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-rw-r--r--ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c1763
1 files changed, 1763 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6d495715b22a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1763 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "record_locl.h"
+#include "../packet_locl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
+ !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
+ )
+# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
+#endif
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
+{
+ rl->s = s;
+ RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
+ SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+
+ /*
+ * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
+ * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
+ * that right?
+ */
+
+ rl->packet = NULL;
+ rl->packet_length = 0;
+ rl->wnum = 0;
+ memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
+ rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+ rl->wpend_tot = 0;
+ rl->wpend_type = 0;
+ rl->wpend_ret = 0;
+ rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
+
+ SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
+ rl->numrpipes = 0;
+ SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
+
+ if (rl->d)
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
+ if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
+ SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+}
+
+/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
+int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
+int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
+ const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
+
+ while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
+ curr_rec++;
+
+ return curr_rec < num_recs;
+}
+
+int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
+ && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
+}
+
+void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+}
+
+size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+ size_t i, num = 0;
+
+ if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
+ != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ return 0;
+ num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
+ }
+
+ return num;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
+{
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
+{
+ switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
+ case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
+ return "read header";
+ case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
+ return "read body";
+ case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
+ return "read done";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
+{
+ switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
+ case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
+ return "RH";
+ case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
+ return "RB";
+ case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
+ return "RD";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return values are as per SSL_read()
+ */
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
+ size_t *readbytes)
+{
+ /*
+ * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+ * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
+ * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
+ * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
+ * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+ * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
+ * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
+ */
+ size_t len, left, align = 0;
+ unsigned char *pkt;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
+ if (rb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ left = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
+#endif
+
+ if (!extend) {
+ /* start with empty packet ... */
+ if (left == 0)
+ rb->offset = align;
+ else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
+ * alignment...
+ */
+ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
+ /*
+ * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
+ * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
+ * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
+ * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
+ * overrun can be triggered.
+ */
+ memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
+ rb->offset = align;
+ }
+ }
+ s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
+ /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+ }
+
+ len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
+ pkt = rb->buf + align;
+ /*
+ * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
+ * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
+ */
+ if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
+ memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
+ s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
+ rb->offset = len + align;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
+ * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
+ * the buffer).
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (left == 0 && extend)
+ return 0;
+ if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ n = left;
+ }
+
+ /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+ if (left >= n) {
+ s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ rb->offset += n;
+ *readbytes = n;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* else we need to read more data */
+
+ if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
+ /* does not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
+ if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ /* ignore max parameter */
+ max = n;
+ else {
+ if (max < n)
+ max = n;
+ if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
+ max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+ }
+
+ while (left < n) {
+ size_t bioread = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
+ * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
+ * possible)
+ */
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+ ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ bioread = ret;
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
+ SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ rb->left = left;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (len + left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ left += bioread;
+ /*
+ * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
+ * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
+ * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (n > left)
+ n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+ rb->offset += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ *readbytes = n;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
+ size_t *written)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
+ size_t tot;
+ size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+ size_t nw;
+#endif
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+ int i;
+ size_t tmpwrit;
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
+ /*
+ * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
+ * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
+ * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
+ * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
+ * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
+ * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
+ * report the error in a way the user will notice
+ */
+ if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
+ || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
+ && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
+ * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
+ * messages yet.
+ */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ if (i < 0)
+ return i;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
+ * will happen with non blocking IO
+ */
+ if (wb->left != 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
+ &tmpwrit);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
+ s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+ tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+ /*
+ * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
+ * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
+ * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
+ * compromise is considered worthy.
+ */
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
+ s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
+ !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
+ unsigned char aad[13];
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
+ size_t packlen;
+ int packleni;
+
+ /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
+ if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
+ max_send_fragment -= 512;
+
+ if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+ packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
+ (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
+
+ if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
+ packlen *= 8;
+ else
+ packlen *= 4;
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
+ /* free jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ *written = tot;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ n = (len - tot);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
+ /* free jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
+ nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
+ else
+ nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
+
+ memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
+ aad[8] = type;
+ aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+ aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+ aad[11] = 0;
+ aad[12] = 0;
+ mb_param.out = NULL;
+ mb_param.inp = aad;
+ mb_param.len = nw;
+
+ packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
+ sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
+ packlen = (size_t)packleni;
+ if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
+ /* free jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mb_param.out = wb->buf;
+ mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
+ mb_param.len = nw;
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
+ sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
+ if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
+ int j = 6;
+ while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
+ }
+
+ wb->offset = 0;
+ wb->left = packlen;
+
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
+ s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
+
+ i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
+ /* free jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ }
+ s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+ if (tmpwrit == n) {
+ /* free jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ *written = tot + tmpwrit;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ n -= tmpwrit;
+ tot += tmpwrit;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
+ if (tot == len) { /* done? */
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+ *written = tot;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ n = (len - tot);
+
+ max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
+ split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
+ /*
+ * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
+ * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
+ * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
+ * explicit IVs
+ */
+ maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
+ if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
+ /*
+ * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
+ * shouldn't get here
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (maxpipes == 0
+ || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
+ || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+ || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
+ maxpipes = 1;
+ if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
+ || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
+ /*
+ * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
+ * fragments so we shouldn't get here
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
+ size_t numpipes, j;
+
+ if (n == 0)
+ numpipes = 1;
+ else
+ numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
+ if (numpipes > maxpipes)
+ numpipes = maxpipes;
+
+ if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
+ /*
+ * We have enough data to completely fill all available
+ * pipelines
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+ pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
+ tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
+ remain = n % numpipes;
+ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+ pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
+ if (j < remain)
+ pipelens[j]++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
+ &tmpwrit);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
+ s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ if (tmpwrit == n ||
+ (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
+ /*
+ * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+ * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
+ */
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+
+ if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+ *written = tot + tmpwrit;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ n -= tmpwrit;
+ tot += tmpwrit;
+ }
+}
+
+int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
+ int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
+{
+ WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+ SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+ WPACKET *thispkt;
+ SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
+ unsigned char *recordstart;
+ int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
+ size_t prefix_len = 0;
+ int eivlen = 0;
+ size_t align = 0;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
+ totlen += pipelens[j];
+ /*
+ * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
+ * will happen with non blocking IO
+ */
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
+ }
+
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ return i;
+ }
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
+ if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ if ((sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
+ clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
+ mac_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
+ */
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
+ /*
+ * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
+ * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+
+ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ /*
+ * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
+ * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
+ * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
+ * payload)
+ */
+ size_t tmppipelen = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (prefix_len >
+ (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment) {
+ wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ /*
+ * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
+ * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
+ * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
+ */
+ align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
+#endif
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ wpinited = 1;
+ } else if (prefix_len) {
+ wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
+ + prefix_len, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ wpinited = 1;
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+ thispkt = &pkt[j];
+
+ wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
+ align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
+#endif
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ wpinited++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
+ int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
+ eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (eivlen <= 1)
+ eivlen = 0;
+ } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+ eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
+ }
+
+ totlen = 0;
+ /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
+ memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
+ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+ unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
+ : s->version;
+ unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
+ size_t maxcomplen;
+ unsigned int rectype;
+
+ thispkt = &pkt[j];
+ thiswr = &wr[j];
+
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
+ * record type
+ */
+ if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
+ && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
+ || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
+ rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
+ else
+ rectype = type;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
+
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
+ * and record version number > TLS 1.0
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
+ && !s->renegotiate
+ && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
+ version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
+
+ maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+
+ /* write the header */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
+ || (eivlen > 0
+ && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
+ || (maxcomplen > 0
+ && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
+ &compressdata))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
+ totlen += pipelens[j];
+
+ /*
+ * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
+ * thiswr->data
+ */
+
+ /* first we compress */
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
+ && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
+ || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+ size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
+
+ /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
+ max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
+ rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
+ if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
+ size_t padding = 0;
+ size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
+ if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
+ padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
+ } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
+ size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
+ size_t remainder;
+
+ /* optimize for power of 2 */
+ if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
+ remainder = rlen & mask;
+ else
+ remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
+ /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
+ if (remainder == 0)
+ padding = 0;
+ else
+ padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
+ }
+ if (padding > 0) {
+ /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
+ if (padding > max_padding)
+ padding = max_padding;
+ if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
+ * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
+ * in the wb->buf
+ */
+
+ if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+ unsigned char *mac;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
+ * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
+ * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NULL)
+ /*
+ * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
+ * sub-packet
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
+ recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
+
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
+ }
+
+ if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
+ * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
+ */
+ if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+ size_t origlen;
+
+ thispkt = &pkt[j];
+ thiswr = &wr[j];
+
+ /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
+ if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
+ /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
+ || origlen > thiswr->length
+ || (thiswr->length > origlen
+ && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
+ thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+ unsigned char *mac;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback) {
+ recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
+ - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
+ unsigned char ctype = type;
+
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
+ &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
+ * is thiswr->length long
+ */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
+ * debugging */
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment) {
+ /*
+ * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
+ * out anything here
+ */
+ if (j > 0) {
+ /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
+ prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
+ * retries later
+ */
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
+
+ /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
+ err:
+ for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
+ *
+ * Return values are as per SSL_write()
+ */
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+ size_t *written)
+{
+ int i;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
+ size_t currbuf = 0;
+ size_t tmpwrit = 0;
+
+ if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
+ || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
+ && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
+ || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
+ SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
+ && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
+ currbuf++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
+ i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
+ &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
+ [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
+ (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
+ if (i >= 0)
+ tmpwrit = i;
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
+ SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i = -1;
+ }
+ if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
+ SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
+ if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
+ continue;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (i <= 0) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /*
+ * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
+ * using a datagram service
+ */
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
+ }
+ return i;
+ }
+ SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
+ SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
+ * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
+ * argument is non NULL.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ * Change cipher spec protocol
+ * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ * Alert protocol
+ * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ * Handshake protocol
+ * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ * Application data protocol
+ * none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
+{
+ int i, j, ret;
+ size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+ int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
+
+ rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
+
+ if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
+ /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
+ && (type !=
+ SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--;
+ s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+
+ if (recvd_type != NULL)
+ *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+
+ *readbytes = n;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
+ */
+
+ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ if (i < 0)
+ return i;
+ if (i == 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ start:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /*-
+ * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
+ * rr[i].type - is the type of record
+ * rr[i].data, - data
+ * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
+ */
+ rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
+ num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
+
+ do {
+ /* get new records if necessary */
+ if (num_recs == 0) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ return ret;
+ }
+ num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
+ if (num_recs == 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Skip over any records we have already read */
+ for (curr_rec = 0;
+ curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
+ curr_rec++) ;
+ if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
+ RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
+ num_recs = 0;
+ curr_rec = 0;
+ }
+ } while (num_recs == 0);
+ rr = &rr[curr_rec];
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
+ * record that isn't an alert.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+ && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
+ s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
+
+ /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+ * 'peek' mode)
+ */
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
+ || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
+ && !is_tls13)) {
+ /*
+ * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
+ * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ */
+ /*
+ * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
+ * doing a handshake for the first time
+ */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
+ && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (recvd_type != NULL)
+ *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
+ * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
+ * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ totalbytes = 0;
+ do {
+ if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+ n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
+ else
+ n = len - totalbytes;
+
+ memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
+ buf += n;
+ if (peek) {
+ /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ } else {
+ SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
+ s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ }
+ }
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
+ || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
+ curr_rec++;
+ rr++;
+ }
+ totalbytes += n;
+ } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
+ && totalbytes < len);
+ if (totalbytes == 0) {
+ /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
+ goto start;
+ }
+ if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
+ && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+ && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ *readbytes = totalbytes;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
+ * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
+ * were actually expecting a CCS).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
+ */
+ if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
+ * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
+ * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
+ * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
+ && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+ /*
+ * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
+ * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
+ * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
+ * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
+ */
+ s->version = rr->rec_version;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+ */
+
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
+ unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
+ + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
+ PACKET alert;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
+ || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+
+ s->rlayer.alert_count++;
+ if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
+ * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
+ */
+ if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
+ goto start;
+ } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
+ && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
+ char tmp[16];
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+ /*
+ * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
+ * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
+ * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
+ * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
+ * the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+ /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
+ * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
+ * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
+ * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
+ * sent close_notify.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
+ goto start;
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
+ * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
+ * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
+ * above.
+ * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
+ */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
+ * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
+ * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
+ * that we're just going to discard.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
+ unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
+ size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
+
+ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
+ n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
+ SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+ *dest_len += n;
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+
+ if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+ goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+ }
+
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
+ * protocol violation)
+ */
+ if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
+ && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+ int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
+
+ /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ if (i < 0)
+ return i;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
+ * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
+ * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
+ */
+ if (ined)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
+ /* no read-ahead left? */
+ BIO *bio;
+ /*
+ * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
+ * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
+ * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
+ * problems in the blocking world
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
+ default:
+ /*
+ * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
+ * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
+ * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
+ * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
+ * record types, using up resources processing them.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ return -1;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /*
+ * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
+ * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
+ * that should not happen when type != rr->type
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /*
+ * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
+ * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
+ * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
+ * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
+ * started), we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
+ /*
+ * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
+ * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
+ * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
+ * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
+ * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
+ * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
+ * record.
+ */
+ if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
+ EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ goto start;
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
+ * format and false otherwise.
+ */
+int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
+ */
+size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-24 04:55:39 +0000