diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/contrib/openzfs/module/icp/api/kcf_mac.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/contrib/openzfs/module/icp/api/kcf_mac.c | 645 |
1 files changed, 645 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/contrib/openzfs/module/icp/api/kcf_mac.c b/sys/contrib/openzfs/module/icp/api/kcf_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a7722d8f914c --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/contrib/openzfs/module/icp/api/kcf_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,645 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ +/* + * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +#include <sys/zfs_context.h> +#include <sys/crypto/common.h> +#include <sys/crypto/impl.h> +#include <sys/crypto/api.h> +#include <sys/crypto/spi.h> +#include <sys/crypto/sched_impl.h> + +/* + * Message authentication codes routines. + */ + +/* + * The following are the possible returned values common to all the routines + * below. The applicability of some of these return values depends on the + * presence of the arguments. + * + * CRYPTO_SUCCESS: The operation completed successfully. + * CRYPTO_QUEUED: A request was submitted successfully. The callback + * routine will be called when the operation is done. + * CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH_NUMBER, CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH_PARAM, or + * CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH for problems with the 'mech'. + * CRYPTO_INVALID_DATA for bogus 'data' + * CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY for failure to allocate memory to handle this work. + * CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT: Not a valid context. + * CRYPTO_BUSY: Cannot process the request now. Schedule a + * crypto_bufcall(), or try later. + * CRYPTO_NOT_SUPPORTED and CRYPTO_MECH_NOT_SUPPORTED: No provider is + * capable of a function or a mechanism. + * CRYPTO_INVALID_KEY: bogus 'key' argument. + * CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC: bogus 'mac' argument. + */ + +/* + * crypto_mac_prov() + * + * Arguments: + * mech: crypto_mechanism_t pointer. + * mech_type is a valid value previously returned by + * crypto_mech2id(); + * When the mech's parameter is not NULL, its definition depends + * on the standard definition of the mechanism. + * key: pointer to a crypto_key_t structure. + * data: The message to compute the MAC for. + * mac: Storage for the MAC. The length needed depends on the mechanism. + * tmpl: a crypto_ctx_template_t, opaque template of a context of a + * MAC with the 'mech' using 'key'. 'tmpl' is created by + * a previous call to crypto_create_ctx_template(). + * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. + * + * Description: + * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a + * single-part message authentication of 'data' with the mechanism + * 'mech', using * the key 'key', on the specified provider with + * the specified session id. + * When complete and successful, 'mac' will contain the message + * authentication code. + * + * Context: + * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'crq'. + * + * Returns: + * See comment in the beginning of the file. + */ +int +crypto_mac_prov(crypto_provider_t provider, crypto_session_id_t sid, + crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, + crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq) +{ + kcf_req_params_t params; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd = provider; + kcf_provider_desc_t *real_provider = pd; + int rv; + + ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); + + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) { + rv = kcf_get_hardware_provider(mech->cm_type, + CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), pd, + &real_provider, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC); + + if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (rv); + } + + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_ATOMIC, sid, mech, key, + data, mac, tmpl); + rv = kcf_submit_request(real_provider, NULL, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE); + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); + + return (rv); +} + +/* + * Same as crypto_mac_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to choose + * a provider. See crypto_mac() comments for more information. + */ +int +crypto_mac(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, + crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, + crypto_call_req_t *crq) +{ + int error; + kcf_mech_entry_t *me; + kcf_req_params_t params; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; + kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; + crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; + kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; + +retry: + /* The pd is returned held */ + if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, + list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), + data->cd_length)) == NULL) { + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + return (error); + } + + /* + * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template + * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so + * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by + * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW + * provider + */ + if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && + ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { + if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); + return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); + } else { + spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; + } + } + + /* The fast path for SW providers. */ + if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { + crypto_mechanism_t lmech; + + lmech = *mech; + KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); + + error = KCF_PROV_MAC_ATOMIC(pd, pd->pd_sid, &lmech, key, data, + mac, spi_ctx_tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); + KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); + } else { + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_HW_PROVIDER && + (pd->pd_flags & CRYPTO_HASH_NO_UPDATE) && + (data->cd_length > pd->pd_hash_limit)) { + /* + * XXX - We need a check to see if this is indeed + * a HMAC. So far, all kernel clients use + * this interface only for HMAC. So, this is fine + * for now. + */ + error = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_BIG; + } else { + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_ATOMIC, + pd->pd_sid, mech, key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl); + + error = kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, + KCF_ISDUALREQ(crq)); + } + } + + if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && + IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { + /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ + if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) + goto retry; + } + + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); + return (error); +} + +/* + * Single part operation to compute the MAC corresponding to the specified + * 'data' and to verify that it matches the MAC specified by 'mac'. + * The other arguments are the same as the function crypto_mac_prov(). + */ +int +crypto_mac_verify_prov(crypto_provider_t provider, crypto_session_id_t sid, + crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, + crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq) +{ + kcf_req_params_t params; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd = provider; + kcf_provider_desc_t *real_provider = pd; + int rv; + + ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); + + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) { + rv = kcf_get_hardware_provider(mech->cm_type, + CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), pd, + &real_provider, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC); + + if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (rv); + } + + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC, sid, mech, + key, data, mac, tmpl); + rv = kcf_submit_request(real_provider, NULL, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE); + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); + + return (rv); +} + +/* + * Same as crypto_mac_verify_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to choose + * a provider. See crypto_mac_verify_prov() comments for more information. + */ +int +crypto_mac_verify(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, + crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, + crypto_call_req_t *crq) +{ + int error; + kcf_mech_entry_t *me; + kcf_req_params_t params; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; + kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; + crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; + kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; + +retry: + /* The pd is returned held */ + if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, + list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), + data->cd_length)) == NULL) { + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + return (error); + } + + /* + * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template + * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so + * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by + * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW + * provider + */ + if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && + ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { + if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); + return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); + } else { + spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; + } + } + + /* The fast path for SW providers. */ + if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { + crypto_mechanism_t lmech; + + lmech = *mech; + KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); + + error = KCF_PROV_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC(pd, pd->pd_sid, &lmech, key, + data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); + KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); + } else { + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_HW_PROVIDER && + (pd->pd_flags & CRYPTO_HASH_NO_UPDATE) && + (data->cd_length > pd->pd_hash_limit)) { + /* see comments in crypto_mac() */ + error = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_BIG; + } else { + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, + KCF_OP_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC, pd->pd_sid, mech, + key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl); + + error = kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, + KCF_ISDUALREQ(crq)); + } + } + + if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && + IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { + /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ + if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) + goto retry; + } + + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); + return (error); +} + +/* + * crypto_mac_init_prov() + * + * Arguments: + * pd: pointer to the descriptor of the provider to use for this + * operation. + * sid: provider session id. + * mech: crypto_mechanism_t pointer. + * mech_type is a valid value previously returned by + * crypto_mech2id(); + * When the mech's parameter is not NULL, its definition depends + * on the standard definition of the mechanism. + * key: pointer to a crypto_key_t structure. + * tmpl: a crypto_ctx_template_t, opaque template of a context of a + * MAC with the 'mech' using 'key'. 'tmpl' is created by + * a previous call to crypto_create_ctx_template(). + * ctxp: Pointer to a crypto_context_t. + * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. + * + * Description: + * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs the + * initialization of a MAC operation on the specified provider with + * the specified session. + * When possible and applicable, will internally use the pre-computed MAC + * context from the context template, tmpl. + * When complete and successful, 'ctxp' will contain a crypto_context_t + * valid for later calls to mac_update() and mac_final(). + * The caller should hold a reference on the specified provider + * descriptor before calling this function. + * + * Context: + * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. + * + * Returns: + * See comment in the beginning of the file. + */ +int +crypto_mac_init_prov(crypto_provider_t provider, crypto_session_id_t sid, + crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t tmpl, + crypto_context_t *ctxp, crypto_call_req_t *crq) +{ + int rv; + crypto_ctx_t *ctx; + kcf_req_params_t params; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd = provider; + kcf_provider_desc_t *real_provider = pd; + + ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); + + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) { + rv = kcf_get_hardware_provider(mech->cm_type, + CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), pd, + &real_provider, CRYPTO_FG_MAC); + + if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (rv); + } + + /* Allocate and initialize the canonical context */ + if ((ctx = kcf_new_ctx(crq, real_provider, sid)) == NULL) { + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); + return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); + } + + /* The fast path for SW providers. */ + if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { + crypto_mechanism_t lmech; + + lmech = *mech; + KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, real_provider, &lmech); + rv = KCF_PROV_MAC_INIT(real_provider, ctx, &lmech, key, tmpl, + KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); + KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, rv); + } else { + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_INIT, sid, mech, key, + NULL, NULL, tmpl); + rv = kcf_submit_request(real_provider, ctx, crq, ¶ms, + B_FALSE); + } + + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); + + if ((rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) || (rv == CRYPTO_QUEUED)) + *ctxp = (crypto_context_t)ctx; + else { + /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx(). */ + KCF_CONTEXT_REFRELE((kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private); + } + + return (rv); +} + +/* + * Same as crypto_mac_init_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to + * choose a provider. See crypto_mac_init_prov() comments for more + * information. + */ +int +crypto_mac_init(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_key_t *key, + crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_context_t *ctxp, + crypto_call_req_t *crq) +{ + int error; + kcf_mech_entry_t *me; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; + kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; + crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; + kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; + +retry: + /* The pd is returned held */ + if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, + list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), 0)) == NULL) { + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + return (error); + } + + /* + * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template + * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so + * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by + * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW + * provider + */ + + if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && + ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { + if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); + return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); + } else { + spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; + } + } + + if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_HW_PROVIDER && + (pd->pd_flags & CRYPTO_HASH_NO_UPDATE)) { + /* + * The hardware provider has limited HMAC support. + * So, we fallback early here to using a software provider. + * + * XXX - need to enhance to do the fallback later in + * crypto_mac_update() if the size of accumulated input data + * exceeds the maximum size digestable by hardware provider. + */ + error = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_BIG; + } else { + error = crypto_mac_init_prov(pd, pd->pd_sid, mech, key, + spi_ctx_tmpl, ctxp, crq); + } + if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && + IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { + /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ + if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) + goto retry; + } + + if (list != NULL) + kcf_free_triedlist(list); + + KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); + return (error); +} + +/* + * crypto_mac_update() + * + * Arguments: + * context: A crypto_context_t initialized by mac_init(). + * data: The message part to be MAC'ed + * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. + * + * Description: + * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a + * part of a MAC operation. + * + * Context: + * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. + * + * Returns: + * See comment in the beginning of the file. + */ +int +crypto_mac_update(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *data, + crypto_call_req_t *cr) +{ + crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; + kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; + kcf_req_params_t params; + int rv; + + if ((ctx == NULL) || + ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || + ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { + return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); + } + + ASSERT(pd->pd_prov_type != CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER); + + /* The fast path for SW providers. */ + if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { + rv = KCF_PROV_MAC_UPDATE(pd, ctx, data, NULL); + KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, rv); + } else { + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_UPDATE, + ctx->cc_session, NULL, NULL, data, NULL, NULL); + rv = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); + } + + return (rv); +} + +/* + * crypto_mac_final() + * + * Arguments: + * context: A crypto_context_t initialized by mac_init(). + * mac: Storage for the message authentication code. + * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. + * + * Description: + * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a + * part of a message authentication operation. + * + * Context: + * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. + * + * Returns: + * See comment in the beginning of the file. + */ +int +crypto_mac_final(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *mac, + crypto_call_req_t *cr) +{ + crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; + kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; + kcf_req_params_t params; + int rv; + + if ((ctx == NULL) || + ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || + ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { + return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); + } + + ASSERT(pd->pd_prov_type != CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER); + + /* The fast path for SW providers. */ + if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { + rv = KCF_PROV_MAC_FINAL(pd, ctx, mac, NULL); + KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, rv); + } else { + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_FINAL, + ctx->cc_session, NULL, NULL, NULL, mac, NULL); + rv = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); + } + + /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx() during init step. */ + KCF_CONTEXT_COND_RELEASE(rv, kcf_ctx); + return (rv); +} + +/* + * See comments for crypto_mac_update() and crypto_mac_final(). + */ +int +crypto_mac_single(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *data, + crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *cr) +{ + crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; + kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; + kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; + int error; + kcf_req_params_t params; + + + if ((ctx == NULL) || + ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || + ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { + return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); + } + + + /* The fast path for SW providers. */ + if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { + error = KCF_PROV_MAC(pd, ctx, data, mac, NULL); + KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); + } else { + KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_SINGLE, pd->pd_sid, + NULL, NULL, data, mac, NULL); + error = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); + } + + /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx() during init step. */ + KCF_CONTEXT_COND_RELEASE(error, kcf_ctx); + return (error); +} + +#if defined(_KERNEL) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_prov); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_verify_prov); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_verify); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_init_prov); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_init); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_update); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_final); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_single); +#endif |