diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c | 601 |
1 files changed, 601 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..28fd7c498e99 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,601 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> +#include "internal/nelem.h" +#include "internal/sizes.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "prov/securitycheck.h" +#include "crypto/dsa.h" +#include "prov/der_dsa.h" + +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn dsa_newctx; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_sign_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_verify_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn dsa_sign; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn dsa_verify; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_sign_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn dsa_digest_sign_final; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_verify_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn dsa_digest_verify_final; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn dsa_freectx; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn dsa_dupctx; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_md_params; + +/* + * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. + * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes DSA structures, so + * we use that here too. + */ + +typedef struct { + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx; + char *propq; + DSA *dsa; + + /* + * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0) + * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify + * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again + * by their Final function. + */ + unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1; + + char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + + /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */ + unsigned char aid_buf[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE]; + unsigned char *aid; + size_t aid_len; + + /* main digest */ + EVP_MD *md; + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; + int operation; +} PROV_DSA_CTX; + + +static size_t dsa_get_md_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx) +{ + if (pdsactx->md != NULL) + return EVP_MD_get_size(pdsactx->md); + return 0; +} + +static void *dsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + pdsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_DSA_CTX)); + if (pdsactx == NULL) + return NULL; + + pdsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx); + pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; + if (propq != NULL && (pdsactx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(pdsactx); + pdsactx = NULL; + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + } + return pdsactx; +} + +static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx, + const char *mdname, const char *mdprops) +{ + if (mdprops == NULL) + mdprops = ctx->propq; + + if (mdname != NULL) { + int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); + WPACKET pkt; + EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops); + int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md, + sha1_allowed); + size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname); + + if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) { + if (md == NULL) + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, + "%s could not be fetched", mdname); + if (md_nid < 0) + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, + "digest=%s", mdname); + if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, + "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); + EVP_MD_free(md); + return 0; + } + + if (!ctx->flag_allow_md) { + if (ctx->mdname[0] != '\0' && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, ctx->mdname)) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, + "digest %s != %s", mdname, ctx->mdname); + EVP_MD_free(md); + return 0; + } + EVP_MD_free(md); + return 1; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); + + /* + * We do not care about DER writing errors. + * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no + * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had, but the operation itself is + * still valid, just as long as it's not used to construct + * anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier. + */ + ctx->aid_len = 0; + if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf)) + && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_DSA_with_MD(&pkt, -1, ctx->dsa, + md_nid) + && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len); + ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt); + } + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + + ctx->mdctx = NULL; + ctx->md = md; + OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)); + } + return 1; +} + +static int dsa_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, + const OSSL_PARAM params[], int operation) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() + || pdsactx == NULL) + return 0; + + if (vdsa == NULL && pdsactx->dsa == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET); + return 0; + } + + if (vdsa != NULL) { + if (!ossl_dsa_check_key(pdsactx->libctx, vdsa, + operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + if (!DSA_up_ref(vdsa)) + return 0; + DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa); + pdsactx->dsa = vdsa; + } + + pdsactx->operation = operation; + + if (!dsa_set_ctx_params(pdsactx, params)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static int dsa_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); +} + +static int dsa_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); +} + +static int dsa_sign(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + int ret; + unsigned int sltmp; + size_t dsasize = DSA_size(pdsactx->dsa); + size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx); + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return 0; + + if (sig == NULL) { + *siglen = dsasize; + return 1; + } + + if (sigsize < (size_t)dsasize) + return 0; + + if (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize) + return 0; + + ret = ossl_dsa_sign_int(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, pdsactx->dsa); + if (ret <= 0) + return 0; + + *siglen = sltmp; + return 1; +} + +static int dsa_verify(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx); + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize)) + return 0; + + return DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, pdsactx->dsa); +} + +static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname, + void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], + int operation) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return 0; + + if (!dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, params, operation)) + return 0; + + if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, NULL)) + return 0; + + pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 0; + + if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) { + pdsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) + goto error; + } + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex2(pdsactx->mdctx, pdsactx->md, params)) + goto error; + + return 1; + + error: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(pdsactx->mdctx); + pdsactx->mdctx = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int dsa_digest_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname, + void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, params, + EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); +} + +static int dsa_digest_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname, + void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, params, + EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); +} + +int dsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_DigestUpdate(pdsactx->mdctx, data, datalen); +} + +int dsa_digest_sign_final(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + size_t sigsize) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int dlen = 0; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields + * are ignored. Defer to dsa_sign. + */ + if (sig != NULL) { + /* + * There is the possibility that some externally provided + * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - + * but that problem is much larger than just in DSA. + */ + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) + return 0; + } + + pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; + + return dsa_sign(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); +} + + +int dsa_digest_verify_final(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int dlen = 0; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * There is the possibility that some externally provided + * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - + * but that problem is much larger than just in DSA. + */ + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) + return 0; + + pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; + + return dsa_verify(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); +} + +static void dsa_freectx(void *vpdsactx) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); + ctx->propq = NULL; + ctx->mdctx = NULL; + ctx->md = NULL; + DSA_free(ctx->dsa); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +static void *dsa_dupctx(void *vpdsactx) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + PROV_DSA_CTX *dstctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); + if (dstctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + *dstctx = *srcctx; + dstctx->dsa = NULL; + dstctx->md = NULL; + dstctx->mdctx = NULL; + dstctx->propq = NULL; + + if (srcctx->dsa != NULL && !DSA_up_ref(srcctx->dsa)) + goto err; + dstctx->dsa = srcctx->dsa; + + if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) + goto err; + dstctx->md = srcctx->md; + + if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { + dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL + || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) + goto err; + } + if (srcctx->propq != NULL) { + dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq); + if (dstctx->propq == NULL) + goto err; + } + + return dstctx; + err: + dsa_freectx(dstctx); + return NULL; +} + +static int dsa_get_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (pdsactx == NULL) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); + if (p != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, pdsactx->aid, pdsactx->aid_len)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, pdsactx->mdname)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +static int dsa_set_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (pdsactx == NULL) + return 0; + if (params == NULL) + return 1; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); + if (p != NULL) { + char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; + char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; + const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = + OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, + OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES); + + if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) + return 0; + if (propsp != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) + return 0; + if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, mdprops)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params_no_digest[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (pdsactx != NULL && !pdsactx->flag_allow_md) + return settable_ctx_params_no_digest; + return settable_ctx_params; +} + +static int dsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(pdsactx->mdctx, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (pdsactx->md == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md); +} + +static int dsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(pdsactx->mdctx, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx) +{ + PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx; + + if (pdsactx->md == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md); +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_dsa_signature_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_newctx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, + (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, + (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, + (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_final }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, + (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, + (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, + (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_final }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_freectx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_dupctx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))dsa_get_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))dsa_gettable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))dsa_set_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))dsa_settable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))dsa_get_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))dsa_set_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))dsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, + { 0, NULL } +}; |