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* Implementations of mpo_check_vnode_deleteextattr() andRobert Watson2003-08-211-1/+35
| | | | | | | | | | mpo_check_vnode_listextattr() for Biba, MLS, and BSD Extended. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=119202
* Remove trailing whitespace.Robert Watson2003-07-051-3/+3
| | | | Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=117247
* Trim "trustedbsd_" from the front of the policy module "short names";Robert Watson2003-03-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | the vendor is only included in the long name currently, reducing verbosity when modules are registered and unregistered. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=112717
* Expand scope of the BSD extended "file system firewall" policy toRobert Watson2003-03-251-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | include a new entry point available for enforcement: mac_bsdextended_check_system_swapon() - Apply extended access control checks to the file target of swap. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=112575
* Back out M_* changes, per decision of the TRB.Warner Losh2003-02-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | Approved by: trb Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=111119
* Remove M_TRYWAIT/M_WAITOK/M_WAIT. Callers should use 0.Alfred Perlstein2003-01-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | Merge M_NOWAIT/M_DONTWAIT into a single flag M_NOWAIT. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=109623
* Map VAPPEND to VWRITE since the ugidfw rule syntax doesn't specificallyRobert Watson2002-12-281-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | address the append access mode. Reported by: "Daniel C. Sobral" <dcs@newsguy.com> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponosred by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories MFC Candidate. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=108376
* Update MAC modules for changes in arguments for exec MAC policyRobert Watson2002-11-081-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | entry points to include an explicit execlabel. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106648
* Update policy modules for changes in arguments associated with supportRobert Watson2002-11-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | for label access on the interpreter, not just the shell script. No policies currently present in the system rely on the new labels. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106469
* License and wording updates: NAI has authorized the removal of clauseRobert Watson2002-11-042-14/+8
| | | | | | | | three from their BSD-style license. Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates Laboratories/. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106393
* Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_opsRobert Watson2002-10-301-55/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106217
* Various minor type, prototype tweaks -- clean up cruft due to lack ofRobert Watson2002-10-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | type checking on entry points (to be introduced shortly). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106214
* While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument forRobert Watson2002-10-301-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106212
* Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriateRobert Watson2002-10-051-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104530
* Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitlyRobert Watson2002-08-191-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=102129
* Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensibleRobert Watson2002-07-312-0/+809
kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=101099
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