. + +EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block +size. + +EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key +length. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() always returns 1. + +EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV +length or zero if the cipher does not use an IV. + +EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the NID of the cipher's +OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID_undef if it has no defined OBJECT IDENTIFIER. + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns an B<EVP_CIPHER> structure. + +EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() and EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() return 1 for +success or zero for failure. + +=head1 CIPHER LISTING + +All algorithms have a fixed key length unless otherwise stated. + +=over 4 + +=item EVP_enc_null() + +Null cipher: does nothing. + +=item EVP_des_cbc(void), EVP_des_ecb(void), EVP_des_cfb(void), EVP_des_ofb(void) + +DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. + +=item EVP_des_ede_cbc(void), EVP_des_ede(), EVP_des_ede_ofb(void), EVP_des_ede_cfb(void) + +Two key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. + +=item EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void), EVP_des_ede3(), EVP_des_ede3_ofb(void), EVP_des_ede3_cfb(void) + +Three key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. + +=item EVP_desx_cbc(void) + +DESX algorithm in CBC mode. + +=item EVP_rc4(void) + +RC4 stream cipher. This is a variable key length cipher with default key length 128 bits. + +=item EVP_rc4_40(void) + +RC4 stream cipher with 40 bit key length. This is obsolete and new code should use EVP_rc4() +and the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function. + +=item EVP_idea_cbc() EVP_idea_ecb(void), EVP_idea_cfb(void), EVP_idea_ofb(void), EVP_idea_cbc(void) + +IDEA encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. + +=item EVP_rc2_cbc(void), EVP_rc2_ecb(void), EVP_rc2_cfb(void), EVP_rc2_ofb(void) + +RC2 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key +length cipher with an additional parameter called "effective key bits" or "effective key length". +By default both are set to 128 bits. + +=item EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void), EVP_rc2_64_cbc(void) + +RC2 algorithm in CBC mode with a default key length and effective key length of 40 and 64 bits. +These are obsolete and new code should use EVP_rc2_cbc(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() and +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() to set the key length and effective key length. + +=item EVP_bf_cbc(void), EVP_bf_ecb(void), EVP_bf_cfb(void), EVP_bf_ofb(void); + +Blowfish encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key +length cipher. + +=item EVP_cast5_cbc(void), EVP_cast5_ecb(void), EVP_cast5_cfb(void), EVP_cast5_ofb(void) + +CAST encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key +length cipher. + +=item EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc(void), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb(void), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(void), EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb(void) + +RC5 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length +cipher with an additional "number of rounds" parameter. By default the key length is set to 128 +bits and 12 rounds. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +Where possible the B<EVP> interface to symmetric ciphers should be used in +preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +transparent to the cipher used and much more flexible. + +PKCS padding works by adding B<n> padding bytes of value B<n> to make the total +length of the encrypted data a multiple of the block size. Padding is always +added so if the data is already a multiple of the block size B<n> will equal +the block size. For example if the block size is 8 and 11 bytes are to be +encrypted then 5 padding bytes of value 5 will be added. + +When decrypting the final block is checked to see if it has the correct form. + +Although the decryption operation can produce an error if padding is enabled, +it is not a strong test that the input data or key is correct. A random block +has better than 1 in 256 chance of being of the correct format and problems with +the input data earlier on will not produce a final decrypt error. + +If padding is disabled then the decryption operation will always succeed if +the total amount of data decrypted is a multiple of the block size. + +The functions EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptInit(), +EVP_CipherInit() and EVP_CipherFinal() are obsolete but are retained for +compatibility with existing code. New code should use EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), +EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), +EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() because they can reuse an +existing context without allocating and freeing it up on each call. + +=head1 BUGS + +For RC5 the number of rounds can currently only be set to 8, 12 or 16. This is +a limitation of the current RC5 code rather than the EVP interface. + +EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH and EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH only refer to the internal ciphers with +default key lengths. If custom ciphers exceed these values the results are +unpredictable. This is because it has become standard practice to define a +generic key as a fixed unsigned char array containing EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH bytes. + +The ASN1 code is incomplete (and sometimes inaccurate) it has only been tested +for certain common S/MIME ciphers (RC2, DES, triple DES) in CBC mode. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Get the number of rounds used in RC5: + + int nrounds; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS, 0, &nrounds); + +Get the RC2 effective key length: + + int key_bits; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &key_bits); + +Set the number of rounds used in RC5: + + int nrounds; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS, nrounds, NULL); + +Set the effective key length used in RC2: + + int key_bits; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL); + +Encrypt a string using blowfish: + + int do_crypt(char *outfile) + { + unsigned char outbuf[1024]; + int outlen, tmplen; + /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from + * another source. + */ + unsigned char key[] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}; + unsigned char iv[] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}; + char intext[] = "Some Crypto Text"; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + FILE *out; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_bf_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); + + if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, intext, strlen(intext))) + { + /* Error */ + return 0; + } + /* Buffer passed to EVP_EncryptFinal() must be after data just + * encrypted to avoid overwriting it. + */ + if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, outbuf + outlen, &tmplen)) + { + /* Error */ + return 0; + } + outlen += tmplen; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + /* Need binary mode for fopen because encrypted data is + * binary data. Also cannot use strlen() on it because + * it wont be null terminated and may contain embedded + * nulls. + */ + out = fopen(outfile, "wb"); + fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out); + fclose(out); + return 1; + } + +The ciphertext from the above example can be decrypted using the B<openssl> +utility with the command line: + + S<openssl bf -in cipher.bin -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -iv 0102030405060708 -d> + +General encryption, decryption function example using FILE I/O and RC2 with an +80 bit key: + + int do_crypt(FILE *in, FILE *out, int do_encrypt) + { + /* Allow enough space in output buffer for additional block */ + inbuf[1024], outbuf[1024 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + int inlen, outlen; + /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from + * another source. + */ + unsigned char key[] = "0123456789"; + unsigned char iv[] = "12345678"; + /* Don't set key or IV because we will modify the parameters */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_rc2(), NULL, NULL, NULL, do_encrypt); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, 10); + /* We finished modifying parameters so now we can set key and IV */ + EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, do_encrypt); + + for(;;) + { + inlen = fread(inbuf, 1, 1024, in); + if(inlen <= 0) break; + if(!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, inbuf, inlen)) + { + /* Error */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return 0; + } + fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out); + } + if(!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen)) + { + /* Error */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return 0; + } + fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return 1; + } + + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(), EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), +EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), EVP_CipherInit_ex(), +EVP_CipherFinal_ex() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() appeared in +OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2e710da945b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_OpenInit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_OpenInit, EVP_OpenUpdate, EVP_OpenFinal - EVP envelope decryption + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,EVP_CIPHER *type,unsigned char *ek, + int ekl,unsigned char *iv,EVP_PKEY *priv); + int EVP_OpenUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); + int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope +decryption. They decrypt a public key encrypted symmetric key and +then decrypt data using it. + +EVP_OpenInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for decryption +with cipher B<type>. It decrypts the encrypted symmetric key of length +B<ekl> bytes passed in the B<ek> parameter using the private key B<priv>. +The IV is supplied in the B<iv> parameter. + +EVP_OpenUpdate() and EVP_OpenFinal() have exactly the same properties +as the EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal() routines, as +documented on the L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> manual +page. + +=head1 NOTES + +It is possible to call EVP_OpenInit() twice in the same way as +EVP_DecryptInit(). The first call should have B<priv> set to NULL +and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again +with B<type> set to NULL. + +If the cipher passed in the B<type> parameter is a variable length +cipher then the key length will be set to the value of the recovered +key length. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then the recovered +key length must match the fixed cipher length. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_OpenInit() returns 0 on error or a non zero integer (actually the +recovered secret key size) if successful. + +EVP_OpenUpdate() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. + +EVP_OpenFinal() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)>, +L<EVP_SealInit(3)|EVP_SealInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..10687e458db2 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_PKEY_new, EVP_PKEY_free - private key allocation functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void); + void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *key); + + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP_PKEY_new() function allocates an empty B<EVP_PKEY> +structure which is used by OpenSSL to store private keys. + +EVP_PKEY_free() frees up the private key B<key>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<EVP_PKEY> structure is used by various OpenSSL functions +which require a general private key without reference to any +particular algorithm. + +The structure returned by EVP_PKEY_new() is empty. To add a +private key to this empty structure the functions described in +L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)|EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)> should be used. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_PKEY_new() returns either the newly allocated B<EVP_PKEY> +structure of B<NULL> if an error occurred. + +EVP_PKEY_free() does not return a value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)|EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2db692e2719e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DH, EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY, +EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DH, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY, +EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DH, EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY, +EVP_PKEY_type - EVP_PKEY assignment functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,RSA *key); + int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DSA *key); + int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DH *key); + int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey,EC_KEY *key); + + RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); + DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); + DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey); + EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey); + + int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,RSA *key); + int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DSA *key); + int EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DH *key); + int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey,EC_KEY *key); + + int EVP_PKEY_type(int type); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and +EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() set the key referenced by B<pkey> to B<key>. + +EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and +EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key in B<pkey> or +B<NULL> if the key is not of the correct type. + +EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH() +and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() also set the referenced key to B<key> +however these use the supplied B<key> internally and so B<key> +will be freed when the parent B<pkey> is freed. + +EVP_PKEY_type() returns the type of key corresponding to the value +B<type>. The type of a key can be obtained with +EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type). The return value will be EVP_PKEY_RSA, +EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_DH or EVP_PKEY_EC for the corresponding +key types or NID_undef if the key type is unassigned. + +=head1 NOTES + +In accordance with the OpenSSL naming convention the key obtained +from or assigned to the B<pkey> using the B<1> functions must be +freed as well as B<pkey>. + +EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH() +EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() are implemented as macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and +EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() return 1 for success or 0 for failure. + +EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and +EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key or B<NULL> if +an error occurred. + +EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH() +and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d793e19ef7a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_SealInit, EVP_SealUpdate, EVP_SealFinal - EVP envelope encryption + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, + unsigned char **ek, int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, + EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk); + int EVP_SealUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl); + int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + int *outl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope +encryption. They generate a random key and IV (if required) then +"envelope" it by using public key encryption. Data can then be +encrypted using this key. + +EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for encryption +with cipher B<type> using a random secret key and IV. B<type> is normally +supplied by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted +using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be +decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B<ek> is an array of +buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer +must contain enough room for the corresponding encrypted key: that is +B<ek[i]> must have room for B<EVP_PKEY_size(pubk[i])> bytes. The actual +size of each encrypted secret key is written to the array B<ekl>. B<pubk> is +an array of B<npubk> public keys. + +The B<iv> parameter is a buffer where the generated IV is written to. It must +contain enough room for the corresponding cipher's IV, as determined by (for +example) EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type). + +If the cipher does not require an IV then the B<iv> parameter is ignored +and can be B<NULL>. + +EVP_SealUpdate() and EVP_SealFinal() have exactly the same properties +as the EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal() routines, as +documented on the L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> manual +page. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_SealInit() returns 0 on error or B<npubk> if successful. + +EVP_SealUpdate() and EVP_SealFinal() return 1 for success and 0 for +failure. + +=head1 NOTES + +Because a random secret key is generated the random number generator +must be seeded before calling EVP_SealInit(). + +The public key must be RSA because it is the only OpenSSL public key +algorithm that supports key transport. + +Envelope encryption is the usual method of using public key encryption +on large amounts of data, this is because public key encryption is slow +but symmetric encryption is fast. So symmetric encryption is used for +bulk encryption and the small random symmetric key used is transferred +using public key encryption. + +It is possible to call EVP_SealInit() twice in the same way as +EVP_EncryptInit(). The first call should have B<npubk> set to 0 +and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again +with B<type> set to NULL. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)>, +L<EVP_OpenInit(3)|EVP_OpenInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +EVP_SealFinal() did not return a value before OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b6e62ce7f610 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + int EVP_SignInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl); + int EVP_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt); + int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + + void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type); + + int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital +signatures. + +EVP_SignInit_ex() sets up signing context B<ctx> to use digest +B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized with +EVP_MD_CTX_init() before calling this function. + +EVP_SignUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the +signature context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the +same B<ctx> to include additional data. + +EVP_SignFinal() signs the data in B<ctx> using the private key B<pkey> and +places the signature in B<sig>. The number of bytes of data written (i.e. the +length of the signature) will be written to the integer at B<s>, at most +EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes will be written. + +EVP_SignInit() initializes a signing context B<ctx> to use the default +implementation of digest B<type>. + +EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes. The actual +signature returned by EVP_SignFinal() may be smaller. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_SignInit_ex(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() return 1 +for success and 0 for failure. + +EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in +preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. + +Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct +digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of +algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>. + +When signing with DSA private keys the random number generator must be seeded +or the operation will fail. The random number generator does not need to be +seeded for RSA signatures. + +The call to EVP_SignFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. +This means that calls to EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() can be called +later to digest and sign additional data. + +Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must +be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak +will occur. + +=head1 BUGS + +Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to +EVP_SignUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_SignFinal(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>, +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>, +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>, +L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>, +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +EVP_SignInit(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() are +available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +EVP_SignInit_ex() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b6afaedee5bf --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_VerifyInit.pod @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_VerifyInit, EVP_VerifyUpdate, EVP_VerifyFinal - EVP signature verification functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + int EVP_VerifyInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl); + int EVP_VerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt); + int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,EVP_PKEY *pkey); + + int EVP_VerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP signature verification routines are a high level interface to digital +signatures. + +EVP_VerifyInit_ex() sets up verification context B<ctx> to use digest +B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized by calling +EVP_MD_CTX_init() before calling this function. + +EVP_VerifyUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the +verification context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the +same B<ctx> to include additional data. + +EVP_VerifyFinal() verifies the data in B<ctx> using the public key B<pkey> +and against the B<siglen> bytes at B<sigbuf>. + +EVP_VerifyInit() initializes verification context B<ctx> to use the default +implementation of digest B<type>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_VerifyInit_ex() and EVP_VerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for +failure. + +EVP_VerifyFinal() returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for failure and -1 if some +other error occurred. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in +preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes +transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible. + +Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct +digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of +algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>. + +The call to EVP_VerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. +This means that calls to EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can be called +later to digest and verify additional data. + +Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must +be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak +will occur. + +=head1 BUGS + +Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to +EVP_VerifyUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_VerifyFinal(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, +L<EVP_SignInit(3)|EVP_SignInit(3)>, +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>, +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>, +L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>, +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +EVP_VerifyInit(), EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() are +available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +EVP_VerifyInit_ex() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod b/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7dcc07923ff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln, OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid, +OBJ_cmp, OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup - ASN1 object utility +functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_nid2obj(int n); + const char * OBJ_nid2ln(int n); + const char * OBJ_nid2sn(int n); + + int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); + int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln); + int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn); + + int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s); + + ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name); + int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name); + + int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a,const ASN1_OBJECT *b); + ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); + + int OBJ_create(const char *oid,const char *sn,const char *ln); + void OBJ_cleanup(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are +a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type. + +OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B<n> to +an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively, +or B<NULL> is an error occurred. + +OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID +for the object B<o>, the long name <ln> or the short name <sn> respectively +or NID_undef if an error occurred. + +OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string <s>. B<s> can be +a long name, a short name or the numerical respresentation of an object. + +OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string B<s> into an ASN1_OBJECT structure. +If B<no_name> is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted +as well as numerical forms. If B<no_name> is 1 only the numerical form +is acceptable. + +OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B<ASN1_OBJECT> B<a> into a textual representation. +The representation is written as a null terminated string to B<buf> +at most B<buf_len> bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. +The total amount of space required is returned. If B<no_name> is 0 then +if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise +the numerical form will be used. If B<no_name> is 1 then the numerical +form will always be used. + +OBJ_cmp() compares B<a> to B<b>. If the two are identical 0 is returned. + +OBJ_dup() returns a copy of B<o>. + +OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. B<oid> is the +numerical form of the object, B<sn> the short name and B<ln> the +long name. A new NID is returned for the created object. + +OBJ_cleanup() cleans up OpenSSLs internal object table: this should +be called before an application exits if any new objects were added +using OBJ_create(). + +=head1 NOTES + +Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical +identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is +represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined +in the header file B<objects.h>. + +For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions: + + #define SN_commonName "CN" + #define LN_commonName "commonName" + #define NID_commonName 13 + +New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create(). + +Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example +their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are +also static constant structures which are shared: that is there +is only a single constant structure for each table object. + +Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef. + +Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed, +the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical +form of an OID. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Create an object for B<commonName>: + + ASN1_OBJECT *o; + o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName); + +Check if an object is B<commonName> + + if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName) + /* Do something */ + +Create a new NID and initialize an object from it: + + int new_nid; + ASN1_OBJECT *obj; + new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier"); + + obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid); + +Create a new object directly: + + obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1); + +=head1 BUGS + +OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the +convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set +to B<NULL> to determine the amount of data that should be written. +Instead B<buf> must point to a valid buffer and B<buf_len> should +be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more +than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure or B<NULL> is an +error occurred. + +OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B<NULL> +on error. + +OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return +a NID or B<NID_undef> on error. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e54de12cc89e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OPENSSL_Applink - glue between OpenSSL BIO and Win32 compiler run-time + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + __declspec(dllexport) void **OPENSSL_Applink(); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +OPENSSL_Applink is application-side interface which provides a glue +between OpenSSL BIO layer and Win32 compiler run-time environment. +Even though it appears at application side, it's essentially OpenSSL +private interface. For this reason application developers are not +expected to implement it, but to compile provided module with +compiler of their choice and link it into the target application. +The referred module is available as <openssl>/ms/applink.c. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c39ac35e78ae --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.pod @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay, SSLeay_version - get OpenSSL version number + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/opensslv.h> + #define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0xnnnnnnnnnL + + #include <openssl/crypto.h> + long SSLeay(void); + const char *SSLeay_version(int t); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER is a numeric release version identifier: + + MMNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status + +The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas +1 to 14, and f for release. + +for example + + 0x000906000 == 0.9.6 dev + 0x000906023 == 0.9.6b beta 3 + 0x00090605f == 0.9.6e release + +Versions prior to 0.9.3 have identifiers E<lt> 0x0930. +Versions between 0.9.3 and 0.9.5 had a version identifier with this +interpretation: + + MMNNFFRBB major minor fix final beta/patch + +for example + + 0x000904100 == 0.9.4 release + 0x000905000 == 0.9.5 dev + +Version 0.9.5a had an interim interpretation that is like the current one, +except the patch level got the highest bit set, to keep continuity. The +number was therefore 0x0090581f. + + +For backward compatibility, SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is also defined. + +SSLeay() returns this number. The return value can be compared to the +macro to make sure that the correct version of the library has been +loaded, especially when using DLLs on Windows systems. + +SSLeay_version() returns different strings depending on B<t>: + +=over 4 + +=item SSLEAY_VERSION + +The text variant of the version number and the release date. For example, +"OpenSSL 0.9.5a 1 Apr 2000". + +=item SSLEAY_CFLAGS + +The compiler flags set for the compilation process in the form +"compiler: ..." if available or "compiler: information not available" +otherwise. + +=item SSLEAY_BUILT_ON + +The date of the build process in the form "built on: ..." if available +or "built on: date not available" otherwise. + +=item SSLEAY_PLATFORM + +The "Configure" target of the library build in the form "platform: ..." +if available or "platform: information not available" otherwise. + +=item SSLEAY_DIR + +The "OPENSSLDIR" setting of the library build in the form "OPENSSLDIR: "..."" +if available or "OPENSSLDIR: N/A" otherwise. + +=back + +For an unknown B<t>, the text "not available" is returned. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +The version number. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSLeay() and SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER is available in all versions of OpenSSL. +B<SSLEAY_DIR> was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e7bba2aacae0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OPENSSL_config, OPENSSL_no_config - simple OpenSSL configuration functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/conf.h> + + void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name); + void OPENSSL_no_config(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +OPENSSL_config() configures OpenSSL using the standard B<openssl.cnf> +configuration file name using B<config_name>. If B<config_name> is NULL then +the default name B<openssl_conf> will be used. Any errors are ignored. Further +calls to OPENSSL_config() will have no effect. The configuration file format +is documented in the L<conf(5)|conf(5)> manual page. + +OPENSSL_no_config() disables configuration. If called before OPENSSL_config() +no configuration takes place. + +=head1 NOTES + +It is B<strongly> recommended that B<all> new applications call OPENSSL_config() +or the more sophisticated functions such as CONF_modules_load() during +initialization (that is before starting any threads). By doing this +an application does not need to keep track of all configuration options +and some new functionality can be supported automatically. + +It is also possible to automatically call OPENSSL_config() when an application +calls OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms() by compiling an application with the +preprocessor symbol B<OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF> #define'd. In this way configuration +can be added without source changes. + +The environment variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> can be set to specify the location +of the configuration file. + +Currently ASN1 OBJECTs and ENGINE configuration can be performed future +versions of OpenSSL will add new configuration options. + +There are several reasons why calling the OpenSSL configuration routines is +advisable. For example new ENGINE functionality was added to OpenSSL 0.9.7. +In OpenSSL 0.9.7 control functions can be supported by ENGINEs, this can be +used (among other things) to load dynamic ENGINEs from shared libraries (DSOs). +However very few applications currently support the control interface and so +very few can load and use dynamic ENGINEs. Equally in future more sophisticated +ENGINEs will require certain control operations to customize them. If an +application calls OPENSSL_config() it doesn't need to know or care about +ENGINE control operations because they can be performed by editing a +configuration file. + +Applications should free up configuration at application closedown by calling +CONF_modules_free(). + +=head1 RESTRICTIONS + +The OPENSSL_config() function is designed to be a very simple "call it and +forget it" function. As a result its behaviour is somewhat limited. It ignores +all errors silently and it can only load from the standard configuration file +location for example. + +It is however B<much> better than nothing. Applications which need finer +control over their configuration functionality should use the configuration +functions such as CONF_load_modules() directly. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<CONF_load_modules_file(3)|CONF_load_modules_file(3)>, +L<CONF_modules_free(3),CONF_modules_free(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +OPENSSL_config() and OPENSSL_no_config() first appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.7 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..121a8ddee5e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OPENSSL_ia32cap - finding the IA-32 processor capabilities + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void); + #define OPENSSL_ia32cap (*(OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc())) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Value returned by OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc() is address of a variable +containing IA-32 processor capabilities bit vector as it appears in EDX +register after executing CPUID instruction with EAX=1 input value (see +Intel Application Note #241618). Naturally it's meaningful on IA-32[E] +platforms only. The variable is normally set up automatically upon +toolkit initialization, but can be manipulated afterwards to modify +crypto library behaviour. For the moment of this writing three bits are +significant, namely bit #28 denoting Hyperthreading, which is used to +distinguish Intel P4 core, bit #26 denoting SSE2 support, and bit #4 +denoting presence of Time-Stamp Counter. Clearing bit #26 at run-time +for example disables high-performance SSE2 code present in the crypto +library. You might have to do this if target OpenSSL application is +executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under control of OS which does not +support SSE2 extentions. Even though you can manipulate the value +programmatically, you most likely will find it more appropriate to set +up an environment variable with the same name prior starting target +application, e.g. 'env OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x10 apps/openssl', to achieve +same effect without modifying the application source code. +Alternatively you can reconfigure the toolkit with no-sse2 option and +recompile. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f14dfaf005dd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules.pod @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules - add standard configuration modules + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/conf.h> + + void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void); + void ASN1_add_oid_module(void); + ENGINE_add_conf_module(); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The function OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() adds all the standard OpenSSL +configuration modules to the internal list. They can then be used by the +OpenSSL configuration code. + +ASN1_add_oid_module() adds just the ASN1 OBJECT module. + +ENGINE_add_conf_module() adds just the ENGINE configuration module. + +=head1 NOTES + +If the simple configuration function OPENSSL_config() is called then +OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() is called automatically. + +Applications which use the configuration functions directly will need to +call OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() themselves I<before> any other +configuration code. + +Applications should call OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules() to load all +configuration modules instead of adding modules selectively: otherwise +functionality may be missing from the application if an when new +modules are added. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +None of the functions return a value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<conf(3)|conf(3)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +These functions first appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod b/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e63411b5bba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms, OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers, OpenSSL_add_all_digests - +add algorithms to internal table + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + void OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void); + void OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(void); + void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void); + + void EVP_cleanup(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +OpenSSL keeps an internal table of digest algorithms and ciphers. It uses +this table to lookup ciphers via functions such as EVP_get_cipher_byname(). + +OpenSSL_add_all_digests() adds all digest algorithms to the table. + +OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() adds all algorithms to the table (digests and +ciphers). + +OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() adds all encryption algorithms to the table including +password based encryption algorithms. + +EVP_cleanup() removes all ciphers and digests from the table. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +None of the functions return a value. + +=head1 NOTES + +A typical application will call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() initially and +EVP_cleanup() before exiting. + +An application does not need to add algorithms to use them explicitly, for example +by EVP_sha1(). It just needs to add them if it (or any of the functions it calls) +needs to lookup algorithms. + +The cipher and digest lookup functions are used in many parts of the library. If +the table is not initialized several functions will misbehave and complain they +cannot find algorithms. This includes the PEM, PKCS#12, SSL and S/MIME libraries. +This is a common query in the OpenSSL mailing lists. + +Calling OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() links in all algorithms: as a result a +statically linked executable can be quite large. If this is important it is possible +to just add the required ciphers and digests. + +=head1 BUGS + +Although the functions do not return error codes it is possible for them to fail. +This will only happen as a result of a memory allocation failure so this is not +too much of a problem in practice. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod b/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..de7cab2bdffc --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PKCS12_create - create a PKCS#12 structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/pkcs12.h> + + PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, + int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +PKCS12_create() creates a PKCS#12 structure. + +B<pass> is the passphrase to use. B<name> is the B<friendlyName> to use for +the supplied certifictate and key. B<pkey> is the private key to include in +the structure and B<cert> its corresponding certificates. B<ca>, if not B<NULL> +is an optional set of certificates to also include in the structure. + +B<nid_key> and B<nid_cert> are the encryption algorithms that should be used +for the key and certificate respectively. B<iter> is the encryption algorithm +iteration count to use and B<mac_iter> is the MAC iteration count to use. +B<keytype> is the type of key. + +=head1 NOTES + +The parameters B<nid_key>, B<nid_cert>, B<iter>, B<mac_iter> and B<keytype> +can all be set to zero and sensible defaults will be used. + +These defaults are: 40 bit RC2 encryption for certificates, triple DES +encryption for private keys, a key iteration count of PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER +(currently 2048) and a MAC iteration count of 1. + +The default MAC iteration count is 1 in order to retain compatibility with +old software which did not interpret MAC iteration counts. If such compatibility +is not required then B<mac_iter> should be set to PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER. + +B<keytype> adds a flag to the store private key. This is a non standard extension +that is only currently interpreted by MSIE. If set to zero the flag is omitted, +if set to B<KEY_SIG> the key can be used for signing only, if set to B<KEY_EX> +it can be used for signing and encryption. This option was useful for old +export grade software which could use signing only keys of arbitrary size but +had restrictions on the permissible sizes of keys which could be used for +encryption. + +=head1 NEW FUNCTIONALITY IN OPENSSL 0.9.8 + +Some additional functionality was added to PKCS12_create() in OpenSSL +0.9.8. These extensions are detailed below. + +If a certificate contains an B<alias> or B<keyid> then this will be +used for the corresponding B<friendlyName> or B<localKeyID> in the +PKCS12 structure. + +Either B<pkey>, B<cert> or both can be B<NULL> to indicate that no key or +certficate is required. In previous versions both had to be present or +a fatal error is returned. + +B<nid_key> or B<nid_cert> can be set to -1 indicating that no encryption +should be used. + +B<mac_iter> can be set to -1 and the MAC will then be omitted entirely. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_PKCS12(3)|d2i_PKCS12(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +PKCS12_create was added in OpenSSL 0.9.3 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod b/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51344f883a9b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PKCS12_parse - parse a PKCS#12 structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/pkcs12.h> + +int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +PKCS12_parse() parses a PKCS12 structure. + +B<p12> is the B<PKCS12> structure to parse. B<pass> is the passphrase to use. +If successful the private key will be written to B<*pkey>, the corresponding +certificate to B<*cert> and any additional certificates to B<*ca>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The parameters B<pkey> and B<cert> cannot be B<NULL>. B<ca> can be <NULL> +in which case additional certificates will be discarded. B<*ca> can also +be a valid STACK in which case additional certificates are appended to +B<*ca>. If B<*ca> is B<NULL> a new STACK will be allocated. + +The B<friendlyName> and B<localKeyID> attributes (if present) on each certificate +will be stored in the B<alias> and B<keyid> attributes of the B<X509> structure. + +=head1 BUGS + +Only a single private key and corresponding certificate is returned by this function. +More complex PKCS#12 files with multiple private keys will only return the first +match. + +Only B<friendlyName> and B<localKeyID> attributes are currently stored in certificates. +Other attributes are discarded. + +Attributes currently cannot be store in the private key B<EVP_PKEY> structure. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_PKCS12(3)|d2i_PKCS12(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +PKCS12_parse was added in OpenSSL 0.9.3 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b0ca067b8922 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PKCS7_decrypt - decrypt content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +PKCS7_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData +structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the +recipients certificate, B<data> is a BIO to write the content to and +B<flags> is an optional set of flags. + +=head1 NOTES + +OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() (or equivalent) should be called before using this +function or errors about unknown algorithms will occur. + +Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed +to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the PKCS#7 structure. + +The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter. + +If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted +from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is +returned. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +PKCS7_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. +The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3) + +=head1 BUGS + +PKCS7_decrypt() must be passed the correct recipient key and certificate. It would +be better if it could look up the correct key and certificate from a database. + +The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as +mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)|PKCS7_encrypt(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +PKCS7_decrypt() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1a507b22a29b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PKCS7_encrypt - create a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +PKCS7_encrypt() creates and returns a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. B<certs> +is a list of recipient certificates. B<in> is the content to be encrypted. +B<cipher> is the symmetric cipher to use. B<flags> is an optional set of flags. + +=head1 NOTES + +Only RSA keys are supported in PKCS#7 and envelopedData so the recipient certificates +supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not have to +be signed using the RSA algorithm. + +EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use because +most clients will support it. + +Some old "export grade" clients may only support weak encryption using 40 or 64 bit +RC2. These can be used by passing EVP_rc2_40_cbc() and EVP_rc2_64_cbc() respectively. + +The algorithm passed in the B<cipher> parameter must support ASN1 encoding of its +parameters. + +Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME +envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced +by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to +PKCS7_encrypt(). + +The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter. + +If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are prepended +to the data. + +Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required +by the S/MIME specifications) if B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set no translation occurs. This +option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation +will corrupt it. If B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set then B<PKCS7_TEXT> is ignored. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +PKCS7_encrypt() returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred. +The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). + +=head1 BUGS + +The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as +mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)|PKCS7_decrypt(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +PKCS7_decrypt() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ffd0c734b096 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PKCS7_sign - create a PKCS#7 signedData structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +PKCS7_sign() creates and returns a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B<signcert> +is the certificate to sign with, B<pkey> is the corresponsding private key. +B<certs> is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the +PKCS#7 structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain). + +The data to be signed is read from BIO B<data>. + +B<flags> is an optional set of flags. + +=head1 NOTES + +Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags> parameter. + +Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If +the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are prepended +to the data. + +If B<PKCS7_NOCERTS> is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the +PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the B<signcert> +parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the signers certificate +can be obtained by other means: for example a previously signed message. + +The data being signed is included in the PKCS7 structure, unless B<PKCS7_DETACHED> +is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for PKCS7 detached signatures +which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed messages for example. + +Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required +by the S/MIME specifications) if B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set no translation occurs. This +option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation +will corrupt it. + +The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 autenticatedAttributes including +the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of ciphers in +an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B<PKCS7_NOATTR> is set then no authenticatedAttributes +will be used. If B<PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP> is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are +omitted. + +If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following +algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any +of these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included. + +If the flags B<PKCS7_PARTSIGN> is set then the returned B<PKCS7> structure +is just initialized ready to perform the signing operation. The signing +is however B<not> performed and the data to be signed is not read from +the B<data> parameter. Signing is deferred until after the data has been +written. In this way data can be signed in a single pass. Currently the +flag B<PKCS7_DETACHED> B<must> also be set. + +=head1 NOTES + +Currently the flag B<PKCS7_PARTSIGN> is only supported for detached +data. If this flag is set the returned B<PKCS7> structure is B<not> +complete and outputting its contents via a function that does not +properly finalize the B<PKCS7> structure will give unpredictable +results. + +At present only the SMIME_write_PKCS7() function properly finalizes the +structure. + +=head1 BUGS + +PKCS7_sign() is somewhat limited. It does not support multiple signers, some +advanced attributes such as counter signatures are not supported. + +The SHA1 digest algorithm is currently always used. + +When the signed data is not detached it will be stored in memory within the +B<PKCS7> structure. This effectively limits the size of messages which can be +signed due to memory restraints. There should be a way to sign data without +having to hold it all in memory, this would however require fairly major +revisions of the OpenSSL ASN1 code. + + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +PKCS7_sign() returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred. +The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_verify(3)|PKCS7_verify(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +PKCS7_sign() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 + +The B<PKCS7_PARTSIGN> flag was added in OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3490b5dc8255 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PKCS7_verify - verify a PKCS#7 signedData structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags); + +STACK_OF(X509) *PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +PKCS7_verify() verifies a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B<p7> is the PKCS7 +structure to verify. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for +the signer's certificate. B<store> is a trusted certficate store (used for +chain verification). B<indata> is the signed data if the content is not +present in B<p7> (that is it is detached). The content is written to B<out> +if it is not NULL. + +B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify +operation. + +PKCS7_get0_signers() retrieves the signer's certificates from B<p7>, it does +B<not> check their validity or whether any signatures are valid. The B<certs> +and B<flags> parameters have the same meanings as in PKCS7_verify(). + +=head1 VERIFY PROCESS + +Normally the verify process proceeds as follows. + +Initially some sanity checks are performed on B<p7>. The type of B<p7> must +be signedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if +the content is detached B<indata> cannot be B<NULL>. + +An attempt is made to locate all the signer's certificates, first looking in +the B<certs> parameter (if it is not B<NULL>) and then looking in any certificates +contained in the B<p7> structure itself. If any signer's certificates cannot be +located the operation fails. + +Each signer's certificate is chain verified using the B<smimesign> purpose and +the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message +are used as untrusted CAs. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned. + +Finally the signed content is read (and written to B<out> is it is not NULL) and +the signature's checked. + +If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful. + +Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags> parameter +to change the default verify behaviour. Only the flag B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is +meaningful to PKCS7_get0_signers(). + +If B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is set the certificates in the message itself are not +searched when locating the signer's certificate. This means that all the signers +certificates must be in the B<certs> parameter. + +If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted +from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is +returned. + +If B<PKCS7_NOVERIFY> is set the signer's certificates are not chain verified. + +If B<PKCS7_NOCHAIN> is set then the certificates contained in the message are +not used as untrusted CAs. This means that the whole verify chain (apart from +the signer's certificate) must be contained in the trusted store. + +If B<PKCS7_NOSIGS> is set then the signatures on the data are not checked. + +=head1 NOTES + +One application of B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is to only accept messages signed by +a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed +in the B<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the +certificates supplied in B<certs> then the verify will fail because the +signer cannot be found. + +Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example +setting B<PKCS7_NOVERIFY|PKCS7_NOSIGS> will totally disable all verification +and any signed message will be considered valid. This combination is however +useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B<out> and its validity +is not considered important. + +Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather +than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the +signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted +timestamp). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +PKCS7_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero or a negative +value if an error occurs. + +PKCS7_get0_signers() returns all signers or B<NULL> if an error occurred. + +The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 BUGS + +The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signers certificate, +this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE> +functionality. + +The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as +mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)|PKCS7_sign(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +PKCS7_verify() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..67c66f3e0c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen - add +entropy to the PRNG + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num); + + void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy); + + int RAND_status(void); + + int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam); + void RAND_screen(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RAND_add() mixes the B<num> bytes at B<buf> into the PRNG state. Thus, +if the data at B<buf> are unpredictable to an adversary, this +increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output +less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random +key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The +B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much +randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about +sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found +in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750. + +RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered +passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output. + +OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On +systems that provide C</dev/urandom>, the randomness device is used +to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the +application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling RAND_add(), +L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)> +or L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>. + +RAND_seed() is equivalent to RAND_add() when B<num == entropy>. + +RAND_event() collects the entropy from Windows events such as mouse +movements and other user interaction. It should be called with the +B<iMsg>, B<wParam> and B<lParam> arguments of I<all> messages sent to +the window procedure. It will estimate the entropy contained in the +event message (if any), and add it to the PRNG. The program can then +process the messages as usual. + +The RAND_screen() function is available for the convenience of Windows +programmers. It adds the current contents of the screen to the PRNG. +For applications that can catch Windows events, seeding the PRNG by +calling RAND_event() is a significantly better source of +randomness. It should be noted that both methods cannot be used on +servers that run without user interaction. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RAND_status() and RAND_event() return 1 if the PRNG has been seeded +with enough data, 0 otherwise. + +The other functions do not return values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>, +L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RAND_seed() and RAND_screen() are available in all versions of SSLeay +and OpenSSL. RAND_add() and RAND_status() have been added in OpenSSL +0.9.5, RAND_event() in OpenSSL 0.9.5a. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ce6329ce54af --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_bytes.pod @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RAND_bytes, RAND_pseudo_bytes - generate random data + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); + + int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RAND_bytes() puts B<num> cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes +into B<buf>. An error occurs if the PRNG has not been seeded with +enough randomness to ensure an unpredictable byte sequence. + +RAND_pseudo_bytes() puts B<num> pseudo-random bytes into B<buf>. +Pseudo-random byte sequences generated by RAND_pseudo_bytes() will be +unique if they are of sufficient length, but are not necessarily +unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for +certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key +generation etc. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error code can be +obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. RAND_pseudo_bytes() returns 1 if the +bytes generated are cryptographically strong, 0 otherwise. Both +functions return -1 if they are not supported by the current RAND +method. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RAND_bytes() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. It +has a return value since OpenSSL 0.9.5. RAND_pseudo_bytes() was added +in OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_cleanup.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_cleanup.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3a8f0749a8d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_cleanup.pod @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RAND_cleanup - erase the PRNG state + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + void RAND_cleanup(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RAND_cleanup() erases the memory used by the PRNG. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +RAND_cleanup() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rand(3)|rand(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RAND_cleanup() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..079838ea2e4a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_egd.pod @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RAND_egd - query entropy gathering daemon + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + int RAND_egd(const char *path); + int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes); + + int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RAND_egd() queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket B<path>. +It queries 255 bytes and uses L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)> to seed the +OpenSSL built-in PRNG. RAND_egd(path) is a wrapper for +RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255); + +RAND_egd_bytes() queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket B<path>. +It queries B<bytes> bytes and uses L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)> to seed the +OpenSSL built-in PRNG. +This function is more flexible than RAND_egd(). +When only one secret key must +be generated, it is not necessary to request the full amount 255 bytes from +the EGD socket. This can be advantageous, since the amount of entropy +that can be retrieved from EGD over time is limited. + +RAND_query_egd_bytes() performs the actual query of the EGD daemon on socket +B<path>. If B<buf> is given, B<bytes> bytes are queried and written into +B<buf>. If B<buf> is NULL, B<bytes> bytes are queried and used to seed the +OpenSSL built-in PRNG using L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>. + +=head1 NOTES + +On systems without /dev/*random devices providing entropy from the kernel, +the EGD entropy gathering daemon can be used to collect entropy. It provides +a socket interface through which entropy can be gathered in chunks up to +255 bytes. Several chunks can be queried during one connection. + +EGD is available from http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ (C<perl +Makefile.PL; make; make install> to install). It is run as B<egd> +I<path>, where I<path> is an absolute path designating a socket. When +RAND_egd() is called with that path as an argument, it tries to read +random bytes that EGD has collected. The read is performed in +non-blocking mode. + +Alternatively, the EGD-interface compatible daemon PRNGD can be used. It is +available from +http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ . +PRNGD does employ an internal PRNG itself and can therefore never run +out of entropy. + +OpenSSL automatically queries EGD when entropy is requested via RAND_bytes() +or the status is checked via RAND_status() for the first time, if the socket +is located at /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool or /etc/egd-pool. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +RAND_egd() and RAND_egd_bytes() return the number of bytes read from the +daemon on success, and -1 if the connection failed or the daemon did not +return enough data to fully seed the PRNG. + +RAND_query_egd_bytes() returns the number of bytes read from the daemon on +success, and -1 if the connection failed. The PRNG state is not considered. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>, +L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RAND_egd() is available since OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +RAND_egd_bytes() is available since OpenSSL 0.9.6. + +RAND_query_egd_bytes() is available since OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +The automatic query of /var/run/egd-pool et al was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d8c134e621d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_load_file.pod @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RAND_load_file, RAND_write_file, RAND_file_name - PRNG seed file + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t num); + + int RAND_load_file(const char *filename, long max_bytes); + + int RAND_write_file(const char *filename); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RAND_file_name() generates a default path for the random seed +file. B<buf> points to a buffer of size B<num> in which to store the +filename. The seed file is $RANDFILE if that environment variable is +set, $HOME/.rnd otherwise. If $HOME is not set either, or B<num> is +too small for the path name, an error occurs. + +RAND_load_file() reads a number of bytes from file B<filename> and +adds them to the PRNG. If B<max_bytes> is non-negative, +up to to B<max_bytes> are read; starting with OpenSSL 0.9.5, +if B<max_bytes> is -1, the complete file is read. + +RAND_write_file() writes a number of random bytes (currently 1024) to +file B<filename> which can be used to initialize the PRNG by calling +RAND_load_file() in a later session. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RAND_load_file() returns the number of bytes read. + +RAND_write_file() returns the number of bytes written, and -1 if the +bytes written were generated without appropriate seed. + +RAND_file_name() returns a pointer to B<buf> on success, and NULL on +error. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>, L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RAND_load_file(), RAND_write_file() and RAND_file_name() are available in +all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c9bb6d9f27b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_set_rand_method.pod @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RAND_set_rand_method, RAND_get_rand_method, RAND_SSLeay - select RAND method + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth); + + const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void); + + RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A B<RAND_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for random number +generation. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as +hardware RNGs may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for important +information about how these RAND API functions are affected by the use of +B<ENGINE> API calls. + +Initially, the default RAND_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as +returned by RAND_SSLeay(). + +RAND_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the method for PRNG use. B<NB>: This is +true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for RAND, so this function +is no longer recommended. + +RAND_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current RAND_METHOD. +However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the ENGINE +API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended. + +=head1 THE RAND_METHOD STRUCTURE + + typedef struct rand_meth_st + { + void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num); + int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num); + void (*cleanup)(void); + void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int entropy); + int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num); + int (*status)(void); + } RAND_METHOD; + +The components point to the implementation of RAND_seed(), +RAND_bytes(), RAND_cleanup(), RAND_add(), RAND_pseudo_rand() +and RAND_status(). +Each component may be NULL if the function is not implemented. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RAND_set_rand_method() returns no value. RAND_get_rand_method() and +RAND_SSLeay() return pointers to the respective methods. + +=head1 NOTES + +As of version 0.9.7, RAND_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other +algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA_METHOD, EVP_CIPHER, etc) in B<ENGINE> modules. If a +default ENGINE is specified for RAND functionality using an ENGINE API function, +that will override any RAND defaults set using the RAND API (ie. +RAND_set_rand_method()). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way +to control default implementations for use in RAND and other cryptographic +algorithms. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<engine(3)|engine(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RAND_set_rand_method(), RAND_get_rand_method() and RAND_SSLeay() are +available in all versions of OpenSSL. + +In the engine version of version 0.9.6, RAND_set_rand_method() was altered to +take an ENGINE pointer as its argument. As of version 0.9.7, that has been +reverted as the ENGINE API transparently overrides RAND defaults if used, +otherwise RAND API functions work as before. RAND_set_rand_engine() was also +introduced in version 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fd2c69abd867 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_blinding_on.pod @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_blinding_on, RSA_blinding_off - protect the RSA operation from timing attacks + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); + + void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can +measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding +must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack. + +RSA_blinding_on() turns blinding on for key B<rsa> and generates a +random blinding factor. B<ctx> is B<NULL> or a pre-allocated and +initialized B<BN_CTX>. The random number generator must be seeded +prior to calling RSA_blinding_on(). + +RSA_blinding_off() turns blinding off and frees the memory used for +the blinding factor. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RSA_blinding_on() returns 1 on success, and 0 if an error occurred. + +RSA_blinding_off() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_blinding_on() and RSA_blinding_off() appeared in SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a5198f3db5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_check_key.pod @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_check_key - validate private RSA keys + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This function validates RSA keys. It checks that B<p> and B<q> are +in fact prime, and that B<n = p*q>. + +It also checks that B<d*e = 1 mod (p-1*q-1)>, +and that B<dmp1>, B<dmq1> and B<iqmp> are set correctly or are B<NULL>. + +As such, this function can not be used with any arbitrary RSA key object, +even if it is otherwise fit for regular RSA operation. See B<NOTES> for more +information. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +RSA_check_key() returns 1 if B<rsa> is a valid RSA key, and 0 otherwise. +-1 is returned if an error occurs while checking the key. + +If the key is invalid or an error occurred, the reason code can be +obtained using L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 NOTES + +This function does not work on RSA public keys that have only the modulus +and public exponent elements populated. It performs integrity checks on all +the RSA key material, so the RSA key structure must contain all the private +key data too. + +Unlike most other RSA functions, this function does B<not> work +transparently with any underlying ENGINE implementation because it uses the +key data in the RSA structure directly. An ENGINE implementation can +override the way key data is stored and handled, and can even provide +support for HSM keys - in which case the RSA structure may contain B<no> +key data at all! If the ENGINE in question is only being used for +acceleration or analysis purposes, then in all likelihood the RSA key data +is complete and untouched, but this can't be assumed in the general case. + +=head1 BUGS + +A method of verifying the RSA key using opaque RSA API functions might need +to be considered. Right now RSA_check_key() simply uses the RSA structure +elements directly, bypassing the RSA_METHOD table altogether (and +completely violating encapsulation and object-orientation in the process). +The best fix will probably be to introduce a "check_key()" handler to the +RSA_METHOD function table so that alternative implementations can also +provide their own verifiers. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_check_key() appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.4. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..52dbb14a537d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_generate_key.pod @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_generate_key - generate RSA key pair + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + RSA *RSA_generate_key(int num, unsigned long e, + void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RSA_generate_key() generates a key pair and returns it in a newly +allocated B<RSA> structure. The pseudo-random number generator must +be seeded prior to calling RSA_generate_key(). + +The modulus size will be B<num> bits, and the public exponent will be +B<e>. Key sizes with B<num> E<lt> 1024 should be considered insecure. +The exponent is an odd number, typically 3, 17 or 65537. + +A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the +progress of the key generation. If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, it +will be called as follows: + +=over 4 + +=item * + +While a random prime number is generated, it is called as +described in L<BN_generate_prime(3)|BN_generate_prime(3)>. + +=item * + +When the n-th randomly generated prime is rejected as not +suitable for the key, B<callback(2, n, cb_arg)> is called. + +=item * + +When a random p has been found with p-1 relatively prime to B<e>, +it is called as B<callback(3, 0, cb_arg)>. + +=back + +The process is then repeated for prime q with B<callback(3, 1, cb_arg)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +If key generation fails, RSA_generate_key() returns B<NULL>; the +error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 BUGS + +B<callback(2, x, cb_arg)> is used with two different meanings. + +RSA_generate_key() goes into an infinite loop for illegal input values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, +L<RSA_free(3)|RSA_free(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<cb_arg> argument was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d0fd1f91de9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_get_ex_new_index, RSA_set_ex_data, RSA_get_ex_data - add application specific data to RSA structures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg); + + void *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx); + + typedef int CRYPTO_EX_new(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef void CRYPTO_EX_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef int CRYPTO_EX_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. +This has several potential uses, it can be used to cache data associated with +a structure (for example the hash of some part of the structure) or some +additional data (for example a handle to the data in an external library). + +Since the application data can be anything at all it is passed and retrieved +as a B<void *> type. + +The B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> function is initially called to "register" some +new application specific data. It takes three optional function pointers which +are called when the parent structure (in this case an RSA structure) is +initially created, when it is copied and when it is freed up. If any or all of +these function pointer arguments are not used they should be set to NULL. The +precise manner in which these function pointers are called is described in more +detail below. B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> also takes additional long and pointer +parameters which will be passed to the supplied functions but which otherwise +have no special meaning. It returns an B<index> which should be stored +(typically in a static variable) and passed used in the B<idx> parameter in +the remaining functions. Each successful call to B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> +will return an index greater than any previously returned, this is important +because the optional functions are called in order of increasing index value. + +B<RSA_set_ex_data()> is used to set application specific data, the data is +supplied in the B<arg> parameter and its precise meaning is up to the +application. + +B<RSA_get_ex_data()> is used to retrieve application specific data. The data +is returned to the application, this will be the same value as supplied to +a previous B<RSA_set_ex_data()> call. + +B<new_func()> is called when a structure is initially allocated (for example +with B<RSA_new()>. The parent structure members will not have any meaningful +values at this point. This function will typically be used to allocate any +application specific structure. + +B<free_func()> is called when a structure is being freed up. The dynamic parent +structure members should not be accessed because they will be freed up when +this function is called. + +B<new_func()> and B<free_func()> take the same parameters. B<parent> is a +pointer to the parent RSA structure. B<ptr> is a the application specific data +(this wont be of much use in B<new_func()>. B<ad> is a pointer to the +B<CRYPTO_EX_DATA> structure from the parent RSA structure: the functions +B<CRYPTO_get_ex_data()> and B<CRYPTO_set_ex_data()> can be called to manipulate +it. The B<idx> parameter is the index: this will be the same value returned by +B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> when the functions were initially registered. Finally +the B<argl> and B<argp> parameters are the values originally passed to the same +corresponding parameters when B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> was called. + +B<dup_func()> is called when a structure is being copied. Pointers to the +destination and source B<CRYPTO_EX_DATA> structures are passed in the B<to> and +B<from> parameters respectively. The B<from_d> parameter is passed a pointer to +the source application data when the function is called, when the function returns +the value is copied to the destination: the application can thus modify the data +pointed to by B<from_d> and have different values in the source and destination. +The B<idx>, B<argl> and B<argp> parameters are the same as those in B<new_func()> +and B<free_func()>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +B<RSA_get_ex_new_index()> returns a new index or -1 on failure (note 0 is a valid +index value). + +B<RSA_set_ex_data()> returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + +B<RSA_get_ex_data()> returns the application data or 0 on failure. 0 may also +be valid application data but currently it can only fail if given an invalid B<idx> +parameter. + +B<new_func()> and B<dup_func()> should return 0 for failure and 1 for success. + +On failure an error code can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 BUGS + +B<dup_func()> is currently never called. + +The return value of B<new_func()> is ignored. + +The B<new_func()> function isn't very useful because no meaningful values are +present in the parent RSA structure when it is called. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_get_ex_new_index(), RSA_set_ex_data() and RSA_get_ex_data() are +available since SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3d15b928243d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_new, RSA_free - allocate and free RSA objects + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + RSA * RSA_new(void); + + void RSA_free(RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RSA_new() allocates and initializes an B<RSA> structure. It is equivalent to +calling RSA_new_method(NULL). + +RSA_free() frees the B<RSA> structure and its components. The key is +erased before the memory is returned to the system. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +If the allocation fails, RSA_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error +code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. Otherwise it returns +a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +RSA_free() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, +L<RSA_generate_key(3)|RSA_generate_key(3)>, +L<RSA_new_method(3)|RSA_new_method(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_new() and RSA_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b8f678fe729d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1, +RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2, +RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP, +RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23, +RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none - asymmetric encryption +padding + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl); + + int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); + + int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl); + + int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); + + int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl, unsigned char *p, int pl); + + int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len, unsigned char *p, int pl); + + int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl); + + int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); + + int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl); + + int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen, + unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The RSA_padding_xxx_xxx() functions are called from the RSA encrypt, +decrypt, sign and verify functions. Normally they should not be called +from application programs. + +However, they can also be called directly to implement padding for other +asymmetric ciphers. RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP() and +RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() may be used in an application combined +with B<RSA_NO_PADDING> in order to implement OAEP with an encoding +parameter. + +RSA_padding_add_xxx() encodes B<fl> bytes from B<f> so as to fit into +B<tlen> bytes and stores the result at B<to>. An error occurs if B<fl> +does not meet the size requirements of the encoding method. + +The following encoding methods are implemented: + +=over 4 + +=item PKCS1_type_1 + +PKCS #1 v2.0 EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 1); used for signatures + +=item PKCS1_type_2 + +PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2) + +=item PKCS1_OAEP + +PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP + +=item SSLv23 + +PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 with SSL-specific modification + +=item none + +simply copy the data + +=back + +The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling +RSA_padding_add_xxx(). + +RSA_padding_check_xxx() verifies that the B<fl> bytes at B<f> contain +a valid encoding for a B<rsa_len> byte RSA key in the respective +encoding method and stores the recovered data of at most B<tlen> bytes +(for B<RSA_NO_PADDING>: of size B<tlen>) +at B<to>. + +For RSA_padding_xxx_OAEP(), B<p> points to the encoding parameter +of length B<pl>. B<p> may be B<NULL> if B<pl> is 0. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The RSA_padding_add_xxx() functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. +The RSA_padding_check_xxx() functions return the length of the +recovered data, -1 on error. Error codes can be obtained by calling +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)|RSA_public_encrypt(3)>, +L<RSA_private_decrypt(3)|RSA_private_decrypt(3)>, +L<RSA_sign(3)|RSA_sign(3)>, L<RSA_verify(3)|RSA_verify(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(), RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(), +RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(), RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(), +RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(), RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), +RSA_padding_add_none() and RSA_padding_check_none() appeared in +SSLeay 0.9.0. + +RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP() and RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() were +added in OpenSSL 0.9.2b. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c971e91f4db6 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_print.pod @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_print, RSA_print_fp, +DSAparams_print, DSAparams_print_fp, DSA_print, DSA_print_fp, +DHparams_print, DHparams_print_fp - print cryptographic parameters + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_print(BIO *bp, RSA *x, int offset); + int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *x, int offset); + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + + int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x); + int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x); + int DSA_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x, int offset); + int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x, int offset); + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, DH *x); + int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DH *x); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A human-readable hexadecimal output of the components of the RSA +key, DSA parameters or key or DH parameters is printed to B<bp> or B<fp>. + +The output lines are indented by B<offset> spaces. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +These functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<BN_bn2bin(3)|BN_bn2bin(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_print(), RSA_print_fp(), DSA_print(), DSA_print_fp(), DH_print(), +DH_print_fp() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +DSAparams_print() and DSAparams_print_fp() were added in SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..746a80c79ea0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_private_encrypt.pod @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt - low level signature operations + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + + int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions handle RSA signatures at a low level. + +RSA_private_encrypt() signs the B<flen> bytes at B<from> (usually a +message digest with an algorithm identifier) using the private key +B<rsa> and stores the signature in B<to>. B<to> must point to +B<RSA_size(rsa)> bytes of memory. + +B<padding> denotes one of the following modes: + +=over 4 + +=item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING + +PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This function does not handle the +B<algorithmIdentifier> specified in PKCS #1. When generating or +verifying PKCS #1 signatures, L<RSA_sign(3)|RSA_sign(3)> and L<RSA_verify(3)|RSA_verify(3)> should be +used. + +=item RSA_NO_PADDING + +Raw RSA signature. This mode should I<only> be used to implement +cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. +Signing user data directly with RSA is insecure. + +=back + +RSA_public_decrypt() recovers the message digest from the B<flen> +bytes long signature at B<from> using the signer's public key +B<rsa>. B<to> must point to a memory section large enough to hold the +message digest (which is smaller than B<RSA_size(rsa) - +11>). B<padding> is the padding mode that was used to sign the data. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RSA_private_encrypt() returns the size of the signature (i.e., +RSA_size(rsa)). RSA_public_decrypt() returns the size of the +recovered message digest. + +On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be +obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, +L<RSA_sign(3)|RSA_sign(3)>, L<RSA_verify(3)|RSA_verify(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<padding> argument was added in SSLeay 0.8. RSA_NO_PADDING is +available since SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ab0fe3b2cd1c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + + int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> (usually a +session key) using the public key B<rsa> and stores the ciphertext in +B<to>. B<to> must point to RSA_size(B<rsa>) bytes of memory. + +B<padding> denotes one of the following modes: + +=over 4 + +=item RSA_PKCS1_PADDING + +PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode. + +=item RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING + +EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty +encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications. + +=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING + +PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes +that the server is SSL3 capable. + +=item RSA_NO_PADDING + +Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement +cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. +Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure. + +=back + +B<flen> must be less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 +based padding modes, less than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 41 for +RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING. +The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling +RSA_public_encrypt(). + +RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the B<flen> bytes at B<from> using the +private key B<rsa> and stores the plaintext in B<to>. B<to> must point +to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is +smaller than RSA_size(B<rsa>)). B<padding> is the padding mode that +was used to encrypt the data. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e., +RSA_size(B<rsa>)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the +recovered plaintext. + +On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be +obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, +L<RSA_size(3)|RSA_size(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<padding> argument was added in SSLeay 0.8. RSA_NO_PADDING is +available since SSLeay 0.9.0, OAEP was added in OpenSSL 0.9.2b. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0a305f6b140d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_set_method.pod @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_set_default_method, RSA_get_default_method, RSA_set_method, +RSA_get_method, RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay, RSA_null_method, RSA_flags, +RSA_new_method - select RSA method + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth); + + RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void); + + int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth); + + RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa); + + RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void); + + RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void); + + int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa); + + RSA *RSA_new_method(RSA_METHOD *method); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +An B<RSA_METHOD> specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for RSA +operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as +hardware accelerators may be used. IMPORTANT: See the NOTES section for +important information about how these RSA API functions are affected by the +use of B<ENGINE> API calls. + +Initially, the default RSA_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, +as returned by RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(). + +RSA_set_default_method() makes B<meth> the default method for all RSA +structures created later. B<NB>: This is true only whilst no ENGINE has +been set as a default for RSA, so this function is no longer recommended. + +RSA_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default +RSA_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on +whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer +recommended. + +RSA_set_method() selects B<meth> to perform all operations using the key +B<rsa>. This will replace the RSA_METHOD used by the RSA key and if the +previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will +be released during the change. It is possible to have RSA keys that only +work with certain RSA_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module +that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases +attempting to change the RSA_METHOD for the key can have unexpected +results. + +RSA_get_method() returns a pointer to the RSA_METHOD being used by B<rsa>. +This method may or may not be supplied by an ENGINE implementation, but if +it is, the return value can only be guaranteed to be valid as long as the +RSA key itself is valid and does not have its implementation changed by +RSA_set_method(). + +RSA_flags() returns the B<flags> that are set for B<rsa>'s current +RSA_METHOD. See the BUGS section. + +RSA_new_method() allocates and initializes an RSA structure so that +B<engine> will be used for the RSA operations. If B<engine> is NULL, the +default ENGINE for RSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, +the RSA_METHOD controlled by RSA_set_default_method() is used. + +RSA_flags() returns the B<flags> that are set for B<rsa>'s current method. + +RSA_new_method() allocates and initializes an B<RSA> structure so that +B<method> will be used for the RSA operations. If B<method> is B<NULL>, +the default method is used. + +=head1 THE RSA_METHOD STRUCTURE + + typedef struct rsa_meth_st + { + /* name of the implementation */ + const char *name; + + /* encrypt */ + int (*rsa_pub_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + + /* verify arbitrary data */ + int (*rsa_pub_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + + /* sign arbitrary data */ + int (*rsa_priv_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + + /* decrypt */ + int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + + /* compute r0 = r0 ^ I mod rsa->n (May be NULL for some + implementations) */ + int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa); + + /* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */ + int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); + + /* called at RSA_new */ + int (*init)(RSA *rsa); + + /* called at RSA_free */ + int (*finish)(RSA *rsa); + + /* RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY - rsa_mod_exp is called for private key + * operations, even if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp + * are NULL + * RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER - enable rsa_sign and rsa_verify + * RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK - don't check pub/private match + */ + int flags; + + char *app_data; /* ?? */ + + /* sign. For backward compatibility, this is used only + * if (flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) + */ + int (*rsa_sign)(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); + + /* verify. For backward compatibility, this is used only + * if (flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) + */ + int (*rsa_verify)(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); + + } RSA_METHOD; + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(), RSA_PKCS1_null_method(), RSA_get_default_method() +and RSA_get_method() return pointers to the respective RSA_METHODs. + +RSA_set_default_method() returns no value. + +RSA_set_method() returns a pointer to the old RSA_METHOD implementation +that was replaced. However, this return value should probably be ignored +because if it was supplied by an ENGINE, the pointer could be invalidated +at any time if the ENGINE is unloaded (in fact it could be unloaded as a +result of the RSA_set_method() function releasing its handle to the +ENGINE). For this reason, the return type may be replaced with a B<void> +declaration in a future release. + +RSA_new_method() returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained +by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> if the allocation fails. Otherwise +it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +=head1 NOTES + +As of version 0.9.7, RSA_METHOD implementations are grouped together with +other algorithmic APIs (eg. DSA_METHOD, EVP_CIPHER, etc) into B<ENGINE> +modules. If a default ENGINE is specified for RSA functionality using an +ENGINE API function, that will override any RSA defaults set using the RSA +API (ie. RSA_set_default_method()). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the +recommended way to control default implementations for use in RSA and other +cryptographic algorithms. + +=head1 BUGS + +The behaviour of RSA_flags() is a mis-feature that is left as-is for now +to avoid creating compatibility problems. RSA functionality, such as the +encryption functions, are controlled by the B<flags> value in the RSA key +itself, not by the B<flags> value in the RSA_METHOD attached to the RSA key +(which is what this function returns). If the flags element of an RSA key +is changed, the changes will be honoured by RSA functionality but will not +be reflected in the return value of the RSA_flags() function - in effect +RSA_flags() behaves more like an RSA_default_flags() function (which does +not currently exist). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<RSA_new(3)|RSA_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_new_method() and RSA_set_default_method() appeared in SSLeay 0.8. +RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method() as +well as the rsa_sign and rsa_verify components of RSA_METHOD were +added in OpenSSL 0.9.4. + +RSA_set_default_openssl_method() and RSA_get_default_openssl_method() +replaced RSA_set_default_method() and RSA_get_default_method() +respectively, and RSA_set_method() and RSA_new_method() were altered to use +B<ENGINE>s rather than B<RSA_METHOD>s during development of the engine +version of OpenSSL 0.9.6. For 0.9.7, the handling of defaults in the ENGINE +API was restructured so that this change was reversed, and behaviour of the +other functions resembled more closely the previous behaviour. The +behaviour of defaults in the ENGINE API now transparently overrides the +behaviour of defaults in the RSA API without requiring changing these +function prototypes. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8553be8e99b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_sign, RSA_verify - RSA signatures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); + + int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RSA_sign() signs the message digest B<m> of size B<m_len> using the +private key B<rsa> as specified in PKCS #1 v2.0. It stores the +signature in B<sigret> and the signature size in B<siglen>. B<sigret> +must point to RSA_size(B<rsa>) bytes of memory. + +B<type> denotes the message digest algorithm that was used to generate +B<m>. It usually is one of B<NID_sha1>, B<NID_ripemd160> and B<NID_md5>; +see L<objects(3)|objects(3)> for details. If B<type> is B<NID_md5_sha1>, +an SSL signature (MD5 and SHA1 message digests with PKCS #1 padding +and no algorithm identifier) is created. + +RSA_verify() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf> of size B<siglen> +matches a given message digest B<m> of size B<m_len>. B<type> denotes +the message digest algorithm that was used to generate the signature. +B<rsa> is the signer's public key. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RSA_sign() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. RSA_verify() returns 1 +on successful verification, 0 otherwise. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 BUGS + +Certain signatures with an improper algorithm identifier are accepted +for compatibility with SSLeay 0.4.5 :-) + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<objects(3)|objects(3)>, +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<RSA_private_encrypt(3)|RSA_private_encrypt(3)>, +L<RSA_public_decrypt(3)|RSA_public_decrypt(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are available in all versions of SSLeay +and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e70380bbfc96 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING.pod @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING - RSA signatures + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, + RSA *rsa); + + int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() signs the octet string B<m> of size +B<m_len> using the private key B<rsa> represented in DER using PKCS #1 +padding. It stores the signature in B<sigret> and the signature size +in B<siglen>. B<sigret> must point to B<RSA_size(rsa)> bytes of +memory. + +B<dummy> is ignored. + +The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(). + +RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() verifies that the signature B<sigbuf> +of size B<siglen> is the DER representation of a given octet string +B<m> of size B<m_len>. B<dummy> is ignored. B<rsa> is the signer's +public key. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. +RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() returns 1 on successful verification, 0 +otherwise. + +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 BUGS + +These functions serve no recognizable purpose. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<objects(3)|objects(3)>, +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<RSA_sign(3)|RSA_sign(3)>, +L<RSA_verify(3)|RSA_verify(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() and RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING() were +added in SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod b/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5b7f835f95d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/RSA_size.pod @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RSA_size - get RSA modulus size + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + + int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This function returns the RSA modulus size in bytes. It can be used to +determine how much memory must be allocated for an RSA encrypted +value. + +B<rsa-E<gt>n> must not be B<NULL>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +The size in bytes. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RSA_size() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod b/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ffafa378877c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SMIME_read_PKCS7 - parse S/MIME message. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *in, BIO **bcont); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SMIME_read_PKCS7() parses a message in S/MIME format. + +B<in> is a BIO to read the message from. + +If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in +a memory bio which is written to B<*bcont>, otherwise +B<*bcont> is set to B<NULL>. + +The parsed PKCS#7 structure is returned or B<NULL> if an +error occurred. + +=head1 NOTES + +If B<*bcont> is not B<NULL> then the message is clear text +signed. B<*bcont> can then be passed to PKCS7_verify() with +the B<PKCS7_DETACHED> flag set. + +Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined +using PKCS7_type(). + +To support future functionality if B<bcont> is not B<NULL> +B<*bcont> should be initialized to B<NULL>. For example: + + BIO *cont = NULL; + PKCS7 *p7; + + p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont); + +=head1 BUGS + +The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_PKCS7() is somewhat primitive. +While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound +formats may not work. + +The parser assumes that the PKCS7 structure is always base64 +encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format +or uses quoted printable format. + +The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size +of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a +streaming single pass option should be available. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SMIME_read_PKCS7() returns a valid B<PKCS7> structure or B<NULL> +is an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_type(3)|PKCS7_type(3)> +L<SMIME_read_PKCS7(3)|SMIME_read_PKCS7(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)|PKCS7_sign(3)>, +L<PKCS7_verify(3)|PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)|PKCS7_encrypt(3)> +L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)|PKCS7_decrypt(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SMIME_read_PKCS7() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod b/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..61945b388728 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SMIME_write_PKCS7 - convert PKCS#7 structure to S/MIME format. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SMIME_write_PKCS7() adds the appropriate MIME headers to a PKCS#7 +structure to produce an S/MIME message. + +B<out> is the BIO to write the data to. B<p7> is the appropriate +B<PKCS7> structure. If cleartext signing (B<multipart/signed>) is +being used then the signed data must be supplied in the B<data> +argument. B<flags> is an optional set of flags. + +=head1 NOTES + +The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter. + +If B<PKCS7_DETACHED> is set then cleartext signing will be used, +this option only makes sense for signedData where B<PKCS7_DETACHED> +is also set when PKCS7_sign() is also called. + +If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> +are added to the content, this only makes sense if B<PKCS7_DETACHED> +is also set. + +If the B<PKCS7_PARTSIGN> flag is set the signed data is finalized +and output along with the content. This flag should only be set +if B<PKCS7_DETACHED> is also set and the previous call to PKCS7_sign() +also set these flags. + +If cleartext signing is being used and B<PKCS7_PARTSIGN> not set then +the data must be read twice: once to compute the signature in PKCS7_sign() +and once to output the S/MIME message. + +=head1 BUGS + +SMIME_write_PKCS7() always base64 encodes PKCS#7 structures, there +should be an option to disable this. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SMIME_write_PKCS7() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)|PKCS7_sign(3)>, +L<PKCS7_verify(3)|PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)|PKCS7_encrypt(3)> +L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)|PKCS7_decrypt(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SMIME_write_PKCS7() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5 + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..11b35f6fd355 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data, +X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data, +X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID, +X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ - X509_NAME_ENTRY utility functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +ASN1_OBJECT * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); +ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); + +int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj); +int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); + +X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); +X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type,unsigned char *bytes, int len); +X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() retrieves the field name of B<ne> in +and B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure. + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() retrieves the field value of B<ne> in +and B<ASN1_STRING> structure. + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object() sets the field name of B<ne> to B<obj>. + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data() sets the field value of B<ne> to string type +B<type> and value determined by B<bytes> and B<len>. + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() +and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an +B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structure. + +=head1 NOTES + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() can be +used to examine an B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> function as returned by +X509_NAME_get_entry() for example. + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(), +and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an + +X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(), +X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data() +are seldom used in practice because B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structures +are almost always part of B<X509_NAME> structures and the +corresponding B<X509_NAME> functions are typically used to +create and add new entries in a single operation. + +The arguments of these functions support similar options to the similarly +named ones of the corresponding B<X509_NAME> functions such as +X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(). So for example B<type> can be set to +B<MBSTRING_ASC> but in the case of X509_set_data() the field name must be +set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>, +L<OBJ_nid2obj(3),OBJ_nid2obj(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e2ab4b0d2bb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID, +X509_NAME_add_entry, X509_NAME_delete_entry - X509_NAME modification functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); + +int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); + +int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); + +int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name,X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set); + +X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ() and +X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() add a field whose name is defined +by a string B<field>, an object B<obj> or a NID B<nid> respectively. +The field value to be added is in B<bytes> of length B<len>. If +B<len> is -1 then the field length is calculated internally using +strlen(bytes). + +The type of field is determined by B<type> which can either be a +definition of the type of B<bytes> (such as B<MBSTRING_ASC>) or a +standard ASN1 type (such as B<V_ASN1_IA5STRING>). The new entry is +added to a position determined by B<loc> and B<set>. + +X509_NAME_add_entry() adds a copy of B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structure B<ne> +to B<name>. The new entry is added to a position determined by B<loc> +and B<set>. Since a copy of B<ne> is added B<ne> must be freed up after +the call. + +X509_NAME_delete_entry() deletes an entry from B<name> at position +B<loc>. The deleted entry is returned and must be freed up. + +=head1 NOTES + +The use of string types such as B<MBSTRING_ASC> or B<MBSTRING_UTF8> +is strongly recommened for the B<type> parameter. This allows the +internal code to correctly determine the type of the field and to +apply length checks according to the relevant standards. This is +done using ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(). + +If instead an ASN1 type is used no checks are performed and the +supplied data in B<bytes> is used directly. + +In X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt() the B<field> string represents +the field name using OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0). + +The B<loc> and B<set> parameters determine where a new entry should +be added. For almost all applications B<loc> can be set to -1 and B<set> +to 0. This adds a new entry to the end of B<name> as a single valued +RelativeDistinguishedName (RDN). + +B<loc> actually determines the index where the new entry is inserted: +if it is -1 it is appended. + +B<set> determines how the new type is added. If it is zero a +new RDN is created. + +If B<set> is -1 or 1 it is added to the previous or next RDN +structure respectively. This will then be a multivalued RDN: +since multivalues RDNs are very seldom used B<set> is almost +always set to zero. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Create an B<X509_NAME> structure: + +"C=UK, O=Disorganized Organization, CN=Joe Bloggs" + + X509_NAME *nm; + nm = X509_NAME_new(); + if (nm == NULL) + /* Some error */ + if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC, + "C", "UK", -1, -1, 0)) + /* Error */ + if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC, + "O", "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0)) + /* Error */ + if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC, + "CN", "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0)) + /* Error */ + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(), +X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() and X509_NAME_add_entry() return 1 for +success of 0 if an error occurred. + +X509_NAME_delete_entry() returns either the deleted B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> +structure of B<NULL> if an error occurred. + +=head1 BUGS + +B<type> can still be set to B<V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE> to use a +different algorithm to determine field types. Since this form does +not understand multicharacter types, performs no length checks and +can result in invalid field types its use is strongly discouraged. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..333323d734e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_get_entry, +X509_NAME_entry_count, X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ - +X509_NAME lookup and enumeration functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name,int nid,int lastpos); +int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name,ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); + +int X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_NAME *name); +X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc); + +int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf,int len); +int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,int len); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions allow an B<X509_NAME> structure to be examined. The +B<X509_NAME> structure is the same as the B<Name> type defined in +RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject +and issuer names. + +X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve +the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos> +should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned. + +X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>. + +X509_NAME_get_entry() retrieves the B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> from B<name> +corresponding to index B<loc>. Acceptable values for B<loc> run from +0 to (X509_NAME_entry_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an +internal pointer which must not be freed. + +X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(), X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() retrieve +the "text" from the first entry in B<name> which matches B<nid> or +B<obj>, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most B<len> bytes +will be written and the text written to B<buf> will be null +terminated. The length of the output string written is returned +excluding the terminating null. If B<buf> is <NULL> then the amount +of space needed in B<buf> (excluding the final null) is returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() are +legacy functions which have various limitations which make them +of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching +entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can +be highly confusing if the target is a muticharacter string type +like a BMPString or a UTF8String. + +For a more general solution X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() or +X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by +X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the +various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Process all entries: + + int i; + X509_NAME_ENTRY *e; + + for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++) + { + e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); + /* Do something with e */ + } + +Process all commonName entries: + + int loc; + X509_NAME_ENTRY *e; + + loc = -1; + for (;;) + { + lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos); + if (lastpos == -1) + break; + e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos); + /* Do something with e */ + } + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() +return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found. + +X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries. + +X509_NAME_get_entry() returns an B<X509_NAME> pointer to the +requested entry or B<NULL> if the index is invalid. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..919b90891937 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_NAME_print_ex, X509_NAME_print_ex_fp, X509_NAME_print, +X509_NAME_oneline - X509_NAME printing routines. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); + int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); + char * X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a,char *buf,int size); + int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +X509_NAME_print_ex() prints a human readable version of B<nm> to BIO B<out>. Each +line (for multiline formats) is indented by B<indent> spaces. The output format +can be extensively customised by use of the B<flags> parameter. + +X509_NAME_print_ex_fp() is identical to X509_NAME_print_ex() except the output is +written to FILE pointer B<fp>. + +X509_NAME_oneline() prints an ASCII version of B<a> to B<buf>. At most B<size> +bytes will be written. If B<buf> is B<NULL> then a buffer is dynamically allocated +and returned, otherwise B<buf> is returned. + +X509_NAME_print() prints out B<name> to B<bp> indenting each line by B<obase> +characters. Multiple lines are used if the output (including indent) exceeds +80 characters. + +=head1 NOTES + +The functions X509_NAME_oneline() and X509_NAME_print() are legacy functions which +produce a non standard output form, they don't handle multi character fields and +have various quirks and inconsistencies. Their use is strongly discouraged in new +applications. + +Although there are a large number of possible flags for most purposes +B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE>, B<XN_FLAG_MULTILINE> or B<XN_FLAG_RFC2253> will suffice. +As noted on the L<ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)|ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)> manual page +for UTF8 terminals the B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> should be unset: so for example +B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> would be used. + +The complete set of the flags supported by X509_NAME_print_ex() is listed below. + +Several options can be ored together. + +The options B<XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS>, B<XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC>, +B<XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC> and B<XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE> determine the field separators +to use. Two distinct separators are used between distinct RelativeDistinguishedName +components and separate values in the same RDN for a multi-valued RDN. Multi-valued +RDNs are currently very rare so the second separator will hardly ever be used. + +B<XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS> uses comma and plus as separators. B<XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC> +uses comma and plus with spaces: this is more readable that plain comma and plus. +B<XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC> uses spaced semicolon and plus. B<XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE> uses +spaced newline and plus respectively. + +If B<XN_FLAG_DN_REV> is set the whole DN is printed in reversed order. + +The fields B<XN_FLAG_FN_SN>, B<XN_FLAG_FN_LN>, B<XN_FLAG_FN_OID>, +B<XN_FLAG_FN_NONE> determine how a field name is displayed. It will +use the short name (e.g. CN) the long name (e.g. commonName) always +use OID numerical form (normally OIDs are only used if the field name is not +recognised) and no field name respectively. + +If B<XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ> is set then spaces will be placed around the '=' character +separating field names and values. + +If B<XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS> is set then the encoding of unknown fields is +printed instead of the values. + +If B<XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN> is set then field names are padded to 20 characters: this +is only of use for multiline format. + +Additionally all the options supported by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() can be used to +control how each field value is displayed. + +In addition a number options can be set for commonly used formats. + +B<XN_FLAG_RFC2253> sets options which produce an output compatible with RFC2253 it +is equivalent to: + B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS | XN_FLAG_DN_REV | XN_FLAG_FN_SN | XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS> + + +B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE> is a more readable one line format it is the same as: + B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | XN_FLAG_FN_SN> + +B<XN_FLAG_MULTILINE> is a multiline format is is the same as: + B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | XN_FLAG_FN_LN | XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN> + +B<XN_FLAG_COMPAT> uses a format identical to X509_NAME_print(): in fact it calls X509_NAME_print() internally. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)|ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fd5fc65ce152 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_new, X509_free - X509 certificate ASN1 allocation functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + X509 *X509_new(void); + void X509_free(X509 *a); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The X509 ASN1 allocation routines, allocate and free an +X509 structure, which represents an X509 certificate. + +X509_new() allocates and initializes a X509 structure. + +X509_free() frees up the B<X509> structure B<a>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +If the allocation fails, X509_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error +code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. +Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure. + +X509_free() returns no value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +X509_new() and X509_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/bio.pod b/doc/crypto/bio.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f9239226ffcc --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/bio.pod @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +bio - I/O abstraction + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + +TBA + + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A BIO is an I/O abstraction, it hides many of the underlying I/O +details from an application. If an application uses a BIO for its +I/O it can transparently handle SSL connections, unencrypted network +connections and file I/O. + +There are two type of BIO, a source/sink BIO and a filter BIO. + +As its name implies a source/sink BIO is a source and/or sink of data, +examples include a socket BIO and a file BIO. + +A filter BIO takes data from one BIO and passes it through to +another, or the application. The data may be left unmodified (for +example a message digest BIO) or translated (for example an +encryption BIO). The effect of a filter BIO may change according +to the I/O operation it is performing: for example an encryption +BIO will encrypt data if it is being written to and decrypt data +if it is being read from. + +BIOs can be joined together to form a chain (a single BIO is a chain +with one component). A chain normally consist of one source/sink +BIO and one or more filter BIOs. Data read from or written to the +first BIO then traverses the chain to the end (normally a source/sink +BIO). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<BIO_ctrl(3)|BIO_ctrl(3)>, +L<BIO_f_base64(3)|BIO_f_base64(3)>, L<BIO_f_buffer(3)|BIO_f_buffer(3)>, +L<BIO_f_cipher(3)|BIO_f_cipher(3)>, L<BIO_f_md(3)|BIO_f_md(3)>, +L<BIO_f_null(3)|BIO_f_null(3)>, L<BIO_f_ssl(3)|BIO_f_ssl(3)>, +L<BIO_find_type(3)|BIO_find_type(3)>, L<BIO_new(3)|BIO_new(3)>, +L<BIO_new_bio_pair(3)|BIO_new_bio_pair(3)>, +L<BIO_push(3)|BIO_push(3)>, L<BIO_read(3)|BIO_read(3)>, +L<BIO_s_accept(3)|BIO_s_accept(3)>, L<BIO_s_bio(3)|BIO_s_bio(3)>, +L<BIO_s_connect(3)|BIO_s_connect(3)>, L<BIO_s_fd(3)|BIO_s_fd(3)>, +L<BIO_s_file(3)|BIO_s_file(3)>, L<BIO_s_mem(3)|BIO_s_mem(3)>, +L<BIO_s_null(3)|BIO_s_null(3)>, L<BIO_s_socket(3)|BIO_s_socket(3)>, +L<BIO_set_callback(3)|BIO_set_callback(3)>, +L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)> diff --git a/doc/crypto/blowfish.pod b/doc/crypto/blowfish.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5b2d274c15fe --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/blowfish.pod @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +blowfish, BF_set_key, BF_encrypt, BF_decrypt, BF_ecb_encrypt, BF_cbc_encrypt, +BF_cfb64_encrypt, BF_ofb64_encrypt, BF_options - Blowfish encryption + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/blowfish.h> + + void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); + + void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + BF_KEY *key, int enc); + void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int enc); + void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num, + int enc); + void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num); + const char *BF_options(void); + + void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data,const BF_KEY *key); + void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data,const BF_KEY *key); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This library implements the Blowfish cipher, which was invented and described +by Counterpane (see http://www.counterpane.com/blowfish.html ). + +Blowfish is a block cipher that operates on 64 bit (8 byte) blocks of data. +It uses a variable size key, but typically, 128 bit (16 byte) keys are +considered good for strong encryption. Blowfish can be used in the same +modes as DES (see L<des_modes(7)|des_modes(7)>). Blowfish is currently one +of the faster block ciphers. It is quite a bit faster than DES, and much +faster than IDEA or RC2. + +Blowfish consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or decryption +phase. + +BF_set_key() sets up the B<BF_KEY> B<key> using the B<len> bytes long key +at B<data>. + +BF_ecb_encrypt() is the basic Blowfish encryption and decryption function. +It encrypts or decrypts the first 64 bits of B<in> using the key B<key>, +putting the result in B<out>. B<enc> decides if encryption (B<BF_ENCRYPT>) +or decryption (B<BF_DECRYPT>) shall be performed. The vector pointed at by +B<in> and B<out> must be 64 bits in length, no less. If they are larger, +everything after the first 64 bits is ignored. + +The mode functions BF_cbc_encrypt(), BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() +all operate on variable length data. They all take an initialization vector +B<ivec> which needs to be passed along into the next call of the same function +for the same message. B<ivec> may be initialized with anything, but the +recipient needs to know what it was initialized with, or it won't be able +to decrypt. Some programs and protocols simplify this, like SSH, where +B<ivec> is simply initialized to zero. +BF_cbc_encrypt() operates on data that is a multiple of 8 bytes long, while +BF_cfb64_encrypt() and BF_ofb64_encrypt() are used to encrypt an variable +number of bytes (the amount does not have to be an exact multiple of 8). The +purpose of the latter two is to simulate stream ciphers, and therefore, they +need the parameter B<num>, which is a pointer to an integer where the current +offset in B<ivec> is stored between calls. This integer must be initialized +to zero when B<ivec> is initialized. + +BF_cbc_encrypt() is the Cipher Block Chaining function for Blowfish. It +encrypts or decrypts the 64 bits chunks of B<in> using the key B<schedule>, +putting the result in B<out>. B<enc> decides if encryption (BF_ENCRYPT) or +decryption (BF_DECRYPT) shall be performed. B<ivec> must point at an 8 byte +long initialization vector. + +BF_cfb64_encrypt() is the CFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback. +It encrypts or decrypts the bytes in B<in> using the key B<schedule>, +putting the result in B<out>. B<enc> decides if encryption (B<BF_ENCRYPT>) +or decryption (B<BF_DECRYPT>) shall be performed. B<ivec> must point at an +8 byte long initialization vector. B<num> must point at an integer which must +be initially zero. + +BF_ofb64_encrypt() is the OFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback. +It uses the same parameters as BF_cfb64_encrypt(), which must be initialized +the same way. + +BF_encrypt() and BF_decrypt() are the lowest level functions for Blowfish +encryption. They encrypt/decrypt the first 64 bits of the vector pointed by +B<data>, using the key B<key>. These functions should not be used unless you +implement 'modes' of Blowfish. The alternative is to use BF_ecb_encrypt(). +If you still want to use these functions, you should be aware that they take +each 32-bit chunk in host-byte order, which is little-endian on little-endian +platforms and big-endian on big-endian ones. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +None of the functions presented here return any value. + +=head1 NOTE + +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the +blowfish functions directly. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<des_modes(7)|des_modes(7)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The Blowfish functions are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut + diff --git a/doc/crypto/bn.pod b/doc/crypto/bn.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cd2f8e50c6c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/bn.pod @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +bn - multiprecision integer arithmetics + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/bn.h> + + BIGNUM *BN_new(void); + void BN_free(BIGNUM *a); + void BN_init(BIGNUM *); + void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a); + void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a); + + BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void); + void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c); + void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c); + + BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); + BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a); + + BIGNUM *BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + + int BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG w); + + void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); + int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); + int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + + int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + + int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a); + int BN_is_one(BIGNUM *a); + int BN_is_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w); + int BN_is_odd(BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a); + int BN_one(BIGNUM *a); + const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void); + int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w); + unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); + int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); + int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); + int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); + + BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits,int safe, BIGNUM *add, + BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); + int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, + void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg); + + int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); + int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); + int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); + + int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); + BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); + char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a); + char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); + int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str); + int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a); + int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); + BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret); + + BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void); + void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); + void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp); + int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, + BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx); + + BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void); + void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx); + void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont); + int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from); + int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, + BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); + + BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, + BIGNUM *mod); + void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b); + int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b,BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n,const BIGNUM *r,BN_BLINDING *b, + BN_CTX *ctx); + unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(const BN_BLINDING *); + void BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); + unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *); + void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long); + BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, + const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx), + BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This library performs arithmetic operations on integers of arbitrary +size. It was written for use in public key cryptography, such as RSA +and Diffie-Hellman. + +It uses dynamic memory allocation for storing its data structures. +That means that there is no limit on the size of the numbers +manipulated by these functions, but return values must always be +checked in case a memory allocation error has occurred. + +The basic object in this library is a B<BIGNUM>. It is used to hold a +single large integer. This type should be considered opaque and fields +should not be modified or accessed directly. + +The creation of B<BIGNUM> objects is described in L<BN_new(3)|BN_new(3)>; +L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)> describes most of the arithmetic operations. +Comparison is described in L<BN_cmp(3)|BN_cmp(3)>; L<BN_zero(3)|BN_zero(3)> +describes certain assignments, L<BN_rand(3)|BN_rand(3)> the generation of +random numbers, L<BN_generate_prime(3)|BN_generate_prime(3)> deals with prime +numbers and L<BN_set_bit(3)|BN_set_bit(3)> with bit operations. The conversion +of B<BIGNUM>s to external formats is described in L<BN_bn2bin(3)|BN_bn2bin(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn_internal(3)|bn_internal(3)>, +L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, +L<BN_new(3)|BN_new(3)>, L<BN_CTX_new(3)|BN_CTX_new(3)>, +L<BN_copy(3)|BN_copy(3)>, L<BN_swap(3)|BN_swap(3)>, L<BN_num_bytes(3)|BN_num_bytes(3)>, +L<BN_add(3)|BN_add(3)>, L<BN_add_word(3)|BN_add_word(3)>, +L<BN_cmp(3)|BN_cmp(3)>, L<BN_zero(3)|BN_zero(3)>, L<BN_rand(3)|BN_rand(3)>, +L<BN_generate_prime(3)|BN_generate_prime(3)>, L<BN_set_bit(3)|BN_set_bit(3)>, +L<BN_bn2bin(3)|BN_bn2bin(3)>, L<BN_mod_inverse(3)|BN_mod_inverse(3)>, +L<BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)|BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(3)>, +L<BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)|BN_mod_mul_montgomery(3)>, +L<BN_BLINDING_new(3)|BN_BLINDING_new(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/bn_internal.pod b/doc/crypto/bn_internal.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..891914678c47 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/bn_internal.pod @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +bn_mul_words, bn_mul_add_words, bn_sqr_words, bn_div_words, +bn_add_words, bn_sub_words, bn_mul_comba4, bn_mul_comba8, +bn_sqr_comba4, bn_sqr_comba8, bn_cmp_words, bn_mul_normal, +bn_mul_low_normal, bn_mul_recursive, bn_mul_part_recursive, +bn_mul_low_recursive, bn_mul_high, bn_sqr_normal, bn_sqr_recursive, +bn_expand, bn_wexpand, bn_expand2, bn_fix_top, bn_check_top, +bn_print, bn_dump, bn_set_max, bn_set_high, bn_set_low - BIGNUM +library internal functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w); + BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, + BN_ULONG w); + void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num); + BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d); + BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp, + int num); + BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp, + int num); + + void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); + void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b); + void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a); + void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a); + + int bn_cmp_words(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); + + void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b, + int nb); + void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n); + void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, + int dna,int dnb,BN_ULONG *tmp); + void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, + int n, int tna,int tnb, BN_ULONG *tmp); + void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, + int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp); + void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, + int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp); + + void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp); + void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp); + + void mul(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c); + void mul_add(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c); + void sqr(BN_ULONG r0, BN_ULONG r1, BN_ULONG a); + + BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits); + BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int n); + BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int n); + void bn_fix_top(BIGNUM *a); + + void bn_check_top(BIGNUM *a); + void bn_print(BIGNUM *a); + void bn_dump(BN_ULONG *d, int n); + void bn_set_max(BIGNUM *a); + void bn_set_high(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); + void bn_set_low(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This page documents the internal functions used by the OpenSSL +B<BIGNUM> implementation. They are described here to facilitate +debugging and extending the library. They are I<not> to be used by +applications. + +=head2 The BIGNUM structure + + typedef struct bignum_st + { + int top; /* number of words used in d */ + BN_ULONG *d; /* pointer to an array containing the integer value */ + int max; /* size of the d array */ + int neg; /* sign */ + } BIGNUM; + +The integer value is stored in B<d>, a malloc()ed array of words (B<BN_ULONG>), +least significant word first. A B<BN_ULONG> can be either 16, 32 or 64 bits +in size, depending on the 'number of bits' (B<BITS2>) specified in +C<openssl/bn.h>. + +B<max> is the size of the B<d> array that has been allocated. B<top> +is the number of words being used, so for a value of 4, bn.d[0]=4 and +bn.top=1. B<neg> is 1 if the number is negative. When a B<BIGNUM> is +B<0>, the B<d> field can be B<NULL> and B<top> == B<0>. + +Various routines in this library require the use of temporary +B<BIGNUM> variables during their execution. Since dynamic memory +allocation to create B<BIGNUM>s is rather expensive when used in +conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the B<BN_CTX> structure is +used. This structure contains B<BN_CTX_NUM> B<BIGNUM>s, see +L<BN_CTX_start(3)|BN_CTX_start(3)>. + +=head2 Low-level arithmetic operations + +These functions are implemented in C and for several platforms in +assembly language: + +bn_mul_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<num>, B<w>) operates on the B<num> word +arrays B<rp> and B<ap>. It computes B<ap> * B<w>, places the result +in B<rp>, and returns the high word (carry). + +bn_mul_add_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<num>, B<w>) operates on the B<num> +word arrays B<rp> and B<ap>. It computes B<ap> * B<w> + B<rp>, places +the result in B<rp>, and returns the high word (carry). + +bn_sqr_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<n>) operates on the B<num> word array +B<ap> and the 2*B<num> word array B<ap>. It computes B<ap> * B<ap> +word-wise, and places the low and high bytes of the result in B<rp>. + +bn_div_words(B<h>, B<l>, B<d>) divides the two word number (B<h>,B<l>) +by B<d> and returns the result. + +bn_add_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<bp>, B<num>) operates on the B<num> word +arrays B<ap>, B<bp> and B<rp>. It computes B<ap> + B<bp>, places the +result in B<rp>, and returns the high word (carry). + +bn_sub_words(B<rp>, B<ap>, B<bp>, B<num>) operates on the B<num> word +arrays B<ap>, B<bp> and B<rp>. It computes B<ap> - B<bp>, places the +result in B<rp>, and returns the carry (1 if B<bp> E<gt> B<ap>, 0 +otherwise). + +bn_mul_comba4(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 4 word arrays B<a> and +B<b> and the 8 word array B<r>. It computes B<a>*B<b> and places the +result in B<r>. + +bn_mul_comba8(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 8 word arrays B<a> and +B<b> and the 16 word array B<r>. It computes B<a>*B<b> and places the +result in B<r>. + +bn_sqr_comba4(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 4 word arrays B<a> and +B<b> and the 8 word array B<r>. + +bn_sqr_comba8(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>) operates on the 8 word arrays B<a> and +B<b> and the 16 word array B<r>. + +The following functions are implemented in C: + +bn_cmp_words(B<a>, B<b>, B<n>) operates on the B<n> word arrays B<a> +and B<b>. It returns 1, 0 and -1 if B<a> is greater than, equal and +less than B<b>. + +bn_mul_normal(B<r>, B<a>, B<na>, B<b>, B<nb>) operates on the B<na> +word array B<a>, the B<nb> word array B<b> and the B<na>+B<nb> word +array B<r>. It computes B<a>*B<b> and places the result in B<r>. + +bn_mul_low_normal(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n>) operates on the B<n> word +arrays B<r>, B<a> and B<b>. It computes the B<n> low words of +B<a>*B<b> and places the result in B<r>. + +bn_mul_recursive(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n2>, B<dna>, B<dnb>, B<t>) operates +on the word arrays B<a> and B<b> of length B<n2>+B<dna> and B<n2>+B<dnb> +(B<dna> and B<dnb> are currently allowed to be 0 or negative) and the 2*B<n2> +word arrays B<r> and B<t>. B<n2> must be a power of 2. It computes +B<a>*B<b> and places the result in B<r>. + +bn_mul_part_recursive(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n>, B<tna>, B<tnb>, B<tmp>) +operates on the word arrays B<a> and B<b> of length B<n>+B<tna> and +B<n>+B<tnb> and the 4*B<n> word arrays B<r> and B<tmp>. + +bn_mul_low_recursive(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<n2>, B<tmp>) operates on the +B<n2> word arrays B<r> and B<tmp> and the B<n2>/2 word arrays B<a> +and B<b>. + +bn_mul_high(B<r>, B<a>, B<b>, B<l>, B<n2>, B<tmp>) operates on the +B<n2> word arrays B<r>, B<a>, B<b> and B<l> (?) and the 3*B<n2> word +array B<tmp>. + +BN_mul() calls bn_mul_normal(), or an optimized implementation if the +factors have the same size: bn_mul_comba8() is used if they are 8 +words long, bn_mul_recursive() if they are larger than +B<BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL> and the size is an exact multiple of the word +size, and bn_mul_part_recursive() for others that are larger than +B<BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL>. + +bn_sqr_normal(B<r>, B<a>, B<n>, B<tmp>) operates on the B<n> word array +B<a> and the 2*B<n> word arrays B<tmp> and B<r>. + +The implementations use the following macros which, depending on the +architecture, may use "long long" C operations or inline assembler. +They are defined in C<bn_lcl.h>. + +mul(B<r>, B<a>, B<w>, B<c>) computes B<w>*B<a>+B<c> and places the +low word of the result in B<r> and the high word in B<c>. + +mul_add(B<r>, B<a>, B<w>, B<c>) computes B<w>*B<a>+B<r>+B<c> and +places the low word of the result in B<r> and the high word in B<c>. + +sqr(B<r0>, B<r1>, B<a>) computes B<a>*B<a> and places the low word +of the result in B<r0> and the high word in B<r1>. + +=head2 Size changes + +bn_expand() ensures that B<b> has enough space for a B<bits> bit +number. bn_wexpand() ensures that B<b> has enough space for an +B<n> word number. If the number has to be expanded, both macros +call bn_expand2(), which allocates a new B<d> array and copies the +data. They return B<NULL> on error, B<b> otherwise. + +The bn_fix_top() macro reduces B<a-E<gt>top> to point to the most +significant non-zero word plus one when B<a> has shrunk. + +=head2 Debugging + +bn_check_top() verifies that C<((a)-E<gt>top E<gt>= 0 && (a)-E<gt>top +E<lt>= (a)-E<gt>max)>. A violation will cause the program to abort. + +bn_print() prints B<a> to stderr. bn_dump() prints B<n> words at B<d> +(in reverse order, i.e. most significant word first) to stderr. + +bn_set_max() makes B<a> a static number with a B<max> of its current size. +This is used by bn_set_low() and bn_set_high() to make B<r> a read-only +B<BIGNUM> that contains the B<n> low or high words of B<a>. + +If B<BN_DEBUG> is not defined, bn_check_top(), bn_print(), bn_dump() +and bn_set_max() are defined as empty macros. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/buffer.pod b/doc/crypto/buffer.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..781f5b11ee54 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/buffer.pod @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow, BUF_strdup - simple +character arrays structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/buffer.h> + + BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void); + + void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a); + + int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len); + + char * BUF_strdup(const char *str); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for +various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs. + +The library uses the BUF_MEM structure defined in buffer.h: + + typedef struct buf_mem_st + { + int length; /* current number of bytes */ + char *data; + int max; /* size of buffer */ + } BUF_MEM; + +B<length> is the current size of the buffer in bytes, B<max> is the amount of +memory allocated to the buffer. There are three functions which handle these +and one "miscellaneous" function. + +BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size. + +BUF_MEM_free() frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed +before freeing up in case the buffer contains sensitive data. + +BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to +B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in +size. + +BUF_strdup() copies a null terminated string into a block of allocated +memory and returns a pointer to the allocated block. +Unlike the standard C library strdup() this function uses OPENSSL_malloc() and so +should be used in preference to the standard library strdup() because it can +be used for memory leak checking or replacing the malloc() function. + +The memory allocated from BUF_strdup() should be freed up using the OPENSSL_free() +function. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +BUF_MEM_new() returns the buffer or NULL on error. + +BUF_MEM_free() has no return value. + +BUF_MEM_grow() returns zero on error or the new size (i.e. B<len>). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +BUF_MEM_new(), BUF_MEM_free() and BUF_MEM_grow() are available in all +versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. BUF_strdup() was added in SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/crypto.pod b/doc/crypto/crypto.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7a527992bb5e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/crypto.pod @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +crypto - OpenSSL cryptographic library + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The OpenSSL B<crypto> library implements a wide range of cryptographic +algorithms used in various Internet standards. The services provided +by this library are used by the OpenSSL implementations of SSL, TLS +and S/MIME, and they have also been used to implement SSH, OpenPGP, and +other cryptographic standards. + +=head1 OVERVIEW + +B<libcrypto> consists of a number of sub-libraries that implement the +individual algorithms. + +The functionality includes symmetric encryption, public key +cryptography and key agreement, certificate handling, cryptographic +hash functions and a cryptographic pseudo-random number generator. + +=over 4 + +=item SYMMETRIC CIPHERS + +L<blowfish(3)|blowfish(3)>, L<cast(3)|cast(3)>, L<des(3)|des(3)>, +L<idea(3)|idea(3)>, L<rc2(3)|rc2(3)>, L<rc4(3)|rc4(3)>, L<rc5(3)|rc5(3)> + +=item PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND KEY AGREEMENT + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)> + +=item CERTIFICATES + +L<x509(3)|x509(3)>, L<x509v3(3)|x509v3(3)> + +=item AUTHENTICATION CODES, HASH FUNCTIONS + +L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>, L<md4(3)|md4(3)>, +L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>, +L<sha(3)|sha(3)> + +=item AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS + +L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<threads(3)|threads(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3)|OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3)> + +=item INPUT/OUTPUT, DATA ENCODING + +L<asn1(3)|asn1(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)>, L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<pem(3)|pem(3)>, +L<pkcs7(3)|pkcs7(3)>, L<pkcs12(3)|pkcs12(3)> + +=item INTERNAL FUNCTIONS + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<buffer(3)|buffer(3)>, L<lhash(3)|lhash(3)>, +L<objects(3)|objects(3)>, L<stack(3)|stack(3)>, +L<txt_db(3)|txt_db(3)> + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +Some of the newer functions follow a naming convention using the numbers +B<0> and B<1>. For example the functions: + + int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev); + int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj); + +The B<0> version uses the supplied structure pointer directly +in the parent and it will be freed up when the parent is freed. +In the above example B<crl> would be freed but B<rev> would not. + +The B<1> function uses a copy of the supplied structure pointer +(or in some cases increases its link count) in the parent and +so both (B<x> and B<obj> above) should be freed up. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..45bb18492cab --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.pod @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_ASN1_OBJECT, i2d_ASN1_OBJECT - ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/objects.h> + + ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. + +Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e98aebeca01 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_DHparams.pod @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_DHparams, i2d_DHparams - PKCS#3 DH parameter functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + + DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_DHparams(DH *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode PKCS#3 DH parameters using the +DHparameter structure described in PKCS#3. + +Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_DSAPublicKey.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_DSAPublicKey.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..22c1b50f2288 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_DSAPublicKey.pod @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_DSAPublicKey, i2d_DSAPublicKey, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, +d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, d2i_DSA_SIG, i2d_DSA_SIG - DSA key encoding +and parsing functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + DSA * d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + DSA * d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + DSA * d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + DSA * d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_DSAparams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + DSA * d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +d2i_DSAPublicKey() and i2d_DSAPublicKey() decode and encode the DSA public key +components structure. + +d2i_DSA_PUBKEY() and i2d_DSA_PUBKEY() decode and encode an DSA public key using +a SubjectPublicKeyInfo (certificate public key) structure. + +d2i_DSAPrivateKey(), i2d_DSAPrivateKey() decode and encode the DSA private key +components. + +d2i_DSAparams(), i2d_DSAparams() decode and encode the DSA parameters using +a B<Dss-Parms> structure as defined in RFC2459. + +d2i_DSA_SIG(), i2d_DSA_SIG() decode and encode a DSA signature using a +B<Dss-Sig-Value> structure as defined in RFC2459. + +The usage of all of these functions is similar to the d2i_X509() and +i2d_X509() described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<DSA> structure passed to the private key encoding functions should have +all the private key components present. + +The data encoded by the private key functions is unencrypted and therefore +offers no private key security. + +The B<DSA_PUBKEY> functions should be used in preference to the B<DSAPublicKey> +functions when encoding public keys because they use a standard format. + +The B<DSAPublicKey> functions use an non standard format the actual data encoded +depends on the value of the B<write_params> field of the B<a> key parameter. +If B<write_params> is zero then only the B<pub_key> field is encoded as an +B<INTEGER>. If B<write_params> is 1 then a B<SEQUENCE> consisting of the +B<p>, B<q>, B<g> and B<pub_key> respectively fields are encoded. + +The B<DSAPrivateKey> functions also use a non standard structure consiting +consisting of a SEQUENCE containing the B<p>, B<q>, B<g> and B<pub_key> and +B<priv_key> fields respectively. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a54b77908844 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.pod @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp, +i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp, +i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp - PKCS#8 format private key functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + + EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The PKCS#8 functions encode and decode private keys in PKCS#8 format using both +PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms. + +Other than the use of DER as opposed to PEM these functions are identical to the +corresponding B<PEM> function as described in the L<pem(3)|pem(3)> manual page. + +=head1 NOTES + +Before using these functions L<OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)|OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)> +should be called to initialize the internal algorithm lookup tables otherwise errors about +unknown algorithms will occur if an attempt is made to decrypt a private key. + +These functions are currently the only way to store encrypted private keys using DER format. + +Currently all the functions use BIOs or FILE pointers, there are no functions which +work directly on memory: this can be readily worked around by converting the buffers +to memory BIOs, see L<BIO_s_mem(3)|BIO_s_mem(3)> for details. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<pem(3)|pem(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_RSAPublicKey.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_RSAPublicKey.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..279b29c873c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_RSAPublicKey.pod @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_RSAPublicKey, i2d_RSAPublicKey, d2i_RSAPrivateKey, i2d_RSAPrivateKey, +d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, i2d_Netscape_RSA, +d2i_Netscape_RSA - RSA public and private key encoding functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + RSA * d2i_RSAPublicKey(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_RSAPublicKey(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + RSA * d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + RSA * d2i_RSAPrivateKey(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + + int i2d_RSAPrivateKey(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + + int i2d_Netscape_RSA(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp, int (*cb)()); + + RSA * d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length, int (*cb)()); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +d2i_RSAPublicKey() and i2d_RSAPublicKey() decode and encode a PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey +structure. + +d2i_RSA_PUBKEY() and i2d_RSA_PUBKEY() decode and encode an RSA public key using +a SubjectPublicKeyInfo (certificate public key) structure. + +d2i_RSAPrivateKey(), i2d_RSAPrivateKey() decode and encode a PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey +structure. + +d2i_Netscape_RSA(), i2d_Netscape_RSA() decode and encode an RSA private key in +NET format. + +The usage of all of these functions is similar to the d2i_X509() and +i2d_X509() described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 NOTES + +The B<RSA> structure passed to the private key encoding functions should have +all the PKCS#1 private key components present. + +The data encoded by the private key functions is unencrypted and therefore +offers no private key security. + +The NET format functions are present to provide compatibility with certain very +old software. This format has some severe security weaknesses and should be +avoided if possible. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5bfa18afbb3d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_X509, i2d_X509, d2i_X509_bio, d2i_X509_fp, i2d_X509_bio, +i2d_X509_fp - X509 encode and decode functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **px, const unsigned char **in, int len); + int i2d_X509(X509 *x, unsigned char **out); + + X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x); + X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x); + + int i2d_X509_bio(X509 *x, BIO *bp); + int i2d_X509_fp(X509 *x, FILE *fp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The X509 encode and decode routines encode and parse an +B<X509> structure, which represents an X509 certificate. + +d2i_X509() attempts to decode B<len> bytes at B<*in>. If +successful a pointer to the B<X509> structure is returned. If an error +occurred then B<NULL> is returned. If B<px> is not B<NULL> then the +returned structure is written to B<*px>. If B<*px> is not B<NULL> +then it is assumed that B<*px> contains a valid B<X509> +structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. If the call is +successful B<*in> is incremented to the byte following the +parsed data. + +i2d_X509() encodes the structure pointed to by B<x> into DER format. +If B<out> is not B<NULL> is writes the DER encoded data to the buffer +at B<*out>, and increments it to point after the data just written. +If the return value is negative an error occurred, otherwise it +returns the length of the encoded data. + +For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be +allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this +case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the +data just written. + +d2i_X509_bio() is similar to d2i_X509() except it attempts +to parse data from BIO B<bp>. + +d2i_X509_fp() is similar to d2i_X509() except it attempts +to parse data from FILE pointer B<fp>. + +i2d_X509_bio() is similar to i2d_X509() except it writes +the encoding of the structure B<x> to BIO B<bp> and it +returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. + +i2d_X509_fp() is similar to i2d_X509() except it writes +the encoding of the structure B<x> to BIO B<bp> and it +returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. + +=head1 NOTES + +The letters B<i> and B<d> in for example B<i2d_X509> stand for +"internal" (that is an internal C structure) and "DER". So that +B<i2d_X509> converts from internal to DER. + +The functions can also understand B<BER> forms. + +The actual X509 structure passed to i2d_X509() must be a valid +populated B<X509> structure it can B<not> simply be fed with an +empty structure such as that returned by X509_new(). + +The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeroes. +Therefore any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode. +Functions such as B<strlen()> will B<not> return the correct length +of the encoded structure. + +The ways that B<*in> and B<*out> are incremented after the operation +can trap the unwary. See the B<WARNINGS> section for some common +errors. + +The reason for the auto increment behaviour is to reflect a typical +usage of ASN1 functions: after one structure is encoded or decoded +another will processed after it. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Allocate and encode the DER encoding of an X509 structure: + + int len; + unsigned char *buf, *p; + + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + + if (buf == NULL) + /* error */ + + p = buf; + + i2d_X509(x, &p); + +If you are using OpenSSL 0.9.7 or later then this can be +simplified to: + + + int len; + unsigned char *buf; + + buf = NULL; + + len = i2d_X509(x, &buf); + + if (len < 0) + /* error */ + +Attempt to decode a buffer: + + X509 *x; + + unsigned char *buf, *p; + + int len; + + /* Something to setup buf and len */ + + p = buf; + + x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len); + + if (x == NULL) + /* Some error */ + +Alternative technique: + + X509 *x; + + unsigned char *buf, *p; + + int len; + + /* Something to setup buf and len */ + + p = buf; + + x = NULL; + + if(!d2i_X509(&x, &p, len)) + /* Some error */ + + +=head1 WARNINGS + +The use of temporary variable is mandatory. A common +mistake is to attempt to use a buffer directly as follows: + + int len; + unsigned char *buf; + + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + + if (buf == NULL) + /* error */ + + i2d_X509(x, &buf); + + /* Other stuff ... */ + + OPENSSL_free(buf); + +This code will result in B<buf> apparently containing garbage because +it was incremented after the call to point after the data just written. +Also B<buf> will no longer contain the pointer allocated by B<OPENSSL_malloc()> +and the subsequent call to B<OPENSSL_free()> may well crash. + +The auto allocation feature (setting buf to NULL) only works on OpenSSL +0.9.7 and later. Attempts to use it on earlier versions will typically +cause a segmentation violation. + +Another trap to avoid is misuse of the B<xp> argument to B<d2i_X509()>: + + X509 *x; + + if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, len)) + /* Some error */ + +This will probably crash somewhere in B<d2i_X509()>. The reason for this +is that the variable B<x> is uninitialized and an attempt will be made to +interpret its (invalid) value as an B<X509> structure, typically causing +a segmentation violation. If B<x> is set to NULL first then this will not +happen. + +=head1 BUGS + +In some versions of OpenSSL the "reuse" behaviour of d2i_X509() when +B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may +persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use +of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged. + +i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, +if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error +then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the +fields entirely and will not be parsed by d2i_X509(). This may be +fixed in future so code should not assume that i2d_X509() will +always succeed. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure +or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +i2d_X509(), i2d_X509_bio() and i2d_X509_fp() return a the number of bytes +successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code +can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +i2d_X509_bio() and i2d_X509_fp() returns 1 for success and 0 if an error +occurs The error code can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +d2i_X509, i2d_X509, d2i_X509_bio, d2i_X509_fp, i2d_X509_bio and i2d_X509_fp +are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_ALGOR.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_ALGOR.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9e5cd92ca7ed --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_ALGOR.pod @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_X509_ALGOR, i2d_X509_ALGOR - AlgorithmIdentifier functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + X509_ALGOR *d2i_X509_ALGOR(X509_ALGOR **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_X509_ALGOR(X509_ALGOR *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode an B<X509_ALGOR> structure which is +equivalent to the B<AlgorithmIdentifier> structure. + +Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e7295a5d6153 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_X509_CRL, i2d_X509_CRL, d2i_X509_CRL_bio, d2i_509_CRL_fp, +i2d_X509_CRL_bio, i2d_X509_CRL_fp - PKCS#10 certificate request functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL(X509_CRL **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_X509_CRL(X509_CRL *a, unsigned char **pp); + + X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **x); + X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **x); + + int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(X509_CRL *x, BIO *bp); + int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(X509_CRL *x, FILE *fp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode an X509 CRL (certificate revocation +list). + +Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..343ffe151914 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + X509_NAME *d2i_X509_NAME(X509_NAME **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_X509_NAME(X509_NAME *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the +the same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used +for example in certificate subject and issuer names. + +Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ae32a3891d67 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_X509_REQ, i2d_X509_REQ, d2i_X509_REQ_bio, d2i_X509_REQ_fp, +i2d_X509_REQ_bio, i2d_X509_REQ_fp - PKCS#10 certificate request functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ(X509_REQ **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_X509_REQ(X509_REQ *a, unsigned char **pp); + + X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **x); + X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **x); + + int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(X509_REQ *x, BIO *bp); + int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(X509_REQ *x, FILE *fp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode a PKCS#10 certificate request. + +Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_SIG.pod b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_SIG.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e48fd79a5104 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_SIG.pod @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG - DigestInfo functions. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + X509_SIG *d2i_X509_SIG(X509_SIG **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_X509_SIG(X509_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions decode and encode an X509_SIG structure which is +equivalent to the B<DigestInfo> structure defined in PKCS#1 and PKCS#7. + +Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509() +described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +TBA + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/des.pod b/doc/crypto/des.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6f0cf1cc5e5f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/des.pod @@ -0,0 +1,358 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +DES_random_key, DES_set_key, DES_key_sched, DES_set_key_checked, +DES_set_key_unchecked, DES_set_odd_parity, DES_is_weak_key, +DES_ecb_encrypt, DES_ecb2_encrypt, DES_ecb3_encrypt, DES_ncbc_encrypt, +DES_cfb_encrypt, DES_ofb_encrypt, DES_pcbc_encrypt, DES_cfb64_encrypt, +DES_ofb64_encrypt, DES_xcbc_encrypt, DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt, +DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt, +DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt, DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt, +DES_cbc_cksum, DES_quad_cksum, DES_string_to_key, DES_string_to_2keys, +DES_fcrypt, DES_crypt, DES_enc_read, DES_enc_write - DES encryption + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/des.h> + + void DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret); + + int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); + int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule); + int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key, + DES_key_schedule *schedule); + void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key, + DES_key_schedule *schedule); + + void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key); + int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key); + + void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, + DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc); + void DES_ecb2_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, + DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, int enc); + void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output, + DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, + DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc); + + void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, + int enc); + void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, + DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); + void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, + DES_cblock *ivec); + void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, + int enc); + void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, + int *num, int enc); + void DES_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, + int *num); + + void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec, + const_DES_cblock *inw, const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc); + + void DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, + DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc); + void DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, + unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, + DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); + void DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, + unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, + DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); + + void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, + DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, + int enc); + void DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, + DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec1, DES_cblock *ivec2, + int enc); + void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, + DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc); + void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, + long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, + DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, + DES_cblock *ivec, int *num); + + DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock *output, + long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, + const_DES_cblock *ivec); + DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[], + long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed); + void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key); + void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1, + DES_cblock *key2); + + char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret); + char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt); + + int DES_enc_read(int fd, void *buf, int len, DES_key_schedule *sched, + DES_cblock *iv); + int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *buf, int len, + DES_key_schedule *sched, DES_cblock *iv); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This library contains a fast implementation of the DES encryption +algorithm. + +There are two phases to the use of DES encryption. The first is the +generation of a I<DES_key_schedule> from a key, the second is the +actual encryption. A DES key is of type I<DES_cblock>. This type is +consists of 8 bytes with odd parity. The least significant bit in +each byte is the parity bit. The key schedule is an expanded form of +the key; it is used to speed the encryption process. + +DES_random_key() generates a random key. The PRNG must be seeded +prior to using this function (see L<rand(3)|rand(3)>). If the PRNG +could not generate a secure key, 0 is returned. + +Before a DES key can be used, it must be converted into the +architecture dependent I<DES_key_schedule> via the +DES_set_key_checked() or DES_set_key_unchecked() function. + +DES_set_key_checked() will check that the key passed is of odd parity +and is not a week or semi-weak key. If the parity is wrong, then -1 +is returned. If the key is a weak key, then -2 is returned. If an +error is returned, the key schedule is not generated. + +DES_set_key() works like +DES_set_key_checked() if the I<DES_check_key> flag is non-zero, +otherwise like DES_set_key_unchecked(). These functions are available +for compatibility; it is recommended to use a function that does not +depend on a global variable. + +DES_set_odd_parity() sets the parity of the passed I<key> to odd. + +DES_is_weak_key() returns 1 is the passed key is a weak key, 0 if it +is ok. The probability that a randomly generated key is weak is +1/2^52, so it is not really worth checking for them. + +The following routines mostly operate on an input and output stream of +I<DES_cblock>s. + +DES_ecb_encrypt() is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or +decrypts a single 8-byte I<DES_cblock> in I<electronic code book> +(ECB) mode. It always transforms the input data, pointed to by +I<input>, into the output data, pointed to by the I<output> argument. +If the I<encrypt> argument is non-zero (DES_ENCRYPT), the I<input> +(cleartext) is encrypted in to the I<output> (ciphertext) using the +key_schedule specified by the I<schedule> argument, previously set via +I<DES_set_key>. If I<encrypt> is zero (DES_DECRYPT), the I<input> (now +ciphertext) is decrypted into the I<output> (now cleartext). Input +and output may overlap. DES_ecb_encrypt() does not return a value. + +DES_ecb3_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts the I<input> block by using +three-key Triple-DES encryption in ECB mode. This involves encrypting +the input with I<ks1>, decrypting with the key schedule I<ks2>, and +then encrypting with I<ks3>. This routine greatly reduces the chances +of brute force breaking of DES and has the advantage of if I<ks1>, +I<ks2> and I<ks3> are the same, it is equivalent to just encryption +using ECB mode and I<ks1> as the key. + +The macro DES_ecb2_encrypt() is provided to perform two-key Triple-DES +encryption by using I<ks1> for the final encryption. + +DES_ncbc_encrypt() encrypts/decrypts using the I<cipher-block-chaining> +(CBC) mode of DES. If the I<encrypt> argument is non-zero, the +routine cipher-block-chain encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by +the I<input> argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the I<output> +argument, using the key schedule provided by the I<schedule> argument, +and initialization vector provided by the I<ivec> argument. If the +I<length> argument is not an integral multiple of eight bytes, the +last block is copied to a temporary area and zero filled. The output +is always an integral multiple of eight bytes. + +DES_xcbc_encrypt() is RSA's DESX mode of DES. It uses I<inw> and +I<outw> to 'whiten' the encryption. I<inw> and I<outw> are secret +(unlike the iv) and are as such, part of the key. So the key is sort +of 24 bytes. This is much better than CBC DES. + +DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt() implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with +three keys. This means that each DES operation inside the CBC mode is +really an C<C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M)))>. This mode is used by SSL. + +The DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt() macro implements two-key Triple-DES by +reusing I<ks1> for the final encryption. C<C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M)))>. +This form of Triple-DES is used by the RSAREF library. + +DES_pcbc_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using the propagating cipher block +chaining mode used by Kerberos v4. Its parameters are the same as +DES_ncbc_encrypt(). + +DES_cfb_encrypt() encrypt/decrypts using cipher feedback mode. This +method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of +characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. +Note: the I<ivec> variable is changed and the new changed value needs to +be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs +a complete DES ECB encryption per I<numbits>, this function is only +suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters. + +DES_cfb64_encrypt() +implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this +useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an +arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this +routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec +and num. num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. If this does +not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-). + +DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() is the same as +DES_cfb64_encrypt() except that Triple-DES is used. + +DES_ofb_encrypt() encrypts using output feedback mode. This method +takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of +characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. +Note: the I<ivec> variable is changed and the new changed value needs to +be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs +a complete DES ECB encryption per numbits, this function is only +suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters. + +DES_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as DES_cfb64_encrypt() using Output +Feed Back mode. + +DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt() and DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() is the same as +DES_ofb64_encrypt(), using Triple-DES. + +The following functions are included in the DES library for +compatibility with the MIT Kerberos library. + +DES_cbc_cksum() produces an 8 byte checksum based on the input stream +(via CBC encryption). The last 4 bytes of the checksum are returned +and the complete 8 bytes are placed in I<output>. This function is +used by Kerberos v4. Other applications should use +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead. + +DES_quad_cksum() is a Kerberos v4 function. It returns a 4 byte +checksum from the input bytes. The algorithm can be iterated over the +input, depending on I<out_count>, 1, 2, 3 or 4 times. If I<output> is +non-NULL, the 8 bytes generated by each pass are written into +I<output>. + +The following are DES-based transformations: + +DES_fcrypt() is a fast version of the Unix crypt(3) function. This +version takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast +crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt in +that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value is +written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This function +is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt. + +DES_crypt() is a faster replacement for the normal system crypt(). +This function calls DES_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the +third parameter. This emulates the normal non-thread safe semantics +of crypt(3). + +DES_enc_write() writes I<len> bytes to file descriptor I<fd> from +buffer I<buf>. The data is encrypted via I<pcbc_encrypt> (default) +using I<sched> for the key and I<iv> as a starting vector. The actual +data send down I<fd> consists of 4 bytes (in network byte order) +containing the length of the following encrypted data. The encrypted +data then follows, padded with random data out to a multiple of 8 +bytes. + +DES_enc_read() is used to read I<len> bytes from file descriptor +I<fd> into buffer I<buf>. The data being read from I<fd> is assumed to +have come from DES_enc_write() and is decrypted using I<sched> for +the key schedule and I<iv> for the initial vector. + +B<Warning:> The data format used by DES_enc_write() and DES_enc_read() +has a cryptographic weakness: When asked to write more than MAXWRITE +bytes, DES_enc_write() will split the data into several chunks that +are all encrypted using the same IV. So don't use these functions +unless you are sure you know what you do (in which case you might not +want to use them anyway). They cannot handle non-blocking sockets. +DES_enc_read() uses an internal state and thus cannot be used on +multiple files. + +I<DES_rw_mode> is used to specify the encryption mode to use with +DES_enc_read() and DES_end_write(). If set to I<DES_PCBC_MODE> (the +default), DES_pcbc_encrypt is used. If set to I<DES_CBC_MODE> +DES_cbc_encrypt is used. + +=head1 NOTES + +Single-key DES is insecure due to its short key size. ECB mode is +not suitable for most applications; see L<des_modes(7)|des_modes(7)>. + +The L<evp(3)|evp(3)> library provides higher-level encryption functions. + +=head1 BUGS + +DES_3cbc_encrypt() is flawed and must not be used in applications. + +DES_cbc_encrypt() does not modify B<ivec>; use DES_ncbc_encrypt() +instead. + +DES_cfb_encrypt() and DES_ofb_encrypt() operates on input of 8 bits. +What this means is that if you set numbits to 12, and length to 2, the +first 12 bits will come from the 1st input byte and the low half of +the second input byte. The second 12 bits will have the low 8 bits +taken from the 3rd input byte and the top 4 bits taken from the 4th +input byte. The same holds for output. This function has been +implemented this way because most people will be using a multiple of 8 +and because once you get into pulling bytes input bytes apart things +get ugly! + +DES_string_to_key() is available for backward compatibility with the +MIT library. New applications should use a cryptographic hash function. +The same applies for DES_string_to_2key(). + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +ANSI X3.106 + +The B<des> library was written to be source code compatible with +the MIT Kerberos library. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +crypt(3), L<des_modes(7)|des_modes(7)>, L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +In OpenSSL 0.9.7, all des_ functions were renamed to DES_ to avoid +clashes with older versions of libdes. Compatibility des_ functions +are provided for a short while, as well as crypt(). +Declarations for these are in <openssl/des_old.h>. There is no DES_ +variant for des_random_seed(). +This will happen to other functions +as well if they are deemed redundant (des_random_seed() just calls +RAND_seed() and is present for backward compatibility only), buggy or +already scheduled for removal. + +des_cbc_cksum(), des_cbc_encrypt(), des_ecb_encrypt(), +des_is_weak_key(), des_key_sched(), des_pcbc_encrypt(), +des_quad_cksum(), des_random_key() and des_string_to_key() +are available in the MIT Kerberos library; +des_check_key_parity(), des_fixup_key_parity() and des_is_weak_key() +are available in newer versions of that library. + +des_set_key_checked() and des_set_key_unchecked() were added in +OpenSSL 0.9.5. + +des_generate_random_block(), des_init_random_number_generator(), +des_new_random_key(), des_set_random_generator_seed() and +des_set_sequence_number() and des_rand_data() are used in newer +versions of Kerberos but are not implemented here. + +des_random_key() generated cryptographically weak random data in +SSLeay and in OpenSSL prior version 0.9.5, as well as in the original +MIT library. + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). Modified for the OpenSSL project +(http://www.openssl.org). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod b/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02664036fc6c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +=pod + +=for comment openssl_manual_section:7 + +=head1 NAME + +Modes of DES - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those +are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among +other things. + +=head1 OVERVIEW + +=head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) + +Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb_encrypt(). + +=over 2 + +=item * + +64 bits are enciphered at a time. + +=item * + +The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. + +=item * + +The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block +(for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. + +=item * + +An error will only affect one ciphertext block. + +=back + +=head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) + +Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cbc_encrypt(). +Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does +not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead. + +=over 2 + +=item * + +a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. + +=item * + +The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same +plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. + +=item * + +The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the +current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not +be rearranged. + +=item * + +The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext +enciphering to the same ciphertext. + +=item * + +An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. + +=back + +=head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) + +Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cfb_encrypt(). + +=over 2 + +=item * + +a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. + +=item * + +The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same +plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. + +=item * + +The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the +current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are +chained together and can not be rearranged. + +=item * + +The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext +enciphering to the same ciphertext. + +=item * + +The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if +j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. + +=item * + +Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through +the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause +greater processing overheads. + +=item * + +Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. + +=item * + +An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. + +=back + +=head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB) + +Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ofb_encrypt(). + +=over 2 + + +=item * + +a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. + +=item * + +The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same +plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More +over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same +key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons +a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. + +=item * + +The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. + +=item * + +The use of different start variables values prevents the same +plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different +key streams. + +=item * + +Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through +the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause +greater processing overheads. + +=item * + +Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. + +=item * + +OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the +resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes +only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. + +=item * + +OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of +encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs +to be re-initialized. + +=item * + +Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable +different from the start variable values used before with the same +key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be +produced each time from the same parameters. This would be +susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. + +=back + +=head2 Triple ECB Mode + +Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb3_encrypt(). + +=over 2 + +=item * + +Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. + +=item * + +As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. +There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective +key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of +memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. + +=item * + +If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with +just one key. + +=item * + +If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. +There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength +to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory. + +=item * + +If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal +ecb mode. + +=back + +=head2 Triple CBC Mode + +Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ede3_cbc_encrypt(). + +=over 2 + + +=item * + +Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. + +=item * + +As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with +the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original +documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed +it to: + + AS 2805.5.2 + Australian Standard + Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, + Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm + Appendix A + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<blowfish(3)|blowfish(3)>, L<des(3)|des(3)>, L<idea(3)|idea(3)>, +L<rc2(3)|rc2(3)> + +=cut + diff --git a/doc/crypto/dh.pod b/doc/crypto/dh.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3ccd0620783 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/dh.pod @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +dh - Diffie-Hellman key agreement + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dh.h> + #include <openssl/engine.h> + + DH * DH_new(void); + void DH_free(DH *dh); + + int DH_size(const DH *dh); + + DH * DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator, + void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); + int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *codes); + + int DH_generate_key(DH *dh); + int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + + void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth); + const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void); + int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth); + DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine); + const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void); + + int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(), + int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)()); + int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, char *arg); + char *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx); + + DH * d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_DHparams(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp); + + int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x); + int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions implement the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. +The generation of shared DH parameters is described in +L<DH_generate_parameters(3)|DH_generate_parameters(3)>; L<DH_generate_key(3)|DH_generate_key(3)> describes how +to perform a key agreement. + +The B<DH> structure consists of several BIGNUM components. + + struct + { + BIGNUM *p; // prime number (shared) + BIGNUM *g; // generator of Z_p (shared) + BIGNUM *priv_key; // private DH value x + BIGNUM *pub_key; // public DH value g^x + // ... + }; + DH + +Note that DH keys may use non-standard B<DH_METHOD> implementations, +either directly or by the use of B<ENGINE> modules. In some cases (eg. an +ENGINE providing support for hardware-embedded keys), these BIGNUM values +will not be used by the implementation or may be used for alternative data +storage. For this reason, applications should generally avoid using DH +structure elements directly and instead use API functions to query or +modify keys. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>, +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<engine(3)|engine(3)>, +L<DH_set_method(3)|DH_set_method(3)>, L<DH_new(3)|DH_new(3)>, +L<DH_get_ex_new_index(3)|DH_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<DH_generate_parameters(3)|DH_generate_parameters(3)>, +L<DH_compute_key(3)|DH_compute_key(3)>, L<d2i_DHparams(3)|d2i_DHparams(3)>, +L<RSA_print(3)|RSA_print(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/dsa.pod b/doc/crypto/dsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..da07d2b930ce --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/dsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +dsa - Digital Signature Algorithm + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/dsa.h> + #include <openssl/engine.h> + + DSA * DSA_new(void); + void DSA_free(DSA *dsa); + + int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa); + + DSA * DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed, + int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, + void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg); + + DH * DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r); + + int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa); + + int DSA_sign(int dummy, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa); + int DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp, + BIGNUM **rp); + int DSA_verify(int dummy, const unsigned char *dgst, int len, + const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa); + + void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth); + const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void); + int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth); + DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); + const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void); + + int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(), + int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)()); + int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, char *arg); + char *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx); + + DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void); + void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a); + int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp); + DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **v, unsigned char **pp, long length); + + DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); + int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + + DSA * d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + DSA * d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + DSA * d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp); + int i2d_DSAparams(const DSA *a,unsigned char **pp); + + int DSAparams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x); + int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x); + int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off); + int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions implement the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The +generation of shared DSA parameters is described in +L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)|DSA_generate_parameters(3)>; +L<DSA_generate_key(3)|DSA_generate_key(3)> describes how to +generate a signature key. Signature generation and verification are +described in L<DSA_sign(3)|DSA_sign(3)>. + +The B<DSA> structure consists of several BIGNUM components. + + struct + { + BIGNUM *p; // prime number (public) + BIGNUM *q; // 160-bit subprime, q | p-1 (public) + BIGNUM *g; // generator of subgroup (public) + BIGNUM *priv_key; // private key x + BIGNUM *pub_key; // public key y = g^x + // ... + } + DSA; + +In public keys, B<priv_key> is NULL. + +Note that DSA keys may use non-standard B<DSA_METHOD> implementations, +either directly or by the use of B<ENGINE> modules. In some cases (eg. an +ENGINE providing support for hardware-embedded keys), these BIGNUM values +will not be used by the implementation or may be used for alternative data +storage. For this reason, applications should generally avoid using DSA +structure elements directly and instead use API functions to query or +modify keys. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature +Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<engine(3)|engine(3)>, +L<DSA_new(3)|DSA_new(3)>, +L<DSA_size(3)|DSA_size(3)>, +L<DSA_generate_parameters(3)|DSA_generate_parameters(3)>, +L<DSA_dup_DH(3)|DSA_dup_DH(3)>, +L<DSA_generate_key(3)|DSA_generate_key(3)>, +L<DSA_sign(3)|DSA_sign(3)>, L<DSA_set_method(3)|DSA_set_method(3)>, +L<DSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|DSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<RSA_print(3)|RSA_print(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod b/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..49b10f22499b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +ecdsa - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> + + ECDSA_SIG* ECDSA_SIG_new(void); + void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig); + int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp); + ECDSA_SIG* d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, + long len); + + ECDSA_SIG* ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + EC_KEY *eckey); + ECDSA_SIG* ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, + const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, + EC_KEY *eckey); + int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY* eckey); + int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, + BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp); + int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, + int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, + unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); + int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, + int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, + unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, + const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); + int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, + int dgstlen, const unsigned char *sig, + int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); + int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey); + + const ECDSA_METHOD* ECDSA_OpenSSL(void); + void ECDSA_set_default_method(const ECDSA_METHOD *meth); + const ECDSA_METHOD* ECDSA_get_default_method(void); + int ECDSA_set_method(EC_KEY *eckey,const ECDSA_METHOD *meth); + + int ECDSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + int ECDSA_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg); + void* ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<ECDSA_SIG> structure consists of two BIGNUMs for the +r and s value of a ECDSA signature (see X9.62 or FIPS 186-2). + + struct + { + BIGNUM *r; + BIGNUM *s; + } ECDSA_SIG; + +ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates a new B<ECDSA_SIG> structure (note: this +function also allocates the BIGNUMs) and initialize it. + +ECDSA_SIG_free() frees the B<ECDSA_SIG> structure B<sig>. + +i2d_ECDSA_SIG() creates the DER encoding of the ECDSA signature +B<sig> and writes the encoded signature to B<*pp> (note: if B<pp> +is NULL B<i2d_ECDSA_SIG> returns the expected length in bytes of +the DER encoded signature). B<i2d_ECDSA_SIG> returns the length +of the DER encoded signature (or 0 on error). + +d2i_ECDSA_SIG() decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature and returns +the decoded signature in a newly allocated B<ECDSA_SIG> structure. +B<*sig> points to the buffer containing the DER encoded signature +of size B<len>. + +ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length of a DER encoded +ECDSA signature created with the private EC key B<eckey>. + +ECDSA_sign_setup() may be used to precompute parts of the +signing operation. B<eckey> is the private EC key and B<ctx> +is a pointer to B<BN_CTX> structure (or NULL). The precomputed +values or returned in B<kinv> and B<rp> and can be used in a +later call to B<ECDSA_sign_ex> or B<ECDSA_do_sign_ex>. + +ECDSA_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_sign_ex with B<kinv> +and B<rp> set to NULL. + +ECDSA_sign_ex() computes a digital signature of the B<dgstlen> bytes +hash value B<dgst> using the private EC key B<eckey> and the optional +pre-computed values B<kinv> and B<rp>. The DER encoded signatures is +stored in B<sig> and it's length is returned in B<sig_len>. Note: B<sig> +must point to B<ECDSA_size> bytes of memory. The parameter B<type> +is ignored. + +ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B<sig> of size +B<siglen> is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value +value B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>. +The parameter B<type> is ignored. + +ECDSA_do_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex with B<kinv> +and B<rp> set to NULL. + +ECDSA_do_sign_ex() computes a digital signature of the B<dgst_len> +bytes hash value B<dgst> using the private key B<eckey> and the +optional pre-computed values B<kinv> and B<rp>. The signature is +returned in a newly allocated B<ECDSA_SIG> structure (or NULL on error). + +ECDSA_do_verify() verifies that the signature B<sig> is a valid +ECDSA signature of the hash value B<dgst> of size B<dgst_len> +using the public key B<eckey>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error. + +ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or -1 +on error. + +ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid +signature, 0 for an invalid signature and -1 on error. +The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Creating a ECDSA signature of given SHA-1 hash value using the +named curve secp192k1. + +First step: create a EC_KEY object (note: this part is B<not> ECDSA +specific) + + int ret; + ECDSA_SIG *sig; + EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new(); + if (eckey == NULL) + { + /* error */ + } + key->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(NID_secp192k1); + if (key->group == NULL) + { + /* error */ + } + if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) + { + /* error */ + } + +Second step: compute the ECDSA signature of a SHA-1 hash value +using B<ECDSA_do_sign> + + sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, eckey); + if (sig == NULL) + { + /* error */ + } + +or using B<ECDSA_sign> + + unsigned char *buffer, *pp; + int buf_len; + buf_len = ECDSA_size(eckey); + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); + pp = buffer; + if (!ECDSA_sign(0, dgst, dgstlen, pp, &buf_len, eckey); + { + /* error */ + } + +Third step: verify the created ECDSA signature using B<ECDSA_do_verify> + + ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, sig, eckey); + +or using B<ECDSA_verify> + + ret = ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, buffer, buf_len, eckey); + +and finally evaluate the return value: + + if (ret == -1) + { + /* error */ + } + else if (ret == 0) + { + /* incorrect signature */ + } + else /* ret == 1 */ + { + /* signature ok */ + } + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +ANSI X9.62, US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186-2 +(Digital Signature Standard, DSS) + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The ecdsa implementation was first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.8 + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project (http://www.openssl.org). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/engine.pod b/doc/crypto/engine.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..75933fccadc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/engine.pod @@ -0,0 +1,599 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +engine - ENGINE cryptographic module support + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/engine.h> + + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e); + + int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e); + + ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id); + + int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e); + + void ENGINE_load_openssl(void); + void ENGINE_load_dynamic(void); + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE + void ENGINE_load_4758cca(void); + void ENGINE_load_aep(void); + void ENGINE_load_atalla(void); + void ENGINE_load_chil(void); + void ENGINE_load_cswift(void); + void ENGINE_load_gmp(void); + void ENGINE_load_nuron(void); + void ENGINE_load_sureware(void); + void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void); + #endif + void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void); + void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); + + void ENGINE_cleanup(void); + + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_ECDH(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_ECDSA(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid); + ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid); + + int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_ECDH(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_ECDSA(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *list); + + int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags); + + unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void); + void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags); + + int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void); + int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void); + int ENGINE_register_ECDH(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_ECDH(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_ECDH(void); + int ENGINE_register_ECDSA(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_ECDSA(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_ECDSA(void); + int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void); + int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void); + int ENGINE_register_STORE(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_STORE(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_STORE(void); + int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void); + int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e); + void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void); + int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void); + + int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); + int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd); + int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, + long i, void *p, void (*f)(void), int cmd_optional); + int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg, + int cmd_optional); + + int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg); + void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx); + + int ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void); + int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e); + int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e); + + int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id); + int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name); + int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth); + int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth); + int ENGINE_set_ECDH(ENGINE *e, const ECDH_METHOD *dh_meth); + int ENGINE_set_ECDSA(ENGINE *e, const ECDSA_METHOD *dh_meth); + int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth); + int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth); + int ENGINE_set_STORE(ENGINE *e, const STORE_METHOD *rand_meth); + int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f); + int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f); + int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f); + int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f); + int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f); + int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f); + int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f); + int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f); + int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags); + int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns); + + const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e); + const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e); + const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e); + const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e); + const ECDH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_ECDH(const ENGINE *e); + const ECDSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_ECDSA(const ENGINE *e); + const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e); + const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e); + const STORE_METHOD *ENGINE_get_STORE(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e); + ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e); + const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid); + const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid); + int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e); + const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e); + + EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + + void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions create, manipulate, and use cryptographic modules in the +form of B<ENGINE> objects. These objects act as containers for +implementations of cryptographic algorithms, and support a +reference-counted mechanism to allow them to be dynamically loaded in and +out of the running application. + +The cryptographic functionality that can be provided by an B<ENGINE> +implementation includes the following abstractions; + + RSA_METHOD - for providing alternative RSA implementations + DSA_METHOD, DH_METHOD, RAND_METHOD, ECDH_METHOD, ECDSA_METHOD, + STORE_METHOD - similarly for other OpenSSL APIs + EVP_CIPHER - potentially multiple cipher algorithms (indexed by 'nid') + EVP_DIGEST - potentially multiple hash algorithms (indexed by 'nid') + key-loading - loading public and/or private EVP_PKEY keys + +=head2 Reference counting and handles + +Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to ENGINEs need to be +treated as handles - ie. not only as pointers, but also as references to +the underlying ENGINE object. Ie. one should obtain a new reference when +making copies of an ENGINE pointer if the copies will be used (and +released) independantly. + +ENGINE objects have two levels of reference-counting to match the way in +which the objects are used. At the most basic level, each ENGINE pointer is +inherently a B<structural> reference - a structural reference is required +to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee +that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released. + +However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is +initiliased and able to use any of its cryptographic +implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not +initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to +support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a +B<functional> reference. This kind of reference can be considered a +specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference +implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid +difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two +kinds of reference independantly. If you have a functional reference to an +ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised ready to +perform cryptographic operations and will remain uninitialised +until after you have released your reference. + +I<Structural references> + +This basic type of reference is used for instantiating new ENGINEs, +iterating across OpenSSL's internal linked-list of loaded +ENGINEs, reading information about an ENGINE, etc. Essentially a structural +reference is sufficient if you only need to query or manipulate the data of +an ENGINE implementation rather than use its functionality. + +The ENGINE_new() function returns a structural reference to a new (empty) +ENGINE object. There are other ENGINE API functions that return structural +references such as; ENGINE_by_id(), ENGINE_get_first(), ENGINE_get_last(), +ENGINE_get_next(), ENGINE_get_prev(). All structural references should be +released by a corresponding to call to the ENGINE_free() function - the +ENGINE object itself will only actually be cleaned up and deallocated when +the last structural reference is released. + +It should also be noted that many ENGINE API function calls that accept a +structural reference will internally obtain another reference - typically +this happens whenever the supplied ENGINE will be needed by OpenSSL after +the function has returned. Eg. the function to add a new ENGINE to +OpenSSL's internal list is ENGINE_add() - if this function returns success, +then OpenSSL will have stored a new structural reference internally so the +caller is still responsible for freeing their own reference with +ENGINE_free() when they are finished with it. In a similar way, some +functions will automatically release the structural reference passed to it +if part of the function's job is to do so. Eg. the ENGINE_get_next() and +ENGINE_get_prev() functions are used for iterating across the internal +ENGINE list - they will return a new structural reference to the next (or +previous) ENGINE in the list or NULL if at the end (or beginning) of the +list, but in either case the structural reference passed to the function is +released on behalf of the caller. + +To clarify a particular function's handling of references, one should +always consult that function's documentation "man" page, or failing that +the openssl/engine.h header file includes some hints. + +I<Functional references> + +As mentioned, functional references exist when the cryptographic +functionality of an ENGINE is required to be available. A functional +reference can be obtained in one of two ways; from an existing structural +reference to the required ENGINE, or by asking OpenSSL for the default +operational ENGINE for a given cryptographic purpose. + +To obtain a functional reference from an existing structural reference, +call the ENGINE_init() function. This returns zero if the ENGINE was not +already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (eg. lack of +system drivers, no special hardware attached, etc), otherwise it will +return non-zero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will +have allocated a new B<functional> reference to the ENGINE. All functional +references are released by calling ENGINE_finish() (which removes the +implicit structural reference as well). + +The second way to get a functional reference is by asking OpenSSL for a +default implementation for a given task, eg. by ENGINE_get_default_RSA(), +ENGINE_get_default_cipher_engine(), etc. These are discussed in the next +section, though they are not usually required by application programmers as +they are used automatically when creating and using the relevant +algorithm-specific types in OpenSSL, such as RSA, DSA, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, etc. + +=head2 Default implementations + +For each supported abstraction, the ENGINE code maintains an internal table +of state to control which implementations are available for a given +abstraction and which should be used by default. These implementations are +registered in the tables and indexed by an 'nid' value, because +abstractions like EVP_CIPHER and EVP_DIGEST support many distinct +algorithms and modes, and ENGINEs can support arbitrarily many of them. +In the case of other abstractions like RSA, DSA, etc, there is only one +"algorithm" so all implementations implicitly register using the same 'nid' +index. + +When a default ENGINE is requested for a given abstraction/algorithm/mode, (eg. +when calling RSA_new_method(NULL)), a "get_default" call will be made to the +ENGINE subsystem to process the corresponding state table and return a +functional reference to an initialised ENGINE whose implementation should be +used. If no ENGINE should (or can) be used, it will return NULL and the caller +will operate with a NULL ENGINE handle - this usually equates to using the +conventional software implementation. In the latter case, OpenSSL will from +then on behave the way it used to before the ENGINE API existed. + +Each state table has a flag to note whether it has processed this +"get_default" query since the table was last modified, because to process +this question it must iterate across all the registered ENGINEs in the +table trying to initialise each of them in turn, in case one of them is +operational. If it returns a functional reference to an ENGINE, it will +also cache another reference to speed up processing future queries (without +needing to iterate across the table). Likewise, it will cache a NULL +response if no ENGINE was available so that future queries won't repeat the +same iteration unless the state table changes. This behaviour can also be +changed; if the ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT flag is set (using +ENGINE_set_table_flags()), no attempted initialisations will take place, +instead the only way for the state table to return a non-NULL ENGINE to the +"get_default" query will be if one is expressly set in the table. Eg. +ENGINE_set_default_RSA() does the same job as ENGINE_register_RSA() except +that it also sets the state table's cached response for the "get_default" +query. In the case of abstractions like EVP_CIPHER, where implementations are +indexed by 'nid', these flags and cached-responses are distinct for each 'nid' +value. + +=head2 Application requirements + +This section will explain the basic things an application programmer should +support to make the most useful elements of the ENGINE functionality +available to the user. The first thing to consider is whether the +programmer wishes to make alternative ENGINE modules available to the +application and user. OpenSSL maintains an internal linked list of +"visible" ENGINEs from which it has to operate - at start-up, this list is +empty and in fact if an application does not call any ENGINE API calls and +it uses static linking against openssl, then the resulting application +binary will not contain any alternative ENGINE code at all. So the first +consideration is whether any/all available ENGINE implementations should be +made visible to OpenSSL - this is controlled by calling the various "load" +functions, eg. + + /* Make the "dynamic" ENGINE available */ + void ENGINE_load_dynamic(void); + /* Make the CryptoSwift hardware acceleration support available */ + void ENGINE_load_cswift(void); + /* Make support for nCipher's "CHIL" hardware available */ + void ENGINE_load_chil(void); + ... + /* Make ALL ENGINE implementations bundled with OpenSSL available */ + void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); + +Having called any of these functions, ENGINE objects would have been +dynamically allocated and populated with these implementations and linked +into OpenSSL's internal linked list. At this point it is important to +mention an important API function; + + void ENGINE_cleanup(void); + +If no ENGINE API functions are called at all in an application, then there +are no inherent memory leaks to worry about from the ENGINE functionality, +however if any ENGINEs are loaded, even if they are never registered or +used, it is necessary to use the ENGINE_cleanup() function to +correspondingly cleanup before program exit, if the caller wishes to avoid +memory leaks. This mechanism uses an internal callback registration table +so that any ENGINE API functionality that knows it requires cleanup can +register its cleanup details to be called during ENGINE_cleanup(). This +approach allows ENGINE_cleanup() to clean up after any ENGINE functionality +at all that your program uses, yet doesn't automatically create linker +dependencies to all possible ENGINE functionality - only the cleanup +callbacks required by the functionality you do use will be required by the +linker. + +The fact that ENGINEs are made visible to OpenSSL (and thus are linked into +the program and loaded into memory at run-time) does not mean they are +"registered" or called into use by OpenSSL automatically - that behaviour +is something for the application to control. Some applications +will want to allow the user to specify exactly which ENGINE they want used +if any is to be used at all. Others may prefer to load all support and have +OpenSSL automatically use at run-time any ENGINE that is able to +successfully initialise - ie. to assume that this corresponds to +acceleration hardware attached to the machine or some such thing. There are +probably numerous other ways in which applications may prefer to handle +things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a +couple of simple cases and leave developers to consider these and the +source code to openssl's builtin utilities as guides. + +I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation> + +Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin +to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of +OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be +used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operation, otherwise +OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code +illustrates how to approach this; + + ENGINE *e; + const char *engine_id = "ACME"; + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); + if(!e) + /* the engine isn't available */ + return; + if(!ENGINE_init(e)) { + /* the engine couldn't initialise, release 'e' */ + ENGINE_free(e); + return; + } + if(!ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e)) + /* This should only happen when 'e' can't initialise, but the previous + * statement suggests it did. */ + abort(); + ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e); + ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e); + /* Release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */ + ENGINE_finish(e); + /* Release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */ + ENGINE_free(e); + +I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations> + +Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations +bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by +OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialise, +it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work; + + /* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */ + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + /* Register all of them for every algorithm they collectively implement */ + ENGINE_register_all_complete(); + +That's all that's required. Eg. the next time OpenSSL tries to set up an +RSA key, any bundled ENGINEs that implement RSA_METHOD will be passed to +ENGINE_init() and if any of those succeed, that ENGINE will be set as the +default for RSA use from then on. + +=head2 Advanced configuration support + +There is a mechanism supported by the ENGINE framework that allows each +ENGINE implementation to define an arbitrary set of configuration +"commands" and expose them to OpenSSL and any applications based on +OpenSSL. This mechanism is entirely based on the use of name-value pairs +and assumes ASCII input (no unicode or UTF for now!), so it is ideal if +applications want to provide a transparent way for users to provide +arbitrary configuration "directives" directly to such ENGINEs. It is also +possible for the application to dynamically interrogate the loaded ENGINE +implementations for the names, descriptions, and input flags of their +available "control commands", providing a more flexible configuration +scheme. However, if the user is expected to know which ENGINE device he/she +is using (in the case of specialised hardware, this goes without saying) +then applications may not need to concern themselves with discovering the +supported control commands and simply prefer to pass settings into ENGINEs +exactly as they are provided by the user. + +Before illustrating how control commands work, it is worth mentioning what +they are typically used for. Broadly speaking there are two uses for +control commands; the first is to provide the necessary details to the +implementation (which may know nothing at all specific to the host system) +so that it can be initialised for use. This could include the path to any +driver or config files it needs to load, required network addresses, +smart-card identifiers, passwords to initialise protected devices, +logging information, etc etc. This class of commands typically needs to be +passed to an ENGINE B<before> attempting to initialise it, ie. before +calling ENGINE_init(). The other class of commands consist of settings or +operations that tweak certain behaviour or cause certain operations to take +place, and these commands may work either before or after ENGINE_init(), or +in some cases both. ENGINE implementations should provide indications of +this in the descriptions attached to builtin control commands and/or in +external product documentation. + +I<Issuing control commands to an ENGINE> + +Let's illustrate by example; a function for which the caller supplies the +name of the ENGINE it wishes to use, a table of string-pairs for use before +initialisation, and another table for use after initialisation. Note that +the string-pairs used for control commands consist of a command "name" +followed by the command "parameter" - the parameter could be NULL in some +cases but the name can not. This function should initialise the ENGINE +(issuing the "pre" commands beforehand and the "post" commands afterwards) +and set it as the default for everything except RAND and then return a +boolean success or failure. + + int generic_load_engine_fn(const char *engine_id, + const char **pre_cmds, int pre_num, + const char **post_cmds, int post_num) + { + ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); + if(!e) return 0; + while(pre_num--) { + if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1], 0)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id, + pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1] ? pre_cmds[1] : "(NULL)"); + ENGINE_free(e); + return 0; + } + pre_cmds += 2; + } + if(!ENGINE_init(e)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed initialisation\n"); + ENGINE_free(e); + return 0; + } + /* ENGINE_init() returned a functional reference, so free the structural + * reference from ENGINE_by_id(). */ + ENGINE_free(e); + while(post_num--) { + if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1], 0)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id, + post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1] ? post_cmds[1] : "(NULL)"); + ENGINE_finish(e); + return 0; + } + post_cmds += 2; + } + ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL & ~ENGINE_METHOD_RAND); + /* Success */ + return 1; + } + +Note that ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() accepts a boolean argument that can +relax the semantics of the function - if set non-zero it will only return +failure if the ENGINE supported the given command name but failed while +executing it, if the ENGINE doesn't support the command name it will simply +return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is +only supplying commands specific to the given ENGINE so we set this to +FALSE. + +I<Discovering supported control commands> + +It is possible to discover at run-time the names, numerical-ids, descriptions +and input parameters of the control commands supported by an ENGINE using a +structural reference. Note that some control commands are defined by OpenSSL +itself and it will intercept and handle these control commands on behalf of the +ENGINE, ie. the ENGINE's ctrl() handler is not used for the control command. +openssl/engine.h defines an index, ENGINE_CMD_BASE, that all control commands +implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. Any command value lower than +this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the +OpenSSL core routines. + +It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the the control +commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands; + + #define ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION 10 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE 11 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE 12 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME 13 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD 14 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD 15 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD 16 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD 17 + #define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS 18 + +Whilst these commands are automatically processed by the OpenSSL framework code, +they use various properties exposed by each ENGINE to process these +queries. An ENGINE has 3 properties it exposes that can affect how this behaves; +it can supply a ctrl() handler, it can specify ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL in +the ENGINE's flags, and it can expose an array of control command descriptions. +If an ENGINE specifies the ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag, then it will +simply pass all these "core" control commands directly to the ENGINE's ctrl() +handler (and thus, it must have supplied one), so it is up to the ENGINE to +reply to these "discovery" commands itself. If that flag is not set, then the +OpenSSL framework code will work with the following rules; + + if no ctrl() handler supplied; + ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns FALSE (zero), + all other commands fail. + if a ctrl() handler was supplied but no array of control commands; + ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE, + all other commands fail. + if a ctrl() handler and array of control commands was supplied; + ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE, + all other commands proceed processing ... + +If the ENGINE's array of control commands is empty then all other commands will +fail, otherwise; ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE returns the identifier of +the first command supported by the ENGINE, ENGINE_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE takes the +identifier of a command supported by the ENGINE and returns the next command +identifier or fails if there are no more, ENGINE_CMD_FROM_NAME takes a string +name for a command and returns the corresponding identifier or fails if no such +command name exists, and the remaining commands take a command identifier and +return properties of the corresponding commands. All except +ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS return the string length of a command name or description, +or populate a supplied character buffer with a copy of the command name or +description. ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS returns a bitwise-OR'd mask of the following +possible values; + + #define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC (unsigned int)0x0001 + #define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING (unsigned int)0x0002 + #define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT (unsigned int)0x0004 + #define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL (unsigned int)0x0008 + +If the ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL flag is set, then any other flags are purely +informational to the caller - this flag will prevent the command being usable +for any higher-level ENGINE functions such as ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). +"INTERNAL" commands are not intended to be exposed to text-based configuration +by applications, administrations, users, etc. These can support arbitrary +operations via ENGINE_ctrl(), including passing to and/or from the control +commands data of any arbitrary type. These commands are supported in the +discovery mechanisms simply to allow applications determinie if an ENGINE +supports certain specific commands it might want to use (eg. application "foo" +might query various ENGINEs to see if they implement "FOO_GET_VENDOR_LOGO_GIF" - +and ENGINE could therefore decide whether or not to support this "foo"-specific +extension). + +=head2 Future developments + +The ENGINE API and internal architecture is currently being reviewed. Slated for +possible release in 0.9.8 is support for transparent loading of "dynamic" +ENGINEs (built as self-contained shared-libraries). This would allow ENGINE +implementations to be provided independantly of OpenSSL libraries and/or +OpenSSL-based applications, and would also remove any requirement for +applications to explicitly use the "dynamic" ENGINE to bind to shared-library +implementations. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(3)|rsa(3)>, L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/err.pod b/doc/crypto/err.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6f729554d2a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/err.pod @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +err - error codes + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/err.h> + + unsigned long ERR_get_error(void); + unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void); + unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line); + unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line); + unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, + const char **data, int *flags); + unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, + const char **data, int *flags); + + int ERR_GET_LIB(unsigned long e); + int ERR_GET_FUNC(unsigned long e); + int ERR_GET_REASON(unsigned long e); + + void ERR_clear_error(void); + + char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf); + const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e); + const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e); + const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e); + + void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp); + void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp); + + void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void); + void ERR_free_strings(void); + + void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid); + + void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, + int line); + void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...); + + void ERR_load_strings(int lib,ERR_STRING_DATA str[]); + unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason); + int ERR_get_next_error_library(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +When a call to the OpenSSL library fails, this is usually signalled +by the return value, and an error code is stored in an error queue +associated with the current thread. The B<err> library provides +functions to obtain these error codes and textual error messages. + +The L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)> manpage describes how to +access error codes. + +Error codes contain information about where the error occurred, and +what went wrong. L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)|ERR_GET_LIB(3)> describes how to +extract this information. A method to obtain human-readable error +messages is described in L<ERR_error_string(3)|ERR_error_string(3)>. + +L<ERR_clear_error(3)|ERR_clear_error(3)> can be used to clear the +error queue. + +Note that L<ERR_remove_state(3)|ERR_remove_state(3)> should be used to +avoid memory leaks when threads are terminated. + +=head1 ADDING NEW ERROR CODES TO OPENSSL + +See L<ERR_put_error(3)> if you want to record error codes in the +OpenSSL error system from within your application. + +The remainder of this section is of interest only if you want to add +new error codes to OpenSSL or add error codes from external libraries. + +=head2 Reporting errors + +Each sub-library has a specific macro XXXerr() that is used to report +errors. Its first argument is a function code B<XXX_F_...>, the second +argument is a reason code B<XXX_R_...>. Function codes are derived +from the function names; reason codes consist of textual error +descriptions. For example, the function ssl23_read() reports a +"handshake failure" as follows: + + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_READ, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + +Function and reason codes should consist of upper case characters, +numbers and underscores only. The error file generation script translates +function codes into function names by looking in the header files +for an appropriate function name, if none is found it just uses +the capitalized form such as "SSL23_READ" in the above example. + +The trailing section of a reason code (after the "_R_") is translated +into lower case and underscores changed to spaces. + +When you are using new function or reason codes, run B<make errors>. +The necessary B<#define>s will then automatically be added to the +sub-library's header file. + +Although a library will normally report errors using its own specific +XXXerr macro, another library's macro can be used. This is normally +only done when a library wants to include ASN1 code which must use +the ASN1err() macro. + +=head2 Adding new libraries + +When adding a new sub-library to OpenSSL, assign it a library number +B<ERR_LIB_XXX>, define a macro XXXerr() (both in B<err.h>), add its +name to B<ERR_str_libraries[]> (in B<crypto/err/err.c>), and add +C<ERR_load_XXX_strings()> to the ERR_load_crypto_strings() function +(in B<crypto/err/err_all.c>). Finally, add an entry + + L XXX xxx.h xxx_err.c + +to B<crypto/err/openssl.ec>, and add B<xxx_err.c> to the Makefile. +Running B<make errors> will then generate a file B<xxx_err.c>, and +add all error codes used in the library to B<xxx.h>. + +Additionally the library include file must have a certain form. +Typically it will initially look like this: + + #ifndef HEADER_XXX_H + #define HEADER_XXX_H + + #ifdef __cplusplus + extern "C" { + #endif + + /* Include files */ + + #include <openssl/bio.h> + #include <openssl/x509.h> + + /* Macros, structures and function prototypes */ + + + /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ + +The B<BEGIN ERROR CODES> sequence is used by the error code +generation script as the point to place new error codes, any text +after this point will be overwritten when B<make errors> is run. +The closing #endif etc will be automatically added by the script. + +The generated C error code file B<xxx_err.c> will load the header +files B<stdio.h>, B<openssl/err.h> and B<openssl/xxx.h> so the +header file must load any additional header files containing any +definitions it uses. + +=head1 USING ERROR CODES IN EXTERNAL LIBRARIES + +It is also possible to use OpenSSL's error code scheme in external +libraries. The library needs to load its own codes and call the OpenSSL +error code insertion script B<mkerr.pl> explicitly to add codes to +the header file and generate the C error code file. This will normally +be done if the external library needs to generate new ASN1 structures +but it can also be used to add more general purpose error code handling. + +TBA more details + +=head1 INTERNALS + +The error queues are stored in a hash table with one B<ERR_STATE> +entry for each pid. ERR_get_state() returns the current thread's +B<ERR_STATE>. An B<ERR_STATE> can hold up to B<ERR_NUM_ERRORS> error +codes. When more error codes are added, the old ones are overwritten, +on the assumption that the most recent errors are most important. + +Error strings are also stored in hash table. The hash tables can +be obtained by calling ERR_get_err_state_table(void) and +ERR_get_string_table(void) respectively. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<CRYPTO_set_id_callback(3)|CRYPTO_set_id_callback(3)>, +L<CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(3)|CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(3)>, +L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, +L<ERR_GET_LIB(3)|ERR_GET_LIB(3)>, +L<ERR_clear_error(3)|ERR_clear_error(3)>, +L<ERR_error_string(3)|ERR_error_string(3)>, +L<ERR_print_errors(3)|ERR_print_errors(3)>, +L<ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)|ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)>, +L<ERR_remove_state(3)|ERR_remove_state(3)>, +L<ERR_put_error(3)|ERR_put_error(3)>, +L<ERR_load_strings(3)|ERR_load_strings(3)>, +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/evp.pod b/doc/crypto/evp.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b3ca14314fac --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/evp.pod @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +evp - high-level cryptographic functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/evp.h> + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The EVP library provides a high-level interface to cryptographic +functions. + +B<EVP_Seal>I<...> and B<EVP_Open>I<...> provide public key encryption +and decryption to implement digital "envelopes". + +The B<EVP_Sign>I<...> and B<EVP_Verify>I<...> functions implement +digital signatures. + +Symmetric encryption is available with the B<EVP_Encrypt>I<...> +functions. The B<EVP_Digest>I<...> functions provide message digests. + +Algorithms are loaded with OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3). + +All the symmetric algorithms (ciphers) and digests can be replaced by ENGINE +modules providing alternative implementations. If ENGINE implementations of +ciphers or digests are registered as defaults, then the various EVP functions +will automatically use those implementations automatically in preference to +built in software implementations. For more information, consult the engine(3) +man page. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)>, +L<EVP_OpenInit(3)|EVP_OpenInit(3)>, +L<EVP_SealInit(3)|EVP_SealInit(3)>, +L<EVP_SignInit(3)|EVP_SignInit(3)>, +L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>, +L<OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)|OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)>, +L<engine(3)|engine(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/hmac.pod b/doc/crypto/hmac.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0bd79a6d3a98 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/hmac.pod @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +HMAC, HMAC_Init, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_cleanup - HMAC message +authentication code + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/hmac.h> + + unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, + int key_len, const unsigned char *d, int n, + unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_len); + + void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx); + + void HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, + const EVP_MD *md); + void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, + const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl); + void HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, int len); + void HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); + + void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx); + void HMAC_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +HMAC is a MAC (message authentication code), i.e. a keyed hash +function used for message authentication, which is based on a hash +function. + +HMAC() computes the message authentication code of the B<n> bytes at +B<d> using the hash function B<evp_md> and the key B<key> which is +B<key_len> bytes long. + +It places the result in B<md> (which must have space for the output of +the hash function, which is no more than B<EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE> bytes). +If B<md> is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array. The size of +the output is placed in B<md_len>, unless it is B<NULL>. + +B<evp_md> can be EVP_sha1(), EVP_ripemd160() etc. +B<key> and B<evp_md> may be B<NULL> if a key and hash function have +been set in a previous call to HMAC_Init() for that B<HMAC_CTX>. + +HMAC_CTX_init() initialises a B<HMAC_CTX> before first use. It must be +called. + +HMAC_CTX_cleanup() erases the key and other data from the B<HMAC_CTX> +and releases any associated resources. It must be called when an +B<HMAC_CTX> is no longer required. + +HMAC_cleanup() is an alias for HMAC_CTX_cleanup() included for back +compatibility with 0.9.6b, it is deprecated. + +The following functions may be used if the message is not completely +stored in memory: + +HMAC_Init() initializes a B<HMAC_CTX> structure to use the hash +function B<evp_md> and the key B<key> which is B<key_len> bytes +long. It is deprecated and only included for backward compatibility +with OpenSSL 0.9.6b. + +HMAC_Init_ex() initializes or reuses a B<HMAC_CTX> structure to use +the function B<evp_md> and key B<key>. Either can be NULL, in which +case the existing one will be reused. HMAC_CTX_init() must have been +called before the first use of an B<HMAC_CTX> in this +function. B<N.B. HMAC_Init() had this undocumented behaviour in +previous versions of OpenSSL - failure to switch to HMAC_Init_ex() in +programs that expect it will cause them to stop working>. + +HMAC_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to +be authenticated (B<len> bytes at B<data>). + +HMAC_Final() places the message authentication code in B<md>, which +must have space for the hash function output. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +HMAC() returns a pointer to the message authentication code. + +HMAC_CTX_init(), HMAC_Init_ex(), HMAC_Update(), HMAC_Final() and +HMAC_CTX_cleanup() do not return values. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +RFC 2104 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<evp(3)|evp(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +HMAC(), HMAC_Init(), HMAC_Update(), HMAC_Final() and HMAC_cleanup() +are available since SSLeay 0.9.0. + +HMAC_CTX_init(), HMAC_Init_ex() and HMAC_CTX_cleanup() are available +since OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/lh_stats.pod b/doc/crypto/lh_stats.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3eeaa72e525d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/lh_stats.pod @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +lh_stats, lh_node_stats, lh_node_usage_stats, lh_stats_bio, +lh_node_stats_bio, lh_node_usage_stats_bio - LHASH statistics + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/lhash.h> + + void lh_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out); + void lh_node_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out); + void lh_node_usage_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out); + + void lh_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out); + void lh_node_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out); + void lh_node_usage_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The B<LHASH> structure records statistics about most aspects of +accessing the hash table. This is mostly a legacy of Eric Young +writing this library for the reasons of implementing what looked like +a nice algorithm rather than for a particular software product. + +lh_stats() prints out statistics on the size of the hash table, how +many entries are in it, and the number and result of calls to the +routines in this library. + +lh_node_stats() prints the number of entries for each 'bucket' in the +hash table. + +lh_node_usage_stats() prints out a short summary of the state of the +hash table. It prints the 'load' and the 'actual load'. The load is +the average number of data items per 'bucket' in the hash table. The +'actual load' is the average number of items per 'bucket', but only +for buckets which contain entries. So the 'actual load' is the +average number of searches that will need to find an item in the hash +table, while the 'load' is the average number that will be done to +record a miss. + +lh_stats_bio(), lh_node_stats_bio() and lh_node_usage_stats_bio() +are the same as the above, except that the output goes to a B<BIO>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +These functions do not return values. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<bio(3)|bio(3)>, L<lhash(3)|lhash(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +These functions are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +This manpage is derived from the SSLeay documentation. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/lhash.pod b/doc/crypto/lhash.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dcdbb43a8ed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/lhash.pod @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +lh_new, lh_free, lh_insert, lh_delete, lh_retrieve, lh_doall, lh_doall_arg, lh_error - dynamic hash table + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/lhash.h> + + LHASH *lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE hash, LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE compare); + void lh_free(LHASH *table); + + void *lh_insert(LHASH *table, void *data); + void *lh_delete(LHASH *table, void *data); + void *lh_retrieve(LHASH *table, void *data); + + void lh_doall(LHASH *table, LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE func); + void lh_doall_arg(LHASH *table, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE func, + void *arg); + + int lh_error(LHASH *table); + + typedef int (*LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE)(const void *, const void *); + typedef unsigned long (*LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE)(const void *); + typedef void (*LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE)(const void *); + typedef void (*LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE)(const void *, const void *); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This library implements dynamic hash tables. The hash table entries +can be arbitrary structures. Usually they consist of key and value +fields. + +lh_new() creates a new B<LHASH> structure to store arbitrary data +entries, and provides the 'hash' and 'compare' callbacks to be used in +organising the table's entries. The B<hash> callback takes a pointer +to a table entry as its argument and returns an unsigned long hash +value for its key field. The hash value is normally truncated to a +power of 2, so make sure that your hash function returns well mixed +low order bits. The B<compare> callback takes two arguments (pointers +to two hash table entries), and returns 0 if their keys are equal, +non-zero otherwise. If your hash table will contain items of some +particular type and the B<hash> and B<compare> callbacks hash/compare +these types, then the B<DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN> and +B<IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN> macros can be used to create callback +wrappers of the prototypes required by lh_new(). These provide +per-variable casts before calling the type-specific callbacks written +by the application author. These macros, as well as those used for +the "doall" callbacks, are defined as; + + #define DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN(f_name,o_type) \ + unsigned long f_name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *); + #define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(f_name,o_type) \ + unsigned long f_name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *arg) { \ + o_type a = (o_type)arg; \ + return f_name(a); } + #define LHASH_HASH_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_HASH + + #define DECLARE_LHASH_COMP_FN(f_name,o_type) \ + int f_name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *, const void *); + #define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(f_name,o_type) \ + int f_name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { \ + o_type a = (o_type)arg1; \ + o_type b = (o_type)arg2; \ + return f_name(a,b); } + #define LHASH_COMP_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_COMP + + #define DECLARE_LHASH_DOALL_FN(f_name,o_type) \ + void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL(const void *); + #define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(f_name,o_type) \ + void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL(const void *arg) { \ + o_type a = (o_type)arg; \ + f_name(a); } + #define LHASH_DOALL_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_DOALL + + #define DECLARE_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(f_name,o_type,a_type) \ + void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(const void *, const void *); + #define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(f_name,o_type,a_type) \ + void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { \ + o_type a = (o_type)arg1; \ + a_type b = (a_type)arg2; \ + f_name(a,b); } + #define LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG + +An example of a hash table storing (pointers to) structures of type 'STUFF' +could be defined as follows; + + /* Calculates the hash value of 'tohash' (implemented elsewhere) */ + unsigned long STUFF_hash(const STUFF *tohash); + /* Orders 'arg1' and 'arg2' (implemented elsewhere) */ + int STUFF_cmp(const STUFF *arg1, const STUFF *arg2); + /* Create the type-safe wrapper functions for use in the LHASH internals */ + static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(STUFF_hash, const STUFF *) + static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(STUFF_cmp, const STUFF *); + /* ... */ + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + /* Create the new hash table using the hash/compare wrappers */ + LHASH *hashtable = lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(STUFF_hash), + LHASH_COMP_FN(STUFF_cmp)); + /* ... */ + } + +lh_free() frees the B<LHASH> structure B<table>. Allocated hash table +entries will not be freed; consider using lh_doall() to deallocate any +remaining entries in the hash table (see below). + +lh_insert() inserts the structure pointed to by B<data> into B<table>. +If there already is an entry with the same key, the old value is +replaced. Note that lh_insert() stores pointers, the data are not +copied. + +lh_delete() deletes an entry from B<table>. + +lh_retrieve() looks up an entry in B<table>. Normally, B<data> is +a structure with the key field(s) set; the function will return a +pointer to a fully populated structure. + +lh_doall() will, for every entry in the hash table, call B<func> with +the data item as its parameter. For lh_doall() and lh_doall_arg(), +function pointer casting should be avoided in the callbacks (see +B<NOTE>) - instead, either declare the callbacks to match the +prototype required in lh_new() or use the declare/implement macros to +create type-safe wrappers that cast variables prior to calling your +type-specific callbacks. An example of this is illustrated here where +the callback is used to cleanup resources for items in the hash table +prior to the hashtable itself being deallocated: + + /* Cleans up resources belonging to 'a' (this is implemented elsewhere) */ + void STUFF_cleanup(STUFF *a); + /* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "STUFF_cleanup" */ + IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(STUFF_cleanup, STUFF *) + /* ... then later in the code ... */ + /* So to run "STUFF_cleanup" against all items in a hash table ... */ + lh_doall(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_FN(STUFF_cleanup)); + /* Then the hash table itself can be deallocated */ + lh_free(hashtable); + +When doing this, be careful if you delete entries from the hash table +in your callbacks: the table may decrease in size, moving the item +that you are currently on down lower in the hash table - this could +cause some entries to be skipped during the iteration. The second +best solution to this problem is to set hash-E<gt>down_load=0 before +you start (which will stop the hash table ever decreasing in size). +The best solution is probably to avoid deleting items from the hash +table inside a "doall" callback! + +lh_doall_arg() is the same as lh_doall() except that B<func> will be +called with B<arg> as the second argument and B<func> should be of +type B<LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE> (a callback prototype that is passed +both the table entry and an extra argument). As with lh_doall(), you +can instead choose to declare your callback with a prototype matching +the types you are dealing with and use the declare/implement macros to +create compatible wrappers that cast variables before calling your +type-specific callbacks. An example of this is demonstrated here +(printing all hash table entries to a BIO that is provided by the +caller): + + /* Prints item 'a' to 'output_bio' (this is implemented elsewhere) */ + void STUFF_print(const STUFF *a, BIO *output_bio); + /* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "STUFF_print" */ + static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(STUFF_print, const STUFF *, BIO *) + /* ... then later in the code ... */ + /* Print out the entire hashtable to a particular BIO */ + lh_doall_arg(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(STUFF_print), logging_bio); + +lh_error() can be used to determine if an error occurred in the last +operation. lh_error() is a macro. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +lh_new() returns B<NULL> on error, otherwise a pointer to the new +B<LHASH> structure. + +When a hash table entry is replaced, lh_insert() returns the value +being replaced. B<NULL> is returned on normal operation and on error. + +lh_delete() returns the entry being deleted. B<NULL> is returned if +there is no such value in the hash table. + +lh_retrieve() returns the hash table entry if it has been found, +B<NULL> otherwise. + +lh_error() returns 1 if an error occurred in the last operation, 0 +otherwise. + +lh_free(), lh_doall() and lh_doall_arg() return no values. + +=head1 NOTE + +The various LHASH macros and callback types exist to make it possible +to write type-safe code without resorting to function-prototype +casting - an evil that makes application code much harder to +audit/verify and also opens the window of opportunity for stack +corruption and other hard-to-find bugs. It also, apparently, violates +ANSI-C. + +The LHASH code regards table entries as constant data. As such, it +internally represents lh_insert()'d items with a "const void *" +pointer type. This is why callbacks such as those used by lh_doall() +and lh_doall_arg() declare their prototypes with "const", even for the +parameters that pass back the table items' data pointers - for +consistency, user-provided data is "const" at all times as far as the +LHASH code is concerned. However, as callers are themselves providing +these pointers, they can choose whether they too should be treating +all such parameters as constant. + +As an example, a hash table may be maintained by code that, for +reasons of encapsulation, has only "const" access to the data being +indexed in the hash table (ie. it is returned as "const" from +elsewhere in their code) - in this case the LHASH prototypes are +appropriate as-is. Conversely, if the caller is responsible for the +life-time of the data in question, then they may well wish to make +modifications to table item passed back in the lh_doall() or +lh_doall_arg() callbacks (see the "STUFF_cleanup" example above). If +so, the caller can either cast the "const" away (if they're providing +the raw callbacks themselves) or use the macros to declare/implement +the wrapper functions without "const" types. + +Callers that only have "const" access to data they're indexing in a +table, yet declare callbacks without constant types (or cast the +"const" away themselves), are therefore creating their own risks/bugs +without being encouraged to do so by the API. On a related note, +those auditing code should pay special attention to any instances of +DECLARE/IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_[ARG_]_FN macros that provide types +without any "const" qualifiers. + +=head1 BUGS + +lh_insert() returns B<NULL> both for success and error. + +=head1 INTERNALS + +The following description is based on the SSLeay documentation: + +The B<lhash> library implements a hash table described in the +I<Communications of the ACM> in 1991. What makes this hash table +different is that as the table fills, the hash table is increased (or +decreased) in size via OPENSSL_realloc(). When a 'resize' is done, instead of +all hashes being redistributed over twice as many 'buckets', one +bucket is split. So when an 'expand' is done, there is only a minimal +cost to redistribute some values. Subsequent inserts will cause more +single 'bucket' redistributions but there will never be a sudden large +cost due to redistributing all the 'buckets'. + +The state for a particular hash table is kept in the B<LHASH> structure. +The decision to increase or decrease the hash table size is made +depending on the 'load' of the hash table. The load is the number of +items in the hash table divided by the size of the hash table. The +default values are as follows. If (hash->up_load E<lt> load) =E<gt> +expand. if (hash-E<gt>down_load E<gt> load) =E<gt> contract. The +B<up_load> has a default value of 1 and B<down_load> has a default value +of 2. These numbers can be modified by the application by just +playing with the B<up_load> and B<down_load> variables. The 'load' is +kept in a form which is multiplied by 256. So +hash-E<gt>up_load=8*256; will cause a load of 8 to be set. + +If you are interested in performance the field to watch is +num_comp_calls. The hash library keeps track of the 'hash' value for +each item so when a lookup is done, the 'hashes' are compared, if +there is a match, then a full compare is done, and +hash-E<gt>num_comp_calls is incremented. If num_comp_calls is not equal +to num_delete plus num_retrieve it means that your hash function is +generating hashes that are the same for different values. It is +probably worth changing your hash function if this is the case because +even if your hash table has 10 items in a 'bucket', it can be searched +with 10 B<unsigned long> compares and 10 linked list traverses. This +will be much less expensive that 10 calls to your compare function. + +lh_strhash() is a demo string hashing function: + + unsigned long lh_strhash(const char *c); + +Since the B<LHASH> routines would normally be passed structures, this +routine would not normally be passed to lh_new(), rather it would be +used in the function passed to lh_new(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<lh_stats(3)|lh_stats(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The B<lhash> library is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +lh_error() was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b. + +This manpage is derived from the SSLeay documentation. + +In OpenSSL 0.9.7, all lhash functions that were passed function pointers +were changed for better type safety, and the function types LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE, +LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE, LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE and LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE +became available. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/md5.pod b/doc/crypto/md5.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d11d5c32cbf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/md5.pod @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +MD2, MD4, MD5, MD2_Init, MD2_Update, MD2_Final, MD4_Init, MD4_Update, +MD4_Final, MD5_Init, MD5_Update, MD5_Final - MD2, MD4, and MD5 hash functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/md2.h> + + unsigned char *MD2(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, + unsigned char *md); + + int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c); + int MD2_Update(MD2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, + unsigned long len); + int MD2_Final(unsigned char *md, MD2_CTX *c); + + + #include <openssl/md4.h> + + unsigned char *MD4(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, + unsigned char *md); + + int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *c); + int MD4_Update(MD4_CTX *c, const void *data, + unsigned long len); + int MD4_Final(unsigned char *md, MD4_CTX *c); + + + #include <openssl/md5.h> + + unsigned char *MD5(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, + unsigned char *md); + + int MD5_Init(MD5_CTX *c); + int MD5_Update(MD5_CTX *c, const void *data, + unsigned long len); + int MD5_Final(unsigned char *md, MD5_CTX *c); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +MD2, MD4, and MD5 are cryptographic hash functions with a 128 bit output. + +MD2(), MD4(), and MD5() compute the MD2, MD4, and MD5 message digest +of the B<n> bytes at B<d> and place it in B<md> (which must have space +for MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH == MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH == MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 +bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest is placed in a static +array. + +The following functions may be used if the message is not completely +stored in memory: + +MD2_Init() initializes a B<MD2_CTX> structure. + +MD2_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to +be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>). + +MD2_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space +for MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output, and erases the B<MD2_CTX>. + +MD4_Init(), MD4_Update(), MD4_Final(), MD5_Init(), MD5_Update(), and +MD5_Final() are analogous using an B<MD4_CTX> and B<MD5_CTX> structure. + +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> +etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly. + +=head1 NOTE + +MD2, MD4, and MD5 are recommended only for compatibility with existing +applications. In new applications, SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160 should be +preferred. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +MD2(), MD4(), and MD5() return pointers to the hash value. + +MD2_Init(), MD2_Update(), MD2_Final(), MD4_Init(), MD4_Update(), +MD4_Final(), MD5_Init(), MD5_Update(), and MD5_Final() return 1 for +success, 0 otherwise. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +RFC 1319, RFC 1320, RFC 1321 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>, L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +MD2(), MD2_Init(), MD2_Update() MD2_Final(), MD5(), MD5_Init(), +MD5_Update() and MD5_Final() are available in all versions of SSLeay +and OpenSSL. + +MD4(), MD4_Init(), and MD4_Update() are available in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and +above. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/mdc2.pod b/doc/crypto/mdc2.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..41f648af3636 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/mdc2.pod @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +MDC2, MDC2_Init, MDC2_Update, MDC2_Final - MDC2 hash function + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/mdc2.h> + + unsigned char *MDC2(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, + unsigned char *md); + + int MDC2_Init(MDC2_CTX *c); + int MDC2_Update(MDC2_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data, + unsigned long len); + int MDC2_Final(unsigned char *md, MDC2_CTX *c); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +MDC2 is a method to construct hash functions with 128 bit output from +block ciphers. These functions are an implementation of MDC2 with +DES. + +MDC2() computes the MDC2 message digest of the B<n> +bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for +MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest +is placed in a static array. + +The following functions may be used if the message is not completely +stored in memory: + +MDC2_Init() initializes a B<MDC2_CTX> structure. + +MDC2_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to +be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>). + +MDC2_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space +for MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH == 16 bytes of output, and erases the B<MDC2_CTX>. + +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the +hash functions directly. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +MDC2() returns a pointer to the hash value. + +MDC2_Init(), MDC2_Update() and MDC2_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +ISO/IEC 10118-2, with DES + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +MDC2(), MDC2_Init(), MDC2_Update() and MDC2_Final() are available since +SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/pem.pod b/doc/crypto/pem.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4f9a27df0cc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/pem.pod @@ -0,0 +1,476 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +PEM - PEM routines + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/pem.h> + + EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid, + char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x); + int PEM_write_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x); + + RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + RSA *PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(BIO *bp, RSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + RSA *PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(FILE *fp, RSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(BIO *bp, RSA *x); + + int PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(FILE *fp, RSA *x); + + RSA *PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, RSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + RSA *PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, RSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, RSA *x); + + int PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, RSA *x); + + DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + DSA *PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(BIO *bp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, DSA *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr, int klen, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, DSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + DSA *PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, DSA **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(BIO *bp, DSA *x); + + int PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(FILE *fp, DSA *x); + + DSA *PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(BIO *bp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + DSA *PEM_read_DSAparams(FILE *fp, DSA **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_DSAparams(BIO *bp, DSA *x); + + int PEM_write_DSAparams(FILE *fp, DSA *x); + + DH *PEM_read_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + DH *PEM_read_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_DHparams(BIO *bp, DH *x); + + int PEM_write_DHparams(FILE *fp, DH *x); + + X509 *PEM_read_bio_X509(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + X509 *PEM_read_X509(FILE *fp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_X509(BIO *bp, X509 *x); + + int PEM_write_X509(FILE *fp, X509 *x); + + X509 *PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(BIO *bp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + X509 *PEM_read_X509_AUX(FILE *fp, X509 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX(BIO *bp, X509 *x); + + int PEM_write_X509_AUX(FILE *fp, X509 *x); + + X509_REQ *PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + X509_REQ *PEM_read_X509_REQ(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x); + + int PEM_write_X509_REQ(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x); + + int PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x); + + int PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *x); + + X509_CRL *PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + X509_CRL *PEM_read_X509_CRL(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + int PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *x); + int PEM_write_X509_CRL(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *x); + + PKCS7 *PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + PKCS7 *PEM_read_PKCS7(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *x); + + int PEM_write_PKCS7(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *x); + + NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(BIO *bp, + NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(FILE *fp, + NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE **x, + pem_password_cb *cb, void *u); + + int PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(BIO *bp, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *x); + + int PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE(FILE *fp, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE *x); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The PEM functions read or write structures in PEM format. In +this sense PEM format is simply base64 encoded data surrounded +by header lines. + +For more details about the meaning of arguments see the +B<PEM FUNCTION ARGUMENTS> section. + +Each operation has four functions associated with it. For +clarity the term "B<foobar> functions" will be used to collectively +refer to the PEM_read_bio_foobar(), PEM_read_foobar(), +PEM_write_bio_foobar() and PEM_write_foobar() functions. + +The B<PrivateKey> functions read or write a private key in +PEM format using an EVP_PKEY structure. The write routines use +"traditional" private key format and can handle both RSA and DSA +private keys. The read functions can additionally transparently +handle PKCS#8 format encrypted and unencrypted keys too. + +PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() +write a private key in an EVP_PKEY structure in PKCS#8 +EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo format using PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption +algorithms. The B<cipher> argument specifies the encryption algoritm to +use: unlike all other PEM routines the encryption is applied at the +PKCS#8 level and not in the PEM headers. If B<cipher> is NULL then no +encryption is used and a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo structure is used instead. + +PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid() and PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid() +also write out a private key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo however +it uses PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 encryption algorithms instead. The algorithm +to use is specified in the B<nid> parameter and should be the NID of the +corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER (see NOTES section). + +The B<PUBKEY> functions process a public key using an EVP_PKEY +structure. The public key is encoded as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo +structure. + +The B<RSAPrivateKey> functions process an RSA private key using an +RSA structure. It handles the same formats as the B<PrivateKey> +functions but an error occurs if the private key is not RSA. + +The B<RSAPublicKey> functions process an RSA public key using an +RSA structure. The public key is encoded using a PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey +structure. + +The B<RSA_PUBKEY> functions also process an RSA public key using +an RSA structure. However the public key is encoded using a +SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public +key is not RSA. + +The B<DSAPrivateKey> functions process a DSA private key using a +DSA structure. It handles the same formats as the B<PrivateKey> +functions but an error occurs if the private key is not DSA. + +The B<DSA_PUBKEY> functions process a DSA public key using +a DSA structure. The public key is encoded using a +SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure and an error occurs if the public +key is not DSA. + +The B<DSAparams> functions process DSA parameters using a DSA +structure. The parameters are encoded using a foobar structure. + +The B<DHparams> functions process DH parameters using a DH +structure. The parameters are encoded using a PKCS#3 DHparameter +structure. + +The B<X509> functions process an X509 certificate using an X509 +structure. They will also process a trusted X509 certificate but +any trust settings are discarded. + +The B<X509_AUX> functions process a trusted X509 certificate using +an X509 structure. + +The B<X509_REQ> and B<X509_REQ_NEW> functions process a PKCS#10 +certificate request using an X509_REQ structure. The B<X509_REQ> +write functions use B<CERTIFICATE REQUEST> in the header whereas +the B<X509_REQ_NEW> functions use B<NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST> +(as required by some CAs). The B<X509_REQ> read functions will +handle either form so there are no B<X509_REQ_NEW> read functions. + +The B<X509_CRL> functions process an X509 CRL using an X509_CRL +structure. + +The B<PKCS7> functions process a PKCS#7 ContentInfo using a PKCS7 +structure. + +The B<NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE> functions process a Netscape Certificate +Sequence using a NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE structure. + +=head1 PEM FUNCTION ARGUMENTS + +The PEM functions have many common arguments. + +The B<bp> BIO parameter (if present) specifies the BIO to read from +or write to. + +The B<fp> FILE parameter (if present) specifies the FILE pointer to +read from or write to. + +The PEM read functions all take an argument B<TYPE **x> and return +a B<TYPE *> pointer. Where B<TYPE> is whatever structure the function +uses. If B<x> is NULL then the parameter is ignored. If B<x> is not +NULL but B<*x> is NULL then the structure returned will be written +to B<*x>. If neither B<x> nor B<*x> is NULL then an attempt is made +to reuse the structure at B<*x> (but see BUGS and EXAMPLES sections). +Irrespective of the value of B<x> a pointer to the structure is always +returned (or NULL if an error occurred). + +The PEM functions which write private keys take an B<enc> parameter +which specifies the encryption algorithm to use, encryption is done +at the PEM level. If this parameter is set to NULL then the private +key is written in unencrypted form. + +The B<cb> argument is the callback to use when querying for the pass +phrase used for encrypted PEM structures (normally only private keys). + +For the PEM write routines if the B<kstr> parameter is not NULL then +B<klen> bytes at B<kstr> are used as the passphrase and B<cb> is +ignored. + +If the B<cb> parameters is set to NULL and the B<u> parameter is not +NULL then the B<u> parameter is interpreted as a null terminated string +to use as the passphrase. If both B<cb> and B<u> are NULL then the +default callback routine is used which will typically prompt for the +passphrase on the current terminal with echoing turned off. + +The default passphrase callback is sometimes inappropriate (for example +in a GUI application) so an alternative can be supplied. The callback +routine has the following form: + + int cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u); + +B<buf> is the buffer to write the passphrase to. B<size> is the maximum +length of the passphrase (i.e. the size of buf). B<rwflag> is a flag +which is set to 0 when reading and 1 when writing. A typical routine +will ask the user to verify the passphrase (for example by prompting +for it twice) if B<rwflag> is 1. The B<u> parameter has the same +value as the B<u> parameter passed to the PEM routine. It allows +arbitrary data to be passed to the callback by the application +(for example a window handle in a GUI application). The callback +B<must> return the number of characters in the passphrase or 0 if +an error occurred. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Although the PEM routines take several arguments in almost all applications +most of them are set to 0 or NULL. + +Read a certificate in PEM format from a BIO: + + X509 *x; + x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL); + if (x == NULL) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Alternative method: + + X509 *x = NULL; + if (!PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL)) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Write a certificate to a BIO: + + if (!PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x)) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Write an unencrypted private key to a FILE pointer: + + if (!PEM_write_PrivateKey(fp, key, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Write a private key (using traditional format) to a BIO using +triple DES encryption, the pass phrase is prompted for: + + if (!PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, NULL)) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Write a private key (using PKCS#8 format) to a BIO using triple +DES encryption, using the pass phrase "hello": + + if (!PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey(bp, key, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, 0, 0, "hello")) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Read a private key from a BIO using the pass phrase "hello": + + key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, 0, "hello"); + if (key == NULL) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Read a private key from a BIO using a pass phrase callback: + + key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp, NULL, pass_cb, "My Private Key"); + if (key == NULL) + { + /* Error */ + } + +Skeleton pass phrase callback: + + int pass_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u); + { + int len; + char *tmp; + /* We'd probably do something else if 'rwflag' is 1 */ + printf("Enter pass phrase for \"%s\"\n", u); + + /* get pass phrase, length 'len' into 'tmp' */ + tmp = "hello"; + len = strlen(tmp); + + if (len <= 0) return 0; + /* if too long, truncate */ + if (len > size) len = size; + memcpy(buf, tmp, len); + return len; + } + +=head1 NOTES + +The old B<PrivateKey> write routines are retained for compatibility. +New applications should write private keys using the +PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() or PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() routines +because they are more secure (they use an iteration count of 2048 whereas +the traditional routines use a count of 1) unless compatibility with older +versions of OpenSSL is important. + +The B<PrivateKey> read routines can be used in all applications because +they handle all formats transparently. + +A frequent cause of problems is attempting to use the PEM routines like +this: + + X509 *x; + PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL); + +this is a bug because an attempt will be made to reuse the data at B<x> +which is an uninitialised pointer. + +=head1 PEM ENCRYPTION FORMAT + +This old B<PrivateKey> routines use a non standard technique for encryption. + +The private key (or other data) takes the following form: + + -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- + Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED + DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,3F17F5316E2BAC89 + + ...base64 encoded data... + -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- + +The line beginning DEK-Info contains two comma separated pieces of information: +the encryption algorithm name as used by EVP_get_cipherbyname() and an 8 +byte B<salt> encoded as a set of hexadecimal digits. + +After this is the base64 encoded encrypted data. + +The encryption key is determined using EVP_bytestokey(), using B<salt> and an +iteration count of 1. The IV used is the value of B<salt> and *not* the IV +returned by EVP_bytestokey(). + +=head1 BUGS + +The PEM read routines in some versions of OpenSSL will not correctly reuse +an existing structure. Therefore the following: + + PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, &x, 0, NULL); + +where B<x> already contains a valid certificate, may not work, whereas: + + X509_free(x); + x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL); + +is guaranteed to work. + +=head1 RETURN CODES + +The read routines return either a pointer to the structure read or NULL +if an error occurred. + +The write routines return 1 for success or 0 for failure. diff --git a/doc/crypto/rand.pod b/doc/crypto/rand.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c068c85b34c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/rand.pod @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +rand - pseudo-random number generator + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rand.h> + + int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine); + + int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); + int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); + + void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num); + void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy); + int RAND_status(void); + + int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes); + int RAND_write_file(const char *file); + const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num); + + int RAND_egd(const char *path); + + void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth); + const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void); + RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void); + + void RAND_cleanup(void); + + /* For Win32 only */ + void RAND_screen(void); + int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Since the introduction of the ENGINE API, the recommended way of controlling +default implementations is by using the ENGINE API functions. The default +B<RAND_METHOD>, as set by RAND_set_rand_method() and returned by +RAND_get_rand_method(), is only used if no ENGINE has been set as the default +"rand" implementation. Hence, these two functions are no longer the recommened +way to control defaults. + +If an alternative B<RAND_METHOD> implementation is being used (either set +directly or as provided by an ENGINE module), then it is entirely responsible +for the generation and management of a cryptographically secure PRNG stream. The +mechanisms described below relate solely to the software PRNG implementation +built in to OpenSSL and used by default. + +These functions implement a cryptographically secure pseudo-random +number generator (PRNG). It is used by other library functions for +example to generate random keys, and applications can use it when they +need randomness. + +A cryptographic PRNG must be seeded with unpredictable data such as +mouse movements or keys pressed at random by the user. This is +described in L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>. Its state can be saved in a seed file +(see L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>) to avoid having to go through the +seeding process whenever the application is started. + +L<RAND_bytes(3)|RAND_bytes(3)> describes how to obtain random data from the +PRNG. + +=head1 INTERNALS + +The RAND_SSLeay() method implements a PRNG based on a cryptographic +hash function. + +The following description of its design is based on the SSLeay +documentation: + +First up I will state the things I believe I need for a good RNG. + +=over 4 + +=item 1 + +A good hashing algorithm to mix things up and to convert the RNG 'state' +to random numbers. + +=item 2 + +An initial source of random 'state'. + +=item 3 + +The state should be very large. If the RNG is being used to generate +4096 bit RSA keys, 2 2048 bit random strings are required (at a minimum). +If your RNG state only has 128 bits, you are obviously limiting the +search space to 128 bits, not 2048. I'm probably getting a little +carried away on this last point but it does indicate that it may not be +a bad idea to keep quite a lot of RNG state. It should be easier to +break a cipher than guess the RNG seed data. + +=item 4 + +Any RNG seed data should influence all subsequent random numbers +generated. This implies that any random seed data entered will have +an influence on all subsequent random numbers generated. + +=item 5 + +When using data to seed the RNG state, the data used should not be +extractable from the RNG state. I believe this should be a +requirement because one possible source of 'secret' semi random +data would be a private key or a password. This data must +not be disclosed by either subsequent random numbers or a +'core' dump left by a program crash. + +=item 6 + +Given the same initial 'state', 2 systems should deviate in their RNG state +(and hence the random numbers generated) over time if at all possible. + +=item 7 + +Given the random number output stream, it should not be possible to determine +the RNG state or the next random number. + +=back + +The algorithm is as follows. + +There is global state made up of a 1023 byte buffer (the 'state'), a +working hash value ('md'), and a counter ('count'). + +Whenever seed data is added, it is inserted into the 'state' as +follows. + +The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for +the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash +function as follows: The data passed to the hash function +is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' +(the location determined by in incremented looping index) as +the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' +(which is incremented after each use). +The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the +'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the +hash function. I +believe this system addresses points 1 (hash function; currently +SHA-1), 3 (the 'state'), 4 (via the 'md'), 5 (by the use of a hash +function and xor). + +When bytes are extracted from the RNG, the following process is used. +For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: + +Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from +the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to +be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' +(incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept +in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the +bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. + +Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the caller, +'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' are fed +into the hash function and the results are kept in the global 'md'. + +I believe the above addressed points 1 (use of SHA-1), 6 (by hashing +into the 'state' the 'old' data from the caller that is about to be +overwritten) and 7 (by not using the 10 bytes given to the caller to +update the 'state', but they are used to update 'md'). + +So of the points raised, only 2 is not addressed (but see +L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<BN_rand(3)|BN_rand(3)>, L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>, +L<RAND_load_file(3)|RAND_load_file(3)>, L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>, +L<RAND_bytes(3)|RAND_bytes(3)>, +L<RAND_set_rand_method(3)|RAND_set_rand_method(3)>, +L<RAND_cleanup(3)|RAND_cleanup(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/rc4.pod b/doc/crypto/rc4.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b6d3a4342caa --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/rc4.pod @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RC4_set_key, RC4 - RC4 encryption + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rc4.h> + + void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data); + + void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, const unsigned char *indata, + unsigned char *outdata); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +This library implements the Alleged RC4 cipher, which is described for +example in I<Applied Cryptography>. It is believed to be compatible +with RC4[TM], a proprietary cipher of RSA Security Inc. + +RC4 is a stream cipher with variable key length. Typically, 128 bit +(16 byte) keys are used for strong encryption, but shorter insecure +key sizes have been widely used due to export restrictions. + +RC4 consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or +decryption phase. + +RC4_set_key() sets up the B<RC4_KEY> B<key> using the B<len> bytes long +key at B<data>. + +RC4() encrypts or decrypts the B<len> bytes of data at B<indata> using +B<key> and places the result at B<outdata>. Repeated RC4() calls with +the same B<key> yield a continuous key stream. + +Since RC4 is a stream cipher (the input is XORed with a pseudo-random +key stream to produce the output), decryption uses the same function +calls as encryption. + +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)|EVP_EncryptInit(3)> +etc. instead of calling the RC4 functions directly. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RC4_set_key() and RC4() do not return values. + +=head1 NOTE + +Certain conditions have to be observed to securely use stream ciphers. +It is not permissible to perform multiple encryptions using the same +key stream. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<blowfish(3)|blowfish(3)>, L<des(3)|des(3)>, L<rc2(3)|rc2(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RC4_set_key() and RC4() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ripemd.pod b/doc/crypto/ripemd.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..264bb99ae793 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ripemd.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +RIPEMD160, RIPEMD160_Init, RIPEMD160_Update, RIPEMD160_Final - +RIPEMD-160 hash function + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ripemd.h> + + unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, + unsigned char *md); + + int RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c); + int RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD_CTX *c, const void *data, + unsigned long len); + int RIPEMD160_Final(unsigned char *md, RIPEMD160_CTX *c); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +RIPEMD-160 is a cryptographic hash function with a +160 bit output. + +RIPEMD160() computes the RIPEMD-160 message digest of the B<n> +bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for +RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest +is placed in a static array. + +The following functions may be used if the message is not completely +stored in memory: + +RIPEMD160_Init() initializes a B<RIPEMD160_CTX> structure. + +RIPEMD160_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to +be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>). + +RIPEMD160_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have +space for RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases +the B<RIPEMD160_CTX>. + +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> etc. instead of calling the +hash functions directly. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +RIPEMD160() returns a pointer to the hash value. + +RIPEMD160_Init(), RIPEMD160_Update() and RIPEMD160_Final() return 1 for +success, 0 otherwise. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +ISO/IEC 10118-3 (draft) (??) + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +RIPEMD160(), RIPEMD160_Init(), RIPEMD160_Update() and +RIPEMD160_Final() are available since SSLeay 0.9.0. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/rsa.pod b/doc/crypto/rsa.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..45ac53ffc147 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/rsa.pod @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +rsa - RSA public key cryptosystem + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/rsa.h> + #include <openssl/engine.h> + + RSA * RSA_new(void); + void RSA_free(RSA *rsa); + + int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); + int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); + int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); + + int RSA_sign(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa); + int RSA_verify(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa); + + int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa); + + RSA *RSA_generate_key(int num, unsigned long e, + void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg); + + int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa); + + int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); + void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa); + + void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth); + const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void); + int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth); + const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa); + RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void); + RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void); + int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa); + RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine); + + int RSA_print(BIO *bp, RSA *x, int offset); + int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *x, int offset); + + int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(), + int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)()); + int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r,int idx,char *arg); + char *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx); + + int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, + RSA *rsa); + int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + RSA *rsa); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions implement RSA public key encryption and signatures +as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 [RFC 2437]. + +The B<RSA> structure consists of several BIGNUM components. It can +contain public as well as private RSA keys: + + struct + { + BIGNUM *n; // public modulus + BIGNUM *e; // public exponent + BIGNUM *d; // private exponent + BIGNUM *p; // secret prime factor + BIGNUM *q; // secret prime factor + BIGNUM *dmp1; // d mod (p-1) + BIGNUM *dmq1; // d mod (q-1) + BIGNUM *iqmp; // q^-1 mod p + // ... + }; + RSA + +In public keys, the private exponent and the related secret values are +B<NULL>. + +B<p>, B<q>, B<dmp1>, B<dmq1> and B<iqmp> may be B<NULL> in private +keys, but the RSA operations are much faster when these values are +available. + +Note that RSA keys may use non-standard B<RSA_METHOD> implementations, +either directly or by the use of B<ENGINE> modules. In some cases (eg. an +ENGINE providing support for hardware-embedded keys), these BIGNUM values +will not be used by the implementation or may be used for alternative data +storage. For this reason, applications should generally avoid using RSA +structure elements directly and instead use API functions to query or +modify keys. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 + +=head1 PATENTS + +RSA was covered by a US patent which expired in September 2000. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<rsa(1)|rsa(1)>, L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<dh(3)|dh(3)>, +L<rand(3)|rand(3)>, L<engine(3)|engine(3)>, L<RSA_new(3)|RSA_new(3)>, +L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)|RSA_public_encrypt(3)>, +L<RSA_sign(3)|RSA_sign(3)>, L<RSA_size(3)|RSA_size(3)>, +L<RSA_generate_key(3)|RSA_generate_key(3)>, +L<RSA_check_key(3)|RSA_check_key(3)>, +L<RSA_blinding_on(3)|RSA_blinding_on(3)>, +L<RSA_set_method(3)|RSA_set_method(3)>, L<RSA_print(3)|RSA_print(3)>, +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<RSA_private_encrypt(3)|RSA_private_encrypt(3)>, +L<RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(3)|RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(3)>, +L<RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(3)|RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/sha.pod b/doc/crypto/sha.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..94ab7bc72416 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/sha.pod @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SHA1, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final - Secure Hash Algorithm + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/sha.h> + + unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n, + unsigned char *md); + + int SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c); + int SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data, + unsigned long len); + int SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function with a +160 bit output. + +SHA1() computes the SHA-1 message digest of the B<n> +bytes at B<d> and places it in B<md> (which must have space for +SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If B<md> is NULL, the digest +is placed in a static array. + +The following functions may be used if the message is not completely +stored in memory: + +SHA1_Init() initializes a B<SHA_CTX> structure. + +SHA1_Update() can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to +be hashed (B<len> bytes at B<data>). + +SHA1_Final() places the message digest in B<md>, which must have space +for SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the B<SHA_CTX>. + +Applications should use the higher level functions +L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> +etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly. + +The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be +used only when backward compatibility is required. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SHA1() returns a pointer to the hash value. + +SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() return 1 for success, 0 otherwise. + +=head1 CONFORMING TO + +SHA: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180 (Secure Hash +Standard), +SHA-1: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-1 (Secure Hash +Standard), +ANSI X9.30 + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SHA1(), SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update() and SHA1_Final() are available in all +versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/threads.pod b/doc/crypto/threads.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3df4ecd7768e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/threads.pod @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +CRYPTO_set_locking_callback, CRYPTO_set_id_callback, CRYPTO_num_locks, +CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback, CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback, +CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback, CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid, +CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid, CRYPTO_lock - OpenSSL thread support + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/crypto.h> + + void CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(void (*locking_function)(int mode, + int n, const char *file, int line)); + + void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*id_function)(void)); + + int CRYPTO_num_locks(void); + + + /* struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value needs to be defined by the user */ + struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value; + + void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value * + (*dyn_create_function)(char *file, int line)); + void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(void (*dyn_lock_function) + (int mode, struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l, + const char *file, int line)); + void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(void (*dyn_destroy_function) + (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l, const char *file, int line)); + + int CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid(void); + + void CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(int i); + + void CRYPTO_lock(int mode, int n, const char *file, int line); + + #define CRYPTO_w_lock(type) \ + CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK|CRYPTO_WRITE,type,__FILE__,__LINE__) + #define CRYPTO_w_unlock(type) \ + CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_UNLOCK|CRYPTO_WRITE,type,__FILE__,__LINE__) + #define CRYPTO_r_lock(type) \ + CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK|CRYPTO_READ,type,__FILE__,__LINE__) + #define CRYPTO_r_unlock(type) \ + CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_UNLOCK|CRYPTO_READ,type,__FILE__,__LINE__) + #define CRYPTO_add(addr,amount,type) \ + CRYPTO_add_lock(addr,amount,type,__FILE__,__LINE__) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +OpenSSL can safely be used in multi-threaded applications provided +that at least two callback functions are set. + +locking_function(int mode, int n, const char *file, int line) is +needed to perform locking on shared data structures. +(Note that OpenSSL uses a number of global data structures that +will be implicitly shared whenever multiple threads use OpenSSL.) +Multi-threaded applications will crash at random if it is not set. + +locking_function() must be able to handle up to CRYPTO_num_locks() +different mutex locks. It sets the B<n>-th lock if B<mode> & +B<CRYPTO_LOCK>, and releases it otherwise. + +B<file> and B<line> are the file number of the function setting the +lock. They can be useful for debugging. + +id_function(void) is a function that returns a thread ID, for example +pthread_self() if it returns an integer (see NOTES below). It isn't +needed on Windows nor on platforms where getpid() returns a different +ID for each thread (see NOTES below). + +Additionally, OpenSSL supports dynamic locks, and sometimes, some parts +of OpenSSL need it for better performance. To enable this, the following +is required: + +=over 4 + +=item * +Three additional callback function, dyn_create_function, dyn_lock_function +and dyn_destroy_function. + +=item * +A structure defined with the data that each lock needs to handle. + +=back + +struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value has to be defined to contain whatever structure +is needed to handle locks. + +dyn_create_function(const char *file, int line) is needed to create a +lock. Multi-threaded applications might crash at random if it is not set. + +dyn_lock_function(int mode, CRYPTO_dynlock *l, const char *file, int line) +is needed to perform locking off dynamic lock numbered n. Multi-threaded +applications might crash at random if it is not set. + +dyn_destroy_function(CRYPTO_dynlock *l, const char *file, int line) is +needed to destroy the lock l. Multi-threaded applications might crash at +random if it is not set. + +CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid() is used to create locks. It will call +dyn_create_function for the actual creation. + +CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() is used to destroy locks. It will call +dyn_destroy_function for the actual destruction. + +CRYPTO_lock() is used to lock and unlock the locks. mode is a bitfield +describing what should be done with the lock. n is the number of the +lock as returned from CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid(). mode can be combined +from the following values. These values are pairwise exclusive, with +undefined behaviour if misused (for example, CRYPTO_READ and CRYPTO_WRITE +should not be used together): + + CRYPTO_LOCK 0x01 + CRYPTO_UNLOCK 0x02 + CRYPTO_READ 0x04 + CRYPTO_WRITE 0x08 + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +CRYPTO_num_locks() returns the required number of locks. + +CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid() returns the index to the newly created lock. + +The other functions return no values. + +=head1 NOTES + +You can find out if OpenSSL was configured with thread support: + + #define OPENSSL_THREAD_DEFINES + #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> + #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) + // thread support enabled + #else + // no thread support + #endif + +Also, dynamic locks are currently not used internally by OpenSSL, but +may do so in the future. + +Defining id_function(void) has it's own issues. Generally speaking, +pthread_self() should be used, even on platforms where getpid() gives +different answers in each thread, since that may depend on the machine +the program is run on, not the machine where the program is being +compiled. For instance, Red Hat 8 Linux and earlier used +LinuxThreads, whose getpid() returns a different value for each +thread. Red Hat 9 Linux and later use NPTL, which is +Posix-conformant, and has a getpid() that returns the same value for +all threads in a process. A program compiled on Red Hat 8 and run on +Red Hat 9 will therefore see getpid() returning the same value for +all threads. + +There is still the issue of platforms where pthread_self() returns +something other than an integer. This is a bit unusual, and this +manual has no cookbook solution for that case. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +B<crypto/threads/mttest.c> shows examples of the callback functions on +Solaris, Irix and Win32. + +=head1 HISTORY + +CRYPTO_set_locking_callback() and CRYPTO_set_id_callback() are +available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. +CRYPTO_num_locks() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.4. +All functions dealing with dynamic locks were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5b-dev. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ui.pod b/doc/crypto/ui.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6df68d604a82 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ui.pod @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +UI_new, UI_new_method, UI_free, UI_add_input_string, UI_dup_input_string, +UI_add_verify_string, UI_dup_verify_string, UI_add_input_boolean, +UI_dup_input_boolean, UI_add_info_string, UI_dup_info_string, +UI_add_error_string, UI_dup_error_string, UI_construct_prompt, +UI_add_user_data, UI_get0_user_data, UI_get0_result, UI_process, +UI_ctrl, UI_set_default_method, UI_get_default_method, UI_get_method, +UI_set_method, UI_OpenSSL, ERR_load_UI_strings - New User Interface + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ui.h> + + typedef struct ui_st UI; + typedef struct ui_method_st UI_METHOD; + + UI *UI_new(void); + UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method); + void UI_free(UI *ui); + + int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, + char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize); + int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, + char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize); + int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, + char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf); + int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags, + char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf); + int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, + const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, + int flags, char *result_buf); + int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc, + const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars, + int flags, char *result_buf); + int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text); + int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text); + int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text); + int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text); + + /* These are the possible flags. They can be or'ed together. */ + #define UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO 0x01 + #define UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD 0x02 + + char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui_method, + const char *object_desc, const char *object_name); + + void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data); + void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui); + + const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i); + + int UI_process(UI *ui); + + int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)()); + #define UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS 1 + #define UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE 2 + + void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth); + const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void); + const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui); + const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth); + + UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +UI stands for User Interface, and is general purpose set of routines to +prompt the user for text-based information. Through user-written methods +(see L<ui_create(3)|ui_create(3)>), prompting can be done in any way +imaginable, be it plain text prompting, through dialog boxes or from a +cell phone. + +All the functions work through a context of the type UI. This context +contains all the information needed to prompt correctly as well as a +reference to a UI_METHOD, which is an ordered vector of functions that +carry out the actual prompting. + +The first thing to do is to create a UI with UI_new() or UI_new_method(), +then add information to it with the UI_add or UI_dup functions. Also, +user-defined random data can be passed down to the underlying method +through calls to UI_add_user_data. The default UI method doesn't care +about these data, but other methods might. Finally, use UI_process() +to actually perform the prompting and UI_get0_result() to find the result +to the prompt. + +A UI can contain more than one prompt, which are performed in the given +sequence. Each prompt gets an index number which is returned by the +UI_add and UI_dup functions, and has to be used to get the corresponding +result with UI_get0_result(). + +The functions are as follows: + +UI_new() creates a new UI using the default UI method. When done with +this UI, it should be freed using UI_free(). + +UI_new_method() creates a new UI using the given UI method. When done with +this UI, it should be freed using UI_free(). + +UI_OpenSSL() returns the built-in UI method (note: not the default one, +since the default can be changed. See further on). This method is the +most machine/OS dependent part of OpenSSL and normally generates the +most problems when porting. + +UI_free() removes a UI from memory, along with all other pieces of memory +that's connected to it, like duplicated input strings, results and others. + +UI_add_input_string() and UI_add_verify_string() add a prompt to the UI, +as well as flags and a result buffer and the desired minimum and maximum +sizes of the result. The given information is used to prompt for +information, for example a password, and to verify a password (i.e. having +the user enter it twice and check that the same string was entered twice). +UI_add_verify_string() takes and extra argument that should be a pointer +to the result buffer of the input string that it's supposed to verify, or +verification will fail. + +UI_add_input_boolean() adds a prompt to the UI that's supposed to be answered +in a boolean way, with a single character for yes and a different character +for no. A set of characters that can be used to cancel the prompt is given +as well. The prompt itself is really divided in two, one part being the +descriptive text (given through the I<prompt> argument) and one describing +the possible answers (given through the I<action_desc> argument). + +UI_add_info_string() and UI_add_error_string() add strings that are shown at +the same time as the prompt for extra information or to show an error string. +The difference between the two is only conceptual. With the builtin method, +there's no technical difference between them. Other methods may make a +difference between them, however. + +The flags currently supported are UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, which is relevant for +UI_add_input_string() and will have the users response be echoed (when +prompting for a password, this flag should obviously not be used, and +UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD, which means that a default password of some +sort will be used (completely depending on the application and the UI +method). + +UI_dup_input_string(), UI_dup_verify_string(), UI_dup_input_boolean(), +UI_dup_info_string() and UI_dup_error_string() are basically the same +as their UI_add counterparts, except that they make their own copies +of all strings. + +UI_construct_prompt() is a helper function that can be used to create +a prompt from two pieces of information: an description and a name. +The default constructor (if there is none provided by the method used) +creates a string "Enter I<description> for I<name>:". With the +description "pass phrase" and the file name "foo.key", that becomes +"Enter pass phrase for foo.key:". Other methods may create whatever +string and may include encodings that will be processed by the other +method functions. + +UI_add_user_data() adds a piece of memory for the method to use at any +time. The builtin UI method doesn't care about this info. Note that several +calls to this function doesn't add data, it replaces the previous blob +with the one given as argument. + +UI_get0_user_data() retrieves the data that has last been given to the +UI with UI_add_user_data(). + +UI_get0_result() returns a pointer to the result buffer associated with +the information indexed by I<i>. + +UI_process() goes through the information given so far, does all the printing +and prompting and returns. + +UI_ctrl() adds extra control for the application author. For now, it +understands two commands: UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, which makes UI_process() +print the OpenSSL error stack as part of processing the UI, and +UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, which returns a flag saying if the used UI can +be used again or not. + +UI_set_default_method() changes the default UI method to the one given. + +UI_get_default_method() returns a pointer to the current default UI method. + +UI_get_method() returns the UI method associated with a given UI. + +UI_set_method() changes the UI method associated with a given UI. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ui_create(3)|ui_create(3)>, L<ui_compat(3)|ui_compat(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The UI section was first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project +(http://www.openssl.org). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/ui_compat.pod b/doc/crypto/ui_compat.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ab3c69bf256 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/ui_compat.pod @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +des_read_password, des_read_2passwords, des_read_pw_string, des_read_pw - +Compatibility user interface functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + int des_read_password(DES_cblock *key,const char *prompt,int verify); + int des_read_2passwords(DES_cblock *key1,DES_cblock *key2, + const char *prompt,int verify); + + int des_read_pw_string(char *buf,int length,const char *prompt,int verify); + int des_read_pw(char *buf,char *buff,int size,const char *prompt,int verify); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The DES library contained a few routines to prompt for passwords. These +aren't necessarely dependent on DES, and have therefore become part of the +UI compatibility library. + +des_read_pw() writes the string specified by I<prompt> to standard output +turns echo off and reads an input string from the terminal. The string is +returned in I<buf>, which must have spac for at least I<size> bytes. +If I<verify> is set, the user is asked for the password twice and unless +the two copies match, an error is returned. The second password is stored +in I<buff>, which must therefore also be at least I<size> bytes. A return +code of -1 indicates a system error, 1 failure due to use interaction, and +0 is success. All other functions described here use des_read_pw() to do +the work. + +des_read_pw_string() is a variant of des_read_pw() that provides a buffer +for you if I<verify> is set. + +des_read_password() calls des_read_pw() and converts the password to a +DES key by calling DES_string_to_key(); des_read_2password() operates in +the same way as des_read_password() except that it generates two keys +by using the DES_string_to_2key() function. + +=head1 NOTES + +des_read_pw_string() is available in the MIT Kerberos library as well, and +is also available under the name EVP_read_pw_string(). + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ui(3)|ui(3)>, L<ui_create(3)|ui_create(3)> + +=head1 AUTHOR + +Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project +(http://www.openssl.org). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/crypto/x509.pod b/doc/crypto/x509.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f9e58e0e41a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/crypto/x509.pod @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +x509 - X.509 certificate handling + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/x509.h> + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +A X.509 certificate is a structured grouping of information about +an individual, a device, or anything one can imagine. A X.509 CRL +(certificate revocation list) is a tool to help determine if a +certificate is still valid. The exact definition of those can be +found in the X.509 document from ITU-T, or in RFC3280 from PKIX. +In OpenSSL, the type X509 is used to express such a certificate, and +the type X509_CRL is used to express a CRL. + +A related structure is a certificate request, defined in PKCS#10 from +RSA Security, Inc, also reflected in RFC2896. In OpenSSL, the type +X509_REQ is used to express such a certificate request. + +To handle some complex parts of a certificate, there are the types +X509_NAME (to express a certificate name), X509_ATTRIBUTE (to express +a certificate attributes), X509_EXTENSION (to express a certificate +extension) and a few more. + +Finally, there's the supertype X509_INFO, which can contain a CRL, a +certificate and a corresponding private key. + +B<X509_>I<...>, B<d2i_X509_>I<...> and B<i2d_X509_>I<...> handle X.509 +certificates, with some exceptions, shown below. + +B<X509_CRL_>I<...>, B<d2i_X509_CRL_>I<...> and B<i2d_X509_CRL_>I<...> +handle X.509 CRLs. + +B<X509_REQ_>I<...>, B<d2i_X509_REQ_>I<...> and B<i2d_X509_REQ_>I<...> +handle PKCS#10 certificate requests. + +B<X509_NAME_>I<...> handle certificate names. + +B<X509_ATTRIBUTE_>I<...> handle certificate attributes. + +B<X509_EXTENSION_>I<...> handle certificate extensions. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)|X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(3)>, +L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)|X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(3)>, +L<X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(3)|X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(3)>, +L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)|X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>, +L<X509_NAME_new(3)|X509_NAME_new(3)>, +L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>, +L<d2i_X509_ALGOR(3)|d2i_X509_ALGOR(3)>, +L<d2i_X509_CRL(3)|d2i_X509_CRL(3)>, +L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>, +L<d2i_X509_REQ(3)|d2i_X509_REQ(3)>, +L<d2i_X509_SIG(3)|d2i_X509_SIG(3)>, +L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, +L<x509v3(3)|x509v3(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/fingerprints.txt b/doc/fingerprints.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d05a855946b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/fingerprints.txt @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ + Fingerprints + +OpenSSL releases are signed with PGP/GnuPG keys. You can find the +signatures in separate files in the same location you find the +distributions themselves. The normal file name is the same as the +distribution file, with '.asc' added. For example, the signature for +the distribution of OpenSSL 0.9.7f, openssl-0.9.7f.tar.gz, is found in +the file openssl-0.9.7f.tar.gz.asc. + +The following is the list of fingerprints for the keys that are +currently in use (have been used since summer 2004) to sign OpenSSL +distributions: + +pub 1024D/F709453B 2003-10-20 + Key fingerprint = C4CA B749 C34F 7F4C C04F DAC9 A7AF 9E78 F709 453B +uid Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> +uid Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> +uid Richard Levitte <levitte@lp.se> + +pub 2048R/F295C759 1998-12-13 + Key fingerprint = D0 5D 8C 61 6E 27 E6 60 41 EC B1 B8 D5 7E E5 97 +uid Dr S N Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> + +pub 1024R/49A563D9 1997-02-24 + Key fingerprint = 7B 79 19 FA 71 6B 87 25 0E 77 21 E5 52 D9 83 BF +uid Mark Cox <mjc@redhat.com> +uid Mark Cox <mark@awe.com> +uid Mark Cox <mjc@apache.org> + +pub 1024R/26BB437D 1997-04-28 + Key fingerprint = 00 C9 21 8E D1 AB 70 37 DD 67 A2 3A 0A 6F 8D A5 +uid Ralf S. Engelschall <rse@engelschall.com> + +pub 1024R/9C58A66D 1997-04-03 + Key fingerprint = 13 D0 B8 9D 37 30 C3 ED AC 9C 24 7D 45 8C 17 67 +uid jaenicke@openssl.org +uid Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> + +pub 1024D/2118CF83 1998-07-13 + Key fingerprint = 7656 55DE 62E3 96FF 2587 EB6C 4F6D E156 2118 CF83 +uid Ben Laurie <ben@thebunker.net> +uid Ben Laurie <ben@cryptix.org> +uid Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> +sub 4096g/1F5143E7 1998-07-13 + +pub 1024R/5A6A9B85 1994-03-22 + Key fingerprint = C7 AC 7E AD 56 6A 65 EC F6 16 66 83 7E 86 68 28 +uid Bodo Moeller <2005@bmoeller.de> +uid Bodo Moeller <2003@bmoeller.de> +uid Bodo Moeller <2004@bmoeller.de> +uid Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> +uid Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org> +uid Bodo Moeller <bm@ulf.mali.sub.org> +uid Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> +uid Bodo Moeller <Bodo_Moeller@public.uni-hamburg.de> +uid Bodo Moeller <3moeller@rzdspc5.informatik.uni-hamburg.de> + diff --git a/doc/openssl-shared.txt b/doc/openssl-shared.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5cf84a054ff3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/openssl-shared.txt @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +The OpenSSL shared libraries are often installed in a directory like +/usr/local/ssl/lib. + +If this directory is not in a standard system path for dynamic/shared +libraries, then you will have problems linking and executing +applications that use OpenSSL libraries UNLESS: + +* you link with static (archive) libraries. If you are truly + paranoid about security, you should use static libraries. +* you use the GNU libtool code during linking + (http://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/libtool.html) +* you use pkg-config during linking (this requires that + PKG_CONFIG_PATH includes the path to the OpenSSL shared + library directory), and make use of -R or -rpath. + (http://www.freedesktop.org/software/pkgconfig/) +* you specify the system-wide link path via a command such + as crle(1) on Solaris systems. +* you add the OpenSSL shared library directory to /etc/ld.so.conf + and run ldconfig(8) on Linux systems. +* you define the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LIBPATH, SHLIB_PATH (HP), + DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH (MacOS X) or PATH (Cygwin and DJGPP) + environment variable and add the OpenSSL shared library + directory to it. + +One common tool to check the dynamic dependencies of an executable +or dynamic library is ldd(1) on most UNIX systems. + +See any operating system documentation and manpages about shared +libraries for your version of UNIX. The following manpages may be +helpful: ld(1), ld.so(1), ld.so.1(1) [Solaris], dld.sl(1) [HP], +ldd(1), crle(1) [Solaris], pldd(1) [Solaris], ldconfig(8) [Linux], +chatr(1) [HP]. diff --git a/doc/openssl.txt b/doc/openssl.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f8817b0a7199 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/openssl.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1254 @@ + +This is some preliminary documentation for OpenSSL. + +Contents: + + OpenSSL X509V3 extension configuration + X509V3 Extension code: programmers guide + PKCS#12 Library + + +============================================================================== + OpenSSL X509V3 extension configuration +============================================================================== + +OpenSSL X509V3 extension configuration: preliminary documentation. + +INTRODUCTION. + +For OpenSSL 0.9.2 the extension code has be considerably enhanced. It is now +possible to add and print out common X509 V3 certificate and CRL extensions. + +BEGINNERS NOTE + +For most simple applications you don't need to know too much about extensions: +the default openssl.cnf values will usually do sensible things. + +If you want to know more you can initially quickly look through the sections +describing how the standard OpenSSL utilities display and add extensions and +then the list of supported extensions. + +For more technical information about the meaning of extensions see: + +http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/ +http://home.netscape.com/eng/security/certs.html + +PRINTING EXTENSIONS. + +Extension values are automatically printed out for supported extensions. + +openssl x509 -in cert.pem -text +openssl crl -in crl.pem -text + +will give information in the extension printout, for example: + + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 73:FE:F7:59:A7:E1:26:84:44:D6:44:36:EE:79:1A:95:7C:B1:4B:15 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:73:FE:F7:59:A7:E1:26:84:44:D6:44:36:EE:79:1A:95:7C:B1:4B:15, DirName:/C=AU/ST=Some-State/O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd/Email=email@1.address/Email=email@2.address, serial:00 + X509v3 Key Usage: + Certificate Sign, CRL Sign + X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: + email:email@1.address, email:email@2.address + +CONFIGURATION FILES. + +The OpenSSL utilities 'ca' and 'req' can now have extension sections listing +which certificate extensions to include. In each case a line: + +x509_extensions = extension_section + +indicates which section contains the extensions. In the case of 'req' the +extension section is used when the -x509 option is present to create a +self signed root certificate. + +The 'x509' utility also supports extensions when it signs a certificate. +The -extfile option is used to set the configuration file containing the +extensions. In this case a line with: + +extensions = extension_section + +in the nameless (default) section is used. If no such line is included then +it uses the default section. + +You can also add extensions to CRLs: a line + +crl_extensions = crl_extension_section + +will include extensions when the -gencrl option is used with the 'ca' utility. +You can add any extension to a CRL but of the supported extensions only +issuerAltName and authorityKeyIdentifier make any real sense. Note: these are +CRL extensions NOT CRL *entry* extensions which cannot currently be generated. +CRL entry extensions can be displayed. + +NB. At this time Netscape Communicator rejects V2 CRLs: to get an old V1 CRL +you should not include a crl_extensions line in the configuration file. + +As with all configuration files you can use the inbuilt environment expansion +to allow the values to be passed in the environment. Therefore if you have +several extension sections used for different purposes you can have a line: + +x509_extensions = $ENV::ENV_EXT + +and set the ENV_EXT environment variable before calling the relevant utility. + +EXTENSION SYNTAX. + +Extensions have the basic form: + +extension_name=[critical,] extension_options + +the use of the critical option makes the extension critical. Extreme caution +should be made when using the critical flag. If an extension is marked +as critical then any client that does not understand the extension should +reject it as invalid. Some broken software will reject certificates which +have *any* critical extensions (these violates PKIX but we have to live +with it). + +There are three main types of extension: string extensions, multi-valued +extensions, and raw extensions. + +String extensions simply have a string which contains either the value itself +or how it is obtained. + +For example: + +nsComment="This is a Comment" + +Multi-valued extensions have a short form and a long form. The short form +is a list of names and values: + +basicConstraints=critical,CA:true,pathlen:1 + +The long form allows the values to be placed in a separate section: + +basicConstraints=critical,@bs_section + +[bs_section] + +CA=true +pathlen=1 + +Both forms are equivalent. However it should be noted that in some cases the +same name can appear multiple times, for example, + +subjectAltName=email:steve@here,email:steve@there + +in this case an equivalent long form is: + +subjectAltName=@alt_section + +[alt_section] + +email.1=steve@here +email.2=steve@there + +This is because the configuration file code cannot handle the same name +occurring twice in the same section. + +The syntax of raw extensions is governed by the extension code: it can +for example contain data in multiple sections. The correct syntax to +use is defined by the extension code itself: check out the certificate +policies extension for an example. + +There are two ways to encode arbitrary extensions. + +The first way is to use the word ASN1 followed by the extension content +using the same syntax as ASN1_generate_nconf(). For example: + +1.2.3.4=critical,ASN1:UTF8String:Some random data + +1.2.3.4=ASN1:SEQUENCE:seq_sect + +[seq_sect] + +field1 = UTF8:field1 +field2 = UTF8:field2 + +It is also possible to use the word DER to include arbitrary data in any +extension. + +1.2.3.4=critical,DER:01:02:03:04 +1.2.3.4=DER:01020304 + +The value following DER is a hex dump of the DER encoding of the extension +Any extension can be placed in this form to override the default behaviour. +For example: + +basicConstraints=critical,DER:00:01:02:03 + +WARNING: DER should be used with caution. It is possible to create totally +invalid extensions unless care is taken. + +CURRENTLY SUPPORTED EXTENSIONS. + +If you aren't sure about extensions then they can be largely ignored: its only +when you want to do things like restrict certificate usage when you need to +worry about them. + +The only extension that a beginner might want to look at is Basic Constraints. +If in addition you want to try Netscape object signing the you should also +look at Netscape Certificate Type. + +Literal String extensions. + +In each case the 'value' of the extension is placed directly in the +extension. Currently supported extensions in this category are: nsBaseUrl, +nsRevocationUrl, nsCaRevocationUrl, nsRenewalUrl, nsCaPolicyUrl, +nsSslServerName and nsComment. + +For example: + +nsComment="This is a test comment" + +Bit Strings. + +Bit string extensions just consist of a list of supported bits, currently +two extensions are in this category: PKIX keyUsage and the Netscape specific +nsCertType. + +nsCertType (netscape certificate type) takes the flags: client, server, email, +objsign, reserved, sslCA, emailCA, objCA. + +keyUsage (PKIX key usage) takes the flags: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, +keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyAgreement, keyCertSign, cRLSign, +encipherOnly, decipherOnly. + +For example: + +nsCertType=server + +keyUsage=digitalSignature, nonRepudiation + +Hints on Netscape Certificate Type. + +Other than Basic Constraints this is the only extension a beginner might +want to use, if you want to try Netscape object signing, otherwise it can +be ignored. + +If you want a certificate that can be used just for object signing then: + +nsCertType=objsign + +will do the job. If you want to use it as a normal end user and server +certificate as well then + +nsCertType=objsign,email,server + +is more appropriate. You cannot use a self signed certificate for object +signing (well Netscape signtool can but it cheats!) so you need to create +a CA certificate and sign an end user certificate with it. + +Side note: If you want to conform to the Netscape specifications then you +should really also set: + +nsCertType=objCA + +in the *CA* certificate for just an object signing CA and + +nsCertType=objCA,emailCA,sslCA + +for everything. Current Netscape software doesn't enforce this so it can +be omitted. + +Basic Constraints. + +This is generally the only extension you need to worry about for simple +applications. If you want your certificate to be usable as a CA certificate +(in addition to an end user certificate) then you set this to: + +basicConstraints=CA:TRUE + +if you want to be certain the certificate cannot be used as a CA then do: + +basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + +The rest of this section describes more advanced usage. + +Basic constraints is a multi-valued extension that supports a CA and an +optional pathlen option. The CA option takes the values true and false and +pathlen takes an integer. Note if the CA option is false the pathlen option +should be omitted. + +The pathlen parameter indicates the maximum number of CAs that can appear +below this one in a chain. So if you have a CA with a pathlen of zero it can +only be used to sign end user certificates and not further CAs. This all +assumes that the software correctly interprets this extension of course. + +Examples: + +basicConstraints=CA:TRUE +basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE, pathlen:0 + +NOTE: for a CA to be considered valid it must have the CA option set to +TRUE. An end user certificate MUST NOT have the CA value set to true. +According to PKIX recommendations it should exclude the extension entirely, +however some software may require CA set to FALSE for end entity certificates. + +Extended Key Usage. + +This extensions consists of a list of usages. + +These can either be object short names of the dotted numerical form of OIDs. +While any OID can be used only certain values make sense. In particular the +following PKIX, NS and MS values are meaningful: + +Value Meaning +----- ------- +serverAuth SSL/TLS Web Server Authentication. +clientAuth SSL/TLS Web Client Authentication. +codeSigning Code signing. +emailProtection E-mail Protection (S/MIME). +timeStamping Trusted Timestamping +msCodeInd Microsoft Individual Code Signing (authenticode) +msCodeCom Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (authenticode) +msCTLSign Microsoft Trust List Signing +msSGC Microsoft Server Gated Crypto +msEFS Microsoft Encrypted File System +nsSGC Netscape Server Gated Crypto + +For example, under IE5 a CA can be used for any purpose: by including a list +of the above usages the CA can be restricted to only authorised uses. + +Note: software packages may place additional interpretations on certificate +use, in particular some usages may only work for selected CAs. Don't for example +expect just including msSGC or nsSGC will automatically mean that a certificate +can be used for SGC ("step up" encryption) otherwise anyone could use it. + +Examples: + +extendedKeyUsage=critical,codeSigning,1.2.3.4 +extendedKeyUsage=nsSGC,msSGC + +Subject Key Identifier. + +This is really a string extension and can take two possible values. Either +a hex string giving details of the extension value to include or the word +'hash' which then automatically follow PKIX guidelines in selecting and +appropriate key identifier. The use of the hex string is strongly discouraged. + +Example: subjectKeyIdentifier=hash + +Authority Key Identifier. + +The authority key identifier extension permits two options. keyid and issuer: +both can take the optional value "always". + +If the keyid option is present an attempt is made to copy the subject key +identifier from the parent certificate. If the value "always" is present +then an error is returned if the option fails. + +The issuer option copies the issuer and serial number from the issuer +certificate. Normally this will only be done if the keyid option fails or +is not included: the "always" flag will always include the value. + +Subject Alternative Name. + +The subject alternative name extension allows various literal values to be +included in the configuration file. These include "email" (an email address) +"URI" a uniform resource indicator, "DNS" (a DNS domain name), RID (a +registered ID: OBJECT IDENTIFIER), IP (and IP address) and otherName. + +Also the email option include a special 'copy' value. This will automatically +include and email addresses contained in the certificate subject name in +the extension. + +otherName can include arbitrary data associated with an OID: the value +should be the OID followed by a semicolon and the content in standard +ASN1_generate_nconf() format. + +Examples: + +subjectAltName=email:copy,email:my@other.address,URI:http://my.url.here/ +subjectAltName=email:my@other.address,RID:1.2.3.4 +subjectAltName=otherName:1.2.3.4;UTF8:some other identifier + +Issuer Alternative Name. + +The issuer alternative name option supports all the literal options of +subject alternative name. It does *not* support the email:copy option because +that would not make sense. It does support an additional issuer:copy option +that will copy all the subject alternative name values from the issuer +certificate (if possible). + +Example: + +issuserAltName = issuer:copy + +Authority Info Access. + +The authority information access extension gives details about how to access +certain information relating to the CA. Its syntax is accessOID;location +where 'location' has the same syntax as subject alternative name (except +that email:copy is not supported). accessOID can be any valid OID but only +certain values are meaningful for example OCSP and caIssuers. OCSP gives the +location of an OCSP responder: this is used by Netscape PSM and other software. + +Example: + +authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.my.host/ +authorityInfoAccess = caIssuers;URI:http://my.ca/ca.html + +CRL distribution points. + +This is a multi-valued extension that supports all the literal options of +subject alternative name. Of the few software packages that currently interpret +this extension most only interpret the URI option. + +Currently each option will set a new DistributionPoint with the fullName +field set to the given value. + +Other fields like cRLissuer and reasons cannot currently be set or displayed: +at this time no examples were available that used these fields. + +If you see this extension with <UNSUPPORTED> when you attempt to print it out +or it doesn't appear to display correctly then let me know, including the +certificate (mail me at steve@openssl.org) . + +Examples: + +crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://www.myhost.com/myca.crl +crlDistributionPoints=URI:http://www.my.com/my.crl,URI:http://www.oth.com/my.crl + +Certificate Policies. + +This is a RAW extension. It attempts to display the contents of this extension: +unfortunately this extension is often improperly encoded. + +The certificate policies extension will rarely be used in practice: few +software packages interpret it correctly or at all. IE5 does partially +support this extension: but it needs the 'ia5org' option because it will +only correctly support a broken encoding. Of the options below only the +policy OID, explicitText and CPS options are displayed with IE5. + +All the fields of this extension can be set by using the appropriate syntax. + +If you follow the PKIX recommendations of not including any qualifiers and just +using only one OID then you just include the value of that OID. Multiple OIDs +can be set separated by commas, for example: + +certificatePolicies= 1.2.4.5, 1.1.3.4 + +If you wish to include qualifiers then the policy OID and qualifiers need to +be specified in a separate section: this is done by using the @section syntax +instead of a literal OID value. + +The section referred to must include the policy OID using the name +policyIdentifier, cPSuri qualifiers can be included using the syntax: + +CPS.nnn=value + +userNotice qualifiers can be set using the syntax: + +userNotice.nnn=@notice + +The value of the userNotice qualifier is specified in the relevant section. +This section can include explicitText, organization and noticeNumbers +options. explicitText and organization are text strings, noticeNumbers is a +comma separated list of numbers. The organization and noticeNumbers options +(if included) must BOTH be present. If you use the userNotice option with IE5 +then you need the 'ia5org' option at the top level to modify the encoding: +otherwise it will not be interpreted properly. + +Example: + +certificatePolicies=ia5org,1.2.3.4,1.5.6.7.8,@polsect + +[polsect] + +policyIdentifier = 1.3.5.8 +CPS.1="http://my.host.name/" +CPS.2="http://my.your.name/" +userNotice.1=@notice + +[notice] + +explicitText="Explicit Text Here" +organization="Organisation Name" +noticeNumbers=1,2,3,4 + +TECHNICAL NOTE: the ia5org option changes the type of the 'organization' field, +according to PKIX it should be of type DisplayText but Verisign uses an +IA5STRING and IE5 needs this too. + +Display only extensions. + +Some extensions are only partially supported and currently are only displayed +but cannot be set. These include private key usage period, CRL number, and +CRL reason. + +============================================================================== + X509V3 Extension code: programmers guide +============================================================================== + +The purpose of the extension code is twofold. It allows an extension to be +created from a string or structure describing its contents and it prints out an +extension in a human or machine readable form. + +1. Initialisation and cleanup. + +No special initialisation is needed before calling the extension functions. +You used to have to call X509V3_add_standard_extensions(); but this is no longer +required and this function no longer does anything. + +void X509V3_EXT_cleanup(void); + +This function should be called to cleanup the extension code if any custom +extensions have been added. If no custom extensions have been added then this +call does nothing. After this call all custom extension code is freed up but +you can still use the standard extensions. + +2. Printing and parsing extensions. + +The simplest way to print out extensions is via the standard X509 printing +routines: if you use the standard X509_print() function, the supported +extensions will be printed out automatically. + +The following functions allow finer control over extension display: + +int X509V3_EXT_print(BIO *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent); +int X509V3_EXT_print_fp(FILE *out, X509_EXTENSION *ext, int flag, int indent); + +These two functions print out an individual extension to a BIO or FILE pointer. +Currently the flag argument is unused and should be set to 0. The 'indent' +argument is the number of spaces to indent each line. + +void *X509V3_EXT_d2i(X509_EXTENSION *ext); + +This function parses an extension and returns its internal structure. The +precise structure you get back depends on the extension being parsed. If the +extension if basicConstraints you will get back a pointer to a +BASIC_CONSTRAINTS structure. Check out the source in crypto/x509v3 for more +details about the structures returned. The returned structure should be freed +after use using the relevant free function, BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free() for +example. + +void * X509_get_ext_d2i(X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); +void * X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); +void * X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); +void * X509V3_get_d2i(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); + +These functions combine the operations of searching for extensions and +parsing them. They search a certificate, a CRL a CRL entry or a stack +of extensions respectively for extension whose NID is 'nid' and return +the parsed result of NULL if an error occurred. For example: + +BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; +bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL); + +This will search for the basicConstraints extension and either return +it value or NULL. NULL can mean either the extension was not found, it +occurred more than once or it could not be parsed. + +If 'idx' is NULL then an extension is only parsed if it occurs precisely +once. This is standard behaviour because extensions normally cannot occur +more than once. If however more than one extension of the same type can +occur it can be used to parse successive extensions for example: + +int i; +void *ext; + +i = -1; +for(;;) { + ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, nid, crit, &idx); + if(ext == NULL) break; + /* Do something with ext */ +} + +If 'crit' is not NULL and the extension was found then the int it points to +is set to 1 for critical extensions and 0 for non critical. Therefore if the +function returns NULL but 'crit' is set to 0 or 1 then the extension was +found but it could not be parsed. + +The int pointed to by crit will be set to -1 if the extension was not found +and -2 if the extension occurred more than once (this will only happen if +idx is NULL). In both cases the function will return NULL. + +3. Generating extensions. + +An extension will typically be generated from a configuration file, or some +other kind of configuration database. + +int X509V3_EXT_add_conf(LHASH *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *section, + X509 *cert); +int X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf(LHASH *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *section, + X509_CRL *crl); + +These functions add all the extensions in the given section to the given +certificate or CRL. They will normally be called just before the certificate +or CRL is due to be signed. Both return 0 on error on non zero for success. + +In each case 'conf' is the LHASH pointer of the configuration file to use +and 'section' is the section containing the extension details. + +See the 'context functions' section for a description of the ctx parameter. + + +X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf(LHASH *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *name, + char *value); + +This function returns an extension based on a name and value pair, if the +pair will not need to access other sections in a config file (or there is no +config file) then the 'conf' parameter can be set to NULL. + +X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(char *conf, X509V3_CTX *ctx, int nid, + char *value); + +This function creates an extension in the same way as X509V3_EXT_conf() but +takes the NID of the extension rather than its name. + +For example to produce basicConstraints with the CA flag and a path length of +10: + +x = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, NULL, NID_basic_constraints,"CA:TRUE,pathlen:10"); + + +X509_EXTENSION *X509V3_EXT_i2d(int ext_nid, int crit, void *ext_struc); + +This function sets up an extension from its internal structure. The ext_nid +parameter is the NID of the extension and 'crit' is the critical flag. + +4. Context functions. + +The following functions set and manipulate an extension context structure. +The purpose of the extension context is to allow the extension code to +access various structures relating to the "environment" of the certificate: +for example the issuers certificate or the certificate request. + +void X509V3_set_ctx(X509V3_CTX *ctx, X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, + X509_REQ *req, X509_CRL *crl, int flags); + +This function sets up an X509V3_CTX structure with details of the certificate +environment: specifically the issuers certificate, the subject certificate, +the certificate request and the CRL: if these are not relevant or not +available then they can be set to NULL. The 'flags' parameter should be set +to zero. + +X509V3_set_ctx_test(ctx) + +This macro is used to set the 'ctx' structure to a 'test' value: this is to +allow the syntax of an extension (or configuration file) to be tested. + +X509V3_set_ctx_nodb(ctx) + +This macro is used when no configuration database is present. + +void X509V3_set_conf_lhash(X509V3_CTX *ctx, LHASH *lhash); + +This function is used to set the configuration database when it is an LHASH +structure: typically a configuration file. + +The following functions are used to access a configuration database: they +should only be used in RAW extensions. + +char * X509V3_get_string(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *name, char *section); + +This function returns the value of the parameter "name" in "section", or NULL +if there has been an error. + +void X509V3_string_free(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str); + +This function frees up the string returned by the above function. + +STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * X509V3_get_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *section); + +This function returns a whole section as a STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) . + +void X509V3_section_free( X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section); + +This function frees up the STACK returned by the above function. + +Note: it is possible to use the extension code with a custom configuration +database. To do this the "db_meth" element of the X509V3_CTX structure should +be set to an X509V3_CTX_METHOD structure. This structure contains the following +function pointers: + +char * (*get_string)(void *db, char *section, char *value); +STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * (*get_section)(void *db, char *section); +void (*free_string)(void *db, char * string); +void (*free_section)(void *db, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section); + +these will be called and passed the 'db' element in the X509V3_CTX structure +to access the database. If a given function is not implemented or not required +it can be set to NULL. + +5. String helper functions. + +There are several "i2s" and "s2i" functions that convert structures to and +from ASCII strings. In all the "i2s" cases the returned string should be +freed using Free() after use. Since some of these are part of other extension +code they may take a 'method' parameter. Unless otherwise stated it can be +safely set to NULL. + +char *i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct); + +This returns a hex string from an ASN1_OCTET_STRING. + +char * i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, ASN1_INTEGER *aint); +char * i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, ASN1_ENUMERATED *aint); + +These return a string decimal representations of an ASN1_INTEGER and an +ASN1_ENUMERATED type, respectively. + +ASN1_OCTET_STRING *s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, + X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str); + +This converts an ASCII hex string to an ASN1_OCTET_STRING. + +ASN1_INTEGER * s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *meth, char *value); + +This converts a decimal ASCII string into an ASN1_INTEGER. + +6. Multi valued extension helper functions. + +The following functions can be used to manipulate STACKs of CONF_VALUE +structures, as used by multi valued extensions. + +int X509V3_get_value_bool(CONF_VALUE *value, int *asn1_bool); + +This function expects a boolean value in 'value' and sets 'asn1_bool' to +it. That is it sets it to 0 for FALSE or 0xff for TRUE. The following +strings are acceptable: "TRUE", "true", "Y", "y", "YES", "yes", "FALSE" +"false", "N", "n", "NO" or "no". + +int X509V3_get_value_int(CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint); + +This accepts a decimal integer of arbitrary length and sets an ASN1_INTEGER. + +int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); + +This simply adds a string name and value pair. + +int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); + +The same as above but for an unsigned character value. + +int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); + +This adds either "TRUE" or "FALSE" depending on the value of 'asn1_bool' + +int X509V3_add_value_bool_nf(char *name, int asn1_bool, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); + +This is the same as above except it adds nothing if asn1_bool is FALSE. + +int X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, ASN1_INTEGER *aint, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist); + +This function adds the value of the ASN1_INTEGER in decimal form. + +7. Other helper functions. + +<to be added> + +ADDING CUSTOM EXTENSIONS. + +Currently there are three types of supported extensions. + +String extensions are simple strings where the value is placed directly in the +extensions, and the string returned is printed out. + +Multi value extensions are passed a STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) name and value pairs +or return a STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE). + +Raw extensions are just passed a BIO or a value and it is the extensions +responsibility to handle all the necessary printing. + +There are two ways to add an extension. One is simply as an alias to an already +existing extension. An alias is an extension that is identical in ASN1 structure +to an existing extension but has a different OBJECT IDENTIFIER. This can be +done by calling: + +int X509V3_EXT_add_alias(int nid_to, int nid_from); + +'nid_to' is the new extension NID and 'nid_from' is the already existing +extension NID. + +Alternatively an extension can be written from scratch. This involves writing +the ASN1 code to encode and decode the extension and functions to print out and +generate the extension from strings. The relevant functions are then placed in +a X509V3_EXT_METHOD structure and int X509V3_EXT_add(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *ext); +called. + +The X509V3_EXT_METHOD structure is described below. + +struct { +int ext_nid; +int ext_flags; +X509V3_EXT_NEW ext_new; +X509V3_EXT_FREE ext_free; +X509V3_EXT_D2I d2i; +X509V3_EXT_I2D i2d; +X509V3_EXT_I2S i2s; +X509V3_EXT_S2I s2i; +X509V3_EXT_I2V i2v; +X509V3_EXT_V2I v2i; +X509V3_EXT_R2I r2i; +X509V3_EXT_I2R i2r; + +void *usr_data; +}; + +The elements have the following meanings. + +ext_nid is the NID of the object identifier of the extension. + +ext_flags is set of flags. Currently the only external flag is + X509V3_EXT_MULTILINE which means a multi valued extensions + should be printed on separate lines. + +usr_data is an extension specific pointer to any relevant data. This + allows extensions to share identical code but have different + uses. An example of this is the bit string extension which uses + usr_data to contain a list of the bit names. + +All the remaining elements are function pointers. + +ext_new is a pointer to a function that allocates memory for the + extension ASN1 structure: for example ASN1_OBJECT_new(). + +ext_free is a pointer to a function that free up memory of the extension + ASN1 structure: for example ASN1_OBJECT_free(). + +d2i is the standard ASN1 function that converts a DER buffer into + the internal ASN1 structure: for example d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(). + +i2d is the standard ASN1 function that converts the internal + structure into the DER representation: for example + i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING(). + +The remaining functions are depend on the type of extension. One i2X and +one X2i should be set and the rest set to NULL. The types set do not need +to match up, for example the extension could be set using the multi valued +v2i function and printed out using the raw i2r. + +All functions have the X509V3_EXT_METHOD passed to them in the 'method' +parameter and an X509V3_CTX structure. Extension code can then access the +parent structure via the 'method' parameter to for example make use of the value +of usr_data. If the code needs to use detail relating to the request it can +use the 'ctx' parameter. + +A note should be given here about the 'flags' member of the 'ctx' parameter. +If it has the value CTX_TEST then the configuration syntax is being checked +and no actual certificate or CRL exists. Therefore any attempt in the config +file to access such information should silently succeed. If the syntax is OK +then it should simply return a (possibly bogus) extension, otherwise it +should return NULL. + +char *i2s(struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext); + +This function takes the internal structure in the ext parameter and returns +a Malloc'ed string representing its value. + +void * s2i(struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, char *str); + +This function takes the string representation in the ext parameter and returns +an allocated internal structure: ext_free() will be used on this internal +structure after use. + +i2v and v2i handle a STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE): + +typedef struct +{ + char *section; + char *name; + char *value; +} CONF_VALUE; + +Only the name and value members are currently used. + +STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * i2v(struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext); + +This function is passed the internal structure in the ext parameter and +returns a STACK of CONF_VALUE structures. The values of name, value, +section and the structure itself will be freed up with Free after use. +Several helper functions are available to add values to this STACK. + +void * v2i(struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, + STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values); + +This function takes a STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) structures and should set the +values of the external structure. This typically uses the name element to +determine which structure element to set and the value element to determine +what to set it to. Several helper functions are available for this +purpose (see above). + +int i2r(struct v3_ext_method *method, void *ext, BIO *out, int indent); + +This function is passed the internal extension structure in the ext parameter +and sends out a human readable version of the extension to out. The 'indent' +parameter should be noted to determine the necessary amount of indentation +needed on the output. + +void * r2i(struct v3_ext_method *method, struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx, char *str); + +This is just passed the string representation of the extension. It is intended +to be used for more elaborate extensions where the standard single and multi +valued options are insufficient. They can use the 'ctx' parameter to parse the +configuration database themselves. See the context functions section for details +of how to do this. + +Note: although this type takes the same parameters as the "r2s" function there +is a subtle difference. Whereas an "r2i" function can access a configuration +database an "s2i" function MUST NOT. This is so the internal code can safely +assume that an "s2i" function will work without a configuration database. + +============================================================================== + PKCS#12 Library +============================================================================== + +This section describes the internal PKCS#12 support. There are very few +differences between the old external library and the new internal code at +present. This may well change because the external library will not be updated +much in future. + +This version now includes a couple of high level PKCS#12 functions which +generally "do the right thing" and should make it much easier to handle PKCS#12 +structures. + +HIGH LEVEL FUNCTIONS. + +For most applications you only need concern yourself with the high level +functions. They can parse and generate simple PKCS#12 files as produced by +Netscape and MSIE or indeed any compliant PKCS#12 file containing a single +private key and certificate pair. + +1. Initialisation and cleanup. + +No special initialisation is needed for the internal PKCS#12 library: the +standard SSLeay_add_all_algorithms() is sufficient. If you do not wish to +add all algorithms (you should at least add SHA1 though) then you can manually +initialise the PKCS#12 library with: + +PKCS12_PBE_add(); + +The memory allocated by the PKCS#12 library is freed up when EVP_cleanup() is +called or it can be directly freed with: + +EVP_PBE_cleanup(); + +after this call (or EVP_cleanup() ) no more PKCS#12 library functions should +be called. + +2. I/O functions. + +i2d_PKCS12_bio(bp, p12) + +This writes out a PKCS12 structure to a BIO. + +i2d_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12) + +This is the same but for a FILE pointer. + +d2i_PKCS12_bio(bp, p12) + +This reads in a PKCS12 structure from a BIO. + +d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12) + +This is the same but for a FILE pointer. + +3. High level functions. + +3.1 Parsing with PKCS12_parse(). + +int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, + STACK **ca); + +This function takes a PKCS12 structure and a password (ASCII, null terminated) +and returns the private key, the corresponding certificate and any CA +certificates. If any of these is not required it can be passed as a NULL. +The 'ca' parameter should be either NULL, a pointer to NULL or a valid STACK +structure. Typically to read in a PKCS#12 file you might do: + +p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL); +PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL); /* CAs not wanted */ +PKCS12_free(p12); + +3.2 PKCS#12 creation with PKCS12_create(). + +PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, + STACK *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, + int mac_iter, int keytype); + +This function will create a PKCS12 structure from a given password, name, +private key, certificate and optional STACK of CA certificates. The remaining +5 parameters can be set to 0 and sensible defaults will be used. + +The parameters nid_key and nid_cert are the key and certificate encryption +algorithms, iter is the encryption iteration count, mac_iter is the MAC +iteration count and keytype is the type of private key. If you really want +to know what these last 5 parameters do then read the low level section. + +Typically to create a PKCS#12 file the following could be used: + +p12 = PKCS12_create(pass, "My Certificate", pkey, cert, NULL, 0,0,0,0,0); +i2d_PKCS12_fp(fp, p12); +PKCS12_free(p12); + +3.3 Changing a PKCS#12 structure password. + +int PKCS12_newpass(PKCS12 *p12, char *oldpass, char *newpass); + +This changes the password of an already existing PKCS#12 structure. oldpass +is the old password and newpass is the new one. An error occurs if the old +password is incorrect. + +LOW LEVEL FUNCTIONS. + +In some cases the high level functions do not provide the necessary +functionality. For example if you want to generate or parse more complex +PKCS#12 files. The sample pkcs12 application uses the low level functions +to display details about the internal structure of a PKCS#12 file. + +Introduction. + +This is a brief description of how a PKCS#12 file is represented internally: +some knowledge of PKCS#12 is assumed. + +A PKCS#12 object contains several levels. + +At the lowest level is a PKCS12_SAFEBAG. This can contain a certificate, a +CRL, a private key, encrypted or unencrypted, a set of safebags (so the +structure can be nested) or other secrets (not documented at present). +A safebag can optionally have attributes, currently these are: a unicode +friendlyName (a Unicode string) or a localKeyID (a string of bytes). + +At the next level is an authSafe which is a set of safebags collected into +a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. This can be just plain data, or encrypted itself. + +At the top level is the PKCS12 structure itself which contains a set of +authSafes in an embedded PKCS#7 Contentinfo of type data. In addition it +contains a MAC which is a kind of password protected digest to preserve +integrity (so any unencrypted stuff below can't be tampered with). + +The reason for these levels is so various objects can be encrypted in various +ways. For example you might want to encrypt a set of private keys with +triple-DES and then include the related certificates either unencrypted or +with lower encryption. Yes it's the dreaded crypto laws at work again which +allow strong encryption on private keys and only weak encryption on other +stuff. + +To build one of these things you turn all certificates and keys into safebags +(with optional attributes). You collect the safebags into (one or more) STACKS +and convert these into authsafes (encrypted or unencrypted). The authsafes +are collected into a STACK and added to a PKCS12 structure. Finally a MAC +inserted. + +Pulling one apart is basically the reverse process. The MAC is verified against +the given password. The authsafes are extracted and each authsafe split into +a set of safebags (possibly involving decryption). Finally the safebags are +decomposed into the original keys and certificates and the attributes used to +match up private key and certificate pairs. + +Anyway here are the functions that do the dirty work. + +1. Construction functions. + +1.1 Safebag functions. + +M_PKCS12_x5092certbag(x509) + +This macro takes an X509 structure and returns a certificate bag. The +X509 structure can be freed up after calling this function. + +M_PKCS12_x509crl2certbag(crl) + +As above but for a CRL. + +PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) + +Take a private key and convert it into a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo structure. +Works for both RSA and DSA private keys. NB since the PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo +structure contains a private key data in plain text form it should be free'd +up as soon as it has been encrypted for security reasons (freeing up the +structure zeros out the sensitive data). This can be done with +PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(). + +PKCS8_add_keyusage(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int usage) + +This sets the key type when a key is imported into MSIE or Outlook 98. Two +values are currently supported: KEY_EX and KEY_SIG. KEY_EX is an exchange type +key that can also be used for signing but its size is limited in the export +versions of MS software to 512 bits, it is also the default. KEY_SIG is a +signing only key but the keysize is unlimited (well 16K is supposed to work). +If you are using the domestic version of MSIE then you can ignore this because +KEY_EX is not limited and can be used for both. + +PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) + +Convert a PKCS8 private key structure into a keybag. This routine embeds the +p8 structure in the keybag so p8 should not be freed up or used after it is +called. The p8 structure will be freed up when the safebag is freed. + +PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) + +Convert a PKCS#8 structure into a shrouded key bag (encrypted). p8 is not +embedded and can be freed up after use. + +int PKCS12_add_localkeyid(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name, int namelen) +int PKCS12_add_friendlyname(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name, int namelen) + +Add a local key id or a friendlyname to a safebag. + +1.2 Authsafe functions. + +PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK *sk) +Take a stack of safebags and convert them into an unencrypted authsafe. The +stack of safebags can be freed up after calling this function. + +PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, STACK *bags); + +As above but encrypted. + +1.3 PKCS12 functions. + +PKCS12 *PKCS12_init(int mode) + +Initialise a PKCS12 structure (currently mode should be NID_pkcs7_data). + +M_PKCS12_pack_authsafes(p12, safes) + +This macro takes a STACK of authsafes and adds them to a PKCS#12 structure. + +int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, EVP_MD *md_type); + +Add a MAC to a PKCS12 structure. If EVP_MD is NULL use SHA-1, the spec suggests +that SHA-1 should be used. + +2. Extraction Functions. + +2.1 Safebags. + +M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag) + +Return the type of "bag". Returns one of the following + +NID_keyBag +NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 7 +NID_certBag 8 +NID_crlBag 9 +NID_secretBag 10 +NID_safeContentsBag 11 + +M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) + +Returns type of certificate bag, following are understood. + +NID_x509Certificate 14 +NID_sdsiCertificate 15 + +M_PKCS12_crl_bag_type(bag) + +Returns crl bag type, currently only NID_crlBag is recognised. + +M_PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag) + +This macro extracts an X509 certificate from a certificate bag. + +M_PKCS12_certbag2x509crl(bag) + +As above but for a CRL. + +EVP_PKEY * PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) + +Extract a private key from a PKCS8 private key info structure. + +M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen) + +Decrypt a shrouded key bag and return a PKCS8 private key info structure. +Works with both RSA and DSA keys + +char *PKCS12_get_friendlyname(bag) + +Returns the friendlyName of a bag if present or NULL if none. The returned +string is a null terminated ASCII string allocated with Malloc(). It should +thus be freed up with Free() after use. + +2.2 AuthSafe functions. + +M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7) + +Extract a STACK of safe bags from a PKCS#7 data ContentInfo. + +#define M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen) + +As above but for an encrypted content info. + +2.3 PKCS12 functions. + +M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12) + +Extract a STACK of authsafes from a PKCS12 structure. + +M_PKCS12_mac_present(p12) + +Check to see if a MAC is present. + +int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, unsigned char *pass, int passlen) + +Verify a MAC on a PKCS12 structure. Returns an error if MAC not present. + + +Notes. + +1. All the function return 0 or NULL on error. +2. Encryption based functions take a common set of parameters. These are +described below. + +pass, passlen +ASCII password and length. The password on the MAC is called the "integrity +password" the encryption password is called the "privacy password" in the +PKCS#12 documentation. The passwords do not have to be the same. If -1 is +passed for the length it is worked out by the function itself (currently +this is sometimes done whatever is passed as the length but that may change). + +salt, saltlen +A 'salt' if salt is NULL a random salt is used. If saltlen is also zero a +default length is used. + +iter +Iteration count. This is a measure of how many times an internal function is +called to encrypt the data. The larger this value is the longer it takes, it +makes dictionary attacks on passwords harder. NOTE: Some implementations do +not support an iteration count on the MAC. If the password for the MAC and +encryption is the same then there is no point in having a high iteration +count for encryption if the MAC has no count. The MAC could be attacked +and the password used for the main decryption. + +pbe_nid +This is the NID of the password based encryption method used. The following are +supported. +NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 +NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 +NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC +NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC +NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC +NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC + +Which you use depends on the implementation you are exporting to. "Export +grade" (i.e. cryptographically challenged) products cannot support all +algorithms. Typically you may be able to use any encryption on shrouded key +bags but they must then be placed in an unencrypted authsafe. Other authsafes +may only support 40bit encryption. Of course if you are using SSLeay +throughout you can strongly encrypt everything and have high iteration counts +on everything. + +3. For decryption routines only the password and length are needed. + +4. Unlike the external version the nid's of objects are the values of the +constants: that is NID_certBag is the real nid, therefore there is no +PKCS12_obj_offset() function. Note the object constants are not the same as +those of the external version. If you use these constants then you will need +to recompile your code. + +5. With the exception of PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG(), after calling any function or +macro of the form PKCS12_MAKE_SOMETHING(other) the "other" structure can be +reused or freed up safely. + diff --git a/doc/openssl_button.gif b/doc/openssl_button.gif Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3d3c90c9f849 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/openssl_button.gif diff --git a/doc/openssl_button.html b/doc/openssl_button.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..44c91bd3d068 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/openssl_button.html @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + +<!-- the `Includes OpenSSL Cryptogaphy Software' button --> +<!-- freely usable by any application linked against OpenSSL --> +<a href="http://www.openssl.org/"> +<img src="openssl_button.gif" + width=102 height=47 border=0></a> + diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f81f692df5de --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CIPHER_get_name, SSL_CIPHER_get_bits, SSL_CIPHER_get_version, SSL_CIPHER_description - get SSL_CIPHER properties + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits); + char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + char *SSL_CIPHER_description(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int size); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CIPHER_get_name() returns a pointer to the name of B<cipher>. If the +argument is the NULL pointer, a pointer to the constant value "NONE" is +returned. + +SSL_CIPHER_get_bits() returns the number of secret bits used for B<cipher>. If +B<alg_bits> is not NULL, it contains the number of bits processed by the +chosen algorithm. If B<cipher> is NULL, 0 is returned. + +SSL_CIPHER_get_version() returns the protocol version for B<cipher>, currently +"SSLv2", "SSLv3", or "TLSv1". If B<cipher> is NULL, "(NONE)" is returned. + +SSL_CIPHER_description() returns a textual description of the cipher used +into the buffer B<buf> of length B<len> provided. B<len> must be at least +128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the the string "Buffer too small" is +returned. If B<buf> is NULL, a buffer of 128 bytes is allocated using +OPENSSL_malloc(). If the allocation fails, a pointer to the string +"OPENSSL_malloc Error" is returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +The number of bits processed can be different from the secret bits. An +export cipher like e.g. EXP-RC4-MD5 has only 40 secret bits. The algorithm +does use the full 128 bits (which would be returned for B<alg_bits>), of +which however 88bits are fixed. The search space is hence only 40 bits. + +The string returned by SSL_CIPHER_description() in case of success consists +of cleartext information separated by one or more blanks in the following +sequence: + +=over 4 + +=item <ciphername> + +Textual representation of the cipher name. + +=item <protocol version> + +Protocol version: B<SSLv2>, B<SSLv3>. The TLSv1 ciphers are flagged with SSLv3. + +=item Kx=<key exchange> + +Key exchange method: B<RSA> (for export ciphers as B<RSA(512)> or +B<RSA(1024)>), B<DH> (for export ciphers as B<DH(512)> or B<DH(1024)>), +B<DH/RSA>, B<DH/DSS>, B<Fortezza>. + +=item Au=<authentication> + +Authentication method: B<RSA>, B<DSS>, B<DH>, B<None>. None is the +representation of anonymous ciphers. + +=item Enc=<symmetric encryption method> + +Encryption method with number of secret bits: B<DES(40)>, B<DES(56)>, +B<3DES(168)>, B<RC4(40)>, B<RC4(56)>, B<RC4(64)>, B<RC4(128)>, +B<RC2(40)>, B<RC2(56)>, B<RC2(128)>, B<IDEA(128)>, B<Fortezza>, B<None>. + +=item Mac=<message authentication code> + +Message digest: B<MD5>, B<SHA1>. + +=item <export flag> + +If the cipher is flagged exportable with respect to old US crypto +regulations, the word "B<export>" is printed. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Some examples for the output of SSL_CIPHER_description(): + + EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 + EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 + RC4-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=MD5 + EXP-RC4-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA Enc=RC4(40) Mac=MD5 export + +=head1 BUGS + +If SSL_CIPHER_description() is called with B<cipher> being NULL, the +library crashes. + +If SSL_CIPHER_description() cannot handle a built-in cipher, the according +description of the cipher property is B<unknown>. This case should not +occur. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +See DESCRIPTION + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_current_cipher(3)|SSL_get_current_cipher(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)|SSL_get_ciphers(3)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..42fa66b19751 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_COMP_add_compression_method - handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() adds the compression method B<cm> with +the identifier B<id> to the list of available compression methods. This +list is globally maintained for all SSL operations within this application. +It cannot be set for specific SSL_CTX or SSL objects. + +=head1 NOTES + +The TLS standard (or SSLv3) allows the integration of compression methods +into the communication. The TLS RFC does however not specify compression +methods or their corresponding identifiers, so there is currently no compatible +way to integrate compression with unknown peers. It is therefore currently not +recommended to integrate compression into applications. Applications for +non-public use may agree on certain compression methods. Using different +compression methods with the same identifier will lead to connection failure. + +An OpenSSL client speaking a protocol that allows compression (SSLv3, TLSv1) +will unconditionally send the list of all compression methods enabled with +SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() to the server during the handshake. +Unlike the mechanisms to set a cipher list, there is no method available to +restrict the list of compression method on a per connection basis. + +An OpenSSL server will match the identifiers listed by a client against +its own compression methods and will unconditionally activate compression +when a matching identifier is found. There is no way to restrict the list +of compression methods supported on a per connection basis. + +The OpenSSL library has the compression methods B<COMP_rle()> and (when +especially enabled during compilation) B<COMP_zlib()> available. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +Once the identities of the compression methods for the TLS protocol have +been standardized, the compression API will most likely be changed. Using +it in the current state is not recommended. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may return the following values: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The operation succeeded. + +=item 1 + +The operation failed. Check the error queue to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ee28f5ccc3a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert - add certificate to chain + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x509) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the certificate +chain presented together with the certificate. Several certificates +can be added one after the other. + +=head1 NOTES + +When constructing the certificate chain, the chain will be formed from +these certificates explicitly specified. If no chain is specified, +the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA +certificates in the trusted CA storage, see +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() returns 1 on success. Check out the +error stack to find out the reason for failure otherwise. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82676b26b239 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_add_session, SSL_add_session, SSL_CTX_remove_session, SSL_remove_session - manipulate session cache + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); + int SSL_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); + + int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); + int SSL_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_add_session() adds the session B<c> to the context B<ctx>. The +reference count for session B<c> is incremented by 1. If a session with +the same session id already exists, the old session is removed by calling +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>. + +SSL_CTX_remove_session() removes the session B<c> from the context B<ctx>. +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)> is called once for B<c>. + +SSL_add_session() and SSL_remove_session() are synonyms for their +SSL_CTX_*() counterparts. + +=head1 NOTES + +When adding a new session to the internal session cache, it is examined +whether a session with the same session id already exists. In this case +it is assumed that both sessions are identical. If the same session is +stored in a different SSL_SESSION object, The old session is +removed and replaced by the new session. If the session is actually +identical (the SSL_SESSION object is identical), SSL_CTX_add_session() +is a no-op, and the return value is 0. + +If a server SSL_CTX is configured with the SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE +flag then the internal cache will not be populated automatically by new +sessions negotiated by the SSL/TLS implementation, even though the internal +cache will be searched automatically for session-resume requests (the +latter can be surpressed by SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP). So the +application can use SSL_CTX_add_session() directly to have full control +over the sessions that can be resumed if desired. + + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following values are returned by all functions: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + + The operation failed. In case of the add operation, it was tried to add + the same (identical) session twice. In case of the remove operation, the + session was not found in the cache. + +=item 1 + + The operation succeeded. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb6adcf50c16 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_ctrl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_ctrl, SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl, SSL_ctrl, SSL_callback_ctrl - internal handling functions for SSL_CTX and SSL objects + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); + long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int cmd, void (*fp)()); + + long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); + long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int cmd, void (*fp)()); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The SSL_*_ctrl() family of functions is used to manipulate settings of +the SSL_CTX and SSL objects. Depending on the command B<cmd> the arguments +B<larg>, B<parg>, or B<fp> are evaluated. These functions should never +be called directly. All functionalities needed are made available via +other functions or macros. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The return values of the SSL*_ctrl() functions depend on the command +supplied via the B<cmd> parameter. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..148c36c87151 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_flush_sessions.pod @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions, SSL_flush_sessions - remove expired sessions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); + void SSL_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions() causes a run through the session cache of +B<ctx> to remove sessions expired at time B<tm>. + +SSL_flush_sessions() is a synonym for SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(). + +=head1 NOTES + +If enabled, the internal session cache will collect all sessions established +up to the specified maximum number (see SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size()). +As sessions will not be reused ones they are expired, they should be +removed from the cache to save resources. This can either be done + automatically whenever 255 new sessions were established (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>) +or manually by calling SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(). + +The parameter B<tm> specifies the time which should be used for the +expiration test, in most cases the actual time given by time(0) +will be used. + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions() will only check sessions stored in the internal +cache. When a session is found and removed, the remove_session_cb is however +called to synchronize with the external cache (see +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_free.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51d86769682f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_free.pod @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_free - free an allocated SSL_CTX object + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_free() decrements the reference count of B<ctx>, and removes the +SSL_CTX object pointed to by B<ctx> and frees up the allocated memory if the +the reference count has reached 0. + +It also calls the free()ing procedures for indirectly affected items, if +applicable: the session cache, the list of ciphers, the list of Client CAs, +the certificates and keys. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +If a session-remove callback is set (SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb()), this +callback will be called for each session being freed from B<ctx>'s +session cache. This implies, that all corresponding sessions from an +external session cache are removed as well. If this is not desired, the user +should explicitly unset the callback by calling +SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(B<ctx>, NULL) prior to calling SSL_CTX_free(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_free() does not provide diagnostic information. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0c40a91f2fb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index, SSL_CTX_set_ex_data, SSL_CTX_get_ex_data - internal application specific data functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *arg); + + void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx); + + typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. +These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application +specific data attached to a specific structure. + +SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index() is used to register a new index for application +specific data. + +SSL_CTX_set_ex_data() is used to store application data at B<arg> for B<idx> +into the B<ctx> object. + +SSL_CTX_get_ex_data() is used to retrieve the information for B<idx> from +B<ctx>. + +A detailed description for the B<*_get_ex_new_index()> functionality +can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>. +The B<*_get_ex_data()> and B<*_set_ex_data()> functionality is described in +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2a3747e75c64 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode, SSL_get_verify_mode, SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth, SSL_get_verify_depth, SSL_get_verify_callback, SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback - get currently set verification parameters + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl); + int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *); + int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode() returns the verification mode currently set in +B<ctx>. + +SSL_get_verify_mode() returns the verification mode currently set in +B<ssl>. + +SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth() returns the verification depth limit currently set +in B<ctx>. If no limit has been explicitly set, -1 is returned and the +default value will be used. + +SSL_get_verify_depth() returns the verification depth limit currently set +in B<ssl>. If no limit has been explicitly set, -1 is returned and the +default value will be used. + +SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback() returns a function pointer to the verification +callback currently set in B<ctx>. If no callback was explicitly set, the +NULL pointer is returned and the default callback will be used. + +SSL_get_verify_callback() returns a function pointer to the verification +callback currently set in B<ssl>. If no callback was explicitly set, the +NULL pointer is returned and the default callback will be used. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +See DESCRIPTION + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..84a799fc71dd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations - set default locations for trusted CA +certificates + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, + const char *CApath); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() specifies the locations for B<ctx>, at +which CA certificates for verification purposes are located. The certificates +available via B<CAfile> and B<CApath> are trusted. + +=head1 NOTES + +If B<CAfile> is not NULL, it points to a file of CA certificates in PEM +format. The file can contain several CA certificates identified by + + -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- + ... (CA certificate in base64 encoding) ... + -----END CERTIFICATE----- + +sequences. Before, between, and after the certificates text is allowed +which can be used e.g. for descriptions of the certificates. + +The B<CAfile> is processed on execution of the SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() +function. + +If B<CApath> is not NULL, it points to a directory containing CA certificates +in PEM format. The files each contain one CA certificate. The files are +looked up by the CA subject name hash value, which must hence be available. +If more than one CA certificate with the same name hash value exist, the +extension must be different (e.g. 9d66eef0.0, 9d66eef0.1 etc). The search +is performed in the ordering of the extension number, regardless of other +properties of the certificates. +Use the B<c_rehash> utility to create the necessary links. + +The certificates in B<CApath> are only looked up when required, e.g. when +building the certificate chain or when actually performing the verification +of a peer certificate. + +When looking up CA certificates, the OpenSSL library will first search the +certificates in B<CAfile>, then those in B<CApath>. Certificate matching +is done based on the subject name, the key identifier (if present), and the +serial number as taken from the certificate to be verified. If these data +do not match, the next certificate will be tried. If a first certificate +matching the parameters is found, the verification process will be performed; +no other certificates for the same parameters will be searched in case of +failure. + +In server mode, when requesting a client certificate, the server must send +the list of CAs of which it will accept client certificates. This list +is not influenced by the contents of B<CAfile> or B<CApath> and must +explicitly be set using the +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)> +family of functions. + +When building its own certificate chain, an OpenSSL client/server will +try to fill in missing certificates from B<CAfile>/B<CApath>, if the +certificate chain was not explicitly specified (see +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +If several CA certificates matching the name, key identifier, and serial +number condition are available, only the first one will be examined. This +may lead to unexpected results if the same CA certificate is available +with different expiration dates. If a "certificate expired" verification +error occurs, no other certificate will be searched. Make sure to not +have expired certificates mixed with valid ones. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Generate a CA certificate file with descriptive text from the CA certificates +ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem: + + #!/bin/sh + rm CAfile.pem + for i in ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem ; do + openssl x509 -in $i -text >> CAfile.pem + done + +Prepare the directory /some/where/certs containing several CA certificates +for use as B<CApath>: + + cd /some/where/certs + c_rehash . + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The operation failed because B<CAfile> and B<CApath> are NULL or the +processing at one of the locations specified failed. Check the error +stack to find out the reason. + +=item 1 + +The operation succeeded. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..465220a75c0a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_new - create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL enabled functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *method); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_new() creates a new B<SSL_CTX> object as framework to establish +TLS/SSL enabled connections. + +=head1 NOTES + +The SSL_CTX object uses B<method> as connection method. The methods exist +in a generic type (for client and server use), a server only type, and a +client only type. B<method> can be of the following types: + +=over 4 + +=item SSLv2_method(void), SSLv2_server_method(void), SSLv2_client_method(void) + +A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand +the SSLv2 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages +and will also indicate that it only understand SSLv2. A server will only +understand SSLv2 client hello messages. + +=item SSLv3_method(void), SSLv3_server_method(void), SSLv3_client_method(void) + +A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the +SSLv3 protocol. A client will send out SSLv3 client hello messages +and will indicate that it only understands SSLv3. A server will only understand +SSLv3 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will +not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for +compatibility reasons, see SSLv23_*_method(). + +=item TLSv1_method(void), TLSv1_server_method(void), TLSv1_client_method(void) + +A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the +TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages +and will indicate that it only understands TLSv1. A server will only understand +TLSv1 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will +not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for +compatibility reasons, see SSLv23_*_method(). It will also not understand +SSLv3 client hello messages. + +=item SSLv23_method(void), SSLv23_server_method(void), SSLv23_client_method(void) + +A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will understand the SSLv2, +SSLv3, and TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages +and will indicate that it also understands SSLv3 and TLSv1. A server will +understand SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLSv1 client hello messages. This is the best +choice when compatibility is a concern. + +=back + +The list of protocols available can later be limited using the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, +SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 options of the B<SSL_CTX_set_options()> or +B<SSL_set_options()> functions. Using these options it is possible to choose +e.g. SSLv23_server_method() and be able to negotiate with all possible +clients, but to only allow newer protocols like SSLv3 or TLSv1. + +SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting, +the callbacks, the keys and certificates, and the options to its default +values. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to +find out the reason. + +=item Pointer to an SSL_CTX object + +The return value points to an allocated SSL_CTX object. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_CTX_free(3)|SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..19aa4e29027b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.pod @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_sess_number, SSL_CTX_sess_connect, SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good, SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate, SSL_CTX_sess_accept, SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good, SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate, SSL_CTX_sess_hits, SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits, SSL_CTX_sess_misses, SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts, SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full - obtain session cache statistics + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_sess_number(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_accept(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_misses(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_sess_number() returns the current number of sessions in the internal +session cache. + +SSL_CTX_sess_connect() returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in +client mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good() returns the number of successfully established +SSL/TLS sessions in client mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate() returns the number of start renegotiations +in client mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_accept() returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in +server mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good() returns the number of successfully established +SSL/TLS sessions in server mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate() returns the number of start renegotiations +in server mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_hits() returns the number of successfully reused sessions. +In client mode a session set with L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)> +successfully reused is counted as a hit. In server mode a session successfully +retrieved from internal or external cache is counted as a hit. + +SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits() returns the number of successfully retrieved sessions +from the external session cache in server mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_misses() returns the number of sessions proposed by clients +that were not found in the internal session cache in server mode. + +SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts() returns the number of sessions proposed by clients +and either found in the internal or external session cache in server mode, + but that were invalid due to timeout. These sessions are not included in +the SSL_CTX_sess_hits() count. + +SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full() returns the number of sessions that were removed +because the maximum session cache size was exceeded. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The functions return the values indicated in the DESCRIPTION section. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)> +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c8b99f4eef09 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size.pod @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size, SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size - manipulate session cache size + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); + long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() sets the size of the internal session cache +of context B<ctx> to B<t>. + +SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size() returns the currently valid session cache size. + +=head1 NOTES + +The internal session cache size is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT, +currently 1024*20, so that up to 20000 sessions can be held. This size +can be modified using the SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() call. A special +case is the size 0, which is used for unlimited size. + +When the maximum number of sessions is reached, no more new sessions are +added to the cache. New space may be added by calling +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> to remove +expired sessions. + +If the size of the session cache is reduced and more sessions are already +in the session cache, old session will be removed at the next time a +session shall be added. This removal is not synchronized with the +expiration of sessions. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size() returns the previously valid size. + +SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size() returns the currently valid size. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b9d54a40a193 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb, SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb - provide callback functions for server side external session caching + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *, SSL_SESSION *)); + void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *)); + void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION (*get_session_cb)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int, int *)); + + int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); + void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); + SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); + + int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); + void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); + SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data, + int len, int *copy); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb() sets the callback function, which is automatically +called whenever a new session was negotiated. + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb() sets the callback function, which is +automatically called whenever a session is removed by the SSL engine, +because it is considered faulty or the session has become obsolete because +of exceeding the timeout value. + +SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb() sets the callback function which is called, +whenever a SSL/TLS client proposed to resume a session but the session +could not be found in the internal session cache (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>). +(SSL/TLS server only.) + +SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(), SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(), and +SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb() allow to retrieve the function pointers of the +provided callback functions. If a callback function has not been set, +the NULL pointer is returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +In order to allow external session caching, synchronization with the internal +session cache is realized via callback functions. Inside these callback +functions, session can be saved to disk or put into a database using the +L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)|d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)> interface. + +The new_session_cb() is called, whenever a new session has been negotiated +and session caching is enabled (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>). +The new_session_cb() is passed the B<ssl> connection and the ssl session +B<sess>. If the callback returns B<0>, the session will be immediately +removed again. + +The remove_session_cb() is called, whenever the SSL engine removes a session +from the internal cache. This happens when the session is removed because +it is expired or when a connection was not shutdown cleanly. It also happens +for all sessions in the internal session cache when +L<SSL_CTX_free(3)|SSL_CTX_free(3)> is called. The remove_session_cb() is passed +the B<ctx> and the ssl session B<sess>. It does not provide any feedback. + +The get_session_cb() is only called on SSL/TLS servers with the session id +proposed by the client. The get_session_cb() is always called, also when +session caching was disabled. The get_session_cb() is passed the +B<ssl> connection, the session id of length B<length> at the memory location +B<data>. With the parameter B<copy> the callback can require the +SSL engine to increment the reference count of the SSL_SESSION object, +Normally the reference count is not incremented and therefore the +session must not be explicitly freed with +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)|d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_free(3)|SSL_CTX_free(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e05aab3c1bc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_sessions.pod @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_sessions - access internal session cache + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_sessions() returns a pointer to the lhash databases containing the +internal session cache for B<ctx>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The sessions in the internal session cache are kept in an +L<lhash(3)|lhash(3)> type database. It is possible to directly +access this database e.g. for searching. In parallel, the sessions +form a linked list which is maintained separately from the +L<lhash(3)|lhash(3)> operations, so that the database must not be +modified directly but by using the +L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)|SSL_CTX_add_session(3)> family of functions. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<lhash(3)|lhash(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)|SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6acf0d9f9b1c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_cert_store, SSL_CTX_get_cert_store - manipulate X509 certificate verification storage + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store); + X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() sets/replaces the certificate verification storage +of B<ctx> to/with B<store>. If another X509_STORE object is currently +set in B<ctx>, it will be X509_STORE_free()ed. + +SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns a pointer to the current certificate +verification storage. + +=head1 NOTES + +In order to verify the certificates presented by the peer, trusted CA +certificates must be accessed. These CA certificates are made available +via lookup methods, handled inside the X509_STORE. From the X509_STORE +the X509_STORE_CTX used when verifying certificates is created. + +Typically the trusted certificate store is handled indirectly via using +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>. +Using the SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() and SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() functions +it is possible to manipulate the X509_STORE object beyond the +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)> +call. + +Currently no detailed documentation on how to use the X509_STORE +object is available. Not all members of the X509_STORE are used when +the verification takes place. So will e.g. the verify_callback() be +overridden with the verify_callback() set via the +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> family of functions. +This document must therefore be updated when documentation about the +X509_STORE object and its handling becomes available. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_cert_store() does not return diagnostic output. + +SSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns the current setting. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c0f4f8570851 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback - set peer certificate verification procedure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() sets the verification callback function for +I<ctx>. SSL objects that are created from I<ctx> inherit the setting valid at +the time when L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> is called. + +=head1 NOTES + +Whenever a certificate is verified during a SSL/TLS handshake, a verification +function is called. If the application does not explicitly specify a +verification callback function, the built-in verification function is used. +If a verification callback I<callback> is specified via +SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), the supplied callback function is called +instead. By setting I<callback> to NULL, the default behaviour is restored. + +When the verification must be performed, I<callback> will be called with +the arguments callback(X509_STORE_CTX *x509_store_ctx, void *arg). The +argument I<arg> is specified by the application when setting I<callback>. + +I<callback> should return 1 to indicate verification success and 0 to +indicate verification failure. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set and I<callback> +returns 0, the handshake will fail. As the verification procedure may +allow to continue the connection in case of failure (by always returning 1) +the verification result must be set in any case using the B<error> +member of I<x509_store_ctx> so that the calling application will be informed +about the detailed result of the verification procedure! + +Within I<x509_store_ctx>, I<callback> has access to the I<verify_callback> +function set using L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +Do not mix the verification callback described in this function with the +B<verify_callback> function called during the verification process. The +latter is set using the L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> +family of functions. + +Providing a complete verification procedure including certificate purpose +settings etc is a complex task. The built-in procedure is quite powerful +and in most cases it should be sufficient to modify its behaviour using +the B<verify_callback> function. + +=head1 BUGS + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() does not provide diagnostic information. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>, +L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +Previous to OpenSSL 0.9.7, the I<arg> argument to B<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback> +was ignored, and I<callback> was called simply as + int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *) +To compile software written for previous versions of OpenSSL, a dummy +argument will have to be added to I<callback>. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ed64f6415702 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list.pod @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list, SSL_set_cipher_list - choose list of available SSL_CIPHERs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str); + int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() sets the list of available ciphers for B<ctx> +using the control string B<str>. The format of the string is described +in L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)>. The list of ciphers is inherited by all +B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>. + +SSL_set_cipher_list() sets the list of ciphers only for B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The control string B<str> should be universally usable and not depend +on details of the library configuration (ciphers compiled in). Thus no +syntax checking takes place. Items that are not recognized, because the +corresponding ciphers are not compiled in or because they are mistyped, +are simply ignored. Failure is only flagged if no ciphers could be collected +at all. + +It should be noted, that inclusion of a cipher to be used into the list is +a necessary condition. On the client side, the inclusion into the list is +also sufficient. On the server side, additional restrictions apply. All ciphers +have additional requirements. ADH ciphers don't need a certificate, but +DH-parameters must have been set. All other ciphers need a corresponding +certificate and key. + +A RSA cipher can only be chosen, when a RSA certificate is available. +RSA export ciphers with a keylength of 512 bits for the RSA key require +a temporary 512 bit RSA key, as typically the supplied key has a length +of 1024 bit (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>). +RSA ciphers using EDH need a certificate and key and additional DH-parameters +(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>). + +A DSA cipher can only be chosen, when a DSA certificate is available. +DSA ciphers always use DH key exchange and therefore need DH-parameters +(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>). + +When these conditions are not met for any cipher in the list (e.g. a +client only supports export RSA ciphers with a asymmetric key length +of 512 bits and the server is not configured to use temporary RSA +keys), the "no shared cipher" (SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER) error is generated +and the handshake will fail. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() and SSL_set_cipher_list() return 1 if any cipher +could be selected and 0 on complete failure. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)|SSL_get_ciphers(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>, +L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..632b556d1262 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list, SSL_set_client_CA_list, SSL_CTX_add_client_CA, +SSL_add_client_CA - set list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a +client certificate + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list); + void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list); + int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cacert); + int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *cacert); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() sets the B<list> of CAs sent to the client when +requesting a client certificate for B<ctx>. + +SSL_set_client_CA_list() sets the B<list> of CAs sent to the client when +requesting a client certificate for the chosen B<ssl>, overriding the +setting valid for B<ssl>'s SSL_CTX object. + +SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() adds the CA name extracted from B<cacert> to the +list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for +B<ctx>. + +SSL_add_client_CA() adds the CA name extracted from B<cacert> to the +list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for +the chosen B<ssl>, overriding the setting valid for B<ssl>'s SSL_CTX object. + +=head1 NOTES + +When a TLS/SSL server requests a client certificate (see +B<SSL_CTX_set_verify_options()>), it sends a list of CAs, for which +it will accept certificates, to the client. + +This list must explicitly be set using SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() for +B<ctx> and SSL_set_client_CA_list() for the specific B<ssl>. The list +specified overrides the previous setting. The CAs listed do not become +trusted (B<list> only contains the names, not the complete certificates); use +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)> +to additionally load them for verification. + +If the list of acceptable CAs is compiled in a file, the +L<SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)|SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)> +function can be used to help importing the necessary data. + +SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() can be used to add additional +items the list of client CAs. If no list was specified before using +SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() or SSL_set_client_CA_list(), a new client +CA list for B<ctx> or B<ssl> (as appropriate) is opened. + +These functions are only useful for TLS/SSL servers. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() and SSL_set_client_CA_list() do not return +diagnostic information. + +SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() have the following return +values: + +=over 4 + +=item 1 + +The operation succeeded. + +=item 0 + +A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or +the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack +to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Scan all certificates in B<CAfile> and list them as acceptable CAs: + + SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)|SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3465b5c7bbaf --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.pod @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb, SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb - handle client certificate callback function + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); + int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); + int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() sets the B<client_cert_cb()> callback, that is +called when a client certificate is requested by a server and no certificate +was yet set for the SSL object. + +When B<client_cert_cb()> is NULL, no callback function is used. + +SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb() returns a pointer to the currently set callback +function. + +client_cert_cb() is the application defined callback. If it wants to +set a certificate, a certificate/private key combination must be set +using the B<x509> and B<pkey> arguments and "1" must be returned. The +certificate will be installed into B<ssl>, see the NOTES and BUGS sections. +If no certificate should be set, "0" has to be returned and no certificate +will be sent. A negative return value will suspend the handshake and the +handshake function will return immediatly. L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> +will return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP to indicate, that the handshake was +suspended. The next call to the handshake function will again lead to the call +of client_cert_cb(). It is the job of the client_cert_cb() to store information +about the state of the last call, if required to continue. + +=head1 NOTES + +During a handshake (or renegotiation) a server may request a certificate +from the client. A client certificate must only be sent, when the server +did send the request. + +When a certificate was set using the +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)> family of functions, +it will be sent to the server. The TLS standard requires that only a +certificate is sent, if it matches the list of acceptable CAs sent by the +server. This constraint is violated by the default behavior of the OpenSSL +library. Using the callback function it is possible to implement a proper +selection routine or to allow a user interaction to choose the certificate to +be sent. + +If a callback function is defined and no certificate was yet defined for the +SSL object, the callback function will be called. +If the callback function returns a certificate, the OpenSSL library +will try to load the private key and certificate data into the SSL +object using the SSL_use_certificate() and SSL_use_private_key() functions. +Thus it will permanently install the certificate and key for this SSL +object. It will not be reset by calling L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>. +If the callback returns no certificate, the OpenSSL library will not send +a certificate. + +=head1 BUGS + +The client_cert_cb() cannot return a complete certificate chain, it can +only return one client certificate. If the chain only has a length of 2, +the root CA certificate may be omitted according to the TLS standard and +thus a standard conforming answer can be sent to the server. For a +longer chain, the client must send the complete chain (with the option +to leave out the root CA certificate). This can only be accomplished by +either adding the intermediate CA certificates into the trusted +certificate store for the SSL_CTX object (resulting in having to add +CA certificates that otherwise maybe would not be trusted), or by adding +the chain certificates using the +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)> +function, which is only available for the SSL_CTX object as a whole and that +therefore probably can only apply for one client certificate, making +the concept of the callback function (to allow the choice from several +certificates) questionable. + +Once the SSL object has been used in conjunction with the callback function, +the certificate will be set for the SSL object and will not be cleared +even when L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> is being called. It is therefore +mandatory to destroy the SSL object using L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> +and create a new one to return to the previous state. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>, +L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2b87f01ca15f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb, SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata - set passwd callback for encrypted PEM file handling + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); + void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); + + int pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb() sets the default password callback called +when loading/storing a PEM certificate with encryption. + +SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() sets a pointer to B<userdata> which +will be provided to the password callback on invocation. + +The pem_passwd_cb(), which must be provided by the application, hands back the +password to be used during decryption. On invocation a pointer to B<userdata> +is provided. The pem_passwd_cb must write the password into the provided buffer +B<buf> which is of size B<size>. The actual length of the password must +be returned to the calling function. B<rwflag> indicates whether the +callback is used for reading/decryption (rwflag=0) or writing/encryption +(rwflag=1). + +=head1 NOTES + +When loading or storing private keys, a password might be supplied to +protect the private key. The way this password can be supplied may depend +on the application. If only one private key is handled, it can be practical +to have pem_passwd_cb() handle the password dialog interactively. If several +keys have to be handled, it can be practical to ask for the password once, +then keep it in memory and use it several times. In the last case, the +password could be stored into the B<userdata> storage and the +pem_passwd_cb() only returns the password already stored. + +When asking for the password interactively, pem_passwd_cb() can use +B<rwflag> to check, whether an item shall be encrypted (rwflag=1). +In this case the password dialog may ask for the same password twice +for comparison in order to catch typos, that would make decryption +impossible. + +Other items in PEM formatting (certificates) can also be encrypted, it is +however not usual, as certificate information is considered public. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() +do not provide diagnostic information. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +The following example returns the password provided as B<userdata> to the +calling function. The password is considered to be a '\0' terminated +string. If the password does not fit into the buffer, the password is +truncated. + + int pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *password) + { + strncpy(buf, (char *)(password), size); + buf[size - 1] = '\0'; + return(strlen(buf)); + } + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..798e8443a711 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id.pod @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id, SSL_set_generate_session_id, SSL_has_matching_session_id - manipulate generation of SSL session IDs (server only) + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, + unsigned int *id_len); + + int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb); + int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB, cb); + int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, + unsigned int id_len); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id() sets the callback function for generating +new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for B<ctx> to be B<cb>. + +SSL_set_generate_session_id() sets the callback function for generating +new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for B<ssl> to be B<cb>. + +SSL_has_matching_session_id() checks, whether a session with id B<id> +(of length B<id_len>) is already contained in the internal session cache +of the parent context of B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +When a new session is established between client and server, the server +generates a session id. The session id is an arbitrary sequence of bytes. +The length of the session id is 16 bytes for SSLv2 sessions and between +1 and 32 bytes for SSLv3/TLSv1. The session id is not security critical +but must be unique for the server. Additionally, the session id is +transmitted in the clear when reusing the session so it must not contain +sensitive information. + +Without a callback being set, an OpenSSL server will generate a unique +session id from pseudo random numbers of the maximum possible length. +Using the callback function, the session id can be changed to contain +additional information like e.g. a host id in order to improve load balancing +or external caching techniques. + +The callback function receives a pointer to the memory location to put +B<id> into and a pointer to the maximum allowed length B<id_len>. The +buffer at location B<id> is only guaranteed to have the size B<id_len>. +The callback is only allowed to generate a shorter id and reduce B<id_len>; +the callback B<must never> increase B<id_len> or write to the location +B<id> exceeding the given limit. + +If a SSLv2 session id is generated and B<id_len> is reduced, it will be +restored after the callback has finished and the session id will be padded +with 0x00. It is not recommended to change the B<id_len> for SSLv2 sessions. +The callback can use the L<SSL_get_version(3)|SSL_get_version(3)> function +to check, whether the session is of type SSLv2. + +The location B<id> is filled with 0x00 before the callback is called, so the +callback may only fill part of the possible length and leave B<id_len> +untouched while maintaining reproducibility. + +Since the sessions must be distinguished, session ids must be unique. +Without the callback a random number is used, so that the probability +of generating the same session id is extremely small (2^128 possible ids +for an SSLv2 session, 2^256 for SSLv3/TLSv1). In order to assure the +uniqueness of the generated session id, the callback must call +SSL_has_matching_session_id() and generate another id if a conflict occurs. +If an id conflict is not resolved, the handshake will fail. +If the application codes e.g. a unique host id, a unique process number, and +a unique sequence number into the session id, uniqueness could easily be +achieved without randomness added (it should however be taken care that +no confidential information is leaked this way). If the application can not +guarantee uniqueness, it is recommended to use the maximum B<id_len> and +fill in the bytes not used to code special information with random data +to avoid collisions. + +SSL_has_matching_session_id() will only query the internal session cache, +not the external one. Since the session id is generated before the +handshake is completed, it is not immediately added to the cache. If +another thread is using the same internal session cache, a race condition +can occur in that another thread generates the same session id. +Collisions can also occur when using an external session cache, since +the external cache is not tested with SSL_has_matching_session_id() +and the same race condition applies. + +When calling SSL_has_matching_session_id() for an SSLv2 session with +reduced B<id_len>, the match operation will be performed using the +fixed length required and with a 0x00 padded id. + +The callback must return 0 if it cannot generate a session id for whatever +reason and return 1 on success. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +The callback function listed will generate a session id with the +server id given, and will fill the rest with pseudo random bytes: + + const char session_id_prefix = "www-18"; + + #define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 + static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, + unsigned int *id_len) + { + unsigned int count = 0; + const char *version; + + version = SSL_get_version(ssl); + if (!strcmp(version, "SSLv2")) + /* we must not change id_len */; + + do { + RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len); + /* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our + * prefix is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects + * anyway, eg. the server could only possibly create 1 session + * ID (ie. the prefix!) so all future session negotiations will + * fail due to conflicts. */ + memcpy(id, session_id_prefix, + (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ? + strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len); + } + while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && + (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)); + if(count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS) + return 0; + return 1; + } + + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id() and SSL_set_generate_session_id() +always return 1. + +SSL_has_matching_session_id() returns 1 if another session with the +same id is already in the cache. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_version(3)|SSL_get_version(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(), SSL_set_generate_session_id() +and SSL_has_matching_session_id() have been introduced in +OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0b4affd5eb1a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_info_callback, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback, SSL_set_info_callback, SSL_get_info_callback - handle information callback for SSL connections + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*callback)()); + void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(); + + void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*callback)()); + void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_info_callback() sets the B<callback> function, that can be used to +obtain state information for SSL objects created from B<ctx> during connection +setup and use. The setting for B<ctx> is overridden from the setting for +a specific SSL object, if specified. +When B<callback> is NULL, not callback function is used. + +SSL_set_info_callback() sets the B<callback> function, that can be used to +obtain state information for B<ssl> during connection setup and use. +When B<callback> is NULL, the callback setting currently valid for +B<ctx> is used. + +SSL_CTX_get_info_callback() returns a pointer to the currently set information +callback function for B<ctx>. + +SSL_get_info_callback() returns a pointer to the currently set information +callback function for B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +When setting up a connection and during use, it is possible to obtain state +information from the SSL/TLS engine. When set, an information callback function +is called whenever the state changes, an alert appears, or an error occurs. + +The callback function is called as B<callback(SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)>. +The B<where> argument specifies information about where (in which context) +the callback function was called. If B<ret> is 0, an error condition occurred. +If an alert is handled, SSL_CB_ALERT is set and B<ret> specifies the alert +information. + +B<where> is a bitmask made up of the following bits: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_CB_LOOP + +Callback has been called to indicate state change inside a loop. + +=item SSL_CB_EXIT + +Callback has been called to indicate error exit of a handshake function. +(May be soft error with retry option for non-blocking setups.) + +=item SSL_CB_READ + +Callback has been called during read operation. + +=item SSL_CB_WRITE + +Callback has been called during write operation. + +=item SSL_CB_ALERT + +Callback has been called due to an alert being sent or received. + +=item SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) + +=item SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) + +=item SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) + +=item SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) + +=item SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) + +=item SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) + +=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START + +Callback has been called because a new handshake is started. + +=item SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 + +Callback has been called because a handshake is finished. + +=back + +The current state information can be obtained using the +L<SSL_state_string(3)|SSL_state_string(3)> family of functions. + +The B<ret> information can be evaluated using the +L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)|SSL_alert_type_string(3)> family of functions. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_set_info_callback() does not provide diagnostic information. + +SSL_get_info_callback() returns the current setting. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +The following example callback function prints state strings, information +about alerts being handled and error messages to the B<bio_err> BIO. + + void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret) + { + const char *str; + int w; + + w=where& ~SSL_ST_MASK; + + if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str="SSL_connect"; + else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str="SSL_accept"; + else str="undefined"; + + if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s:%s\n",str,SSL_state_string_long(s)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) + { + str=(where & SSL_CB_READ)?"read":"write"; + BIO_printf(bio_err,"SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n", + str, + SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), + SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) + { + if (ret == 0) + BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s:failed in %s\n", + str,SSL_state_string_long(s)); + else if (ret < 0) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s:error in %s\n", + str,SSL_state_string_long(s)); + } + } + } + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_state_string(3)|SSL_state_string(3)>, +L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)|SSL_alert_type_string(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..da68cb9fc240 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list.pod @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list, SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list, SSL_set_max_cert_list, SSL_get_max_cert_list, - manipulate allowed for the peer's certificate chain + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, long size); + long SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx); + + long SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, long size); + long SSL_get_max_cert_list(SSL *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list() sets the maximum size allowed for the peer's +certificate chain for all SSL objects created from B<ctx> to be <size> bytes. +The SSL objects inherit the setting valid for B<ctx> at the time +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> is being called. + +SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list() returns the currently set maximum size for B<ctx>. + +SSL_set_max_cert_list() sets the maximum size allowed for the peer's +certificate chain for B<ssl> to be <size> bytes. This setting stays valid +until a new value is set. + +SSL_get_max_cert_list() returns the currently set maximum size for B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +During the handshake process, the peer may send a certificate chain. +The TLS/SSL standard does not give any maximum size of the certificate chain. +The OpenSSL library handles incoming data by a dynamically allocated buffer. +In order to prevent this buffer from growing without bounds due to data +received from a faulty or malicious peer, a maximum size for the certificate +chain is set. + +The default value for the maximum certificate chain size is 100kB (30kB +on the 16bit DOS platform). This should be sufficient for usual certificate +chains (OpenSSL's default maximum chain length is 10, see +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>, and certificates +without special extensions have a typical size of 1-2kB). + +For special applications it can be necessary to extend the maximum certificate +chain size allowed to be sent by the peer, see e.g. the work on +"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate Profile" +and "TLS Delegation Protocol" at http://www.ietf.org/ and +http://www.globus.org/ . + +Under normal conditions it should never be necessary to set a value smaller +than the default, as the buffer is handled dynamically and only uses the +memory actually required by the data sent by the peer. + +If the maximum certificate chain size allowed is exceeded, the handshake will +fail with a SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE error. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list() and SSL_set_max_cert_list() return the previously +set value. + +SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list() and SSL_get_max_cert_list() return the currently +set value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSL*_set/get_max_cert_list() have been introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9822544e5e2d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_mode, SSL_set_mode, SSL_CTX_get_mode, SSL_get_mode - manipulate SSL engine mode + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, long mode); + long SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, long mode); + + long SSL_CTX_get_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_get_mode(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B<mode> to B<ctx>. +Options already set before are not cleared. + +SSL_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B<mode> to B<ssl>. +Options already set before are not cleared. + +SSL_CTX_get_mode() returns the mode set for B<ctx>. + +SSL_get_mode() returns the mode set for B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The following mode changes are available: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE + +Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success +when just a single record has been written). When not set (the default), +SSL_write() will only report success once the complete chunk was written. +Once SSL_write() returns with r, r bytes have been successfully written +and the next call to SSL_write() must only send the n-r bytes left, +imitating the behaviour of write(). + +=item SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER + +Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location +(the buffer contents must stay the same). This is not the default to avoid +the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like +non-blocking write(). + +=item SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY + +Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking. +If a renegotiation take place during normal operation, a +L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)> or L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> would return +with -1 and indicate the need to retry with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ. +In a non-blocking environment applications must be prepared to handle +incomplete read/write operations. +In a blocking environment, applications are not always prepared to +deal with read/write operations returning without success report. The +flag SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY will cause read/write operations to only +return after the handshake and successful completion. + +=back + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_set_mode() return the new mode bitmask +after adding B<mode>. + +SSL_CTX_get_mode() and SSL_get_mode() return the current bitmask. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY as been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0015e6ea7923 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback, SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg, SSL_set_msg_callback, SSL_get_msg_callback_arg - install callback for observing protocol messages + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + + void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback() or SSL_set_msg_callback() can be used to +define a message callback function I<cb> for observing all SSL/TLS +protocol messages (such as handshake messages) that are received or +sent. SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() and SSL_set_msg_callback_arg() +can be used to set argument I<arg> to the callback function, which is +available for arbitrary application use. + +SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback() and SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() specify +default settings that will be copied to new B<SSL> objects by +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>. SSL_set_msg_callback() and +SSL_set_msg_callback_arg() modify the actual settings of an B<SSL> +object. Using a B<0> pointer for I<cb> disables the message callback. + +When I<cb> is called by the SSL/TLS library for a protocol message, +the function arguments have the following meaning: + +=over 4 + +=item I<write_p> + +This flag is B<0> when a protocol message has been received and B<1> +when a protocol message has been sent. + +=item I<version> + +The protocol version according to which the protocol message is +interpreted by the library. Currently, this is one of +B<SSL2_VERSION>, B<SSL3_VERSION> and B<TLS1_VERSION> (for SSL 2.0, SSL +3.0 and TLS 1.0, respectively). + +=item I<content_type> + +In the case of SSL 2.0, this is always B<0>. In the case of SSL 3.0 +or TLS 1.0, this is one of the B<ContentType> values defined in the +protocol specification (B<change_cipher_spec(20)>, B<alert(21)>, +B<handshake(22)>; but never B<application_data(23)> because the +callback will only be called for protocol messages). + +=item I<buf>, I<len> + +I<buf> points to a buffer containing the protocol message, which +consists of I<len> bytes. The buffer is no longer valid after the +callback function has returned. + +=item I<ssl> + +The B<SSL> object that received or sent the message. + +=item I<arg> + +The user-defined argument optionally defined by +SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg() or SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(). + +=back + +=head1 NOTES + +Protocol messages are passed to the callback function after decryption +and fragment collection where applicable. (Thus record boundaries are +not visible.) + +If processing a received protocol message results in an error, +the callback function may not be called. For example, the callback +function will never see messages that are considered too large to be +processed. + +Due to automatic protocol version negotiation, I<version> is not +necessarily the protocol version used by the sender of the message: If +a TLS 1.0 ClientHello message is received by an SSL 3.0-only server, +I<version> will be B<SSL3_VERSION>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(), SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(), +SSL_set_msg_callback() and SSL_get_msg_callback_arg() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fa63263601c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options - manipulate SSL engine options + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); + long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options); + + long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx); + long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ctx>. +Options already set before are not cleared! + +SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>. +Options already set before are not cleared! + +SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B<ctx>. + +SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. +The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical B<or> +operation (|). Options can only be added but can never be reset. + +SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) +protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of +the API can be changed by using the similar +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> and SSL_set_mode() functions. + +During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When +a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the current +option setting is copied. Changes to B<ctx> do not affect already created +SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings. + +The following B<bug workaround> options are available: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG + +www.microsoft.com - when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is +performed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message +is different from the one decided upon. + +=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG + +Netscape-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte +challenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the +encryption keys. Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use 32. +According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the challenge +when operating in SSLv2/v3 compatibility mode, but as mentioned above, +this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go. + +=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG + +ssl3.netscape.com:443, first a connection is established with RC4-MD5. +If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA. It should be +RC4-MD5 according to 7.6.1.3, 'cipher_suite'. + +Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 (https://merchant.netscape.com) has this bug. +It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then reconnecting +via SSLv3. The cipher list changes.... + +NEW INFORMATION. Try connecting with a cipher list of just +DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5. For some weird reason, each new connection uses +RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA. So netscape, when +doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in the cipher list. + +=item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG + +... + +=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER + +... + +=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING + +As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect. + +=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG + +... + +=item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG + +... + +=item SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG + +... + +=item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS + +Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol +vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some +broken SSL implementations. This option has no effect for connections +using other ciphers. + +=item SSL_OP_ALL + +All of the above bug workarounds. + +=back + +It is usually safe to use B<SSL_OP_ALL> to enable the bug workaround +options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is +desired. + +The following B<modifying> options are available: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG + +Disable version rollback attack detection. + +During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information +about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some +clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example: +the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server +only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the +same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect +to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.) + +=item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE + +Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters +(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>). +This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when +the DH parameters were not generated using "strong" primes +(e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>). +If "strong" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate +a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended. +B<SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE> should therefore be enabled whenever +temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used. + +=item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA + +Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations +(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>). +According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key +can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers +with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral +RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the +SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with +clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral +Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead. + +=item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE + +When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client +preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients +preferences. When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1 server will choose following its +own preferences. Because of the different protocol, for SSLv2 the server +will send its list of preferences to the client and the client chooses. + +=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 + +... + +=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 + +... + +=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG + +If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a +non-self-signed CA which does not have its CA in netscape, and the +browser has a cert, it will crash/hang. Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta + +=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG + +... + +=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 + +Do not use the SSLv2 protocol. + +=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 + +Do not use the SSLv3 protocol. + +=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 + +Do not use the TLSv1 protocol. + +=item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + +When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session +(i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial +handshake). This option is not needed for clients. + +=back + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask +after adding B<options>. + +SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>, +L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +B<SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE> and +B<SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION> have been added in +OpenSSL 0.9.7. + +B<SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG> has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was automatically +enabled with B<SSL_OP_ALL>. As of 0.9.7, it is no longer included in B<SSL_OP_ALL> +and must be explicitly set. + +B<SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS> has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e. +Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that +can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always +enabled). + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..393f8ff0b467 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown, SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown, SSL_set_quiet_shutdown, SSL_get_quiet_shutdown - manipulate shutdown behaviour + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); + int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + + void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); + int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown() sets the "quiet shutdown" flag for B<ctx> to be +B<mode>. SSL objects created from B<ctx> inherit the B<mode> valid at the time +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> is called. B<mode> may be 0 or 1. + +SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown() returns the "quiet shutdown" setting of B<ctx>. + +SSL_set_quiet_shutdown() sets the "quiet shutdown" flag for B<ssl> to be +B<mode>. The setting stays valid until B<ssl> is removed with +L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> or SSL_set_quiet_shutdown() is called again. +It is not changed when L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> is called. +B<mode> may be 0 or 1. + +SSL_get_quiet_shutdown() returns the "quiet shutdown" setting of B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +Normally when a SSL connection is finished, the parties must send out +"close notify" alert messages using L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> +for a clean shutdown. + +When setting the "quiet shutdown" flag to 1, L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> +will set the internal flags to SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN. +(L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> then behaves like +L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)> called with +SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN.) +The session is thus considered to be shutdown, but no "close notify" alert +is sent to the peer. This behaviour violates the TLS standard. + +The default is normal shutdown behaviour as described by the TLS standard. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown() and SSL_set_quiet_shutdown() do not return +diagnostic information. + +SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown() and SSL_get_quiet_shutdown return the current +setting. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c5d2f43dff15 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode, SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode - enable/disable session caching + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx, long mode); + long SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode() enables/disables session caching +by setting the operational mode for B<ctx> to <mode>. + +SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode() returns the currently used cache mode. + +=head1 NOTES + +The OpenSSL library can store/retrieve SSL/TLS sessions for later reuse. +The sessions can be held in memory for each B<ctx>, if more than one +SSL_CTX object is being maintained, the sessions are unique for each SSL_CTX +object. + +In order to reuse a session, a client must send the session's id to the +server. It can only send exactly one id. The server then either +agrees to reuse the session or it starts a full handshake (to create a new +session). + +A server will lookup up the session in its internal session storage. If the +session is not found in internal storage or lookups for the internal storage +have been deactivated (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP), the server will try +the external storage if available. + +Since a client may try to reuse a session intended for use in a different +context, the session id context must be set by the server (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>). + +The following session cache modes and modifiers are available: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF + +No session caching for client or server takes place. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT + +Client sessions are added to the session cache. As there is no reliable way +for the OpenSSL library to know whether a session should be reused or which +session to choose (due to the abstract BIO layer the SSL engine does not +have details about the connection), the application must select the session +to be reused by using the L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)> +function. This option is not activated by default. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER + +Server sessions are added to the session cache. When a client proposes a +session to be reused, the server looks for the corresponding session in (first) +the internal session cache (unless SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP is set), +then (second) in the external cache if available. If the session is found, the +server will try to reuse the session. This is the default. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH + +Enable both SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT and SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER at the same time. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR + +Normally the session cache is checked for expired sessions every +255 connections using the +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> function. Since +this may lead to a delay which cannot be controlled, the automatic +flushing may be disabled and +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> can be called +explicitly by the application. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP + +By setting this flag, session-resume operations in an SSL/TLS server will not +automatically look up sessions in the internal cache, even if sessions are +automatically stored there. If external session caching callbacks are in use, +this flag guarantees that all lookups are directed to the external cache. +As automatic lookup only applies for SSL/TLS servers, the flag has no effect on +clients. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE + +Depending on the presence of SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT and/or SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, +sessions negotiated in an SSL/TLS handshake may be cached for possible reuse. +Normally a new session is added to the internal cache as well as any external +session caching (callback) that is configured for the SSL_CTX. This flag will +prevent sessions being stored in the internal cache (though the application can +add them manually using L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)|SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>). Note: +in any SSL/TLS servers where external caching is configured, any successful +session lookups in the external cache (ie. for session-resume requests) would +normally be copied into the local cache before processing continues - this flag +prevents these additions to the internal cache as well. + +=item SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL + +Enable both SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP and +SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE at the same time. + + +=back + +The default mode is SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode() returns the previously set cache mode. + +SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode() returns the currently set cache mode. + + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>, +L<SSL_session_reused(3)|SSL_session_reused(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)|SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE and SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL +were introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.6h. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..58fc685506eb --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context, SSL_set_session_id_context - set context within which session can be reused (server side only) + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len); + int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, + unsigned int sid_ctx_len); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() sets the context B<sid_ctx> of length +B<sid_ctx_len> within which a session can be reused for the B<ctx> object. + +SSL_set_session_id_context() sets the context B<sid_ctx> of length +B<sid_ctx_len> within which a session can be reused for the B<ssl> object. + +=head1 NOTES + +Sessions are generated within a certain context. When exporting/importing +sessions with B<i2d_SSL_SESSION>/B<d2i_SSL_SESSION> it would be possible, +to re-import a session generated from another context (e.g. another +application), which might lead to malfunctions. Therefore each application +must set its own session id context B<sid_ctx> which is used to distinguish +the contexts and is stored in exported sessions. The B<sid_ctx> can be +any kind of binary data with a given length, it is therefore possible +to use e.g. the name of the application and/or the hostname and/or service +name ... + +The session id context becomes part of the session. The session id context +is set by the SSL/TLS server. The SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() and +SSL_set_session_id_context() functions are therefore only useful on the +server side. + +OpenSSL clients will check the session id context returned by the server +when reusing a session. + +The maximum length of the B<sid_ctx> is limited to +B<SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH>. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +If the session id context is not set on an SSL/TLS server and client +certificates are used, stored sessions +will not be reused but a fatal error will be flagged and the handshake +will fail. + +If a server returns a different session id context to an OpenSSL client +when reusing a session, an error will be flagged and the handshake will +fail. OpenSSL servers will always return the correct session id context, +as an OpenSSL server checks the session id context itself before reusing +a session as described above. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context() and SSL_set_session_id_context() +return the following values: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The length B<sid_ctx_len> of the session id context B<sid_ctx> exceeded +the maximum allowed length of B<SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH>. The error +is logged to the error stack. + +=item 1 + +The operation succeeded. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..002018096551 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version, SSL_set_ssl_method, SSL_get_ssl_method +- choose a new TLS/SSL method + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_METHOD *method); + int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, SSL_METHOD *method); + SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version() sets a new default TLS/SSL B<method> for SSL objects +newly created from this B<ctx>. SSL objects already created with +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> are not affected, except when +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> is being called. + +SSL_set_ssl_method() sets a new TLS/SSL B<method> for a particular B<ssl> +object. It may be reset, when SSL_clear() is called. + +SSL_get_ssl_method() returns a function pointer to the TLS/SSL method +set in B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The available B<method> choices are described in +L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>. + +When L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> is called and no session is connected to +an SSL object, the method of the SSL object is reset to the method currently +set in the corresponding SSL_CTX object. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur for SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version() +and SSL_set_ssl_method(): + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The new choice failed, check the error stack to find out the reason. + +=item 1 + +The operation succeeded. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e3de27c47367 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_timeout.pod @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_timeout, SSL_CTX_get_timeout - manipulate timeout values for session caching + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); + long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_timeout() sets the timeout for newly created sessions for +B<ctx> to B<t>. The timeout value B<t> must be given in seconds. + +SSL_CTX_get_timeout() returns the currently set timeout value for B<ctx>. + +=head1 NOTES + +Whenever a new session is created, it is assigned a maximum lifetime. This +lifetime is specified by storing the creation time of the session and the +timeout value valid at this time. If the actual time is later than creation +time plus timeout, the session is not reused. + +Due to this realization, all sessions behave according to the timeout value +valid at the time of the session negotiation. Changes of the timeout value +do not affect already established sessions. + +The expiration time of a single session can be modified using the +L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)|SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)> family of functions. + +Expired sessions are removed from the internal session cache, whenever +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> is called, either +directly by the application or automatically (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>) + +The default value for session timeout is decided on a per protocol +basis, see L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)|SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>. +All currently supported protocols have the same default timeout value +of 300 seconds. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_timeout() returns the previously set timeout value. + +SSL_CTX_get_timeout() returns the currently set timeout value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)|SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>, +L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)|SSL_get_default_timeout(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..29d1f8a6fbfe --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_set_tmp_dh - handle DH keys for ephemeral key exchange + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh); + + void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh) + + DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for B<ctx> to be +used when a DH parameters are required to B<tmp_dh_callback>. +The callback is inherited by all B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>. + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() sets DH parameters to be used to be B<dh>. +The key is inherited by all B<ssl> objects created from B<ctx>. + +SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback only for B<ssl>. + +SSL_set_tmp_dh() sets the parameters only for B<ssl>. + +These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only. + +=head1 NOTES + +When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key exchange +can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys as well. +In these cases, the session data are negotiated using the +ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and certified +by the certificate chain is only used for signing. +Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral DH keys. + +Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection +can only be decrypted, when the DH key is known. By generating a temporary +DH key inside the server application that is lost when the application +is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, +even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was +only used for signing. + +In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group +(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate a new +DH key during the negotiation, when the DH parameters are supplied via +callback and/or when the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> is set. It will +immediately create a DH key, when DH parameters are supplied via +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set. In this case, +it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later +being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the +negotiation is being saved. + +If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly +necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward +secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially +the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used +in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE +has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not +very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable +this option. + +As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application +should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters. +DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during +the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker +may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore +generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the +openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer +time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters +instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE +is mandatory. + +Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem, +dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096 in the 'apps' directory of current +version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters, +which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly. +These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the +L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. +Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using +L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were +generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore +recommended. + +An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or +can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach +has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different +key lengths. + +The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and +the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the +ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling +partly left out.) + + ... + /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */ + DH *dh_512 = NULL; + DH *dh_1024 = NULL; + FILE *paramfile; + + ... + /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */ + paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r"); + if (paramfile) { + dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fclose(paramfile); + } + /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */ + paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r"); + if (paramfile) { + dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fclose(paramfile); + } + ... + + /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */ + DH *get_dh512() { ... } + DH *get_dh1024() { ... } + + DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength) + { + DH *dh_tmp=NULL; + + switch (keylength) { + case 512: + if (!dh_512) + dh_512 = get_dh512(); + dh_tmp = dh_512; + break; + case 1024: + if (!dh_1024) + dh_1024 = get_dh1024(); + dh_tmp = dh_1024; + break; + default: + /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */ + setup_dh_parameters_like_above(); + } + return(dh_tmp); + } + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback() do not return +diagnostic output. + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_set_tmp_dh() do return 1 on success and 0 +on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, +L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)>, L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..534643cd9de4 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_need_tmp_rsa - handle RSA keys for ephemeral key exchange + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); + long SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx); + + void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); + long SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) + long SSL_need_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl) + + RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback() sets the callback function for B<ctx> to be +used when a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is required to B<tmp_rsa_callback>. +The callback is inherited by all SSL objects newly created from B<ctx> +with <SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>. Already created SSL objects are not affected. + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa() sets the temporary/ephemeral RSA key to be used to be +B<rsa>. The key is inherited by all SSL objects newly created from B<ctx> +with <SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>. Already created SSL objects are not affected. + +SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa() returns 1, if a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is needed +for RSA-based strength-limited 'exportable' ciphersuites because a RSA key +with a keysize larger than 512 bits is installed. + +SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback() sets the callback only for B<ssl>. + +SSL_set_tmp_rsa() sets the key only for B<ssl>. + +SSL_need_tmp_rsa() returns 1, if a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is needed, +for RSA-based strength-limited 'exportable' ciphersuites because a RSA key +with a keysize larger than 512 bits is installed. + +These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only. + +=head1 NOTES + +When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral RSA key exchange +can take place. In this case the session data are negotiated using the +ephemeral/temporary RSA key and the RSA key supplied and certified +by the certificate chain is only used for signing. + +Under previous export restrictions, ciphers with RSA keys shorter (512 bits) +than the usual key length of 1024 bits were created. To use these ciphers +with RSA keys of usual length, an ephemeral key exchange must be performed, +as the normal (certified) key cannot be directly used. + +Using ephemeral RSA key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection +can only be decrypted, when the RSA key is known. By generating a temporary +RSA key inside the server application that is lost when the application +is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, +even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) RSA key, as this key was +used for signing only. The downside is that creating a RSA key is +computationally expensive. + +Additionally, the use of ephemeral RSA key exchange is only allowed in +the TLS standard, when the RSA key can be used for signing only, that is +for export ciphers. Using ephemeral RSA key exchange for other purposes +violates the standard and can break interoperability with clients. +It is therefore strongly recommended to not use ephemeral RSA key +exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) key exchange instead +in order to achieve forward secrecy (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>). + +On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default +and must be explicitly enabled using the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA option of +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, violating the TLS/SSL +standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers, +it will automatically be used without this option! + +An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via +a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the +callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the +generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant +delay in the handshake procedure. Another advantage of the callback function +is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA +usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of +512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length +if a longer key would be allowed. + +The B<tmp_rsa_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and +the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the +ephemeral RSA key exchange is performed with an export cipher. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Generate temporary RSA keys to prepare ephemeral RSA key exchange. As the +generation of a RSA key costs a lot of computer time, they saved for later +reuse. For demonstration purposes, two keys for 512 bits and 1024 bits +respectively are generated. + + ... + /* Set up ephemeral RSA stuff */ + RSA *rsa_512 = NULL; + RSA *rsa_1024 = NULL; + + rsa_512 = RSA_generate_key(512,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL); + if (rsa_512 == NULL) + evaluate_error_queue(); + + rsa_1024 = RSA_generate_key(1024,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL); + if (rsa_1024 == NULL) + evaluate_error_queue(); + + ... + + RSA *tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength) + { + RSA *rsa_tmp=NULL; + + switch (keylength) { + case 512: + if (rsa_512) + rsa_tmp = rsa_512; + else { /* generate on the fly, should not happen in this example */ + rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL); + rsa_512 = rsa_tmp; /* Remember for later reuse */ + } + break; + case 1024: + if (rsa_1024) + rsa_tmp=rsa_1024; + else + should_not_happen_in_this_example(); + break; + default: + /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */ + if (rsa_1024) + rsa_tmp=rsa_1024; + else + rsa_tmp=rsa_512; /* Use at least a shorter key */ + } + return(rsa_tmp); + } + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback() do not return +diagnostic output. + +SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa() and SSL_set_tmp_rsa() do return 1 on success and 0 +on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure. + +SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa() and SSL_need_tmp_rsa() return 1 if a temporary +RSA key is needed and 0 otherwise. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<ciphers(1)|ciphers(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ca8d81b82c81 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth - set peer certificate verification parameters + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, + int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); + void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, + int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); + void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth); + void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); + + int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ctx> to be B<mode> and +specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function +shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. + +SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for B<ssl> to be B<mode> and +specifies the B<verify_callback> function to be used. If no callback function +shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. In +this case last B<verify_callback> set specifically for this B<ssl> remains. If +no special B<callback> was set before, the default callback for the underlying +B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the the time B<ssl> was created with +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>. + +SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain +verification that shall be allowed for B<ctx>. (See the BUGS section.) + +SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain +verification that shall be allowed for B<ssl>. (See the BUGS section.) + +=head1 NOTES + +The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically +or'ed B<mode> flags: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_VERIFY_NONE + +B<Server mode:> the server will not send a client certificate request to the +client, so the client will not send a certificate. + +B<Client mode:> if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the +server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the +certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake +using the L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)> function. +The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result. + +=item SSL_VERIFY_PEER + +B<Server mode:> the server sends a client certificate request to the client. +The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process +fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is +immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for +the verification failure. +The behaviour can be controlled by the additional +SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT and SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE flags. + +B<Client mode:> the server certificate is verified. If the verification process +fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is +immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for +the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an +anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored. + +=item SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT + +B<Server mode:> if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL +handshake is immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert. +This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. + +B<Client mode:> ignored + +=item SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE + +B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL +handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a +renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. + +B<Client mode:> ignored + +=back + +Exactly one of the B<mode> flags SSL_VERIFY_NONE and SSL_VERIFY_PEER must be +set at any time. + +The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in +verification procedure or using another application provided verification +function set with +L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>. +The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An +application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information +and the verify_callback() function, but the way this information is used +may be different. + +SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set the limit up +to which depth certificates in a chain are used during the verification +procedure. If the certificate chain is longer than allowed, the certificates +above the limit are ignored. Error messages are generated as if these +certificates would not be present, most likely a +X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY will be issued. +The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate", +"level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum +depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, and 2. The default depth limit is 9, +allowing for the peer certificate and additional 9 CA certificates. + +The B<verify_callback> function is used to control the behaviour when the +SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and +receives two arguments: B<preverify_ok> indicates, whether the verification of +the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not +(preverify_ok=0). B<x509_ctx> is a pointer to the complete context used +for the certificate chain verification. + +The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level +(the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate. +At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever +a verification error is found, the error number is stored in B<x509_ctx> +and B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=0. By applying +X509_CTX_store_* functions B<verify_callback> can locate the certificate +in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is +found for a certificate, B<verify_callback> is called with B<preverify_ok>=1 +before advancing to the next level. + +The return value of B<verify_callback> controls the strategy of the further +verification process. If B<verify_callback> returns 0, the verification +process is immediately stopped with "verification failed" state. If +SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and +the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If B<verify_callback> returns 1, +the verification process is continued. If B<verify_callback> always returns +1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification +failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can +however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using +L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)> or by maintaining its +own error storage managed by B<verify_callback>. + +If no B<verify_callback> is specified, the default callback will be used. +Its return value is identical to B<preverify_ok>, so that any verification +failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an +alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set. + +=head1 BUGS + +In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag +is set, but whether SSL_VERIFY_NONE is not set. This can lead to +unexpected behaviour, if the SSL_VERIFY_PEER and SSL_VERIFY_NONE are not +used as required (exactly one must be set at any time). + +The certificate verification depth set with SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth() +stops the verification at a certain depth. The error message produced +will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and not +X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG as may be expected. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +The following code sequence realizes an example B<verify_callback> function +that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification +failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with +more informational output. + +All verification errors are printed, informations about the certificate chain +are printed on request. +The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client +certificates. + +The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data +into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure +(see L<SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)|SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)|SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>). + + ... + typedef struct { + int verbose_mode; + int verify_depth; + int always_continue; + } mydata_t; + int mydata_index; + ... + static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + char buf[256]; + X509 *err_cert; + int err, depth; + SSL *ssl; + mydata_t *mydata; + + err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); + err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); + depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); + + /* + * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated + * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. + */ + ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); + mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index); + + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256); + + /* + * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using + * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so + * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we + * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition. + * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not + * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the + * additional certificates would be logged. + */ + if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) { + preverify_ok = 0; + err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err); + } + if (!preverify_ok) { + printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err, + X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf); + } + else if (mydata->verbose_mode) + { + printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf); + } + + /* + * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use + * it for something special + */ + if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) + { + X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256); + printf("issuer= %s\n", buf); + } + + if (mydata->always_continue) + return 1; + else + return preverify_ok; + } + ... + + mydata_t mydata; + + ... + mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL); + + ... + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, + verify_callback); + + /* + * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get + * an appropriate error in the logfile. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1); + + /* + * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL + * structure. + */ + mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ... + SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata); + + ... + SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */ + if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) + { + if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) + { + /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */ + } + } + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>, +L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)|SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)|SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)|SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..10be95fdb109 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_CTX_use_certificate, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file, SSL_use_certificate, SSL_use_certificate_ASN1, SSL_use_certificate_file, SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file, SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_PrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1, SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file, SSL_CTX_check_private_key, SSL_check_private_key - load certificate and key data + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); + int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d); + int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); + int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); + int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, int len); + int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); + + int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); + + int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, + long len); + int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); + int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); + int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); + int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); + int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); + int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); + int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); + int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); + int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); + + int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +These functions load the certificates and private keys into the SSL_CTX +or SSL object, respectively. + +The SSL_CTX_* class of functions loads the certificates and keys into the +SSL_CTX object B<ctx>. The information is passed to SSL objects B<ssl> +created from B<ctx> with L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> by copying, so that +changes applied to B<ctx> do not propagate to already existing SSL objects. + +The SSL_* class of functions only loads certificates and keys into a +specific SSL object. The specific information is kept, when +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> is called for this SSL object. + +SSL_CTX_use_certificate() loads the certificate B<x> into B<ctx>, +SSL_use_certificate() loads B<x> into B<ssl>. The rest of the +certificates needed to form the complete certificate chain can be +specified using the +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)> +function. + +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate from +the memory location B<d> (with length B<len>) into B<ctx>, +SSL_use_certificate_ASN1() loads the ASN1 encoded certificate into B<ssl>. + +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() loads the first certificate stored in B<file> +into B<ctx>. The formatting B<type> of the certificate must be specified +from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1. +SSL_use_certificate_file() loads the certificate from B<file> into B<ssl>. +See the NOTES section on why SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() +should be preferred. + +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() loads a certificate chain from +B<file> into B<ctx>. The certificates must be in PEM format and must +be sorted starting with the subject's certificate (actual client or server +certificate), followed by intermediate CA certificates if applicable, and +ending at the highest level (root) CA. +There is no corresponding function working on a single SSL object. + +SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() adds B<pkey> as private key to B<ctx>. +SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds the private key B<rsa> of type RSA +to B<ctx>. SSL_use_PrivateKey() adds B<pkey> as private key to B<ssl>; +SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey() adds B<rsa> as private key of type RSA to B<ssl>. +If a certificate has already been set and the private does not belong +to the certificate an error is returned. To change a certificate, private +key pair the new certificate needs to be set with SSL_use_certificate() +or SSL_CTX_use_certificate() before setting the private key with +SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey() or SSL_use_PrivateKey(). + + +SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type B<pk> +stored at memory location B<d> (length B<len>) to B<ctx>. +SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() adds the private key of type RSA +stored at memory location B<d> (length B<len>) to B<ctx>. +SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1() and SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1() add the private +key to B<ssl>. + +SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found in +B<file> to B<ctx>. The formatting B<type> of the certificate must be specified +from the known types SSL_FILETYPE_PEM, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1. +SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private RSA key found in +B<file> to B<ctx>. SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() adds the first private key found +in B<file> to B<ssl>; SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file() adds the first private +RSA key found to B<ssl>. + +SSL_CTX_check_private_key() checks the consistency of a private key with +the corresponding certificate loaded into B<ctx>. If more than one +key/certificate pair (RSA/DSA) is installed, the last item installed will +be checked. If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate or key, the RSA +key/certificate pair will be checked. SSL_check_private_key() performs +the same check for B<ssl>. If no key/certificate was explicitly added for +this B<ssl>, the last item added into B<ctx> will be checked. + +=head1 NOTES + +The internal certificate store of OpenSSL can hold two private key/certificate +pairs at a time: one key/certificate of type RSA and one key/certificate +of type DSA. The certificate used depends on the cipher select, see +also L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>. + +When reading certificates and private keys from file, files of type +SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 (also known as B<DER>, binary encoding) can only contain +one certificate or private key, consequently +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() is only applicable to PEM formatting. +Files of type SSL_FILETYPE_PEM can contain more than one item. + +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() adds the first certificate found +in the file to the certificate store. The other certificates are added +to the store of chain certificates using +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>. +There exists only one extra chain store, so that the same chain is appended +to both types of certificates, RSA and DSA! If it is not intended to use +both type of certificate at the same time, it is recommended to use the +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() instead of the +SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() function in order to allow the use of +complete certificate chains even when no trusted CA storage is used or +when the CA issuing the certificate shall not be added to the trusted +CA storage. + +If additional certificates are needed to complete the chain during the +TLS negotiation, CA certificates are additionally looked up in the +locations of trusted CA certificates, see +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>. + +The private keys loaded from file can be encrypted. In order to successfully +load encrypted keys, a function returning the passphrase must have been +supplied, see +L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>. +(Certificate files might be encrypted as well from the technical point +of view, it however does not make sense as the data in the certificate +is considered public anyway.) + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +On success, the functions return 1. +Otherwise check out the error stack to find out the reason. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +Support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) in +SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() was added +in 0.9.8 . + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..558de01df91d --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_SESSION_free - free an allocated SSL_SESSION structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_SESSION_free() decrements the reference count of B<session> and removes +the B<SSL_SESSION> structure pointed to by B<session> and frees up the allocated +memory, if the the reference count has reached 0. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_SESSION objects are allocated, when a TLS/SSL handshake operation +is successfully completed. Depending on the settings, see +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +the SSL_SESSION objects are internally referenced by the SSL_CTX and +linked into its session cache. SSL objects may be using the SSL_SESSION object; +as a session may be reused, several SSL objects may be using one SSL_SESSION +object at the same time. It is therefore crucial to keep the reference +count (usage information) correct and not delete a SSL_SESSION object +that is still used, as this may lead to program failures due to +dangling pointers. These failures may also appear delayed, e.g. +when an SSL_SESSION object was completely freed as the reference count +incorrectly became 0, but it is still referenced in the internal +session cache and the cache list is processed during a +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)> operation. + +SSL_SESSION_free() must only be called for SSL_SESSION objects, for +which the reference count was explicitly incremented (e.g. +by calling SSL_get1_session(), see L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>) +or when the SSL_SESSION object was generated outside a TLS handshake +operation, e.g. by using L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)|d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)>. +It must not be called on other SSL_SESSION objects, as this would cause +incorrect reference counts and therefore program failures. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_SESSION_free() does not provide diagnostic information. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>, + L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)|d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..657cda931ff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index, SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data, SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data - internal application specific data functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg); + + void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx); + + typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. +These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application +specific data attached to a specific structure. + +SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index() is used to register a new index for application +specific data. + +SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data() is used to store application data at B<arg> for B<idx> +into the B<session> object. + +SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data() is used to retrieve the information for B<idx> from +B<session>. + +A detailed description for the B<*_get_ex_new_index()> functionality +can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>. +The B<*_get_ex_data()> and B<*_set_ex_data()> functionality is described in +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +The application data is only maintained for sessions held in memory. The +application data is not included when dumping the session with +i2d_SSL_SESSION() (and all functions indirectly calling the dump functions +like PEM_write_SSL_SESSION() and PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION()) and can +therefore not be restored. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..490337a32f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_SESSION_get_time, SSL_SESSION_set_time, SSL_SESSION_get_timeout, SSL_SESSION_set_timeout - retrieve and manipulate session time and timeout settings + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); + long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); + long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); + long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); + + long SSL_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); + long SSL_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); + long SSL_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); + long SSL_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_SESSION_get_time() returns the time at which the session B<s> was +established. The time is given in seconds since the Epoch and therefore +compatible to the time delivered by the time() call. + +SSL_SESSION_set_time() replaces the creation time of the session B<s> with +the chosen value B<tm>. + +SSL_SESSION_get_timeout() returns the timeout value set for session B<s> +in seconds. + +SSL_SESSION_set_timeout() sets the timeout value for session B<s> in seconds +to B<tm>. + +The SSL_get_time(), SSL_set_time(), SSL_get_timeout(), and SSL_set_timeout() +functions are synonyms for the SSL_SESSION_*() counterparts. + +=head1 NOTES + +Sessions are expired by examining the creation time and the timeout value. +Both are set at creation time of the session to the actual time and the +default timeout value at creation, respectively, as set by +L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>. +Using these functions it is possible to extend or shorten the lifetime +of the session. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_SESSION_get_time() and SSL_SESSION_get_timeout() return the currently +valid values. + +SSL_SESSION_set_time() and SSL_SESSION_set_timeout() return 1 on success. + +If any of the function is passed the NULL pointer for the session B<s>, +0 is returned. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>, +L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)|SSL_get_default_timeout(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cc724c0d561a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_accept - wait for a TLS/SSL client to initiate a TLS/SSL handshake + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_accept() waits for a TLS/SSL client to initiate the TLS/SSL handshake. +The communication channel must already have been set and assigned to the +B<ssl> by setting an underlying B<BIO>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The behaviour of SSL_accept() depends on the underlying BIO. + +If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_accept() will only return once the +handshake has been finished or an error occurred, except for SGC (Server +Gated Cryptography). For SGC, SSL_accept() may return with -1, but +SSL_get_error() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE> and SSL_accept() +should be called again. + +If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_accept() will also return +when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_accept() +to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1. +In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the +return value of SSL_accept() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after +taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_accept(). +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required +condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written +into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 1 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been +established. + +=item 0 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and +by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the +return value B<ret> to find out the reason. + +=item E<lt>0 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either +at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was +not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation +for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> +to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)>, +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>, +L<SSL_do_handshake(3)|SSL_do_handshake(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..94e28cc3075e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_alert_type_string.pod @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_alert_type_string, SSL_alert_type_string_long, SSL_alert_desc_string, SSL_alert_desc_string_long - get textual description of alert information + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); + const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); + + const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); + const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_alert_type_string() returns a one letter string indicating the +type of the alert specified by B<value>. + +SSL_alert_type_string_long() returns a string indicating the type of the alert +specified by B<value>. + +SSL_alert_desc_string() returns a two letter string as a short form +describing the reason of the alert specified by B<value>. + +SSL_alert_desc_string_long() returns a string describing the reason +of the alert specified by B<value>. + +=head1 NOTES + +When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about +a special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message +and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results +in the communication being canceled). + +A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The +"close notify" alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for +non-fatal errors are certificate errors ("certificate expired", +"unsupported certificate"), for which a warning alert may be sent. +(The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The +receiving side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning +alert on it discretion. + +Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as specified +by the TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_type_string() or +SSL_alert_type_string_long(): + +=over 4 + +=item "W"/"warning" + +=item "F"/"fatal" + +=item "U"/"unknown" + +This indicates that no support is available for this alert type. +Probably B<value> does not contain a correct alert message. + +=back + +The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_desc_string() or +SSL_alert_desc_string_long(): + +=over 4 + +=item "CN"/"close notify" + +The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert. + +=item "UM"/"unexpected message" + +An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal +and should never be observed in communication between proper +implementations. + +=item "BM"/"bad record mac" + +This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect +MAC. This message is always fatal. + +=item "DF"/"decompression failure" + +The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data +that would expand to excessive length). This message is always +fatal. + +=item "HF"/"handshake failure" + +Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the +sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security +parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error. + +=item "NC"/"no certificate" + +A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate +(SSLv3 only). + +=item "BC"/"bad certificate" + +A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not +verify correctly, etc + +=item "UC"/"unsupported certificate" + +A certificate was of an unsupported type. + +=item "CR"/"certificate revoked" + +A certificate was revoked by its signer. + +=item "CE"/"certificate expired" + +A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. + +=item "CU"/"certificate unknown" + +Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the +certificate, rendering it unacceptable. + +=item "IP"/"illegal parameter" + +A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with +other fields. This is always fatal. + +=item "DC"/"decryption failed" + +A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an +even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when +checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal. + +=item "RO"/"record overflow" + +A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than +2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record +with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal. + +=item "CA"/"unknown CA" + +A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the +certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not +be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This +message is always fatal. + +=item "AD"/"access denied" + +A valid certificate was received, but when access control was +applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. +This message is always fatal. + +=item "DE"/"decode error" + +A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the +specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This +message is always fatal. + +=item "CY"/"decrypt error" + +A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being +unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, +or validate a finished message. + +=item "ER"/"export restriction" + +A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was +detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit +ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This +message is always fatal. + +=item "PV"/"protocol version" + +The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is +recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol +versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is +always fatal. + +=item "IS"/"insufficient security" + +Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has +failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more +secure than those supported by the client. This message is always +fatal. + +=item "IE"/"internal error" + +An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the +protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory +allocation failure). This message is always fatal. + +=item "US"/"user canceled" + +This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a +protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the +handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a +close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed +by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning. + +=item "NR"/"no renegotiation" + +Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the +server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. +Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that +is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert; +at that point, the original requester can decide whether to +proceed with the connection. One case where this would be +appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to +satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters +(key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be +difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that +point. This message is always a warning. + +=item "UK"/"unknown" + +This indicates that no description is available for this alert type. +Probably B<value> does not contain a correct alert message. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8e077e31c9a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_clear - reset SSL object to allow another connection + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Reset B<ssl> to allow another connection. All settings (method, ciphers, +BIOs) are kept. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_clear is used to prepare an SSL object for a new connection. While all +settings are kept, a side effect is the handling of the current SSL session. +If a session is still B<open>, it is considered bad and will be removed +from the session cache, as required by RFC2246. A session is considered open, +if L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> was not called for the connection +or at least L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)> was used to +set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state. + +If a session was closed cleanly, the session object will be kept and all +settings corresponding. This explicitly means, that e.g. the special method +used during the session will be kept for the next handshake. So if the +session was a TLSv1 session, a SSL client object will use a TLSv1 client +method for the next handshake and a SSL server object will use a TLSv1 +server method, even if SSLv23_*_methods were chosen on startup. This +will might lead to connection failures (see L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>) +for a description of the method's properties. + +=head1 WARNINGS + +SSL_clear() resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The +reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions +(some of these settings were made automatically during the last +handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing +an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings. +SSL_clear() is not a short form for the sequence +L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>; L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>; . + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The SSL_clear() operation could not be performed. Check the error stack to +find out the reason. + +=item 1 + +The SSL_clear() operation was successful. + +=back + +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cc56ebb75f3f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_connect - initiate the TLS/SSL handshake with an TLS/SSL server + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_connect() initiates the TLS/SSL handshake with a server. The communication +channel must already have been set and assigned to the B<ssl> by setting an +underlying B<BIO>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The behaviour of SSL_connect() depends on the underlying BIO. + +If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_connect() will only return once the +handshake has been finished or an error occurred. + +If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_connect() will also return +when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_connect() +to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value -1. +In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the +return value of SSL_connect() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after +taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_connect(). +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required +condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written +into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 1 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been +established. + +=item 0 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and +by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the +return value B<ret> to find out the reason. + +=item E<lt>0 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either +at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was +not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation +for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> +to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)>, +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>, +L<SSL_do_handshake(3)|SSL_do_handshake(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..243576451b7f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_do_handshake - perform a TLS/SSL handshake + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_do_handshake() will wait for a SSL/TLS handshake to take place. If the +connection is in client mode, the handshake will be started. The handshake +routines may have to be explicitly set in advance using either +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or +L<SSL_set_accept_state(3)|SSL_set_accept_state(3)>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The behaviour of SSL_do_handshake() depends on the underlying BIO. + +If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_do_handshake() will only return +once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred, except for SGC +(Server Gated Cryptography). For SGC, SSL_do_handshake() may return with -1, +but SSL_get_error() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE> and +SSL_do_handshake() should be called again. + +If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_do_handshake() will also return +when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake() +to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the +return value of SSL_do_handshake() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after +taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_do_handshake(). +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required +condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written +into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 1 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been +established. + +=item 0 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and +by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the +return value B<ret> to find out the reason. + +=item E<lt>0 + +The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either +at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was +not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation +for non-blocking BIOs. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> +to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)>, +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2d4f8b6168b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_free - free an allocated SSL structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_free() decrements the reference count of B<ssl>, and removes the SSL +structure pointed to by B<ssl> and frees up the allocated memory if the +the reference count has reached 0. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_free() also calls the free()ing procedures for indirectly affected items, if +applicable: the buffering BIO, the read and write BIOs, +cipher lists specially created for this B<ssl>, the B<SSL_SESSION>. +Do not explicitly free these indirectly freed up items before or after +calling SSL_free(), as trying to free things twice may lead to program +failure. + +The ssl session has reference counts from two users: the SSL object, for +which the reference count is removed by SSL_free() and the internal +session cache. If the session is considered bad, because +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> was not called for the connection +and L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)> was not used to set the +SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN state, the session will also be removed +from the session cache as required by RFC2246. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_free() does not provide diagnostic information. + +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..659c482c792a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_SSL_CTX - get the SSL_CTX from which an SSL is created + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_SSL_CTX() returns a pointer to the SSL_CTX object, from which +B<ssl> was created with L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The pointer to the SSL_CTX object is returned. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aecadd9138f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_ciphers, SSL_get_cipher_list - get list of available SSL_CIPHERs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *ssl); + const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl, int priority); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_ciphers() returns the stack of available SSL_CIPHERs for B<ssl>, +sorted by preference. If B<ssl> is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL +is returned. + +SSL_get_cipher_list() returns a pointer to the name of the SSL_CIPHER +listed for B<ssl> with B<priority>. If B<ssl> is NULL, no ciphers are +available, or there are less ciphers than B<priority> available, NULL +is returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +The details of the ciphers obtained by SSL_get_ciphers() can be obtained using +the L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)|SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)> family of functions. + +Call SSL_get_cipher_list() with B<priority> starting from 0 to obtain the +sorted list of available ciphers, until NULL is returned. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +See DESCRIPTION + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)|SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..68181b2407b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_client_CA_list, SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list - get list of client CAs + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list() returns the list of client CAs explicitly set for +B<ctx> using L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>. + +SSL_get_client_CA_list() returns the list of client CAs explicitly +set for B<ssl> using SSL_set_client_CA_list() or B<ssl>'s SSL_CTX object with +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>, when in +server mode. In client mode, SSL_get_client_CA_list returns the list of +client CAs sent from the server, if any. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list() and SSL_set_client_CA_list() do not return +diagnostic information. + +SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() and SSL_add_client_CA() have the following return +values: + +=over 4 + +=item STACK_OF(X509_NAMES) + +List of CA names explicitly set (for B<ctx> or in server mode) or send +by the server (client mode). + +=item NULL + +No client CA list was explicitly set (for B<ctx> or in server mode) or +the server did not send a list of CAs (client mode). + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e5ab12491e63 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_current_cipher, SSL_get_cipher, SSL_get_cipher_name, +SSL_get_cipher_bits, SSL_get_cipher_version - get SSL_CIPHER of a connection + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *ssl); + #define SSL_get_cipher(s) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) + #define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) + #define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np) + #define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \ + SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_current_cipher() returns a pointer to an SSL_CIPHER object containing +the description of the actually used cipher of a connection established with +the B<ssl> object. + +SSL_get_cipher() and SSL_get_cipher_name() are identical macros to obtain the +name of the currently used cipher. SSL_get_cipher_bits() is a +macro to obtain the number of secret/algorithm bits used and +SSL_get_cipher_version() returns the protocol name. +See L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)|SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)> for more details. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_get_current_cipher() returns the cipher actually used or NULL, when +no session has been established. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)|SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a648a9b82df6 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_default_timeout - get default session timeout value + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_default_timeout() returns the default timeout value assigned to +SSL_SESSION objects negotiated for the protocol valid for B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +Whenever a new session is negotiated, it is assigned a timeout value, +after which it will not be accepted for session reuse. If the timeout +value was not explicitly set using +L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>, the hardcoded default +timeout for the protocol will be used. + +SSL_get_default_timeout() return this hardcoded value, which is 300 seconds +for all currently supported protocols (SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLSv1). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +See description. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)|SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>, +L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)|SSL_get_default_timeout(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..48c6b15db78f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_error - obtain result code for TLS/SSL I/O operation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_error() returns a result code (suitable for the C "switch" +statement) for a preceding call to SSL_connect(), SSL_accept(), SSL_do_handshake(), +SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), or SSL_write() on B<ssl>. The value returned by +that TLS/SSL I/O function must be passed to SSL_get_error() in parameter +B<ret>. + +In addition to B<ssl> and B<ret>, SSL_get_error() inspects the +current thread's OpenSSL error queue. Thus, SSL_get_error() must be +used in the same thread that performed the TLS/SSL I/O operation, and no +other OpenSSL function calls should appear in between. The current +thread's error queue must be empty before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is +attempted, or SSL_get_error() will not work reliably. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can currently occur: + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_ERROR_NONE + +The TLS/SSL I/O operation completed. This result code is returned +if and only if B<ret E<gt> 0>. + +=item SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN + +The TLS/SSL connection has been closed. If the protocol version is SSL 3.0 +or TLS 1.0, this result code is returned only if a closure +alert has occurred in the protocol, i.e. if the connection has been +closed cleanly. Note that in this case B<SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN> +does not necessarily indicate that the underlying transport +has been closed. + +=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ, SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE + +The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be +called again later. If, by then, the underlying B<BIO> has data +available for reading (if the result code is B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ>) +or allows writing data (B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>), then some TLS/SSL +protocol progress will take place, i.e. at least part of an TLS/SSL +record will be read or written. Note that the retry may again lead to +a B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE> condition. +There is no fixed upper limit for the number of iterations that +may be necessary until progress becomes visible at application +protocol level. + +For socket B<BIO>s (e.g. when SSL_set_fd() was used), select() or +poll() on the underlying socket can be used to find out when the +TLS/SSL I/O function should be retried. + +Caveat: Any TLS/SSL I/O function can lead to either of +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> and B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. In particular, +SSL_read() or SSL_peek() may want to write data and SSL_write() may want +to read data. This is mainly because TLS/SSL handshakes may occur at any +time during the protocol (initiated by either the client or the server); +SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), and SSL_write() will handle any pending handshakes. + +=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT, SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT + +The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be +called again later. The underlying BIO was not connected yet to the peer +and the call would block in connect()/accept(). The SSL function should be +called again when the connection is established. These messages can only +appear with a BIO_s_connect() or BIO_s_accept() BIO, respectively. +In order to find out, when the connection has been successfully established, +on many platforms select() or poll() for writing on the socket file descriptor +can be used. + +=item SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP + +The operation did not complete because an application callback set by +SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() has asked to be called again. +The TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. +Details depend on the application. + +=item SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL + +Some I/O error occurred. The OpenSSL error queue may contain more +information on the error. If the error queue is empty +(i.e. ERR_get_error() returns 0), B<ret> can be used to find out more +about the error: If B<ret == 0>, an EOF was observed that violates +the protocol. If B<ret == -1>, the underlying B<BIO> reported an +I/O error (for socket I/O on Unix systems, consult B<errno> for details). + +=item SSL_ERROR_SSL + +A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. The +OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +SSL_get_error() was added in SSLeay 0.8. + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..165c6a5b2cae --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx.pod @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx - get ex_data index to access SSL structure +from X509_STORE_CTX + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() returns the index number under which +the pointer to the SSL object is stored into the X509_STORE_CTX object. + +=head1 NOTES + +Whenever a X509_STORE_CTX object is created for the verification of the +peers certificate during a handshake, a pointer to the SSL object is +stored into the X509_STORE_CTX object to identify the connection affected. +To retrieve this pointer the X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data() function can +be used with the correct index. This index is globally the same for all +X509_STORE_CTX objects and can be retrieved using +SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(). The index value is set when +SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() is first called either by the application +program directly or indirectly during other SSL setup functions or during +the handshake. + +The value depends on other index values defined for X509_STORE_CTX objects +before the SSL index is created. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +=over 4 + +=item E<gt>=0 + +The index value to access the pointer. + +=item E<lt>0 + +An error occurred, check the error stack for a detailed error message. + +=back + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +The index returned from SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() allows to +access the SSL object for the connection to be accessed during the +verify_callback() when checking the peers certificate. Please check +the example in L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>, + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>, +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_new_index.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_new_index.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..228d23d8c0bb --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_ex_new_index, SSL_set_ex_data, SSL_get_ex_data - internal application specific data functions + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, + CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); + + int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *arg); + + void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx); + + typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. +These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application +specific data attached to a specific structure. + +SSL_get_ex_new_index() is used to register a new index for application +specific data. + +SSL_set_ex_data() is used to store application data at B<arg> for B<idx> into +the B<ssl> object. + +SSL_get_ex_data() is used to retrieve the information for B<idx> from +B<ssl>. + +A detailed description for the B<*_get_ex_new_index()> functionality +can be found in L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>. +The B<*_get_ex_data()> and B<*_set_ex_data()> functionality is described in +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +An example on how to use the functionality is included in the example +verify_callback() in L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)|RSA_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)|CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..89260b522ca2 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_fd - get file descriptor linked to an SSL object + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_fd() returns the file descriptor which is linked to B<ssl>. +SSL_get_rfd() and SSL_get_wfd() return the file descriptors for the +read or the write channel, which can be different. If the read and the +write channel are different, SSL_get_fd() will return the file descriptor +of the read channel. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item -1 + +The operation failed, because the underlying BIO is not of the correct type +(suitable for file descriptors). + +=item E<gt>=0 + +The file descriptor linked to B<ssl>. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_set_fd(3)|SSL_set_fd(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> , L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..49fb88f86faf --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_peer_cert_chain - get the X509 certificate chain of the peer + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + STACKOF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACKOF(X509) certificates +forming the certificate chain of the peer. If called on the client side, +the stack also contains the peer's certificate; if called on the server +side, the peer's certificate must be obtained separately using +L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)|SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>. +If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +The peer certificate chain is not necessarily available after reusing +a session, in which case a NULL pointer is returned. + +The reference count of the STACKOF(X509) object is not incremented. +If the corresponding session is freed, the pointer must not be used +any longer. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established +or the certificate chain is no longer available when a session is reused. + +=item Pointer to a STACKOF(X509) + +The return value points to the certificate chain presented by the peer. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)|SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ef7c8be18079 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_peer_certificate - get the X509 certificate of the peer + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns a pointer to the X509 certificate the +peer presented. If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +Due to the protocol definition, a TLS/SSL server will always send a +certificate, if present. A client will only send a certificate when +explicitly requested to do so by the server (see +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>). If an anonymous cipher +is used, no certificates are sent. + +That a certificate is returned does not indicate information about the +verification state, use L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)> +to check the verification state. + +The reference count of the X509 object is incremented by one, so that it +will not be destroyed when the session containing the peer certificate is +freed. The X509 object must be explicitly freed using X509_free(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established. + +=item Pointer to an X509 certificate + +The return value points to the certificate presented by the peer. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3d98233cacee --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_rbio.pod @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_rbio - get BIO linked to an SSL object + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + BIO *SSL_get_rbio(SSL *ssl); + BIO *SSL_get_wbio(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_rbio() and SSL_get_wbio() return pointers to the BIOs for the +read or the write channel, which can be different. The reference count +of the BIO is not incremented. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +No BIO was connected to the SSL object + +=item Any other pointer + +The BIO linked to B<ssl>. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_set_bio(3)|SSL_set_bio(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> , L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0c41caa922ab --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_session - retrieve TLS/SSL session data + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); + SSL_SESSION *SSL_get0_session(const SSL *ssl); + SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_session() returns a pointer to the B<SSL_SESSION> actually used in +B<ssl>. The reference count of the B<SSL_SESSION> is not incremented, so +that the pointer can become invalid by other operations. + +SSL_get0_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(). + +SSL_get1_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(), but the reference +count of the B<SSL_SESSION> is incremented by one. + +=head1 NOTES + +The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the +connection without a new handshake. + +SSL_get0_session() returns a pointer to the actual session. As the +reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while +the connection is in use. If L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> or +L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> is called, the session may be removed completely +(if considered bad), and the pointer obtained will become invalid. Even +if the session is valid, it can be removed at any time due to timeout +during L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>. + +If the data is to be kept, SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference +count, so that the session will not be implicitly removed by other operations +but stays in memory. In order to remove the session +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)> must be explicitly called once +to decrement the reference count again. + +SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache +list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. +One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore +only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created +from this SSL_CTX object). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +There is no session available in B<ssl>. + +=item Pointer to an SSL + +The return value points to the data of an SSL session. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>, +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..55b56a53f92e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_verify_result - get result of peer certificate verification + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_verify_result() returns the result of the verification of the +X509 certificate presented by the peer, if any. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_get_verify_result() can only return one error code while the verification +of a certificate can fail because of many reasons at the same time. Only +the last verification error that occurred during the processing is available +from SSL_get_verify_result(). + +The verification result is part of the established session and is restored +when a session is reused. + +=head1 BUGS + +If no peer certificate was presented, the returned result code is +X509_V_OK. This is because no verification error occurred, it does however +not indicate success. SSL_get_verify_result() is only useful in connection +with L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)|SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can currently occur: + +=over 4 + +=item X509_V_OK + +The verification succeeded or no peer certificate was presented. + +=item Any other value + +Documented in L<verify(1)|verify(1)>. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_verify_result(3)|SSL_set_verify_result(3)>, +L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)|SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>, +L<verify(1)|verify(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cc271db2c534 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_get_version - get the protocol version of a connection. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_get_cipher_version() returns the name of the protocol used for the +connection B<ssl>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following strings can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item SSLv2 + +The connection uses the SSLv2 protocol. + +=item SSLv3 + +The connection uses the SSLv3 protocol. + +=item TLSv1 + +The connection uses the TLSv1 protocol. + +=item unknown + +This indicates that no version has been set (no connection established). + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ecf3c4858e52 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_library_init.pod @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_library_init, OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms, SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms +- initialize SSL library by registering algorithms + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_library_init(void); + #define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() + #define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_library_init() registers the available ciphers and digests. + +OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() and SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() are synonyms +for SSL_library_init(). + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_library_init() must be called before any other action takes place. + +=head1 WARNING + +SSL_library_init() only registers ciphers. Another important initialization +is the seeding of the PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator), which has to +be performed separately. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +A typical TLS/SSL application will start with the library initialization, +will provide readable error messages and will seed the PRNG. + + SSL_load_error_strings(); /* readable error messages */ + SSL_library_init(); /* initialize library */ + actions_to_seed_PRNG(); + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_library_init() always returns "1", so it is safe to discard the return +value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_load_error_strings(3)|SSL_load_error_strings(3)>, +L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02527dc2edc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_load_client_CA_file.pod @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_load_client_CA_file - load certificate names from file + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_load_client_CA_file() reads certificates from B<file> and returns +a STACK_OF(X509_NAME) with the subject names found. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_load_client_CA_file() reads a file of PEM formatted certificates and +extracts the X509_NAMES of the certificates found. While the name suggests +the specific usage as support function for +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>, +it is not limited to CA certificates. + +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Load names of CAs from file and use it as a client CA list: + + SSL_CTX *ctx; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cert_names; + + ... + cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file("/path/to/CAfile.pem"); + if (cert_names != NULL) + SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, cert_names); + else + error_handling(); + ... + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +The operation failed, check out the error stack for the reason. + +=item Pointer to STACK_OF(X509_NAME) + +Pointer to the subject names of the successfully read certificates. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25300e978f02 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_new - create a new SSL structure for a connection + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_new() creates a new B<SSL> structure which is needed to hold the +data for a TLS/SSL connection. The new structure inherits the settings +of the underlying context B<ctx>: connection method (SSLv2/v3/TLSv1), +options, verification settings, timeout settings. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item NULL + +The creation of a new SSL structure failed. Check the error stack to +find out the reason. + +=item Pointer to an SSL structure + +The return value points to an allocated SSL structure. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, +L<SSL_get_SSL_CTX(3)|SSL_get_SSL_CTX(3)>, +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..43f2874e8b6a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_pending - obtain number of readable bytes buffered in an SSL object + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_pending() returns the number of bytes which are available inside +B<ssl> for immediate read. + +=head1 NOTES + +Data are received in blocks from the peer. Therefore data can be buffered +inside B<ssl> and are ready for immediate retrieval with +L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The number of bytes pending is returned. + +=head1 BUGS + +SSL_pending() takes into account only bytes from the TLS/SSL record +that is currently being processed (if any). If the B<SSL> object's +I<read_ahead> flag is set, additional protocol bytes may have been +read containing more TLS/SSL records; these are ignored by +SSL_pending(). + +Up to OpenSSL 0.9.6, SSL_pending() does not check if the record type +of pending data is application data. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f6c37f77e491 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_read - read bytes from a TLS/SSL connection. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_read() tries to read B<num> bytes from the specified B<ssl> into the +buffer B<buf>. + +=head1 NOTES + +If necessary, SSL_read() will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if +not already explicitly performed by L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)> or +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>. If the +peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during +the SSL_read() operation. The behaviour of SSL_read() depends on the +underlying BIO. + +For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the B<ssl> must have been +initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or SSL_set_accept_state() +before the first call to an SSL_read() or L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> +function. + +SSL_read() works based on the SSL/TLS records. The data are received in +records (with a maximum record size of 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1). Only when a +record has been completely received, it can be processed (decryption and +check of integrity). Therefore data that was not retrieved at the last +call of SSL_read() can still be buffered inside the SSL layer and will be +retrieved on the next call to SSL_read(). If B<num> is higher than the +number of bytes buffered, SSL_read() will return with the bytes buffered. +If no more bytes are in the buffer, SSL_read() will trigger the processing +of the next record. Only when the record has been received and processed +completely, SSL_read() will return reporting success. At most the contents +of the record will be returned. As the size of an SSL/TLS record may exceed +the maximum packet size of the underlying transport (e.g. TCP), it may +be necessary to read several packets from the transport layer before the +record is complete and SSL_read() can succeed. + +If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_read() will only return, once the +read operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a +renegotiation take place, in which case a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ may occur. +This behaviour can be controlled with the SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY flag of the +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> call. + +If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_read() will also return +when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_read() +to continue the operation. In this case a call to +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> with the +return value of SSL_read() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a +call to SSL_read() can also cause write operations! The calling process +then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the +needs of SSL_read(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a +non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check +for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data +must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. + +=head1 WARNING + +When an SSL_read() operation has to be repeated because of +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>, it must be repeated +with the same arguments. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item E<gt>0 + +The read operation was successful; the return value is the number of +bytes actually read from the TLS/SSL connection. + +=item 0 + +The read operation was not successful. The reason may either be a clean +shutdown due to a "close notify" alert sent by the peer (in which case +the SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN flag in the ssl shutdown state is set +(see L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>). It is also possible, that +the peer simply shut down the underlying transport and the shutdown is +incomplete. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> to find out, +whether an error occurred or the connection was shut down cleanly +(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN). + +SSLv2 (deprecated) does not support a shutdown alert protocol, so it can +only be detected, whether the underlying connection was closed. It cannot +be checked, whether the closure was initiated by the peer or by something +else. + +=item E<lt>0 + +The read operation was not successful, because either an error occurred +or action must be taken by the calling process. Call SSL_get_error() with the +return value B<ret> to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, +L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)> +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bdb8a1fcd55f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_rstate_string.pod @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_rstate_string, SSL_rstate_string_long - get textual description of state of an SSL object during read operation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + const char *SSL_rstate_string(SSL *ssl); + const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_rstate_string() returns a 2 letter string indicating the current read state +of the SSL object B<ssl>. + +SSL_rstate_string_long() returns a string indicating the current read state of +the SSL object B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +When performing a read operation, the SSL/TLS engine must parse the record, +consisting of header and body. When working in a blocking environment, +SSL_rstate_string[_long]() should always return "RD"/"read done". + +This function should only seldom be needed in applications. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_rstate_string() and SSL_rstate_string_long() can return the following +values: + +=over 4 + +=item "RH"/"read header" + +The header of the record is being evaluated. + +=item "RB"/"read body" + +The body of the record is being evaluated. + +=item "RD"/"read done" + +The record has been completely processed. + +=item "unknown"/"unknown" + +The read state is unknown. This should never happen. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..da7d06264d04 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_session_reused - query whether a reused session was negotiated during handshake + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_session_reused(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +Query, whether a reused session was negotiated during the handshake. + +=head1 NOTES + +During the negotiation, a client can propose to reuse a session. The server +then looks up the session in its cache. If both client and server agree +on the session, it will be reused and a flag is being set that can be +queried by the application. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +A new session was negotiated. + +=item 1 + +A session was reused. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..67c9756d3fe5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_bio.pod @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_set_bio - connect the SSL object with a BIO + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_set_bio() connects the BIOs B<rbio> and B<wbio> for the read and write +operations of the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of B<ssl>. + +The SSL engine inherits the behaviour of B<rbio> and B<wbio>, respectively. +If a BIO is non-blocking, the B<ssl> will also have non-blocking behaviour. + +If there was already a BIO connected to B<ssl>, BIO_free() will be called +(for both the reading and writing side, if different). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_set_bio() cannot fail. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_rbio(3)|SSL_get_rbio(3)>, +L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_set_connect_state.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_connect_state.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d88a057deffa --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_connect_state.pod @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_set_connect_state, SSL_get_accept_state - prepare SSL object to work in client or server mode + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl); + + void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_set_connect_state() sets B<ssl> to work in client mode. + +SSL_set_accept_state() sets B<ssl> to work in server mode. + +=head1 NOTES + +When the SSL_CTX object was created with L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, +it was either assigned a dedicated client method, a dedicated server +method, or a generic method, that can be used for both client and +server connections. (The method might have been changed with +L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)|SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)> or +SSL_set_ssl_method().) + +When beginning a new handshake, the SSL engine must know whether it must +call the connect (client) or accept (server) routines. Even though it may +be clear from the method chosen, whether client or server mode was +requested, the handshake routines must be explicitly set. + +When using the L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)> or +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)> routines, the correct handshake +routines are automatically set. When performing a transparent negotiation +using L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> or L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, the +handshake routines must be explicitly set in advance using either +SSL_set_connect_state() or SSL_set_accept_state(). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_set_connect_state() and SSL_set_accept_state() do not return diagnostic +information. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, +L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, +L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, +L<SSL_do_handshake(3)|SSL_do_handshake(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)|SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..70291128fcec --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_set_fd - connect the SSL object with a file descriptor + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd); + int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); + int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_set_fd() sets the file descriptor B<fd> as the input/output facility +for the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of B<ssl>. B<fd> will typically be the +socket file descriptor of a network connection. + +When performing the operation, a B<socket BIO> is automatically created to +interface between the B<ssl> and B<fd>. The BIO and hence the SSL engine +inherit the behaviour of B<fd>. If B<fd> is non-blocking, the B<ssl> will +also have non-blocking behaviour. + +If there was already a BIO connected to B<ssl>, BIO_free() will be called +(for both the reading and writing side, if different). + +SSL_set_rfd() and SSL_set_wfd() perform the respective action, but only +for the read channel or the write channel, which can be set independently. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The operation failed. Check the error stack to find out why. + +=item 1 + +The operation succeeded. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_fd(3)|SSL_get_fd(3)>, L<SSL_set_bio(3)|SSL_set_bio(3)>, +L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> , L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5f54714ad86a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_set_session - set a TLS/SSL session to be used during TLS/SSL connect + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_set_session() sets B<session> to be used when the TLS/SSL connection +is to be established. SSL_set_session() is only useful for TLS/SSL clients. +When the session is set, the reference count of B<session> is incremented +by 1. If the session is not reused, the reference count is decremented +again during SSL_connect(). Whether the session was reused can be queried +with the L<SSL_session_reused(3)|SSL_session_reused(3)> call. + +If there is already a session set inside B<ssl> (because it was set with +SSL_set_session() before or because the same B<ssl> was already used for +a connection), SSL_SESSION_free() will be called for that session. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache +list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. +One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore +only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created +from this SSL_CTX object). + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +The operation failed; check the error stack to find out the reason. + +=item 1 + +The operation succeeded. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>, +L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>, +L<SSL_session_reused(3)|SSL_session_reused(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..011a022a12c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_set_shutdown, SSL_get_shutdown - manipulate shutdown state of an SSL connection + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode); + + int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_set_shutdown() sets the shutdown state of B<ssl> to B<mode>. + +SSL_get_shutdown() returns the shutdown mode of B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of: + +=over 4 + +=item 0 + +No shutdown setting, yet. + +=item SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN + +A "close notify" shutdown alert was sent to the peer, the connection is being +considered closed and the session is closed and correct. + +=item SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN + +A shutdown alert was received form the peer, either a normal "close notify" +or a fatal error. + +=back + +SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN and SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN can be set at the same time. + +The shutdown state of the connection is used to determine the state of +the ssl session. If the session is still open, when +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)> or L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> is called, +it is considered bad and removed according to RFC2246. +The actual condition for a correctly closed session is SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN +(according to the TLS RFC, it is acceptable to only send the "close notify" +alert but to not wait for the peer's answer, when the underlying connection +is closed). +SSL_set_shutdown() can be used to set this state without sending a +close alert to the peer (see L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>). + +If a "close notify" was received, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN will be set, +for setting SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN the application must however still call +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> or SSL_set_shutdown() itself. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_set_shutdown() does not return diagnostic information. + +SSL_get_shutdown() returns the current setting. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)|SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..04ab101aad2e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_set_verify_result.pod @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_set_verify_result - override result of peer certificate verification + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long verify_result); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_set_verify_result() sets B<verify_result> of the object B<ssl> to be the +result of the verification of the X509 certificate presented by the peer, +if any. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_set_verify_result() overrides the verification result. It only changes +the verification result of the B<ssl> object. It does not become part of the +established session, so if the session is to be reused later, the original +value will reappear. + +The valid codes for B<verify_result> are documented in L<verify(1)|verify(1)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +SSL_set_verify_result() does not provide a return value. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, +L<SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)|SSL_get_peer_certificate(3)>, +L<verify(1)|verify(1)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..89911acbcac8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_shutdown - shut down a TLS/SSL connection + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_shutdown() shuts down an active TLS/SSL connection. It sends the +"close notify" shutdown alert to the peer. + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_shutdown() tries to send the "close notify" shutdown alert to the peer. +Whether the operation succeeds or not, the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag is set and +a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the +session cache for further reuse. + +The shutdown procedure consists of 2 steps: the sending of the "close notify" +shutdown alert and the reception of the peer's "close notify" shutdown +alert. According to the TLS standard, it is acceptable for an application +to only send its shutdown alert and then close the underlying connection +without waiting for the peer's response (this way resources can be saved, +as the process can already terminate or serve another connection). +When the underlying connection shall be used for more communications, the +complete shutdown procedure (bidirectional "close notify" alerts) must be +performed, so that the peers stay synchronized. + +SSL_shutdown() supports both uni- and bidirectional shutdown by its 2 step +behaviour. + +=over 4 + +=item When the application is the first party to send the "close notify" +alert, SSL_shutdown() will only send the alert and then set the +SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag (so that the session is considered good and will +be kept in cache). SSL_shutdown() will then return with 0. If a unidirectional +shutdown is enough (the underlying connection shall be closed anyway), this +first call to SSL_shutdown() is sufficient. In order to complete the +bidirectional shutdown handshake, SSL_shutdown() must be called again. +The second call will make SSL_shutdown() wait for the peer's "close notify" +shutdown alert. On success, the second call to SSL_shutdown() will return +with 1. + +=item If the peer already sent the "close notify" alert B<and> it was +already processed implicitly inside another function +(L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>), the SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN flag is set. +SSL_shutdown() will send the "close notify" alert, set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN +flag and will immediately return with 1. +Whether SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN is already set can be checked using the +SSL_get_shutdown() (see also L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)> call. + +=back + +It is therefore recommended, to check the return value of SSL_shutdown() +and call SSL_shutdown() again, if the bidirectional shutdown is not yet +complete (return value of the first call is 0). As the shutdown is not +specially handled in the SSLv2 protocol, SSL_shutdown() will succeed on +the first call. + +The behaviour of SSL_shutdown() additionally depends on the underlying BIO. + +If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_shutdown() will only return once the +handshake step has been finished or an error occurred. + +If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_shutdown() will also return +when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown() +to continue the handshake. In this case a call to SSL_get_error() with the +return value of SSL_shutdown() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. The calling process then must repeat the call after +taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_shutdown(). +The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, +nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required +condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written +into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. + +SSL_shutdown() can be modified to only set the connection to "shutdown" +state but not actually send the "close notify" alert messages, +see L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)|SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>. +When "quiet shutdown" is enabled, SSL_shutdown() will always succeed +and return 1. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item 1 + +The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent +and the peer's "close notify" alert was received. + +=item 0 + +The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time, +if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed. +The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an +erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred. + +=item -1 + +The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either +at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. It can also occur if +action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. +Call L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> with the return value B<ret> +to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)|SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, L<SSL_free(3)|SSL_free(3)>, +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fe25d47c71a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_state_string, SSL_state_string_long - get textual description of state of an SSL object + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *ssl); + const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_state_string() returns a 6 letter string indicating the current state +of the SSL object B<ssl>. + +SSL_state_string_long() returns a string indicating the current state of +the SSL object B<ssl>. + +=head1 NOTES + +During its use, an SSL objects passes several states. The state is internally +maintained. Querying the state information is not very informative before +or when a connection has been established. It however can be of significant +interest during the handshake. + +When using non-blocking sockets, the function call performing the handshake +may return with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE condition, +so that SSL_state_string[_long]() may be called. + +For both blocking or non-blocking sockets, the details state information +can be used within the info_callback function set with the +SSL_set_info_callback() call. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +Detailed description of possible states to be included later. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c0059c0d4a56 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_want, SSL_want_nothing, SSL_want_read, SSL_want_write, SSL_want_x509_lookup - obtain state information TLS/SSL I/O operation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_want(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_want_nothing(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_want_read(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_want_write(const SSL *ssl); + int SSL_want_x509_lookup(const SSL *ssl); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_want() returns state information for the SSL object B<ssl>. + +The other SSL_want_*() calls are shortcuts for the possible states returned +by SSL_want(). + +=head1 NOTES + +SSL_want() examines the internal state information of the SSL object. Its +return values are similar to that of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>. +Unlike L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, which also evaluates the +error queue, the results are obtained by examining an internal state flag +only. The information must therefore only be used for normal operation under +non-blocking I/O. Error conditions are not handled and must be treated +using L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>. + +The result returned by SSL_want() should always be consistent with +the result of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can currently occur for SSL_want(): + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_NOTHING + +There is no data to be written or to be read. + +=item SSL_WRITING + +There are data in the SSL buffer that must be written to the underlying +B<BIO> layer in order to complete the actual SSL_*() operation. +A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> should return +SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. + +=item SSL_READING + +More data must be read from the underlying B<BIO> layer in order to +complete the actual SSL_*() operation. +A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> should return +SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ. + +=item SSL_X509_LOOKUP + +The operation did not complete because an application callback set by +SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() has asked to be called again. +A call to L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> should return +SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP. + +=back + +SSL_want_nothing(), SSL_want_read(), SSL_want_write(), SSL_want_x509_lookup() +return 1, when the corresponding condition is true or 0 otherwise. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>, L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e013c12d5254 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_write - write bytes to a TLS/SSL connection. + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +SSL_write() writes B<num> bytes from the buffer B<buf> into the specified +B<ssl> connection. + +=head1 NOTES + +If necessary, SSL_write() will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if +not already explicitly performed by L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)> or +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>. If the +peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during +the SSL_write() operation. The behaviour of SSL_write() depends on the +underlying BIO. + +For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the B<ssl> must have been +initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)> or SSL_set_accept_state() +before the first call to an L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)> or SSL_write() function. + +If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_write() will only return, once the +write operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a +renegotiation take place, in which case a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ may occur. +This behaviour can be controlled with the SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY flag of the +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> call. + +If the underlying BIO is B<non-blocking>, SSL_write() will also return, +when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_write() +to continue the operation. In this case a call to +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> with the +return value of SSL_write() will yield B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a +call to SSL_write() can also cause read operations! The calling process +then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the +needs of SSL_write(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a +non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check +for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data +must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. + +SSL_write() will only return with success, when the complete contents +of B<buf> of length B<num> has been written. This default behaviour +can be changed with the SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE option of +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>. When this flag is set, +SSL_write() will also return with success, when a partial write has been +successfully completed. In this case the SSL_write() operation is considered +completed. The bytes are sent and a new SSL_write() operation with a new +buffer (with the already sent bytes removed) must be started. +A partial write is performed with the size of a message block, which is +16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1. + +=head1 WARNING + +When an SSL_write() operation has to be repeated because of +B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ> or B<SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE>, it must be repeated +with the same arguments. + +When calling SSL_write() with num=0 bytes to be sent the behaviour is +undefined. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +The following return values can occur: + +=over 4 + +=item E<gt>0 + +The write operation was successful, the return value is the number of +bytes actually written to the TLS/SSL connection. + +=item 0 + +The write operation was not successful. Probably the underlying connection +was closed. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> to find out, +whether an error occurred or the connection was shut down cleanly +(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN). + +SSLv2 (deprecated) does not support a shutdown alert protocol, so it can +only be detected, whether the underlying connection was closed. It cannot +be checked, why the closure happened. + +=item E<lt>0 + +The write operation was not successful, because either an error occurred +or action must be taken by the calling process. Call SSL_get_error() with the +return value B<ret> to find out the reason. + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, +L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)> +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>, +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<bio(3)|bio(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod b/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..81d276477f9f --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +d2i_SSL_SESSION, i2d_SSL_SESSION - convert SSL_SESSION object from/to ASN1 representation + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include <openssl/ssl.h> + + SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); + int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +d2i_SSL_SESSION() transforms the external ASN1 representation of an SSL/TLS +session, stored as binary data at location B<pp> with length B<length>, into +an SSL_SESSION object. + +i2d_SSL_SESSION() transforms the SSL_SESSION object B<in> into the ASN1 +representation and stores it into the memory location pointed to by B<pp>. +The length of the resulting ASN1 representation is returned. If B<pp> is +the NULL pointer, only the length is calculated and returned. + +=head1 NOTES + +The SSL_SESSION object is built from several malloc()ed parts, it can +therefore not be moved, copied or stored directly. In order to store +session data on disk or into a database, it must be transformed into +a binary ASN1 representation. + +When using d2i_SSL_SESSION(), the SSL_SESSION object is automatically +allocated. The reference count is 1, so that the session must be +explicitly removed using L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>, +unless the SSL_SESSION object is completely taken over, when being called +inside the get_session_cb() (see +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>). + +SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache +list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. +One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore +only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created +from this SSL_CTX object). + +When using i2d_SSL_SESSION(), the memory location pointed to by B<pp> must be +large enough to hold the binary representation of the session. There is no +known limit on the size of the created ASN1 representation, so the necessary +amount of space should be obtained by first calling i2d_SSL_SESSION() with +B<pp=NULL>, and obtain the size needed, then allocate the memory and +call i2d_SSL_SESSION() again. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +d2i_SSL_SESSION() returns a pointer to the newly allocated SSL_SESSION +object. In case of failure the NULL-pointer is returned and the error message +can be retrieved from the error stack. + +i2d_SSL_SESSION() returns the size of the ASN1 representation in bytes. +When the session is not valid, B<0> is returned and no operation is performed. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)> + +=cut diff --git a/doc/ssl/ssl.pod b/doc/ssl/ssl.pod new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..266697d22164 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssl/ssl.pod @@ -0,0 +1,736 @@ + +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL - OpenSSL SSL/TLS library + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +The OpenSSL B<ssl> library implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and +Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols. It provides a rich API which is +documented here. + +At first the library must be initialized; see +L<SSL_library_init(3)|SSL_library_init(3)>. + +Then an B<SSL_CTX> object is created as a framework to establish +TLS/SSL enabled connections (see L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>). +Various options regarding certificates, algorithms etc. can be set +in this object. + +When a network connection has been created, it can be assigned to an +B<SSL> object. After the B<SSL> object has been created using +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_set_fd(3)|SSL_set_fd(3)> or +L<SSL_set_bio(3)|SSL_set_bio(3)> can be used to associate the network +connection with the object. + +Then the TLS/SSL handshake is performed using +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)> or L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)> +respectively. +L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)> and L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)> are used +to read and write data on the TLS/SSL connection. +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)> can be used to shut down the +TLS/SSL connection. + +=head1 DATA STRUCTURES + +Currently the OpenSSL B<ssl> library functions deals with the following data +structures: + +=over 4 + +=item B<SSL_METHOD> (SSL Method) + +That's a dispatch structure describing the internal B<ssl> library +methods/functions which implement the various protocol versions (SSLv1, SSLv2 +and TLSv1). It's needed to create an B<SSL_CTX>. + +=item B<SSL_CIPHER> (SSL Cipher) + +This structure holds the algorithm information for a particular cipher which +are a core part of the SSL/TLS protocol. The available ciphers are configured +on a B<SSL_CTX> basis and the actually used ones are then part of the +B<SSL_SESSION>. + +=item B<SSL_CTX> (SSL Context) + +That's the global context structure which is created by a server or client +once per program life-time and which holds mainly default values for the +B<SSL> structures which are later created for the connections. + +=item B<SSL_SESSION> (SSL Session) + +This is a structure containing the current TLS/SSL session details for a +connection: B<SSL_CIPHER>s, client and server certificates, keys, etc. + +=item B<SSL> (SSL Connection) + +That's the main SSL/TLS structure which is created by a server or client per +established connection. This actually is the core structure in the SSL API. +Under run-time the application usually deals with this structure which has +links to mostly all other structures. + +=back + + +=head1 HEADER FILES + +Currently the OpenSSL B<ssl> library provides the following C header files +containing the prototypes for the data structures and and functions: + +=over 4 + +=item B<ssl.h> + +That's the common header file for the SSL/TLS API. Include it into your +program to make the API of the B<ssl> library available. It internally +includes both more private SSL headers and headers from the B<crypto> library. +Whenever you need hard-core details on the internals of the SSL API, look +inside this header file. + +=item B<ssl2.h> + +That's the sub header file dealing with the SSLv2 protocol only. +I<Usually you don't have to include it explicitly because +it's already included by ssl.h>. + +=item B<ssl3.h> + +That's the sub header file dealing with the SSLv3 protocol only. +I<Usually you don't have to include it explicitly because +it's already included by ssl.h>. + +=item B<ssl23.h> + +That's the sub header file dealing with the combined use of the SSLv2 and +SSLv3 protocols. +I<Usually you don't have to include it explicitly because +it's already included by ssl.h>. + +=item B<tls1.h> + +That's the sub header file dealing with the TLSv1 protocol only. +I<Usually you don't have to include it explicitly because +it's already included by ssl.h>. + +=back + +=head1 API FUNCTIONS + +Currently the OpenSSL B<ssl> library exports 214 API functions. +They are documented in the following: + +=head2 DEALING WITH PROTOCOL METHODS + +Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS +protocol methods defined in B<SSL_METHOD> structures. + +=over 4 + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_client_method>(void); + +Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_server_method>(void); + +Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_method>(void); + +Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_client_method>(void); + +Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_server_method>(void); + +Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_method>(void); + +Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_client_method>(void); + +Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_server_method>(void); + +Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server. + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_method>(void); + +Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server. + +=back + +=head2 DEALING WITH CIPHERS + +Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS +ciphers defined in B<SSL_CIPHER> structures. + +=over 4 + +=item char *B<SSL_CIPHER_description>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len); + +Write a string to I<buf> (with a maximum size of I<len>) containing a human +readable description of I<cipher>. Returns I<buf>. + +=item int B<SSL_CIPHER_get_bits>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits); + +Determine the number of bits in I<cipher>. Because of export crippled ciphers +there are two bits: The bits the algorithm supports in general (stored to +I<alg_bits>) and the bits which are actually used (the return value). + +=item const char *B<SSL_CIPHER_get_name>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +Return the internal name of I<cipher> as a string. These are the various +strings defined by the I<SSL2_TXT_xxx>, I<SSL3_TXT_xxx> and I<TLS1_TXT_xxx> +definitions in the header files. + +=item char *B<SSL_CIPHER_get_version>(SSL_CIPHER *cipher); + +Returns a string like "C<TLSv1/SSLv3>" or "C<SSLv2>" which indicates the +SSL/TLS protocol version to which I<cipher> belongs (i.e. where it was defined +in the specification the first time). + +=back + +=head2 DEALING WITH PROTOCOL CONTEXTS + +Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS +protocol context defined in the B<SSL_CTX> structure. + +=over 4 + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_add_client_CA>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_add_session>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_check_private_key>(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_ctrl>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions>(SSL_CTX *s, long t); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_free>(SSL_CTX *a); + +=item char *B<SSL_CTX_get_app_data>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item X509_STORE *B<SSL_CTX_get_cert_store>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item STACK *B<SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list>(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int (*B<SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); + +=item char *B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_data>(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) + +=item void (*B<SSL_CTX_get_info_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown>(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_get_timeout>(const SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int (*B<SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback>(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations>(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *CAfile, char *CApath); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item SSL_CTX *B<SSL_CTX_new>(SSL_METHOD *meth); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_remove_session>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_accept>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_connect>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item SSL_SESSION *(*B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); + +=item int (*B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); + +=item void (*B<SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_hits>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_misses>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_number>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size>(SSL_CTX *ctx,t); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item LHASH *B<SSL_CTX_sessions>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_app_data>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_cert_store>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *cs); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(), char *arg) + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list>(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *str); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list>(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK *list); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb);(void)) + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int m); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ex_data>(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, char *arg); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int cb, int ret)); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg>(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_options>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version>(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_METHOD *meth); + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_timeout>(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh>(SSL_CTX* ctx, DH *dh); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback>(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*cb)(void)); + +=item long B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa>(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); + +=item SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback + +C<long B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback>(SSL_CTX *B<ctx>, RSA *(*B<cb>)(SSL *B<ssl>, int B<export>, int B<keylength>));> + +Sets the callback which will be called when a temporary private key is +required. The B<C<export>> flag will be set if the reason for needing +a temp key is that an export ciphersuite is in use, in which case, +B<C<keylength>> will contain the required keylength in bits. Generate a key of +appropriate size (using ???) and return it. + +=item SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback + +long B<SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback>(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylength)); + +The same as B<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback>, except it operates on an SSL +session instead of a context. + +=item void B<SSL_CTX_set_verify>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb);(void)) + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey>(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1>(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int type); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey>(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1>(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int type); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_certificate>(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1>(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d); + +=item int B<SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file>(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file, int type); + +=back + +=head2 DEALING WITH SESSIONS + +Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS +sessions defined in the B<SSL_SESSION> structures. + +=over 4 + +=item int B<SSL_SESSION_cmp>(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b); + +=item void B<SSL_SESSION_free>(SSL_SESSION *ss); + +=item char *B<SSL_SESSION_get_app_data>(SSL_SESSION *s); + +=item char *B<SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data>(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx); + +=item int B<SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) + +=item long B<SSL_SESSION_get_time>(const SSL_SESSION *s); + +=item long B<SSL_SESSION_get_timeout>(const SSL_SESSION *s); + +=item unsigned long B<SSL_SESSION_hash>(const SSL_SESSION *a); + +=item SSL_SESSION *B<SSL_SESSION_new>(void); + +=item int B<SSL_SESSION_print>(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x); + +=item int B<SSL_SESSION_print_fp>(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x); + +=item void B<SSL_SESSION_set_app_data>(SSL_SESSION *s, char *a); + +=item int B<SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data>(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, char *arg); + +=item long B<SSL_SESSION_set_time>(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); + +=item long B<SSL_SESSION_set_timeout>(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); + +=back + +=head2 DEALING WITH CONNECTIONS + +Here we document the various API functions which deal with the SSL/TLS +connection defined in the B<SSL> structure. + +=over 4 + +=item int B<SSL_accept>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack>(STACK *stack, const char *dir); + +=item int B<SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack>(STACK *stack, const char *file); + +=item int B<SSL_add_client_CA>(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); + +=item char *B<SSL_alert_desc_string>(int value); + +=item char *B<SSL_alert_desc_string_long>(int value); + +=item char *B<SSL_alert_type_string>(int value); + +=item char *B<SSL_alert_type_string_long>(int value); + +=item int B<SSL_check_private_key>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item void B<SSL_clear>(SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_clear_num_renegotiations>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_connect>(SSL *ssl); + +=item void B<SSL_copy_session_id>(SSL *t, const SSL *f); + +=item long B<SSL_ctrl>(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, char *parg); + +=item int B<SSL_do_handshake>(SSL *ssl); + +=item SSL *B<SSL_dup>(SSL *ssl); + +=item STACK *B<SSL_dup_CA_list>(STACK *sk); + +=item void B<SSL_free>(SSL *ssl); + +=item SSL_CTX *B<SSL_get_SSL_CTX>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_app_data>(SSL *ssl); + +=item X509 *B<SSL_get_certificate>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item const char *B<SSL_get_cipher>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_get_cipher_bits>(const SSL *ssl, int *alg_bits); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_cipher_list>(const SSL *ssl, int n); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_cipher_name>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_cipher_version>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item STACK *B<SSL_get_ciphers>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item STACK *B<SSL_get_client_CA_list>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item SSL_CIPHER *B<SSL_get_current_cipher>(SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_get_default_timeout>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_get_error>(const SSL *ssl, int i); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_ex_data>(const SSL *ssl, int idx); + +=item int B<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx>(void); + +=item int B<SSL_get_ex_new_index>(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func);(void), int (*dup_func)(void), void (*free_func)(void)) + +=item int B<SSL_get_fd>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item void (*B<SSL_get_info_callback>(const SSL *ssl);)() + +=item STACK *B<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item X509 *B<SSL_get_peer_certificate>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item EVP_PKEY *B<SSL_get_privatekey>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_get_quiet_shutdown>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item BIO *B<SSL_get_rbio>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_get_read_ahead>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item SSL_SESSION *B<SSL_get_session>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_shared_ciphers>(const SSL *ssl, char *buf, int len); + +=item int B<SSL_get_shutdown>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item SSL_METHOD *B<SSL_get_ssl_method>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_get_state>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_get_time>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_get_timeout>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int (*B<SSL_get_verify_callback>(const SSL *ssl))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) + +=item int B<SSL_get_verify_mode>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_get_verify_result>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_get_version>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item BIO *B<SSL_get_wbio>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_in_accept_init>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_in_before>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_in_connect_init>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_in_init>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_is_init_finished>(SSL *ssl); + +=item STACK *B<SSL_load_client_CA_file>(char *file); + +=item void B<SSL_load_error_strings>(void); + +=item SSL *B<SSL_new>(SSL_CTX *ctx); + +=item long B<SSL_num_renegotiations>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_peek>(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); + +=item int B<SSL_pending>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_read>(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num); + +=item int B<SSL_renegotiate>(SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_rstate_string>(SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_rstate_string_long>(SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_session_reused>(SSL *ssl); + +=item void B<SSL_set_accept_state>(SSL *ssl); + +=item void B<SSL_set_app_data>(SSL *ssl, char *arg); + +=item void B<SSL_set_bio>(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio); + +=item int B<SSL_set_cipher_list>(SSL *ssl, char *str); + +=item void B<SSL_set_client_CA_list>(SSL *ssl, STACK *list); + +=item void B<SSL_set_connect_state>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_set_ex_data>(SSL *ssl, int idx, char *arg); + +=item int B<SSL_set_fd>(SSL *ssl, int fd); + +=item void B<SSL_set_info_callback>(SSL *ssl, void (*cb);(void)) + +=item void B<SSL_set_msg_callback>(SSL *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + +=item void B<SSL_set_msg_callback_arg>(SSL *ctx, void *arg); + +=item void B<SSL_set_options>(SSL *ssl, unsigned long op); + +=item void B<SSL_set_quiet_shutdown>(SSL *ssl, int mode); + +=item void B<SSL_set_read_ahead>(SSL *ssl, int yes); + +=item int B<SSL_set_rfd>(SSL *ssl, int fd); + +=item int B<SSL_set_session>(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session); + +=item void B<SSL_set_shutdown>(SSL *ssl, int mode); + +=item int B<SSL_set_ssl_method>(SSL *ssl, SSL_METHOD *meth); + +=item void B<SSL_set_time>(SSL *ssl, long t); + +=item void B<SSL_set_timeout>(SSL *ssl, long t); + +=item void B<SSL_set_verify>(SSL *ssl, int mode, int (*callback);(void)) + +=item void B<SSL_set_verify_result>(SSL *ssl, long arg); + +=item int B<SSL_set_wfd>(SSL *ssl, int fd); + +=item int B<SSL_shutdown>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_state>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_state_string>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item char *B<SSL_state_string_long>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item long B<SSL_total_renegotiations>(SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_use_PrivateKey>(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +=item int B<SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1>(int type, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); + +=item int B<SSL_use_PrivateKey_file>(SSL *ssl, char *file, int type); + +=item int B<SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey>(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); + +=item int B<SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1>(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); + +=item int B<SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file>(SSL *ssl, char *file, int type); + +=item int B<SSL_use_certificate>(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); + +=item int B<SSL_use_certificate_ASN1>(SSL *ssl, int len, unsigned char *d); + +=item int B<SSL_use_certificate_file>(SSL *ssl, char *file, int type); + +=item int B<SSL_version>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_want>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_want_nothing>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_want_read>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_want_write>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_want_x509_lookup>(const SSL *ssl); + +=item int B<SSL_write>(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num); + +=back + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>, L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>, +L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>, +L<SSL_connect(3)|SSL_connect(3)>, +L<SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)|SSL_CIPHER_get_name(3)>, +L<SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(3)|SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)|SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_add_session(3)|SSL_CTX_add_session(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_ctrl(3)|SSL_CTX_ctrl(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(3)|SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)> +L<SSL_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CTX_new(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_sessions(3)|SSL_CTX_sessions(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(3)|SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(3)|SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)|SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)|SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)|SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)|SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)|SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)>, +L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>, +L<SSL_alert_type_string(3)|SSL_alert_type_string(3)>, +L<SSL_do_handshake(3)|SSL_do_handshake(3)>, +L<SSL_get_SSL_CTX(3)|SSL_get_SSL_CTX(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)|SSL_get_ciphers(3)>, +L<SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)|SSL_get_client_CA_list(3)>, +L<SSL_get_default_timeout(3)|SSL_get_default_timeout(3)>, +L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)|SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)>, +L<SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)|SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<SSL_get_fd(3)|SSL_get_fd(3)>, +L<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)|SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)>, +L<SSL_get_rbio(3)|SSL_get_rbio(3)>, +L<SSL_get_session(3)|SSL_get_session(3)>, +L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)|SSL_get_verify_result(3)>, +L<SSL_get_version(3)|SSL_get_version(3)>, +L<SSL_library_init(3)|SSL_library_init(3)>, +L<SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)|SSL_load_client_CA_file(3)>, +L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, +L<SSL_pending(3)|SSL_pending(3)>, +L<SSL_read(3)|SSL_read(3)>, +L<SSL_rstate_string(3)|SSL_rstate_string(3)>, +L<SSL_session_reused(3)|SSL_session_reused(3)>, +L<SSL_set_bio(3)|SSL_set_bio(3)>, +L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>, +L<SSL_set_fd(3)|SSL_set_fd(3)>, +L<SSL_set_session(3)|SSL_set_session(3)>, +L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)|SSL_set_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_shutdown(3)|SSL_shutdown(3)>, +L<SSL_state_string(3)|SSL_state_string(3)>, +L<SSL_want(3)|SSL_want(3)>, +L<SSL_write(3)|SSL_write(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_free(3)|SSL_SESSION_free(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(3)|SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(3)>, +L<SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)|SSL_SESSION_get_time(3)>, +L<d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)|d2i_SSL_SESSION(3)> + +=head1 HISTORY + +The L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)> document appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.2 + +=cut + diff --git a/doc/ssleay.txt b/doc/ssleay.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c75312911f96 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/ssleay.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7030 @@ + +Bundle of old SSLeay documentation files [OBSOLETE!] + +*** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! *** + +OBSOLETE means that nothing in this document should be trusted. This +document is provided mostly for historical purposes (it wasn't even up +to date at the time SSLeay 0.8.1 was released) and as inspiration. If +you copy some snippet of code from this document, please _check_ that +it really is correct from all points of view. For example, you can +check with the other documents in this directory tree, or by comparing +with relevant parts of the include files. + +People have done the mistake of trusting what's written here. Please +don't do that. + +*** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! *** + + +==== readme ======================================================== + +This is the old 0.6.6 docuementation. Most of the cipher stuff is still +relevent but I'm working (very slowly) on new docuemtation. +The current version can be found online at + +http://www.cryptsoft.com/ssleay/doc + +==== API.doc ======================================================== + +SSL - SSLv2/v3/v23 etc. + +BIO - methods and how they plug together + +MEM - memory allocation callback + +CRYPTO - locking for threads + +EVP - Ciphers/Digests/signatures + +RSA - methods + +X509 - certificate retrieval + +X509 - validation + +X509 - X509v3 extensions + +Objects - adding object identifiers + +ASN.1 - parsing + +PEM - parsing + +==== ssl/readme ===================================================== + +22 Jun 1996 +This file belongs in ../apps, but I'll leave it here because it deals +with SSL :-) It is rather dated but it gives you an idea of how +things work. +=== + +17 Jul 1995 +I have been changing things quite a bit and have not fully updated +this file, so take what you read with a grain of salt +eric +=== +The s_client and s_server programs can be used to test SSL capable +IP/port addresses and the verification of the X509 certificates in use +by these services. I strongly advise having a look at the code to get +an idea of how to use the authentication under SSLeay. Any feedback +on changes and improvements would be greatly accepted. + +This file will probably be gibberish unless you have read +rfc1421, rfc1422, rfc1423 and rfc1424 which describe PEM +authentication. + +A Brief outline (and examples) how to use them to do so. + +NOTE: +The environment variable SSL_CIPER is used to specify the prefered +cipher to use, play around with setting it's value to combinations of +RC4-MD5, EXP-RC4-MD5, CBC-DES-MD5, CBC3-DES-MD5, CFB-DES-NULL +in a : separated list. + +This directory contains 3 X509 certificates which can be used by these programs. +client.pem: a file containing a certificate and private key to be used + by s_client. +server.pem :a file containing a certificate and private key to be used + by s_server. +eay1024.pem:the certificate used to sign client.pem and server.pem. + This would be your CA's certificate. There is also a link + from the file a8556381.0 to eay1024.PEM. The value a8556381 + is returned by 'x509 -hash -noout <eay1024.pem' and is the + value used by X509 verification routines to 'find' this + certificte when search a directory for it. + [the above is not true any more, the CA cert is + ../certs/testca.pem which is signed by ../certs/mincomca.pem] + +When testing the s_server, you may get +bind: Address already in use +errors. These indicate the port is still being held by the unix +kernel and you are going to have to wait for it to let go of it. If +this is the case, remember to use the port commands on the s_server and +s_client to talk on an alternative port. + +===== +s_client. +This program can be used to connect to any IP/hostname:port that is +talking SSL. Once connected, it will attempt to authenticate the +certificate it was passed and if everything works as expected, a 2 +directional channel will be open. Any text typed will be sent to the +other end. type Q<cr> to exit. Flags are as follows. +-host arg : Arg is the host or IP address to connect to. +-port arg : Arg is the port to connect to (https is 443). +-verify arg : Turn on authentication of the server certificate. + : Arg specifies the 'depth', this will covered below. +-cert arg : The optional certificate to use. This certificate + : will be returned to the server if the server + : requests it for client authentication. +-key arg : The private key that matches the certificate + : specified by the -cert option. If this is not + : specified (but -cert is), the -cert file will be + : searched for the Private key. Both files are + : assumed to be in PEM format. +-CApath arg : When to look for certificates when 'verifying' the + : certificate from the server. +-CAfile arg : A file containing certificates to be used for + : 'verifying' the server certificate. +-reconnect : Once a connection has been made, drop it and + : reconnect with same session-id. This is for testing :-). + +The '-verify n' parameter specifies not only to verify the servers +certificate but to also only take notice of 'n' levels. The best way +to explain is to show via examples. +Given +s_server -cert server.PEM is running. + +s_client + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +What has happened is that the 'SSLeay demo server' certificate's +issuer ('CA') could not be found but because verify is not on, we +don't care and the connection has been made anyway. It is now 'up' +using CBC-DES-MD5 mode. This is an unauthenticate secure channel. +You may not be talking to the right person but the data going to them +is encrypted. + +s_client -verify 0 + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +We are 'verifying' but only to depth 0, so since the 'SSLeay demo server' +certificate passed the date and checksum, we are happy to proceed. + +s_client -verify 1 + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate + verify return:0 + ERROR + verify error:unable to get issuer certificate +In this case we failed to make the connection because we could not +authenticate the certificate because we could not find the +'CA' certificate. + +s_client -verify 1 -CAfile eay1024.PEM + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +We loaded the certificates from the file eay1024.PEM. Everything +checked out and so we made the connection. + +s_client -verify 1 -CApath . + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +We looked in out local directory for issuer certificates and 'found' +a8556381.0 and so everything is ok. + +It is worth noting that 'CA' is a self certified certificate. If you +are passed one of these, it will fail to 'verify' at depth 0 because +we need to lookup the certifier of a certificate from some information +that we trust and keep locally. + +SSL_CIPHER=CBC3-DES-MD5:RC4-MD5 +export SSL_CIPHER +s_client -verify 10 -CApath . -reconnect + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + drop the connection and reconnect with the same session id + CIPHER is CBC3-DES-MD5 +This has done a full connection and then re-estabished it with the +same session id but a new socket. No RSA stuff occures on the second +connection. Note that we said we would prefer to use CBC3-DES-MD5 +encryption and so, since the server supports it, we are. + +===== +s_server +This program accepts SSL connections on a specified port +Once connected, it will estabish an SSL connection and optionaly +attempt to authenticate the client. A 2 directional channel will be +open. Any text typed will be sent to the other end. Type Q<cr> to exit. +Flags are as follows. +-port arg : Arg is the port to listen on. +-verify arg : Turn on authentication of the client if they have a + : certificate. Arg specifies the 'depth'. +-Verify arg : Turn on authentication of the client. If they don't + : have a valid certificate, drop the connection. +-cert arg : The certificate to use. This certificate + : will be passed to the client. If it is not + : specified, it will default to server.PEM +-key arg : The private key that matches the certificate + : specified by the -cert option. If this is not + : specified (but -cert is), the -cert file will be + : searched for the Private key. Both files are + : assumed to be in PEM format. Default is server.PEM +-CApath arg : When to look for certificates when 'verifying' the + : certificate from the client. +-CAfile arg : A file containing certificates to be used for + : 'verifying' the client certificate. + +For the following 'demo' I will specify the s_server command and +the s_client command and then list the output from the s_server. +s_server +s_client + CONNECTED + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +Everything up and running + +s_server -verify 0 +s_client + CONNECTED + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +Ok since no certificate was returned and we don't care. + +s_server -verify 0 +./s_client -cert client.PEM + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client + issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +Ok since we were only verifying to level 0 + +s_server -verify 4 +s_client -cert client.PEM + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client + issuer= /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify error:num=1:unable to get issuer certificate + verify return:0 + ERROR + verify error:unable to get issuer certificate +Bad because we could not authenticate the returned certificate. + +s_server -verify 4 -CApath . +s_client -cert client.PEM + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +Ok because we could authenticate the returned certificate :-). + +s_server -Verify 0 -CApath . +s_client + CONNECTED + ERROR + SSL error:function is:REQUEST_CERTIFICATE + :error is :client end did not return a certificate +Error because no certificate returned. + +s_server -Verify 4 -CApath . +s_client -cert client.PEM + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +Full authentication of the client. + +So in summary to do full authentication of both ends +s_server -Verify 9 -CApath . +s_client -cert client.PEM -CApath . -verify 9 +From the server side + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo client + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 +From the client side + CONNECTED + depth=0 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=SSLeay demo server + verify return:1 + depth=1 /C=AU/SOP=QLD/O=Mincom Pty. Ltd./OU=CS/CN=CA + verify return:1 + CIPHER is CBC-DES-MD5 + +For general probing of the 'internet https' servers for the +distribution area, run +s_client -host www.netscape.com -port 443 -verify 4 -CApath ../rsa/hash +Then enter +GET / +and you should be talking to the https server on that host. + +www.rsa.com was refusing to respond to connections on 443 when I was +testing. + +have fun :-). + +eric + +==== a_verify.doc ======================================================== + +From eay@mincom.com Fri Oct 4 18:29:06 1996 +Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA29080 + (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Fri, 4 Oct 1996 08:29:07 +1000 +Date: Fri, 4 Oct 1996 08:29:06 +1000 (EST) +From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au> +X-Sender: eay@orb +To: wplatzer <wplatzer@iaik.tu-graz.ac.at> +Cc: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>, SSL Mailing List <ssl-users@mincom.com> +Subject: Re: Netscape's Public Key +In-Reply-To: <19961003134837.NTM0049@iaik.tu-graz.ac.at> +Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.961004081346.8018K-100000@orb> +Mime-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII +Status: RO +X-Status: + +On Thu, 3 Oct 1996, wplatzer wrote: +> I get Public Key from Netscape (Gold 3.0b4), but cannot do anything +> with it... It looks like (asn1parse): +> +> 0:d=0 hl=3 l=180 cons: SEQUENCE +> 3:d=1 hl=2 l= 96 cons: SEQUENCE +> 5:d=2 hl=2 l= 92 cons: SEQUENCE +> 7:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE +> 9:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsaEncryption +> 20:d=4 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL +> 22:d=3 hl=2 l= 75 prim: BIT STRING +> 99:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: IA5STRING : +> 101:d=1 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE +> 103:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :md5withRSAEncryption +> 114:d=2 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL +> 116:d=1 hl=2 l= 65 prim: BIT STRING +> +> The first BIT STRING is the public key and the second BIT STRING is +> the signature. +> But a public key consists of the public exponent and the modulus. Are +> both numbers in the first BIT STRING? +> Is there a document simply describing this coding stuff (checking +> signature, get the public key, etc.)? + +Minimal in SSLeay. If you want to see what the modulus and exponent are, +try asn1parse -offset 25 -length 75 <key.pem +asn1parse will currently stuff up on the 'length 75' part (fixed in next +release) but it will print the stuff. If you are after more +documentation on ASN.1, have a look at www.rsa.com and get their PKCS +documents, most of my initial work on SSLeay was done using them. + +As for SSLeay, +util/crypto.num and util/ssl.num are lists of all exported functions in +the library (but not macros :-(. + +The ones for extracting public keys from certificates and certificate +requests are EVP_PKEY * X509_REQ_extract_key(X509_REQ *req); +EVP_PKEY * X509_extract_key(X509 *x509); + +To verify a signature on a signed ASN.1 object +int X509_verify(X509 *a,EVP_PKEY *key); +int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a,EVP_PKEY *key); +int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a,EVP_PKEY *key); +int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a,EVP_PKEY *key); + +I should mention that EVP_PKEY can be used to hold a public or a private key, +since for things like RSA and DSS, a public key is just a subset of what +is stored for the private key. + +To sign any of the above structures + +int X509_sign(X509 *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md); +int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md); +int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md); +int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a,EVP_PKEY *key,EVP_MD *md); + +where md is the message digest to sign with. + +There are all defined in x509.h and all the _sign and _verify functions are +actually macros to the ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify() functions. +These functions will put the correct algorithm identifiers in the correct +places in the structures. + +eric +-- +Eric Young | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates. +AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au | RTFM Win32 GetMessage(). + +==== x509 ======================================================= + +X509_verify() +X509_sign() + +X509_get_version() +X509_get_serialNumber() +X509_get_issuer() +X509_get_subject() +X509_get_notBefore() +X509_get_notAfter() +X509_get_pubkey() + +X509_set_version() +X509_set_serialNumber() +X509_set_issuer() +X509_set_subject() +X509_set_notBefore() +X509_set_notAfter() +X509_set_pubkey() + +X509_get_extensions() +X509_set_extensions() + +X509_EXTENSIONS_clear() +X509_EXTENSIONS_retrieve() +X509_EXTENSIONS_add() +X509_EXTENSIONS_delete() + +==== x509 attribute ================================================ + +PKCS7 + STACK of X509_ATTRIBUTES + ASN1_OBJECT + STACK of ASN1_TYPE + +So it is + +p7.xa[].obj +p7.xa[].data[] + +get_obj_by_nid(STACK , nid) +get_num_by_nid(STACK , nid) +get_data_by_nid(STACK , nid, index) + +X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_new(void ); +void X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(X509_ATTRIBUTE *a); + +X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **ex, + int nid, STACK *value); + +X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **ex, + int nid, STACK *value); + +int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex,ASN1_OBJECT *obj); +int X509_ATTRIBUTE_add_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex, int index, + ASN1_TYPE *value); + +ASN1_OBJECT * X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ex); +int X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_num(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ne); +ASN1_TYPE * X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ne,int index); + +ASN1_TYPE * X509_ATTRIBUTE_get_data_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE *ne, + ASN1_OBJECT *obj); + +X509_ATTRIBUTE *PKCS7_get_s_att_by_NID(PKCS7 *p7,int nid); +X509_ATTRIBUTE *PKCS7_get_u_att_by_NID(PKCS7 *p7,int nid); + +==== x509 v3 ======================================================== + +The 'new' system. + +The X509_EXTENSION_METHOD includes extensions and attributes and/or names. +Basically everthing that can be added to an X509 with an OID identifying it. + +It operates via 2 methods per object id. +int a2i_XXX(X509 *x,char *str,int len); +int i2a_XXX(BIO *bp,X509 *x); + +The a2i_XXX function will add the object with a value converted from the +string into the X509. Len can be -1 in which case the length is calculated +via strlen(str). Applications can always use direct knowledge to load and +unload the relevent objects themselves. + +i2a_XXX will print to the passed BIO, a text representation of the +relevet object. Use a memory BIO if you want it printed to a buffer :-). + +X509_add_by_NID(X509 *x,int nid,char *str,int len); +X509_add_by_OBJ(X509 *x,ASN1_OBJECT *obj,char *str,int len); + +X509_print_by_name(BIO *bp,X509 *x); +X509_print_by_NID(BIO *bp,X509 *x); +X509_print_by_OBJ(BIO *bp,X509 *x); + +==== verify ======================================================== + +X509_verify_cert_chain( + CERT_STORE *cert_store, + STACK /* X509 */ *certs, + int *verify_result, + int (*verify_error_callback)() + char *argument_to_callback, /* SSL */ + +app_verify_callback( + char *app_verify_arg, /* from SSL_CTX */ + STACK /* X509 */ *certs, + int *verify_result, + int (*verify_error_callback)() + SSL *s, + +int X509_verify_cert( + CERT_STORE *cert_store, + X509 *x509, + int *verify_result, + int (*verify_error_callback)(), + char *arg, + +==== apps.doc ======================================================== + +The applications + +Ok, where to begin.... +In the begining, when SSLeay was small (April 1995), there +were but few applications, they did happily cohabit in +the one bin directory. Then over time, they did multiply and grow, +and they started to look like microsoft software; 500k to print 'hello world'. +A new approach was needed. They were coalessed into one 'Monolithic' +application, ssleay. This one program is composed of many programs that +can all be compiled independantly. + +ssleay has 3 modes of operation. +1) If the ssleay binaray has the name of one of its component programs, it +executes that program and then exits. This can be achieve by using hard or +symbolic links, or failing that, just renaming the binary. +2) If the first argument to ssleay is the name of one of the component +programs, that program runs that program and then exits. +3) If there are no arguments, ssleay enters a 'command' mode. Each line is +interpreted as a program name plus arguments. After each 'program' is run, +ssleay returns to the comand line. + +dgst - message digests +enc - encryption and base64 encoding + +ans1parse - 'pulls' appart ASN.1 encoded objects like certificates. + +dh - Diffle-Hellman parameter manipulation. +rsa - RSA manipulations. +crl - Certificate revokion list manipulations +x509 - X509 cert fiddles, including signing. +pkcs7 - pkcs7 manipulation, only DER versions right now. + +genrsa - generate an RSA private key. +gendh - Generate a set of Diffle-Hellman parameters. +req - Generate a PKCS#10 object, a certificate request. + +s_client - SSL client program +s_server - SSL server program +s_time - A SSL protocol timing program +s_mult - Another SSL server, but it multiplexes + connections. +s_filter - under development + +errstr - Convert SSLeay error numbers to strings. +ca - Sign certificate requests, and generate + certificate revokion lists +crl2pkcs7 - put a crl and certifcates into a pkcs7 object. +speed - Benchmark the ciphers. +verify - Check certificates +hashdir - under development + +[ there a now a few more options, play with the program to see what they + are ] + +==== asn1.doc ======================================================== + +The ASN.1 Routines. + +ASN.1 is a specification for how to encode structured 'data' in binary form. +The approach I have take to the manipulation of structures and their encoding +into ASN.1 is as follows. + +For each distinct structure there are 4 function of the following form +TYPE *TYPE_new(void); +void TYPE_free(TYPE *); +TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a,unsigned char **pp,long length); +long i2d_TYPE(TYPE *a,unsigned char **pp); /* CHECK RETURN VALUE */ + +where TYPE is the type of the 'object'. The TYPE that have these functions +can be in one of 2 forms, either the internal C malloc()ed data structure +or in the DER (a variant of ASN.1 encoding) binary encoding which is just +an array of unsigned bytes. The 'i2d' functions converts from the internal +form to the DER form and the 'd2i' functions convert from the DER form to +the internal form. + +The 'new' function returns a malloc()ed version of the structure with all +substructures either created or left as NULL pointers. For 'optional' +fields, they are normally left as NULL to indicate no value. For variable +size sub structures (often 'SET OF' or 'SEQUENCE OF' in ASN.1 syntax) the +STACK data type is used to hold the values. Have a read of stack.doc +and have a look at the relevant header files to see what I mean. If there +is an error while malloc()ing the structure, NULL is returned. + +The 'free' function will free() all the sub components of a particular +structure. If any of those sub components have been 'removed', replace +them with NULL pointers, the 'free' functions are tolerant of NULL fields. + +The 'd2i' function copies a binary representation into a C structure. It +operates as follows. 'a' is a pointer to a pointer to +the structure to populate, 'pp' is a pointer to a pointer to where the DER +byte string is located and 'length' is the length of the '*pp' data. +If there are no errors, a pointer to the populated structure is returned. +If there is an error, NULL is returned. Errors can occur because of +malloc() failures but normally they will be due to syntax errors in the DER +encoded data being parsed. It is also an error if there was an +attempt to read more that 'length' bytes from '*p'. If +everything works correctly, the value in '*p' is updated +to point at the location just beyond where the DER +structure was read from. In this way, chained calls to 'd2i' type +functions can be made, with the pointer into the 'data' array being +'walked' along the input byte array. +Depending on the value passed for 'a', different things will be done. If +'a' is NULL, a new structure will be malloc()ed and returned. If '*a' is +NULL, a new structure will be malloc()ed and put into '*a' and returned. +If '*a' is not NULL, the structure in '*a' will be populated, or in the +case of an error, free()ed and then returned. +Having these semantics means that a structure +can call a 'd2i' function to populate a field and if the field is currently +NULL, the structure will be created. + +The 'i2d' function type is used to copy a C structure to a byte array. +The parameter 'a' is the structure to convert and '*p' is where to put it. +As for the 'd2i' type structure, 'p' is updated to point after the last +byte written. If p is NULL, no data is written. The function also returns +the number of bytes written. Where this becomes useful is that if the +function is called with a NULL 'p' value, the length is returned. This can +then be used to malloc() an array of bytes and then the same function can +be recalled passing the malloced array to be written to. e.g. + +int len; +unsigned char *bytes,*p; +len=i2d_X509(x,NULL); /* get the size of the ASN1 encoding of 'x' */ +if ((bytes=(unsigned char *)malloc(len)) == NULL) + goto err; +p=bytes; +i2d_X509(x,&p); + +Please note that a new variable, 'p' was passed to i2d_X509. After the +call to i2d_X509 p has been incremented by len bytes. + +Now the reason for this functional organisation is that it allows nested +structures to be built up by calling these functions as required. There +are various macros used to help write the general 'i2d', 'd2i', 'new' and +'free' functions. They are discussed in another file and would only be +used by some-one wanting to add new structures to the library. As you +might be able to guess, the process of writing ASN.1 files can be a bit CPU +expensive for complex structures. I'm willing to live with this since the +simpler library code make my life easier and hopefully most programs using +these routines will have their execution profiles dominated by cipher or +message digest routines. +What follows is a list of 'TYPE' values and the corresponding ASN.1 +structure and where it is used. + +TYPE ASN.1 +ASN1_INTEGER INTEGER +ASN1_BIT_STRING BIT STRING +ASN1_OCTET_STRING OCTET STRING +ASN1_OBJECT OBJECT IDENTIFIER +ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING PrintableString +ASN1_T61STRING T61String +ASN1_IA5STRING IA5String +ASN1_UTCTIME UTCTime +ASN1_TYPE Any of the above mentioned types plus SEQUENCE and SET + +Most of the above mentioned types are actualled stored in the +ASN1_BIT_STRING type and macros are used to differentiate between them. +The 3 types used are + +typedef struct asn1_object_st + { + /* both null if a dynamic ASN1_OBJECT, one is + * defined if a 'static' ASN1_OBJECT */ + char *sn,*ln; + int nid; + int length; + unsigned char *data; + } ASN1_OBJECT; +This is used to store ASN1 OBJECTS. Read 'objects.doc' for details ono +routines to manipulate this structure. 'sn' and 'ln' are used to hold text +strings that represent the object (short name and long or lower case name). +These are used by the 'OBJ' library. 'nid' is a number used by the OBJ +library to uniquely identify objects. The ASN1 routines will populate the +'length' and 'data' fields which will contain the bit string representing +the object. + +typedef struct asn1_bit_string_st + { + int length; + int type; + unsigned char *data; + } ASN1_BIT_STRING; +This structure is used to hold all the other base ASN1 types except for +ASN1_UTCTIME (which is really just a 'char *'). Length is the number of +bytes held in data and type is the ASN1 type of the object (there is a list +in asn1.h). + +typedef struct asn1_type_st + { + int type; + union { + char *ptr; + ASN1_INTEGER * integer; + ASN1_BIT_STRING * bit_string; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING * octet_string; + ASN1_OBJECT * object; + ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING * printablestring; + ASN1_T61STRING * t61string; + ASN1_IA5STRING * ia5string; + ASN1_UTCTIME * utctime; + ASN1_BIT_STRING * set; + ASN1_BIT_STRING * sequence; + } value; + } ASN1_TYPE; +This structure is used in a few places when 'any' type of object can be +expected. + +X509 Certificate +X509_CINF CertificateInfo +X509_ALGOR AlgorithmIdentifier +X509_NAME Name +X509_NAME_ENTRY A single sub component of the name. +X509_VAL Validity +X509_PUBKEY SubjectPublicKeyInfo +The above mentioned types are declared in x509.h. They are all quite +straight forward except for the X509_NAME/X509_NAME_ENTRY pair. +A X509_NAME is a STACK (see stack.doc) of X509_NAME_ENTRY's. +typedef struct X509_name_entry_st + { + ASN1_OBJECT *object; + ASN1_BIT_STRING *value; + int set; + int size; /* temp variable */ + } X509_NAME_ENTRY; +The size is a temporary variable used by i2d_NAME and set is the set number +for the particular NAME_ENTRY. A X509_NAME is encoded as a sequence of +sequence of sets. Normally each set contains only a single item. +Sometimes it contains more. Normally throughout this library there will be +only one item per set. The set field contains the 'set' that this entry is +a member of. So if you have just created a X509_NAME structure and +populated it with X509_NAME_ENTRYs, you should then traverse the X509_NAME +(which is just a STACK) and set the 'set/' field to incrementing numbers. +For more details on why this is done, read the ASN.1 spec for Distinguished +Names. + +X509_REQ CertificateRequest +X509_REQ_INFO CertificateRequestInfo +These are used to hold certificate requests. + +X509_CRL CertificateRevocationList +These are used to hold a certificate revocation list + +RSAPrivateKey PrivateKeyInfo +RSAPublicKey PublicKeyInfo +Both these 'function groups' operate on 'RSA' structures (see rsa.doc). +The difference is that the RSAPublicKey operations only manipulate the m +and e fields in the RSA structure. + +DSAPrivateKey DSS private key +DSAPublicKey DSS public key +Both these 'function groups' operate on 'DSS' structures (see dsa.doc). +The difference is that the RSAPublicKey operations only manipulate the +XXX fields in the DSA structure. + +DHparams DHParameter +This is used to hold the p and g value for The Diffie-Hellman operation. +The function deal with the 'DH' strucure (see dh.doc). + +Now all of these function types can be used with several other functions to give +quite useful set of general manipulation routines. Normally one would +not uses these functions directly but use them via macros. + +char *ASN1_dup(int (*i2d)(),char *(*d2i)(),char *x); +'x' is the input structure case to a 'char *', 'i2d' is the 'i2d_TYPE' +function for the type that 'x' is and d2i is the 'd2i_TYPE' function for the +type that 'x' is. As is obvious from the parameters, this function +duplicates the strucutre by transforming it into the DER form and then +re-loading it into a new strucutre and returning the new strucutre. This +is obviously a bit cpu intensive but when faced with a complex dynamic +structure this is the simplest programming approach. There are macros for +duplicating the major data types but is simple to add extras. + +char *ASN1_d2i_fp(char *(*new)(),char *(*d2i)(),FILE *fp,unsigned char **x); +'x' is a pointer to a pointer of the 'desired type'. new and d2i are the +corresponding 'TYPE_new' and 'd2i_TYPE' functions for the type and 'fp' is +an open file pointer to read from. This function reads from 'fp' as much +data as it can and then uses 'd2i' to parse the bytes to load and return +the parsed strucutre in 'x' (if it was non-NULL) and to actually return the +strucutre. The behavior of 'x' is as per all the other d2i functions. + +char *ASN1_d2i_bio(char *(*new)(),char *(*d2i)(),BIO *fp,unsigned char **x); +The 'BIO' is the new IO type being used in SSLeay (see bio.doc). This +function is the same as ASN1_d2i_fp() except for the BIO argument. +ASN1_d2i_fp() actually calls this function. + +int ASN1_i2d_fp(int (*i2d)(),FILE *out,unsigned char *x); +'x' is converted to bytes by 'i2d' and then written to 'out'. ASN1_i2d_fp +and ASN1_d2i_fp are not really symetric since ASN1_i2d_fp will read all +available data from the file pointer before parsing a single item while +ASN1_i2d_fp can be used to write a sequence of data objects. To read a +series of objects from a file I would sugest loading the file into a buffer +and calling the relevent 'd2i' functions. + +char *ASN1_d2i_bio(char *(*new)(),char *(*d2i)(),BIO *fp,unsigned char **x); +This function is the same as ASN1_i2d_fp() except for the BIO argument. +ASN1_i2d_fp() actually calls this function. + +char * PEM_ASN1_read(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char **x,int (*cb)()); +This function will read the next PEM encoded (base64) object of the same +type as 'x' (loaded by the d2i function). 'name' is the name that is in +the '-----BEGIN name-----' that designates the start of that object type. +If the data is encrypted, 'cb' will be called to prompt for a password. If +it is NULL a default function will be used to prompt from the password. +'x' is delt with as per the standard 'd2i' function interface. This +function can be used to read a series of objects from a file. While any +data type can be encrypted (see PEM_ASN1_write) only RSA private keys tend +to be encrypted. + +char * PEM_ASN1_read_bio(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,BIO *fp, + char **x,int (*cb)()); +Same as PEM_ASN1_read() except using a BIO. This is called by +PEM_ASN1_read(). + +int PEM_ASN1_write(int (*i2d)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char *x,EVP_CIPHER *enc, + unsigned char *kstr,int klen,int (*callback)()); + +int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(),char *name,BIO *fp, + char *x,EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen, + int (*callback)()); + +int ASN1_sign(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, + ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, RSA *rsa, EVP_MD *type); +int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *algor1, + ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,char *data, RSA *rsa); + +int ASN1_BIT_STRING_cmp(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *b); +ASN1_BIT_STRING *ASN1_BIT_STRING_type_new(int type ); + +int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *a); +void ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_UTCTIME *a); +ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_dup(ASN1_UTCTIME *a); + +ASN1_BIT_STRING *d2i_asn1_print_type(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,unsigned char **pp, + long length,int type); + +int i2d_ASN1_SET(STACK *a, unsigned char **pp, + int (*func)(), int ex_tag, int ex_class); +STACK * d2i_ASN1_SET(STACK **a, unsigned char **pp, long length, + char *(*func)(), int ex_tag, int ex_class); + +int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp,ASN1_OBJECT *object); +int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *a); +int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp,ASN1_INTEGER *bs,char *buf,int size); + +int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v); +long ASN1_INTEGER_get(ASN1_INTEGER *a); +ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai); +BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ASN1_INTEGER *ai,BIGNUM *bn); + +/* given a string, return the correct type. Max is the maximum number + * of bytes to parse. It stops parsing when 'max' bytes have been + * processed or a '\0' is hit */ +int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(unsigned char *s,int max); + +void ASN1_parse(BIO *fp,unsigned char *pp,long len); + +int i2d_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp, int tag, int class); +ASN1_BIT_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **a, unsigned char **pp, + long length, int Ptag, int Pclass); + +/* PARSING */ +int asn1_Finish(ASN1_CTX *c); + +/* SPECIALS */ +int ASN1_get_object(unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, + int *pclass, long omax); +int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p,long len); +void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, + int tag, int class); +int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag); + +X509 * X509_get_cert(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509_NAME * name,X509 *tmp_x509); +int X509_add_cert(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509 *); + +char * X509_cert_verify_error_string(int n); +int X509_add_cert_file(CERTIFICATE_CTX *c,char *file, int type); +char * X509_gmtime (char *s, long adj); +int X509_add_cert_dir (CERTIFICATE_CTX *c,char *dir, int type); +int X509_load_verify_locations (CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx, + char *file_env, char *dir_env); +int X509_set_default_verify_paths(CERTIFICATE_CTX *cts); +X509 * X509_new_D2i_X509(int len, unsigned char *p); +char * X509_get_default_cert_area(void ); +char * X509_get_default_cert_dir(void ); +char * X509_get_default_cert_file(void ); +char * X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void ); +char * X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void ); +char * X509_get_default_private_dir(void ); +X509_REQ *X509_X509_TO_req(X509 *x, RSA *rsa); +int X509_cert_verify(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509 *xs, int (*cb)()); + +CERTIFICATE_CTX *CERTIFICATE_CTX_new(); +void CERTIFICATE_CTX_free(CERTIFICATE_CTX *c); + +void X509_NAME_print(BIO *fp, X509_NAME *name, int obase); +int X509_print_fp(FILE *fp,X509 *x); +int X509_print(BIO *fp,X509 *x); + +X509_INFO * X509_INFO_new(void); +void X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *a); + +char * X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a); + +#define X509_verify(x,rsa) +#define X509_REQ_verify(x,rsa) +#define X509_CRL_verify(x,rsa) + +#define X509_sign(x,rsa,md) +#define X509_REQ_sign(x,rsa,md) +#define X509_CRL_sign(x,rsa,md) + +#define X509_dup(x509) +#define d2i_X509_fp(fp,x509) +#define i2d_X509_fp(fp,x509) +#define d2i_X509_bio(bp,x509) +#define i2d_X509_bio(bp,x509) + +#define X509_CRL_dup(crl) +#define d2i_X509_CRL_fp(fp,crl) +#define i2d_X509_CRL_fp(fp,crl) +#define d2i_X509_CRL_bio(bp,crl) +#define i2d_X509_CRL_bio(bp,crl) + +#define X509_REQ_dup(req) +#define d2i_X509_REQ_fp(fp,req) +#define i2d_X509_REQ_fp(fp,req) +#define d2i_X509_REQ_bio(bp,req) +#define i2d_X509_REQ_bio(bp,req) + +#define RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa) +#define d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,rsa) +#define i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,rsa) +#define d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,rsa) +#define i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,rsa) + +#define X509_NAME_dup(xn) +#define X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(ne) + +void X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *fp,X509_REQ *req); +void X509_REQ_print(BIO *fp,X509_REQ *req); + +RSA *X509_REQ_extract_key(X509_REQ *req); +RSA *X509_extract_key(X509 *x509); + +int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b); +unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a); + +X509_NAME * X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a); +int X509_issuer_name_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b); +unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *a); + +X509_NAME * X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a); +int X509_subject_name_cmp(X509 *a,X509 *b); +unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x); + +int X509_NAME_cmp (X509_NAME *a, X509_NAME *b); +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x); + + +==== bio.doc ======================================================== + +BIO Routines + +This documentation is rather sparse, you are probably best +off looking at the code for specific details. + +The BIO library is a IO abstraction that was originally +inspired by the need to have callbacks to perform IO to FILE +pointers when using Windows 3.1 DLLs. There are two types +of BIO; a source/sink type and a filter type. +The source/sink methods are as follows: +- BIO_s_mem() memory buffer - a read/write byte array that + grows until memory runs out :-). +- BIO_s_file() FILE pointer - A wrapper around the normal + 'FILE *' commands, good for use with stdin/stdout. +- BIO_s_fd() File descriptor - A wrapper around file + descriptors, often used with pipes. +- BIO_s_socket() Socket - Used around sockets. It is + mostly in the Microsoft world that sockets are different + from file descriptors and there are all those ugly winsock + commands. +- BIO_s_null() Null - read nothing and write nothing.; a + useful endpoint for filter type BIO's specifically things + like the message digest BIO. + +The filter types are +- BIO_f_buffer() IO buffering - does output buffering into + larger chunks and performs input buffering to allow gets() + type functions. +- BIO_f_md() Message digest - a transparent filter that can + be asked to return a message digest for the data that has + passed through it. +- BIO_f_cipher() Encrypt or decrypt all data passing + through the filter. +- BIO_f_base64() Base64 decode on read and encode on write. +- BIO_f_ssl() A filter that performs SSL encryption on the + data sent through it. + +Base BIO functions. +The BIO library has a set of base functions that are +implemented for each particular type. Filter BIOs will +normally call the equivalent function on the source/sink BIO +that they are layered on top of after they have performed +some modification to the data stream. Multiple filter BIOs +can be 'push' into a stack of modifers, so to read from a +file, unbase64 it, then decrypt it, a BIO_f_cipher, +BIO_f_base64 and a BIO_s_file would probably be used. If a +sha-1 and md5 message digest needed to be generated, a stack +two BIO_f_md() BIOs and a BIO_s_null() BIO could be used. +The base functions are +- BIO *BIO_new(BIO_METHOD *type); Create a new BIO of type 'type'. +- int BIO_free(BIO *a); Free a BIO structure. Depending on + the configuration, this will free the underlying data + object for a source/sink BIO. +- int BIO_read(BIO *b, char *data, int len); Read upto 'len' + bytes into 'data'. +- int BIO_gets(BIO *bp,char *buf, int size); Depending on + the BIO, this can either be a 'get special' or a get one + line of data, as per fgets(); +- int BIO_write(BIO *b, char *data, int len); Write 'len' + bytes from 'data' to the 'b' BIO. +- int BIO_puts(BIO *bp,char *buf); Either a 'put special' or + a write null terminated string as per fputs(). +- long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,char *parg); A + control function which is used to manipulate the BIO + structure and modify it's state and or report on it. This + function is just about never used directly, rather it + should be used in conjunction with BIO_METHOD specific + macros. +- BIO *BIO_push(BIO *new_top, BIO *old); new_top is apped to the + top of the 'old' BIO list. new_top should be a filter BIO. + All writes will go through 'new_top' first and last on read. + 'old' is returned. +- BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *bio); the new topmost BIO is returned, NULL if + there are no more. + +If a particular low level BIO method is not supported +(normally BIO_gets()), -2 will be returned if that method is +called. Otherwise the IO methods (read, write, gets, puts) +will return the number of bytes read or written, and 0 or -1 +for error (or end of input). For the -1 case, +BIO_should_retry(bio) can be called to determine if it was a +genuine error or a temporary problem. -2 will also be +returned if the BIO has not been initalised yet, in all +cases, the correct error codes are set (accessible via the +ERR library). + + +The following functions are convenience functions: +- int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, char * format, ..); printf but + to a BIO handle. +- long BIO_ctrl_int(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,int iarg); a + convenience function to allow a different argument types + to be passed to BIO_ctrl(). +- int BIO_dump(BIO *b,char *bytes,int len); output 'len' + bytes from 'bytes' in a hex dump debug format. +- long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, char *argp, int + argi, long argl, long ret) - a default debug BIO callback, + this is mentioned below. To use this one normally has to + use the BIO_set_callback_arg() function to assign an + output BIO for the callback to use. +- BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *bio,int type); when there is a 'stack' + of BIOs, this function scan the list and returns the first + that is of type 'type', as listed in buffer.h under BIO_TYPE_XXX. +- void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio); Free the bio and all other BIOs + in the list. It walks the bio->next_bio list. + + + +Extra commands are normally implemented as macros calling BIO_ctrl(). +- BIO_number_read(BIO *bio) - the number of bytes processed + by BIO_read(bio,.). +- BIO_number_written(BIO *bio) - the number of bytes written + by BIO_write(bio,.). +- BIO_reset(BIO *bio) - 'reset' the BIO. +- BIO_eof(BIO *bio) - non zero if we are at the current end + of input. +- BIO_set_close(BIO *bio, int close_flag) - set the close flag. +- BIO_get_close(BIO *bio) - return the close flag. + BIO_pending(BIO *bio) - return the number of bytes waiting + to be read (normally buffered internally). +- BIO_flush(BIO *bio) - output any data waiting to be output. +- BIO_should_retry(BIO *io) - after a BIO_read/BIO_write + operation returns 0 or -1, a call to this function will + return non zero if you should retry the call later (this + is for non-blocking IO). +- BIO_should_read(BIO *io) - we should retry when data can + be read. +- BIO_should_write(BIO *io) - we should retry when data can + be written. +- BIO_method_name(BIO *io) - return a string for the method name. +- BIO_method_type(BIO *io) - return the unique ID of the BIO method. +- BIO_set_callback(BIO *io, long (*callback)(BIO *io, int + cmd, char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret); - sets + the debug callback. +- BIO_get_callback(BIO *io) - return the assigned function + as mentioned above. +- BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *io, char *arg) - assign some + data against the BIO. This is normally used by the debug + callback but could in reality be used for anything. To + get an idea of how all this works, have a look at the code + in the default debug callback mentioned above. The + callback can modify the return values. + +Details of the BIO_METHOD structure. +typedef struct bio_method_st + { + int type; + char *name; + int (*bwrite)(); + int (*bread)(); + int (*bputs)(); + int (*bgets)(); + long (*ctrl)(); + int (*create)(); + int (*destroy)(); + } BIO_METHOD; + +The 'type' is the numeric type of the BIO, these are listed in buffer.h; +'Name' is a textual representation of the BIO 'type'. +The 7 function pointers point to the respective function +methods, some of which can be NULL if not implemented. +The BIO structure +typedef struct bio_st + { + BIO_METHOD *method; + long (*callback)(BIO * bio, int mode, char *argp, int + argi, long argl, long ret); + char *cb_arg; /* first argument for the callback */ + int init; + int shutdown; + int flags; /* extra storage */ + int num; + char *ptr; + struct bio_st *next_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */ + int references; + unsigned long num_read; + unsigned long num_write; + } BIO; + +- 'Method' is the BIO method. +- 'callback', when configured, is called before and after + each BIO method is called for that particular BIO. This + is intended primarily for debugging and of informational feedback. +- 'init' is 0 when the BIO can be used for operation. + Often, after a BIO is created, a number of operations may + need to be performed before it is available for use. An + example is for BIO_s_sock(). A socket needs to be + assigned to the BIO before it can be used. +- 'shutdown', this flag indicates if the underlying + comunication primative being used should be closed/freed + when the BIO is closed. +- 'flags' is used to hold extra state. It is primarily used + to hold information about why a non-blocking operation + failed and to record startup protocol information for the + SSL BIO. +- 'num' and 'ptr' are used to hold instance specific state + like file descriptors or local data structures. +- 'next_bio' is used by filter BIOs to hold the pointer of the + next BIO in the chain. written data is sent to this BIO and + data read is taken from it. +- 'references' is used to indicate the number of pointers to + this structure. This needs to be '1' before a call to + BIO_free() is made if the BIO_free() function is to + actually free() the structure, otherwise the reference + count is just decreased. The actual BIO subsystem does + not really use this functionality but it is useful when + used in more advanced applicaion. +- num_read and num_write are the total number of bytes + read/written via the 'read()' and 'write()' methods. + +BIO_ctrl operations. +The following is the list of standard commands passed as the +second parameter to BIO_ctrl() and should be supported by +all BIO as best as possible. Some are optional, some are +manditory, in any case, where is makes sense, a filter BIO +should pass such requests to underlying BIO's. +- BIO_CTRL_RESET - Reset the BIO back to an initial state. +- BIO_CTRL_EOF - return 0 if we are not at the end of input, + non 0 if we are. +- BIO_CTRL_INFO - BIO specific special command, normal + information return. +- BIO_CTRL_SET - set IO specific parameter. +- BIO_CTRL_GET - get IO specific parameter. +- BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE - Get the close on BIO_free() flag, one + of BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. +- BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE - Set the close on BIO_free() flag. +- BIO_CTRL_PENDING - Return the number of bytes available + for instant reading +- BIO_CTRL_FLUSH - Output pending data, return number of bytes output. +- BIO_CTRL_SHOULD_RETRY - After an IO error (-1 returned) + should we 'retry' when IO is possible on the underlying IO object. +- BIO_CTRL_RETRY_TYPE - What kind of IO are we waiting on. + +The following command is a special BIO_s_file() specific option. +- BIO_CTRL_SET_FILENAME - specify a file to open for IO. + +The BIO_CTRL_RETRY_TYPE needs a little more explanation. +When performing non-blocking IO, or say reading on a memory +BIO, when no data is present (or cannot be written), +BIO_read() and/or BIO_write() will return -1. +BIO_should_retry(bio) will return true if this is due to an +IO condition rather than an actual error. In the case of +BIO_s_mem(), a read when there is no data will return -1 and +a should retry when there is more 'read' data. +The retry type is deduced from 2 macros +BIO_should_read(bio) and BIO_should_write(bio). +Now while it may appear obvious that a BIO_read() failure +should indicate that a retry should be performed when more +read data is available, this is often not true when using +things like an SSL BIO. During the SSL protocol startup +multiple reads and writes are performed, triggered by any +SSL_read or SSL_write. +So to write code that will transparently handle either a +socket or SSL BIO, + i=BIO_read(bio,..) + if (I == -1) + { + if (BIO_should_retry(bio)) + { + if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + { + /* call us again when BIO can be read */ + } + if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + { + /* call us again when BIO can be written */ + } + } + } + +At this point in time only read and write conditions can be +used but in the future I can see the situation for other +conditions, specifically with SSL there could be a condition +of a X509 certificate lookup taking place and so the non- +blocking BIO_read would require a retry when the certificate +lookup subsystem has finished it's lookup. This is all +makes more sense and is easy to use in a event loop type +setup. +When using the SSL BIO, either SSL_read() or SSL_write()s +can be called during the protocol startup and things will +still work correctly. +The nice aspect of the use of the BIO_should_retry() macro +is that all the errno codes that indicate a non-fatal error +are encapsulated in one place. The Windows specific error +codes and WSAGetLastError() calls are also hidden from the +application. + +Notes on each BIO method. +Normally buffer.h is just required but depending on the +BIO_METHOD, ssl.h or evp.h will also be required. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void); +- BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *bio, BUF_MEM *bm, int close_flag) - + set the underlying BUF_MEM structure for the BIO to use. +- BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *bio, char **pp) - if pp is not NULL, + set it to point to the memory array and return the number + of bytes available. +A read/write BIO. Any data written is appended to the +memory array and any read is read from the front. This BIO +can be used for read/write at the same time. BIO_gets() is +supported in the fgets() sense. +BIO_CTRL_INFO can be used to retrieve pointers to the memory +buffer and it's length. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void); +- BIO_set_fp(BIO *bio, FILE *fp, int close_flag) - set 'FILE *' to use. +- BIO_get_fp(BIO *bio, FILE **fp) - get the 'FILE *' in use. +- BIO_read_filename(BIO *bio, char *name) - read from file. +- BIO_write_filename(BIO *bio, char *name) - write to file. +- BIO_append_filename(BIO *bio, char *name) - append to file. +This BIO sits over the normal system fread()/fgets() type +functions. Gets() is supported. This BIO in theory could be +used for read and write but it is best to think of each BIO +of this type as either a read or a write BIO, not both. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void); +BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void); +- BIO_sock_should_retry(int i) - the underlying function + used to determine if a call should be retried; the + argument is the '0' or '-1' returned by the previous BIO + operation. +- BIO_fd_should_retry(int i) - same as the +- BIO_sock_should_retry() except that it is different internally. +- BIO_set_fd(BIO *bio, int fd, int close_flag) - set the + file descriptor to use +- BIO_get_fd(BIO *bio, int *fd) - get the file descriptor. +These two methods are very similar. Gets() is not +supported, if you want this functionality, put a +BIO_f_buffer() onto it. This BIO is bi-directional if the +underlying file descriptor is. This is normally the case +for sockets but not the case for stdio descriptors. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void); +Read and write as much data as you like, it all disappears +into this BIO. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void); +- BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(BIO *bio) - return the number of + complete lines in the buffer. +- BIO_set_buffer_size(BIO *bio, long size) - set the size of + the buffers. +This type performs input and output buffering. It performs +both at the same time. The size of the buffer can be set +via the set buffer size option. Data buffered for output is +only written when the buffer fills. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); +- BIO_set_ssl(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int close_flag) - the SSL + structure to use. +- BIO_get_ssl(BIO *bio, SSL **ssl) - get the SSL structure + in use. +The SSL bio is a little different from normal BIOs because +the underlying SSL structure is a little different. A SSL +structure performs IO via a read and write BIO. These can +be different and are normally set via the +SSL_set_rbio()/SSL_set_wbio() calls. The SSL_set_fd() calls +are just wrappers that create socket BIOs and then call +SSL_set_bio() where the read and write BIOs are the same. +The BIO_push() operation makes the SSLs IO BIOs the same, so +make sure the BIO pushed is capable of two directional +traffic. If it is not, you will have to install the BIOs +via the more conventional SSL_set_bio() call. BIO_pop() will retrieve +the 'SSL read' BIO. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_md(void); +- BIO_set_md(BIO *bio, EVP_MD *md) - set the message digest + to use. +- BIO_get_md(BIO *bio, EVP_MD **mdp) - return the digest + method in use in mdp, return 0 if not set yet. +- BIO_reset() reinitializes the digest (EVP_DigestInit()) + and passes the reset to the underlying BIOs. +All data read or written via BIO_read() or BIO_write() to +this BIO will be added to the calculated digest. This +implies that this BIO is only one directional. If read and +write operations are performed, two separate BIO_f_md() BIOs +are reuqired to generate digests on both the input and the +output. BIO_gets(BIO *bio, char *md, int size) will place the +generated digest into 'md' and return the number of bytes. +The EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE should probably be used to size the 'md' +array. Reading the digest will also reset it. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_cipher(void); +- BIO_reset() reinitializes the cipher. +- BIO_flush() should be called when the last bytes have been + output to flush the final block of block ciphers. +- BIO_get_cipher_status(BIO *b), when called after the last + read from a cipher BIO, returns non-zero if the data + decrypted correctly, otherwise, 0. +- BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *key, + unsigned char *iv, int encrypt) This function is used to + setup a cipher BIO. The length of key and iv are + specified by the choice of EVP_CIPHER. Encrypt is 1 to + encrypt and 0 to decrypt. + +BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void); +- BIO_flush() should be called when the last bytes have been output. +This BIO base64 encodes when writing and base64 decodes when +reading. It will scan the input until a suitable begin line +is found. After reading data, BIO_reset() will reset the +BIO to start scanning again. Do not mix reading and writing +on the same base64 BIO. It is meant as a single stream BIO. + +Directions type +both BIO_s_mem() +one/both BIO_s_file() +both BIO_s_fd() +both BIO_s_socket() +both BIO_s_null() +both BIO_f_buffer() +one BIO_f_md() +one BIO_f_cipher() +one BIO_f_base64() +both BIO_f_ssl() + +It is easy to mix one and two directional BIOs, all one has +to do is to keep two separate BIO pointers for reading and +writing and be careful about usage of underlying BIOs. The +SSL bio by it's very nature has to be two directional but +the BIO_push() command will push the one BIO into the SSL +BIO for both reading and writing. + +The best example program to look at is apps/enc.c and/or perhaps apps/dgst.c. + + +==== blowfish.doc ======================================================== + +The Blowfish library. + +Blowfish is a block cipher that operates on 64bit (8 byte) quantities. It +uses variable size key, but 128bit (16 byte) key would normally be considered +good. It can be used in all the modes that DES can be used. This +library implements the ecb, cbc, cfb64, ofb64 modes. + +Blowfish is quite a bit faster that DES, and much faster than IDEA or +RC2. It is one of the faster block ciphers. + +For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the +same. + +This library requires the inclusion of 'blowfish.h'. + +All of the encryption functions take what is called an BF_KEY as an +argument. An BF_KEY is an expanded form of the Blowfish key. +For all modes of the Blowfish algorithm, the BF_KEY used for +decryption is the same one that was used for encryption. + +The define BF_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption for the functions +that require an encryption/decryption flag. BF_DECRYPT is passed to +specify decryption. + +Please note that any of the encryption modes specified in my DES library +could be used with Blowfish. I have only implemented ecb, cbc, cfb64 and +ofb64 for the following reasons. +- ecb is the basic Blowfish encryption. +- cbc is the normal 'chaining' form for block ciphers. +- cfb64 can be used to encrypt single characters, therefore input and output + do not need to be a multiple of 8. +- ofb64 is similar to cfb64 but is more like a stream cipher, not as + secure (not cipher feedback) but it does not have an encrypt/decrypt mode. +- If you want triple Blowfish, thats 384 bits of key and you must be totally + obsessed with security. Still, if you want it, it is simple enough to + copy the function from the DES library and change the des_encrypt to + BF_encrypt; an exercise left for the paranoid reader :-). + +The functions are as follows: + +void BF_set_key( +BF_KEY *ks; +int len; +unsigned char *key; + BF_set_key converts an 'len' byte key into a BF_KEY. + A 'ks' is an expanded form of the 'key' which is used to + perform actual encryption. It can be regenerated from the Blowfish key + so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about + to occur. Don't save or pass around BF_KEY's since they + are CPU architecture dependent, 'key's are not. Blowfish is an + interesting cipher in that it can be used with a variable length + key. 'len' is the length of 'key' to be used as the key. + A 'len' of 16 is recomended by me, but blowfish can use upto + 72 bytes. As a warning, blowfish has a very very slow set_key + function, it actually runs BF_encrypt 521 times. + +void BF_encrypt(unsigned long *data, BF_KEY *key); +void BF_decrypt(unsigned long *data, BF_KEY *key); + These are the Blowfish encryption function that gets called by just + about every other Blowfish routine in the library. You should not + use this function except to implement 'modes' of Blowfish. + I say this because the + functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to + long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory + access do not occur. + Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and key is the + BF_KEY to use. + +void BF_ecb_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +BF_KEY *key, +int encrypt); + This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of Blowfish (in DES this + mode is called Electronic Code Book so I'm going to use the term + for blowfish as well. + Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by + key. Depending on the encrypt, encryption or + decryption occurs. Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes. + +void BF_cbc_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +BF_KEY *ks, +unsigned char *ivec, +int encrypt); + This routine implements Blowfish in Cipher Block Chaining mode. + Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted + (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes. + The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above, + should be a multiple of 8). If length is not a multiple of 8, bad + things will probably happen. ivec is the initialisation vector. + This function updates iv after each call so that it can be passed to + the next call to BF_cbc_encrypt(). + +void BF_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +BF_KEY *schedule, +unsigned char *ivec, +int *num, +int encrypt); + This is one of the more useful functions in this Blowfish library, it + implements CFB mode of Blowfish with 64bit feedback. + This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, + you do not require 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. + 'Encrypt' is used to indicate encryption or decryption. + CFB64 mode operates by using the cipher to generate a stream + of bytes which is used to encrypt the plain text. + The cipher text is then encrypted to generate the next 64 bits to + be xored (incrementally) with the next 64 bits of plain + text. As can be seen from this, to encrypt or decrypt, + the same 'cipher stream' needs to be generated but the way the next + block of data is gathered for encryption is different for + encryption and decryption. + +void BF_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +BF_KEY *schedule, +unsigned char *ivec, +int *num); + This functions implements OFB mode of Blowfish with 64bit feedback. + This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, + you do not require 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. + This is in effect a stream cipher, there is no encryption or + decryption mode. + +For reading passwords, I suggest using des_read_pw_string() from my DES library. +To generate a password from a text string, I suggest using MD5 (or MD2) to +produce a 16 byte message digest that can then be passed directly to +BF_set_key(). + +===== +For more information about the specific Blowfish modes in this library +(ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb), read the section entitled 'Modes of DES' from the +documentation on my DES library. What is said about DES is directly +applicable for Blowfish. + + +==== bn.doc ======================================================== + +The Big Number library. + +#include "bn.h" when using this library. + +This big number library was written for use in implementing the RSA and DH +public key encryption algorithms. As such, features such as negative +numbers have not been extensively tested but they should work as expected. +This library uses dynamic memory allocation for storing its data structures +and so there are no limit on the size of the numbers manipulated by these +routines but there is always the requirement to check return codes from +functions just in case a memory allocation error has occurred. + +The basic object in this library is a BIGNUM. It is used to hold a single +large integer. This type should be considered opaque and fields should not +be modified or accessed directly. +typedef struct bignum_st + { + int top; /* Index of last used d. */ + BN_ULONG *d; /* Pointer to an array of 'BITS2' bit chunks. */ + int max; /* Size of the d array. */ + int neg; + } BIGNUM; +The big number is stored in a malloced array of BN_ULONG's. A BN_ULONG can +be either 16, 32 or 64 bits in size, depending on the 'number of bits' +specified in bn.h. +The 'd' field is this array. 'max' is the size of the 'd' array that has +been allocated. 'top' is the 'last' entry being used, so for a value of 4, +bn.d[0]=4 and bn.top=1. 'neg' is 1 if the number is negative. +When a BIGNUM is '0', the 'd' field can be NULL and top == 0. + +Various routines in this library require the use of 'temporary' BIGNUM +variables during their execution. Due to the use of dynamic memory +allocation to create BIGNUMs being rather expensive when used in +conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the BN_CTX structure is +used. This structure contains BN_CTX BIGNUMs. BN_CTX +is the maximum number of temporary BIGNUMs any publicly exported +function will use. + +#define BN_CTX 12 +typedef struct bignum_ctx + { + int tos; /* top of stack */ + BIGNUM *bn[BN_CTX]; /* The variables */ + } BN_CTX; + +The functions that follow have been grouped according to function. Most +arithmetic functions return a result in the first argument, sometimes this +first argument can also be an input parameter, sometimes it cannot. These +restrictions are documented. + +extern BIGNUM *BN_value_one; +There is one variable defined by this library, a BIGNUM which contains the +number 1. This variable is useful for use in comparisons and assignment. + +Get Size functions. + +int BN_num_bits(BIGNUM *a); + This function returns the size of 'a' in bits. + +int BN_num_bytes(BIGNUM *a); + This function (macro) returns the size of 'a' in bytes. + For conversion of BIGNUMs to byte streams, this is the number of + bytes the output string will occupy. If the output byte + format specifies that the 'top' bit indicates if the number is + signed, so an extra '0' byte is required if the top bit on a + positive number is being written, it is upto the application to + make this adjustment. Like I said at the start, I don't + really support negative numbers :-). + +Creation/Destruction routines. + +BIGNUM *BN_new(); + Return a new BIGNUM object. The number initially has a value of 0. If + there is an error, NULL is returned. + +void BN_free(BIGNUM *a); + Free()s a BIGNUM. + +void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a); + Sets 'a' to a value of 0 and also zeros all unused allocated + memory. This function is used to clear a variable of 'sensitive' + data that was held in it. + +void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a); + This function zeros the memory used by 'a' and then free()'s it. + This function should be used to BN_free() BIGNUMS that have held + sensitive numeric values like RSA private key values. Both this + function and BN_clear tend to only be used by RSA and DH routines. + +BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void); + Returns a new BN_CTX. NULL on error. + +void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c); + Free a BN_CTX structure. The BIGNUMs in 'c' are BN_clear_free()ed. + +BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *b, int bits); + This is an internal function that should not normally be used. It + ensures that 'b' has enough room for a 'bits' bit number. It is + mostly used by the various BIGNUM routines. If there is an error, + NULL is returned. if not, 'b' is returned. + +BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *to, BIGNUM *from); + The 'from' is copied into 'to'. NULL is returned if there is an + error, otherwise 'to' is returned. + +BIGNUM *BN_dup(BIGNUM *a); + A new BIGNUM is created and returned containing the value of 'a'. + NULL is returned on error. + +Comparison and Test Functions. + +int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a) + Return 1 if 'a' is zero, else 0. + +int BN_is_one(a) + Return 1 is 'a' is one, else 0. + +int BN_is_word(a,w) + Return 1 if 'a' == w, else 0. 'w' is a BN_ULONG. + +int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + Return -1 if 'a' is less than 'b', 0 if 'a' and 'b' are the same + and 1 is 'a' is greater than 'b'. This is a signed comparison. + +int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + This function is the same as BN_cmp except that the comparison + ignores the sign of the numbers. + +Arithmetic Functions +For all of these functions, 0 is returned if there is an error and 1 is +returned for success. The return value should always be checked. eg. +if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err; +Unless explicitly mentioned, the 'return' value can be one of the +'parameters' to the function. + +int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + Add 'a' and 'b' and return the result in 'r'. This is r=a+b. + +int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + Subtract 'a' from 'b' and put the result in 'r'. This is r=a-b. + +int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); + Shift 'a' left by 'n' bits. This is r=a*(2^n). + +int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); + Shift 'a' left by 1 bit. This form is more efficient than + BN_lshift(r,a,1). This is r=a*2. + +int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n); + Shift 'a' right by 'n' bits. This is r=int(a/(2^n)). + +int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a); + Shift 'a' right by 1 bit. This form is more efficient than + BN_rshift(r,a,1). This is r=int(a/2). + +int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b); + Multiply a by b and return the result in 'r'. 'r' must not be + either 'a' or 'b'. It has to be a different BIGNUM. + This is r=a*b. + +int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); + Multiply a by a and return the result in 'r'. 'r' must not be + 'a'. This function is alot faster than BN_mul(r,a,a). This is r=a*a. + +int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *m, BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); + Divide 'm' by 'd' and return the result in 'dv' and the remainder + in 'rem'. Either of 'dv' or 'rem' can be NULL in which case that + value is not returned. 'ctx' needs to be passed as a source of + temporary BIGNUM variables. + This is dv=int(m/d), rem=m%d. + +int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *m, BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); + Find the remainder of 'm' divided by 'd' and return it in 'rem'. + 'ctx' holds the temporary BIGNUMs required by this function. + This function is more efficient than BN_div(NULL,rem,m,d,ctx); + This is rem=m%d. + +int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BIGNUM *m,BN_CTX *ctx); + Multiply 'a' by 'b' and return the remainder when divided by 'm'. + 'ctx' holds the temporary BIGNUMs required by this function. + This is r=(a*b)%m. + +int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *m,BN_CTX *ctx); + Raise 'a' to the 'p' power and return the remainder when divided by + 'm'. 'ctx' holds the temporary BIGNUMs required by this function. + This is r=(a^p)%m. + +int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + Return the reciprocal of 'm'. 'ctx' holds the temporary variables + required. This function returns -1 on error, otherwise it returns + the number of bits 'r' is shifted left to make 'r' into an integer. + This number of bits shifted is required in BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(). + This is r=(1/m)<<(BN_num_bits(m)+1). + +int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *m, + BIGNUM *i, int nb, BN_CTX *ctx); + This function is used to perform an efficient BN_mod_mul() + operation. If one is going to repeatedly perform BN_mod_mul() with + the same modulus is worth calculating the reciprocal of the modulus + and then using this function. This operation uses the fact that + a/b == a*r where r is the reciprocal of b. On modern computers + multiplication is very fast and big number division is very slow. + 'x' is multiplied by 'y' and then divided by 'm' and the remainder + is returned. 'i' is the reciprocal of 'm' and 'nb' is the number + of bits as returned from BN_reciprocal(). Normal usage is as follows. + bn=BN_reciprocal(i,m); + for (...) + { BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r,x,y,m,i,bn,ctx); } + This is r=(x*y)%m. Internally it is approximately + r=(x*y)-m*(x*y/m) or r=(x*y)-m*((x*y*i) >> bn) + This function is used in BN_mod_exp() and BN_is_prime(). + +Assignment Operations + +int BN_one(BIGNUM *a) + Set 'a' to hold the value one. + This is a=1. + +int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a) + Set 'a' to hold the value zero. + This is a=0. + +int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w); + Set 'a' to hold the value of 'w'. 'w' is an unsigned long. + This is a=w. + +unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a); + Returns 'a' in an unsigned long. Not remarkably, often 'a' will + be biger than a word, in which case 0xffffffffL is returned. + +Word Operations +These functions are much more efficient that the normal bignum arithmetic +operations. + +BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w); + Return the remainder of 'a' divided by 'w'. + This is return(a%w). + +int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w); + Add 'w' to 'a'. This function does not take the sign of 'a' into + account. This is a+=w; + +Bit operations. + +int BN_is_bit_set(BIGNUM *a, int n); + This function return 1 if bit 'n' is set in 'a' else 0. + +int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); + This function sets bit 'n' to 1 in 'a'. + This is a&= ~(1<<n); + +int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n); + This function sets bit 'n' to zero in 'a'. Return 0 if less + than 'n' bits in 'a' else 1. This is a&= ~(1<<n); + +int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n); + Truncate 'a' to n bits long. This is a&= ~((~0)<<n) + +Format conversion routines. + +BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(unsigned char *s, int len,BIGNUM *ret); + This function converts 'len' bytes in 's' into a BIGNUM which + is put in 'ret'. If ret is NULL, a new BIGNUM is created. + Either this new BIGNUM or ret is returned. The number is + assumed to be in bigendian form in 's'. By this I mean that + to 'ret' is created as follows for 'len' == 5. + ret = s[0]*2^32 + s[1]*2^24 + s[2]*2^16 + s[3]*2^8 + s[4]; + This function cannot be used to convert negative numbers. It + is always assumed the number is positive. The application + needs to diddle the 'neg' field of th BIGNUM its self. + The better solution would be to save the numbers in ASN.1 format + since this is a defined standard for storing big numbers. + Look at the functions + + ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai); + BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ASN1_INTEGER *ai,BIGNUM *bn); + int i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a,unsigned char **pp); + ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a,unsigned char **pp, + long length; + +int BN_bn2bin(BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to); + This function converts 'a' to a byte string which is put into + 'to'. The representation is big-endian in that the most + significant byte of 'a' is put into to[0]. This function + returns the number of bytes used to hold 'a'. BN_num_bytes(a) + would return the same value and can be used to determine how + large 'to' needs to be. If the number is negative, this + information is lost. Since this library was written to + manipulate large positive integers, the inability to save and + restore them is not considered to be a problem by me :-). + As for BN_bin2bn(), look at the ASN.1 integer encoding funtions + for SSLeay. They use BN_bin2bn() and BN_bn2bin() internally. + +char *BN_bn2ascii(BIGNUM *a); + This function returns a malloc()ed string that contains the + ascii hexadecimal encoding of 'a'. The number is in bigendian + format with a '-' in front if the number is negative. + +int BN_ascii2bn(BIGNUM **bn, char *a); + The inverse of BN_bn2ascii. The function returns the number of + characters from 'a' were processed in generating a the bignum. + error is inticated by 0 being returned. The number is a + hex digit string, optionally with a leading '-'. If *bn + is null, a BIGNUM is created and returned via that variable. + +int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, BIGNUM *a); + 'a' is printed to file pointer 'fp'. It is in the same format + that is output from BN_bn2ascii(). 0 is returned on error, + 1 if things are ok. + +int BN_print(BIO *bp, BIGNUM *a); + Same as BN_print except that the output is done to the SSLeay libraries + BIO routines. BN_print_fp() actually calls this function. + +Miscellaneous Routines. + +int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); + This function returns in 'rnd' a random BIGNUM that is bits + long. If bottom is 1, the number returned is odd. If top is set, + the top 2 bits of the number are set. This is useful because if + this is set, 2 'n; bit numbers multiplied together will return a 2n + bit number. If top was not set, they could produce a 2n-1 bit + number. + +BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); + This function create a new BIGNUM and returns it. This number + is the inverse mod 'n' of 'a'. By this it is meant that the + returned value 'r' satisfies (a*r)%n == 1. This function is + used in the generation of RSA keys. 'ctx', as per usual, + is used to hold temporary variables that are required by the + function. NULL is returned on error. + +int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r,BIGNUM *a,BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); + 'r' has the greatest common divisor of 'a' and 'b'. 'ctx' is + used for temporary variables and 0 is returned on error. + +int BN_is_prime(BIGNUM *p,int nchecks,void (*callback)(),BN_CTX *ctx, + char *cb_arg); + This function is used to check if a BIGNUM ('p') is prime. + It performs this test by using the Miller-Rabin randomised + primality test. This is a probalistic test that requires a + number of rounds to ensure the number is prime to a high + degree of probability. Since this can take quite some time, a + callback function can be passed and it will be called each + time 'p' passes a round of the prime testing. 'callback' will + be called as follows, callback(1,n,cb_arg) where n is the number of + the round, just passed. As per usual 'ctx' contains temporary + variables used. If ctx is NULL, it does not matter, a local version + will be malloced. This parameter is present to save some mallocing + inside the function but probably could be removed. + 0 is returned on error. + 'ncheck' is the number of Miller-Rabin tests to run. It is + suggested to use the value 'BN_prime_checks' by default. + +BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime( +int bits, +int strong, +BIGNUM *a, +BIGNUM *rems, +void (*callback)()); +char *cb_arg + This function is used to generate prime numbers. It returns a + new BIGNUM that has a high probability of being a prime. + 'bits' is the number of bits that + are to be in the prime. If 'strong' is true, the returned prime + will also be a strong prime ((p-1)/2 is also prime). + While searching for the prime ('p'), we + can add the requirement that the prime fill the following + condition p%a == rem. This can be used to help search for + primes with specific features, which is required when looking + for primes suitable for use with certain 'g' values in the + Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. If 'a' is NULL, + this condition is not checked. If rem is NULL, rem is assumed + to be 1. Since this search for a prime + can take quite some time, if callback is not NULL, it is called + in the following situations. + We have a suspected prime (from a quick sieve), + callback(0,sus_prime++,cb_arg). Each item to be passed to BN_is_prime(). + callback(1,round++,cb_arg). Each successful 'round' in BN_is_prime(). + callback(2,round,cb_arg). For each successful BN_is_prime() test. + +Hints +----- + +DSA wants 64*32 to use word mont mul, but RSA wants to use full. + +==== callback.doc ======================================================== + +Callback functions used in SSLeay. + +-------------------------- +The BIO library. + +Each BIO structure can have a callback defined against it. This callback is +called 2 times for each BIO 'function'. It is passed 6 parameters. +BIO_debug_callback() is an example callback which is defined in +crypto/buffer/bio_cb.c and is used in apps/dgst.c This is intended mostly +for debuging or to notify the application of IO. + +long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio,int cmd,char *argp,int argi,long argl, + long ret); +bio is the BIO being called, cmd is the type of BIO function being called. +Look at the BIO_CB_* defines in buffer.h. Argp and argi are the arguments +passed to BIO_read(), BIO_write, BIO_gets(), BIO_puts(). In the case of +BIO_ctrl(), argl is also defined. The first time the callback is called, +before the underlying function has been executed, 0 is passed as 'ret', and +if the return code from the callback is not > 0, the call is aborted +and the returned <= 0 value is returned. +The second time the callback is called, the 'cmd' value also has +BIO_CB_RETURN logically 'or'ed with it. The 'ret' value is the value returned +from the actuall function call and whatever the callback returns is returned +from the BIO function. + +BIO_set_callback(b,cb) can be used to set the callback function +(b is a BIO), and BIO_set_callback_arg(b,arg) can be used to +set the cb_arg argument in the BIO strucutre. This field is only intended +to be used by application, primarily in the callback function since it is +accessable since the BIO is passed. + +-------------------------- +The PEM library. + +The pem library only really uses one type of callback, +static int def_callback(char *buf, int num, int verify); +which is used to return a password string if required. +'buf' is the buffer to put the string in. 'num' is the size of 'buf' +and 'verify' is used to indicate that the password should be checked. +This last flag is mostly used when reading a password for encryption. + +For all of these functions, a NULL callback will call the above mentioned +default callback. This default function does not work under Windows 3.1. +For other machines, it will use an application defined prompt string +(EVP_set_pw_prompt(), which defines a library wide prompt string) +if defined, otherwise it will use it's own PEM password prompt. +It will then call EVP_read_pw_string() to get a password from the console. +If your application wishes to use nice fancy windows to retrieve passwords, +replace this function. The callback should return the number of bytes read +into 'buf'. If the number of bytes <= 0, it is considered an error. + +Functions that take this callback are listed below. For the 'read' type +functions, the callback will only be required if the PEM data is encrypted. + +For the Write functions, normally a password can be passed in 'kstr', of +'klen' bytes which will be used if the 'enc' cipher is not NULL. If +'kstr' is NULL, the callback will be used to retrieve a password. + +int PEM_do_header (EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data,long *len, + int (*callback)()); +char *PEM_ASN1_read_bio(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,BIO *bp,char **x,int (*cb)()); +char *PEM_ASN1_read(char *(*d2i)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char **x,int (*cb)()); +int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(),char *name,BIO *bp,char *x, + EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen,int (*callback)()); +int PEM_ASN1_write(int (*i2d)(),char *name,FILE *fp,char *x, + EVP_CIPHER *enc,unsigned char *kstr,int klen,int (*callback)()); +STACK *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK *sk, int (*cb)()); +STACK *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *fp, STACK *sk, int (*cb)()); + +#define PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb) +#define PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(fp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb) +#define PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb) +#define PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bp,x,enc,kstr,klen,cb) +#define PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_X509(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_X509_REQ(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_X509_CRL(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_PKCS7(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_DHparams(fp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_X509(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(bp,x,cb) +#define PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bp,x,cb) +int i2d_Netscape_RSA(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp, int (*cb)()); +RSA *d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length, int (*cb)()); + +Now you will notice that macros like +#define PEM_write_X509(fp,x) \ + PEM_ASN1_write((int (*)())i2d_X509,PEM_STRING_X509,fp, \ + (char *)x, NULL,NULL,0,NULL) +Don't do encryption normally. If you want to PEM encrypt your X509 structure, +either just call PEM_ASN1_write directly or just define you own +macro variant. As you can see, this macro just sets all encryption related +parameters to NULL. + + +-------------------------- +The SSL library. + +#define SSL_set_info_callback(ssl,cb) +#define SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,cb) +void callback(SSL *ssl,int location,int ret) +This callback is called each time around the SSL_connect()/SSL_accept() +state machine. So it will be called each time the SSL protocol progresses. +It is mostly present for use when debugging. When SSL_connect() or +SSL_accept() return, the location flag is SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT or +SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT and 'ret' is the value about to be returned. +Have a look at the SSL_CB_* defines in ssl.h. If an info callback is defined +against the SSL_CTX, it is called unless there is one set against the SSL. +Have a look at +void client_info_callback() in apps/s_client() for an example. + +Certificate verification. +void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) ()); +void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*callback)()); +This callback is used to help verify client and server X509 certificates. +It is actually passed to X509_cert_verify(), along with the SSL structure +so you have to read about X509_cert_verify() :-). The SSL_CTX version is used +if the SSL version is not defined. X509_cert_verify() is the function used +by the SSL part of the library to verify certificates. This function is +nearly always defined by the application. + +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(),char *arg); +int callback(char *arg,SSL *s,X509 *xs,STACK *cert_chain); +This call is used to replace the SSLeay certificate verification code. +The 'arg' is kept in the SSL_CTX and is passed to the callback. +If the callback returns 0, the certificate is rejected, otherwise it +is accepted. The callback is replacing the X509_cert_verify() call. +This feature is not often used, but if you wished to implement +some totally different certificate authentication system, this 'hook' is +vital. + +SSLeay keeps a cache of session-ids against each SSL_CTX. These callbacks can +be used to notify the application when a SSL_SESSION is added to the cache +or to retrieve a SSL_SESSION that is not in the cache from the application. +#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx,cb) +SSL_SESSION *callback(SSL *s,char *session_id,int session_id_len,int *copy); +If defined, this callback is called to return the SESSION_ID for the +session-id in 'session_id', of 'session_id_len' bytes. 'copy' is set to 1 +if the server is to 'take a copy' of the SSL_SESSION structure. It is 0 +if the SSL_SESSION is being 'passed in' so the SSLeay library is now +responsible for 'free()ing' the structure. Basically it is used to indicate +if the reference count on the SSL_SESSION structure needs to be incremented. + +#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx,cb) +int callback(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess); +When a new connection is established, if the SSL_SESSION is going to be added +to the cache, this callback is called. Return 1 if a 'copy' is required, +otherwise, return 0. This return value just causes the reference count +to be incremented (on return of a 1), this means the application does +not need to worry about incrementing the refernece count (and the +locking that implies in a multi-threaded application). + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)()); +This sets the SSL password reading function. +It is mostly used for windowing applications +and used by PEM_read_bio_X509() and PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey() +calls inside the SSL library. The only reason this is present is because the +calls to PEM_* functions is hidden in the SSLeay library so you have to +pass in the callback some how. + +#define SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(ctx,cb) +int callback(SSL *s,X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); +Called when a client certificate is requested but there is not one set +against the SSL_CTX or the SSL. If the callback returns 1, x509 and +pkey need to point to valid data. The library will free these when +required so if the application wants to keep these around, increment +their reference counts. If 0 is returned, no client cert is +available. If -1 is returned, it is assumed that the callback needs +to be called again at a later point in time. SSL_connect will return +-1 and SSL_want_x509_lookup(ssl) returns true. Remember that +application data can be attached to an SSL structure via the +SSL_set_app_data(SSL *ssl,char *data) call. + +-------------------------- +The X509 library. + +int X509_cert_verify(CERTIFICATE_CTX *ctx,X509 *xs, int (*cb)(), + int *error,char *arg,STACK *cert_chain); +int verify_callback(int ok,X509 *xs,X509 *xi,int depth,int error,char *arg, + STACK *cert_chain); + +X509_cert_verify() is used to authenticate X509 certificates. The 'ctx' holds +the details of the various caches and files used to locate certificates. +'xs' is the certificate to verify and 'cb' is the application callback (more +detail later). 'error' will be set to the error code and 'arg' is passed +to the 'cb' callback. Look at the VERIFY_* defines in crypto/x509/x509.h + +When ever X509_cert_verify() makes a 'negative' decision about a +certitificate, the callback is called. If everything checks out, the +callback is called with 'VERIFY_OK' or 'VERIFY_ROOT_OK' (for a self +signed cert that is not the passed certificate). + +The callback is passed the X509_cert_verify opinion of the certificate +in 'ok', the certificate in 'xs', the issuer certificate in 'xi', +the 'depth' of the certificate in the verification 'chain', the +VERIFY_* code in 'error' and the argument passed to X509_cert_verify() +in 'arg'. cert_chain is a list of extra certs to use if they are not +in the cache. + +The callback can be used to look at the error reason, and then return 0 +for an 'error' or '1' for ok. This will override the X509_cert_verify() +opinion of the certificates validity. Processing will continue depending on +the return value. If one just wishes to use the callback for informational +reason, just return the 'ok' parameter. + +-------------------------- +The BN and DH library. + +BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(int bits,int strong,BIGNUM *add, + BIGNUM *rem,void (*callback)(int,int)); +int BN_is_prime(BIGNUM *p,int nchecks,void (*callback)(int,int), + +Read doc/bn.doc for the description of these 2. + +DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len,int generator, + void (*callback)(int,int)); +Read doc/bn.doc for the description of the callback, since it is just passed +to BN_generate_prime(), except that it is also called as +callback(3,0) by this function. + +-------------------------- +The CRYPTO library. + +void CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(void (*func)(int mode,int type,char *file, + int line)); +void CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback(int (*func)(int *num,int mount, + int type,char *file, int line)); +void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*func)(void)); + +Read threads.doc for info on these ones. + + +==== cipher.doc ======================================================== + +The Cipher subroutines. + +These routines require "evp.h" to be included. + +These functions are a higher level interface to the various cipher +routines found in this library. As such, they allow the same code to be +used to encrypt and decrypt via different ciphers with only a change +in an initial parameter. These routines also provide buffering for block +ciphers. + +These routines all take a pointer to the following structure to specify +which cipher to use. If you wish to use a new cipher with these routines, +you would probably be best off looking an how an existing cipher is +implemented and copying it. At this point in time, I'm not going to go +into many details. This structure should be considered opaque + +typedef struct pem_cipher_st + { + int type; + int block_size; + int key_len; + int iv_len; + void (*enc_init)(); /* init for encryption */ + void (*dec_init)(); /* init for decryption */ + void (*do_cipher)(); /* encrypt data */ + } EVP_CIPHER; + +The type field is the object NID of the cipher type +(read the section on Objects for an explanation of what a NID is). +The cipher block_size is how many bytes need to be passed +to the cipher at a time. Key_len is the +length of the key the cipher requires and iv_len is the length of the +initialisation vector required. enc_init is the function +called to initialise the ciphers context for encryption and dec_init is the +function to initialise for decryption (they need to be different, especially +for the IDEA cipher). + +One reason for specifying the Cipher via a pointer to a structure +is that if you only use des-cbc, only the des-cbc routines will +be included when you link the program. If you passed an integer +that specified which cipher to use, the routine that mapped that +integer to a set of cipher functions would cause all the ciphers +to be link into the code. This setup also allows new ciphers +to be added by the application (with some restrictions). + +The thirteen ciphers currently defined in this library are + +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb(); /* DES in ecb mode, iv=0, block=8, key= 8 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(); /* DES in ecb ede mode, iv=0, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(); /* DES in ecb ede mode, iv=0, block=8, key=24 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cfb(); /* DES in cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key= 8 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cfb(); /* DES in ede cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cfb();/* DES in ede cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=24 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ofb(); /* DES in ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key= 8 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_ofb(); /* DES in ede ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_ofb();/* DES in ede ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=24 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc(); /* DES in cbc mode, iv=8, block=8, key= 8 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(); /* DES in cbc ede mode, iv=8, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc();/* DES in cbc ede mode, iv=8, block=8, key=24 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_desx_cbc(); /* DES in desx cbc mode,iv=8, block=8, key=24 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(); /* RC4, iv=0, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ecb(); /* IDEA in ecb mode, iv=0, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cfb(); /* IDEA in cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_ofb(); /* IDEA in ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_idea_cbc(); /* IDEA in cbc mode, iv=8, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ecb(); /* RC2 in ecb mode, iv=0, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cfb(); /* RC2 in cfb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_ofb(); /* RC2 in ofb mode, iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc2_cbc(); /* RC2 in cbc mode, iv=8, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ecb(); /* Blowfish in ecb mode,iv=0, block=8, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cfb(); /* Blowfish in cfb mode,iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_ofb(); /* Blowfish in ofb mode,iv=8, block=1, key=16 */ +EVP_CIPHER *EVP_bf_cbc(); /* Blowfish in cbc mode,iv=8, block=8, key=16 */ + +The meaning of the compound names is as follows. +des The base cipher is DES. +idea The base cipher is IDEA +rc4 The base cipher is RC4-128 +rc2 The base cipher is RC2-128 +ecb Electronic Code Book form of the cipher. +cbc Cipher Block Chaining form of the cipher. +cfb 64 bit Cipher Feedback form of the cipher. +ofb 64 bit Output Feedback form of the cipher. +ede The cipher is used in Encrypt, Decrypt, Encrypt mode. The first + and last keys are the same. +ede3 The cipher is used in Encrypt, Decrypt, Encrypt mode. + +All the Cipher routines take a EVP_CIPHER_CTX pointer as an argument. +The state of the cipher is kept in this structure. + +typedef struct EVP_CIPHER_Ctx_st + { + EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + int encrypt; /* encrypt or decrypt */ + int buf_len; /* number we have left */ + unsigned char buf[8]; + union { + .... /* cipher specific stuff */ + } c; + } EVP_CIPHER_CTX; + +Cipher is a pointer the the EVP_CIPHER for the current context. The encrypt +flag indicates encryption or decryption. buf_len is the number of bytes +currently being held in buf. +The 'c' union holds the cipher specify context. + +The following functions are to be used. + +int EVP_read_pw_string( +char *buf, +int len, +char *prompt, +int verify, + This function is the same as des_read_pw_string() (des.doc). + +void EVP_set_pw_prompt(char *prompt); + This function sets the 'default' prompt to use to use in + EVP_read_pw_string when the prompt parameter is NULL. If the + prompt parameter is NULL, this 'default prompt' feature is turned + off. Be warned, this is a global variable so weird things + will happen if it is used under Win16 and care must be taken + with a multi-threaded version of the library. + +char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(); + This returns a pointer to the default prompt string. NULL + if it is not set. + +int EVP_BytesToKey( +EVP_CIPHER *type, +EVP_MD *md, +unsigned char *salt, +unsigned char *data, +int datal, +int count, +unsigned char *key, +unsigned char *iv); + This function is used to generate a key and an initialisation vector + for a specified cipher from a key string and a salt. Type + specifies the cipher the 'key' is being generated for. Md is the + message digest algorithm to use to generate the key and iv. The salt + is an optional 8 byte object that is used to help seed the key + generator. + If the salt value is NULL, it is just not used. Datal is the + number of bytes to use from 'data' in the key generation. + This function returns the key size for the specified cipher, if + data is NULL, this value is returns and no other + computation is performed. Count is + the number of times to loop around the key generator. I would + suggest leaving it's value as 1. Key and iv are the structures to + place the returning iv and key in. If they are NULL, no value is + generated for that particular value. + The algorithm used is as follows + + /* M[] is an array of message digests + * MD() is the message digest function */ + M[0]=MD(data . salt); + for (i=1; i<count; i++) M[0]=MD(M[0]); + + i=1 + while (data still needed for key and iv) + { + M[i]=MD(M[i-1] . data . salt); + for (i=1; i<count; i++) M[i]=MD(M[i]); + i++; + } + + If the salt is NULL, it is not used. + The digests are concatenated together. + M = M[0] . M[1] . M[2] ....... + + For key= 8, iv=8 => key=M[0.. 8], iv=M[ 9 .. 16]. + For key=16, iv=0 => key=M[0..16]. + For key=16, iv=8 => key=M[0..16], iv=M[17 .. 24]. + For key=24, iv=8 => key=M[0..24], iv=M[25 .. 32]. + + This routine will produce DES-CBC keys and iv that are compatible + with the PKCS-5 standard when md2 or md5 are used. If md5 is + used, the salt is NULL and count is 1, this routine will produce + the password to key mapping normally used with RC4. + I have attempted to logically extend the PKCS-5 standard to + generate keys and iv for ciphers that require more than 16 bytes, + if anyone knows what the correct standard is, please inform me. + When using sha or sha1, things are a bit different under this scheme, + since sha produces a 20 byte digest. So for ciphers requiring + 24 bits of data, 20 will come from the first MD and 4 will + come from the second. + + I have considered having a separate function so this 'routine' + can be used without the requirement of passing a EVP_CIPHER *, + but I have decided to not bother. If you wish to use the + function without official EVP_CIPHER structures, just declare + a local one and set the key_len and iv_len fields to the + length you desire. + +The following routines perform encryption and decryption 'by parts'. By +this I mean that there are groups of 3 routines. An Init function that is +used to specify a cipher and initialise data structures. An Update routine +that does encryption/decryption, one 'chunk' at a time. And finally a +'Final' function that finishes the encryption/decryption process. +All these functions take a EVP_CIPHER pointer to specify which cipher to +encrypt/decrypt with. They also take a EVP_CIPHER_CTX object as an +argument. This structure is used to hold the state information associated +with the operation in progress. + +void EVP_EncryptInit( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +EVP_CIPHER *type, +unsigned char *key, +unsigned char *iv); + This function initialise a EVP_CIPHER_CTX for encryption using the + cipher passed in the 'type' field. The cipher is initialised to use + 'key' as the key and 'iv' for the initialisation vector (if one is + required). If the type, key or iv is NULL, the value currently in the + EVP_CIPHER_CTX is reused. So to perform several decrypt + using the same cipher, key and iv, initialise with the cipher, + key and iv the first time and then for subsequent calls, + reuse 'ctx' but pass NULL for type, key and iv. You must make sure + to pass a key that is large enough for a particular cipher. I + would suggest using the EVP_BytesToKey() function. + +void EVP_EncryptUpdate( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *out, +int *outl, +unsigned char *in, +int inl); + This function takes 'inl' bytes from 'in' and outputs bytes + encrypted by the cipher 'ctx' was initialised with into 'out'. The + number of bytes written to 'out' is put into outl. If a particular + cipher encrypts in blocks, less or more bytes than input may be + output. Currently the largest block size used by supported ciphers + is 8 bytes, so 'out' should have room for 'inl+7' bytes. Normally + EVP_EncryptInit() is called once, followed by lots and lots of + calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate, followed by a single EVP_EncryptFinal + call. + +void EVP_EncryptFinal( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *out, +int *outl); + Because quite a large number of ciphers are block ciphers, there is + often an incomplete block to write out at the end of the + encryption. EVP_EncryptFinal() performs processing on this last + block. The last block in encoded in such a way that it is possible + to determine how many bytes in the last block are valid. For 8 byte + block size ciphers, if only 5 bytes in the last block are valid, the + last three bytes will be filled with the value 3. If only 2 were + valid, the other 6 would be filled with sixes. If all 8 bytes are + valid, a extra 8 bytes are appended to the cipher stream containing + nothing but 8 eights. These last bytes are output into 'out' and + the number of bytes written is put into 'outl' These last bytes + are output into 'out' and the number of bytes written is put into + 'outl'. This form of block cipher finalisation is compatible with + PKCS-5. Please remember that even if you are using ciphers like + RC4 that has no blocking and so the function will not write + anything into 'out', it would still be a good idea to pass a + variable for 'out' that can hold 8 bytes just in case the cipher is + changed some time in the future. It should also be remembered + that the EVP_CIPHER_CTX contains the password and so when one has + finished encryption with a particular EVP_CIPHER_CTX, it is good + practice to zero the structure + (ie. memset(ctx,0,sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)). + +void EVP_DecryptInit( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +EVP_CIPHER *type, +unsigned char *key, +unsigned char *iv); + This function is basically the same as EVP_EncryptInit() accept that + is prepares the EVP_CIPHER_CTX for decryption. + +void EVP_DecryptUpdate( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *out, +int *outl, +unsigned char *in, +int inl); + This function is basically the same as EVP_EncryptUpdate() + except that it performs decryption. There is one + fundamental difference though. 'out' can not be the same as + 'in' for any ciphers with a block size greater than 1 if more + than one call to EVP_DecryptUpdate() will be made. This + is because this routine can hold a 'partial' block between + calls. When a partial block is decrypted (due to more bytes + being passed via this function, they will be written to 'out' + overwriting the input bytes in 'in' that have not been read + yet. From this it should also be noted that 'out' should + be at least one 'block size' larger than 'inl'. This problem + only occurs on the second and subsequent call to + EVP_DecryptUpdate() when using a block cipher. + +int EVP_DecryptFinal( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *out, +int *outl); + This function is different to EVP_EncryptFinal in that it 'removes' + any padding bytes appended when the data was encrypted. Due to the + way in which 1 to 8 bytes may have been appended when encryption + using a block cipher, 'out' can end up with 0 to 7 bytes being put + into it. When decoding the padding bytes, it is possible to detect + an incorrect decryption. If the decryption appears to be wrong, 0 + is returned. If everything seems ok, 1 is returned. For ciphers + with a block size of 1 (RC4), this function would normally not + return any bytes and would always return 1. Just because this + function returns 1 does not mean the decryption was correct. It + would normally be wrong due to either the wrong key/iv or + corruption of the cipher data fed to EVP_DecryptUpdate(). + As for EVP_EncryptFinal, it is a good idea to zero the + EVP_CIPHER_CTX after use since the structure contains the key used + to decrypt the data. + +The following Cipher routines are convenience routines that call either +EVP_EncryptXxx or EVP_DecryptXxx depending on weather the EVP_CIPHER_CTX +was setup to encrypt or decrypt. + +void EVP_CipherInit( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +EVP_CIPHER *type, +unsigned char *key, +unsigned char *iv, +int enc); + This function take arguments that are the same as EVP_EncryptInit() + and EVP_DecryptInit() except for the extra 'enc' flag. If 1, the + EVP_CIPHER_CTX is setup for encryption, if 0, decryption. + +void EVP_CipherUpdate( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *out, +int *outl, +unsigned char *in, +int inl); + Again this function calls either EVP_EncryptUpdate() or + EVP_DecryptUpdate() depending on state in the 'ctx' structure. + As noted for EVP_DecryptUpdate(), when this routine is used + for decryption with block ciphers, 'out' should not be the + same as 'in'. + +int EVP_CipherFinal( +EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *outm, +int *outl); + This routine call EVP_EncryptFinal() or EVP_DecryptFinal() + depending on the state information in 'ctx'. 1 is always returned + if the mode is encryption, otherwise the return value is the return + value of EVP_DecryptFinal(). + +==== cipher.m ======================================================== + +Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 08:16:14 +1000 (EST) +From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.com> +X-Sender: eay@orb +To: Roland Haring <rharing@tandem.cl> +Cc: ssl-users@mincom.com +Subject: Re: Symmetric encryption with ssleay +In-Reply-To: <m0vBpyq-00001aC@tandemnet.tandem.cl> +Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.961015075623.11394A-100000@orb> +Mime-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII +Sender: ssl-lists-owner@mincom.com +Precedence: bulk +Status: RO +X-Status: + +On Fri, 11 Oct 1996, Roland Haring wrote: +> THE_POINT: +> Would somebody be so kind to give me the minimum basic +> calls I need to do to libcrypto.a to get some text encrypted +> and decrypted again? ...hopefully with code included to do +> base64 encryption and decryption ... e.g. that sign-it.c code +> posted some while ago was a big help :-) (please, do not point +> me to apps/enc.c where I suspect my Heissenbug to be hidden :-) + +Ok, the base64 encoding stuff in 'enc.c' does the wrong thing sometimes +when the data is less than a line long (this is for decoding). I'll dig +up the exact fix today and post it. I am taking longer on 0.6.5 than I +intended so I'll just post this patch. + +The documentation to read is in +doc/cipher.doc, +doc/encode.doc (very sparse :-). +and perhaps +doc/digest.doc, + +The basic calls to encrypt with say triple DES are + +Given +char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; +char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; +EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; +unsigned char out[512+8]; +int outl; + +/* optional generation of key/iv data from text password using md5 + * via an upward compatable verson of PKCS#5. */ +EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_des_ede3_cbc,EVP_md5,NULL,passwd,strlen(passwd), + key,iv); + +/* Initalise the EVP_CIPHER_CTX */ +EVP_EncryptInit(ctx,EVP_des_ede3_cbc,key,iv); + +while (....) + { + /* This is processing 512 bytes at a time, the bytes are being + * copied into 'out', outl bytes are output. 'out' should not be the + * same as 'in' for reasons mentioned in the documentation. */ + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx,out,&outl,in,512); + } + +/* Output the last 'block'. If the cipher is a block cipher, the last + * block is encoded in such a way so that a wrong decryption will normally be + * detected - again, one of the PKCS standards. */ + +EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx,out,&outl); + +To decrypt, use the EVP_DecryptXXXXX functions except that EVP_DecryptFinal() +will return 0 if the decryption fails (only detectable on block ciphers). + +You can also use +EVP_CipherInit() +EVP_CipherUpdate() +EVP_CipherFinal() +which does either encryption or decryption depending on an extra +parameter to EVP_CipherInit(). + + +To do the base64 encoding, +EVP_EncodeInit() +EVP_EncodeUpdate() +EVP_EncodeFinal() + +EVP_DecodeInit() +EVP_DecodeUpdate() +EVP_DecodeFinal() + +where the encoding is quite simple, but the decoding can be a bit more +fun (due to dud input). + +EVP_DecodeUpdate() returns -1 for an error on an input line, 0 if the +'last line' was just processed, and 1 if more lines should be submitted. + +EVP_DecodeFinal() returns -1 for an error or 1 if things are ok. + +So the loop becomes +EVP_DecodeInit(....) +for (;;) + { + i=EVP_DecodeUpdate(....); + if (i < 0) goto err; + + /* process the data */ + + if (i == 0) break; + } +EVP_DecodeFinal(....); +/* process the data */ + +The problem in 'enc.c' is that I was stuff the processing up after the +EVP_DecodeFinal(...) when the for(..) loop was not being run (one line of +base64 data) and this was because 'enc.c' tries to scan over a file until +it hits the first valid base64 encoded line. + +hope this helps a bit. +eric +-- +Eric Young | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates. +AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au | RTFM Win32 GetMessage(). + +==== conf.doc ======================================================== + +The CONF library. + +The CONF library is a simple set of routines that can be used to configure +programs. It is a superset of the genenv() function with some extra +structure. + +The library consists of 5 functions. + +LHASH *CONF_load(LHASH *config,char *file); +This function is called to load in a configuration file. Multiple +configuration files can be loaded, with each subsequent 'load' overwriting +any already defined 'variables'. If there is an error, NULL is returned. +If config is NULL, a new LHASH structure is created and returned, otherwise +the new data in the 'file' is loaded into the 'config' structure. + +void CONF_free(LHASH *config); +This function free()s the data in config. + +char *CONF_get_string(LHASH *config,char *section,char *name); +This function returns the string found in 'config' that corresponds to the +'section' and 'name' specified. Classes and the naming system used will be +discussed later in this document. If the variable is not defined, an NULL +is returned. + +long CONF_get_long(LHASH *config,char *section, char *name); +This function is the same as CONF_get_string() except that it converts the +string to an long and returns it. If variable is not a number or the +variable does not exist, 0 is returned. This is a little problematic but I +don't know of a simple way around it. + +STACK *CONF_get_section(LHASH *config, char *section); +This function returns a 'stack' of CONF_VALUE items that are all the +items defined in a particular section. DO NOT free() any of the +variable returned. They will disappear when CONF_free() is called. + +The 'lookup' model. +The configuration file is divided into 'sections'. Each section is started by +a line of the form '[ section ]'. All subsequent variable definitions are +of this section. A variable definition is a simple alpha-numeric name +followed by an '=' and then the data. A section or variable name can be +described by a regular expression of the following form '[A-Za-z0-9_]+'. +The value of the variable is the text after the '=' until the end of the +line, stripped of leading and trailing white space. +At this point I should mention that a '#' is a comment character, \ is the +escape character, and all three types of quote can be used to stop any +special interpretation of the data. +Now when the data is being loaded, variable expansion can occur. This is +done by expanding any $NAME sequences into the value represented by the +variable NAME. If the variable is not in the current section, the different +section can be specified by using the $SECTION::NAME form. The ${NAME} form +also works and is very useful for expanding variables inside strings. + +When a variable is looked up, there are 2 special section. 'default', which +is the initial section, and 'ENV' which is the processes environment +variables (accessed via getenv()). When a variable is looked up, it is +first 'matched' with it's section (if one was specified), if this fails, the +'default' section is matched. +If the 'lhash' variable passed was NULL, the environment is searched. + +Now why do we bother with sections? So we can have multiple programs using +the same configuration file, or multiple instances of the same program +using different variables. It also provides a nice mechanism to override +the processes environment variables (eg ENV::HOME=/tmp). If there is a +program specific variable missing, we can have default values. +Multiple configuration files can be loaded, with each new value clearing +any predefined values. A system config file can provide 'default' values, +and application/usr specific files can provide overriding values. + +Examples + +# This is a simple example +SSLEAY_HOME = /usr/local/ssl +ENV::PATH = $SSLEAY_HOME/bin:$PATH # override my path + +[X509] +cert_dir = $SSLEAY_HOME/certs # /usr/local/ssl/certs + +[SSL] +CIPHER = DES-EDE-MD5:RC4-MD5 +USER_CERT = $HOME/${USER}di'r 5' # /home/eay/eaydir 5 +USER_CERT = $HOME/\${USER}di\'r # /home/eay/${USER}di'r +USER_CERT = "$HOME/${US"ER}di\'r # $HOME/${USER}di'r + +TEST = 1234\ +5678\ +9ab # TEST=123456789ab +TTT = 1234\n\n # TTT=1234<nl><nl> + + + +==== des.doc ======================================================== + +The DES library. + +Please note that this library was originally written to operate with +eBones, a version of Kerberos that had had encryption removed when it left +the USA and then put back in. As such there are some routines that I will +advise not using but they are still in the library for historical reasons. +For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the +same. + +This library requires the inclusion of 'des.h'. + +All of the encryption functions take what is called a des_key_schedule as an +argument. A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the des key. +A des_key is 8 bytes of odd parity, the type used to hold the key is a +des_cblock. A des_cblock is an array of 8 bytes, often in this library +description I will refer to input bytes when the function specifies +des_cblock's as input or output, this just means that the variable should +be a multiple of 8 bytes. + +The define DES_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption, DES_DECRYPT to +specify decryption. The functions and global variable are as follows: + +int des_check_key; + DES keys are supposed to be odd parity. If this variable is set to + a non-zero value, des_set_key() will check that the key has odd + parity and is not one of the known weak DES keys. By default this + variable is turned off; + +void des_set_odd_parity( +des_cblock *key ); + This function takes a DES key (8 bytes) and sets the parity to odd. + +int des_is_weak_key( +des_cblock *key ); + This function returns a non-zero value if the DES key passed is a + weak, DES key. If it is a weak key, don't use it, try a different + one. If you are using 'random' keys, the chances of hitting a weak + key are 1/2^52 so it is probably not worth checking for them. + +int des_set_key( +des_cblock *key, +des_key_schedule schedule); + Des_set_key converts an 8 byte DES key into a des_key_schedule. + A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the key which is used to + perform actual encryption. It can be regenerated from the DES key + so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about + to occur. Don't save or pass around des_key_schedule's since they + are CPU architecture dependent, DES keys are not. If des_check_key + is non zero, zero is returned if the key has the wrong parity or + the key is a weak key, else 1 is returned. + +int des_key_sched( +des_cblock *key, +des_key_schedule schedule); + An alternative name for des_set_key(). + +int des_rw_mode; /* defaults to DES_PCBC_MODE */ + This flag holds either DES_CBC_MODE or DES_PCBC_MODE (default). + This specifies the function to use in the enc_read() and enc_write() + functions. + +void des_encrypt( +unsigned long *data, +des_key_schedule ks, +int enc); + This is the DES encryption function that gets called by just about + every other DES routine in the library. You should not use this + function except to implement 'modes' of DES. I say this because the + functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to + long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory + access do not occur. The characters are loaded 'little endian', + have a look at my source code for more details on how I use this + function. + Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and ks is the + des_key_schedule to use. enc, is non zero specifies encryption, + zero if decryption. + +void des_encrypt2( +unsigned long *data, +des_key_schedule ks, +int enc); + This functions is the same as des_encrypt() except that the DES + initial permutation (IP) and final permutation (FP) have been left + out. As for des_encrypt(), you should not use this function. + It is used by the routines in my library that implement triple DES. + IP() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() FP() is the same + as des_encrypt() des_encrypt() des_encrypt() except faster :-). + +void des_ecb_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +des_key_schedule ks, +int enc); + This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of DES, the most basic + form. Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by + ks. If enc is non zero (DES_ENCRYPT), encryption occurs, otherwise + decryption occurs. Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes. + (the des_cblock structure is 8 chars). + +void des_ecb3_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +int enc); + This is the 3 key EDE mode of ECB DES. What this means is that + the 8 bytes of input is encrypted with ks1, decrypted with ks2 and + then encrypted again with ks3, before being put into output; + C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). There is a macro, des_ecb2_encrypt() + that only takes 2 des_key_schedules that implements, + C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))) in that the final encrypt is done with ks1. + +void des_cbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + This routine implements DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode. + Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted + (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes. + The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above, + should be a multiple of 8). If length is not a multiple of 8, I'm + not being held responsible :-). ivec is the initialisation vector. + This function does not modify this variable. To correctly implement + cbc mode, you need to do one of 2 things; copy the last 8 bytes of + cipher text for use as the next ivec in your application, + or use des_ncbc_encrypt(). + Only this routine has this problem with updating the ivec, all + other routines that are implementing cbc mode update ivec. + +void des_ncbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule sk, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + For historical reasons, des_cbc_encrypt() did not update the + ivec with the value requires so that subsequent calls to + des_cbc_encrypt() would 'chain'. This was needed so that the same + 'length' values would not need to be used when decrypting. + des_ncbc_encrypt() does the right thing. It is the same as + des_cbc_encrypt accept that ivec is updates with the correct value + to pass in subsequent calls to des_ncbc_encrypt(). I advise using + des_ncbc_encrypt() instead of des_cbc_encrypt(); + +void des_xcbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule sk, +des_cblock *ivec, +des_cblock *inw, +des_cblock *outw, +int enc); + This is RSA's DESX mode of DES. It uses inw and outw to + 'whiten' the encryption. inw and outw are secret (unlike the iv) + and are as such, part of the key. So the key is sort of 24 bytes. + This is much better than cbc des. + +void des_3cbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule sk1, +des_key_schedule sk2, +des_cblock *ivec1, +des_cblock *ivec2, +int enc); + This function is flawed, do not use it. I have left it in the + library because it is used in my des(1) program and will function + correctly when used by des(1). If I removed the function, people + could end up unable to decrypt files. + This routine implements outer triple cbc encryption using 2 ks and + 2 ivec's. Use des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() instead. + +void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + This function implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with 3 + keys. What this means is that each 'DES' operation + inside the cbc mode is really an C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). + Again, this is cbc mode so an ivec is requires. + This mode is used by SSL. + There is also a des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() that only uses 2 + des_key_schedule's, the first being reused for the final + encryption. C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). This form of triple DES + is used by the RSAref library. + +void des_pcbc_encrypt( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + This is Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode of DES. It is used + by Kerberos v4. It's parameters are the same as des_ncbc_encrypt(). + +void des_cfb_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +int numbits, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int enc); + Cipher Feedback Back mode of DES. This implementation 'feeds back' + in numbit blocks. The input (and output) is in multiples of numbits + bits. numbits should to be a multiple of 8 bits. Length is the + number of bytes input. If numbits is not a multiple of 8 bits, + the extra bits in the bytes will be considered padding. So if + numbits is 12, for each 2 input bytes, the 4 high bits of the + second byte will be ignored. So to encode 72 bits when using + a numbits of 12 take 12 bytes. To encode 72 bits when using + numbits of 9 will take 16 bytes. To encode 80 bits when using + numbits of 16 will take 10 bytes. etc, etc. This padding will + apply to both input and output. + + +void des_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num, +int enc); + This is one of the more useful functions in this DES library, it + implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this + useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an + arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. If this does + not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-). + +void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num, +int enc); + Same as des_cfb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is + triple DES. As usual, there is a macro for + des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1. + +void des_ofb_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +int numbits, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec); + This is a implementation of Output Feed Back mode of DES. It is + the same as des_cfb_encrypt() in that numbits is the size of the + units dealt with during input and output (in bits). + +void des_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num); + The same as des_cfb64_encrypt() except that it is Output Feed Back + mode. + +void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks1, +des_key_schedule ks2, +des_key_schedule ks3, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num); + Same as des_ofb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is + triple DES. As usual, there is a macro for + des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1. + +int des_read_pw_string( +char *buf, +int length, +char *prompt, +int verify); + This routine is used to get a password from the terminal with echo + turned off. Buf is where the string will end up and length is the + size of buf. Prompt is a string presented to the 'user' and if + verify is set, the key is asked for twice and unless the 2 copies + match, an error is returned. A return code of -1 indicates a + system error, 1 failure due to use interaction, and 0 is success. + +unsigned long des_cbc_cksum( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec); + This function produces an 8 byte checksum from input that it puts in + output and returns the last 4 bytes as a long. The checksum is + generated via cbc mode of DES in which only the last 8 byes are + kept. I would recommend not using this function but instead using + the EVP_Digest routines, or at least using MD5 or SHA. This + function is used by Kerberos v4 so that is why it stays in the + library. + +char *des_fcrypt( +const char *buf, +const char *salt +char *ret); + This is my fast version of the unix crypt(3) function. This version + takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast + crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt + in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value + is written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This + function is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt. + +char *crypt( +const char *buf, +const char *salt); + This function calls des_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the + third parameter. This emulates the normal non-thread safe semantics + of crypt(3). + +void des_string_to_key( +char *str, +des_cblock *key); + This function takes str and converts it into a DES key. I would + recommend using MD5 instead and use the first 8 bytes of output. + When I wrote the first version of these routines back in 1990, MD5 + did not exist but I feel these routines are still sound. This + routines is compatible with the one in MIT's libdes. + +void des_string_to_2keys( +char *str, +des_cblock *key1, +des_cblock *key2); + This function takes str and converts it into 2 DES keys. + I would recommend using MD5 and using the 16 bytes as the 2 keys. + I have nothing against these 2 'string_to_key' routines, it's just + that if you say that your encryption key is generated by using the + 16 bytes of an MD5 hash, every-one knows how you generated your + keys. + +int des_read_password( +des_cblock *key, +char *prompt, +int verify); + This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_key(). + +int des_read_2passwords( +des_cblock *key1, +des_cblock *key2, +char *prompt, +int verify); + This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_2key(). + +void des_random_seed( +des_cblock key); + This routine sets a starting point for des_random_key(). + +void des_random_key( +des_cblock ret); + This function return a random key. Make sure to 'seed' the random + number generator (with des_random_seed()) before using this function. + I personally now use a MD5 based random number system. + +int des_enc_read( +int fd, +char *buf, +int len, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *iv); + This function will write to a file descriptor the encrypted data + from buf. This data will be preceded by a 4 byte 'byte count' and + will be padded out to 8 bytes. The encryption is either CBC of + PCBC depending on the value of des_rw_mode. If it is DES_PCBC_MODE, + pcbc is used, if DES_CBC_MODE, cbc is used. The default is to use + DES_PCBC_MODE. + +int des_enc_write( +int fd, +char *buf, +int len, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *iv); + This routines read stuff written by des_enc_read() and decrypts it. + I have used these routines quite a lot but I don't believe they are + suitable for non-blocking io. If you are after a full + authentication/encryption over networks, have a look at SSL instead. + +unsigned long des_quad_cksum( +des_cblock *input, +des_cblock *output, +long length, +int out_count, +des_cblock *seed); + This is a function from Kerberos v4 that is not anything to do with + DES but was needed. It is a cksum that is quicker to generate than + des_cbc_cksum(); I personally would use MD5 routines now. +===== +Modes of DES +Quite a bit of the following information has been taken from + AS 2805.5.2 + Australian Standard + Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, + Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm + Appendix A + +There are several different modes in which DES can be used, they are +as follows. + +Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) (des_ecb_encrypt()) +- 64 bits are enciphered at a time. +- The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. +- The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block + (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. +- An error will only affect one ciphertext block. + +Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) (des_cbc_encrypt()) +- a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. +- The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. +- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the + current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not + be rearranged. +- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext + enciphering to the same ciphertext. +- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. + +Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) (des_cfb_encrypt()) +- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. +- The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. +- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the + current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are + chained together and can not be rearranged. +- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext + enciphering to the same ciphertext. +- The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if + j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. +- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through + the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause + greater processing overheads. +- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. +- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. + +Output Feedback Mode (OFB) (des_ofb_encrypt()) +- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. +- The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same + plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More + over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same + key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons + a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. +- The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. +- The use of different start variables values prevents the same + plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different + key streams. +- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through + the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause + greater processing overheads. +- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. +- OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the + resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes + only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. +- OFB mode is not self-synchronising. If the two operation of + encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs + to be re-initialised. +- Each re-initialisation should use a value of the start variable + different from the start variable values used before with the same + key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be + produced each time from the same parameters. This would be + susceptible to a ' known plaintext' attack. + +Triple ECB Mode (des_ecb3_encrypt()) +- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. +- As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. + There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective + key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of + memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. +- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with + just one key. +- If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. + There are attacks that could reduce the key space to 55 bit's but it + requires 2^56 blocks of memory. +- If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal + ecb mode. + +Triple CBC Mode (des_ede3_cbc_encrypt()) +- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. +- As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with + the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. + +==== digest.doc ======================================================== + + +The Message Digest subroutines. + +These routines require "evp.h" to be included. + +These functions are a higher level interface to the various message digest +routines found in this library. As such, they allow the same code to be +used to digest via different algorithms with only a change in an initial +parameter. They are basically just a front-end to the MD2, MD5, SHA +and SHA1 +routines. + +These routines all take a pointer to the following structure to specify +which message digest algorithm to use. +typedef struct evp_md_st + { + int type; + int pkey_type; + int md_size; + void (*init)(); + void (*update)(); + void (*final)(); + + int required_pkey_type; /*EVP_PKEY_xxx */ + int (*sign)(); + int (*verify)(); + } EVP_MD; + +If additional message digest algorithms are to be supported, a structure of +this type needs to be declared and populated and then the Digest routines +can be used with that algorithm. The type field is the object NID of the +digest type (read the section on Objects for an explanation). The pkey_type +is the Object type to use when the a message digest is generated by there +routines and then is to be signed with the pkey algorithm. Md_size is +the size of the message digest returned. Init, update +and final are the relevant functions to perform the message digest function +by parts. One reason for specifying the message digest to use via this +mechanism is that if you only use md5, only the md5 routines will +be included in you linked program. If you passed an integer +that specified which message digest to use, the routine that mapped that +integer to a set of message digest functions would cause all the message +digests functions to be link into the code. This setup also allows new +message digest functions to be added by the application. + +The six message digests defined in this library are + +EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void); /* RSA sign/verify */ +EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void); /* RSA sign/verify */ +EVP_MD *EVP_sha(void); /* RSA sign/verify */ +EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void); /* RSA sign/verify */ +EVP_MD *EVP_dss(void); /* DSA sign/verify */ +EVP_MD *EVP_dss1(void); /* DSA sign/verify */ + +All the message digest routines take a EVP_MD_CTX pointer as an argument. +The state of the message digest is kept in this structure. + +typedef struct pem_md_ctx_st + { + EVP_MD *digest; + union { + unsigned char base[4]; /* this is used in my library as a + * 'pointer' to all union elements + * structures. */ + MD2_CTX md2; + MD5_CTX md5; + SHA_CTX sha; + } md; + } EVP_MD_CTX; + +The Digest functions are as follows. + +void EVP_DigestInit( +EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +EVP_MD *type); + This function is used to initialise the EVP_MD_CTX. The message + digest that will associated with 'ctx' is specified by 'type'. + +void EVP_DigestUpdate( +EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *data, +unsigned int cnt); + This function is used to pass more data to the message digest + function. 'cnt' bytes are digested from 'data'. + +void EVP_DigestFinal( +EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *md, +unsigned int *len); + This function finishes the digestion and puts the message digest + into 'md'. The length of the message digest is put into len; + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE is the size of the largest message digest that + can be returned from this function. Len can be NULL if the + size of the digest is not required. + + +==== encode.doc ======================================================== + + +void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); +void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out, + int *outl,unsigned char *in,int inl); +void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,int *outl); +int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *f, int n); + +void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx); +int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,int *outl, + unsigned char *in, int inl); +int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned + char *out, int *outl); +int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, unsigned + char *f, int n); + + +==== envelope.doc ======================================================== + +The following routines are use to create 'digital' envelopes. +By this I mean that they perform various 'higher' level cryptographic +functions. Have a read of 'cipher.doc' and 'digest.doc' since those +routines are used by these functions. +cipher.doc contains documentation about the cipher part of the +envelope library and digest.doc contatins the description of the +message digests supported. + +To 'sign' a document involves generating a message digest and then encrypting +the digest with an private key. + +#define EVP_SignInit(a,b) EVP_DigestInit(a,b) +#define EVP_SignUpdate(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) +Due to the fact this operation is basically just an extended message +digest, the first 2 functions are macro calls to Digest generating +functions. + +int EVP_SignFinal( +EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *md, +unsigned int *s, +EVP_PKEY *pkey); + This finalisation function finishes the generation of the message +digest and then encrypts the digest (with the correct message digest +object identifier) with the EVP_PKEY private key. 'ctx' is the message digest +context. 'md' will end up containing the encrypted message digest. This +array needs to be EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes long. 's' will actually +contain the exact length. 'pkey' of course is the private key. It is +one of EVP_PKEY_RSA or EVP_PKEY_DSA type. +If there is an error, 0 is returned, otherwise 1. + +Verify is used to check an signed message digest. + +#define EVP_VerifyInit(a,b) EVP_DigestInit(a,b) +#define EVP_VerifyUpdate(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) +Since the first step is to generate a message digest, the first 2 functions +are macros. + +int EVP_VerifyFinal( +EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, +unsigned char *md, +unsigned int s, +EVP_PKEY *pkey); + This function finishes the generation of the message digest and then +compares it with the supplied encrypted message digest. 'md' contains the +'s' bytes of encrypted message digest. 'pkey' is used to public key decrypt +the digest. It is then compared with the message digest just generated. +If they match, 1 is returned else 0. + +int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek, + int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk); +Must have at least one public key, error is 0. I should also mention that +the buffers pointed to by 'ek' need to be EVP_PKEY_size(pubk[n]) is size. + +#define EVP_SealUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) EVP_EncryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) +void EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *out,int *outl); + + +int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,EVP_CIPHER *type,unsigned char *ek, + int ekl,unsigned char *iv,EVP_PKEY *priv); +0 on failure + +#define EVP_OpenUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) EVP_DecryptUpdate(a,b,c,d,e) + +int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); +Decrypt final return code + + +==== error.doc ======================================================== + +The error routines. + +The 'error' system I've implemented is intended to server 2 purpose, to +record the reason why a command failed and to record where in the libraries +the failure occurred. It is more or less setup to record a 'trace' of which +library components were being traversed when the error occurred. + +When an error is recorded, it is done so a as single unsigned long which is +composed of three parts. The top byte is the 'library' number, the middle +12 bytes is the function code, and the bottom 12 bits is the 'reason' code. + +Each 'library', or should a say, 'section' of the SSLeay library has a +different unique 'library' error number. Each function in the library has +a number that is unique for that library. Each 'library' also has a number +for each 'error reason' that is only unique for that 'library'. + +Due to the way these error routines record a 'error trace', there is an +array per thread that is used to store the error codes. +The various functions in this library are used to access +and manipulate this array. + +void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func,int reason); + This routine records an error in library 'lib', function 'func' +and reason 'reason'. As errors get 'put' into the buffer, they wrap +around and overwrite old errors if too many are written. It is assumed +that the last errors are the most important. + +unsigned long ERR_get_error(void ); + This function returns the last error added to the error buffer. +In effect it is popping the value off the buffer so repeated calls will +continue to return values until there are no more errors to return in which +case 0 is returned. + +unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void ); + This function returns the value of the last error added to the +error buffer but does not 'pop' it from the buffer. + +void ERR_clear_error(void ); + This function clears the error buffer, discarding all unread +errors. + +While the above described error system obviously produces lots of different +error number, a method for 'reporting' these errors in a human readable +form is required. To achieve this, each library has the option of +'registering' error strings. + +typedef struct ERR_string_data_st + { + unsigned long error; + char *string; + } ERR_STRING_DATA; + +The 'ERR_STRING_DATA' contains an error code and the corresponding text +string. To add new function error strings for a library, the +ERR_STRING_DATA needs to be 'registered' with the library. + +void ERR_load_strings(unsigned long lib,ERR_STRING_DATA *err); + This function 'registers' the array of ERR_STRING_DATA pointed to by +'err' as error text strings for the error library 'lib'. + +void ERR_free_strings(void); + This function free()s all the loaded error strings. + +char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long error,char *buf); + This function returns a text string that is a human readable +version of the error represented by 'error'. Buff should be at least 120 +bytes long and if it is NULL, the return value is a pointer to a static +variable that will contain the error string, otherwise 'buf' is returned. +If there is not a text string registered for a particular error, a text +string containing the error number is returned instead. + +void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp); +void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp); + This function is a convenience routine that prints the error string +for each error until all errors have been accounted for. + +char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e); +char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e); +char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e); +The above three functions return the 3 different components strings for the +error 'e'. ERR_error_string() uses these functions. + +void ERR_load_ERR_strings(void ); + This function 'registers' the error strings for the 'ERR' module. + +void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void ); + This function 'register' the error strings for just about every +library in the SSLeay package except for the SSL routines. There is no +need to ever register any error text strings and you will probably save in +program size. If on the other hand you do 'register' all errors, it is +quite easy to determine why a particular routine failed. + +As a final footnote as to why the error system is designed as it is. +1) I did not want a single 'global' error code. +2) I wanted to know which subroutine a failure occurred in. +3) For Windows NT etc, it should be simple to replace the 'key' routines + with code to pass error codes back to the application. +4) I wanted the option of meaningful error text strings. + +Late breaking news - the changes to support threads. + +Each 'thread' has an 'ERR_STATE' state associated with it. +ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void ) will return the 'state' for the calling +thread/process. + +ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid); will 'free()' this state. If pid == 0 +the current 'thread/process' will have it's error state removed. +If you do not remove the error state of a thread, this could be considered a +form of memory leak, so just after 'reaping' a thread that has died, +call ERR_remove_state(pid). + +Have a read of thread.doc for more details for what is required for +multi-threading support. All the other error routines will +work correctly when using threads. + + +==== idea.doc ======================================================== + +The IDEA library. +IDEA is a block cipher that operates on 64bit (8 byte) quantities. It +uses a 128bit (16 byte) key. It can be used in all the modes that DES can +be used. This library implements the ecb, cbc, cfb64 and ofb64 modes. + +For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the +same. + +This library requires the inclusion of 'idea.h'. + +All of the encryption functions take what is called an IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE as an +argument. An IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE is an expanded form of the idea key. +For all modes of the IDEA algorithm, the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE used for +decryption is different to the one used for encryption. + +The define IDEA_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption for the functions +that require an encryption/decryption flag. IDEA_DECRYPT is passed to +specify decryption. For some mode there is no encryption/decryption +flag since this is determined by the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE. + +So to encrypt you would do the following +idea_set_encrypt_key(key,encrypt_ks); +idea_ecb_encrypt(...,encrypt_ks); +idea_cbc_encrypt(....,encrypt_ks,...,IDEA_ENCRYPT); + +To Decrypt +idea_set_encrypt_key(key,encrypt_ks); +idea_set_decrypt_key(encrypt_ks,decrypt_ks); +idea_ecb_encrypt(...,decrypt_ks); +idea_cbc_encrypt(....,decrypt_ks,...,IDEA_DECRYPT); + +Please note that any of the encryption modes specified in my DES library +could be used with IDEA. I have only implemented ecb, cbc, cfb64 and +ofb64 for the following reasons. +- ecb is the basic IDEA encryption. +- cbc is the normal 'chaining' form for block ciphers. +- cfb64 can be used to encrypt single characters, therefore input and output + do not need to be a multiple of 8. +- ofb64 is similar to cfb64 but is more like a stream cipher, not as + secure (not cipher feedback) but it does not have an encrypt/decrypt mode. +- If you want triple IDEA, thats 384 bits of key and you must be totally + obsessed with security. Still, if you want it, it is simple enough to + copy the function from the DES library and change the des_encrypt to + idea_encrypt; an exercise left for the paranoid reader :-). + +The functions are as follows: + +void idea_set_encrypt_key( +unsigned char *key; +IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); + idea_set_encrypt_key converts a 16 byte IDEA key into an + IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE. The IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE is an expanded form of + the key which can be used to perform IDEA encryption. + An IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE is an expanded form of the key which is used to + perform actual encryption. It can be regenerated from the IDEA key + so it only needs to be kept when encryption is about + to occur. Don't save or pass around IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE's since they + are CPU architecture dependent, IDEA keys are not. + +void idea_set_decrypt_key( +IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *encrypt_ks, +IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *decrypt_ks); + This functions converts an encryption IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE into a + decryption IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE. For all decryption, this conversion + of the key must be done. In some modes of IDEA, an + encryption/decryption flag is also required, this is because these + functions involve block chaining and the way this is done changes + depending on which of encryption of decryption is being done. + Please note that there is no quick way to generate the decryption + key schedule other than generating the encryption key schedule and + then converting it. + +void idea_encrypt( +unsigned long *data, +IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); + This is the IDEA encryption function that gets called by just about + every other IDEA routine in the library. You should not use this + function except to implement 'modes' of IDEA. I say this because the + functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to + long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory + access do not occur. + Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and ks is the + IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE to use. Encryption or decryption depends on the + IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE. + +void idea_ecb_encrypt( +unsigned char *input, +unsigned char *output, +IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks); + This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of IDEA (in DES this + mode is called Electronic Code Book so I'm going to use the term + for idea as well :-). + Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by + ks. Depending on the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE, encryption or + decryption occurs. Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes. + +void idea_cbc_encrypt( +unsigned char *input, +unsigned char *output, +long length, +IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE *ks, +unsigned char *ivec, +int enc); + This routine implements IDEA in Cipher Block Chaining mode. + Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted + (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes. + The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above, + should be a multiple of 8). If length is not a multiple of 8, bad + things will probably happen. ivec is the initialisation vector. + This function updates iv after each call so that it can be passed to + the next call to idea_cbc_encrypt(). + +void idea_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num, +int enc); + This is one of the more useful functions in this IDEA library, it + implements CFB mode of IDEA with 64bit feedback. + This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, + you do not require 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. + Enc is used to indicate encryption or decryption. + One very important thing to remember is that when decrypting, use + the encryption form of the key. + CFB64 mode operates by using the cipher to + generate a stream of bytes which is used to encrypt the plain text. + The cipher text is then encrypted to generate the next 64 bits to + be xored (incrementally) with the next 64 bits of plain + text. As can be seen from this, to encrypt or decrypt, + the same 'cipher stream' needs to be generated but the way the next + block of data is gathered for encryption is different for + encryption and decryption. What this means is that to encrypt + idea_set_encrypt_key(key,ks); + idea_cfb64_encrypt(...,ks,..,IDEA_ENCRYPT) + do decrypt + idea_set_encrypt_key(key,ks) + idea_cfb64_encrypt(...,ks,...,IDEA_DECRYPT) + Note: The same IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE but different encryption flags. + For idea_cbc or idea_ecb, idea_set_decrypt_key() would need to be + used to generate the IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE for decryption. + The reason I'm stressing this point is that I just wasted 3 hours + today trying to decrypt using this mode and the decryption form of + the key :-(. + +void idea_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +des_key_schedule ks, +des_cblock *ivec, +int *num); + This functions implements OFB mode of IDEA with 64bit feedback. + This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, + you do not require 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. + This is in effect a stream cipher, there is no encryption or + decryption mode. The same key and iv should be used to + encrypt and decrypt. + +For reading passwords, I suggest using des_read_pw_string() from my DES library. +To generate a password from a text string, I suggest using MD5 (or MD2) to +produce a 16 byte message digest that can then be passed directly to +idea_set_encrypt_key(). + +===== +For more information about the specific IDEA modes in this library +(ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb), read the section entitled 'Modes of DES' from the +documentation on my DES library. What is said about DES is directly +applicable for IDEA. + + +==== legal.doc ======================================================== + +From eay@mincom.com Thu Jun 27 00:25:45 1996 +Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA15821 + (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Wed, 26 Jun 1996 14:25:45 +1000 +Date: Wed, 26 Jun 1996 14:25:45 +1000 (EST) +From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au> +X-Sender: eay@orb +To: Ken Toll <ktoll@ren.digitalage.com> +Cc: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au>, ssl-talk@netscape.com +Subject: Re: Unidentified subject! +In-Reply-To: <9606261950.ZM28943@ren.digitalage.com> +Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.960626131156.28573K-100000@orb> +Mime-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII +Status: O +X-Status: + + +This is a little off topic but since SSLeay is a free implementation of +the SSLv2 protocol, I feel it is worth responding on the topic of if it +is actually legal for Americans to use free cryptographic software. + +On Wed, 26 Jun 1996, Ken Toll wrote: +> Is the U.S the only country that SSLeay cannot be used commercially +> (because of RSAref) or is that going to be an issue with every country +> that a client/server application (non-web browser/server) is deployed +> and sold? + +>From what I understand, the software patents that apply to algorithms +like RSA and DH only apply in the USA. The IDEA algorithm I believe is +patened in europe (USA?), but considing how little it is used by other SSL +implementations, it quite easily be left out of the SSLeay build +(this can be done with a compile flag). + +Actually if the RSA patent did apply outside the USA, it could be rather +interesting since RSA is not alowed to let RSA toolkits outside of the USA +[1], and since these are the only forms that they will alow the algorithm +to be used in, it would mean that non-one outside of the USA could produce +public key software which would be a very strong statment for +international patent law to make :-). This logic is a little flawed but +it still points out some of the more interesting permutations of USA +patent law and ITAR restrictions. + +Inside the USA there is also the unresolved issue of RC4/RC2 which were +made public on sci.crypt in Sep 1994 (RC4) and Feb 1996 (RC2). I have +copies of the origional postings if people are interested. RSA I believe +claim that they were 'trade-secrets' and that some-one broke an NDA in +revealing them. Other claim they reverse engineered the algorithms from +compiled binaries. If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I belive +RSA had no legal leg to stand on. If an NDA was broken, I don't know. +Regardless, RSA, I belive, is willing to go to court over the issue so +licencing is probably the best idea, or at least talk to them. +If there are people who actually know more about this, pease let me know, I +don't want to vilify or spread miss-information if I can help it. + +If you are not producing a web browser, it is easy to build SSLeay with +RC2/RC4 removed. Since RC4 is the defacto standard cipher in +all web software (and it is damn fast) it is more or less required for +www use. For non www use of SSL, especially for an application where +interoperability with other vendors is not critical just leave it out. + +Removing IDEA, RC2 and RC4 would only leave DES and Triple DES but +they should be ok. Considing that Triple DES can encrypt at rates of +410k/sec on a pentium 100, and 940k/sec on a P6/200, this is quite +reasonable performance. Single DES clocks in at 1160k/s and 2467k/s +respectivly is actually quite fast for those not so paranoid (56 bit key).[1] + +> Is it possible to get a certificate for commercial use outside of the U.S.? +yes. + +Thawte Consulting issues certificates (they are the people who sell the + Sioux httpd server and are based in South Africa) +Verisign will issue certificates for Sioux (sold from South Africa), so this + proves that they will issue certificate for OS use if they are + happy with the quality of the software. + +(The above mentioned companies just the ones that I know for sure are issuing + certificates outside the USA). + +There is always the point that if you are using SSL for an intra net, +SSLeay provides programs that can be used so you can issue your own +certificates. They need polishing but at least it is a good starting point. + +I am not doing anything outside Australian law by implementing these +algorithms (to the best of my knowedge). It is another example of how +the world legal system does not cope with the internet very well. + +I may start making shared libraries available (I have now got DLL's for +Windows). This will mean that distributions into the usa could be +shipped with a version with a reduced cipher set and the versions outside +could use the DLL/shared library with all the ciphers (and without RSAref). + +This could be completly hidden from the application, so this would not +even require a re-linking. + +This is the reverse of what people were talking about doing to get around +USA export regulations :-) + +eric + +[1]: The RSAref2.0 tookit is available on at least 3 ftp sites in Europe + and one in South Africa. + +[2]: Since I always get questions when I post benchmark numbers :-), + DES performace figures are in 1000's of bytes per second in cbc + mode using an 8192 byte buffer. The pentium 100 was running Windows NT + 3.51 DLLs and the 686/200 was running NextStep. + I quote pentium 100 benchmarks because it is basically the + 'entry level' computer that most people buy for personal use. + Windows 95 is the OS shipping on those boxes, so I'll give + NT numbers (the same Win32 runtime environment). The 686 + numbers are present as an indication of where we will be in a + few years. +-- +Eric Young | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates. +AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au | RTFM Win32 GetMessage(). + + + +==== lhash.doc ======================================================== + +The LHASH library. + +I wrote this library in 1991 and have since forgotten why I called it lhash. +It implements a hash table from an article I read at the +time from 'Communications of the ACM'. What makes this hash +table different is that as the table fills, the hash table is +increased (or decreased) in size via realloc(). +When a 'resize' is done, instead of all hashes being redistributed over +twice as many 'buckets', one bucket is split. So when an 'expand' is done, +there is only a minimal cost to redistribute some values. Subsequent +inserts will cause more single 'bucket' redistributions but there will +never be a sudden large cost due to redistributing all the 'buckets'. + +The state for a particular hash table is kept in the LHASH structure. +The LHASH structure also records statistics about most aspects of accessing +the hash table. This is mostly a legacy of my writing this library for +the reasons of implementing what looked like a nice algorithm rather than +for a particular software product. + +Internal stuff you probably don't want to know about. +The decision to increase or decrease the hash table size is made depending +on the 'load' of the hash table. The load is the number of items in the +hash table divided by the size of the hash table. The default values are +as follows. If (hash->up_load < load) => expand. +if (hash->down_load > load) => contract. The 'up_load' has a default value of +1 and 'down_load' has a default value of 2. These numbers can be modified +by the application by just playing with the 'up_load' and 'down_load' +variables. The 'load' is kept in a form which is multiplied by 256. So +hash->up_load=8*256; will cause a load of 8 to be set. + +If you are interested in performance the field to watch is +num_comp_calls. The hash library keeps track of the 'hash' value for +each item so when a lookup is done, the 'hashes' are compared, if +there is a match, then a full compare is done, and +hash->num_comp_calls is incremented. If num_comp_calls is not equal +to num_delete plus num_retrieve it means that your hash function is +generating hashes that are the same for different values. It is +probably worth changing your hash function if this is the case because +even if your hash table has 10 items in a 'bucked', it can be searched +with 10 'unsigned long' compares and 10 linked list traverses. This +will be much less expensive that 10 calls to you compare function. + +LHASH *lh_new( +unsigned long (*hash)(), +int (*cmp)()); + This function is used to create a new LHASH structure. It is passed + function pointers that are used to store and retrieve values passed + into the hash table. The 'hash' + function is a hashing function that will return a hashed value of + it's passed structure. 'cmp' is passed 2 parameters, it returns 0 + is they are equal, otherwise, non zero. + If there are any problems (usually malloc failures), NULL is + returned, otherwise a new LHASH structure is returned. The + hash value is normally truncated to a power of 2, so make sure + that your hash function returns well mixed low order bits. + +void lh_free( +LHASH *lh); + This function free()s a LHASH structure. If there is malloced + data in the hash table, it will not be freed. Consider using the + lh_doall function to deallocate any remaining entries in the hash + table. + +char *lh_insert( +LHASH *lh, +char *data); + This function inserts the data pointed to by data into the lh hash + table. If there is already and entry in the hash table entry, the + value being replaced is returned. A NULL is returned if the new + entry does not clash with an entry already in the table (the normal + case) or on a malloc() failure (perhaps I should change this....). + The 'char *data' is exactly what is passed to the hash and + comparison functions specified in lh_new(). + +char *lh_delete( +LHASH *lh, +char *data); + This routine deletes an entry from the hash table. The value being + deleted is returned. NULL is returned if there is no such value in + the hash table. + +char *lh_retrieve( +LHASH *lh, +char *data); + If 'data' is in the hash table it is returned, else NULL is + returned. The way these routines would normally be uses is that a + dummy structure would have key fields populated and then + ret=lh_retrieve(hash,&dummy);. Ret would now be a pointer to a fully + populated structure. + +void lh_doall( +LHASH *lh, +void (*func)(char *a)); + This function will, for every entry in the hash table, call function + 'func' with the data item as parameters. + This function can be quite useful when used as follows. + void cleanup(STUFF *a) + { STUFF_free(a); } + lh_doall(hash,cleanup); + lh_free(hash); + This can be used to free all the entries, lh_free() then + cleans up the 'buckets' that point to nothing. Be careful + when doing this. If you delete entries from the hash table, + in the call back function, the table may decrease in size, + moving item that you are + currently on down lower in the hash table. This could cause + some entries to be skipped. The best solution to this problem + is to set lh->down_load=0 before you start. This will stop + the hash table ever being decreased in size. + +void lh_doall_arg( +LHASH *lh; +void(*func)(char *a,char *arg)); +char *arg; + This function is the same as lh_doall except that the function + called will be passed 'arg' as the second argument. + +unsigned long lh_strhash( +char *c); + This function is a demo string hashing function. Since the LHASH + routines would normally be passed structures, this routine would + not normally be passed to lh_new(), rather it would be used in the + function passed to lh_new(). + +The next three routines print out various statistics about the state of the +passed hash table. These numbers are all kept in the lhash structure. + +void lh_stats( +LHASH *lh, +FILE *out); + This function prints out statistics on the size of the hash table, + how many entries are in it, and the number and result of calls to + the routines in this library. + +void lh_node_stats( +LHASH *lh, +FILE *out); + For each 'bucket' in the hash table, the number of entries is + printed. + +void lh_node_usage_stats( +LHASH *lh, +FILE *out); + This function prints out a short summary of the state of the hash + table. It prints what I call the 'load' and the 'actual load'. + The load is the average number of data items per 'bucket' in the + hash table. The 'actual load' is the average number of items per + 'bucket', but only for buckets which contain entries. So the + 'actual load' is the average number of searches that will need to + find an item in the hash table, while the 'load' is the average number + that will be done to record a miss. + +==== md2.doc ======================================================== + +The MD2 library. +MD2 is a message digest algorithm that can be used to condense an arbitrary +length message down to a 16 byte hash. The functions all need to be passed +a MD2_CTX which is used to hold the MD2 context during multiple MD2_Update() +function calls. The normal method of use for this library is as follows + +MD2_Init(...); +MD2_Update(...); +... +MD2_Update(...); +MD2_Final(...); + +This library requires the inclusion of 'md2.h'. + +The main negative about MD2 is that it is slow, especially when compared +to MD5. + +The functions are as follows: + +void MD2_Init( +MD2_CTX *c); + This function needs to be called to initiate a MD2_CTX structure for + use. + +void MD2_Update( +MD2_CTX *c; +unsigned char *data; +unsigned long len); + This updates the message digest context being generated with 'len' + bytes from the 'data' pointer. The number of bytes can be any + length. + +void MD2_Final( +unsigned char *md; +MD2_CTX *c; + This function is called when a message digest of the data digested + with MD2_Update() is wanted. The message digest is put in the 'md' + array and is MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH (16) bytes long. + +unsigned char *MD2( +unsigned long n; +unsigned char *d; +unsigned char *md; + This function performs a MD2_Init(), followed by a MD2_Update() + followed by a MD2_Final() (using a local MD2_CTX). + The resulting digest is put into 'md' if it is not NULL. + Regardless of the value of 'md', the message + digest is returned from the function. If 'md' was NULL, the message + digest returned is being stored in a static structure. + +==== md5.doc ======================================================== + +The MD5 library. +MD5 is a message digest algorithm that can be used to condense an arbitrary +length message down to a 16 byte hash. The functions all need to be passed +a MD5_CTX which is used to hold the MD5 context during multiple MD5_Update() +function calls. This library also contains random number routines that are +based on MD5 + +The normal method of use for this library is as follows + +MD5_Init(...); +MD5_Update(...); +... +MD5_Update(...); +MD5_Final(...); + +This library requires the inclusion of 'md5.h'. + +The functions are as follows: + +void MD5_Init( +MD5_CTX *c); + This function needs to be called to initiate a MD5_CTX structure for + use. + +void MD5_Update( +MD5_CTX *c; +unsigned char *data; +unsigned long len); + This updates the message digest context being generated with 'len' + bytes from the 'data' pointer. The number of bytes can be any + length. + +void MD5_Final( +unsigned char *md; +MD5_CTX *c; + This function is called when a message digest of the data digested + with MD5_Update() is wanted. The message digest is put in the 'md' + array and is MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH (16) bytes long. + +unsigned char *MD5( +unsigned char *d; +unsigned long n; +unsigned char *md; + This function performs a MD5_Init(), followed by a MD5_Update() + followed by a MD5_Final() (using a local MD5_CTX). + The resulting digest is put into 'md' if it is not NULL. + Regardless of the value of 'md', the message + digest is returned from the function. If 'md' was NULL, the message + digest returned is being stored in a static structure. + + +==== memory.doc ======================================================== + +In the interests of debugging SSLeay, there is an option to compile +using some simple memory leak checking. + +All malloc(), free() and realloc() calls in SSLeay now go via +Malloc(), Free() and Realloc() (except those in crypto/lhash). + +If CRYPTO_MDEBUG is defined, these calls are #defined to +CRYPTO_malloc(), CRYPTO_free() and CRYPTO_realloc(). +If it is not defined, they are #defined to malloc(), free() and realloc(). + +the CRYPTO_malloc() routines by default just call the underlying library +functons. + +If CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) is called, memory leak detection is +turned on. CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) turns it off. + +When turned on, each Malloc() or Realloc() call is recored along with the file +and line number from where the call was made. (This is done using the +lhash library which always uses normal system malloc(3) routines). + +void CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b); +void CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(FILE *fp); +These both print out the list of memory that has not been free()ed. +This will probably be rather hard to read, but if you look for the 'top level' +structure allocation, this will often give an idea as to what is not being +free()ed. I don't expect people to use this stuff normally. + +==== ca.1 ======================================================== + +From eay@orb.mincom.oz.au Thu Dec 28 23:56:45 1995 +Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA07374 + (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Thu, 28 Dec 1995 13:56:45 +1000 +Date: Thu, 28 Dec 1995 13:56:45 +1000 (EST) +From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au> +X-Sender: eay@orb +To: sameer <sameer@c2.org> +Cc: ssleay@mincom.oz.au +Subject: Re: 'ca' +In-Reply-To: <199512230440.UAA23410@infinity.c2.org> +Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951228133525.7269A-100000@orb> +Mime-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII +Status: RO +X-Status: + +On Fri, 22 Dec 1995, sameer wrote: +> I could use documentation on 'ca'. Thanks. + +Very quickly. +The ca program uses the ssleay.conf file for most of its configuration + +./ca -help + + -verbose - Talk alot while doing things + -config file - A config file. If you don't want to use the + default config file + -name arg - The particular CA definition to use + In the config file, the section to use for parameters. This lets + multiple setups to be contained in the one file. By default, the + default_ca variable is looked up in the [ ca ] section. So in the + shipped ssleay.conf, the CA definition used is CA_default. It could be + any other name. + -gencrl days - Generate a new CRL, days is when the next CRL is due + This will generate a new certificate revocion list. + -days arg - number of days to certify the certificate for + When certifiying certificates, this is the number of days to use. + -md arg - md to use, one of md2, md5, sha or sha1 + -policy arg - The CA 'policy' to support + I'll describe this later, but there are 2 policies definied in the + shipped ssleay.conf + -keyfile arg - PEM RSA private key file + -key arg - key to decode the RSA private key if it is encrypted + since we need to keep the CA's RSA key encrypted + -cert - The CA certificate + -in file - The input PEM encoded certificate request(s) + -out file - Where to put the output file(s) + -outdir dir - Where to put output certificates + The -out options concatinates all the output certificied + certificates to one file, -outdir puts them in a directory, + named by serial number. + -infiles .... - The last argument, requests to process + The certificate requests to process, -in is the same. + +Just about all the above have default values defined in ssleay.conf. + +The key variables in ssleay.conf are (for the pariticular '-name' being +used, in the default, it is CA_default). + +dir is where all the CA database stuff is kept. +certs is where all the previously issued certificates are kept. +The database is a simple text database containing the following tab separated +fields. +status: a value of 'R' - revoked, 'E' -expired or 'V' valid. +issued date: When the certificate was certified. +revoked date: When it was revoked, blank if not revoked. +serial number: The certificate serial number. +certificate: Where the certificate is located. +CN: The name of the certificate. + +The demo file has quite a few made up values it it. The last 2 were +added by the ca program and are acurate. +The CA program does not update the 'certificate' file correctly right now. +The serial field should be unique as should the CN/status combination. +The ca program checks these at startup. What still needs to be +wrtten is a program to 'regenerate' the data base file from the issued +certificate list (and a CRL list). + +Back to the CA_default variables. + +Most of the variables are commented. + +policy is the default policy. + +Ok for policies, they define the order and which fields must be present +in the certificate request and what gets filled in. + +So a value of +countryName = match +means that the country name must match the CA certificate. +organizationalUnitName = optional +The org.Unit,Name does not have to be present and +commonName = supplied +commonName must be supplied in the certificate request. + +For the 'policy_match' polocy, the order of the attributes in the +generated certiticate would be +countryName +stateOrProvinceName +organizationName +organizationalUnitName +commonName +emailAddress + +Have a play, it sort of makes sense. If you think about how the persona +requests operate, it is similar to the 'policy_match' policy and the +'policy_anything' is similar to what versign is doing. + +I hope this helps a bit. Some backend scripts are definitly needed to +update the database and to make certificate revocion easy. All +certificates issued should also be kept forever (or until they expire?) + +hope this helps +eric (who has to run off an buy some cheap knee pads for the caving in 4 +days time :-) + +-- +Eric Young | Signature removed since it was generating +AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au | more followups than the message contents :-) + + +==== ms3-ca.doc ======================================================== + +Date: Mon, 9 Jun 97 08:00:33 +0200 +From: Holger.Reif@PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE (Holger Reif) +Subject: ms3-ca.doc +Organization: TU Ilmenau, Fak. IA, FG Telematik +Content-Length: 14575 +Status: RO +X-Status: + +Loading client certs into MSIE 3.01 +=================================== + +This document contains all the information necessary to successfully set up +some scripts to issue client certs to Microsoft Internet Explorer. It +includes the required knowledge about the model MSIE uses for client +certification and includes complete sample scripts ready to play with. The +scripts were tested against a modified ca program of SSLeay 0.6.6 and should +work with the regular ca program that comes with version 0.8.0. I haven't +tested against MSIE 4.0 + +You can use the information contained in this document in either way you +want. However if you feel it saved you a lot of time I ask you to be as fair +as to mention my name: Holger Reif <reif@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de>. + +1.) The model used by MSIE +-------------------------- + +The Internet Explorer doesn't come with a embedded engine for installing +client certs like Netscape's Navigator. It rather uses the CryptoAPI (CAPI) +defined by Microsoft. CAPI comes with WindowsNT 4.0 or is installed together +with Internet Explorer since 3.01. The advantage of this approach is a higher +flexibility because the certificates in the (per user) system open +certificate store may be used by other applications as well. The drawback +however is that you need to do a bit more work to get a client cert issued. + +CAPI defines functions which will handle basic cryptographic work, eg. +generating keys, encrypting some data, signing text or building a certificate +request. The procedure is as follows: A CAPI function generates you a key +pair and saves it into the certificate store. After that one builds a +Distinguished Name. Together with that key pair another CAPI function forms a +PKCS#10 request which you somehow need to submit to a CA. Finally the issued +cert is given to a yet another CAPI function which saves it into the +certificate store. + +The certificate store with the user's keys and certs is in the registry. You +will find it under HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/Microsoft/Cryptography/ (I +leave it to you as a little exercise to figure out what all the entries mean +;-). Note that the keys are protected only with the user's usual Windows +login password. + +2.) The practical usage +----------------------- + +Unfortunatly since CAPI is a system API you can't access its functions from +HTML code directly. For this purpose Microsoft provides a wrapper called +certenr3.dll. This DLL accesses the CAPI functions and provides an interface +usable from Visual Basic Script. One needs to install that library on the +computer which wants to have client cert. The easiest way is to load it as an +ActiveX control (certenr3.dll is properly authenticode signed by MS ;-). If +you have ever enrolled e cert request at a CA you will have installed it. + +At time of writing certenr3.dll is contained in +http://www.microsoft.com/workshop/prog/security/csa/certenr3.exe. It comes +with an README file which explains the available functions. It is labeled +beta but every CA seems to use it anyway. The license.txt allows you the +usage for your own purposes (as far as I understood) and a somehow limited +distribution. + +The two functions of main interest are GenerateKeyPair and AcceptCredentials. +For complete explanation of all possible parameters see the README file. Here +are only minimal required parameters and their values. + +GenerateKeyPair(sessionID, FASLE, szName, 0, "ClientAuth", TRUE, FALSE, 1) +- sessionID is a (locally to that computer) unique string to correlate the +generated key pair with a cert installed later. +- szName is the DN of the form "C=DE; S=Thueringen; L=Ilmenau; CN=Holger +Reif; 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=reif@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de". Note that S is the +abreviation for StateOrProvince. The recognized abreviation include CN, O, C, +OU, G, I, L, S, T. If the abreviation is unknown (eg. for PKCS#9 email addr) +you need to use the full object identifier. The starting point for searching +them could be crypto/objects.h since all OIDs know to SSLeay are listed +there. +- note: the possible ninth parameter which should give a default name to the +certificate storage location doesn't seem to work. Changes to the constant +values in the call above doesn't seem to make sense. You can't generate +PKCS#10 extensions with that function. + +The result of GenerateKeyPair is the base64 encoded PKCS#10 request. However +it has a little strange format that SSLeay doesn't accept. (BTW I feel the +decision of rejecting that format as standard conforming.) It looks like +follows: + 1st line with 76 chars + 2nd line with 76 chars + ... + (n-2)th line with 76 chars + (n-1)th line contains a multiple of 4 chars less then 76 (possible +empty) + (n)th line has zero or 4 chars (then with 1 or 2 equal signs - the + original text's lenght wasn'T a multiple of 3) + The line separator has two chars: 0x0d 0x0a + +AcceptCredentials(sessionID, credentials, 0, FALSE) +- sessionID needs to be the same as while generating the key pair +- credentials is the base64 encoded PKCS#7 object containing the cert. + +CRL's and CA certs are not required simply just the client cert. (It seems to +me that both are not even checked somehow.) The only format of the base64 +encoded object I succesfully used was all characters in a very long string +without line feeds or carriage returns. (Hey, it doesn't matter, only a +computer reads it!) + +The result should be S_OK. For error handling see the example that comes with +certenr3.dll. + +A note about ASN.1 character encodings. certenr3.dll seems to know only about +2 of them: UniversalString and PrintableString. First it is definitely wrong +for an email address which is IA5STRING (checked by ssleay's ca). Second +unfortunately MSIE (at least until version 3.02) can't handle UniversalString +correctly - they just blow up you cert store! Therefore ssleay's ca (starting +from version 0.8.0) tries to convert the encodings automatically to IA5STRING +or TeletexString. The beef is it will work only for the latin-1 (western) +charset. Microsoft still has to do abit of homework... + +3.) An example +-------------- + +At least you need two steps: generating the key & request and then installing +the certificate. A real world CA would have some more steps involved, eg. +accepting some license. Note that both scripts shown below are just +experimental state without any warrenty! + +First how to generate a request. Note that we can't use a static page because +of the sessionID. I generate it from system time plus pid and hope it is +unique enough. Your are free to feed it through md5 to get more impressive +ID's ;-) Then the intended text is read in with sed which inserts the +sessionID. + +-----BEGIN ms-enroll.cgi----- +#!/bin/sh +SESSION_ID=`date '+%y%m%d%H%M%S'`$$ +echo Content-type: text/html +echo +sed s/template_for_sessId/$SESSION_ID/ <<EOF +<HTML><HEAD> +<TITLE>Certificate Enrollment Test Page</TITLE> +</HEAD><BODY> + +<OBJECT + classid="clsid:33BEC9E0-F78F-11cf-B782-00C04FD7BF43" + codebase=certenr3.dll + id=certHelper + > +</OBJECT> + +<CENTER> +<H2>enrollment for a personal cert</H2> +<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR><P> +<FORM NAME="MSIE_Enrollment" ACTION="ms-gencert.cgi" ENCTYPE=x-www-form- +encoded METHOD=POST> +<TABLE> + <TR><TD>Country</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="Country" VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD>State</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="StateOrProvince" VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD>Location</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="Location" VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD>Organization</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="Organization" +VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD>Organizational Unit</TD> + <TD><INPUT NAME="OrganizationalUnit" VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD>Name</TD><TD><INPUT NAME="CommonName" VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD>eMail Address</TD> + <TD><INPUT NAME="EmailAddress" VALUE=""></TD></TR> + <TR><TD></TD> + <TD><INPUT TYPE="BUTTON" NAME="submit" VALUE="Beantragen"></TD></TR> +</TABLE> + <INPUT TYPE="hidden" NAME="SessionId" VALUE="template_for_sessId"> + <INPUT TYPE="hidden" NAME="Request" VALUE=""> +</FORM> +<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR><P> +</CENTER> + +<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=VBS> + Dim DN + + Sub Submit_OnClick + Dim TheForm + Set TheForm = Document.MSIE_Enrollment + sessionId = TheForm.SessionId.value + reqHardware = FALSE + C = TheForm.Country.value + SP = TheForm.StateOrProvince.value + L = TheForm.Location.value + O = TheForm.Organization.value + OU = TheForm.OrganizationalUnit.value + CN = TheForm.CommonName.value + Email = TheForm.EmailAddress.value + szPurpose = "ClientAuth" + doAcceptanceUINow = FALSE + doOnline = TRUE + + DN = "" + + Call Add_RDN("C", C) + Call Add_RDN("S", SP) + Call Add_RDN("L", L) + Call Add_RDN("O", O) + Call Add_RDN("OU", OU) + Call Add_RDN("CN", CN) + Call Add_RDN("1.2.840.113549.1.9.1", Email) + ' rsadsi + ' pkcs + ' pkcs9 + ' eMailAddress + On Error Resume Next + sz10 = certHelper.GenerateKeyPair(sessionId, _ + FALSE, DN, 0, ClientAuth, FASLE, TRUE, 1)_ + theError = Err.Number + On Error Goto 0 + if (sz10 = Empty OR theError <> 0) Then + sz = "The error '" & Hex(theError) & "' occurred." & chr(13) & _ + chr(10) & "Your credentials could not be generated." + result = MsgBox(sz, 0, "Credentials Enrollment") + Exit Sub + else + TheForm.Request.value = sz10 + TheForm.Submit + end if + End Sub + + Sub Add_RDN(sn, value) + if (value <> "") then + if (DN <> "") then + DN = DN & "; " + end if + DN = DN & sn & "=" & value + end if + End Sub +</SCRIPT> +</BODY> +</HTML> +EOF +-----END ms-enroll.cgi----- + +Second, how to extract the request and feed the certificate back? We need to +"normalize" the base64 encoding of the PKCS#10 format which means +regenerating the lines and wrapping with BEGIN and END line. This is done by +gawk. The request is taken by ca the normal way. Then the cert needs to be +packed into a PKCS#7 structure (note: the use of a CRL is necessary for +crl2pkcs7 as of version 0.6.6. Starting with 0.8.0 it it might probably be +ommited). Finally we need to format the PKCS#7 object and generate the HTML +text. I use two templates to have a clearer script. + +1st note: postit2 is slightly modified from a program I found at ncsa's ftp +site. Grab it from http://www.easterngraphics.com/certs/IX9704/postit2.c. You +need utils.c from there too. + +2nd note: I'm note quite sure wether the gawk script really handles all +possible inputs for the request right! Today I don't use this construction +anymore myself. + +3d note: the cert must be of version 3! This could be done with the nsComment +line in ssleay.cnf... + +------BEGIN ms-gencert.cgi----- +#!/bin/sh +FILE="/tmp/"`date '+%y%m%d%H%M%S'-`$$ +rm -f "$FILE".* + +HOME=`pwd`; export HOME # as ssleay.cnf insists on having such an env var +cd /usr/local/ssl #where demoCA (as named in ssleay.conf) is located + +postit2 -s " " -i 0x0d > "$FILE".inp # process the FORM vars + +SESSION_ID=`gawk '$1 == "SessionId" { print $2; exit }' "$FILE".inp` + +gawk \ + 'BEGIN { \ + OFS = ""; \ + print "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----"; \ + req_seen=0 \ + } \ + $1 == "Request" { \ + req_seen=1; \ + if (length($2) == 72) print($2); \ + lastline=$2; \ + next; \ + } \ + { \ + if (req_seen == 1) { \ + if (length($1) >= 72) print($1); \ + else if (length(lastline) < 72) { \ + req_seen=0; \ + print (lastline,$1); \ + } \ + lastline=$1; \ + } \ + } \ + END { \ + print "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----"; \ + }' > "$FILE".pem < "$FILE".inp + +ssleay ca -batch -in "$FILE".pem -key passwd -out "$FILE".out +ssleay crl2pkcs7 -certfile "$FILE".out -out "$FILE".pkcs7 -in demoCA/crl.pem + +sed s/template_for_sessId/$SESSION_ID/ <ms-enroll2a.html >"$FILE".cert +/usr/local/bin/gawk \ + 'BEGIN { \ + OFS = ""; \ + dq = sprintf("%c",34); \ + } \ + $0 ~ "PKCS7" { next; } \ + { \ + print dq$0dq" & _"; \ + }' <"$FILE".pkcs7 >> "$FILE".cert +cat ms-enroll2b.html >>"$FILE".cert + +echo Content-type: text/html +echo Content-length: `wc -c "$FILE".cert` +echo +cat "$FILE".cert +rm -f "$FILE".* +-----END ms-gencert.cgi----- + +----BEGIN ms-enroll2a.html---- +<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Certificate Acceptance Test Page</TITLE></HEAD><BODY> + +<OBJECT + classid="clsid:33BEC9E0-F78F-11cf-B782-00C04FD7BF43" + codebase=certenr3.dll + id=certHelper + > +</OBJECT> + +<CENTER> +<H2>Your personal certificate</H2> +<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR><P> +Press the button! +<P><INPUT TYPE=BUTTON VALUE="Nimm mich!" NAME="InstallCert"> +</CENTER> +<BR><HR WIDTH=50%><BR> + +<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=VBS> + Sub InstallCert_OnClick + + sessionId = "template_for_sessId" +credentials = "" & _ +----END ms-enroll2a.html---- + +----BEGIN ms-enroll2b.html---- +"" + On Error Resume Next + result = certHelper.AcceptCredentials(sessionId, credentials, 0, +FALSE) + if (IsEmpty(result)) Then + sz = "The error '" & Err.Number & "' occurred." & chr(13) & +chr(10) & "This Digital ID could not be registered." + msgOut = MsgBox(sz, 0, "Credentials Registration Error") + navigate "error.html" + else + sz = "Digital ID successfully registered." + msgOut = MsgBox(sz, 0, "Credentials Registration") + navigate "success.html" + end if + Exit Sub + End Sub +</SCRIPT> +</BODY> +</HTML> +----END ms-enroll2b.html---- + +4.) What do do with the cert? +----------------------------- + +The cert is visible (without restarting MSIE) under the following menu: +View->Options->Security->Personal certs. You can examine it's contents at +least partially. + +To use it for client authentication you need to use SSL3.0 (fortunately +SSLeay supports it with 0.8.0). Furthermore MSIE is told to only supports a +kind of automatic selection of certs (I personally wasn't able to test it +myself). But there is a requirement that the issuer of the server cert and +the issuer of the client cert needs to be the same (according to a developer +from MS). Which means: you need may more then one cert to talk to all +servers... + +I'm sure we will get a bit more experience after ApacheSSL is available for +SSLeay 0.8.8. + + +I hope you enjoyed reading and that in future questions on this topic will +rarely appear on ssl-users@moncom.com ;-) + +Ilmenau, 9th of June 1997 +Holger Reif <reif@prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de> +-- +read you later - Holger Reif +---------------------------------------- Signaturprojekt Deutsche Einheit +TU Ilmenau - Informatik - Telematik (Verdamp lang her) +Holger.Reif@PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE Alt wie ein Baum werden, um ueber +http://Remus.PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE/Reif/ alle 7 Bruecken gehen zu koennen + + +==== ns-ca.doc ======================================================== + +The following documentation was supplied by Jeff Barber, who provided the +patch to the CA program to add this functionality. + +eric +-- +Jeff Barber Email: jeffb@issl.atl.hp.com + +Hewlett Packard Phone: (404) 648-9503 +Internet and System Security Lab Fax: (404) 648-9516 + + oo +---------------------cut /\ here for ns-ca.doc ------------------------------ + +This document briefly describes how to use SSLeay to implement a +certificate authority capable of dynamically serving up client +certificates for version 3.0 beta 5 (and presumably later) versions of +the Netscape Navigator. Before describing how this is done, it's +important to understand a little about how the browser implements its +client certificate support. This is documented in some detail in the +URLs based at <URL:http://home.netscape.com/eng/security/certs.html>. +Here's a brief overview: + +- The Navigator supports a new HTML tag "KEYGEN" which will cause + the browser to generate an RSA key pair when you submit a form + containing the tag. The public key, along with an optional + challenge (supposedly provided for use in certificate revocation + but I don't use it) is signed, DER-encoded, base-64 encoded + and sent to the web server as the value of the variable + whose NAME is provided in the KEYGEN tag. The private key is + stored by the browser in a local key database. + + This "Signed Public Key And Challenge" (SPKAC) arrives formatted + into 64 character lines (which are of course URL-encoded when + sent via HTTP -- i.e. spaces, newlines and most punctuatation are + encoded as "%HH" where HH is the hex equivalent of the ASCII code). + Note that the SPKAC does not contain the other usual attributes + of a certificate request, especially the subject name fields. + These must be otherwise encoded in the form for submission along + with the SPKAC. + +- Either immediately (in response to this form submission), or at + some later date (a real CA will probably verify your identity in + some way before issuing the certificate), a web server can send a + certificate based on the public key and other attributes back to + the browser by encoding it in DER (the binary form) and sending it + to the browser as MIME type: + "Content-type: application/x-x509-user-cert" + + The browser uses the public key encoded in the certificate to + associate the certificate with the appropriate private key in + its local key database. Now, the certificate is "installed". + +- When a server wants to require authentication based on client + certificates, it uses the right signals via the SSL protocol to + trigger the Navigator to ask you which certificate you want to + send. Whether the certificate is accepted is dependent on CA + certificates and so forth installed in the server and is beyond + the scope of this document. + + +Now, here's how the SSLeay package can be used to provide client +certficates: + +- You prepare a file for input to the SSLeay ca application. + The file contains a number of "name = value" pairs that identify + the subject. The names here are the same subject name component + identifiers used in the CA section of the lib/ssleay.conf file, + such as "emailAddress", "commonName" "organizationName" and so + forth. Both the long version and the short version (e.g. "Email", + "CN", "O") can be used. + + One more name is supported: this one is "SPKAC". Its value + is simply the value of the base-64 encoded SPKAC sent by the + browser (with all the newlines and other space charaters + removed -- and newline escapes are NOT supported). + + [ As of SSLeay 0.6.4, multiple lines are supported. + Put a \ at the end of each line and it will be joined with the + previous line with the '\n' removed - eay ] + + Here's a sample input file: + +C = US +SP = Georgia +O = Some Organization, Inc. +OU = Netscape Compatibility Group +CN = John X. Doe +Email = jxdoe@someorg.com +SPKAC = MIG0MGAwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEAwmk6FMJ4uAVIYbcvIOx5+bDGTfvL8X5gE+R67ccMk6rCSGbVQz2cetyQtnI+VIs0NwdD6wjuSuVtVFbLoHonowIDAQABFgAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADQQBFZDUWFl6BJdomtN1Bi53mwijy1rRgJ4YirF15yBEDM3DjAQkKXHYOIX+qpz4KXKnl6EYxTnGSFL5wWt8X2iyx + +- You execute the ca command (either from a CGI program run out of + the web server, or as a later manual task) giving it the above + file as input. For example, if the file were named /tmp/cert.req, + you'd run: + $SSLDIR/bin/ca -spkac /tmp/cert.req -out /tmp/cert + + The output is in DER format (binary) if a -out argument is + provided, as above; otherwise, it's in the PEM format (base-64 + encoded DER). Also, the "-batch" switch is implied by the + "-spkac" so you don't get asked whether to complete the signing + (probably it shouldn't work this way but I was only interested + in hacking together an online CA that could be used for issuing + test certificates). + + The "-spkac" capability doesn't support multiple files (I think). + + Any CHALLENGE provided in the SPKAC is simply ignored. + + The interactions between the identification fields you provide + and those identified in your lib/ssleay.conf are the same as if + you did an ordinary "ca -in infile -out outfile" -- that is, if + something is marked as required in the ssleay.conf file and it + isn't found in the -spkac file, the certificate won't be issued. + +- Now, you pick up the output from /tmp/cert and pass it back to + the Navigator prepending the Content-type string described earlier. + +- In order to run the ca command out of a CGI program, you must + provide a password to decrypt the CA's private key. You can + do this by using "echo MyKeyPassword | $SSLDIR/bin/ca ..." + I think there's a way to not encrypt the key file in the first + place, but I didn't see how to do that, so I made a small change + to the library that allows the password to be accepted from a pipe. + Either way is UTTERLY INSECURE and a real CA would never do that. + + [ You can use the 'ssleay rsa' command to remove the password + from the private key, or you can use the '-key' option to the + ca command to specify the decryption key on the command line + or use the -nodes option when generating the key. + ca will try to clear the command line version of the password + but for quite a few operating systems, this is not possible. + - eric ] + +So, what do you have to do to make use of this stuff to create an online +demo CA capability with SSLeay? + +1 Create an HTML form for your users. The form should contain + fields for all of the required or optional fields in ssleay.conf. + The form must contain a KEYGEN tag somewhere with at least a NAME + attribute. + +2 Create a CGI program to process the form input submitted by the + browser. The CGI program must URL-decode the variables and create + the file described above, containing subject identification info + as well as the SPKAC block. It should then run the the ca program + with the -spkac option. If it works (check the exit status), + return the new certificate with the appropriate MIME type. If not, + return the output of the ca command with MIME type "text/plain". + +3 Set up your web server to accept connections signed by your demo + CA. This probably involves obtaining the PEM-encoded CA certificate + (ordinarily in $SSLDIR/CA/cacert.pem) and installing it into a + server database. See your server manual for instructions. + + +==== obj.doc ======================================================== + +The Object library. + +As part of my Crypto library, I found I required a method of identifying various +objects. These objects normally had 3 different values associated with +them, a short text name, a long (or lower case) text name, and an +ASN.1 Object Identifier (which is a sequence of numbers). +This library contains a static list of objects and functions to lookup +according to one type and to return the other types. + +To use these routines, 'Object.h' needs to be included. + +For each supported object, #define entries are defined as follows +#define SN_Algorithm "Algorithm" +#define LN_algorithm "algorithm" +#define NID_algorithm 38 +#define OBJ_algorithm 1L,3L,14L,3L,2L + +SN_ stands for short name. +LN_ stands for either long name or lowercase name. +NID_ stands for Numeric ID. I each object has a unique NID and this + should be used internally to identify objects. +OBJ_ stands for ASN.1 Object Identifier or ASN1_OBJECT as defined in the + ASN1 routines. These values are used in ASN1 encoding. + +The following functions are to be used to return pointers into a static +definition of these types. What this means is "don't try to free() any +pointers returned from these functions. + +ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj( +int n); + Return the ASN1_OBJECT that corresponds to a NID of n. + +char *OBJ_nid2ln( +int n); + Return the long/lower case name of the object represented by the + NID of n. + +char *OBJ_nid2sn( +int n); + Return the short name for the object represented by the NID of n. + +ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup( +ASN1_OBJECT *o); + Duplicate and return a new ASN1_OBJECT that is the same as the + passed parameter. + +int OBJ_obj2nid( +ASN1_OBJECT *o); + Given ASN1_OBJECT o, return the NID that corresponds. + +int OBJ_ln2nid( +char *s); + Given the long/lower case name 's', return the NID of the object. + +int OBJ_sn2nid( +char *s); + Given the short name 's', return the NID of the object. + +char *OBJ_bsearch( +char *key, +char *base, +int num, +int size, +int (*cmp)()); + Since I have come across a few platforms that do not have the + bsearch() function, OBJ_bsearch is my version of that function. + Feel free to use this function, but you may as well just use the + normal system bsearch(3) if it is present. This version also + has tolerance of being passed NULL pointers. + +==== keys =========================================================== + +EVP_PKEY_DSA +EVP_PKEY_DSA2 +EVP_PKEY_DSA3 +EVP_PKEY_DSA4 + +EVP_PKEY_RSA +EVP_PKEY_RSA2 + +valid DSA pkey types + NID_dsa + NID_dsaWithSHA + NID_dsaWithSHA1 + NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 + +valid RSA pkey types + NID_rsaEncryption + NID_rsa + +NID_dsaWithSHA NID_dsaWithSHA DSA SHA +NID_dsa NID_dsaWithSHA1 DSA SHA1 +NID_md2 NID_md2WithRSAEncryption RSA-pkcs1 MD2 +NID_md5 NID_md5WithRSAEncryption RSA-pkcs1 MD5 +NID_mdc2 NID_mdc2WithRSA RSA-none MDC2 +NID_ripemd160 NID_ripemd160WithRSA RSA-pkcs1 RIPEMD160 +NID_sha NID_shaWithRSAEncryption RSA-pkcs1 SHA +NID_sha1 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption RSA-pkcs1 SHA1 + +==== rand.doc ======================================================== + +My Random number library. + +These routines can be used to generate pseudo random numbers and can be +used to 'seed' the pseudo random number generator (RNG). The RNG make no +effort to reproduce the same random number stream with each execution. +Various other routines in the SSLeay library 'seed' the RNG when suitable +'random' input data is available. Read the section at the end for details +on the design of the RNG. + +void RAND_bytes( +unsigned char *buf, +int num); + This routine puts 'num' random bytes into 'buf'. One should make + sure RAND_seed() has been called before using this routine. + +void RAND_seed( +unsigned char *buf, +int num); + This routine adds more 'seed' data the RNG state. 'num' bytes + are added to the RNG state, they are taken from 'buf'. This + routine can be called with sensitive data such as user entered + passwords. This sensitive data is in no way recoverable from + the RAND library routines or state. Try to pass as much data + from 'random' sources as possible into the RNG via this function. + Also strongly consider using the RAND_load_file() and + RAND_write_file() routines. + +void RAND_cleanup(); + When a program has finished with the RAND library, if it so + desires, it can 'zero' all RNG state. + +The following 3 routines are convenience routines that can be used to +'save' and 'restore' data from/to the RNG and it's state. +Since the more 'random' data that is feed as seed data the better, why not +keep it around between executions of the program? Of course the +application should pass more 'random' data in via RAND_seed() and +make sure no-one can read the 'random' data file. + +char *RAND_file_name( +char *buf, +int size); + This routine returns a 'default' name for the location of a 'rand' + file. The 'rand' file should keep a sequence of random bytes used + to initialise the RNG. The filename is put in 'buf'. Buf is 'size' + bytes long. Buf is returned if things go well, if they do not, + NULL is returned. The 'rand' file name is generated in the + following way. First, if there is a 'RANDFILE' environment + variable, it is returned. Second, if there is a 'HOME' environment + variable, $HOME/.rand is returned. Third, NULL is returned. NULL + is also returned if a buf would overflow. + +int RAND_load_file( +char *file, +long number); + This function 'adds' the 'file' into the RNG state. It does this by + doing a RAND_seed() on the value returned from a stat() system call + on the file and if 'number' is non-zero, upto 'number' bytes read + from the file. The number of bytes passed to RAND_seed() is returned. + +int RAND_write_file( +char *file), + RAND_write_file() writes N random bytes to the file 'file', where + N is the size of the internal RND state (currently 1k). + This is a suitable method of saving RNG state for reloading via + RAND_load_file(). + +What follows is a description of this RNG and a description of the rational +behind it's design. + +It should be noted that this RNG is intended to be used to generate +'random' keys for various ciphers including generation of DH and RSA keys. + +It should also be noted that I have just created a system that I am happy with. +It may be overkill but that does not worry me. I have not spent that much +time on this algorithm so if there are glaring errors, please let me know. +Speed has not been a consideration in the design of these routines. + +First up I will state the things I believe I need for a good RNG. +1) A good hashing algorithm to mix things up and to convert the RNG 'state' + to random numbers. +2) An initial source of random 'state'. +3) The state should be very large. If the RNG is being used to generate + 4096 bit RSA keys, 2 2048 bit random strings are required (at a minimum). + If your RNG state only has 128 bits, you are obviously limiting the + search space to 128 bits, not 2048. I'm probably getting a little + carried away on this last point but it does indicate that it may not be + a bad idea to keep quite a lot of RNG state. It should be easier to + break a cipher than guess the RNG seed data. +4) Any RNG seed data should influence all subsequent random numbers + generated. This implies that any random seed data entered will have + an influence on all subsequent random numbers generated. +5) When using data to seed the RNG state, the data used should not be + extractable from the RNG state. I believe this should be a + requirement because one possible source of 'secret' semi random + data would be a private key or a password. This data must + not be disclosed by either subsequent random numbers or a + 'core' dump left by a program crash. +6) Given the same initial 'state', 2 systems should deviate in their RNG state + (and hence the random numbers generated) over time if at all possible. +7) Given the random number output stream, it should not be possible to determine + the RNG state or the next random number. + + +The algorithm is as follows. + +There is global state made up of a 1023 byte buffer (the 'state'), a +working message digest ('md') and a counter ('count'). + +Whenever seed data is added, it is inserted into the 'state' as +follows. + The input is chopped up into units of 16 bytes (or less for + the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the MD5 + message digest. The data passed to the MD5 digest is the + current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' + (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as + the current 'block' and the new key data 'block'. The result + of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the 'state' at the + same locations that were used as input into the MD5. + I believe this system addresses points 1 (MD5), 3 (the 'state'), + 4 (via the 'md'), 5 (by the use of MD5 and xor). + +When bytes are extracted from the RNG, the following process is used. +For each group of 8 bytes (or less), we do the following, + Input into MD5, the top 8 bytes from 'md', the byte that are + to be overwritten by the random bytes and bytes from the + 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output + (which is kept in 'md'), the top (upto) 8 bytes are + returned to the caller and the bottom (upto) 8 bytes are xored + into the 'state'. + Finally, after we have finished 'generation' random bytes for the + called, 'count' (which is incremented) and 'md' are fed into MD5 and + the results are kept in 'md'. + I believe the above addressed points 1 (use of MD5), 6 (by + hashing into the 'state' the 'old' data from the caller that + is about to be overwritten) and 7 (by not using the 8 bytes + given to the caller to update the 'state', but they are used + to update 'md'). + +So of the points raised, only 2 is not addressed, but sources of +random data will always be a problem. + + +==== rc2.doc ======================================================== + +The RC2 library. + +RC2 is a block cipher that operates on 64bit (8 byte) quantities. It +uses variable size key, but 128bit (16 byte) key would normally be considered +good. It can be used in all the modes that DES can be used. This +library implements the ecb, cbc, cfb64, ofb64 modes. + +I have implemented this library from an article posted to sci.crypt on +11-Feb-1996. I personally don't know how far to trust the RC2 cipher. +While it is capable of having a key of any size, not much reseach has +publically been done on it at this point in time (Apr-1996) +since the cipher has only been public for a few months :-) +It is of a similar speed to DES and IDEA, so unless it is required for +meeting some standard (SSLv2, perhaps S/MIME), it would probably be advisable +to stick to IDEA, or for the paranoid, Tripple DES. + +Mind you, having said all that, I should mention that I just read alot and +implement ciphers, I'm a 'babe in the woods' when it comes to evaluating +ciphers :-). + +For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the +same. + +This library requires the inclusion of 'rc2.h'. + +All of the encryption functions take what is called an RC2_KEY as an +argument. An RC2_KEY is an expanded form of the RC2 key. +For all modes of the RC2 algorithm, the RC2_KEY used for +decryption is the same one that was used for encryption. + +The define RC2_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption for the functions +that require an encryption/decryption flag. RC2_DECRYPT is passed to +specify decryption. + +Please note that any of the encryption modes specified in my DES library +could be used with RC2. I have only implemented ecb, cbc, cfb64 and +ofb64 for the following reasons. +- ecb is the basic RC2 encryption. +- cbc is the normal 'chaining' form for block ciphers. +- cfb64 can be used to encrypt single characters, therefore input and output + do not need to be a multiple of 8. +- ofb64 is similar to cfb64 but is more like a stream cipher, not as + secure (not cipher feedback) but it does not have an encrypt/decrypt mode. +- If you want triple RC2, thats 384 bits of key and you must be totally + obsessed with security. Still, if you want it, it is simple enough to + copy the function from the DES library and change the des_encrypt to + RC2_encrypt; an exercise left for the paranoid reader :-). + +The functions are as follows: + +void RC2_set_key( +RC2_KEY *ks; +int len; +unsigned char *key; +int bits; + RC2_set_key converts an 'len' byte key into a RC2_KEY. + A 'ks' is an expanded form of the 'key' which is used to + perform actual encryption. It can be regenerated from the RC2 key + so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about + to occur. Don't save or pass around RC2_KEY's since they + are CPU architecture dependent, 'key's are not. RC2 is an + interesting cipher in that it can be used with a variable length + key. 'len' is the length of 'key' to be used as the key. + A 'len' of 16 is recomended. The 'bits' argument is an + interesting addition which I only found out about in Aug 96. + BSAFE uses this parameter to 'limit' the number of bits used + for the key. To use the 'key' unmodified, set bits to 1024. + This is what old versions of my RC2 library did (SSLeay 0.6.3). + RSAs BSAFE library sets this parameter to be 128 if 128 bit + keys are being used. So to be compatable with BSAFE, set it + to 128, if you don't want to reduce RC2's key length, leave it + at 1024. + +void RC2_encrypt( +unsigned long *data, +RC2_KEY *key, +int encrypt); + This is the RC2 encryption function that gets called by just about + every other RC2 routine in the library. You should not use this + function except to implement 'modes' of RC2. I say this because the + functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to + long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory + access do not occur. + Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and key is the + RC2_KEY to use. Encryption or decryption is indicated by 'encrypt'. + which can have the values RC2_ENCRYPT or RC2_DECRYPT. + +void RC2_ecb_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +RC2_KEY *key, +int encrypt); + This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of RC2 (in DES this + mode is called Electronic Code Book so I'm going to use the term + for rc2 as well. + Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by + key. Depending on the encrypt, encryption or + decryption occurs. Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes. + +void RC2_cbc_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +RC2_KEY *ks, +unsigned char *ivec, +int encrypt); + This routine implements RC2 in Cipher Block Chaining mode. + Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted + (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes. + The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above, + should be a multiple of 8). If length is not a multiple of 8, bad + things will probably happen. ivec is the initialisation vector. + This function updates iv after each call so that it can be passed to + the next call to RC2_cbc_encrypt(). + +void RC2_cfb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +RC2_KEY *schedule, +unsigned char *ivec, +int *num, +int encrypt); + This is one of the more useful functions in this RC2 library, it + implements CFB mode of RC2 with 64bit feedback. + This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, + you do not require 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. + 'Encrypt' is used to indicate encryption or decryption. + CFB64 mode operates by using the cipher to generate a stream + of bytes which is used to encrypt the plain text. + The cipher text is then encrypted to generate the next 64 bits to + be xored (incrementally) with the next 64 bits of plain + text. As can be seen from this, to encrypt or decrypt, + the same 'cipher stream' needs to be generated but the way the next + block of data is gathered for encryption is different for + encryption and decryption. + +void RC2_ofb64_encrypt( +unsigned char *in, +unsigned char *out, +long length, +RC2_KEY *schedule, +unsigned char *ivec, +int *num); + This functions implements OFB mode of RC2 with 64bit feedback. + This allows you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, + you do not require 8 byte padding. Each call to this + routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec + and num. Num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. + This is in effect a stream cipher, there is no encryption or + decryption mode. + +For reading passwords, I suggest using des_read_pw_string() from my DES library. +To generate a password from a text string, I suggest using MD5 (or MD2) to +produce a 16 byte message digest that can then be passed directly to +RC2_set_key(). + +===== +For more information about the specific RC2 modes in this library +(ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb), read the section entitled 'Modes of DES' from the +documentation on my DES library. What is said about DES is directly +applicable for RC2. + + +==== rc4.doc ======================================================== + +The RC4 library. +RC4 is a stream cipher that operates on a byte stream. It can be used with +any length key but I would recommend normally using 16 bytes. + +This library requires the inclusion of 'rc4.h'. + +The RC4 encryption function takes what is called an RC4_KEY as an argument. +The RC4_KEY is generated by the RC4_set_key function from the key bytes. + +RC4, being a stream cipher, does not have an encryption or decryption mode. +It produces a stream of bytes that the input stream is xor'ed against and +so decryption is just a case of 'encrypting' again with the same key. + +I have only put in one 'mode' for RC4 which is the normal one. This means +there is no initialisation vector and there is no feedback of the cipher +text into the cipher. This implies that you should not ever use the +same key twice if you can help it. If you do, you leave yourself open to +known plain text attacks; if you know the plain text and +corresponding cipher text in one message, all messages that used the same +key can have the cipher text decoded for the corresponding positions in the +cipher stream. + +The main positive feature of RC4 is that it is a very fast cipher; about 4 +times faster that DES. This makes it ideally suited to protocols where the +key is randomly chosen, like SSL. + +The functions are as follows: + +void RC4_set_key( +RC4_KEY *key; +int len; +unsigned char *data); + This function initialises the RC4_KEY structure with the key passed + in 'data', which is 'len' bytes long. The key data can be any + length but 16 bytes seems to be a good number. + +void RC4( +RC4_KEY *key; +unsigned long len; +unsigned char *in; +unsigned char *out); + Do the actual RC4 encryption/decryption. Using the 'key', 'len' + bytes are transformed from 'in' to 'out'. As mentioned above, + decryption is the operation as encryption. + +==== ref.doc ======================================================== + +I have lots more references etc, and will update this list in the future, +30 Aug 1996 - eay + + +SSL The SSL Protocol - from Netscapes. + +RC4 Newsgroups: sci.crypt + From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) + Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. + Message-ID: <sternCvKL4B.Hyy@netcom.com> + +RC2 Newsgroups: sci.crypt + From: pgut01@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) + Subject: Specification for Ron Rivests Cipher No.2 + Message-ID: <4fk39f$f70@net.auckland.ac.nz> + +MD2 RFC1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm +MD5 RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm + +X509 Certificates + RFC1421 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I + RFC1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II + RFC1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III + RFC1424 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV + +RSA and various standard encoding + PKCS#1 RSA Encryption Standard + PKCS#5 Password-Based Encryption Standard + PKCS#7 Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard + A Layman's Guide to a Subset of ASN.1, BER, and DER + An Overview of the PKCS Standards + Some Examples of the PKCS Standards + +IDEA Chapter 3 The Block Cipher IDEA + +RSA, prime number generation and bignum algorithms + Introduction To Algorithms, + Thomas Cormen, Charles Leiserson, Ronald Rivest, + Section 29 Arithmetic Circuits + Section 33 Number-Theoretic Algorithms + +Fast Private Key algorithm + Fast Decipherment Algorithm for RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem + J.-J. Quisquater and C. Couvreur, Electronics Letters, + 14th October 1982, Vol. 18 No. 21 + +Prime number generation and bignum algorithms. + PGP-2.3a + +==== rsa.doc ======================================================== + +The RSA encryption and utility routines. + +The RSA routines are built on top of a big number library (the BN library). +There are support routines in the X509 library for loading and manipulating +the various objects in the RSA library. When errors are returned, read +about the ERR library for how to access the error codes. + +All RSA encryption is done according to the PKCS-1 standard which is +compatible with PEM and RSAref. This means that any values being encrypted +must be less than the size of the modulus in bytes, minus 10, bytes long. + +This library uses RAND_bytes()() for it's random data, make sure to feed +RAND_seed() with lots of interesting and varied data before using these +routines. + +The RSA library has one specific data type, the RSA structure. +It is composed of 8 BIGNUM variables (see the BN library for details) and +can hold either a private RSA key or a public RSA key. +Some RSA libraries have different structures for public and private keys, I +don't. For my libraries, a public key is determined by the fact that the +RSA->d value is NULL. These routines will operate on any size RSA keys. +While I'm sure 4096 bit keys are very very secure, they take a lot longer +to process that 1024 bit keys :-). + +The function in the RSA library are as follows. + +RSA *RSA_new(); + This function creates a new RSA object. The sub-fields of the RSA + type are also malloced so you should always use this routine to + create RSA variables. + +void RSA_free( +RSA *rsa); + This function 'frees' an RSA structure. This routine should always + be used to free the RSA structure since it will also 'free' any + sub-fields of the RSA type that need freeing. + +int RSA_size( +RSA *rsa); + This function returns the size of the RSA modulus in bytes. Why do + I need this you may ask, well the reason is that when you encrypt + with RSA, the output string will be the size of the RSA modulus. + So the output for the RSA_encrypt and the input for the RSA_decrypt + routines need to be RSA_size() bytes long, because this is how many + bytes are expected. + +For the following 4 RSA encryption routines, it should be noted that +RSA_private_decrypt() should be used on the output from +RSA_public_encrypt() and RSA_public_decrypt() should be used on +the output from RSA_private_encrypt(). + +int RSA_public_encrypt( +int from_len; +unsigned char *from +unsigned char *to +RSA *rsa); + This function implements RSA public encryption, the rsa variable + should be a public key (but can be a private key). 'from_len' + bytes taken from 'from' and encrypted and put into 'to'. 'to' needs + to be at least RSA_size(rsa) bytes long. The number of bytes + written into 'to' is returned. -1 is returned on an error. The + operation performed is + to = from^rsa->e mod rsa->n. + +int RSA_private_encrypt( +int from_len; +unsigned char *from +unsigned char *to +RSA *rsa); + This function implements RSA private encryption, the rsa variable + should be a private key. 'from_len' bytes taken from + 'from' and encrypted and put into 'to'. 'to' needs + to be at least RSA_size(rsa) bytes long. The number of bytes + written into 'to' is returned. -1 is returned on an error. The + operation performed is + to = from^rsa->d mod rsa->n. + +int RSA_public_decrypt( +int from_len; +unsigned char *from +unsigned char *to +RSA *rsa); + This function implements RSA public decryption, the rsa variable + should be a public key (but can be a private key). 'from_len' + bytes are taken from 'from' and decrypted. The decrypted data is + put into 'to'. The number of bytes encrypted is returned. -1 is + returned to indicate an error. The operation performed is + to = from^rsa->e mod rsa->n. + +int RSA_private_decrypt( +int from_len; +unsigned char *from +unsigned char *to +RSA *rsa); + This function implements RSA private decryption, the rsa variable + should be a private key. 'from_len' bytes are taken + from 'from' and decrypted. The decrypted data is + put into 'to'. The number of bytes encrypted is returned. -1 is + returned to indicate an error. The operation performed is + to = from^rsa->d mod rsa->n. + +int RSA_mod_exp( +BIGNUM *n; +BIGNUM *p; +RSA *rsa); + Normally you will never use this routine. + This is really an internal function which is called by + RSA_private_encrypt() and RSA_private_decrypt(). It performs + n=n^p mod rsa->n except that it uses the 5 extra variables in the + RSA structure to make this more efficient. + +RSA *RSA_generate_key( +int bits; +unsigned long e; +void (*callback)(); +char *cb_arg; + This routine is used to generate RSA private keys. It takes + quite a period of time to run and should only be used to + generate initial private keys that should then be stored + for later use. The passed callback function + will be called periodically so that feedback can be given + as to how this function is progressing. + 'bits' is the length desired for the modulus, so it would be 1024 + to generate a 1024 bit private key. + 'e' is the value to use for the public exponent 'e'. Traditionally + it is set to either 3 or 0x10001. + The callback function (if not NULL) is called in the following + situations. + when we have generated a suspected prime number to test, + callback(0,num1++,cb_arg). When it passes a prime number test, + callback(1,num2++,cb_arg). When it is rejected as one of + the 2 primes required due to gcd(prime,e value) != 0, + callback(2,num3++,cb_arg). When finally accepted as one + of the 2 primes, callback(3,num4++,cb_arg). + + +==== rsaref.doc ======================================================== + +This package can be compiled to use the RSAref library. +This library is not allowed outside of the USA but inside the USA it is +claimed by RSA to be the only RSA public key library that can be used +besides BSAFE.. + +There are 2 files, rsaref/rsaref.c and rsaref/rsaref.h that contain the glue +code to use RSAref. These files were written by looking at the PGP +source code and seeing which routines it used to access RSAref. +I have also been sent by some-one a copy of the RSAref header file that +contains the library error codes. + +[ Jun 1996 update - I have recently gotten hold of RSAref 2.0 from + South Africa and have been doing some performace tests. ] + +They have now been tested against the recently announced RSAEURO +library. + +There are 2 ways to use SSLeay and RSAref. First, to build so that +the programs must be linked with RSAref, add '-DRSAref' to CFLAG in the top +level makefile and -lrsaref (or where ever you are keeping RSAref) to +EX_LIBS. + +To build a makefile via util/mk1mf.pl to do this, use the 'rsaref' option. + +The second method is to build as per normal and link applications with +the RSAglue library. The correct library order would be +cc -o cmd cmd.o -lssl -lRSAglue -lcrypto -lrsaref -ldes +The RSAglue library is built in the rsa directory and is NOT +automatically installed. + +Be warned that the RSAEURO library, that is claimed to be compatible +with RSAref contains a different value for the maximum number of bits +supported. This changes structure sizes and so if you are using +RSAEURO, change the value of RSAref_MAX_BITS in rsa/rsaref.h + + +==== s_mult.doc ======================================================== + +s_mult is a test program I hacked up on a Sunday for testing non-blocking +IO. It has a select loop at it's centre that handles multiple readers +and writers. + +Try the following command +ssleay s_mult -echo -nbio -ssl -v +echo - sends any sent text back to the sender +nbio - turns on non-blocking IO +ssl - accept SSL connections, default is normal text +v - print lots + type Q<cr> to quit + +In another window, run the following +ssleay s_client -pause </etc/termcap + +The pause option puts in a 1 second pause in each read(2)/write(2) call +so the other end will have read()s fail. + +==== session.doc ======================================================== + +I have just checked over and re-worked the session stuff. +The following brief example will ignore all setup information to do with +authentication. + +Things operate as follows. + +The SSL environment has a 'context', a SSL_CTX structure. This holds the +cached SSL_SESSIONS (which can be reused) and the certificate lookup +information. Each SSL structure needs to be associated with a SSL_CTX. +Normally only one SSL_CTX structure is needed per program. + +SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(void ); +void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *); +These 2 functions create and destroy SSL_CTX structures + +The SSL_CTX has a session_cache_mode which is by default, +in SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER mode. What this means is that the library +will automatically add new session-id's to the cache apon sucsessful +SSL_accept() calls. +If SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT is set, then client certificates are also added +to the cache. +SSL_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,mode) will set the 'mode' and +SSL_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) will get the cache 'mode'. +The modes can be +SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF - no caching +SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT - only SSL_connect() +SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER - only SSL_accept() +SSL_SESS_NO_CACHE_BOTH - Either SSL_accept() or SSL_connect(). +If SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR is set, old timed out sessions are +not automatically removed each 255, SSL_connect()s or SSL_accept()s. + +By default, apon every 255 successful SSL_connect() or SSL_accept()s, +the cache is flush. Please note that this could be expensive on +a heavily loaded SSL server, in which case, turn this off and +clear the cache of old entries 'manually' (with one of the functions +listed below) every few hours. Perhaps I should up this number, it is hard +to say. Remember, the '255' new calls is just a mechanims to get called +every now and then, in theory at most 255 new session-id's will have been +added but if 100 are added every minute, you would still have +500 in the cache before any would start being flushed (assuming a 3 minute +timeout).. + +int SSL_CTX_sess_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx); +int SSL_CTX_sess_misses(SSL_CTX *ctx); +int SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(SSL_CTX *ctx); +These 3 functions return statistics about the SSL_CTX. These 3 are the +number of session id reuses. hits is the number of reuses, misses are the +number of lookups that failed, and timeouts is the number of cached +entries ignored because they had timeouted. + +ctx->new_session_cb is a function pointer to a function of type +int new_session_callback(SSL *ssl,SSL_SESSION *new); +This function, if set in the SSL_CTX structure is called whenever a new +SSL_SESSION is added to the cache. If the callback returns non-zero, it +means that the application will have to do a SSL_SESSION_free() +on the structure (this is +to do with the cache keeping the reference counts correct, without the +application needing to know about it. +The 'active' parameter is the current SSL session for which this connection +was created. + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,int (*cb)()); +to set the callback, +int (*cb)() SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) +to get the callback. + +If the 'get session' callback is set, when a session id is looked up and +it is not in the session-id cache, this callback is called. The callback is +of the form +SSL_SESSION *get_session_callback(unsigned char *sess_id,int sess_id_len, + int *copy); + +The get_session_callback is intended to return null if no session id is found. +The reference count on the SSL_SESSION in incremented by the SSL library, +if copy is 1. Otherwise, the reference count is not modified. + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx,cb) sets the callback and +int (*cb)()SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(ctx) returns the callback. + +These callbacks are basically indended to be used by processes to +send their session-id's to other processes. I currently have not implemented +non-blocking semantics for these callbacks, it is upto the appication +to make the callbacks effiecent if they require blocking (perhaps +by 'saving' them and then 'posting them' when control returns from +the SSL_accept(). + +LHASH *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) +This returns the session cache. The lhash strucutre can be accessed for +statistics about the cache. + +void lh_stats(LHASH *lh, FILE *out); +void lh_node_stats(LHASH *lh, FILE *out); +void lh_node_usage_stats(LHASH *lh, FILE *out); + +can be used to print details about it's activity and current state. +You can also delve directly into the lhash structure for 14 different +counters that are kept against the structure. When I wrote the lhash library, +I was interested in gathering statistics :-). +Have a read of doc/lhash.doc in the SSLeay distribution area for more details +on the lhash library. + +Now as mentioned ealier, when a SSL is created, it needs a SSL_CTX. +SSL * SSL_new(SSL_CTX *); + +This stores a session. A session is secret information shared between 2 +SSL contexts. It will only be created if both ends of the connection have +authenticated their peer to their satisfaction. It basically contains +the information required to use a particular secret key cipher. + +To retrieve the SSL_CTX being used by a SSL, +SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(SSL *s); + +Now when a SSL session is established between to programs, the 'session' +information that is cached in the SSL_CTX can me manipulated by the +following functions. +int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session); +This will set the SSL_SESSION to use for the next SSL_connect(). If you use +this function on an already 'open' established SSL connection, 'bad things +will happen'. This function is meaning-less when used on a ssl strucutre +that is just about to be used in a SSL_accept() call since the +SSL_accept() will either create a new session or retrieve one from the +cache. + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *s); +This will return the SSL_SESSION for the current SSL, NULL if there is +no session associated with the SSL structure. + +The SSL sessions are kept in the SSL_CTX in a hash table, to remove a +session +void SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c); +and to add one +int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); +SSL_CTX_add_session() returns 1 if the session was already in the cache (so it +was not added). +Whenever a new session is created via SSL_connect()/SSL_accept(), +they are automatically added to the cache, depending on the session_cache_mode +settings. SSL_set_session() +does not add it to the cache. Just call SSL_CTX_add_session() if you do want the +session added. For a 'client' this would not normally be the case. +SSL_CTX_add_session() is not normally ever used, except for doing 'evil' things +which the next 2 funtions help you do. + +int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp); +SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a,unsigned char **pp,long length); +These 2 functions are in the standard ASN1 library form and can be used to +load and save to a byte format, the SSL_SESSION structure. +With these functions, you can save and read these structures to a files or +arbitary byte string. +The PEM_write_SSL_SESSION(fp,x) and PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(fp,x,cb) will +write to a file pointer in base64 encoding. + +What you can do with this, is pass session information between separate +processes. Please note, that you will probably also need to modify the +timeout information on the SSL_SESSIONs. + +long SSL_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s) +will return the 'time' that the session +was loaded. The timeout is relative to this time. This information is +saved when the SSL_SESSION is converted to binarary but it is stored +in as a unix long, which is rather OS dependant, but easy to convert back. + +long SSL_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s,long t) will set the above mentioned time. +The time value is just the value returned from time(3), and should really +be defined by be to be time_t. + +long SSL_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s); +long SSL_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s,long t); +These 2 retrieve and set the timeout which is just a number of secconds +from the 'SSL_get_time()' value. When this time period has elapesed, +the session will no longer be in the cache (well it will actually be removed +the next time it is attempted to be retrieved, so you could 'bump' +the timeout so it remains valid). +The 'time' and 'timeout' are set on a session when it is created, not reset +each time it is reused. If you did wish to 'bump it', just after establishing +a connection, do a +SSL_set_time(ssl,time(NULL)); + +You can also use +SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx,unsigned long t) and +SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx) to manipulate the default timeouts for +all SSL connections created against a SSL_CTX. If you set a timeout in +an SSL_CTX, all new SSL's created will inherit the timeout. It can be over +written by the SSL_set_timeout(SSL *s,unsigned long t) function call. +If you 'set' the timeout back to 0, the system default will be used. + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(); +void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); +These 2 functions are used to create and dispose of SSL_SESSION functions. +You should not ever normally need to use them unless you are using +i2d_SSL_SESSION() and/or d2i_SSL_SESSION(). If you 'load' a SSL_SESSION +via d2i_SSL_SESSION(), you will need to SSL_SESSION_free() it. +Both SSL_set_session() and SSL_CTX_add_session() will 'take copies' of the +structure (via reference counts) when it is passed to them. + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,time); +The first function will clear all sessions from the cache, which have expired +relative to 'time' (which could just be time(NULL)). + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,0); +This is a special case that clears everything. + +As a final comment, a 'session' is not enough to establish a new +connection. If a session has timed out, a certificate and private key +need to have been associated with the SSL structure. +SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,SSL *from); will copy not only the session +strucutre but also the private key and certificate associated with +'from'. + +EXAMPLES. + +So lets play at being a weird SSL server. + +/* setup a context */ +ctx=SSL_CTX_new(); + +/* Lets load some session from binary into the cache, why one would do + * this is not toally clear, but passing between programs does make sense + * Perhaps you are using 4096 bit keys and are happy to keep them + * valid for a week, to avoid the RSA overhead of 15 seconds, I'm not toally + * sure, perhaps this is a process called from an SSL inetd and this is being + * passed to the application. */ +session=d2i_SSL_SESSION(....) +SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx,session); + +/* Lets even add a session from a file */ +session=PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(....) +SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx,session); + +/* create a new SSL structure */ +ssl=SSL_new(ctx); + +/* At this point we want to be able to 'create' new session if + * required, so we need a certificate and RSAkey. */ +SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(ssl,...) +SSL_use_certificate_file(ssl,...) + +/* Now since we are a server, it make little sence to load a session against + * the ssl strucutre since a SSL_accept() will either create a new session or + * grab an existing one from the cache. */ + +/* grab a socket descriptor */ +fd=accept(...); + +/* associated it with the ssl strucutre */ +SSL_set_fd(ssl,fd); + +SSL_accept(ssl); /* 'do' SSL using out cert and RSA key */ + +/* Lets print out the session details or lets save it to a file, + * perhaps with a secret key cipher, so that we can pass it to the FBI + * when they want to decode the session :-). While we have RSA + * this does not matter much but when I do SSLv3, this will allow a mechanism + * for the server/client to record the information needed to decode + * the traffic that went over the wire, even when using Diffie-Hellman */ +PEM_write_SSL_SESSION(SSL_get_session(ssl),stdout,....) + +Lets 'connect' back to the caller using the same session id. + +ssl2=SSL_new(ctx); +fd2=connect(them); +SSL_set_fd(ssl2,fd2); +SSL_set_session(ssl2,SSL_get_session(ssl)); +SSL_connect(ssl2); + +/* what the hell, lets accept no more connections using this session */ +SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl),SSL_get_session(ssl)); + +/* we could have just as easily used ssl2 since they both are using the + * same session. + * You will note that both ssl and ssl2 are still using the session, and + * the SSL_SESSION structure will be free()ed when both ssl and ssl2 + * finish using the session. Also note that you could continue to initiate + * connections using this session by doing SSL_get_session(ssl) to get the + * existing session, but SSL_accept() will not be able to find it to + * use for incoming connections. + * Of corse, the session will timeout at the far end and it will no + * longer be accepted after a while. The time and timeout are ignored except + * by SSL_accept(). */ + +/* Since we have had our server running for 10 weeks, and memory is getting + * short, perhaps we should clear the session cache to remove those + * 100000 session entries that have expired. Some may consider this + * a memory leak :-) */ + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,time(NULL)); + +/* Ok, after a bit more time we wish to flush all sessions from the cache + * so that all new connections will be authenticated and incure the + * public key operation overhead */ + +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx,0); + +/* As a final note, to copy everything to do with a SSL, use */ +SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,SSL *from); +/* as this also copies the certificate and RSA key so new session can + * be established using the same details */ + + +==== sha.doc ======================================================== + +The SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) library. +SHA is a message digest algorithm that can be used to condense an arbitrary +length message down to a 20 byte hash. The functions all need to be passed +a SHA_CTX which is used to hold the SHA context during multiple SHA_Update() +function calls. The normal method of use for this library is as follows +This library contains both SHA and SHA-1 digest algorithms. SHA-1 is +an update to SHA (which should really be called SHA-0 now) which +tweaks the algorithm slightly. The SHA-1 algorithm is used by simply +using SHA1_Init(), SHA1_Update(), SHA1_Final() and SHA1() instead of the +SHA*() calls + +SHA_Init(...); +SHA_Update(...); +... +SHA_Update(...); +SHA_Final(...); + +This library requires the inclusion of 'sha.h'. + +The functions are as follows: + +void SHA_Init( +SHA_CTX *c); + This function needs to be called to initiate a SHA_CTX structure for + use. + +void SHA_Update( +SHA_CTX *c; +unsigned char *data; +unsigned long len); + This updates the message digest context being generated with 'len' + bytes from the 'data' pointer. The number of bytes can be any + length. + +void SHA_Final( +unsigned char *md; +SHA_CTX *c; + This function is called when a message digest of the data digested + with SHA_Update() is wanted. The message digest is put in the 'md' + array and is SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH (20) bytes long. + +unsigned char *SHA( +unsigned char *d; +unsigned long n; +unsigned char *md; + This function performs a SHA_Init(), followed by a SHA_Update() + followed by a SHA_Final() (using a local SHA_CTX). + The resulting digest is put into 'md' if it is not NULL. + Regardless of the value of 'md', the message + digest is returned from the function. If 'md' was NULL, the message + digest returned is being stored in a static structure. + + +==== speed.doc ======================================================== + +To get an idea of the performance of this library, use +ssleay speed + +perl util/sp-diff.pl file1 file2 + +will print out the relative differences between the 2 files which are +expected to be the output from the speed program. + +The performace of the library is very dependant on the Compiler +quality and various flags used to build. + +--- + +These are some numbers I did comparing RSAref and SSLeay on a Pentium 100. +[ These numbers are all out of date, as of SSL - 0.6.1 the RSA +operations are about 2 times faster, so check the version number ] + +RSA performance. + +SSLeay 0.6.0 +Pentium 100, 32meg, Windows NT Workstation 3.51 +linux - gcc v 2.7.0 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -m486 +and +Windows NT - Windows NT 3.51 - Visual C++ 4.1 - 586 code + 32bit assember +Windows 3.1 - Windows NT 3.51 - Visual C++ 1.52c - 286 code + 32bit assember +NT Dos Shell- Windows NT 3.51 - Visual C++ 1.52c - 286 code + 16bit assember + +Times are how long it takes to do an RSA private key operation. + + 512bits 1024bits +------------------------------- +SSLeay NT dll 0.042s 0.202s see above +SSLeay linux 0.046s 0.218s Assember inner loops (normal build) +SSLeay linux 0.067s 0.380s Pure C code with BN_LLONG defined +SSLeay W3.1 dll 0.108s 0.478s see above +SSLeay linux 0.109s 0.713s C without BN_LLONG. +RSAref2.0 linux 0.149s 0.936s +SSLeay MS-DOS 0.197s 1.049s see above + +486DX66, 32meg, Windows NT Server 3.51 + 512bits 1024bits +------------------------------- +SSLeay NT dll 0.084s 0.495s <- SSLeay 0.6.3 +SSLeay NT dll 0.154s 0.882s +SSLeay W3.1 dll 0.335s 1.538s +SSLeay MS-DOS 0.490s 2.790s + +What I find cute is that I'm still faster than RSAref when using standard C, +without using the 'long long' data type :-), %35 faster for 512bit and we +scale up to 3.2 times faster for the 'default linux' build. I should mention +that people should 'try' to use either x86-lnx.s (elf), x86-lnxa.s or +x86-sol.s for any x86 based unix they are building on. The only problems +with be with syntax but the performance gain is quite large, especially for +servers. The code is very simple, you just need to modify the 'header'. + +The message is, if you are stuck using RSAref, the RSA performance will be +bad. Considering the code was compiled for a pentium, the 486DX66 number +would indicate 'Use RSAref and turn you Pentium 100 into a 486DX66' :-). +[ As of verson 0.6.1, it would be correct to say 'turn you pentium 100 + into a 486DX33' :-) ] + +I won't tell people if the DLL's are using RSAref or my stuff if no-one +asks :-). + +eric + +PS while I know I could speed things up further, I will probably not do + so due to the effort involved. I did do some timings on the + SSLeay bignum format -> RSAref number format conversion that occurs + each time RSAref is used by SSLeay, and the numbers are trivial. + 0.00012s a call for 512bit vs 0.149s for the time spent in the function. + 0.00018s for 1024bit vs 0.938s. Insignificant. + So the 'way to go', to support faster RSA libraries, if people are keen, + is to write 'glue' code in a similar way that I do for RSAref and send it + to me :-). + My base library still has the advantage of being able to operate on + any size numbers, and is not that far from the performance from the + leaders in the field. (-%30?) + [ Well as of 0.6.1 I am now the leader in the filed on x86 (we at + least very close :-) ] + + I suppose I should also mention some other numbers RSAref numbers, again + on my Pentium. + DES CBC EDE-DES MD5 + RSAref linux 830k/s 302k/s 4390k/s + SSLeay linux 855k/s 319k/s 10025k/s + SSLeay NT 1158k/s 410k/s 10470k/s + SSLeay w31 378k/s 143k/s 2383k/s (fully 16bit) + + Got to admit that Visual C++ 4.[01] is a damn fine compiler :-) +-- +Eric Young | BOOL is tri-state according to Bill Gates. +AARNet: eay@cryptsoft.com | RTFM Win32 GetMessage(). + + + + +==== ssl-ciph.doc ======================================================== + +This is a quick high level summery of how things work now. + +Each SSLv2 and SSLv3 cipher is composed of 4 major attributes plus a few extra +minor ones. + +They are 'The key exchange algorithm', which is RSA for SSLv2 but can also +be Diffle-Hellman for SSLv3. + +An 'Authenticion algorithm', which can be RSA, Diffle-Helman, DSS or +none. + +The cipher + +The MAC digest. + +A cipher can also be an export cipher and is either an SSLv2 or a +SSLv3 ciphers. + +To specify which ciphers to use, one can either specify all the ciphers, +one at a time, or use 'aliases' to specify the preference and order for +the ciphers. + +There are a large number of aliases, but the most importaint are +kRSA, kDHr, kDHd and kEDH for key exchange types. + +aRSA, aDSS, aNULL and aDH for authentication +DES, 3DES, RC4, RC2, IDEA and eNULL for ciphers +MD5, SHA0 and SHA1 digests + +Now where this becomes interesting is that these can be put together to +specify the order and ciphers you wish to use. + +To speed this up there are also aliases for certian groups of ciphers. +The main ones are +SSLv2 - all SSLv2 ciphers +SSLv3 - all SSLv3 ciphers +EXP - all export ciphers +LOW - all low strngth ciphers (no export ciphers, normally single DES) +MEDIUM - 128 bit encryption +HIGH - Triple DES + +These aliases can be joined in a : separated list which specifies to +add ciphers, move them to the current location and delete them. + +A simpler way to look at all of this is to use the 'ssleay ciphers -v' command. +The default library cipher spec is +!ADH:RC4+RSA:HIGH:MEDIUM:LOW:EXP:+SSLv2:+EXP +which means, first, remove from consideration any ciphers that do not +authenticate. Next up, use ciphers using RC4 and RSA. Next include the HIGH, +MEDIUM and the LOW security ciphers. Finish up by adding all the export +ciphers on the end, then 'pull' all the SSLv2 and export ciphers to +the end of the list. + +The results are +$ ssleay ciphers -v '!ADH:RC4+RSA:HIGH:MEDIUM:LOW:EXP:+SSLv2:+EXP' + +RC4-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=SHA1 +RC4-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=MD5 +EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 +EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 +DES-CBC3-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=SHA1 +IDEA-CBC-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=SHA1 +EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=DES(56) Mac=SHA1 +EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=DSS Enc=DES(56) Mac=SHA1 +DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=DES(56) Mac=SHA1 +DES-CBC3-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=3DES(168) Mac=MD5 +DES-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=DES(56) Mac=MD5 +IDEA-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=IDEA(128) Mac=MD5 +RC2-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC2(128) Mac=MD5 +RC4-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA Au=RSA Enc=RC4(128) Mac=MD5 +EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC SSLv3 Kx=DH(512) Au=RSA Enc=DES(40) Mac=SHA1 export +EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH(512) Au=DSS Enc=DES(40) Mac=SHA1 export +EXP-DES-CBC-SHA SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA Enc=DES(40) Mac=SHA1 export +EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA Enc=RC2(40) Mac=MD5 export +EXP-RC4-MD5 SSLv3 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA Enc=RC4(40) Mac=MD5 export +EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA Enc=RC2(40) Mac=MD5 export +EXP-RC4-MD5 SSLv2 Kx=RSA(512) Au=RSA Enc=RC4(40) Mac=MD5 export + +I would recoment people use the 'ssleay ciphers -v "text"' +command to check what they are going to use. + +Anyway, I'm falling asleep here so I'll do some more tomorrow. + +eric + +==== ssl.doc ======================================================== + +SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) - the session-id hash table. + +/* Session-id cache stats */ +SSL_CTX_sess_number +SSL_CTX_sess_connect +SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good +SSL_CTX_sess_accept +SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good +SSL_CTX_sess_hits +SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits +SSL_CTX_sess_misses +SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts + +/* Session-id application notification callbacks */ +SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb +SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb +SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb +SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb + +/* Session-id cache operation mode */ +SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode +SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode + +/* Set default timeout values to use. */ +SSL_CTX_set_timeout +SSL_CTX_get_timeout + +/* Global SSL initalisation informational callback */ +SSL_CTX_set_info_callback +SSL_CTX_get_info_callback +SSL_set_info_callback +SSL_get_info_callback + +/* If the SSL_accept/SSL_connect returned with -1, these indicate when + * we should re-call *. +SSL_want +SSL_want_nothing +SSL_want_read +SSL_want_write +SSL_want_x509_lookup + +/* Where we are in SSL initalisation, used in non-blocking, perhaps + * have a look at ssl/bio_ssl.c */ +SSL_state +SSL_is_init_finished +SSL_in_init +SSL_in_connect_init +SSL_in_accept_init + +/* Used to set the 'inital' state so SSL_in_connect_init and SSL_in_accept_init + * can be used to work out which function to call. */ +SSL_set_connect_state +SSL_set_accept_state + +/* Where to look for certificates for authentication */ +SSL_set_default_verify_paths /* calles SSL_load_verify_locations */ +SSL_load_verify_locations + +/* get info from an established connection */ +SSL_get_session +SSL_get_certificate +SSL_get_SSL_CTX + +SSL_CTX_new +SSL_CTX_free +SSL_new +SSL_clear +SSL_free + +SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list +SSL_get_cipher +SSL_set_cipher_list +SSL_get_cipher_list +SSL_get_shared_ciphers + +SSL_accept +SSL_connect +SSL_read +SSL_write + +SSL_debug + +SSL_get_read_ahead +SSL_set_read_ahead +SSL_set_verify + +SSL_pending + +SSL_set_fd +SSL_set_rfd +SSL_set_wfd +SSL_set_bio +SSL_get_fd +SSL_get_rbio +SSL_get_wbio + +SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey +SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1 +SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file +SSL_use_PrivateKey +SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1 +SSL_use_PrivateKey_file +SSL_use_certificate +SSL_use_certificate_ASN1 +SSL_use_certificate_file + +ERR_load_SSL_strings +SSL_load_error_strings + +/* human readable version of the 'state' of the SSL connection. */ +SSL_state_string +SSL_state_string_long +/* These 2 report what kind of IO operation the library was trying to + * perform last. Probably not very usefull. */ +SSL_rstate_string +SSL_rstate_string_long + +SSL_get_peer_certificate + +SSL_SESSION_new +SSL_SESSION_print_fp +SSL_SESSION_print +SSL_SESSION_free +i2d_SSL_SESSION +d2i_SSL_SESSION + +SSL_get_time +SSL_set_time +SSL_get_timeout +SSL_set_timeout +SSL_copy_session_id +SSL_set_session +SSL_CTX_add_session +SSL_CTX_remove_session +SSL_CTX_flush_sessions + +BIO_f_ssl + +/* used to hold information as to why a certificate verification failed */ +SSL_set_verify_result +SSL_get_verify_result + +/* can be used by the application to associate data with an SSL structure. + * It needs to be 'free()ed' by the application */ +SSL_set_app_data +SSL_get_app_data + +/* The following all set values that are kept in the SSL_CTX but + * are used as the default values when an SSL session is created. + * They are over writen by the relevent SSL_xxxx functions */ + +/* SSL_set_verify */ +void SSL_CTX_set_default_verify + +/* This callback, if set, totaly overrides the normal SSLeay verification + * functions and should return 1 on success and 0 on failure */ +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback + +/* The following are the same as the equivilent SSL_xxx functions. + * Only one copy of this information is kept and if a particular + * SSL structure has a local override, it is totally separate structure. + */ +int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey +int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1 +int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file +int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey +int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1 +int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file +int SSL_CTX_use_certificate +int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1 +int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file + + +==== ssl_ctx.doc ======================================================== + +This is now a bit dated, quite a few of the SSL_ functions could be +SSL_CTX_ functions. I will update this in the future. 30 Aug 1996 + +From eay@orb.mincom.oz.au Mon Dec 11 21:37:08 1995 +Received: by orb.mincom.oz.au id AA00696 + (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for eay); Mon, 11 Dec 1995 11:37:08 +1000 +Date: Mon, 11 Dec 1995 11:37:08 +1000 (EST) +From: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au> +X-Sender: eay@orb +To: sameer <sameer@c2.org> +Cc: Eric Young <eay@mincom.oz.au> +Subject: Re: PEM_readX509 oesn't seem to be working +In-Reply-To: <199512110102.RAA12521@infinity.c2.org> +Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951211112115.28608D-100000@orb> +Mime-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII +Status: RO +X-Status: + +On Sun, 10 Dec 1995, sameer wrote: +> OK, that's solved. I've found out that it is saying "no +> certificate set" in SSL_accept because s->conn == NULL +> so there is some place I need to initialize s->conn that I am +> not initializing it. + +The full order of things for a server should be. + +ctx=SSL_CTX_new(); + +/* The next line should not really be using ctx->cert but I'll leave it + * this way right now... I don't want a X509_ routine to know about an SSL + * structure, there should be an SSL_load_verify_locations... hmm, I may + * add it tonight. + */ +X509_load_verify_locations(ctx->cert,CAfile,CApath); + +/* Ok now for each new connection we do the following */ +con=SSL_new(ctx); +SSL_set_fd(con,s); +SSL_set_verify(con,verify,verify_callback); + +/* set the certificate and private key to use. */ +SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(con,X509_certificate); +SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(con,RSA_private_key); + +SSL_accept(con); + +SSL_read(con)/SSL_write(con); + +There is a bit more than that but that is basically the structure. + +Create a context and specify where to lookup certificates. + +foreach connection + { + create a SSL structure + set the certificate and private key + do a SSL_accept + + we should now be ok + } + +eric +-- +Eric Young | Signature removed since it was generating +AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au | more followups than the message contents :-) + + + +==== ssleay.doc ======================================================== + +SSLeay: a cryptographic kitchen sink. + +1st December 1995 +Way back at the start of April 1995, I was looking for a mindless +programming project. A friend of mine (Tim Hudson) said "why don't you do SSL, +it has DES encryption in it and I would not mind using it in a SSL telnet". +While it was true I had written a DES library in previous years, litle +did I know what an expansive task SSL would turn into. + +First of all, the SSL protocol contains DES encryption. Well and good. My +DES library was fast and portable. It also contained the RSA's RC4 stream +cipher. Again, not a problem, some-one had just posted to sci.crypt +something that was claimed to be RC4. It also contained IDEA, I had the +specifications, not a problem to implement. MD5, an RFC, trivial, at most +I could spend a week or so trying to see if I could speed up the +implementation. All in all a nice set of ciphers. +Then the first 'expantion of the scope', RSA public key +encryption. Since I did not knowing a thing about public key encryption +or number theory, this appeared quite a daunting task. Just writing a +big number library would be problomatic in itself, let alone making it fast. +At this point the scope of 'implementing SSL' expands eponentialy. +First of all, the RSA private keys were being kept in ASN.1 format. +Thankfully the RSA PKCS series of documents explains this format. So I now +needed to be able to encode and decode arbitary ASN.1 objects. The Public +keys were embeded in X509 certificates. Hmm... these are not only +ASN.1 objects but they make up a heirachy of authentication. To +authenticate a X509 certificate one needs to retrieve it's issuers +certificate etc etc. Hmm..., so I also need to implement some kind +of certificate management software. I would also have to implement +software to authenticate certificates. At this point the support code made +the SSL part of my library look quite small. +Around this time, the first version of SSLeay was released. + +Ah, but here was the problem, I was not happy with the code so far. As may +have become obvious, I had been treating all of this as a learning +exersize, so I have completely written the library myself. As such, due +to the way it had grown like a fungus, much of the library was not +'elagent' or neat. There were global and static variables all over the +place, the SSL part did not even handle non-blocking IO. +The Great rewrite began. + +As of this point in time, the 'Great rewrite' has almost finished. So what +follows is an approximate list of what is actually SSLeay 0.5.0 + +/********* This needs to be updated for 0.6.0+ *************/ + +--- +The library contains the following routines. Please note that most of these +functions are not specfic for SSL or any other particular cipher +implementation. I have tried to make all the routines as general purpose +as possible. So you should not think of this library as an SSL +implemtation, but rather as a library of cryptographic functions +that also contains SSL. I refer to each of these function groupings as +libraries since they are often capable of functioning as independant +libraries + +First up, the general ciphers and message digests supported by the library. + +MD2 rfc???, a standard 'by parts' interface to this algorithm. +MD5 rfc???, the same type of interface as for the MD2 library except a + different algorithm. +SHA THe Secure Hash Algorithm. Again the same type of interface as + MD2/MD5 except the digest is 20 bytes. +SHA1 The 'revised' version of SHA. Just about identical to SHA except + for one tweak of an inner loop. +DES This is my libdes library that has been floating around for the last + few years. It has been enhanced for no other reason than completeness. + It now supports ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb, cfb64, ofb64 in normal mode and + triple DES modes of ecb, cbc, cfb64 and ofb64. cfb64 and ofb64 are + functional interfaces to the 64 bit modes of cfb and ofb used in + such a way thay they function as single character interfaces. +RC4 The RSA Inc. stream cipher. +RC2 The RSA Inc. block cipher. +IDEA An implmentation of the IDEA cipher, the library supports ecb, cbc, + cfb64 and ofb64 modes of operation. + +Now all the above mentioned ciphers and digests libraries support high +speed, minimal 'crap in the way' type interfaces. For fastest and +lowest level access, these routines should be used directly. + +Now there was also the matter of public key crypto systems. These are +based on large integer arithmatic. + +BN This is my large integer library. It supports all the normal + arithmentic operations. It uses malloc extensivly and as such has + no limits of the size of the numbers being manipulated. If you + wish to use 4000 bit RSA moduli, these routines will handle it. + This library also contains routines to 'generate' prime numbers and + to test for primality. The RSA and DH libraries sit on top of this + library. As of this point in time, I don't support SHA, but + when I do add it, it will just sit on top of the routines contained + in this library. +RSA This implements the RSA public key algorithm. It also contains + routines that will generate a new private/public key pair. + All the RSA functions conform to the PKCS#1 standard. +DH This is an implementation of the + Diffie-Hellman protocol. There are all the require routines for + the protocol, plus extra routines that can be used to generate a + strong prime for use with a specified generator. While this last + routine is not generally required by applications implementing DH, + It is present for completeness and because I thing it is much + better to be able to 'generate' your own 'magic' numbers as oposed + to using numbers suplied by others. I conform to the PKCS#3 + standard where required. + +You may have noticed the preceeding section mentions the 'generation' of +prime numbers. Now this requries the use of 'random numbers'. + +RAND This psuedo-random number library is based on MD5 at it's core + and a large internal state (2k bytes). Once you have entered enough + seed data into this random number algorithm I don't feel + you will ever need to worry about it generating predictable output. + Due to the way I am writing a portable library, I have left the + issue of how to get good initial random seed data upto the + application but I do have support routines for saving and loading a + persistant random number state for use between program runs. + +Now to make all these ciphers easier to use, a higher level +interface was required. In this form, the same function would be used to +encrypt 'by parts', via any one of the above mentioned ciphers. + +EVP The Digital EnVeloPe library is quite large. At it's core are + function to perform encryption and decryption by parts while using + an initial parameter to specify which of the 17 different ciphers + or 4 different message digests to use. On top of these are implmented + the digital signature functions, sign, verify, seal and open. + Base64 encoding of binary data is also done in this library. + +PEM rfc???? describe the format for Privacy Enhanced eMail. + As part of this standard, methods of encoding digital enveloped + data is an ascii format are defined. As such, I use a form of these + to encode enveloped data. While at this point in time full support + for PEM has not been built into the library, a minimal subset of + the secret key and Base64 encoding is present. These reoutines are + mostly used to Ascii encode binary data with a 'type' associated + with it and perhaps details of private key encryption used to + encrypt the data. + +PKCS7 This is another Digital Envelope encoding standard which uses ASN.1 + to encode the data. At this point in time, while there are some + routines to encode and decode this binary format, full support is + not present. + +As Mentioned, above, there are several different ways to encode +data structures. + +ASN1 This library is more a set of primatives used to encode the packing + and unpacking of data structures. It is used by the X509 + certificate standard and by the PKCS standards which are used by + this library. It also contains routines for duplicating and signing + the structures asocisated with X509. + +X509 The X509 library contains routines for packing and unpacking, + verifying and just about every thing else you would want to do with + X509 certificates. + +PKCS7 PKCS-7 is a standard for encoding digital envelope data + structures. At this point in time the routines will load and save + DER forms of these structees. They need to be re-worked to support + the BER form which is the normal way PKCS-7 is encoded. If the + previous 2 sentances don't make much sense, don't worry, this + library is not used by this version of SSLeay anyway. + +OBJ ASN.1 uses 'object identifiers' to identify objects. A set of + functions were requred to translate from ASN.1 to an intenger, to a + character string. This library provieds these translations + +Now I mentioned an X509 library. X509 specified a hieachy of certificates +which needs to be traversed to authenticate particular certificates. + +METH This library is used to push 'methods' of retrieving certificates + into the library. There are some supplied 'methods' with SSLeay + but applications can add new methods if they so desire. + This library has not been finished and is not being used in this + version. + +Now all the above are required for use in the initial point of this project. + +SSL The SSL protocol. This is a full implmentation of SSL v 2. It + support both server and client authentication. SSL v 3 support + will be added when the SSL v 3 specification is released in it's + final form. + +Now quite a few of the above mentioned libraries rely on a few 'complex' +data structures. For each of these I have a library. + +Lhash This is a hash table library which is used extensivly. + +STACK An implemetation of a Stack data structure. + +BUF A simple character array structure that also support a function to + check that the array is greater that a certain size, if it is not, + it is realloced so that is it. + +TXT_DB A simple memory based text file data base. The application can specify + unique indexes that will be enforced at update time. + +CONF Most of the programs written for this library require a configuration + file. Instead of letting programs constantly re-implment this + subsystem, the CONF library provides a consistant and flexable + interface to not only configuration files but also environment + variables. + +But what about when something goes wrong? +The one advantage (and perhaps disadvantage) of all of these +functions being in one library was the ability to implement a +single error reporting system. + +ERR This library is used to report errors. The error system records + library number, function number (in the library) and reason + number. Multiple errors can be reported so that an 'error' trace + is created. The errors can be printed in numeric or textual form. + + +==== ssluse.doc ======================================================== + +We have an SSL_CTX which contains global information for lots of +SSL connections. The session-id cache and the certificate verificate cache. +It also contains default values for use when certificates are used. + +SSL_CTX + default cipher list + session-id cache + certificate cache + default session-id timeout period + New session-id callback + Required session-id callback + session-id stats + Informational callback + Callback that is set, overrides the SSLeay X509 certificate + verification + The default Certificate/Private Key pair + Default read ahead mode. + Default verify mode and verify callback. These are not used + if the over ride callback mentioned above is used. + +Each SSL can have the following defined for it before a connection is made. + +Certificate +Private key +Ciphers to use +Certificate verify mode and callback +IO object to use in the comunication. +Some 'read-ahead' mode information. +A previous session-id to re-use. + +A connection is made by using SSL_connect or SSL_accept. +When non-blocking IO is being used, there are functions that can be used +to determin where and why the SSL_connect or SSL_accept did not complete. +This information can be used to recall the functions when the 'error' +condition has dissapeared. + +After the connection has been made, information can be retrived about the +SSL session and the session-id values that have been decided apon. +The 'peer' certificate can be retrieved. + +The session-id values include +'start time' +'timeout length' + + + +==== stack.doc ======================================================== + +The stack data structure is used to store an ordered list of objects. +It is basically misnamed to call it a stack but it can function that way +and that is what I originally used it for. Due to the way element +pointers are kept in a malloc()ed array, the most efficient way to use this +structure is to add and delete elements from the end via sk_pop() and +sk_push(). If you wish to do 'lookups' sk_find() is quite efficient since +it will sort the stack (if required) and then do a binary search to lookup +the requested item. This sorting occurs automatically so just sk_push() +elements on the stack and don't worry about the order. Do remember that if +you do a sk_find(), the order of the elements will change. + +You should never need to 'touch' this structure directly. +typedef struct stack_st + { + unsigned int num; + char **data; + int sorted; + + unsigned int num_alloc; + int (*comp)(); + } STACK; + +'num' holds the number of elements in the stack, 'data' is the array of +elements. 'sorted' is 1 is the list has been sorted, 0 if not. + +num_alloc is the number of 'nodes' allocated in 'data'. When num becomes +larger than num_alloc, data is realloced to a larger size. +If 'comp' is set, it is a function that is used to compare 2 of the items +in the stack. The function should return -1, 0 or 1, depending on the +ordering. + +#define sk_num(sk) ((sk)->num) +#define sk_value(sk,n) ((sk)->data[n]) + +These 2 macros should be used to access the number of elements in the +'stack' and to access a pointer to one of the values. + +STACK *sk_new(int (*c)()); + This creates a new stack. If 'c', the comparison function, is not +specified, the various functions that operate on a sorted 'stack' will not +work (sk_find()). NULL is returned on failure. + +void sk_free(STACK *); + This function free()'s a stack structure. The elements in the +stack will not be freed so one should 'pop' and free all elements from the +stack before calling this function or call sk_pop_free() instead. + +void sk_pop_free(STACK *st; void (*func)()); + This function calls 'func' for each element on the stack, passing +the element as the argument. sk_free() is then called to free the 'stack' +structure. + +int sk_insert(STACK *sk,char *data,int where); + This function inserts 'data' into stack 'sk' at location 'where'. +If 'where' is larger that the number of elements in the stack, the element +is put at the end. This function tends to be used by other 'stack' +functions. Returns 0 on failure, otherwise the number of elements in the +new stack. + +char *sk_delete(STACK *st,int loc); + Remove the item a location 'loc' from the stack and returns it. +Returns NULL if the 'loc' is out of range. + +char *sk_delete_ptr(STACK *st, char *p); + If the data item pointed to by 'p' is in the stack, it is deleted +from the stack and returned. NULL is returned if the element is not in the +stack. + +int sk_find(STACK *st,char *data); + Returns the location that contains a value that is equal to +the 'data' item. If the comparison function was not set, this function +does a linear search. This function actually qsort()s the stack if it is not +in order and then uses bsearch() to do the initial search. If the +search fails,, -1 is returned. For mutliple items with the same +value, the index of the first in the array is returned. + +int sk_push(STACK *st,char *data); + Append 'data' to the stack. 0 is returned if there is a failure +(due to a malloc failure), else 1. This is +sk_insert(st,data,sk_num(st)); + +int sk_unshift(STACK *st,char *data); + Prepend 'data' to the front (location 0) of the stack. This is +sk_insert(st,data,0); + +char *sk_shift(STACK *st); + Return and delete from the stack the first element in the stack. +This is sk_delete(st,0); + +char *sk_pop(STACK *st); + Return and delete the last element on the stack. This is +sk_delete(st,sk_num(sk)-1); + +void sk_zero(STACK *st); + Removes all items from the stack. It does not 'free' +pointers but is a quick way to clear a 'stack of references'. + +==== threads.doc ======================================================== + +How to compile SSLeay for multi-threading. + +Well basically it is quite simple, set the compiler flags and build. +I have only really done much testing under Solaris and Windows NT. +If you library supports localtime_r() and gmtime_r() add, +-DTHREADS to the makefile parameters. You can probably survive with out +this define unless you are going to have multiple threads generating +certificates at once. It will not affect the SSL side of things. + +The approach I have taken to doing locking is to make the application provide +callbacks to perform locking and so that the SSLeay library can distinguish +between threads (for the error state). + +To have a look at an example program, 'cd mt; vi mttest.c'. +To build under solaris, sh solaris.sh, for Windows NT or Windows 95, +win32.bat + +This will build mttest which will fire up 10 threads that talk SSL +to each other 10 times. +To enable everything to work, the application needs to call + +CRYPTO_set_id_callback(id_function); +CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(locking_function); + +before any multithreading is started. +id_function does not need to be defined under Windows NT or 95, the +correct function will be called if it is not. Under unix, getpid() +is call if the id_callback is not defined, for Solaris this is wrong +(since threads id's are not pid's) but under Linux it is correct +(threads are just processes sharing the data segement). + +The locking_callback is used to perform locking by the SSLeay library. +eg. + +void solaris_locking_callback(mode,type,file,line) +int mode; +int type; +char *file; +int line; + { + if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) + mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type])); + else + mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); + } + +Now in this case I have used mutexes instead of read/write locks, since they +are faster and there are not many read locks in SSLeay, you may as well +always use write locks. file and line are __FILE__ and __LINE__ from +the compile and can be usefull when debugging. + +Now as you can see, 'type' can be one of a range of values, these values are +defined in crypto/crypto.h +CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type) will return a text version of what the lock is. +There are CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS locks required, so under solaris, the setup +for multi-threading can be + +static mutex_t lock_cs[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS]; + +void thread_setup() + { + int i; + + for (i=0; i<CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS; i++) + mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]),USYNC_THREAD,NULL); + CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())solaris_thread_id); + CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)())solaris_locking_callback); + } + +As a final note, under Windows NT or Windows 95, you have to be careful +not to mix the various threaded, unthreaded and debug libraries. +Normally if they are mixed incorrectly, mttest will crash just after printing +out some usage statistics at the end. This is because the +different system libraries use different malloc routines and if +data is malloc()ed inside crypt32.dll or ssl32.dll and then free()ed by a +different library malloc, things get very confused. + +The default SSLeay DLL builds use /MD, so if you use this on your +application, things will work as expected. If you use /MDd, +you will probably have to rebuild SSLeay using this flag. +I should modify util/mk1mf.pl so it does all this correctly, but +this has not been done yet. + +One last warning. Because locking overheads are actually quite large, the +statistics collected against the SSL_CTX for successfull connections etc +are not locked when updated. This does make it possible for these +values to be slightly lower than they should be, if you are +running multithreaded on a multi-processor box, but this does not really +matter much. + + +==== txt_db.doc ======================================================== + +TXT_DB, a simple text based in memory database. + +It holds rows of ascii data, for which the only special character is '\0'. +The rows can be of an unlimited length. + +==== why.doc ======================================================== + +This file is more of a note for other people who wish to understand why +the build environment is the way it is :-). + +The include files 'depend' as follows. +Each of +crypto/*/*.c includes crypto/cryptlib.h +ssl/*.c include ssl/ssl_locl.h +apps/*.c include apps/apps.h +crypto/cryptlib.h, ssl/ssl_locl.h and apps/apps.h +all include e_os.h which contains OS/environment specific information. +If you need to add something todo with a particular environment, +add it to this file. It is worth remembering that quite a few libraries, +like lhash, des, md, sha etc etc do not include crypto/cryptlib.h. This +is because these libraries should be 'independantly compilable' and so I +try to keep them this way. +e_os.h is not so much a part of SSLeay, as the placing in one spot all the +evil OS dependant muck. + +I wanted to automate as many things as possible. This includes +error number generation. A +make errors +will scan the source files for error codes, append them to the correct +header files, and generate the functions to print the text version +of the error numbers. So don't even think about adding error numbers by +hand, put them in the form +XXXerr(XXXX_F_XXXX,YYYY_R_YYYY); +on line and it will be automatically picked up my a make errors. + +In a similar vein, programs to be added into ssleay in the apps directory +just need to have an entry added to E_EXE in makefile.ssl and +everthing will work as expected. Don't edit progs.h by hand. + +make links re-generates the symbolic links that are used. The reason why +I keep everything in its own directory, and don't put all the +test programs and header files in 'test' and 'include' is because I want +to keep the 'sub-libraries' independant. I still 'pull' out +indervidual libraries for use in specific projects where the code is +required. I have used the 'lhash' library in just about every software +project I have worked on :-). + +make depend generates dependancies and +make dclean removes them. + +You will notice that I use perl quite a bit when I could be using 'sed'. +The reason I decided to do this was to just stick to one 'extra' program. +For Windows NT, I have perl and no sed. + +The util/mk1mf.pl program can be used to generate a single makefile. +I use this because makefiles under Microsoft are horrific. +Each C compiler seems to have different linker formats, which have +to be used because the retarted C compilers explode when you do +cl -o file *.o. + +Now some would argue that I should just use the single makefile. I don't +like it during develoment for 2 reasons. First, the actuall make +command takes a long time. For my current setup, if I'm in +crypto/bn and I type make, only the crypto/bn directory gets rebuilt, +which is nice when you are modifying prototypes in bn.h which +half the SSLeay depends on. The second is that to add a new souce file +I just plonk it in at the required spot in the local makefile. This +then alows me to keep things local, I don't need to modify a 'global' +tables (the make for unix, the make for NT, the make for w31...). +When I am ripping apart a library structure, it is nice to only +have to worry about one directory :-). + +Having said all this, for the hell of it I put together 2 files that +#include all the souce code (generated by doing a ls */*.o after a build). +crypto.c takes only 30 seconds to build under NT and 2 minutes under linux +for my pentium100. Much faster that the normal build :-). +Again, the problem is that when using libraries, every program linked +to libcrypto.a would suddenly get 330k of library when it may only need +1k. This technique does look like a nice way to do shared libraries though. + +Oh yes, as a final note, to 'build' a distribution, I just type +make dist. +This cleans and packages everything. The directory needs to be called +SSLeay since the make does a 'cd ..' and renames and tars things up. + +==== req.1 ======================================================== + +The 'req' command is used to manipulate and deal with pkcs#10 +certificate requests. + +It's default mode of operation is to load a certificate and then +write it out again. + +By default the 'req' is read from stdin in 'PEM' format. +The -inform option can be used to specify 'pem' format or 'der' +format. PEM format is the base64 encoding of the DER format. + +By default 'req' then writes the request back out. -outform can be used +to indicate the desired output format, be it 'pem' or 'der'. + +To specify an input file, use the '-in' option and the '-out' option +can be used to specify the output file. + +If you wish to perform a command and not output the certificate +request afterwards, use the '-noout' option. + +When a certificate is loaded, it can be printed in a human readable +ascii format via the '-text' option. + +To check that the signature on a certificate request is correct, use +the '-verify' option to make sure that the private key contained in the +certificate request corresponds to the signature. + +Besides the default mode, there is also the 'generate a certificate +request' mode. There are several flags that trigger this mode. + +-new will generate a new RSA key (if required) and then prompts +the user for details for the certificate request. +-newkey has an argument that is the number of bits to make the new +key. This function also triggers '-new'. + +The '-new' option can have a key to use specified instead of having to +load one, '-key' is used to specify the file containg the key. +-keyform can be used to specify the format of the key. Only +'pem' and 'der' formats are supported, later, 'netscape' format may be added. + +Finally there is the '-x509' options which makes req output a self +signed x509 certificate instead of a certificate request. + +Now as you may have noticed, there are lots of default options that +cannot be specified via the command line. They are held in a 'template' +or 'configuration file'. The -config option specifies which configuration +file to use. See conf.doc for details on the syntax of this file. + +The req command uses the 'req' section of the config file. + +--- +# The following variables are defined. For this example I will populate +# the various values +[ req ] +default_bits = 512 # default number of bits to use. +default_keyfile = testkey.pem # Where to write the generated keyfile + # if not specified. +distinguished_name= req_dn # The section that contains the + # information about which 'object' we + # want to put in the DN. +attributes = req_attr # The objects we want for the + # attributes field. +encrypt_rsa_key = no # Should we encrypt newly generated + # keys. I strongly recommend 'yes'. + +# The distinguished name section. For the following entries, the +# object names must exist in the SSLeay header file objects.h. If they +# do not, they will be silently ignored. The entries have the following +# format. +# <object_name> => string to prompt with +# <object_name>_default => default value for people +# <object_name>_value => Automatically use this value for this field. +# <object_name>_min => minimum number of characters for data (def. 0) +# <object_name>_max => maximum number of characters for data (def. inf.) +# All of these entries are optional except for the first one. +[ req_dn ] +countryName = Country Name (2 letter code) +countryName_default = AU + +stateOrProvinceName = State or Province Name (full name) +stateOrProvinceName_default = Queensland + +localityName = Locality Name (eg, city) + +organizationName = Organization Name (eg, company) +organizationName_default = Mincom Pty Ltd + +organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) +organizationalUnitName_default = MTR + +commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name) +commonName_max = 64 + +emailAddress = Email Address +emailAddress_max = 40 + +# The next section is the attributes section. This is exactly the +# same as for the previous section except that the resulting objects are +# put in the attributes field. +[ req_attr ] +challengePassword = A challenge password +challengePassword_min = 4 +challengePassword_max = 20 + +unstructuredName = An optional company name + +---- +Also note that the order that attributes appear in this file is the +order they will be put into the distinguished name. + +Once this request has been generated, it can be sent to a CA for +certifying. + +---- +A few quick examples.... + +To generate a new request and a new key +req -new + +To generate a new request and a 1058 bit key +req -newkey 1058 + +To generate a new request using a pre-existing key +req -new -key key.pem + +To generate a self signed x509 certificate from a certificate +request using a supplied key, and we want to see the text form of the +output certificate (which we will put in the file selfSign.pem +req -x509 -in req.pem -key key.pem -text -out selfSign.pem + +Verify that the signature is correct on a certificate request. +req -verify -in req.pem + +Verify that the signature was made using a specified public key. +req -verify -in req.pem -key key.pem + +Print the contents of a certificate request +req -text -in req.pem + +==== danger ======================================================== + +If you specify a SSLv2 cipher, and the mode is SSLv23 and the server +can talk SSLv3, it will claim there is no cipher since you should be +using SSLv3. + +When tracing debug stuff, remember BIO_s_socket() is different to +BIO_s_connect(). + +BSD/OS assember is not working + diff --git a/doc/standards.txt b/doc/standards.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bda55d1581ad --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/standards.txt @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +Standards related to OpenSSL +============================ + +[Please, this is currently a draft. I made a first try at finding + documents that describe parts of what OpenSSL implements. There are + big gaps, and I've most certainly done something wrong. Please + correct whatever is... Also, this note should be removed when this + file is reaching a somewhat correct state. -- Richard Levitte] + + +All pointers in here will be either URL's or blobs of text borrowed +from miscellaneous indexes, like rfc-index.txt (index of RFCs), +1id-index.txt (index of Internet drafts) and the like. + +To find the latest possible RFCs, it's recommended to either browse +ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/ or go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/ and +use the search mechanism found there. +To find the latest possible Internet drafts, it's recommended to +browse ftp://ftp.isi.edu/internet-drafts/. +To find the latest possible PKCS, it's recommended to browse +http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/. + + +Implemented: +------------ + +These are documents that describe things that are implemented (in +whole or at least great parts) in OpenSSL. + +1319 The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm. B. Kaliski. April 1992. + (Format: TXT=25661 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +1320 The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm. R. Rivest. April 1992. (Format: + TXT=32407 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. R. Rivest. April 1992. (Format: + TXT=35222 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. T. Dierks, C. Allen. January 1999. + (Format: TXT=170401 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2268 A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm. R. Rivest. + January 1998. (Format: TXT=19048 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +2315 PKCS 7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5. B. Kaliski. + March 1998. (Format: TXT=69679 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +PKCS#8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard + +PKCS#12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard, version 1.0. + +2560 X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate + Status Protocol - OCSP. M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, + C. Adams. June 1999. (Format: TXT=43243 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED + STANDARD) + +2712 Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security + (TLS). A. Medvinsky, M. Hur. October 1999. (Format: TXT=13763 bytes) + (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2898 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0. + B. Kaliski. September 2000. (Format: TXT=68692 bytes) (Status: + INFORMATIONAL) + +2986 PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7. + M. Nystrom, B. Kaliski. November 2000. (Format: TXT=27794 bytes) + (Obsoletes RFC2314) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +3174 US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1). D. Eastlake 3rd, P. Jones. + September 2001. (Format: TXT=35525 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +3268 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport + Layer Security (TLS). P. Chown. June 2002. (Format: TXT=13530 bytes) + (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3279 Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) + Profile. L. Bassham, W. Polk, R. Housley. April 2002. (Format: + TXT=53833 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and + Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. R. Housley, W. Polk, W. + Ford, D. Solo. April 2002. (Format: TXT=295556 bytes) (Obsoletes + RFC2459) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography + Specifications Version 2.1. J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski. February 2003. + (Format: TXT=143173 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2437) (Status: + INFORMATIONAL) + +3713 A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm. M. Matsui, + J. Nakajima, S. Moriai. April 2004. (Format: TXT=25031 bytes) + (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +3820 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Proxy Certificate + Profile. S. Tuecke, V. Welch, D. Engert, L. Pearlman, M. Thompson. + June 2004. (Format: TXT=86374 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +4132 Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security + (TLS). S. Moriai, A. Kato, M. Kanda. July 2005. (Format: TXT=13590 + bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +Related: +-------- + +These are documents that are close to OpenSSL, for example the +STARTTLS documents. + +1421 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message + Encryption and Authentication Procedures. J. Linn. February 1993. + (Format: TXT=103894 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC1113) (Status: PROPOSED + STANDARD) + +1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: + Certificate-Based Key Management. S. Kent. February 1993. (Format: + TXT=86085 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC1114) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: + Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers. D. Balenson. February 1993. + (Format: TXT=33277 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC1115) (Status: PROPOSED + STANDARD) + +1424 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key + Certification and Related Services. B. Kaliski. February 1993. + (Format: TXT=17537 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2025 The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM). C. Adams. October + 1996. (Format: TXT=101692 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2510 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management + Protocols. C. Adams, S. Farrell. March 1999. (Format: TXT=158178 + bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2511 Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format. M. Myers, C. + Adams, D. Solo, D. Kemp. March 1999. (Format: TXT=48278 bytes) + (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2527 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and + Certification Practices Framework. S. Chokhani, W. Ford. March 1999. + (Format: TXT=91860 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +2538 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS). D. Eastlake + 3rd, O. Gudmundsson. March 1999. (Format: TXT=19857 bytes) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2539 Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS). + D. Eastlake 3rd. March 1999. (Format: TXT=21049 bytes) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2559 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols - + LDAPv2. S. Boeyen, T. Howes, P. Richard. April 1999. (Format: + TXT=22889 bytes) (Updates RFC1778) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2585 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: + FTP and HTTP. R. Housley, P. Hoffman. May 1999. (Format: TXT=14813 + bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2587 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema. S. + Boeyen, T. Howes, P. Richard. June 1999. (Format: TXT=15102 bytes) + (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2595 Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP. C. Newman. June 1999. + (Format: TXT=32440 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method. E. Rescorla. June 1999. + (Format: TXT=25932 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2632 S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling. B. Ramsdell, Ed.. June + 1999. (Format: TXT=27925 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2716 PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol. B. Aboba, D. Simon. October + 1999. (Format: TXT=50108 bytes) (Status: EXPERIMENTAL) + +2773 Encryption using KEA and SKIPJACK. R. Housley, P. Yee, W. Nace. + February 2000. (Format: TXT=20008 bytes) (Updates RFC0959) (Status: + EXPERIMENTAL) + +2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS. M. Myers, X. Liu, J. + Schaad, J. Weinstein. April 2000. (Format: TXT=103357 bytes) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2817 Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1. R. Khare, S. Lawrence. May + 2000. (Format: TXT=27598 bytes) (Updates RFC2616) (Status: PROPOSED + STANDARD) + +2818 HTTP Over TLS. E. Rescorla. May 2000. (Format: TXT=15170 bytes) + (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +2876 Use of the KEA and SKIPJACK Algorithms in CMS. J. Pawling. July + 2000. (Format: TXT=29265 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +2984 Use of the CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm in CMS. C. Adams. + October 2000. (Format: TXT=11591 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +2985 PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0. + M. Nystrom, B. Kaliski. November 2000. (Format: TXT=70703 bytes) + (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +3029 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Validation and + Certification Server Protocols. C. Adams, P. Sylvester, M. Zolotarev, + R. Zuccherato. February 2001. (Format: TXT=107347 bytes) (Status: + EXPERIMENTAL) + +3039 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates + Profile. S. Santesson, W. Polk, P. Barzin, M. Nystrom. January 2001. + (Format: TXT=67619 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3058 Use of the IDEA Encryption Algorithm in CMS. S. Teiwes, P. + Hartmann, D. Kuenzi. February 2001. (Format: TXT=17257 bytes) + (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +3161 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol + (TSP). C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, R. Zuccherato. August 2001. + (Format: TXT=54585 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3185 Reuse of CMS Content Encryption Keys. S. Farrell, S. Turner. + October 2001. (Format: TXT=20404 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3207 SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer + Security. P. Hoffman. February 2002. (Format: TXT=18679 bytes) + (Obsoletes RFC2487) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3217 Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. R. Housley. December 2001. + (Format: TXT=19855 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL) + +3274 Compressed Data Content Type for Cryptographic Message Syntax + (CMS). P. Gutmann. June 2002. (Format: TXT=11276 bytes) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3278 Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in + Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). S. Blake-Wilson, D. Brown, P. + Lambert. April 2002. (Format: TXT=33779 bytes) (Status: + INFORMATIONAL) + +3281 An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization. S. + Farrell, R. Housley. April 2002. (Format: TXT=90580 bytes) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3369 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). R. Housley. August 2002. + (Format: TXT=113975 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2630, RFC3211) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3370 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms. R. Housley. August + 2002. (Format: TXT=51001 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2630, RFC3211) (Status: + PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3377 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Technical + Specification. J. Hodges, R. Morgan. September 2002. (Format: + TXT=9981 bytes) (Updates RFC2251, RFC2252, RFC2253, RFC2254, RFC2255, + RFC2256, RFC2829, RFC2830) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. J. Schaad, + R. Housley. September 2002. (Format: TXT=73072 bytes) (Status: + INFORMATIONAL) + +3436 Transport Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission + Protocol. A. Jungmaier, E. Rescorla, M. Tuexen. December 2002. + (Format: TXT=16333 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +3657 Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic + Message Syntax (CMS). S. Moriai, A. Kato. January 2004. + (Format: TXT=26282 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) + +"Securing FTP with TLS", 01/27/2000, <draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-05.txt> + + +To be implemented: +------------------ + +These are documents that describe things that are planed to be +implemented in the hopefully short future. + |
