From 20adc8f2a99cd37b64a80ef63dfc5ba6627d4dfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dag-Erling Smørgrav Date: Sun, 6 May 2018 12:24:45 +0000 Subject: Vendor import of OpenSSH 7.6p1. --- .gitignore | 28 + .skipped-commit-ids | 10 + ChangeLog | 11377 +++++++++++----------- INSTALL | 2 +- LICENCE | 23 +- Makefile.in | 31 +- PROTOCOL | 6 +- PROTOCOL.agent | 585 +- PROTOCOL.certkeys | 21 +- README | 10 +- auth-options.c | 14 +- auth-options.h | 4 +- auth-pam.c | 47 +- auth.c | 165 +- auth.h | 81 +- auth2-chall.c | 37 +- auth2-gss.c | 77 +- auth2-hostbased.c | 111 +- auth2-kbdint.c | 6 +- auth2-none.c | 14 +- auth2-passwd.c | 32 +- auth2-pubkey.c | 580 +- auth2.c | 173 +- authfd.c | 174 +- authfd.h | 7 +- authfile.c | 113 +- bitmap.c | 9 +- bufbn.c | 42 +- buffer.h | 6 +- channels.c | 3893 ++++---- channels.h | 228 +- cipher-3des1.c | 158 - cipher-bf1.c | 106 - cipher.c | 299 +- cipher.h | 29 +- clientloop.c | 855 +- clientloop.h | 31 +- compat.c | 34 +- compat.h | 6 +- config.h.in | 42 +- configure | 335 +- configure.ac | 106 +- contrib/aix/README | 2 +- contrib/redhat/openssh.spec | 2 +- contrib/ssh-copy-id | 15 +- contrib/suse/openssh.spec | 2 +- deattack.c | 165 - deattack.h | 38 - defines.h | 29 + digest-libc.c | 12 +- digest-openssl.c | 3 +- digest.h | 13 +- dispatch.c | 21 +- dispatch.h | 14 +- dns.c | 2 +- dns.h | 2 +- gss-serv.c | 11 +- hostfile.c | 33 +- includes.h | 3 + kex.c | 81 +- kex.h | 9 +- kexc25519c.c | 7 +- kexc25519s.c | 5 +- kexdhc.c | 7 +- kexdhs.c | 7 +- kexecdhc.c | 7 +- kexecdhs.c | 7 +- kexgexc.c | 16 +- kexgexs.c | 12 +- key.c | 177 +- key.h | 36 +- krl.c | 4 +- log.c | 35 +- log.h | 4 +- mac.c | 9 +- md-sha256.c | 86 - misc.c | 473 +- misc.h | 22 +- moduli.0 | 2 +- monitor.c | 103 +- monitor_wrap.c | 31 +- monitor_wrap.h | 17 +- mux.c | 239 +- myproposal.h | 5 +- nchan.c | 369 +- opacket.c | 20 - opacket.h | 10 +- openbsd-compat/Makefile.in | 4 +- openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c | 6 + openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c | 23 + openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c | 55 + openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c | 10 + openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h | 4 + openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c | 4 + openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c | 18 +- openbsd-compat/freezero.c | 29 + openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h | 12 + openbsd-compat/port-tun.c | 93 +- openbsd-compat/port-tun.h | 5 +- openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c | 90 + packet.c | 802 +- packet.h | 18 +- pathnames.h | 4 +- platform-misc.c | 35 + platform.c | 16 - readconf.c | 202 +- readconf.h | 16 +- regress/Makefile | 38 +- regress/agent-getpeereid.sh | 2 +- regress/agent-pkcs11.sh | 4 +- regress/agent.sh | 38 +- regress/authinfo.sh | 17 + regress/banner.sh | 8 +- regress/broken-pipe.sh | 17 +- regress/brokenkeys.sh | 6 +- regress/cert-file.sh | 131 +- regress/cert-hostkey.sh | 14 +- regress/cert-userkey.sh | 36 +- regress/cfgmatch.sh | 76 +- regress/cipher-speed.sh | 27 +- regress/connect-privsep.sh | 30 +- regress/connect.sh | 12 +- regress/dhgex.sh | 3 +- regress/dynamic-forward.sh | 20 +- regress/exit-status.sh | 34 +- regress/forcecommand.sh | 23 +- regress/forward-control.sh | 109 +- regress/forwarding.sh | 174 +- regress/host-expand.sh | 9 +- regress/hostkey-agent.sh | 4 +- regress/integrity.sh | 10 +- regress/key-options.sh | 52 +- regress/keygen-change.sh | 5 +- regress/keyscan.sh | 6 +- regress/keytype.sh | 15 +- regress/localcommand.sh | 14 +- regress/login-timeout.sh | 20 +- regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile | 22 + regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README | 1 + regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc | 18 + regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc | 50 + regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile | 4 +- regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c | 4 +- regress/multiplex.sh | 6 +- regress/principals-command.sh | 18 +- regress/proto-mismatch.sh | 12 +- regress/proto-version.sh | 16 +- regress/proxy-connect.sh | 41 +- regress/putty-ciphers.sh | 4 +- regress/putty-transfer.sh | 45 +- regress/reconfigure.sh | 22 +- regress/reexec.sh | 32 +- regress/ssh-com.sh | 4 +- regress/stderr-after-eof.sh | 4 +- regress/stderr-data.sh | 14 +- regress/test-exec.sh | 37 +- regress/transfer.sh | 29 +- regress/try-ciphers.sh | 24 +- regress/unittests/Makefile.inc | 4 +- regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh | 16 +- regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c | 249 +- regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts | 45 +- regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh | 35 +- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c | 51 +- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c | 45 +- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c | 22 +- regress/yes-head.sh | 18 +- rsa.c | 188 - rsa.h | 26 - sandbox-capsicum.c | 2 +- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 +- sandbox-solaris.c | 6 + scp.0 | 13 +- scp.1 | 19 +- scp.c | 42 +- servconf.c | 117 +- servconf.h | 15 +- serverloop.c | 133 +- serverloop.h | 6 +- session.c | 377 +- session.h | 18 +- sftp-client.c | 4 +- sftp-common.c | 25 +- sftp-server.0 | 2 +- sftp-server.c | 6 +- sftp.0 | 19 +- sftp.1 | 20 +- sftp.c | 58 +- ssh-add.0 | 32 +- ssh-add.1 | 21 +- ssh-add.c | 109 +- ssh-agent.0 | 2 +- ssh-agent.c | 744 +- ssh-gss.h | 3 +- ssh-keygen.0 | 161 +- ssh-keygen.1 | 120 +- ssh-keygen.c | 292 +- ssh-keyscan.0 | 13 +- ssh-keyscan.1 | 14 +- ssh-keyscan.c | 129 +- ssh-keysign.0 | 2 +- ssh-pkcs11-client.c | 6 +- ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 | 2 +- ssh-pkcs11-helper.c | 14 +- ssh-pkcs11.c | 9 +- ssh-rsa.c | 45 +- ssh.0 | 81 +- ssh.1 | 92 +- ssh.c | 362 +- ssh.h | 9 +- ssh1.h | 91 - ssh_api.c | 3 +- ssh_config | 10 +- ssh_config.0 | 147 +- ssh_config.5 | 137 +- sshbuf-getput-basic.c | 4 +- sshbuf.c | 17 +- sshbuf.h | 3 +- sshconnect.c | 339 +- sshconnect.h | 18 +- sshconnect1.c | 774 -- sshconnect2.c | 141 +- sshd.0 | 24 +- sshd.8 | 26 +- sshd.c | 87 +- sshd_config.0 | 42 +- sshd_config.5 | 45 +- ssherr.c | 6 +- ssherr.h | 4 +- sshkey.c | 609 +- sshkey.h | 19 +- ttymodes.c | 125 +- ttymodes.h | 21 +- umac.c | 8 +- utf8.c | 7 +- version.h | 4 +- xmalloc.c | 14 +- xmalloc.h | 3 +- 238 files changed, 13686 insertions(+), 17772 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .gitignore delete mode 100644 cipher-3des1.c delete mode 100644 cipher-bf1.c delete mode 100644 deattack.c delete mode 100644 deattack.h delete mode 100644 md-sha256.c create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/freezero.c create mode 100644 openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c create mode 100644 platform-misc.c create mode 100644 regress/authinfo.sh create mode 100644 regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile create mode 100644 regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README create mode 100644 regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc create mode 100644 regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc delete mode 100644 rsa.c delete mode 100644 rsa.h delete mode 100644 ssh1.h delete mode 100644 sshconnect1.c diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..650eb3c3c90c --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +Makefile +buildpkg.sh +config.h +config.h.in +config.status +configure +openbsd-compat/Makefile +openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile +openssh.xml +opensshd.init +survey.sh +**/*.0 +**/*.o +**/*.out +**/*.a +autom4te.cache/ +scp +sftp +sftp-server +ssh +ssh-add +ssh-agent +ssh-keygen +ssh-keyscan +ssh-keysign +ssh-pkcs11-helper +sshd +!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile diff --git a/.skipped-commit-ids b/.skipped-commit-ids index ee8241fb3bec..7c03c9db827a 100644 --- a/.skipped-commit-ids +++ b/.skipped-commit-ids @@ -11,3 +11,13 @@ f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead. 96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile 6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file 77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY +38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 Change COMPILER_VERSION tests +30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c resync integrity.sh shell +1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 integrity.sh reliability +fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 Makefile.inc bits +5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 Delete sshconnect1.c +ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c Makefile.inc warning flags +b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 moduli-gen.sh tweak +b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 Updated moduli +1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac rsa.[ch] already removed +e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 Makefile changes diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 48f648d78fe3..e008ec9f383f 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,9394 +1,9351 @@ -commit d38f05dbdd291212bc95ea80648b72b7177e9f4e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Mar 20 13:38:27 2017 +1100 +commit 66bf74a92131b7effe49fb0eefe5225151869dc5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 2 19:33:20 2017 +0000 - Add llabs() implementation. + upstream commit + + Fix PermitOpen crash; spotted by benno@, ok dtucker@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: c2cc84ffac070d2e1ff76182c70ca230a387983c -commit 72536316a219b7394996a74691a5d4ec197480f7 +commit d63b38160a59039708fd952adc75a0b3da141560 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Mar 20 12:23:04 2017 +1100 +Date: Sun Oct 1 10:32:25 2017 +1100 - crank version numbers + update URL again + + I spotted a typo in the draft so uploaded a new version... -commit 3be52bc36bdfd24ded7e0f46999e7db520fb4e3f +commit 6f64f596430cd3576c529f07acaaf2800aa17d58 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 10:01:56 2017 +1100 + + sync release notes URL + +commit 35ff70a04dd71663a5ac1e73b90d16d270a06e0d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 10:01:25 2017 +1100 + + sync contrib/ssh-copy-id with upstream + +commit 290843b8ede85f8b30bf29cd7dceb805c3ea5b66 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 09:59:19 2017 +1100 + + update version in RPM spec files + +commit 4e4e0bb223c5be88d87d5798c75cc6b0d4fef31d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 09:58:24 2017 +1100 + + update agent draft URL + +commit e4a798f001d2ecd8bf025c1d07658079f27cc604 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 20 01:18:59 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Sep 30 22:26:33 2017 +0000 upstream commit - openssh-7.5 + openssh-7.6; ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: b8b9a4a949427c393cd868215e1724ceb3467ee5 + Upstream-ID: a39c3a5b63a1baae109ae1ae4c7c34c2a59acde0 -commit db84e52fe9cfad57f22e7e23c5fbf00092385129 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Mar 20 12:07:20 2017 +1100 +commit 5fa1407e16e7e5fda9769d53b626ce39d5588d4d +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 27 06:45:53 2017 +0000 - I'm a doofus. + upstream commit - Unbreak obvious syntax error. + tweak EposeAuthinfo; diff from lars nooden + + tweaked by sthen; ok djm dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 8f2ea5d2065184363e8be7a0ba24d98a3b259748 -commit 89f04852db27643717c9c3a2b0dde97ae50099ee +commit bba69c246f0331f657fd6ec97724df99fc1ad174 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Mar 20 11:53:34 2017 +1100 +Date: Thu Sep 28 16:06:21 2017 -0700 - on Cygwin, check paths from server for backslashes - - Pointed out by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero + don't fatal ./configure for LibreSSL -commit 7ef1f9bafc2cc8d97ff2fbd4f280002b6e8ea5d9 +commit 04dc070e8b4507d9d829f910b29be7e3b2414913 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Mar 20 11:48:34 2017 +1100 +Date: Thu Sep 28 14:54:34 2017 -0700 - Yet another synonym for ASCII: "646" + abort in configure when only openssl-1.1.x found - Used by NetBSD; this unbreaks mprintf() and friends there for the C - locale (caught by dtucker@ and his menagerie of test systems). + We don't support openssl-1.1.x yet (see multiple threads on the + openssh-unix-dev@ mailing list for the reason), but previously + ./configure would accept it and the compilation would subsequently + fail. This makes ./configure display an explicit error message and + abort. + + ok dtucker@ -commit 9165abfea3f68a0c684a6ed2e575e59bc31a3a6b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Mar 20 09:58:34 2017 +1100 +commit 74c1c3660acf996d9dc329e819179418dc115f2c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 27 07:44:41 2017 +1000 - create test mux socket in /tmp + Check for and handle calloc(p, 0) = NULL. - Creating the socket in $OBJ could blow past the (quite limited) - path limit for Unix domain sockets. As a bandaid for bz#2660, - reported by Colin Watson; ok dtucker@ + On some platforms (AIX, maybe others) allocating zero bytes of memory + via the various *alloc functions returns NULL, which is permitted + by the standards. Autoconf has some macros for detecting this (with + the exception of calloc for some reason) so use these and if necessary + activate shims for them. ok djm@ -commit 2adbe1e63bc313d03e8e84e652cc623af8ebb163 +commit 6a9481258a77b0b54b2a313d1761c87360c5f1f5 Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 15 07:07:39 2017 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 21 19:18:12 2017 +0000 upstream commit - disallow KEXINIT before NEWKEYS; ok djm; report by - vegard.nossum at oracle.com + test reverse dynamic forwarding with SOCKS - Upstream-ID: 3668852d1f145050e62f1da08917de34cb0c5234 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 95cf290470f7e5e2f691e4bc6ba19b91eced2f79 -commit 2fbf91684d76d38b9cf06550b69c9e41bca5a71c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Mar 16 14:05:46 2017 +1100 +commit 1b9f321605733754df60fac8c1d3283c89b74455 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Sep 26 16:55:55 2017 +1000 - Include includes.h for compat bits. + sync missing changes in dynamic-forward.sh -commit b55f634e96b9c5b0cd991e23a9ca181bec4bdbad +commit 44fc334c7a9ebdd08addb6d5fa005369897fddeb Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Mar 16 13:45:17 2017 +1100 +Date: Mon Sep 25 09:48:10 2017 +1000 - Wrap stdint.h in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H + Add minimal strsignal for platforms without it. -commit 55a1117d7342a0bf8b793250cf314bab6b482b99 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Mar 16 11:22:42 2017 +1100 +commit 218e6f98df566fb9bd363f6aa47018cb65ede196 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 24 13:45:34 2017 +0000 - Adapt Cygwin config script to privsep knob removal + upstream commit - Patch from Corinna Vinschen. + fix inverted test on channel open failure path that + "upgraded" a transient failure into a fatal error; reported by sthen and also + seen by benno@; ok sthen@ + + Upstream-ID: b58b3fbb79ba224599c6cd6b60c934fc46c68472 -commit 1a321bfdb91defe3c4d9cca5651724ae167e5436 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 15 03:52:30 2017 +0000 +commit c704f641f7b8777497dc82e81f2ac89afec7e401 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 24 09:50:01 2017 +0000 upstream commit - accidents happen to the best of us; ok djm + write the correct buffer when tunnel forwarding; doesn't + matter on OpenBSD (they are the same) but does matter on portable where we + use an output filter to translate os-specific tun/tap headers - Upstream-ID: b7a9dbd71011ffde95e06f6945fe7197dedd1604 + Upstream-ID: f1ca94eff48404827b12e1d12f6139ee99a72284 -commit 25f837646be8c2017c914d34be71ca435dfc0e07 +commit 55486f5cef117354f0c64f991895835077b7c7f7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 15 02:25:09 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Sep 23 22:04:07 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix regression in 7.4: deletion of PKCS#11-hosted keys - would fail unless they were specified by full physical pathname. Report and - fix from Jakub Jelen via bz#2682; ok dtucker@ + fix tunnel forwarding problem introduced in refactor; + reported by stsp@ ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 5b5bc20ca11cacb5d5eb29c3f93fd18425552268 + Upstream-ID: 81a731cdae1122c8522134095d1a8b60fa9dcd04 -commit a8c5eeacf032a7d3408957e45dd7603cc1baf55f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 15 02:19:09 2017 +0000 +commit 609d7a66ce578abf259da2d5f6f68795c2bda731 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 21 19:16:53 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can - only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by - Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker + Add 'reverse' dynamic forwarding which combines dynamic + forwarding (-D) with remote forwarding (-R) where the remote-forwarded port + expects SOCKS-requests. - Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7 + The SSH server code is unchanged and the parsing happens at the SSH + clients side. Thus the full SOCKS-request is sent over the forwarded + channel and the client parses c->output. Parsing happens in + channel_before_prepare_select(), _before_ the select bitmask is + computed in the pre[] handlers, but after network input processing + in the post[] handlers. + + help and ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: aa25a6a3851064f34fe719e0bf15656ad5a64b89 -commit 66705948c0639a7061a0d0753266da7685badfec -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 14 07:19:07 2017 +0000 +commit 36945fa103176c00b39731e1fc1919a0d0808b81 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 20 05:19:00 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Mark the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option as - deprecated, effectively making privsep mandatory in sandboxing mode. ok - markus@ deraadt@ + Use strsignal in debug message instead of casting for the + benefit of portable where sig_atomic_t might not be int. "much nicer" + deraadt@ - (note: this doesn't remove the !privsep code paths, though that will - happen eventually). + Upstream-ID: 2dac6c1e40511c700bd90664cd263ed2299dcf79 + +commit 3e8d185af326bf183b6f78597d5e3d2eeb2dc40e +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 19 12:10:30 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit - Upstream-ID: b4c52666256c4dd865f8ce9431af5d6ce2d74a0a + Use explicit_bzero() instead of bzero() before free() to + prevent the compiler from optimizing away the bzero() call. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: cdc6197e64c9684c7250e23d60863ee1b53cef1d -commit f86586b03fe6cd8f595289bde200a94bc2c191af -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 14 18:26:29 2017 +1100 +commit 5b8da1f53854c0923ec6e927e86709e4d72737b6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 19 04:24:22 2017 +0000 - Make seccomp-bpf sandbox work on Linux/X32 + upstream commit - Allow clock_gettime syscall with X32 bit masked off. Apparently - this is required for at least some kernel versions. bz#2142 - Patch mostly by Colin Watson. ok dtucker@ + fix use-after-free in ~^Z escape handler path, introduced + in channels.c refactor; spotted by millert@ "makes sense" deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 8fa2cdc65c23ad6420c1e59444b0c955b0589b22 -commit 2429cf78dd2a9741ce27ba25ac41c535274a0af6 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 14 18:01:52 2017 +1100 +commit a3839d8d2b89ff1a80cadd4dd654336710de2c9e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 18 12:03:24 2017 +0000 - require OpenSSL >=1.0.1 + upstream commit + + Prevent type mismatch warning in debug on platforms where + sig_atomic_t != int. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 306e2375eb0364a4c68e48f091739bea4f4892ed -commit e3ea335abeab731c68f2b2141bee85a4b0bf680f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 14 17:48:43 2017 +1100 +commit 30484e5e5f0b63d2c6ba32c6b85f06b6c6fa55fc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 18 09:41:52 2017 +0000 - Remove macro trickery; no binary change + upstream commit - This stops the SC_ALLOW(), SC_ALLOW_ARG() and SC_DENY() macros - prepending __NR_ to the syscall number parameter and just makes - them explicit in the macro invocations. + Add braces missing after channels refactor. ok markus@ - No binary change in stripped object file before/after. + Upstream-ID: 72ab325c84e010680dbc88f226e2aa96b11a3980 -commit 5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f +commit b79569190b9b76dfacc6d996faa482f16e8fc026 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 14 13:15:18 2017 +1100 +Date: Tue Sep 19 12:29:23 2017 +1000 - support ioctls for ICA crypto card on Linux/s390 + add freezero(3) replacement - Based on patch from Eduardo Barretto; ok dtucker@ + ok dtucker@ -commit b1b22dd0df2668b322dda174e501dccba2cf5c44 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 14 14:19:36 2017 +1100 +commit 161af8f5ec0961b10cc032efb5cc1b44ced5a92e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Sep 19 10:18:56 2017 +1000 - Plumb conversion test into makefile. + move FORTIFY_SOURCE into hardening options group + + It's still on by default, but now it's possible to turn it off using + --without-hardening. This is useful since it's known to cause problems + with some -fsanitize options. ok dtucker@ -commit f57783f1ddfb4cdfbd612c6beb5ec01cb5b9a6b9 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 14 01:20:29 2017 +0000 +commit 09eacf856e0fe1a6e3fe597ec8032b7046292914 +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 13 14:58:26 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add unit test for convtime(). + Print SKIPPED if sudo and doas configuration is missing. + Prevents that running the regression test with wrong environment is reported + as failure. Keep the fatal there to avoid interfering with other setups for + portable ssh. OK dtucker@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8717bc0ca4c21120f6dd3a1d3b7a363f707c31e1 + Upstream-Regress-ID: f0dc60023caef496ded341ac5aade2a606fa234e -commit 8884b7247d094cd11ff9e39c325ba928c5bdbc6c +commit cdede10899892f25f1ccdccd7a3fe5e5ef0aa49a Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 14 01:10:07 2017 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 7 03:52:55 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add ASSERT_LONG_* helpers. + Remove obsolete privsep=no fallback test. - Upstream-Regress-ID: fe15beaea8f5063c7f21b0660c722648e3d76431 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7d6e1baa1678ac6be50c2a1555662eb1047638df -commit c6774d21185220c0ba11e8fd204bf0ad1a432071 +commit ec218c105daa9f5b192f7aa890fdb2d4fdc4e9d8 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 14 00:55:37 2017 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 7 00:53:51 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix convtime() overflow test on boundary condition, - spotted by & ok djm. + Remove non-privsep test since disabling privsep is now + deprecated. - Upstream-ID: 51f14c507ea87a3022e63f574100613ab2ba5708 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 77ad3f3d8d52e87f514a80f285c6c1229b108ce8 -commit f5746b40cfe6d767c8e128fe50c43274b31cd594 +commit 239c57d5bc2253e27e3e6ad7ac52ec8c377ee24e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 14 00:25:03 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 28 10:32:08 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Check for integer overflow when parsing times in - convtime(). Reported by nicolas.iooss at m4x.org, ok djm@ + Don't call fatal from stop_sshd since it calls cleanup + which calls stop_sshd which will probably fail in the same way. Instead, + just bail. Differentiate between sshd dying without cleanup and not shutting + down. - Upstream-ID: 35e6a4e98f6fa24df50bfb8ba1307cf70e966f13 + Upstream-Regress-ID: f97315f538618b349e2b0bea02d6b0c9196c6bc4 -commit f5907982f42a8d88a430b8a46752cbb7859ba979 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 14 13:38:15 2017 +1100 +commit aea59a0d9f120f2a87c7f494a0d9c51eaa79b8ba +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 14 04:32:21 2017 +0000 - Add a "unit" target to run only unit tests. + upstream commit + + Revert commitid: gJtIN6rRTS3CHy9b. + + ------------- + identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but other DNS RR + types are present and display a more useful error message for this + case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@ + ------------- + + This caused unexpected failures when VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes, SSHFP results + are missing but the user already has the key in known_hosts + + Spotted by dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 97e31742fddaf72046f6ffef091ec0d823299920 -commit 9e96b41682aed793fadbea5ccd472f862179fb02 +commit 871f1e4374420b07550041b329627c474abc3010 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 14 12:24:47 2017 +1100 +Date: Tue Sep 12 18:01:35 2017 +1000 - Fix weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection + adapt portable to channels API changes + +commit 4ec0bb9f9ad7b4eb0af110fa8eddf8fa199e46bb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 12 07:55:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit - Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct - seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not - even those correctly for BE systems. + unused variable - Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the - socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems - impossible. + Upstream-ID: 2f9ba09f2708993d35eac5aa71df910dcc52bac1 + +commit 9145a73ce2ba30c82bbf91d7205bfd112529449f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 12 07:32:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit - ok dtucker + fix tun/tap forwarding case in previous + + Upstream-ID: 43ebe37a930320e24bca6900dccc39857840bc53 -commit 8ff3fc3f2f7c13e8968717bc2b895ee32c441275 +commit 9f53229c2ac97dbc6f5a03657de08a1150a9ac7e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Mar 11 23:44:16 2017 +0000 +Date: Tue Sep 12 06:35:31 2017 +0000 upstream commit - regress tests for loading certificates without public keys; - bz#2617 based on patch from Adam Eijdenberg; ok markus@ dtucker@ + Make remote channel ID a u_int - Upstream-Regress-ID: 0145d19328ed995b73fe2d9da33596b17429d0d0 + Previously we tracked the remote channel IDs in an int, but this is + strictly incorrect: the wire protocol uses uint32 and there is nothing + in-principle stopping a SSH implementation from sending, say, 0xffff0000. + + In practice everyone numbers their channels sequentially, so this has + never been a problem. + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: b9f4cd3dc53155b4a5c995c0adba7da760d03e73 -commit 1e24552716194db8f2f620587b876158a9ef56ad +commit dbee4119b502e3f8b6cd3282c69c537fd01d8e16 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Mar 11 23:40:26 2017 +0000 +Date: Tue Sep 12 06:32:07 2017 +0000 upstream commit - allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private - key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch - from Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@ + refactor channels.c - Upstream-ID: 295668dca2c39505281577217583ddd2bd4b00b9 + Move static state to a "struct ssh_channels" that is allocated at + runtime and tracked as a member of struct ssh. + + Explicitly pass "struct ssh" to all channels functions. + + Replace use of the legacy packet APIs in channels.c. + + Rework sshd_config PermitOpen handling: previously the configuration + parser would call directly into the channels layer. After the refactor + this is not possible, as the channels structures are allocated at + connection time and aren't available when the configuration is parsed. + The server config parser now tracks PermitOpen itself and explicitly + configures the channels code later. + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 11828f161656b965cc306576422613614bea2d8f -commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000 +commit abd59663df37a42152e37980113ccaa405b9a282 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 7 23:48:09 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Don't count the initial block twice when computing how - many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode. - ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL + typo in comment - Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2 + Upstream-ID: a93b1e6f30f1f9b854b5b964b9fd092d0c422c47 -commit ef653dd5bd5777132d9f9ee356225f9ee3379504 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 07:18:32 2017 +0000 +commit 149a8cd24ce9dd47c36f571738681df5f31a326c +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 4 06:34:43 2017 +0000 upstream commit - krl.c + tweak previous; - Upstream-ID: fc5e695d5d107d730182e2da7b23f00b489e0ee1 + Upstream-ID: bb8cc40b61b15f6a13d81da465ac5bfc65cbfc4b -commit d94c1dfef2ea30ca67b1204ada7c3b537c54f4d0 +commit ec9d22cc251cc5acfe7b2bcef9cc7a1fe0e949d8 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Mar 12 10:48:14 2017 +1100 +Date: Fri Sep 8 12:44:13 2017 +1000 - sync fmt_scaled.c with OpenBSD + Fuzzer harnesses for sig verify and pubkey parsing - revision 1.13 - date: 2017/03/11 23:37:23; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +14 -1; commitid: jnFKyHkB3CEiEZ2R; - fix signed integer overflow in scan_scaled. Found by Nicolas Iooss - using AFL against ssh_config. ok deraadt@ millert@ - ---------------------------- - revision 1.12 - date: 2013/11/29 19:00:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +6 -5; - fairly simple unsigned char casts for ctype - ok krw - ---------------------------- - revision 1.11 - date: 2012/11/12 14:07:20; author: halex; state: Exp; lines: +4 -2; - make scan_scaled set errno to EINVAL rather than ERANGE if it encounters - an invalid multiplier, like the man page says it should - - "looks sensible" deraadt@, ok ian@ - ---------------------------- - revision 1.10 - date: 2009/06/20 15:00:04; author: martynas; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; - use llabs instead of the home-grown version; and some comment changes - ok ian@, millert@ - ---------------------------- + These are some basic clang libfuzzer harnesses for signature + verification and public key parsing. Some assembly (metaphorical) + required. -commit 894221a63fa061e52e414ca58d47edc5fe645968 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 05:01:13 2017 +0000 +commit de35c382894964a896a63ecd5607d3a3b93af75d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Sep 8 12:38:31 2017 +1000 - upstream commit + Give configure ability to set CFLAGS/LDFLAGS later - When updating hostkeys, accept RSA keys if - HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA keytype. Previously, ssh could ignore RSA - keys when any of the ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods was enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms - nit ssh-rsa (SHA1 signatures) was not. bz#2650 reported by Luis Ressel; ok - dtucker@ + Some CFLAGS/LDFLAGS may disrupt the configure script's operation, + in particular santization and fuzzer options that break assumptions + about memory and file descriptor dispositions. - Upstream-ID: c5e8cfee15c42f4a05d126158a0766ea06da79d2 + This adds two flags to configure --with-cflags-after and + --with-ldflags-after that allow specifying additional compiler and + linker options that are added to the resultant Makefiles but not + used in the configure run itself. + + E.g. + + env CC=clang-3.9 ./configure \ + --with-cflags-after=-fsantize=address \ + --with-ldflags-after="-g -fsanitize=address" -commit dd3e2298663f4cc1a06bc69582d00dcfee27d73c +commit 22376d27a349f62c502fec3396dfe0fdcb2a40b7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000 +Date: Sun Sep 3 23:33:13 2017 +0000 upstream commit - make hostname matching really insensitive to case; - bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@ + Expand ssh_config's StrictModes option with two new + settings: - Upstream-ID: e467622ff154269e36ba8b6c9e3d105e1c4a9253 + StrictModes=accept-new will automatically accept hitherto-unseen keys + but will refuse connections for changed or invalid hostkeys. + + StrictModes=off is the same as StrictModes=no + + Motivation: + + StrictModes=no combines two behaviours for host key processing: + automatically learning new hostkeys and continuing to connect to hosts + with invalid/changed hostkeys. The latter behaviour is quite dangerous + since it removes most of the protections the SSH protocol is supposed to + provide. + + Quite a few users want to automatically learn hostkeys however, so + this makes that feature available with less danger. + + At some point in the future, StrictModes=no will change to be a synonym + for accept-new, with its current behaviour remaining available via + StrictModes=off. + + bz#2400, suggested by Michael Samuel; ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 0f55502bf75fc93a74fb9853264a8276b9680b64 -commit 77a9be9446697fe8b5499fe651f4a82a71a4b51f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000 +commit ff3c42384033514e248ba5d7376aa033f4a2b99a +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 1 15:41:26 2017 +0000 upstream commit - reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns + remove blank line; - Upstream-ID: 4ef509a66b96c7314bbcc87027c2af71fa9d0ba4 + Upstream-ID: 2f46b51a0ddb3730020791719e94d3e418e9f423 -commit 61b8ef6a66efaec07e023342cb94a10bdc2254dc +commit b828605d51f57851316d7ba402b4ae06cf37c55d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 04:27:32 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 1 05:53:56 2017 +0000 upstream commit - better match sshd config parser behaviour: fatal() if - line is overlong, increase line buffer to match sshd's; bz#2651 reported by - Don Fong; ok dtucker@ + identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but + other DNS RR types are present and display a more useful error message for + this case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: b175ae7e0ba403833f1ee566edf10f67443ccd18 + Upstream-ID: 8f7a5a8344f684823d8317a9708b63e75be2c244 -commit db2597207e69912f2592cd86a1de8e948a9d7ffb +commit 8042bad97e2789a50e8f742c3bcd665ebf0add32 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 04:26:06 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 1 05:50:48 2017 +0000 upstream commit - ensure hostname is lower-case before hashing it; - bz#2591 reported by Griff Miller II; ok dtucker@ + document available AuthenticationMethods; bz#2453 ok + dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: c3b8b93804f376bd00d859b8bcd9fc0d86b4db17 + Upstream-ID: 2c70576f237bb699aff59889dbf2acba4276d3d0 -commit df9936936c695f85c1038bd706d62edf752aca4b +commit 71e5a536ec815d542b199f2ae6d646c0db9f1b58 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000 +Date: Wed Aug 30 03:59:08 2017 +0000 upstream commit - make hostname matching really insensitive to case; - bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@ + pass packet state down to some of the channels function + (more to come...); ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: e632b7a9bf0d0558d5ff56dab98b7cca6c3db549 + Upstream-ID: d8ce7a94f4059d7ac1e01fb0eb01de0c4b36c81b -commit 67eed24bfa7645d88fa0b883745fccb22a0e527e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 04:11:00 2017 +0000 +commit 6227fe5b362239c872b91bbdee4bf63cf85aebc5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 29 13:05:58 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Remove old null check from config dumper. Patch from - jjelen at redhat.com vi bz#2687, ok djm@ + sort options; - Upstream-ID: 824ab71467b78c4bab0dd1b3a38e8bc5f63dd528 + Upstream-ID: cf21d68cf54e81968bca629aaeddc87f0c684f3c -commit 183ba55aaaecca0206184b854ad6155df237adbe -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 04:07:20 2017 +0000 +commit 530591a5795a02d01c78877d58604723918aac87 +Author: dlg@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 29 09:42:29 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix regression in 7.4 server-sig-algs, where we were - accidentally excluding SHA2 RSA signature methods. bz#2680, patch from Nuno - Goncalves; ok dtucker@ + add a -q option to ssh-add to make it quiet on success. - Upstream-ID: 81ac8bfb30960447740b9b8f6a214dcf322f12e8 + if you want to silence ssh-add without this you generally redirect + the output to /dev/null, but that can hide error output which you + should see. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 2f31b9b13f99dcf587e9a8ba443458e6c0d8997c -commit 66be4fe8c4435af5bbc82998501a142a831f1181 +commit a54eb27dd64b5eca3ba94e15cec3535124bd5029 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:53:11 2017 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 27 00:38:41 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Check for NULL return value from key_new. Patch from - jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + Increase the buffer sizes for user prompts to ensure that + they won't be truncated by snprintf. Based on patch from cjwatson at + debian.org via bz#2768, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 059e33cd43cba88dc8caf0b1936fd4dd88fd5b8e + Upstream-ID: 6ffacf1abec8f40b469de5b94bfb29997d96af3e -commit ec2892b5c7fea199914cb3a6afb3af38f84990bf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000 +commit dd9d9b3381a4597b840d480b043823112039327e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 28 16:48:27 2017 +1000 - upstream commit + Switch Capsicum header to sys/capsicum.h. - reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns + FreeBSD's was renamed to in 2014 to + avoid future conflicts with POSIX capabilities (the last release that + didn't have it was 9.3) so switch to that. Patch from des at des.no. + +commit f5e917ab105af5dd6429348d9bc463e52b263f92 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Aug 27 08:55:40 2017 +1000 + + Add missing includes for bsd-err.c. - Upstream-ID: b4b48b4487c0821d16e812c40c9b09f03b28e349 + Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via bz#2767. -commit 7fadbb6da3f4122de689165651eb39985e1cba85 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:48:57 2017 +0000 +commit 878e029797cfc9754771d6f6ea17f8c89e11d225 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 25 13:25:01 2017 +1000 + + Split platform_sys_dir_uid into its own file + + platform.o is too heavy for libssh.a use; it calls into the server on + many platforms. Move just the function needed by misc.c into its own + file. + +commit 07949bfe9133234eddd01715592aa0dde67745f0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Aug 23 20:13:18 2017 +1000 + + misc.c needs functions from platform.c now + +commit b074c3c3f820000a21953441cea7699c4b17d72f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 18 05:48:04 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Check for NULL argument to sshkey_read. Patch from - jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + add a "quiet" flag to exited_cleanly() that supresses + errors about exit status (failure due to signal is still reported) - Upstream-ID: c2d00c2ea50c4861d271d0a586f925cc64a87e0e + Upstream-ID: db85c39c3aa08e6ff67fc1fb4ffa89f807a9d2f0 -commit 5a06b9e019e2b0b0f65a223422935b66f3749de3 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:45:40 2017 +0000 +commit de4ae07f12dabf8815ecede54235fce5d22e3f63 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 18 05:36:45 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Plug some mem leaks mostly on error paths. From jjelen - at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + Move several subprocess-related functions from various + locations to misc.c. Extend subprocess() to offer a little more control over + stdio disposition. - Upstream-ID: 3fb030149598957a51b7c8beb32bf92cf30c96f2 + feedback & ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 3573dd7109d13ef9bd3bed93a3deb170fbfce049 -commit f6edbe9febff8121f26835996b1229b5064d31b7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:24:48 2017 +0000 +commit 643c2ad82910691b2240551ea8b14472f60b5078 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 12 06:46:01 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Plug mem leak on GLOB_NOMATCH case. From jjelen at - redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + make "--" before the hostname terminate command-line + option processing completely; previous behaviour would not prevent further + options appearing after the hostname (ssh has a supported options after the + hostname for >20 years, so that's too late to change). - Upstream-ID: 8016a7ae97719d3aa55fb723fc2ad3200058340d + ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: ef5ee50571b98ad94dcdf8282204e877ec88ad89 -commit 566b3a46e89a2fda2db46f04f2639e92da64a120 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:22:40 2017 +0000 +commit 0f3455356bc284d7c6f4d3c1614d31161bd5dcc2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 12 06:42:52 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Plug descriptor leaks of auth_sock. From jjelen at - redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + Switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for encrypting + new-style private keys. The latter having the advantage of being supported + for no-OpenSSL builds; bz#2754 ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 248acb99a5ed2fdca37d1aa33c0fcee7be286d88 + Upstream-ID: 54179a2afd28f93470471030567ac40431e56909 -commit 8a2834454c73dfc1eb96453c0e97690595f3f4c2 +commit c4972d0a9bd6f898462906b4827e09b7caea2d9b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:18:24 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 11 04:47:12 2017 +0000 upstream commit - correctly hash hosts with a port number. Reported by Josh - Powers in bz#2692; ok dtucker@ + refuse to a private keys when its corresponding .pub key + does not match. bz#2737 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 468e357ff143e00acc05bdd2803a696b3d4b6442 + Upstream-ID: 54ff5e2db00037f9db8d61690f26ef8f16e0d913 -commit 9747b9c742de409633d4753bf1a752cbd211e2d3 +commit 4b3ecbb663c919132dddb3758e17a23089413519 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 03:15:58 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 11 04:41:08 2017 +0000 upstream commit - don't truncate off \r\n from long stderr lines; bz#2688, - reported by Brian Dyson; ok dtucker@ + don't print verbose error message when ssh disconnects + under sftp; bz#2750; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: cdfdc4ba90639af807397ce996153c88af046ca4 + Upstream-ID: 6d83708aed77b933c47cf155a87dc753ec01f370 -commit 4a4b75adac862029a1064577eb5af299b1580cdd +commit 42a8f8bc288ef8cac504c5c73f09ed610bc74a34 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 10 02:59:51 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 11 04:16:35 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Validate digest arg in ssh_digest_final; from jjelen at - redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + Tweak previous keepalive commit: if last_time + keepalive + <= now instead of just "<" so client_alive_check will fire if the select + happens to return on exact second of the timeout. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: dbe5494dfddfe523fab341a3dab5a79e7338f878 + Upstream-ID: e02756bd6038d11bb8522bfd75a4761c3a684fcc -commit bee0167be2340d8de4bdc1ab1064ec957c85a447 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 10 13:40:18 2017 +1100 +commit b60ff20051ef96dfb207b6bfa45c0ad6c34a542a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 11 03:58:36 2017 +0000 - Check for NULL from malloc. + upstream commit - Part of bz#2687, from jjelen at redhat.com. - -commit da39b09d43b137a5a3d071b51589e3efb3701238 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 10 13:22:32 2017 +1100 - - If OSX is using launchd, remove screen no. + Keep track of the last time we actually heard from the + client and use this to also schedule a client_alive_check(). Prevents + activity on a forwarded port from indefinitely preventing the select timeout + so that client_alive_check() will eventually (although not optimally) be + called. - Check for socket with and without screen number. From Apple and Jakob - Schlyter via bz#2341, with contributions from Ron Frederick, ok djm@ + Analysis by willchan at google com via bz#2756, feedback & ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c08721e0bbda55c6d18e2760f3fe1b17fb71169e -commit 8fb15311a011517eb2394bb95a467c209b8b336c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 8 12:07:47 2017 +0000 +commit 94bc1e7ffba3cbdea8c7dcdab8376bf29283128f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 28 14:50:59 2017 +1000 - upstream commit - - quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump commandline; the - [ / ] characters can confuse some shells (e.g. zsh). Reported by Lauri - Tirkkonen via bugs@ + Expose list of completed auth methods to PAM - Upstream-ID: 65cdd161460e1351c3d778e974c1c2a4fa4bc182 + bz#2408; ok dtucker@ -commit 18501151cf272a15b5f2c5e777f2e0933633c513 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 6 02:03:20 2017 +0000 +commit c78e6eec78c88acf8d51db90ae05a3e39458603d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 21 14:38:16 2017 +1000 - upstream commit + fix problems in tunnel forwarding portability code - Check l->hosts before dereferencing; fixes potential null - pointer deref. ok djm@ + This fixes a few problems in the tun forwarding code, mostly to do + with host/network byte order confusion. - Upstream-ID: 81c0327c6ec361da794b5c680601195cc23d1301 + Based on a report and patch by stepe AT centaurus.uberspace.de; + bz#2735; ok dtucker@ -commit d072370793f1a20f01ad827ba8fcd3b8f2c46165 +commit 2985d4062ebf4204bbd373456a810d558698f9f5 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 6 00:44:51 2017 +0000 +Date: Tue Jul 25 09:22:25 2017 +0000 upstream commit - linenum is unsigned long so use %lu in log formats. ok - deraadt@ + Make WinSCP patterns for SSH_OLD_DHGEX more specific to + exclude WinSCP 5.10.x and up. bz#2748, from martin at winscp.net, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 9dc582d9bb887ebe0164e030d619fc20b1a4ea08 + Upstream-ID: 6fd7c32e99af3952db007aa180e73142ddbc741a -commit 12d3767ba4c84c32150cbe6ff6494498780f12c9 +commit 9f0e44e1a0439ff4646495d5735baa61138930a9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 3 06:13:11 2017 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 24 04:34:28 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix ssh-keygen -H accidentally corrupting known_hosts that - contained already-hashed entries. HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED is only set by - hostkeys_foreach() when hostname matching is in use, so we need to look for - the hash marker explicitly. + g/c unused variable; make a little more portable - Upstream-ID: da82ad653b93e8a753580d3cf5cd448bc2520528 + Upstream-ID: 3f5980481551cb823c6fb2858900f93fa9217dea -commit d7abb771bd5a941b26144ba400a34563a1afa589 +commit 51676ec61491ec6d7cbd06082034e29b377b3bf6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 28 06:10:08 2017 +0000 +Date: Sun Jul 23 23:37:02 2017 +0000 upstream commit - small memleak: free fd_set on connection timeout (though - we are heading to exit anyway). From Tom Rix in bz#2683 + Allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit + ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system default; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 10e3dadbb8199845b66581473711642d9e6741c4 + Upstream-ID: 77906ff8c7b660b02ba7cb1e47b17d66f54f1f7e -commit 78142e3ab3887e53a968d6e199bcb18daaf2436e -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 27 14:30:33 2017 +0000 +commit 6c1fbd5a50d8d2415f06c920dd3b1279b741072d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 21 14:24:26 2017 +1000 + + mention libedit + +commit dc2bd308768386b02c7337120203ca477e67ba62 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 19 08:30:41 2017 +0000 upstream commit - errant dot; from klemens nanni + fix support for unknown key types; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 83d93366a5acf47047298c5d3ebc5e7426f37921 + Upstream-ID: 53fb29394ed04d616d65b3748dee5aa06b07ab48 -commit 8071a6924c12bb51406a9a64a4b2892675112c87 +commit fd0e8fa5f89d21290b1fb5f9d110ca4f113d81d9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 24 03:16:34 2017 +0000 +Date: Wed Jul 19 01:15:02 2017 +0000 upstream commit - might as well set the listener socket CLOEXEC + switch from select() to poll() for the ssh-agent + mainloop; ok markus - Upstream-ID: 9c538433d6a0ca79f5f21decc5620e46fb68ab57 + Upstream-ID: 4a94888ee67b3fd948fd10693973beb12f802448 -commit d5499190559ebe374bcdfa8805408646ceffad64 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 19 00:11:29 2017 +0000 +commit b1e72df2b813ecc15bd0152167bf4af5f91c36d3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 14 03:18:21 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add test cases for C locale; ok schwarze@ + Make ""Killed by signal 1" LogLevel verbose so it's not + shown at the default level. Prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and + equivalent ProxyCommand configs. bz#1906, bz#2744, feedback&ok markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 783d75de35fbc923d46e2a5e6cee30f8f381ba87 + Upstream-ID: debfaa7e859b272246c2f2633335d288d2e2ae28 -commit 011c8ffbb0275281a0cf330054cf21be10c43e37 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 19 00:10:57 2017 +0000 +commit 1f3d202770a08ee6752ed2a234b7ca6f180eb498 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 13 19:16:33 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add a common nl_langinfo(CODESET) alias for US-ASCII - "ANSI_X3.4-1968" that is used by Linux. Fixes mprintf output truncation for - non-UTF-8 locales on Linux spotted by dtucker@; ok deraadt@ schwarze@ + man pages with pseudo synopses which list filenames end + up creating very ugly output in man -k; after some discussion with ingo, we + feel the simplest fix is to remove such SYNOPSIS sections: the info is hardly + helpful at page top, is contained already in FILES, and there are + sufficiently few that just zapping them is simple; - Upstream-ID: c6808956ebffd64066f9075d839f74ff0dd60719 + ok schwarze, who also helpfully ran things through a build to check + output; + + Upstream-ID: 3e211b99457e2f4c925c5927d608e6f97431336c -commit 0c4430a19b73058a569573492f55e4c9eeaae67b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 7 23:03:11 2017 +0000 +commit 7f13a4827fb28957161de4249bd6d71954f1f2ed +Author: espie@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 10 14:09:59 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Remove deprecated SSH1 options RSAAuthentication and - RhostsRSAAuthentication from regression test sshd_config. + zap redundant Makefile variables. okay djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8066b753d9dce7cf02ff87af5c727ff680d99491 + Upstream-ID: e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 -commit 3baa4cdd197c95d972ec3d07f1c0d08f2d7d9199 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 17 02:32:05 2017 +0000 +commit dc44dd3a9e2c9795394e6a7e1e71c929cbc70ce0 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 8 18:32:54 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Do not show rsa1 key type in usage when compiled without - SSH1 support. + slightly rework previous, to avoid an article issue; - Upstream-ID: 068b5c41357a02f319957746fa4e84ea73960f57 + Upstream-ID: 15a315f0460ddd3d4e2ade1f16d6c640a8c41b30 -commit ecc35893715f969e98fee118481f404772de4132 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 17 02:31:14 2017 +0000 +commit 853edbe057a84ebd0024c8003e4da21bf2b469f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 7 03:53:12 2017 +0000 upstream commit - ifdef out "rsa1" from the list of supported keytypes when - compiled without SSH1 support. Found by kdunlop at guralp.com, ok djm@ + When generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A), clobber + existing keys if they exist but are zero length. zero-length keys could + previously be made if ssh-keygen failed part way through generating them, so + avoid that case too. bz#2561 reported by Krzysztof Cieplucha; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: cea93a26433d235bb1d64b1d990f19a9c160a70f + Upstream-ID: f662201c28ab8e1f086b5d43c59cddab5ade4044 -commit 10577c6d96a55b877a960b2d0b75edef1b9945af +commit 43616876ba68a2ffaece6a6c792def4b039f2d6e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 17 02:04:15 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jul 1 22:55:44 2017 +0000 upstream commit - For ProxyJump/-J, surround host name with brackets to - allow literal IPv6 addresses. From Dick Visser; ok dtucker@ + actually remove these files - Upstream-ID: 3a5d3b0171250daf6a5235e91bce09c1d5746bf1 + Upstream-ID: 1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac -commit b2afdaf1b52231aa23d2153f4a8c5a60a694dda4 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 15 23:38:31 2017 +0000 +commit 83fa3a044891887369ce8b487ce88d713a04df48 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 1 13:50:45 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix memory leaks in match_filter_list() error paths. - - ok dtucker@ markus@ + remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge + the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus - Upstream-ID: c7f96ac0877f6dc9188bbc908100a8d246cc7f0e + Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f -commit 6d5a41b38b55258213ecfaae9df7a758caa752a1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 15 01:46:47 2017 +0000 +commit 738c73dca2c99ee78c531b4cbeefc2008fe438f0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 14 14:26:36 2017 +1000 + + make explicit_bzero/memset safe for sz=0 + +commit 8433d51e067e0829f5521c0c646b6fd3fe17e732 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Tue Jul 11 18:47:56 2017 -0700 + + modified: configure.ac + UnixWare needs BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON like Solaris + Analysis by Robbie Zhang + +commit ff3507aea9c7d30cd098e7801e156c68faff7cc7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 7 11:21:27 2017 +1000 + + typo + +commit d79bceb9311a9c137d268f5bc481705db4151810 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 30 04:17:23 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix division by zero crash in "df" output when server - returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes. Spotted by Guido Vranken; ok - dtucker@ + Only call close once in confree(). ssh_packet_close will + close the FD so only explicitly close non-SSH channels. bz#2734, from + bagajjal at microsoft.com, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 6fb6c2ae6b289aa07b6232dbc0be54682ef5419f + Upstream-ID: a81ce0c8b023527167739fccf1732b154718ab02 -commit bd5d7d239525d595ecea92765334af33a45d9d63 +commit 197dc9728f062e23ce374f44c95a2b5f9ffa4075 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Feb 12 15:45:15 2017 +1100 +Date: Thu Jun 29 15:40:25 2017 +1000 - ifdef out EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR - - EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 so ifdef out - for the benefit of OpenSSL versions prior to that. + Update link for my patches. -commit 155d540d00ff55f063421ec182ec8ff2b7ab6cbe +commit a98339edbc1fc21342a390f345179a9c3031bef7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 10 04:34:50 2017 +0000 +Date: Wed Jun 28 01:09:22 2017 +0000 upstream commit - bring back r1.34 that was backed out for problems loading - public keys: - - translate OpenSSL error codes to something more - meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@ - - with additional fix from Jakub Jelen to solve the backout. - bz#2525 bz#2523 re-ok dtucker@ + Allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in ssh-agent as a CA when + signing certificates. bz#2377 ok markus - Upstream-ID: a9d5bc0306f4473d9b4f4484f880e95f3c1cc031 + Upstream-ID: fb42e920b592edcbb5b50465739a867c09329c8f -commit a287c5ad1e0bf9811c7b9221979b969255076019 +commit c9cdef35524bd59007e17d5bd2502dade69e2dfb Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 10 03:36:40 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:35:24 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent to printf - but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports it; bz#2520 ok dtucker@ + regress test for ExposeAuthInfo - Upstream-ID: e8eed28712ba7b22d49be534237eed019875bd1e + Upstream-Regress-ID: 190e5b6866376f4061c411ab157ca4d4e7ae86fd -commit e40269be388972848aafcca7060111c70aab5b87 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 8 20:32:43 2017 +0000 +commit f17ee61cad25d210edab69d04ed447ad55fe80c1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 07:08:57 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Avoid printf %s NULL. From semarie@, OK djm@ + correct env var name - Upstream-ID: 06beef7344da0208efa9275d504d60d2a5b9266c + Upstream-ID: 721e761c2b1d6a4dcf700179f16fd53a1dadb313 -commit 5b90709ab8704dafdb31e5651073b259d98352bc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 6 09:22:51 2017 +0000 +commit 40962198e3b132cecdb32e9350acd4294e6a1082 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:57:04 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Restore \r\n newline sequence for server ident string. The CR - got lost in the flensing of SSHv1. Pointed out by Stef Bon + spelling; - Upstream-ID: 5333fd43ce5396bf5999496096fac5536e678fac + Upstream-ID: 606f933c8e2d0be902ea663946bc15e3eee40b25 -commit 97c31c46ee2e6b46dfffdfc4f90bbbf188064cbc +commit 33f86265d7e8a0e88d3a81745d746efbdd397370 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:42 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:38:11 2017 +0000 upstream commit - unit test for match_filter_list() function; still want a - better name for this... + don't pass pointer to struct sshcipher between privsep + processes, just redo the lookup in each using the already-passed cipher name. + bz#2704 based on patch from Brooks Davis; ok markus dtucker - Upstream-Regress-ID: 840ad6118552c35111f0a897af9c8d93ab8de92a + Upstream-ID: 2eab434c09bdf549dafd7da3e32a0d2d540adbe0 -commit f1a193464a7b77646f0d0cedc929068e4a413ab4 +commit 8f574959272ac7fe9239c4f5d10fd913f8920ab0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 3 23:05:57 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:34:38 2017 +0000 upstream commit - use ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to include connection - username in packet log messages, e.g. + refactor authentication logging - Connection closed by invalid user foo 10.1.1.1 port 44056 [preauth] + optionally record successful auth methods and public credentials + used in a file accessible to user sessions - ok markus@ bz#113 + feedback and ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 3591b88bdb5416d6066fb3d49d8fff2375bf1a15 + Upstream-ID: 090b93036967015717b9a54fd0467875ae9d32fb -commit 07edd7e9537ab32aa52abb5fb2a915c350fcf441 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 3 23:03:33 2017 +0000 +commit e2004d4bb7eb01c663dd3a3e7eb224f1ccdc9bba +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:28:50 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to allow inclusion of a - preamble string in disconnect messages; ok markus@ + word fix; - Upstream-ID: 34cb41182cd76d414c214ccb01c01707849afead + Upstream-ID: 8539bdaf2366603a34a9b2f034527ca13bb795c5 -commit 68bc8cfa7642d3ccbf2cd64281c16b8b9205be59 +commit 4540428cd0adf039bcf5a8a27f2d5cdf09191513 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:19 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 24 05:37:44 2017 +0000 upstream commit - support =- for removing methods from algorithms lists, - e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc; suggested by Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn in bz#2671 "I like - it" markus@ + switch sshconnect.c from (slightly abused) select() to + poll(); ok deraadt@ a while back - Upstream-ID: c78c38f9f81a963b33d0eade559f6048add24a6d + Upstream-ID: efc1937fc591bbe70ac9e9542bb984f354c8c175 -commit c924b2ef941028a1f31e6e94f54dfeeeef462a4e +commit 6f8ca3b92540fa1a9b91670edc98d15448e3d765 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 3 05:05:56 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 24 05:35:05 2017 +0000 upstream commit - allow form-feed characters at EOL; bz#2431 ok dtucker@ - - Upstream-ID: 1f453afaba6da2ae69d6afdf1ae79a917552f1a2 - -commit 523db8540b720c4d21ab0ff6f928476c70c38aab -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Feb 3 16:01:22 2017 +1100 - - prefer to use ldns-config to find libldns - - Should fix bz#2603 - "Build with ldns and without kerberos support - fails if ldns compiled with kerberos support" by including correct - cflags/libs + use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for + matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728; ok dtucker@ - ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: dc2e11c83ae9201bbe74872a0c895ae9725536dd -commit c998bf0afa1a01257a53793eba57941182e9e0b7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 3 02:56:00 2017 +0000 +commit 8904ffce057b80a7472955f1ec00d7d5c250076c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 05:24:11 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of - seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time). - This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison - warning. - - rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op - on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on - anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually - wraps, anyway). - - some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@ + no need to call log_init to reinitialise logged PID in + child sessions, since we haven't called openlog() in log_init() since 1999; + ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c + Upstream-ID: 0906e4002af5d83d3d544df75e1187c932a3cf2e -commit 3ec5fa4ba97d4c4853620daea26a33b9f1fe3422 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 2 10:54:25 2017 +0000 +commit e238645d789cd7eb47541b66aea2a887ea122c9b +Author: mestre@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 23 07:24:48 2017 +0000 upstream commit - In vasnmprintf() return an error if malloc fails and - don't set a function argument to the address of free'd memory. + When using the escape sequence &~ the code path is + client_loop() -> client_simple_escape_filter() -> process_escapes() -> fork() + and the pledge for this path lacks the proc promise and therefore aborts the + process. The solution is to just add proc the promise to this specific + pledge. - ok djm@ + Reported by Gregoire Jadi gjadi ! omecha.info + Insight with tb@, OK jca@ - Upstream-ID: 1efffffff2f51d53c9141f245b90ac23d33b9779 + Upstream-ID: 63c05e30c28209519f476023b65b0b1b0387a05b -commit 858252fb1d451ebb0969cf9749116c8f0ee42753 +commit 5abbb31c4e7a6caa922cc1cbb14e87a77f9d19d3 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 1 02:59:09 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 23 03:30:42 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Return true reason for port forwarding failures where - feasible rather than always "administratively prohibited". bz#2674, ok djm@ + Import regenerated moduli. - Upstream-ID: d901d9887951774e604ca970e1827afaaef9e419 + Upstream-ID: b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 -commit 6ba9f893838489add6ec4213c7a997b425e4a9e0 +commit 849c5468b6d9b4365784c5dd88e3f1fb568ba38f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 23:27:39 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 23 03:25:53 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Small correction to the known_hosts section on when it is - updated. Patch from lkppo at free.fr some time ago, pointed out by smallm at - sdf.org + Run the screen twice so we end up with more candidate + groups. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 1834d7af179dea1a12ad2137f84566664af225d5 + Upstream-ID: b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 -commit c61d5ec3c11e7ff9779b6127421d9f166cf10915 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 3 14:10:34 2017 +1100 +commit 4626e39c7053c6486c1c8b708ec757e464623f5f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 14 00:31:38 2017 +0000 - Remove _XOPEN_SOURCE from wide char detection. + upstream commit - Having _XOPEN_SOURCE unconditionally causes problems on some platforms - and configurations, notably Solaris 64-bit binaries. It was there for - the benefit of Linux put the required bits in the *-*linux* section. + Add user@host prefix to client's "Permisison denied" + messages, useful in particular when using "stacked" connections where it's + not clear which host is denying. bz#2720, ok djm@ markus@ - Patch from yvoinov at gmail.com. + Upstream-ID: de88e1e9dcb050c98e85377482d1287a9fe0d2be -commit f25ee13b3e81fd80efeb871dc150fe49d7fc8afd +commit c948030d54911b2d3cddb96a7a8e9269e15d11cd Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 05:22:14 2017 +0000 +Date: Tue Jun 13 12:13:59 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fully unbreak: some $SSH invocations did not have -F - specified and could pick up the ~/.ssh/config of the user running the tests + Do not require that unknown EXT_INFO extension values not + contain \0 characters. This would cause fatal connection errors if an + implementation sent e.g. string-encoded sub-values inside a value. - Upstream-Regress-ID: f362d1892c0d3e66212d5d3fc02d915c58ef6b89 + Reported by Denis Bider; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 030e10fdc605563c040244c4b4f1d8ae75811a5c -commit 6956e21fb26652887475fe77ea40d2efcf25908b +commit 6026f48dfca78b713e4a7f681ffa42a0afe0929e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 04:54:07 2017 +0000 +Date: Tue Jun 13 11:22:15 2017 +0000 upstream commit - partially unbreak: was not specifying hostname on some - $SSH invocations + missing prototype. - Upstream-Regress-ID: bc8a5e98e57bad0a92ef4f34ed91c1d18294e2cc + Upstream-ID: f443d2be9910fd2165a0667956d03343c46f66c9 -commit 52763dd3fe0a4678dafdf7aeb32286e514130afc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 01:03:00 2017 +0000 +commit bcd1485075aa72ba9418003f5cc27af2b049c51b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Jun 10 23:41:25 2017 +1000 - upstream commit - - revise keys/principals command hang fix (bz#2655) to - consume entire output, avoiding sending SIGPIPE to subprocesses early; ok - dtucker@ + portability for sftp globbed ls sort by mtime - Upstream-ID: 7cb04b31a61f8c78c4e48ceededcd2fd5c4ee1bc + Include replacement timespeccmp() for systems that lack it. + Support time_t struct stat->st_mtime in addition to + timespec stat->st_mtim, as well as unsorted fallback. -commit 381a2615a154a82c4c53b787f4a564ef894fe9ac +commit 072e172f1d302d2a2c6043ecbfb4004406717b96 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 00:38:50 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 10 06:36:46 2017 +0000 upstream commit - small cleanup post SSHv1 removal: - - remove SSHv1-isms in commented examples - - reorder token table to group deprecated and compile-time conditional tokens - better - - fix config dumping code for some compile-time conditional options that - weren't being correctly skipped (SSHv1 and PKCS#11) + print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the + protocol doesn't provide) for remote listings. bz#2710 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: f2e96b3cb3158d857c5a91ad2e15925df3060105 + Upstream-ID: c611f98a66302cea452ef10f13fff8cf0385242e -commit 4833d01591b7eb049489d9558b65f5553387ed43 +commit 72be5b2f8e7dc37235e8c4b8d0bc7b5ee1301505 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 00:34:01 2017 +0000 +Date: Sat Jun 10 06:33:34 2017 +0000 upstream commit - some explicit NULL tests when dumping configured - forwardings; from Karsten Weiss + implement sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 40957b8dea69672b0e50df6b4a91a94e3e37f72d + Upstream-ID: ed3110f351cc9703411bf847ba864041fb7216a8 -commit 326e2fae9f2e3e067b5651365eba86b35ee5a6b2 +commit 5b2f34a74aa6a524cd57e856b23e1b7b25007721 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:28 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 9 06:47:13 2017 +0000 upstream commit - misplaced braces in test; from Karsten Weiss + return failure rather than fatal() for more cases during + mux negotiations. Causes the session to fall back to a non-mux connection if + they occur. bz#2707 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: f7b794074d3aae8e35b69a91d211c599c94afaae + Upstream-ID: d2a7892f464d434e1f615334a1c9d0cdb83b29ab -commit 3e032a95e46bfaea9f9e857678ac8fa5f63997fb +commit 7f5637c4a67a49ef256cb4eedf14e8590ac30976 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:03 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 9 06:43:01 2017 +0000 upstream commit - don't dereference authctxt before testing != NULL, it - causes compilers to make assumptions; from Karsten Weiss + in description of public key authentication, mention that + the server will send debug messages to the client for some error conditions + after authentication has completed. bz#2709 ok dtucker - Upstream-ID: 794243aad1e976ebc717885b7a97a25e00c031b2 + Upstream-ID: 750127dbd58c5a2672c2d28bc35fe221fcc8d1dd -commit 01cfaa2b1cfb84f3cdd32d1bf82b120a8d30e057 +commit 2076e4adb986512ce8c415dd194fd4e52136c4b4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:51:16 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 9 06:40:24 2017 +0000 upstream commit - use correct ssh-add program; bz#2654, from Colin Watson + better translate libcrypto errors by looking deeper in + the accursed error stack for codes that indicate the wrong passphrase was + supplied for a PEM key. bz#2699 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 7042a36e1bdaec6562f6e57e9d047efe9c7a6030 + Upstream-ID: 4da4286326d570f4f0489459bb71f6297e54b681 -commit e5c7ec67cdc42ae2584085e0fc5cc5ee91133cf5 +commit ad0531614cbe8ec424af3c0fa90c34a8e1ebee4c Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:26:10 2017 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 9 04:40:04 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Account for timeouts in the integrity tests as failures. - - If the first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low - bytes of a packet length, then ssh will time out and this will be - interpreted as a test failure. Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via - bz#2658. + Add comments referring to the relevant RFC sections for + rekeying behaviour. - Upstream-Regress-ID: e7467613b0badedaa300bc6fc7495ec2f44e2fb9 + Upstream-ID: 6fc8e82485757a27633f9175ad00468f49a07d40 -commit dbaf599b61bd6e0f8469363a8c8e7f633b334018 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:09:25 2017 +0000 +commit ce9134260b9b1247e2385a1afed00c26112ba479 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jun 9 14:43:47 2017 +1000 - upstream commit - - Make forwarding test less racy by using unix domain - sockets instead of TCP ports where possible. Patch from cjwatson at - debian.org via bz#2659. + drop two more privileges in the Solaris sandbox - Upstream-Regress-ID: 4756375aac5916ef9d25452a1c1d5fa9e90299a9 + Drop PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO. + Patch from huieying.lee AT oracle.com via bz#2723 -commit 9390b0031ebd6eb5488d3bc4d4333c528dffc0a6 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jan 29 21:35:23 2017 +0000 +commit e0f609c8a2ab940374689ab8c854199c3c285a76 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 9 13:36:29 2017 +1000 + + Wrap stdint.h include in #ifdef. + +commit 1de5e47a85850526a4fdaf77185134046c050f75 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 7 01:48:15 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward - cancellation. bz#2672, from Brad Marshall via Colin Watson and Ubuntu's - bugtracker. + unbreak after sshv1 purge - Upstream-ID: 0d4a7e5ead6cc59c9a44b4c1e5435ab3aada09af + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8ea01a92d5f571b9fba88c1463a4254a7552d51b -commit 4ba15462ca38883b8a61a1eccc093c79462d5414 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 21 11:32:04 2017 +0000 +commit 550c053168123fcc0791f9952abad684704b5760 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 6 09:12:17 2017 +0000 upstream commit - The POSIX APIs that that sockaddrs all ignore the s*_len - field in the incoming socket, so userspace doesn't need to set it unless it - has its own reasons for tracking the size along with the sockaddr. - - ok phessler@ deraadt@ florian@ + Fix compression output stats broken in rev 1.201. Patch + originally by Russell Coker via Debian bug #797964 and Christoph Biedl. ok + djm@ - Upstream-ID: ca6e49e2f22f2b9e81d6d924b90ecd7e422e7437 + Upstream-ID: 83a1903b95ec2e4ed100703debb4b4a313b01016 -commit a1187bd3ef3e4940af849ca953a1b849dae78445 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 16:28:12 2017 +0000 +commit 55d06c6e72a9abf1c06a7ac2749ba733134a1f39 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 2 06:06:10 2017 +0000 upstream commit - keep the tokens list sorted; + rationalise the long list of manual CDIAGFLAGS that we + add; most of these were redundant to -Wall -Wextra - Upstream-ID: b96239dae4fb3aa94146bb381afabcc7740a1638 + Upstream-ID: ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c -commit b64077f9767634715402014f509e58decf1e140d +commit 1527d9f61e6d50f6c2b4a3fa5b45829034b1b0b1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 09:27:52 2017 +0000 +Date: Thu Jun 1 06:59:21 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix previous + no need to bzero allocated space now that we use use + recallocarray; ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: c107d6a69bc22325d79fbf78a2a62e04bcac6895 + Upstream-ID: 53333c62ccf97de60b8cb570608c1ba5ca5803c8 -commit 5e820e9ea2e949aeb93071fe31c80b0c42f2b2de +commit cc812baf39b93d5355565da98648d8c31f955990 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 03:53:58 2017 +0000 +Date: Thu Jun 1 06:58:25 2017 +0000 upstream commit - show a useful error message when included config files - can't be opened; bz#2653, ok dtucker@ + unconditionally zero init size of buffer; ok markus@ + deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: f598b73b5dfe497344cec9efc9386b4e5a3cb95b + Upstream-ID: 218963e846d8f26763ba25afe79294547b99da29 -commit 13bd2e2d622d01dc85d22b94520a5b243d006049 +commit 65eb8fae0d7ba45ef4483a3cf0ae7fd0dbc7c226 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 1 16:25:09 2017 +1000 + + avoid compiler warning + +commit 2d75d74272dc2a0521fce13cfe6388800c9a2406 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 03:45:41 2017 +0000 +Date: Thu Jun 1 06:16:43 2017 +0000 upstream commit - sshd_config is documented to set - GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes by default, so actually make it do this. - bz#2637 ok dtucker + some warnings spotted by clang; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 99ef8ac51f17f0f7aec166cb2e34228d4d72a665 + Upstream-ID: 24381d68ca249c5cee4388ceb0f383fa5b43991b -commit f89b928534c9e77f608806a217d39a2960cc7fd0 +commit 151c6e433a5f5af761c78de87d7b5d30a453cf5e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 1 15:25:13 2017 +1000 + + add recallocarray replacement and dependency + + recallocarray() needs getpagesize() so add a tiny replacement for that. + +commit 01e6f78924da308447e71e9a32c8a6104ef4e888 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 1 15:16:24 2017 +1000 + + add *.0 manpage droppings + +commit 4b2e2d3fd9dccff357e1e26ce9a5f2e103837a36 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 03:41:58 2017 +0000 +Date: Thu Jun 1 04:51:58 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Avoid confusing error message when attempting to use - ssh-keyscan built without SSH protocol v.1 to scan for v.1 keys; bz#2583 + fix casts re constness - Upstream-ID: 5d214abd3a21337d67c6dcc5aa6f313298d0d165 + Upstream-ID: e38f2bac162b37dbaf784d349c8327a6626fa266 -commit 0999533014784579aa6f01c2d3a06e3e8804b680 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 6 02:34:54 2017 +0000 +commit 75b8af8de805c0694b37fcf80ce82783b2acc86f +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 10:54:00 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Re-add '%k' token for AuthorizedKeysCommand which was - lost during the re-org in rev 1.235. bz#2656, from jboning at gmail.com. + make sure we don't pass a NULL string to vfprintf + (triggered by the principals-command regress test); ok bluhm - Upstream-ID: 2884e203c02764d7b3fe7472710d9c24bdc73e38 + Upstream-ID: eb49854f274ab37a0b57056a6af379a0b7111990 -commit 51045869fa084cdd016fdd721ea760417c0a3bf3 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 4 05:37:40 2017 +0000 +commit 84008608c9ee944d9f72f5100f31ccff743b10f2 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 10:04:29 2017 +0000 upstream commit - unbreak Unix domain socket forwarding for root; ok - markus@ + use SO_ZEROIZE for privsep communication (if available) - Upstream-ID: 6649c76eb7a3fa15409373295ca71badf56920a2 + Upstream-ID: abcbb6d2f8039fc4367a6a78096e5d5c39de4a62 -commit 58fca12ba967ea5c768653535604e1522d177e44 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jan 16 09:08:32 2017 +1100 +commit 9e509d4ec97cb3d71696f1a2f1fdad254cbbce11 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 09:15:42 2017 +0000 - Remove LOGIN_PROGRAM. + upstream commit - UseLogin is gone, remove leftover. bz#2665, from cjwatson at debian.org + Switch to recallocarray() for a few operations. Both + growth and shrinkage are handled safely, and there also is no need for + preallocation dances. Future changes in this area will be less error prone. + Review and one bug found by markus + + Upstream-ID: 822d664d6a5a1d10eccb23acdd53578a679d5065 -commit b108ce92aae0ca0376dce9513d953be60e449ae1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 4 02:21:43 2017 +0000 +commit dc5dc45662773c0f7745c29cf77ae2d52723e55e +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 08:58:52 2017 +0000 upstream commit - relax PKCS#11 whitelist a bit to allow libexec as well as - lib directories. + These shutdown() SHUT_RDWR are not needed before close() + ok djm markus claudio - Upstream-ID: cf5617958e2e2d39f8285fd3bc63b557da484702 + Upstream-ID: 36f13ae4ba10f5618cb9347933101eb4a98dbcb5 -commit c7995f296b9222df2846f56ecf61e5ae13d7a53d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 3 05:46:51 2017 +0000 +commit 1e0cdf8efb745d0d1116e1aa22bdc99ee731695e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 08:09:45 2017 +0000 upstream commit - check number of entries in SSH2_FXP_NAME response; avoids - unreachable overflow later. Reported by Jann Horn + clear session keys from memory; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: b6b2b434a6d6035b1644ca44f24cd8104057420f + Upstream-ID: ecd178819868975affd5fd6637458b7c712b6a0f -commit ddd3d34e5c7979ca6f4a3a98a7d219a4ed3d98c2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 30 22:08:02 2016 +0000 +commit 92e9fe633130376a95dd533df6e5e6a578c1e6b8 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 07:00:13 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of - output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com + remove now obsolete ctx from ssh_dispatch_run; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe + Upstream-ID: 9870aabf7f4d71660c31fda91b942b19a8e68d29 -commit 30eee7d1b2fec33c14870cc11910610be5d2aa6f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 20 12:16:11 2016 +1100 +commit 17ad5b346043c5bbc5befa864d0dbeb76be39390 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 05:34:14 2017 +0000 - Re-add missing "Prerequisites" header and fix typo + upstream commit - Patch from HARUYAMA Seigo . + use the ssh_dispatch_run_fatal variant + + Upstream-ID: 28c5b364e37c755d1b22652b8cd6735a05c625d8 -commit c8c60f3663165edd6a52632c6ddbfabfce1ca865 +commit 39896b777320a6574dd06707aebac5fb98e666da Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 19 22:35:23 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed May 31 05:08:46 2017 +0000 upstream commit - use standard /bin/sh equality test; from Mike Frysinger + another ctx => ssh conversion (in GSSAPI code) - Upstream-Regress-ID: 7b6f0b63525f399844c8ac211003acb8e4b0bec2 + Upstream-ID: 4d6574c3948075c60608d8e045af42fe5b5d8ae0 -commit 4a354fc231174901f2629437c2a6e924a2dd6772 +commit 6116bd4ed354a71a733c8fd0f0467ce612f12911 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Dec 19 15:59:26 2016 +1100 +Date: Wed May 31 14:56:07 2017 +1000 - crank version numbers for release + fix conversion of kexc25519s.c to struct ssh too + + git cvsimport missed this commit for some reason -commit 5f8d0bb8413d4d909cc7aa3c616fb0538224c3c9 +commit d40dbdc85b6fb2fd78485ba02225511b8cbf20d7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:51 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed May 31 04:29:44 2017 +0000 upstream commit - openssh-7.4 + spell out that custom options/extensions should follow the + usual SSH naming rules, e.g. "extension@example.com" - Upstream-ID: 1ee404adba6bbe10ae9277cbae3a94abe2867b79 + Upstream-ID: ab326666d2fad40769ec96b5a6de4015ffd97b8d -commit 3a8213ea0ed843523e34e55ab9c852332bab4c7b +commit 2a108277f976e8d0955c8b29d1dfde04dcbb3d5b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:18 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed May 31 04:17:12 2017 +0000 upstream commit - remove testcase that depends on exact output and - behaviour of snprintf(..., "%s", NULL) + one more void *ctx => struct ssh *ssh conversion - Upstream-Regress-ID: cab4288531766bd9593cb556613b91a2eeefb56f + Upstream-ID: d299d043471c10214cf52c03daa10f1c232759e2 -commit eae735a82d759054f6ec7b4e887fb7a5692c66d7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 19 03:32:57 2016 +0000 +commit c04e979503e97f52b750d3b98caa6fe004ab2ab9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 00:43:04 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Use LOGNAME to get current user and fall back to whoami if - not set. Mainly to benefit -portable since some platforms don't have whoami. + fix possible OOB strlen() in SOCKS4A hostname parsing; + ok markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: e3a16b7836a3ae24dc8f8a4e43fdf8127a60bdfa + Upstream-ID: c67297cbeb0e5a19d81752aa18ec44d31270cd11 -commit 0d2f88428487518eea60602bd593989013831dcf -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 03:51:19 2016 +0000 +commit a3bb250c93bfe556838c46ed965066afce61cffa +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 19:38:17 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add regression test for AllowUsers and DenyUsers. Patch from - Zev Weiss + tweak previous; - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8f1aac24d52728398871dac14ad26ea38b533fb9 + Upstream-ID: 66987651046c42d142f7318c9695fb81a6d14031 -commit 3bc8180a008929f6fe98af4a56fb37d04444b417 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 16 15:02:24 2016 +1100 +commit 1112b534a6a7a07190e497e6bf86b0d5c5fb02dc +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 18:58:37 2017 +0000 - Add missing monitor.h include. + upstream commit - Fixes warning pointed out by Zev Weiss + Add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the + ssh config file instead of giving it on the client's command line. This + command will be executed on the remote host. The feature allows to automate + tasks using ssh config. OK markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 5d982fc17adea373a9c68cae1021ce0a0904a5ee -commit 410681f9015d76cc7b137dd90dac897f673244a0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 02:48:55 2016 +0000 +commit eb272ea4099fd6157846f15c129ac5727933aa69 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:29:59 2017 +0000 upstream commit - revert to rev1.2; the new bits in this test depend on changes - to ssh that aren't yet committed + switch auth2 to ssh_dispatch API; ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 828ffc2c7afcf65d50ff2cf3dfc47a073ad39123 + Upstream-ID: a752ca19e2782900dd83060b5c6344008106215f -commit 2f2ffa4fbe4b671bbffa0611f15ba44cff64d58e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 01:06:27 2016 +0000 +commit 5a146bbd4fdf5c571f9fb438e5210d28cead76d9 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:27:22 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Move the "stop sshd" code into its own helper function. - Patch from Zev Weiss , ok djm@ + switch auth2-none.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: a113dea77df5bd97fb4633ea31f3d72dbe356329 + Upstream-ID: 07252b58e064d332214bcabbeae8e08c44b2001b -commit e15e7152331e3976b35475fd4e9c72897ad0f074 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 16 01:01:07 2016 +0000 +commit 60306b2d2f029f91927c6aa7c8e08068519a0fa2 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:26:49 2017 +0000 upstream commit - regression test for certificates along with private key - with no public half. bz#2617, mostly from Adam Eijdenberg + switch auth2-passwd.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 2e74dc2c726f4dc839609b3ce045466b69f01115 + Upstream-ID: cba0a8b72b4f97adfb7e3b3fd2f8ba3159981fc7 -commit 9a70ec085faf6e55db311cd1a329f1a35ad2a500 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 15 23:50:37 2016 +0000 +commit eb76698b91338bd798c978d4db2d6af624d185e4 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:25:42 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Use $SUDO to read pidfile in case root's umask is - restricted. From portable. + switch auth2-hostbased.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: f6b1c7ffbc5a0dfb7d430adb2883344899174a98 + Upstream-ID: 146af25c36daeeb83d5dbbb8ca52b5d25de88f4e -commit fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 15 21:29:05 2016 +0000 +commit 2ae666a8fc20b3b871b2f1b90ad65cc027336ccd +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:23:52 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add missing braces in DenyUsers code. Patch from zev at - bewilderbeest.net, ok deraadt@ + protocol handlers all get struct ssh passed; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: d747ace338dcf943b077925f90f85f789714b54e + Upstream-ID: 0ca9ea2a5d01a6d2ded94c5024456a930c5bfb5d -commit dcc7d74242a574fd5c4afbb4224795b1644321e7 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 15 21:20:41 2016 +0000 +commit 94583beb24a6c5fd19cedb9104ab2d2d5cd052b6 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:19:15 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix text in error message. Patch from zev at - bewilderbeest.net. + ssh: pass struct ssh to auth functions, too; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: deb0486e175e7282f98f9a15035d76c55c84f7f6 + Upstream-ID: d13c509cc782f8f19728fbea47ac7cf36f6e85dd -commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Dec 14 00:36:34 2016 +0000 +commit 5f4082d886c6173b9e90b9768c9a38a3bfd92c2b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:18:15 2017 +0000 upstream commit - disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is - disabled + sshd: pass struct ssh to auth functions; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: ab61516ae0faadad407857808517efa900a0d6d0 + Upstream-ID: b00a80c3460884ebcdd14ef550154c761aebe488 -commit 08a1e7014d65c5b59416a0e138c1f73f417496eb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 9 03:04:29 2016 +0000 +commit 7da5df11ac788bc1133d8d598d298e33500524cc +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:16:41 2017 +0000 upstream commit - log connections dropped in excess of MaxStartups at - verbose LogLevel; bz#2613 based on diff from Tomas Kuthan; ok dtucker@ + remove unused wrapper functions from key.[ch]; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 703ae690dbf9b56620a6018f8a3b2389ce76d92b + Upstream-ID: ea0f4016666a6817fc11f439dd4be06bab69707e -commit 10e290ec00964b2bf70faab15a10a5574bb80527 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 13:51:32 2016 +1100 +commit ff7371afd08ac0bbd957d90451d4dcd0da087ef5 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:15:17 2017 +0000 - Get default of TEST_SSH_UTF8 from environment. + upstream commit + + sshkey_new() might return NULL (pkcs#11 code only); ok + djm@ + + Upstream-ID: de9f2ad4a42c0b430caaa7d08dea7bac943075dd -commit b9b8ba3f9ed92c6220b58d70d1e6d8aa3eea1104 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 12:56:40 2016 +1100 +commit beb965bbc5a984fa69fb1e2b45ebe766ae09d1ef +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:13:40 2017 +0000 - Remove commented-out includes. + upstream commit - These commented-out includes have "Still needed?" comments. Since - they've been commented out for ~13 years I assert that they're not. + switch sshconnect.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 27be17f84b950d5e139b7a9b281aa487187945ad -commit 25275f1c9d5f01a0877d39444e8f90521a598ea0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 12:54:23 2016 +1100 +commit 00ed75c92d1f95fe50032835106c368fa22f0f02 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:10:53 2017 +0000 - Add prototype for strcasestr in compat library. + upstream commit + + switch auth2-pubkey.c to modern APIs; with & ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8f08d4316eb1b0c4ffe4a206c05cdd45ed1daf07 -commit afec07732aa2985142f3e0b9a01eb6391f523dec -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 13 10:23:03 2016 +1100 +commit 54d90ace1d3535b44d92a8611952dc109a74a031 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 08:52:19 2017 +0000 - Add strcasestr to compat library. + upstream commit - Fixes build on (at least) Solaris 10. + switch from Key typedef with struct sshkey; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 3067d33e04efbe5131ce8f70668c47a58e5b7a1f -commit dda78a03af32e7994f132d923c2046e98b7c56c8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Dec 12 13:57:10 2016 +1100 +commit c221219b1fbee47028dcaf66613f4f8d6b7640e9 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 08:49:58 2017 +0000 - Force Turkish locales back to C/POSIX; bz#2643 + upstream commit - Turkish locales are unique in their handling of the letters 'i' and - 'I' (yes, they are different letters) and OpenSSH isn't remotely - prepared to deal with that. For now, the best we can do is to force - OpenSSH to use the C/POSIX locale and try to preserve the UTF-8 - encoding if possible. + remove ssh1 references; ok djm@ - ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: fc23b7578e7b0a8daaec72946d7f5e58ffff5a3d -commit c35995048f41239fc8895aadc3374c5f75180554 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 9 12:52:02 2016 +1100 +commit afbfa68fa18081ef05a9cd294958509a5d3cda8b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 08:49:32 2017 +0000 - exit is in stdlib.h not unistd.h (that's _exit). + upstream commit + + revise sshkey_load_public(): remove ssh1 related + comments, remove extra open()/close() on keyfile, prevent leak of 'pub' if + 'keyp' is NULL, replace strlcpy+cat with asprintf; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 6175e47cab5b4794dcd99c1175549a483ec673ca -commit d399a8b914aace62418c0cfa20341aa37a192f98 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Dec 9 12:33:25 2016 +1100 +commit 813f55336a24fdfc45e7ed655fccc7d792e8f859 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 20:34:49 2017 +0000 - Include for exit in utf8 locale test. + upstream commit + + sshbuf_consume: reset empty buffer; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 0d4583ba57f69e369d38bbd7843d85cac37fa821 -commit 47b8c99ab3221188ad3926108dd9d36da3b528ec -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Dec 8 15:48:34 2016 +1100 +commit 6cf711752cc2a7ffaad1fb4de18cae65715ed8bb +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 19:35:50 2017 +0000 - Check for utf8 local support before testing it. + upstream commit - Check for utf8 local support and if not found, do not attempt to run the - utf8 tests. Suggested by djm@ + remove SSH_CHANNEL_XXX_DRAINING (ssh1 only); ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: e2e225b6ac67b84dd024f38819afff2554fafe42 -commit 4089fc1885b3a2822204effbb02b74e3da58240d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Dec 8 12:57:24 2016 +1100 +commit 364f0d5edea27767fb0f915ea7fc61aded88d3e8 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 19:34:12 2017 +0000 - Use AC_PATH_TOOL for krb5-config. + upstream commit - This will use the host-prefixed version when cross compiling; patch from - david.michael at coreos.com. + remove channel_input_close_confirmation (ssh1 only); ok + djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8e7c8c38f322d255bb0294a5c0ebef53fdf576f1 -commit b4867e0712c89b93be905220c82f0a15e6865d1e +commit 8ba0fd40082751dbbc23a830433488bbfb1abdca Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Dec 6 07:48:01 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri May 26 01:40:07 2017 +0000 upstream commit - make IdentityFile successfully load and use certificates that - have no corresponding bare public key. E.g. just a private id_rsa and - certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub). - - bz#2617 ok dtucker@ + fix references to obsolete v00 cert format; spotted by + Jakub Jelen - Upstream-ID: c1e9699b8c0e3b63cc4189e6972e3522b6292604 + Upstream-ID: 7600ce193ab8fd19451acfe24fc2eb39d46b2c4f -commit c9792783a98881eb7ed295680013ca97a958f8ac -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Nov 25 14:04:21 2016 +1100 +commit dcc714c65cfb81eb6903095b4590719e8690f3da +Author: Mike Frysinger +Date: Wed May 24 23:21:19 2017 -0400 - Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 target for GTK+3 version + configure: actually set cache vars when cross-compiling - Based on patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640 + The cross-compiling fallback message says it's assuming the test + passed, but it didn't actually set the cache var which causes + later tests to fail. -commit 7be85ae02b9de0993ce0a1d1e978e11329f6e763 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Nov 25 14:03:53 2016 +1100 +commit 947a3e829a5b8832a4768fd764283709a4ca7955 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat May 20 02:35:47 2017 +0000 - Make gnome-ssh-askpass2.c GTK+3-friendly + upstream commit - Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640 + there's no reason to artificially limit the key path + here, just check that it fits PATH_MAX; spotted by Matthew Patton + + Upstream-ID: 858addaf2009c9cf04d80164a41b2088edb30b58 -commit b9844a45c7f0162fd1b5465683879793d4cc4aaa +commit 773224802d7cb250bb8b461546fcce10567b4b2e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 4 23:54:02 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri May 19 21:07:17 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix public key authentication when multiple - authentication is in use. Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire - keys list, just reset the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good - order (with already- tried keys at the back) + Now that we no longer support SSHv1, replace the contents + of this file with a pointer to + https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00 It's better edited, + doesn't need to document stuff we no longer implement and does document stuff + that we do implement (RSA SHA256/512 signature flags) - Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@ - - Upstream-ID: 7123f12dc2f3bcaae715853035a97923d7300176 + Upstream-ID: da8cdc46bbcc266efabd565ddddd0d8e556f846e -commit f2398eb774075c687b13af5bc22009eb08889abe -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 4 22:27:25 2016 +0000 +commit 54cd41a4663fad66406dd3c8fe0e4760ccd8a899 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 17 01:24:17 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the - new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the - pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain - a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@ + allow LogLevel in sshd_config Match blocks; ok dtucker + bz#2717 - Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870 + Upstream-ID: 662e303be63148f47db1aa78ab81c5c2e732baa8 -commit 85aa2efeba51a96bf6834f9accf2935d96150296 +commit 277abcda3f1b08d2376686f0ef20320160d4c8ab Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 30 03:01:33 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue May 16 16:56:15 2017 +0000 upstream commit - test new behaviour of cert force-command restriction vs. - authorized_key/ principals + remove duplicate check; spotted by Jakub Jelen - Upstream-Regress-ID: 399efa7469d40c404c0b0a295064ce75d495387c + Upstream-ID: 30c2996c1767616a8fdc49d4cee088efac69c3b0 -commit 5d333131cd8519d022389cfd3236280818dae1bc -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 30 06:54:26 2016 +0000 +commit adb47ce839c977fa197e770c1be8f852508d65aa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 16 16:54:05 2017 +0000 upstream commit - tweak previous; while here fix up FILES and AUTHORS; + mention that Ed25519 keys are valid as CA keys; spotted + by Jakub Jelen - Upstream-ID: 93f6e54086145a75df8d8ec7d8689bdadbbac8fa + Upstream-ID: d3f6db58b30418cb1c3058211b893a1ffed3dfd4 -commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc +commit 6bdf70f01e700348bb4d8c064c31a0ab90896df6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue May 9 14:35:03 2017 +1000 + + clean up regress files and add a .gitignore + +commit 7bdb2eeb1d3c26acdc409bd94532eefa252e440b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 30 03:07:37 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon May 8 22:57:38 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load - (via ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@ + remove hmac-ripemd160; ok dtucker - Upstream-ID: fe79769469d9cd6d26fe0dc15751b83ef2a06e8f + Upstream-ID: 896e737ea0bad6e23327d1c127e02d5e9e9c654d -commit 7844f357cdd90530eec81340847783f1f1da010b +commit 5f02bb1f99f70bb422be8a5c2b77ef853f1db554 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 30 03:00:05 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon May 8 06:11:06 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables - X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as - anything else we might implement in the future. - - This, like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, is intended to be a - simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. Suggested as - a complement to 'restrict' by Jann Horn; ok markus@ + make requesting bad ECDSA bits yield the same error + (SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH) as the same mistake for RSA/DSA - Upstream-ID: 203803f66e533a474086b38a59ceb4cf2410fcf7 + Upstream-ID: bf40d3fee567c271e33f05ef8e4e0fa0b6f0ece6 -commit fd6dcef2030d23c43f986d26979f84619c10589d +commit d757a4b633e8874629a1442c7c2e7b1b55d28c19 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 30 02:57:40 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon May 8 06:08:42 2017 +0000 upstream commit - When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and - an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the - certificate unless they are identical. - - The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced- - command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone. - - Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@ + fix for new SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH error value - Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f + Upstream-Regress-ID: c38a6e6174d4c3feca3518df150d4fbae0dca8dc -commit 7fc4766ac78abae81ee75b22b7550720bfa28a33 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 30 00:28:31 2016 +0000 +commit 2e58a69508ac49c02d1bb6057300fa6a76db1045 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 06:03:39 2017 +0000 upstream commit - On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized - and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This - means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer - change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@. + helps if I commit the correct version of the file. fix + missing return statement. - Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9 + Upstream-ID: c86394a3beeb1ec6611e659bfa830254f325546c -commit c9f880c195c65f1dddcbc4ce9d6bfea7747debcc -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Nov 30 13:51:49 2016 +1100 +commit effaf526bfa57c0ac9056ca236becf52385ce8af +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 01:52:49 2017 +0000 - factor out common PRNG reseed before privdrop + upstream commit - Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets - stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann - Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@ + remove arcfour, blowfish and CAST here too + + Upstream-Regress-ID: c613b3bcbef75df1fe84ca4dc2d3ef253dc5e920 -commit 79e4829ec81dead1b30999e1626eca589319a47f -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 25 03:02:01 2016 +0000 +commit 7461a5bc571696273252df28a1f1578968cae506 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 00:21:36 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Allow PuTTY interop tests to run unattended. bz#2639, - patch from cjwatson at debian.org. + I was too aggressive with the scalpel in the last commit; + unbreak sshd, spotted quickly by naddy@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 4345253558ac23b2082aebabccd48377433b6fe0 + Upstream-ID: fb7e75d2b2c7e6ca57dee00ca645e322dd49adbf -commit 504c3a9a1bf090f6b27260fc3e8ea7d984d163dc -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 25 02:56:49 2016 +0000 +commit bd636f40911094a39c2920bf87d2ec340533c152 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 7 23:15:59 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Reverse args to sshd-log-wrapper. Matches change in - portable, where it allows sshd do be optionally run under Valgrind. + Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length. Improve reporting + for keys that do not meet this requirement. ok markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: b438d1c6726dc5caa2a45153e6103a0393faa906 + Upstream-ID: b385e2a7b13b1484792ee681daaf79e1e203df6c -commit bd13017736ec2f8f9ca498fe109fb0035f322733 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 25 02:49:18 2016 +0000 +commit 70c1218fc45757a030285051eb4d209403f54785 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 7 23:13:42 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix typo in trace message; from portable. + Don't offer CBC ciphers by default in the client. ok + markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 4c4a2ba0d37faf5fd230a91b4c7edb5699fbd73a + Upstream-ID: 94c9ce8d0d1a085052e11c7f3307950fdc0901ef -commit 7da751d8b007c7f3e814fd5737c2351440d78b4c -Author: tb@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Nov 1 13:43:27 2016 +0000 +commit acaf34fd823235d549c633c0146ee03ac5956e82 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 7 23:12:57 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Clean up MALLOC_OPTIONS. For the unittests, move - MALLOC_OPTIONS and TEST_ENV to unittets/Makefile.inc. - - ok otto + As promised in last release announcement: remove + support for Blowfish, RC4 and CAST ciphers. ok markus@ deraadt@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 890d497e0a38eeddfebb11cc429098d76cf29f12 + Upstream-ID: 21f8facdba3fd8da248df6417000867cec6ba222 -commit 36f58e68221bced35e06d1cca8d97c48807a8b71 -Author: tb@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 31 23:45:08 2016 +0000 +commit 3e371bd2124427403971db853fb2e36ce789b6fd +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 5 10:42:49 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Remove the obsolete A and P flags from MALLOC_OPTIONS. - - ok dtucker + more simplification and removal of SSHv1-related code; + ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 6cc25024c8174a87e5734a0dc830194be216dd59 + Upstream-ID: d2f041aa0b79c0ebd98c68a01e5a0bfab2cf3b55 -commit b0899ee26a6630883c0f2350098b6a35e647f512 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Nov 29 03:54:50 2016 +0000 +commit 2e9c324b3a7f15c092d118c2ac9490939f6228fd +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 5 10:41:58 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Factor out code to disconnect from controlling terminal - into its own function. ok djm@ + remove superfluous protocol 2 mentions; ok jmc@ - Upstream-ID: 39fd9e8ebd7222615a837312face5cc7ae962885 + Upstream-ID: 0aaf7567c9f2e50fac5906b6a500a39c33c4664d -commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d +commit 744bde79c3361e2153cb395a2ecdcee6c713585d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 25 23:24:45 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu May 4 06:10:57 2017 +0000 upstream commit - use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for - loading keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which - might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This doesn't - appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but was observed for - novelty oversize ones. - - Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@ + since a couple of people have asked, leave a comment + explaining why we retain SSH v.1 support in the "delete all keys from agent" + path. - Upstream-ID: d620e1d46a29fdea56aeadeda120879eddc60ab1 + Upstream-ID: 4b42dcfa339813c15fe9248a2c1b7ed41c21bbb4 -commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e +commit 0c378ff6d98d80bc465a4a6a787670fb9cc701ee Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 25 23:22:04 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu May 4 01:33:21 2017 +0000 upstream commit - split allocation out of sshbuf_reserve() into a separate - sshbuf_allocate() function; ok markus@ + another tentacle: cipher_set_key_string() was only ever + used for SSHv1 - Upstream-ID: 11b8a2795afeeb1418d508a2c8095b3355577ec2 + Upstream-ID: 7fd31eb6c48946f7e7cc12af0699fe8eb637e94a -commit f0ddedee460486fa0e32fefb2950548009e5026e -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 23 23:14:15 2016 +0000 +commit 9a82e24b986e3e0dc70849dbb2c19aa6c707b37f +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 21:49:18 2017 +0000 upstream commit - allow ClientAlive{Interval,CountMax} in Match; ok dtucker, - djm + restore mistakenly deleted description of the + ConnectionAttempts option ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 8beb4c1eadd588f1080b58932281983864979f55 + Upstream-ID: 943002b1b7c470caea3253ba7b7348c359de0348 -commit 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Nov 8 22:04:34 2016 +0000 +commit 768405fddf64ff83aa6ef701ebb3c1f82d98a2f3 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 21:08:09 2017 +0000 upstream commit - unbreak DenyUsers; reported by henning@ + remove miscellaneous SSH1 leftovers; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 1c67d4148f5e953c35acdb62e7c08ae8e33f7cb2 + Upstream-ID: af23696022ae4d45a1abc2fb8b490d8d9dd63b7c -commit 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 6 05:46:37 2016 +0000 +commit 1a1b24f8229bf7a21f89df21987433283265527a +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 10:01:44 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Validate address ranges for AllowUser/DenyUsers at - configuration load time and refuse to accept bad ones. It was previously - possible to specify invalid CIDR address ranges (e.g. djm@127.1.2.3/55) and - these would always match. - - Thanks to Laurence Parry for a detailed bug report. ok markus (for - a previous diff version) + more protocol 1 bits removed; ok djm - Upstream-ID: 9dfcdd9672b06e65233ea4434c38226680d40bfb + Upstream-ID: b5b977eaf756915acb56aef3604a650e27f7c2b9 -commit efb494e81d1317209256b38b49f4280897c61e69 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 28 03:33:52 2016 +0000 +commit 2b6f799e9b230cf13a7eefc05ecead7d8569d6b5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 06:32:02 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Improve pkcs11_add_provider() logging: demote some - excessively verbose error()s to debug()s, include PKCS#11 provider name and - slot in log messages where possible. bz#2610, based on patch from Jakub Jelen + more protocol 1 stuff to go; ok djm - Upstream-ID: 3223ef693cfcbff9079edfc7e89f55bf63e1973d + Upstream-ID: 307a30441d2edda480fd1661d998d36665671e47 -commit 5ee3fb5affd7646f141749483205ade5fc54adaf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 1 08:12:33 2016 +1100 +commit f10c0d32cde2084d2a0b19bc47d80cb93e85a093 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 17:04:09 2017 +0000 - Use ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..) on OS X. + upstream commit + + rsa1 is no longer valid; + + Upstream-ID: 9953d09ed9841c44b7dcf7019fa874783a709d89 -commit 315d2a4e674d0b7115574645cb51f968420ebb34 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 28 14:34:07 2016 +1100 +commit 42b690b4fd0faef78c4d68225948b6e5c46c5163 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 14:06:37 2017 +0000 - Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8) OpenSSL + upstream commit - ok dtucker@ + add PubKeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the -o list: scp(1) has + it, so i guess this should too; + + Upstream-ID: 7fab32e869ca5831d09ab0c40d210b461d527a2c -commit a9ff3950b8e80ff971b4d44bbce96df27aed28af -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 28 14:26:58 2016 +1100 +commit d852603214defd93e054de2877b20cc79c19d0c6 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 13:44:51 2017 +0000 - Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat. + upstream commit - Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat and add ifdefs to mac.c around the - ripemd160 MACs. + remove now obsolete protocol1 options from the -o + lists; + + Upstream-ID: 828e478a440bc5f9947672c392420510a362b3dd -commit bce58885160e5db2adda3054c3b81fe770f7285a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 28 13:52:31 2016 +1100 +commit 8b60ce8d8111e604c711c4cdd9579ffe0edced74 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 09:05:58 2017 +0000 - Check if RIPEMD160 is disabled in OpenSSL. + upstream commit + + more -O shuffle; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: c239991a3a025cdbb030b73e990188dd9bfbeceb -commit d924640d4c355d1b5eca1f4cc60146a9975dbbff -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 28 13:38:19 2016 +1100 +commit 3575f0b12afe6b561681582fd3c34067d1196231 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 08:54:19 2017 +0000 - Skip ssh1 specfic ciphers. + upstream commit - cipher-3des1.c and cipher-bf1.c are specific to sshv1 so don't even try - to compile them when Protocol 1 is not enabled. + remove -1 / -2 options; pointed out by jmc@ + + Upstream-ID: 65d2a816000741a95df1c7cfdb5fa8469fcc7daa -commit 79d078e7a49caef746516d9710ec369ba45feab6 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 25 04:08:13 2016 +0000 +commit 4f1ca823bad12e4f9614895eefe0d0073b84a28f +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 08:06:33 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix logic in add_local_forward() that inverted a test - when code was refactored out into bind_permitted(). This broke ssh port - forwarding for non-priv ports as a non root user. - - ok dtucker@ 'looks good' deraadt@ + remove options -12 from usage(); - Upstream-ID: ddb8156ca03cc99997de284ce7777536ff9570c9 + Upstream-ID: db7ceef25132e63b50ed05289bf447fece1d1270 -commit a903e315dee483e555c8a3a02c2946937f9b4e5d -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 24 01:09:17 2016 +0000 +commit 6b84897f7fd39956b849eac7810319d8a9958568 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 07:13:31 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Remove dead breaks, found via opencoverage.net. ok - deraadt@ + tidy up -O somewhat; ok djm - Upstream-ID: ad9cc655829d67fad219762810770787ba913069 + Upstream-ID: 804405f716bf7ef15c1f36ab48581ca16aeb4d52 -commit b4e96b4c9bea4182846e4942ba2048e6d708ee54 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 26 08:43:25 2016 +1100 +commit d1c6b7fdbdfe4a7a37ecd48a97f0796b061c2868 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 22:09:48 2017 +0000 - Use !=NULL instead of >0 for getdefaultproj. + upstream commit - getdefaultproj() returns a pointer so test it for NULL inequality - instead of >0. Fixes compiler warning and is more correct. Patch from - David Binderman. + when freeing a bitmap, zero all it bytes; spotted by Ilya + Kaliman + + Upstream-ID: 834ac024f2c82389d6ea6b1c7d6701b3836e28e4 -commit 1c4ef0b808d3d38232aeeb1cebb7e9a43def42c5 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Oct 23 22:04:05 2016 +0000 +commit 0f163983016c2988a92e039d18a7569f9ea8e071 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 14:08:26 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Factor out "can bind to low ports" check into its own function. This will - make it easier for Portable to support platforms with permissions models - other than uid==0 (eg bz#2625). ok djm@, "doesn't offend me too much" - deraadt@. + this one I did forget to "cvs rm" - Upstream-ID: 86213df4183e92b8f189a6d2dac858c994bfface + Upstream-ID: 5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 -commit 0b9ee623d57e5de7e83e66fd61a7ba9a5be98894 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Oct 19 23:21:56 2016 +0000 +commit 21ed00a8e26fe8a772bcca782175fafc2b0890ed +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 09:27:45 2017 +0000 upstream commit - When tearing down ControlMaster connecctions, don't - pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet. Patch from Tim Kuijsten via tech@. + don't know why cvs didn't exterminate these the first + time around, I use rm -f and everuthing... - Upstream-ID: d9b3a68b2a7c2f2fc7f74678e29a4618d55ceced + pointed out by sobrado@ + + Upstream-ID: a6c44a0c2885330d322ee01fcfd7f6f209b1e15d -commit 09e6a7d8354224933febc08ddcbc2010f542284e +commit d29ba6f45086703fdcb894532848ada3427dfde6 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Oct 24 09:06:18 2016 +1100 +Date: Mon May 1 13:53:07 2017 +1000 - Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef. + Define INT32_MAX and INT64_MAX if needed. -commit 08d9e9516e587b25127545c029e5464b2e7f2919 +commit 329037e389f02ec95c8e16bf93ffede94d3d44ce Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 21 09:46:46 2016 +1100 +Date: Mon May 1 13:19:41 2017 +1000 - Fix formatting. + Wrap stdint.h in HAVE_STDINT_H -commit 461f50e7ab8751d3a55e9158c44c13031db7ba1d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 21 06:55:58 2016 +1100 +commit f382362e8dfb6b277f16779ab1936399d7f2af78 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 02:27:11 2017 +0000 - Update links to https. + upstream commit - www.openssh.com now supports https and ftp.openbsd.org no longer - supports ftp. Make all links to these https. - -commit dd4e7212a6141f37742de97795e79db51e4427ad -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 21 06:48:46 2016 +1100 - - Update host key generation examples. + remove unused variable - Remove ssh1 host key generation, add ssh-keygen -A + Upstream-ID: 66011f00819d0e71b14700449a98414033284516 -commit 6d49ae82634c67e9a4d4af882bee20b40bb8c639 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Oct 21 05:22:55 2016 +1100 +commit dd369320d2435b630a5974ab270d686dcd92d024 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:34:55 2017 +0000 - Update links. + upstream commit - Make links to openssh.com HTTPS now that it's supported, point release - notes link to the HTML release notes page, and update a couple of other - links and bits of text. - -commit fe0d1ca6ace06376625084b004ee533f2c2ea9d6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 20 03:42:09 2016 +1100 - - Remote channels .orig and .rej files. + eliminate explicit specification of protocol in tests and + loops over protocol. We only support SSHv2 now. - These files were incorrectly added during an OpenBSD sync. + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0082838a9b8a382b7ee9cbf0c1b9db727784fadd -commit 246aa842a4ad368d8ce030495e657ef3a0e1f95c -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 18 17:32:54 2016 +0000 +commit 557f921aad004be15805e09fd9572969eb3d9321 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:33:48 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Remove channel_input_port_forward_request(); the only caller - was the recently-removed SSH1 server code so it's now dead code. ok markus@ + remove SSHv1 support from unit tests - Upstream-ID: 05453983230a1f439562535fec2818f63f297af9 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 395ca2aa48f1f7d23eefff6cb849ea733ca8bbfe -commit 2c6697c443d2c9c908260eed73eb9143223e3ec9 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 18 12:41:22 2016 +0000 +commit e77e1562716fb3da413e4c2397811017b762f5e3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 00:03:18 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Install a signal handler for tty-generated signals and - wait for the ssh child to suspend before suspending sftp. This lets ssh - restore the terminal mode as needed when it is suspended at the password - prompt. OK dtucker@ + fixup setting ciphercontext->plaintext (lost in SSHv1 purge), + though it isn't really used for much anymore. - Upstream-ID: a31c1f42aa3e2985dcc91e46e6a17bd22e372d69 + Upstream-ID: 859b8bce84ff4865b32097db5430349d04b9b747 -commit fd2a8f1033fa2316fff719fd5176968277560158 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Oct 15 19:56:25 2016 +0000 +commit f7849e6c83a4e0f602dea6c834a24091c622d68e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon May 1 09:55:56 2017 +1000 + + remove configure --with-ssh1 + +commit f4a6a88ddb6dba6d2f7bfb9e2c9879fcc9633043 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:29:10 2017 +0000 upstream commit - various formatting fixes, specifically removing Dq; + flense SSHv1 support from ssh-agent, considerably + simplifying it - Upstream-ID: 81e85df2b8e474f5f93d66e61d9a4419ce87347c - -commit 8f866d8a57b9a2dc5dd04504e27f593b551618e3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 19 03:26:09 2016 +1100 - - Import readpassphrase.c rev 1.26. + ok markus - Author: miller@openbsd.org: - Avoid generate SIGTTOU when restoring the terminal mode. If we get - SIGTTOU it means the process is not in the foreground process group - which, in most cases, means that the shell has taken control of the tty. - Requiring the user the fg the process in this case doesn't make sense - and can result in both SIGTSTP and SIGTTOU being sent which can lead to - the process being suspended again immediately after being brought into - the foreground. + Upstream-ID: 71d772cdcefcb29f76e01252e8361e6fc2dfc365 -commit f901440cc844062c9bab0183d133f7ccc58ac3a5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Oct 19 03:23:16 2016 +1100 +commit 930e8d2827853bc2e196c20c3e000263cc87fb75 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:41 2017 +0000 - Import readpassphrase.c rev 1.25. + upstream commit - Wrap so internal calls go direct and - readpassphrase is weak. + obliterate ssh1.h and some dead code that used it - (DEF_WEAK is a no-op in portable.) - -commit 032147b69527e5448a511049b2d43dbcae582624 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Oct 15 05:51:12 2016 +1100 - - Move DEF_WEAK into defines.h. + ok markus@ - As well pull in more recent changes from OpenBSD these will start to - arrive so put it where the definition is shared. + Upstream-ID: 1ca9159a9fb95618f9d51e069ac8e1131a087343 -commit e0259a82ddd950cfb109ddee86fcebbc09c6bd04 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Oct 15 04:34:46 2016 +1100 +commit a3710d5d529a34b8f56aa62db798c70e85d576a0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:12 2017 +0000 - Remove do_pam_set_tty which is dead code. + upstream commit - The callers of do_pam_set_tty were removed in 2008, so this is now dead - code. bz#2604, pointed out by jjelen at redhat.com. - -commit ca04de83f210959ad2ed870a30ba1732c3ae00e3 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Oct 13 18:53:43 2016 +1100 - - unbreak principals-command test + exterminate the -1 flag from scp - Undo inconsistetly updated variable name. + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 26d247f7065da15056b209cef5f594ff591b89db -commit 1723ec92eb485ce06b4cbf49712d21975d873909 +commit aebd0abfaa8a41e75d50f9f7934267b0a2d9acb4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 11 21:49:54 2016 +0000 +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:26:54 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix the KEX fuzzer - the previous method of obtaining the - packet contents was broken. This now uses the new per-packet input hook, so - it sees exact post-decrypt packets and doesn't have to pass packet integrity - checks. ok markus@ + purge the last traces of SSHv1 from the TTY modes + handling code - Upstream-Regress-ID: 402fb6ffabd97de590e8e57b25788949dce8d2fd + ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 963a19f1e06577377c38a3b7ce468f121b966195 -commit 09f997893f109799cddbfce6d7e67f787045cbb2 -Author: natano@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 6 09:31:38 2016 +0000 +commit dfa641f758d4b8b2608ab1b00abaf88df0a8e36a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:26:16 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Move USER out of the way to unbreak the BUILDUSER - mechanism. ok tb + remove the (in)famous SSHv1 CRC compensation attack + detector. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 74ab9687417dd071d62316eaadd20ddad1d5af3c + Despite your cameo in The Matrix movies, you will not be missed. + + ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 44261fce51a56d93cdb2af7b6e184be629f667e0 -commit 3049a012c482a7016f674db168f23fd524edce27 -Author: bluhm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 30 11:55:20 2016 +0000 +commit e5d3bd36ef67d82092861f39b5bf422cb12b31a6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:25:03 2017 +0000 upstream commit - In ssh tests set REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY with ?= so that the - environment can change it. OK djm@ + undo some local debugging stuff that I committed by + accident - Upstream-Regress-ID: 77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b + Upstream-ID: fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 -commit 39af7b444db28c1cb01b7ea468a4f574a44f375b +commit 3d6d09f2e90f4ad650ebda6520bf2da446f37f14 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 11 21:47:45 2016 +0000 +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:23:54 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add a per-packet input hook that is called with the - decrypted packet contents. This will be used for fuzzing; ok markus@ + remove SSHv1 support from packet and buffer APIs - Upstream-ID: a3221cee6b1725dd4ae1dd2c13841b4784cb75dc + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: bfc290053d40b806ecac46317d300677d80e1dc9 -commit ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 10 19:28:48 2016 +0000 +commit 05164358577c82de18ed7373196bc7dbd8a3f79c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:21:54 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been - received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause - allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by - shilei-c at 360.cn + remove SSHv1-related buffers from client code - Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05 + Upstream-ID: dca5d01108f891861ceaf7ba1c0f2eb274e0c7dd -commit 29d40319392e6e19deeca9d45468aa1119846e50 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 13 04:07:20 2016 +1100 +commit 873d3e7d9a4707d0934fb4c4299354418f91b541 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:18:44 2017 +0000 - Import rev 1.24 from OpenBSD. + upstream commit - revision 1.24 - date: 2013/11/24 23:51:29; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; - most obvious unsigned char casts for ctype - ok jca krw ingo - -commit 12069e56221de207ed666c2449dedb431a2a7ca2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 13 04:04:44 2016 +1100 - - Import rev 1.23 from OpenBSD. Fixes bz#2619. + remove KEY_RSA1 - revision 1.23 - date: 2010/05/14 13:30:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +41 -39; - Defer installing signal handlers until echo is disabled so that we - get suspended normally when not the foreground process. Fix potential - infinite loop when restoring terminal settings if process is in the - background when restore occurs. OK miod@ + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 7408517b077c892a86b581e19f82a163069bf133 -commit 7508d83eff89af069760b4cc587305588a64e415 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 13 03:53:51 2016 +1100 +commit 788ac799a6efa40517f2ac0d895a610394298ffc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:18:22 2017 +0000 - If we don't have TCSASOFT, define it to zero. + upstream commit - This makes it a no-op when we use it below, which allows us to re-sync - those lines with the upstream and make future updates easier. + remove SSHv1 configuration options and man pages bits + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 84638c23546c056727b7a7d653c72574e0f19424 -commit aae4dbd4c058d3b1fe1eb5c4e6ddf35827271377 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 7 14:41:52 2016 +0000 +commit e6882463a8ae0594aacb6d6575a6318a41973d84 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:17:37 2017 +0000 upstream commit - tidy up the formatting in this file. more specifically, - replace .Dq, which looks appalling, with .Cm, where appropriate; + remove SSH1 make flag and associated files ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: ff8e90aa0343d9bb56f40a535e148607973cc738 + Upstream-ID: ba9feacc5787337c413db7cf26ea3d53f854cfef -commit a571dbcc7b7b25371174569b13df5159bc4c6c7a +commit cdccebdf85204bf7542b7fcc1aa2ea3f36661833 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 4 21:34:40 2016 +0000 +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:15:04 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add a comment about implicitly-expected checks to - sshkey_ec_validate_public() + remove SSHv1 ciphers; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 74a7f71c28f7c13a50f89fc78e7863b9cd61713f + Upstream-ID: e5ebc5e540d7f23a8c1266db1839794d4d177890 -commit 2f78a2a698f4222f8e05cad57ac6e0c3d1faff00 +commit 97f4d3083b036ce3e68d6346a6140a22123d5864 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 30 20:24:46 2016 +0000 +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:13:25 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix some -Wpointer-sign warnings in the new mux proxy; ok - markus@ + remove compat20/compat13/compat15 variables - Upstream-ID: b1ba7b3769fbc6b7f526792a215b0197f5e55dfd + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 43802c035ceb3fef6c50c400e4ecabf12354691c -commit ca71c36645fc26fcd739a8cfdc702cec85607761 -Author: bluhm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 28 20:09:52 2016 +0000 +commit 99f95ba82673d33215dce17bfa1512b57f54ec09 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:11:45 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add a makefile rule to create the ssh library when - regress needs it. This allows to run the ssh regression tests without doing - a "make build" before. Discussed with dtucker@ and djm@; OK djm@ + remove options.protocol and client Protocol + configuration knob - Upstream-Regress-ID: ce489bd53afcd471225a125b4b94565d4717c025 + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 5a967f5d06e2d004b0235457b6de3a9a314e9366 -commit ce44c970f913d2a047903dba8670554ac42fc479 -Author: bluhm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 26 21:34:38 2016 +0000 +commit 56912dea6ef63dae4eb1194e5d88973a7c6c5740 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:10:43 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Allow to run ssh regression tests as root. If the user - is already root, the test should not expect that SUDO is set. If ssh needs - another user, use sudo or doas to switch from root if necessary. OK dtucker@ + unifdef WITH_SSH1 ok markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: b464e55185ac4303529e3e6927db41683aaeace2 + Upstream-ID: 9716e62a883ef8826c57f4d33b4a81a9cc7755c7 -commit 8d0578478586e283e751ca51e7b0690631da139a -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 30 09:19:13 2016 +0000 +commit d4084cd230f7319056559b00db8b99296dad49d5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 29 06:06:01 2017 +0000 upstream commit - ssh proxy mux mode (-O proxy; idea from Simon Tatham): - mux - client speaks the ssh-packet protocol directly over unix-domain socket. - mux - server acts as a proxy, translates channel IDs and relays to the server. - no - filedescriptor passing necessary. - combined with unix-domain forwarding it's - even possible to run mux client and server on different machines. feedback - & ok djm@ + tweak previous; - Upstream-ID: 666a2fb79f58e5c50e246265fb2b9251e505c25b + Upstream-ID: a3abc6857455299aa42a046d232b7984568bceb9 -commit b7689155f3f5c4999846c07a852b1c7a43b09cec +commit 249516e428e8461b46340a5df5d5ed1fbad2ccce Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 28 21:44:52 2016 +0000 +Date: Sat Apr 29 04:12:25 2017 +0000 upstream commit - put back some pre-auth zlib bits that I shouldn't have - removed - they are still used by the client. Spotted by naddy@ + allow ssh-keygen to include arbitrary string or flag + certificate extensions and critical options. ok markus@ dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 80919468056031037d56a1f5b261c164a6f90dc2 + Upstream-ID: 2cf28dd6c5489eb9fc136e0b667ac3ea10241646 -commit 4577adead6a7d600c8e764619d99477a08192c8f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 28 20:32:42 2016 +0000 +commit 47a287bb6ac936c26b4f3ae63279c02902ded3b9 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 06:15:03 2017 +0000 upstream commit - restore pre-auth compression support in the client -- the - previous commit was intended to remove it from the server only. - - remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped + sort; - adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5) - - pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@ - - Upstream-ID: d23696ed72a228dacd4839dd9f2dec424ba2016b + Upstream-ID: 7e6b56e52b039cf44d0418e9de9aca20a2d2d15a -commit 80d1c963b4dc84ffd11d09617b39c4bffda08956 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 28 17:59:22 2016 +0000 +commit 36465a76a79ad5040800711b41cf5f32249d5120 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:44:28 2017 +1000 - upstream commit - - use a separate TOKENS section, as we've done for - sshd_config(5); help/ok djm + Typo. - Upstream-ID: 640e32b5e4838e4363738cdec955084b3579481d + Upstream-Regress-ID: 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 -commit 1cfd5c06efb121e58e8b6671548fda77ef4b4455 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 29 03:19:23 2016 +1000 +commit 9d18cb7bdeb00b20205fd13d412aae8c0e0457ed +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:41:17 2017 +1000 - Remove portability support for mmap + Add 2 regress commits I applied by hand. - We no longer need to wrap/replace mmap for portability now that - pre-auth compression has been removed from OpenSSH. + Upstream-Regress-ID: 30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c + Upstream-Regress-ID: 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 -commit 0082fba4efdd492f765ed4c53f0d0fbd3bdbdf7f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 28 16:33:06 2016 +0000 +commit 9504ea6b27f9f0ece64e88582ebb9235e664a100 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:33:43 2017 +1000 - upstream commit - - Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing - compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, - but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple - compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. - - Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed - the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the - required attack surface considerably larger. - - Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security - check in the shared memory manager found by Stack - (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ - - NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd - for >10 years. + Merge integrity.sh rev 1.22. - Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf + Merge missing bits from Colin Watson's patch in bz#2658 which make integrity + tests more robust against timeouts. ok djm@ -commit 27c3a9c2aede2184856b5de1e6eca414bb751c38 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 26 21:16:11 2016 +0000 +commit 06ec837a34542627e2183a412d6a9d2236f22140 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:30:03 2017 +1000 - upstream commit - - Avoid a theoretical signed integer overflow should - BN_num_bytes() ever violate its manpage and return a negative value. Improve - order of tests to avoid confusing increasingly pedantic compilers. - - Reported by Guido Vranken from stack (css.csail.mit.edu/stack) - unstable optimisation analyser output. ok deraadt@ - - Upstream-ID: f8508c830c86d8f36c113985e52bf8eedae23505 + Id sync for integrity.sh rev 1.21 which pulls in some shell portability fixes -commit 8663e51c80c6aa3d750c6d3bcff6ee05091922be -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Sep 28 07:40:33 2016 +1000 +commit e0194b471efe7d3daedc9cc66686cb1ab69d3be8 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 17 11:02:31 2017 +0000 - fix mdoc2man.awk formatting for top-level lists + upstream commit - Reported by Glenn Golden - Diagnosis and fix from Ingo Schwarze + Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional + warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle + -Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e48d7dc13e48d9334b8195ef884dfbc51316012f -commit b97739dc21570209ed9d4e7beee0c669ed23b097 +commit 6830be90e71f46bcd182a9202b151eaf2b299434 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 22 21:15:41 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 28 03:24:53 2017 +0000 upstream commit - missing bit from previous commit + include key fingerprint in "Offering public key" debug + message - Upstream-ID: 438d5ed6338b28b46e822eb13eee448aca31df37 + Upstream-ID: 964749f820c2ed4cf6a866268b1a05e907315c52 -commit de6a175a99d22444e10d19ad3fffef39bc3ee3bb -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 22 19:19:01 2016 +0000 +commit 066437187e16dcafcbc19f9402ef0e6575899b1d +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 03:21:12 2017 +0000 upstream commit - organise the token stuff into a separate section; ok - markus for an earlier version of the diff ok/tweaks djm + Avoid relying on implementation-specific behavior when + detecting whether the timestamp or file size overflowed. If time_t and off_t + are not either 32-bit or 64-bit scp will exit with an error. OK djm@ - Upstream-ID: 81a6daa506a4a5af985fce7cf9e59699156527c8 + Upstream-ID: f31caae73ddab6df496b7bbbf7da431e267ad135 -commit 16277fc45ffc95e4ffc3d45971ff8320b974de2b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 22 17:55:13 2016 +0000 +commit 68d3a2a059183ebd83b15e54984ffaced04d2742 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 03:20:27 2017 +0000 upstream commit - mention curve25519-sha256 KEX + Add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the + equivalent option in sshd(8). bz#2705, patch from erahn at arista.com, ok + djm@ - Upstream-ID: 33ae1f433ce4795ffa6203761fbdf86e0d7ffbaf + Upstream-ID: d5115c2c0193ceb056ed857813b2a7222abda9ed -commit 0493766d5676c7ca358824ea8d3c90f6047953df -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 22 17:52:53 2016 +0000 +commit e13aad66e73a14b062d13aee4e98f1e21a3f6a14 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 27 13:40:05 2017 +0000 upstream commit - support plain curve25519-sha256 KEX algorithm now that it - is approaching standardisation (same algorithm is currently supported as - curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) + remove a static array unused since rev 1.306 spotted by + clang ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 5e2b6db2e72667048cf426da43c0ee3fc777baa2 + Upstream-ID: 249b3eed2446f6074ba2219ccc46919dd235a7b8 -commit f31c654b30a6f02ce0b8ea8ab81791b675489628 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 22 02:29:57 2016 +0000 +commit 91bd2181866659f00714903e78e1c3edd4c45f3d +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 27 11:53:12 2017 +0000 upstream commit - If ssh receives a PACKET_DISCONNECT during userauth it - will cause ssh_dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, ...) to return without the - session being authenticated. Check for this and exit if necessary. ok djm@ + Avoid potential signed int overflow when parsing the file + size. Use strtoul() instead of parsing manually. OK djm@ - Upstream-ID: b3afe126c0839d2eae6cddd41ff2ba317eda0903 + Upstream-ID: 1f82640861c7d905bbb05e7d935d46b0419ced02 -commit 1622649b7a829fc8dc313042a43a974f0f3e8a99 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 19:53:12 2016 +0000 +commit 17a54a03f5a1d35e33cc24e22cd7a9d0f6865dc4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 25 08:32:27 2017 +1000 - upstream commit + Fix typo in "socketcall". - correctly return errors from kex_send_ext_info(). Fix from - Sami Farin via https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/50 - - Upstream-ID: c85999af28aaecbf92cfa2283381df81e839b42c + Pointed out by jjelen at redhat.com. -commit f83a0cfe16c7a73627b46a9a94e40087d60f32fb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 17:44:20 2016 +0000 +commit 8b0eee148f7cf8b248c30d1bae57300f2cc5aafd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 24 19:40:31 2017 +1000 - upstream commit + Deny socketcall in seccomp filter on ppc64le. - cast uint64_t for printf + OpenSSL is using socket() calls (in FIPS mode) when handling ECDSA keys + in privsep child. The socket() syscall is already denied in the seccomp + filter, but in ppc64le kernel, it is implemented using socketcall() + syscall, which is not denied yet (only SYS_SHUTDOWN is allowed) and + therefore fails hard. - Upstream-ID: 76d23e89419ccbd2320f92792a6d878211666ac1 + Patch from jjelen at redhat.com. -commit 5f63ab474f58834feca4f35c498be03b7dd38a16 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 17:03:54 2016 +0000 +commit f8500b2be599053daa05248a86a743232ec6a536 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 17 14:31:23 2017 +0000 upstream commit - disable tests for affirmative negated match after backout of - match change + Recognize nl_langinfo(CODESET) return values "646" and "" + as aliases for "US-ASCII", useful for different versions of NetBSD and + Solaris. Found by dtucker@ and by Tom G. Christensen . OK dtucker@ deraadt@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: acebb8e5042f03d66d86a50405c46c4de0badcfd + Upstream-ID: 38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 -commit a5ad3a9db5a48f350f257a67b62fafd719ecb7e0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 16:55:42 2016 +0000 +commit 7480dfedf8c5c93baaabef444b3def9331e86ad5 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 17 11:02:31 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Revert two recent changes to negated address matching. The - new behaviour offers unintuitive surprises. We'll find a better way to deal - with single negated matches. - - match.c 1.31: - > fix matching for pattern lists that contain a single negated match, - > e.g. "Host !example" - > - > report and patch from Robin Becker. bz#1918 ok dtucker@ - - addrmatch.c 1.11: - > fix negated address matching where the address list consists of a - > single negated match, e.g. "Match addr !192.20.0.1" - > - > Report and patch from Jakub Jelen. bz#2397 ok dtucker@ + Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional + warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle + -Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition. - Upstream-ID: ec96c770f0f5b9a54e5e72fda25387545e9c80c6 + Upstream-ID: 5cbe348aa76dc1adf55be6c0e388fafaa945439a -commit 119b7a2ca0ef2bf3f81897ae10301b8ca8cba844 +commit 4d827f0d75a53d3952288ab882efbddea7ffadfe Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 01:35:12 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Apr 4 00:24:56 2017 +0000 upstream commit - test all the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand % expansions + disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; + reported by Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 0a79a84dfaa59f958e46b474c3db780b454d30e3 + Upstream-ID: 5d9c8f2fa8511d4ecf95322994ffe73e9283899b -commit bfa9d969ab6235d4938ce069d4db7e5825c56a19 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 21 01:34:45 2016 +0000 +commit ef47843af0a904a21c920e619c5aec97b65dd9ac +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 26 00:18:52 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add a way for principals command to get see key ID and serial - too + incorrect renditions of this quote bother me - Upstream-ID: 0d30978bdcf7e8eaeee4eea1b030eb2eb1823fcb + Upstream-ID: 1662be3ebb7a71d543da088119c31d4d463a9e49 -commit 920585b826af1c639e4ed78b2eba01fd2337b127 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 16 06:09:31 2016 +0000 +commit d9048861bea842c4eba9c2dbbf97064cc2a5ef02 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 31 11:04:43 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - add a note on kexfuzz' limitations + Check for and use gcc's -pipe. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 03804d4a0dbc5163e1a285a4c8cc0a76a4e864ec + Speeds up configure and build by a couple of percent. ok djm@ -commit 0445ff184080b196e12321998b4ce80b0f33f8d1 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 16 01:01:41 2016 +0000 +commit 282cad2240c4fbc104c2f2df86d688192cbbe4bb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 16:34:44 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix for newer modp DH groups - (diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 etc) + Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.16 from OpenBSD. - Upstream-Regress-ID: fe942c669959462b507516ae1634fde0725f1c68 + Fix overly-conservative overflow checks on mulitplications and add checks + on additions. This allows scan_scaled to work up to +/-LLONG_MAX (LLONG_MIN + will still be flagged as a range error). ok millert@ -commit 28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 19:02:19 2016 +0000 +commit c73a229e4edf98920f395e19fd310684fc6bb951 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 16:34:02 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - move inbound NEWKEYS handling to kex layer; otherwise - early NEWKEYS causes NULL deref; found by Robert Swiecki/honggfuzz; fixed - with & ok djm@ + Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.15 from OpenBSD. - Upstream-ID: 9a68b882892e9f51dc7bfa9f5a423858af358b2f + Collapse underflow and overflow checks into a single block. + ok djm@ millert@ -commit 492710894acfcc2f173d14d1d45bd2e688df605d -Author: natano@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 19 07:52:42 2016 +0000 +commit d427b73bf5a564f663d16546dbcbd84ba8b9d4af +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 16:32:57 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - Replace two more arc4random() loops with - arc4random_buf(). + Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.14 from OpenBSD. - tweaks and ok dtucker - ok deraadt - - Upstream-ID: 738d3229130ccc7eac975c190276ca6fcf0208e4 + Catch integer underflow in scan_scaled reported by Nicolas Iooss. + ok deraadt@ djm@ -commit 1036356324fecc13099ac6e986b549f6219327d7 -Author: tedu@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Sep 17 18:00:27 2016 +0000 +commit d13281f2964abc5f2e535e1613c77fc61b0c53e7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 12:39:39 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - replace two arc4random loops with arc4random_buf ok - deraadt natano + Don't check privsep user or path when unprivileged - Upstream-ID: e18ede972d1737df54b49f011fa4f3917a403f48 + If running with privsep (mandatory now) as a non-privileged user, we + don't chroot or change to an unprivileged user however we still checked + the existence of the user and directory. Don't do those checks if we're + not going to use them. Based in part on a patch from Lionel Fourquaux + via Corinna Vinschen, ok djm@ -commit 00df97ff68a49a756d4b977cd02283690f5dfa34 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 14 20:11:26 2016 +0000 +commit f2742a481fe151e493765a3fbdef200df2ea7037 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 10:50:31 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - take fingerprint of correct key for - AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + Remove SHA256 EVP wrapper implementation. - Upstream-ID: 553581a549cd6a3e73ce9f57559a325cc2cb1f38 + All supported versions of OpenSSL should now have SHA256 so remove our + EVP wrapper implementaion. ok djm@ -commit e7907c1cb938b96dd33d27c2fea72c4e08c6b2f6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 14 05:42:25 2016 +0000 +commit 5346f271fc76549caf4a8e65b5fba319be422fe9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 10:23:58 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match those - supported for AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, fingerprint, etc) and a - few more to provide access to the certificate's CA key; 'looks ok' dtucker@ + Remove check for OpenSSL < 0.9.8g. - Upstream-ID: 6b00fd446dbebe67f4e4e146d2e492d650ae04eb + We no longer support OpenSSL < 1.0.1 so remove check for unreliable ECC + in OpenSSL < 0.9.8g. -commit 2b939c272a81c4d0c47badeedbcb2ba7c128ccda -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 14 00:45:31 2016 +0000 +commit 8fed0a5fe7b4e78a6810b133d8e91be9742ee0a1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 10:16:15 2017 +1100 - upstream commit + Remove compat code for OpenSSL < 0.9.7. - Improve test coverage of ssh-keygen -T a bit. + Resyncs that code with OpenBSD upstream. + +commit 608ec1f62ff22fdccc3952e51463d79c43cbd0d3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 09:50:54 2017 +1100 + + Remove SSHv1 code path. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8851668c721bcc2b400600cfc5a87644cc024e72 + Server-side support for Protocol 1 has been removed so remove !compat20 + PAM code path. -commit 44d82fc83be6c5ccd70881c2dac1a73e5050398b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 12 02:25:46 2016 +0000 +commit 7af27bf538cbc493d609753f9a6d43168d438f1b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 24 09:44:56 2017 +1100 - upstream commit + Enable ldns when using ldns-config. - Add testcase for ssh-keygen -j, -J and -K options for - moduli screening. Does not currently test generation as that is extremely - slow. + Actually enable ldns when attempting to use ldns-config. bz#2697, patch + from fredrik at fornwall.net. + +commit 58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Mar 22 12:43:02 2017 +1100 + + Missing header on Linux/s390 - Upstream-Regress-ID: 9de6ce801377ed3ce0a63a1413f1cd5fd3c2d062 + Patch from Jakub Jelen -commit 44e5f756d286bc3a1a5272ea484ee276ba3ac5c2 +commit 096fb65084593f9f3c1fc91b6d9052759a272a00 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 23 08:17:04 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Mar 20 22:08:06 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add tests for addr_match_list() + remove /usr/bin/time calls around tests, makes diffing test + runs harder. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger - Upstream-Regress-ID: fae2d1fef84687ece584738a924c7bf969616c8e + Upstream-Regress-ID: 81c1083b14dcf473b23d2817882f40b346ebc95c -commit 445e218878035b59c704c18406e8aeaff4c8aa25 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 12 23:39:34 2016 +0000 +commit 6b853c6f8ba5eecc50f3b57af8e63f8184eb0fa6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 21 08:47:55 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - handle certs in rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(), saving an - unnecessary special case elsewhere. + Fix syntax error on Linux/X32 - Upstream-ID: 901cb081c59d6d2698b57901c427f3f6dc7397d4 + Patch from Mike Frysinger -commit 130f5df4fa37cace8c079dccb690e5cafbf00751 +commit d38f05dbdd291212bc95ea80648b72b7177e9f4e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 20 13:38:27 2017 +1100 + + Add llabs() implementation. + +commit 72536316a219b7394996a74691a5d4ec197480f7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 12:23:04 2017 +1100 + + crank version numbers + +commit 3be52bc36bdfd24ded7e0f46999e7db520fb4e3f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 12 23:31:27 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Mar 20 01:18:59 2017 +0000 upstream commit - list all supported signature algorithms in the - server-sig-algs Reported by mb AT smartftp.com in bz#2547 and (independantly) - Ron Frederick; ok markus@ + openssh-7.5 - Upstream-ID: ddf702d721f54646b11ef2cee6d916666cb685cd - -commit 8f750ccfc07acb8aa98be5a5dd935033a6468cfd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 12 14:43:58 2016 +1000 - - Remove no-op brackets to resync with upstream. + Upstream-ID: b8b9a4a949427c393cd868215e1724ceb3467ee5 -commit 7050896e7395866278c19c2ff080c26152619d1d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 12 13:57:28 2016 +1000 +commit db84e52fe9cfad57f22e7e23c5fbf00092385129 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 12:07:20 2017 +1100 - Resync ssh-keygen -W error message with upstream. + I'm a doofus. + + Unbreak obvious syntax error. -commit 43cceff82cc20413cce58ba3375e19684e62cec4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 12 13:55:37 2016 +1000 +commit 89f04852db27643717c9c3a2b0dde97ae50099ee +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 11:53:34 2017 +1100 - Move ssh-keygen -W handling code to match upstream + on Cygwin, check paths from server for backslashes + + Pointed out by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero -commit af48d541360b1d7737b35740a4b1ca34e1652cd9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 12 13:52:17 2016 +1000 +commit 7ef1f9bafc2cc8d97ff2fbd4f280002b6e8ea5d9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 11:48:34 2017 +1100 - Move ssh-keygen -T handling code to match upstream. + Yet another synonym for ASCII: "646" + + Used by NetBSD; this unbreaks mprintf() and friends there for the C + locale (caught by dtucker@ and his menagerie of test systems). -commit d8c3cfbb018825c6c86547165ddaf11924901c49 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 12 13:30:50 2016 +1000 +commit 9165abfea3f68a0c684a6ed2e575e59bc31a3a6b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 09:58:34 2017 +1100 - Move -M handling code to match upstream. + create test mux socket in /tmp + + Creating the socket in $OBJ could blow past the (quite limited) + path limit for Unix domain sockets. As a bandaid for bz#2660, + reported by Colin Watson; ok dtucker@ -commit 7b63cf6dbbfa841c003de57d1061acbf2ff22364 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 12 03:29:16 2016 +0000 +commit 2adbe1e63bc313d03e8e84e652cc623af8ebb163 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 07:07:39 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Spaces->tabs. + disallow KEXINIT before NEWKEYS; ok djm; report by + vegard.nossum at oracle.com - Upstream-ID: f4829dfc3f36318273f6082b379ac562eead70b7 + Upstream-ID: 3668852d1f145050e62f1da08917de34cb0c5234 -commit 11e5e644536821ceb3bb4dd8487fbf0588522887 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 12 03:25:20 2016 +0000 +commit 2fbf91684d76d38b9cf06550b69c9e41bca5a71c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 16 14:05:46 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - Style whitespace fix. Also happens to remove a no-op - diff with portable. - - Upstream-ID: 45d90f9a62ad56340913a433a9453eb30ceb8bf3 + Include includes.h for compat bits. -commit 9136ec134c97a8aff2917760c03134f52945ff3c -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 12 01:22:38 2016 +0000 +commit b55f634e96b9c5b0cd991e23a9ca181bec4bdbad +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 16 13:45:17 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - Add MAXIMUM(), MINIMUM(), and ROUNDUP() to misc.h, then - use those definitions rather than pulling and unknown namespace - pollution. ok djm markus dtucker - - Upstream-ID: 712cafa816c9f012a61628b66b9fbd5687223fb8 + Wrap stdint.h in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H -commit f219fc8f03caca7ac82a38ed74bbd6432a1195e7 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 7 18:39:24 2016 +0000 +commit 55a1117d7342a0bf8b793250cf314bab6b482b99 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Mar 16 11:22:42 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - sort; from matthew martin + Adapt Cygwin config script to privsep knob removal - Upstream-ID: 73cec7f7ecc82d37a4adffad7745e4684de67ce7 + Patch from Corinna Vinschen. -commit 06ce56b05def9460aecc7cdb40e861a346214793 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 6 09:22:56 2016 +0000 +commit 1a321bfdb91defe3c4d9cca5651724ae167e5436 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 03:52:30 2017 +0000 upstream commit - ssh_set_newkeys: print correct block counters on - rekeying; ok djm@ + accidents happen to the best of us; ok djm - Upstream-ID: 32bb7a9cb9919ff5bab28d50ecef3a2b2045dd1e + Upstream-ID: b7a9dbd71011ffde95e06f6945fe7197dedd1604 -commit e5e8d9114ac6837a038f4952994ca95a97fafe8d -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 6 09:14:05 2016 +0000 +commit 25f837646be8c2017c914d34be71ca435dfc0e07 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 02:25:09 2017 +0000 upstream commit - update ext_info_c every time we receive a kexinit msg; - fixes sending of ext_info if privsep is disabled; report Aris Adamantiadis & - Mancha; ok djm@ + fix regression in 7.4: deletion of PKCS#11-hosted keys + would fail unless they were specified by full physical pathname. Report and + fix from Jakub Jelen via bz#2682; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 2ceaa1076e19dbd3542254b4fb8e42d608f28856 + Upstream-ID: 5b5bc20ca11cacb5d5eb29c3f93fd18425552268 -commit da95318dbedbaa1335323dba370975c2f251afd8 +commit a8c5eeacf032a7d3408957e45dd7603cc1baf55f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 5 14:02:42 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Mar 15 02:19:09 2017 +0000 upstream commit - remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal; - 64-bit block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until - attacks like sweet32 are extended to SSH. - - As 3des-cbc was the only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may - cause problems connecting to older devices using the defaults, but - it's highly likely that such devices already need explicit - configuration for KEX and hostkeys anyway. - - ok deraadt, markus, dtucker + Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can + only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by + Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker - Upstream-ID: a505dfe65c6733af0f751b64cbc4bb7e0761bc2f + Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7 -commit b33ad6d997d36edfea65e243cd12ccd01f413549 +commit 66705948c0639a7061a0d0753266da7685badfec Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 5 13:57:31 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Mar 14 07:19:07 2017 +0000 upstream commit - enforce expected request flow for GSSAPI calls; thanks to - Jakub Jelen for testing; ok markus@ + Mark the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option as + deprecated, effectively making privsep mandatory in sandboxing mode. ok + markus@ deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: d4bc0e70e1be403735d3d9d7e176309b1fd626b9 + (note: this doesn't remove the !privsep code paths, though that will + happen eventually). + + Upstream-ID: b4c52666256c4dd865f8ce9431af5d6ce2d74a0a -commit 0bb2980260fb24e5e0b51adac471395781b66261 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 12 11:07:00 2016 +1000 +commit f86586b03fe6cd8f595289bde200a94bc2c191af +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 18:26:29 2017 +1100 - Restore ssh-keygen's -J and -j option handling. + Make seccomp-bpf sandbox work on Linux/X32 - These were incorrectly removed in the 1d9a2e28 sync commit. + Allow clock_gettime syscall with X32 bit masked off. Apparently + this is required for at least some kernel versions. bz#2142 + Patch mostly by Colin Watson. ok dtucker@ -commit 775f8a23f2353f5869003c57a213d14b28e0736e +commit 2429cf78dd2a9741ce27ba25ac41c535274a0af6 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Aug 31 10:48:07 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Mar 14 18:01:52 2017 +1100 - tighten PAM monitor calls - - only allow kbd-interactive ones when that authentication method is - enabled. Prompted by Solar Designer + require OpenSSL >=1.0.1 -commit 7fd0ea8a1db4bcfb3d8cd9df149e5d571ebea1f4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 30 07:50:21 2016 +0000 +commit e3ea335abeab731c68f2b2141bee85a4b0bf680f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 17:48:43 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - restrict monitor auth calls to be allowed only when their - respective authentication methods are enabled in the configuration. + Remove macro trickery; no binary change - prompted by Solar Designer; ok markus dtucker + This stops the SC_ALLOW(), SC_ALLOW_ARG() and SC_DENY() macros + prepending __NR_ to the syscall number parameter and just makes + them explicit in the macro invocations. - Upstream-ID: 6eb3f89332b3546d41d6dbf5a8e6ff920142b553 + No binary change in stripped object file before/after. -commit b38b95f5bcc52278feb839afda2987933f68ff96 +commit 5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Aug 29 11:47:07 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Mar 14 13:15:18 2017 +1100 - Tighten monitor state-machine flow for PAM calls + support ioctls for ICA crypto card on Linux/s390 - (attack surface reduction) + Based on patch from Eduardo Barretto; ok dtucker@ -commit dc664d1bd0fc91b24406a3e9575b81c285b8342b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 28 22:28:12 2016 +0000 +commit b1b22dd0df2668b322dda174e501dccba2cf5c44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 14 14:19:36 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call; harmless - on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin. Reported by James Slepicka ok - deraadt@ - - Upstream-ID: 1987ccee508ba5b18f016c85100d7ac3f70ff965 + Plumb conversion test into makefile. -commit 5bcc1e2769f7d6927d41daf0719a9446ceab8dd7 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 27 04:05:12 2016 +0000 +commit f57783f1ddfb4cdfbd612c6beb5ec01cb5b9a6b9 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 01:20:29 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Pull in for struct timeval - - ok deraadt@ + Add unit test for convtime(). - Upstream-ID: ae34525485a173bccd61ac8eefeb91c57e3b7df6 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8717bc0ca4c21120f6dd3a1d3b7a363f707c31e1 -commit fa4a4c96b19127dc2fd4e92f20d99c0c7f34b538 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 27 04:04:56 2016 +0000 +commit 8884b7247d094cd11ff9e39c325ba928c5bdbc6c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 01:10:07 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Pull in for NULL - - ok deraadt@ + Add ASSERT_LONG_* helpers. - Upstream-ID: 7baa6a0f1e049bb3682522b4b95a26c866bfc043 + Upstream-Regress-ID: fe15beaea8f5063c7f21b0660c722648e3d76431 -commit ae363d74ccc1451185c0c8bd4631e28c67c7fd36 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 25 23:57:54 2016 +0000 +commit c6774d21185220c0ba11e8fd204bf0ad1a432071 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 00:55:37 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add a sIgnore opcode that silently ignores options and - use it to suppress noisy deprecation warnings for the Protocol directive. - - req henning, ok markus + Fix convtime() overflow test on boundary condition, + spotted by & ok djm. - Upstream-ID: 9fe040aca3d6ff393f6f7e60045cdd821dc4cbe0 + Upstream-ID: 51f14c507ea87a3022e63f574100613ab2ba5708 -commit a94c60306643ae904add6e8ed219e4be3494255c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 25 23:56:51 2016 +0000 +commit f5746b40cfe6d767c8e128fe50c43274b31cd594 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 00:25:03 2017 +0000 upstream commit - remove superfluous NOTREACHED comment + Check for integer overflow when parsing times in + convtime(). Reported by nicolas.iooss at m4x.org, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: a7485c1f1be618e8c9e38fd9be46c13b2d03b90c + Upstream-ID: 35e6a4e98f6fa24df50bfb8ba1307cf70e966f13 -commit fc041c47144ce28cf71353124a8a5d183cd6a251 -Author: otto@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 23 16:21:45 2016 +0000 +commit f5907982f42a8d88a430b8a46752cbb7859ba979 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 14 13:38:15 2017 +1100 - upstream commit + Add a "unit" target to run only unit tests. + +commit 9e96b41682aed793fadbea5ccd472f862179fb02 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 12:24:47 2017 +1100 + + Fix weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection - fix previous, a condition was modified incorrectly; ok - markus@ deraadt@ + Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct + seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not + even those correctly for BE systems. - Upstream-ID: c443e339768e7ed396dff3bb55f693e7d3641453 + Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the + socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems + impossible. + + ok dtucker -commit 23555eb13a9b0550371a16dcf8beaab7a5806a64 +commit 8ff3fc3f2f7c13e8968717bc2b895ee32c441275 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 23 08:17:42 2016 +0000 +Date: Sat Mar 11 23:44:16 2017 +0000 upstream commit - downgrade an error() to a debug2() to match similar cases - in addr_match_list() + regress tests for loading certificates without public keys; + bz#2617 based on patch from Adam Eijdenberg; ok markus@ dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 07c3d53e357214153d9d08f234411e0d1a3d6f5c + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0145d19328ed995b73fe2d9da33596b17429d0d0 -commit a39627134f6d90e7009eeb14e9582ecbc7a99192 +commit 1e24552716194db8f2f620587b876158a9ef56ad Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 23 06:36:23 2016 +0000 +Date: Sat Mar 11 23:40:26 2017 +0000 upstream commit - remove Protocol directive from client/server configs that - causes spammy deprecation warnings - - hardcode SSH_PROTOCOLS=2, since that's all we support on the server - now (the client still may support both, so it could get confused) + allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private + key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch + from Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: c16662c631af51633f9fd06aca552a70535de181 + Upstream-ID: 295668dca2c39505281577217583ddd2bd4b00b9 -commit 6ee4f1c01ee31e65245881d49d4bccf014956066 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 23 16:33:48 2016 +1000 +commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000 - hook match and utf8 unittests up to Makefile + upstream commit + + Don't count the initial block twice when computing how + many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode. + ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL + + Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2 -commit 114efe2bc0dd2842d997940a833f115e6fc04854 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 19 06:44:13 2016 +0000 +commit ef653dd5bd5777132d9f9ee356225f9ee3379504 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 07:18:32 2017 +0000 upstream commit - add tests for matching functions + krl.c - Upstream-Regress-ID: 0869d4f5c5d627c583c6a929d69c17d5dd65882c + Upstream-ID: fc5e695d5d107d730182e2da7b23f00b489e0ee1 -commit 857568d2ac81c14bcfd625b27536c1e28c992b3c +commit d94c1dfef2ea30ca67b1204ada7c3b537c54f4d0 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 23 14:32:37 2016 +1000 +Date: Sun Mar 12 10:48:14 2017 +1100 - removing UseLogin bits from configure.ac + sync fmt_scaled.c with OpenBSD + + revision 1.13 + date: 2017/03/11 23:37:23; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +14 -1; commitid: jnFKyHkB3CEiEZ2R; + fix signed integer overflow in scan_scaled. Found by Nicolas Iooss + using AFL against ssh_config. ok deraadt@ millert@ + ---------------------------- + revision 1.12 + date: 2013/11/29 19:00:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +6 -5; + fairly simple unsigned char casts for ctype + ok krw + ---------------------------- + revision 1.11 + date: 2012/11/12 14:07:20; author: halex; state: Exp; lines: +4 -2; + make scan_scaled set errno to EINVAL rather than ERANGE if it encounters + an invalid multiplier, like the man page says it should + + "looks sensible" deraadt@, ok ian@ + ---------------------------- + revision 1.10 + date: 2009/06/20 15:00:04; author: martynas; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; + use llabs instead of the home-grown version; and some comment changes + ok ian@, millert@ + ---------------------------- -commit cc182d01cef8ca35a1d25ea9bf4e2ff72e588208 +commit 894221a63fa061e52e414ca58d47edc5fe645968 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 23 03:24:10 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 10 05:01:13 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix negated address matching where the address list - consists of a single negated match, e.g. "Match addr !192.20.0.1" - - Report and patch from Jakub Jelen. bz#2397 ok dtucker@ + When updating hostkeys, accept RSA keys if + HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA keytype. Previously, ssh could ignore RSA + keys when any of the ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods was enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms + nit ssh-rsa (SHA1 signatures) was not. bz#2650 reported by Luis Ressel; ok + dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 01dcac3f3e6ca47518cf293e31c73597a4bb40d8 + Upstream-ID: c5e8cfee15c42f4a05d126158a0766ea06da79d2 -commit 4067ec8a4c64ccf16250c35ff577b4422767da64 +commit dd3e2298663f4cc1a06bc69582d00dcfee27d73c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 23 03:22:49 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix matching for pattern lists that contain a single - negated match, e.g. "Host !example" - - report and patch from Robin Becker. bz#1918 ok dtucker@ + make hostname matching really insensitive to case; + bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 05a0cb323ea4bc20e98db099b42c067bfb9ea1ea + Upstream-ID: e467622ff154269e36ba8b6c9e3d105e1c4a9253 -commit 83b581862a1dbb06fc859959f829dde2654aef3c +commit 77a9be9446697fe8b5499fe651f4a82a71a4b51f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 19 03:18:06 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000 upstream commit - remove UseLogin option and support for having /bin/login - manage login sessions; ok deraadt markus dtucker + reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns - Upstream-ID: bea7213fbf158efab7e602d9d844fba4837d2712 + Upstream-ID: 4ef509a66b96c7314bbcc87027c2af71fa9d0ba4 -commit ffe6549c2f7a999cc5264b873a60322e91862581 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 15 12:32:04 2016 +0000 +commit 61b8ef6a66efaec07e023342cb94a10bdc2254dc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:27:32 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Catch up with the SSH1 code removal and delete all - mention of protocol 1 particularities, key files and formats, command line - options, and configuration keywords from the server documentation and - examples. ok jmc@ + better match sshd config parser behaviour: fatal() if + line is overlong, increase line buffer to match sshd's; bz#2651 reported by + Don Fong; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 850328854675b4b6a0d4a90f0b4a9dd9ca4e905f + Upstream-ID: b175ae7e0ba403833f1ee566edf10f67443ccd18 -commit c38ea634893a1975dbbec798fb968c9488013f4a -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 15 12:27:56 2016 +0000 +commit db2597207e69912f2592cd86a1de8e948a9d7ffb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:26:06 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Remove more SSH1 server code: * Drop sshd's -k option. * - Retire configuration keywords that only apply to protocol 1, as well as the - "protocol" keyword. * Remove some related vestiges of protocol 1 support. - - ok markus@ + ensure hostname is lower-case before hashing it; + bz#2591 reported by Griff Miller II; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 9402f82886de917779db12f8ee3f03d4decc244d - -commit 33ba55d9e358c07f069e579bfab80eccaaad52cb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 16:26:04 2016 +1000 - - Only check for prctl once. + Upstream-ID: c3b8b93804f376bd00d859b8bcd9fc0d86b4db17 -commit 976ba8a8fd66a969bf658280c1e5adf694cc2fc6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 15:33:10 2016 +1000 +commit df9936936c695f85c1038bd706d62edf752aca4b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000 - Fix typo. + upstream commit + + make hostname matching really insensitive to case; + bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: e632b7a9bf0d0558d5ff56dab98b7cca6c3db549 -commit 9abf84c25ff4448891edcde60533a6e7b2870de1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 14:25:43 2016 +1000 +commit 67eed24bfa7645d88fa0b883745fccb22a0e527e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:11:00 2017 +0000 - Correct LDFLAGS for clang example. + upstream commit - --with-ldflags isn't used until after the -ftrapv test, so mention - LDFLAGS instead for now. + Remove old null check from config dumper. Patch from + jjelen at redhat.com vi bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 824ab71467b78c4bab0dd1b3a38e8bc5f63dd528 -commit 1e8013a17ff11e3c6bd0012fb1fc8d5f1330eb21 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 14:08:42 2016 +1000 +commit 183ba55aaaecca0206184b854ad6155df237adbe +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:07:20 2017 +0000 - Remove obsolete CVS $Id from source files. + upstream commit - Since -portable switched to git the CVS $Id tags are no longer being - updated and are becoming increasingly misleading. Remove them. + fix regression in 7.4 server-sig-algs, where we were + accidentally excluding SHA2 RSA signature methods. bz#2680, patch from Nuno + Goncalves; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 81ac8bfb30960447740b9b8f6a214dcf322f12e8 -commit adab758242121181700e48b4f6c60d6b660411fe -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 13:40:58 2016 +1000 +commit 66be4fe8c4435af5bbc82998501a142a831f1181 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:53:11 2017 +0000 - Remove now-obsolete CVS $Id tags from text files. + upstream commit - Since -portable switched to git, the CVS $Id tags are no longer being - updated and are becoming increasingly misleading. Remove them. - -commit 560c0068541315002ec4c1c00a560bbd30f2d671 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 13:38:30 2016 +1000 - - Add a section for compiler specifics. + Check for NULL return value from key_new. Patch from + jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ - Add a section for compiler specifics and document the runtime requirements - for clang's integer sanitization. + Upstream-ID: 059e33cd43cba88dc8caf0b1936fd4dd88fd5b8e -commit a8fc0f42e1eda2fa3393d1ea5e61322d5e07a9cd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Aug 17 13:35:43 2016 +1000 +commit ec2892b5c7fea199914cb3a6afb3af38f84990bf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000 - Test multiplying two long long ints. + upstream commit - When using clang with -ftrapv or -sanitize=integer the tests would pass - but linking would fail with "undefined reference to __mulodi4". - Explicitly test for this before enabling -trapv. + reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns + + Upstream-ID: b4b48b4487c0821d16e812c40c9b09f03b28e349 -commit a1cc637e7e11778eb727559634a6ef1c19c619f6 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 16 14:47:34 2016 +1000 +commit 7fadbb6da3f4122de689165651eb39985e1cba85 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:48:57 2017 +0000 - add a --with-login-program configure argument + upstream commit - Saves messing around with LOGIN_PROGRAM env var, which come - packaging environments make hard to do during configure phase. + Check for NULL argument to sshkey_read. Patch from + jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c2d00c2ea50c4861d271d0a586f925cc64a87e0e -commit 8bd81e1596ab1bab355146cb65e82fb96ade3b23 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 16 13:30:56 2016 +1000 +commit 5a06b9e019e2b0b0f65a223422935b66f3749de3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:45:40 2017 +0000 - add --with-pam-service to specify PAM service name + upstream commit - Saves messing around with CFLAGS to do it. + Plug some mem leaks mostly on error paths. From jjelen + at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 3fb030149598957a51b7c8beb32bf92cf30c96f2 -commit 74433a19bb6f4cef607680fa4d1d7d81ca3826aa -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 16 13:28:23 2016 +1000 +commit f6edbe9febff8121f26835996b1229b5064d31b7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:24:48 2017 +0000 - fix false positives when compiled with msan + upstream commit - Our explicit_bzero successfully confused clang -fsanitize-memory - in to thinking that memset is never called to initialise memory. - Ensure that it is called in a way that the compiler recognises. + Plug mem leak on GLOB_NOMATCH case. From jjelen at + redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8016a7ae97719d3aa55fb723fc2ad3200058340d -commit 6cb6dcffe1a2204ba9006de20f73255c268fcb6b -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Aug 13 17:47:40 2016 +0000 +commit 566b3a46e89a2fda2db46f04f2639e92da64a120 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:22:40 2017 +0000 upstream commit - remove ssh1 server code; ok djm@ + Plug descriptor leaks of auth_sock. From jjelen at + redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: c24c0c32c49b91740d5a94ae914fb1898ea5f534 + Upstream-ID: 248acb99a5ed2fdca37d1aa33c0fcee7be286d88 -commit 42d47adc5ad1187f22c726cbc52e71d6b1767ca2 -Author: jca@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 12 19:19:04 2016 +0000 +commit 8a2834454c73dfc1eb96453c0e97690595f3f4c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:18:24 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet for - configuration examples. + correctly hash hosts with a port number. Reported by Josh + Powers in bz#2692; ok dtucker@ - This makes the IPv6 example consistent with IPv4, and removes a dubious - mention of a 6bone subnet. + Upstream-ID: 468e357ff143e00acc05bdd2803a696b3d4b6442 + +commit 9747b9c742de409633d4753bf1a752cbd211e2d3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:15:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit - ok sthen@ millert@ + don't truncate off \r\n from long stderr lines; bz#2688, + reported by Brian Dyson; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: b027f3d0e0073419a132fd1bf002e8089b233634 + Upstream-ID: cdfdc4ba90639af807397ce996153c88af046ca4 -commit b61f53c0c3b43c28e013d3b3696d64d1c0204821 +commit 4a4b75adac862029a1064577eb5af299b1580cdd Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 11 01:42:11 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 10 02:59:51 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Update moduli file. + Validate digest arg in ssh_digest_final; from jjelen at + redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 + Upstream-ID: dbe5494dfddfe523fab341a3dab5a79e7338f878 -commit f217d9bd42d306f69f56335231036b44502d8191 +commit bee0167be2340d8de4bdc1ab1064ec957c85a447 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Aug 11 11:42:48 2016 +1000 +Date: Fri Mar 10 13:40:18 2017 +1100 - Import updated moduli. + Check for NULL from malloc. + + Part of bz#2687, from jjelen at redhat.com. -commit 67dca60fbb4923b7a11c1645b90a5ca57c03d8be -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Aug 8 22:40:57 2016 +0000 +commit da39b09d43b137a5a3d071b51589e3efb3701238 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 10 13:22:32 2017 +1100 - upstream commit - - Improve error message for overlong ControlPath. ok markus@ - djm@ + If OSX is using launchd, remove screen no. - Upstream-ID: aed374e2e88dd3eb41390003e5303d0089861eb5 + Check for socket with and without screen number. From Apple and Jakob + Schlyter via bz#2341, with contributions from Ron Frederick, ok djm@ -commit 4706c1d8c15cd5565b59512853c2da9bd4ca26c9 +commit 8fb15311a011517eb2394bb95a467c209b8b336c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 3 05:41:57 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Mar 8 12:07:47 2017 +0000 upstream commit - small refactor of cipher.c: make ciphercontext opaque to - callers feedback and ok markus@ + quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump commandline; the + [ / ] characters can confuse some shells (e.g. zsh). Reported by Lauri + Tirkkonen via bugs@ - Upstream-ID: 094849f8be68c3bdad2c0f3dee551ecf7be87f6f + Upstream-ID: 65cdd161460e1351c3d778e974c1c2a4fa4bc182 -commit e600348a7afd6325cc5cd783cb424065cbc20434 +commit 18501151cf272a15b5f2c5e777f2e0933633c513 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 3 04:23:55 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Mar 6 02:03:20 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Fix bug introduced in rev 1.467 which causes - "buffer_get_bignum_ret: incomplete message" errors when built with WITH_SSH1 - and run such that no Protocol 1 ephemeral host key is generated (eg "Protocol - 2", no SSH1 host key supplied). Reported by rainer.laatsch at t-online.de, - ok deraadt@ + Check l->hosts before dereferencing; fixes potential null + pointer deref. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: aa6b132da5c325523aed7989cc5a320497c919dc + Upstream-ID: 81c0327c6ec361da794b5c680601195cc23d1301 -commit d7e7348e72f9b203189e3fffb75605afecba4fda -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 27 23:18:12 2016 +0000 +commit d072370793f1a20f01ad827ba8fcd3b8f2c46165 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 6 00:44:51 2017 +0000 upstream commit - better bounds check on iovcnt (we only ever use fixed, - positive values) + linenum is unsigned long so use %lu in log formats. ok + deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 9baa6eb5cd6e30c9dc7398e5fe853721a3a5bdee + Upstream-ID: 9dc582d9bb887ebe0164e030d619fc20b1a4ea08 -commit 5faa52d295f764562ed6dd75c4a4ce9134ae71e3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 2 15:22:40 2016 +1000 +commit 12d3767ba4c84c32150cbe6ff6494498780f12c9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 3 06:13:11 2017 +0000 - Use tabs consistently inside "case $host". + upstream commit + + fix ssh-keygen -H accidentally corrupting known_hosts that + contained already-hashed entries. HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED is only set by + hostkeys_foreach() when hostname matching is in use, so we need to look for + the hash marker explicitly. + + Upstream-ID: da82ad653b93e8a753580d3cf5cd448bc2520528 -commit 20e5e8ba9c5d868d897896190542213a60fffbd2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 2 12:16:34 2016 +1000 +commit d7abb771bd5a941b26144ba400a34563a1afa589 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 28 06:10:08 2017 +0000 - Explicitly test for broken strnvis. - - NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the - existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed - for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during - development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it. - Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible - implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option - if we're cross compiling. + upstream commit - OpenBSD 2.9 (2001): strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag); - NetBSD 6.0 (2012): strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag); + small memleak: free fd_set on connection timeout (though + we are heading to exit anyway). From Tom Rix in bz#2683 - ok djm@ + Upstream-ID: 10e3dadbb8199845b66581473711642d9e6741c4 -commit b0b48beab1b74100b61ecbadb9140c9ab4c2ea8c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 2 11:06:23 2016 +1000 +commit 78142e3ab3887e53a968d6e199bcb18daaf2436e +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 27 14:30:33 2017 +0000 - update recommended autoconf version + upstream commit + + errant dot; from klemens nanni + + Upstream-ID: 83d93366a5acf47047298c5d3ebc5e7426f37921 -commit 23902e31dfd18c6d7bb41ccd73de3b5358a377da -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 2 10:48:04 2016 +1000 +commit 8071a6924c12bb51406a9a64a4b2892675112c87 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 24 03:16:34 2017 +0000 - update config.guess and config.sub to current + upstream commit - upstream commit 562f3512b3911ba0c77a7f68214881d1f241f46e + might as well set the listener socket CLOEXEC + + Upstream-ID: 9c538433d6a0ca79f5f21decc5620e46fb68ab57 -commit dd1031b78b83083615b68d7163c44f4408635be2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 2 10:01:52 2016 +1000 +commit d5499190559ebe374bcdfa8805408646ceffad64 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 19 00:11:29 2017 +0000 - Replace spaces with tabs. + upstream commit - Mechanically replace spaces with tabs in compat files not synced with - OpenBSD. + add test cases for C locale; ok schwarze@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 783d75de35fbc923d46e2a5e6cee30f8f381ba87 -commit c20dccb5614c5714f4155dda01bcdebf97cfae7e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 2 09:44:25 2016 +1000 +commit 011c8ffbb0275281a0cf330054cf21be10c43e37 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 19 00:10:57 2017 +0000 - Strip trailing whitespace. + upstream commit - Mechanically strip trailing whitespace on files not synced with OpenBSD - (or in the case of bsd-snprint.c, rsync). - -commit 30f9bd1c0963c23bfba8468dfd26aa17609ba42f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 2 09:06:27 2016 +1000 - - Repair $OpenBSD markers. - -commit 9715d4ad4b53877ec23dc8681dd7a405de9419a6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Aug 2 09:02:42 2016 +1000 - - Repair $OpenBSD marker. - -commit cf3e0be7f5828a5e5f6c296a607d20be2f07d60c -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Mon Aug 1 14:31:52 2016 -0700 - - modified: configure.ac opensshd.init.in - Skip generating missing RSA1 key on startup unless ssh1 support is enabled. - Spotted by Jean-Pierre Radley + Add a common nl_langinfo(CODESET) alias for US-ASCII + "ANSI_X3.4-1968" that is used by Linux. Fixes mprintf output truncation for + non-UTF-8 locales on Linux spotted by dtucker@; ok deraadt@ schwarze@ + + Upstream-ID: c6808956ebffd64066f9075d839f74ff0dd60719 -commit 99522ba7ec6963a05c04a156bf20e3ba3605987c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jul 28 08:54:27 2016 +1000 +commit 0c4430a19b73058a569573492f55e4c9eeaae67b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 7 23:03:11 2017 +0000 - define _OPENBSD_SOURCE for reallocarray on NetBSD + upstream commit - Report by and debugged with Hisashi T Fujinaka, dtucker nailed - the problem (lack of prototype causing return type confusion). + Remove deprecated SSH1 options RSAAuthentication and + RhostsRSAAuthentication from regression test sshd_config. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8066b753d9dce7cf02ff87af5c727ff680d99491 -commit 3e1e076550c27c6bbdddf36d8f42bd79fbaaa187 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jul 27 08:25:42 2016 +1000 +commit 3baa4cdd197c95d972ec3d07f1c0d08f2d7d9199 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 02:32:05 2017 +0000 - KNF + upstream commit + + Do not show rsa1 key type in usage when compiled without + SSH1 support. + + Upstream-ID: 068b5c41357a02f319957746fa4e84ea73960f57 -commit d99ee9c4e5e217e7d05eeec84e9ce641f4675331 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jul 27 08:25:23 2016 +1000 +commit ecc35893715f969e98fee118481f404772de4132 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 02:31:14 2017 +0000 - Linux auditing also needs packet.h + upstream commit + + ifdef out "rsa1" from the list of supported keytypes when + compiled without SSH1 support. Found by kdunlop at guralp.com, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: cea93a26433d235bb1d64b1d990f19a9c160a70f -commit 393bd381a45884b589baa9aed4394f1d250255ca -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jul 27 08:18:05 2016 +1000 +commit 10577c6d96a55b877a960b2d0b75edef1b9945af +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 02:04:15 2017 +0000 - fix auditing on Linux + upstream commit - get_remote_ipaddr() was replaced with ssh_remote_ipaddr() + For ProxyJump/-J, surround host name with brackets to + allow literal IPv6 addresses. From Dick Visser; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 3a5d3b0171250daf6a5235e91bce09c1d5746bf1 -commit 80e766fb089de4f3c92b1600eb99e9495e37c992 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sun Jul 24 21:50:13 2016 +1000 +commit b2afdaf1b52231aa23d2153f4a8c5a60a694dda4 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 15 23:38:31 2017 +0000 - crank version numbers + upstream commit + + Fix memory leaks in match_filter_list() error paths. + + ok dtucker@ markus@ + + Upstream-ID: c7f96ac0877f6dc9188bbc908100a8d246cc7f0e -commit b1a478792d458f2e938a302e64bab2b520edc1b3 +commit 6d5a41b38b55258213ecfaae9df7a758caa752a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jul 24 11:45:36 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 15 01:46:47 2017 +0000 upstream commit - openssh-7.3 + fix division by zero crash in "df" output when server + returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes. Spotted by Guido Vranken; ok + dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: af106a7eb665f642648cf1993e162c899f358718 + Upstream-ID: 6fb6c2ae6b289aa07b6232dbc0be54682ef5419f -commit 353766e0881f069aeca30275ab706cd60a1a8fdd +commit bd5d7d239525d595ecea92765334af33a45d9d63 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sat Jul 23 16:14:42 2016 +1000 +Date: Sun Feb 12 15:45:15 2017 +1100 - Move Cygwin IPPORT_RESERVED overrride to defines.h + ifdef out EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR - Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. + EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 so ifdef out + for the benefit of OpenSSL versions prior to that. -commit 368dd977ae07afb93f4ecea23615128c95ab2b32 +commit 155d540d00ff55f063421ec182ec8ff2b7ab6cbe Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 23 02:54:08 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 10 04:34:50 2017 +0000 upstream commit - fix pledge violation with ssh -f; reported by Valentin - Kozamernik ok dtucker@ + bring back r1.34 that was backed out for problems loading + public keys: - Upstream-ID: a61db7988db88d9dac3c4dd70e18876a8edf84aa + translate OpenSSL error codes to something more + meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@ + + with additional fix from Jakub Jelen to solve the backout. + bz#2525 bz#2523 re-ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: a9d5bc0306f4473d9b4f4484f880e95f3c1cc031 -commit f00211e3c6d24d6ea2b64b4b1209f671f6c1d42e +commit a287c5ad1e0bf9811c7b9221979b969255076019 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 22 07:00:46 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 10 03:36:40 2017 +0000 upstream commit - improve wording; suggested by jmc@ + Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent to printf + but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports it; bz#2520 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 55cb0a24c8e0618b3ceec80998dc82c85db2d2f8 + Upstream-ID: e8eed28712ba7b22d49be534237eed019875bd1e -commit 83cbca693c3b0719270e6a0f2efe3f9ee93a65b8 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 22 05:46:11 2016 +0000 +commit e40269be388972848aafcca7060111c70aab5b87 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 8 20:32:43 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Lower loglevel for "Authenticated with partial success" - message similar to other similar level. bz#2599, patch from cgallek at - gmail.com, ok markus@ - - Upstream-ID: 3faab814e947dc7b2e292edede23e94c608cb4dd - -commit 10358abd087ab228b7ce2048efc4f3854a9ab9a6 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 22 14:06:36 2016 +1000 - - retry waitpid on EINTR failure + Avoid printf %s NULL. From semarie@, OK djm@ - patch from Jakub Jelen on bz#2581; ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: 06beef7344da0208efa9275d504d60d2a5b9266c -commit da88a70a89c800e74ea8e5661ffa127a3cc79a92 +commit 5b90709ab8704dafdb31e5651073b259d98352bc Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 22 03:47:36 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Feb 6 09:22:51 2017 +0000 upstream commit - constify a few functions' arguments; patch from Jakub - Jelen bz#2581 + Restore \r\n newline sequence for server ident string. The CR + got lost in the flensing of SSHv1. Pointed out by Stef Bon - Upstream-ID: f2043f51454ea37830ff6ad60c8b32b4220f448d + Upstream-ID: 5333fd43ce5396bf5999496096fac5536e678fac -commit c36d91bd4ebf767f310f7cea88d61d1c15f53ddf +commit 97c31c46ee2e6b46dfffdfc4f90bbbf188064cbc Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 22 03:39:13 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:42 2017 +0000 upstream commit - move debug("%p", key) to before key is free'd; probable - undefined behaviour on strict compilers; reported by Jakub Jelen bz#2581 + unit test for match_filter_list() function; still want a + better name for this... - Upstream-ID: 767f323e1f5819508a0e35e388ec241bac2f953a + Upstream-Regress-ID: 840ad6118552c35111f0a897af9c8d93ab8de92a -commit 286f5a77c3bfec1e8892ca268087ac885ac871bf +commit f1a193464a7b77646f0d0cedc929068e4a413ab4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 22 03:35:11 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:05:57 2017 +0000 upstream commit - reverse the order in which -J/JumpHost proxies are visited to - be more intuitive and document + use ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to include connection + username in packet log messages, e.g. - reported by and manpage bits naddy@ + Connection closed by invalid user foo 10.1.1.1 port 44056 [preauth] - Upstream-ID: 3a68fd6a841fd6cf8cedf6552a9607ba99df179a + ok markus@ bz#113 + + Upstream-ID: 3591b88bdb5416d6066fb3d49d8fff2375bf1a15 -commit fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 21 01:39:35 2016 +0000 +commit 07edd7e9537ab32aa52abb5fb2a915c350fcf441 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:03:33 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Skip passwords longer than 1k in length so clients can't - easily DoS sshd by sending very long passwords, causing it to spend CPU - hashing them. feedback djm@, ok markus@. - - Brought to our attention by tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, shilei-c at - 360.cn and coredump at autistici.org + add ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to allow inclusion of a + preamble string in disconnect messages; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: d0af7d4a2190b63ba1d38eec502bc4be0be9e333 + Upstream-ID: 34cb41182cd76d414c214ccb01c01707849afead -commit 324583e8fb3935690be58790425793df619c6d4d -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 20 10:45:27 2016 +0000 +commit 68bc8cfa7642d3ccbf2cd64281c16b8b9205be59 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:19 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Do not clobber the global jump_host variables when - parsing an inactive configuration. ok djm@ + support =- for removing methods from algorithms lists, + e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc; suggested by Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn in bz#2671 "I like + it" markus@ - Upstream-ID: 5362210944d91417d5976346d41ac0b244350d31 + Upstream-ID: c78c38f9f81a963b33d0eade559f6048add24a6d -commit 32d921c323b989d28405e78d0a8923d12913d737 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 19 12:59:16 2016 +0000 +commit c924b2ef941028a1f31e6e94f54dfeeeef462a4e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 05:05:56 2017 +0000 upstream commit - tweak previous; + allow form-feed characters at EOL; bz#2431 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: f3c1a5b3f05dff366f60c028728a2b43f15ff534 + Upstream-ID: 1f453afaba6da2ae69d6afdf1ae79a917552f1a2 -commit d7eabc86fa049a12ba2c3fb198bd1d51b37f7025 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 19 11:38:53 2016 +0000 +commit 523db8540b720c4d21ab0ff6f928476c70c38aab +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Feb 3 16:01:22 2017 +1100 - upstream commit + prefer to use ldns-config to find libldns - Allow wildcard for PermitOpen hosts as well as ports. - bz#2582, patch from openssh at mzpqnxow.com and jjelen at redhat.com. ok - markus@ + Should fix bz#2603 - "Build with ldns and without kerberos support + fails if ldns compiled with kerberos support" by including correct + cflags/libs - Upstream-ID: af0294e9b9394c4e16e991424ca0a47a7cc605f2 + ok dtucker@ -commit b98a2a8348e907b3d71caafd80f0be8fdd075943 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 18 11:35:33 2016 +0000 +commit c998bf0afa1a01257a53793eba57941182e9e0b7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 02:56:00 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Reduce timing attack against obsolete CBC modes by always - computing the MAC over a fixed size of data. Reported by Jean Paul - Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. ok djm@ + Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of + seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time). + This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison + warning. - Upstream-ID: f20a13279b00ba0afbacbcc1f04e62e9d41c2912 + rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op + on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on + anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually + wraps, anyway). + + some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c -commit dbf788b4d9d9490a5fff08a7b09888272bb10fcc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 21 14:17:31 2016 +1000 +commit 3ec5fa4ba97d4c4853620daea26a33b9f1fe3422 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 2 10:54:25 2017 +0000 - Search users for one with a valid salt. + upstream commit - If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking - until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of - invalid users. ok djm@ + In vasnmprintf() return an error if malloc fails and + don't set a function argument to the address of free'd memory. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 1efffffff2f51d53c9141f245b90ac23d33b9779 -commit e8b58f48fbb1b524fb4f0d4865fa0005d6a4b782 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 18 17:22:49 2016 +1000 +commit 858252fb1d451ebb0969cf9749116c8f0ee42753 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 1 02:59:09 2017 +0000 - Explicitly specify source files for regress tools. + upstream commit - Since adding $(REGRESSLIBS), $? is wrong because it includes only the - changed source files. $< seems like it'd be right however it doesn't - seem to work on some non-GNU makes, so do what works everywhere. + Return true reason for port forwarding failures where + feasible rather than always "administratively prohibited". bz#2674, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: d901d9887951774e604ca970e1827afaaef9e419 -commit eac1bbd06872c273f16ac0f9976b0aef026b701b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 18 17:12:22 2016 +1000 +commit 6ba9f893838489add6ec4213c7a997b425e4a9e0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 23:27:39 2017 +0000 - Conditionally include err.h. + upstream commit + + Small correction to the known_hosts section on when it is + updated. Patch from lkppo at free.fr some time ago, pointed out by smallm at + sdf.org + + Upstream-ID: 1834d7af179dea1a12ad2137f84566664af225d5 -commit 0a454147568746c503f669e1ba861f76a2e7a585 +commit c61d5ec3c11e7ff9779b6127421d9f166cf10915 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 18 16:26:26 2016 +1000 +Date: Fri Feb 3 14:10:34 2017 +1100 - Remove local implementation of err, errx. + Remove _XOPEN_SOURCE from wide char detection. - We now have a shared implementation in libopenbsd-compat. + Having _XOPEN_SOURCE unconditionally causes problems on some platforms + and configurations, notably Solaris 64-bit binaries. It was there for + the benefit of Linux put the required bits in the *-*linux* section. + + Patch from yvoinov at gmail.com. -commit eb999a4590846ba4d56ddc90bd07c23abfbab7b1 +commit f25ee13b3e81fd80efeb871dc150fe49d7fc8afd Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 18 06:08:01 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Jan 30 05:22:14 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add some unsigned overflow checks for extra_pad. None of - these are reachable with the amount of padding that we use internally. - bz#2566, pointed out by Torben Hansen. ok markus@ + fully unbreak: some $SSH invocations did not have -F + specified and could pick up the ~/.ssh/config of the user running the tests - Upstream-ID: 4d4be8450ab2fc1b852d5884339f8e8c31c3fd76 + Upstream-Regress-ID: f362d1892c0d3e66212d5d3fc02d915c58ef6b89 -commit c71ba790c304545464bb494de974cdf0f4b5cf1e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 18 15:43:25 2016 +1000 +commit 6956e21fb26652887475fe77ea40d2efcf25908b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 04:54:07 2017 +0000 - Add dependency on libs for unit tests. + upstream commit - Makes "./configure && make tests" work again. ok djm@ - -commit 8199d0311aea3e6fd0284c9025e7a83f4ece79e8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 18 13:47:39 2016 +1000 - - Correct location for kexfuzz in clean target. + partially unbreak: was not specifying hostname on some + $SSH invocations + + Upstream-Regress-ID: bc8a5e98e57bad0a92ef4f34ed91c1d18294e2cc -commit 01558b7b07af43da774d3a11a5c51fa9c310849d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 18 09:33:25 2016 +1000 +commit 52763dd3fe0a4678dafdf7aeb32286e514130afc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 01:03:00 2017 +0000 - Handle PAM_MAXTRIES from modules. + upstream commit - bz#2249: handle the case where PAM returns PAM_MAXTRIES by ceasing to offer - password and keyboard-interative authentication methods. Should prevent - "sshd ignoring max retries" warnings in the log. ok djm@ + revise keys/principals command hang fix (bz#2655) to + consume entire output, avoiding sending SIGPIPE to subprocesses early; ok + dtucker@ - It probably won't trigger with keyboard-interactive in the default - configuration because the retry counter is stored in module-private - storage which goes away with the sshd PAM process (see bz#688). On the - other hand, those cases probably won't log a warning either. + Upstream-ID: 7cb04b31a61f8c78c4e48ceededcd2fd5c4ee1bc -commit 65c6c6b567ab5ab12945a5ad8e0ab3a8c26119cc +commit 381a2615a154a82c4c53b787f4a564ef894fe9ac Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jul 17 04:20:16 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:38:50 2017 +0000 upstream commit - support UTF-8 characters in ssh(1) banners using - schwarze@'s safe fmprintf printer; bz#2058 + small cleanup post SSHv1 removal: - feedback schwarze@ ok dtucker@ + remove SSHv1-isms in commented examples - Upstream-ID: a72ce4e3644c957643c9524eea2959e41b91eea7 + reorder token table to group deprecated and compile-time conditional tokens + better + + fix config dumping code for some compile-time conditional options that + weren't being correctly skipped (SSHv1 and PKCS#11) + + Upstream-ID: f2e96b3cb3158d857c5a91ad2e15925df3060105 -commit e4eb7d910976fbfc7ce3e90c95c11b07b483d0d7 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 16 06:57:55 2016 +0000 +commit 4833d01591b7eb049489d9558b65f5553387ed43 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:34:01 2017 +0000 upstream commit - - add proxyjump to the options list - formatting fixes - - update usage() - - ok djm + some explicit NULL tests when dumping configured + forwardings; from Karsten Weiss - Upstream-ID: 43d318e14ce677a2eec8f21ef5ba2f9f68a59457 + Upstream-ID: 40957b8dea69672b0e50df6b4a91a94e3e37f72d -commit af1f084857621f14bd9391aba8033d35886c2455 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 15 05:01:58 2016 +0000 +commit 326e2fae9f2e3e067b5651365eba86b35ee5a6b2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:28 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common protocol - events from LOG_CRIT by replacing fatal() calls with logdie(). Part of - bz#2585, ok djm@ + misplaced braces in test; from Karsten Weiss - Upstream-ID: 9005805227c94edf6ac02a160f0e199638d288e5 - -commit bd5f2b78b69cf38d6049a0de445a79c8595e4a1f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 15 19:14:48 2016 +1000 - - missing openssl/dh.h - -commit 4a984fd342effe5f0aad874a0d538c4322d973c0 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 15 18:47:07 2016 +1000 - - cast to avoid type warning in error message + Upstream-ID: f7b794074d3aae8e35b69a91d211c599c94afaae -commit 5abfb15ced985c340359ae7fb65a625ed3692b3e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 14:48:30 2016 +1000 +commit 3e032a95e46bfaea9f9e857678ac8fa5f63997fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:03 2017 +0000 - Move VA_COPY macro into compat header. + upstream commit - Some AIX compilers unconditionally undefine va_copy but don't set it back - to an internal function, causing link errors. In some compat code we - already use VA_COPY instead so move the two existing instances into the - shared header and use for sshbuf-getput-basic.c too. Should fix building - with at lease some versions of AIX's compiler. bz#2589, ok djm@ + don't dereference authctxt before testing != NULL, it + causes compilers to make assumptions; from Karsten Weiss + + Upstream-ID: 794243aad1e976ebc717885b7a97a25e00c031b2 -commit 832b7443b7a8e181c95898bc5d73497b7190decd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 15 14:45:34 2016 +1000 +commit 01cfaa2b1cfb84f3cdd32d1bf82b120a8d30e057 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:51:16 2017 +0000 - disable ciphers not supported by OpenSSL + upstream commit - bz#2466 ok dtucker@ + use correct ssh-add program; bz#2654, from Colin Watson + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7042a36e1bdaec6562f6e57e9d047efe9c7a6030 -commit 5fbe93fc6fbb2fe211e035703dec759d095e3dd8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 15 13:54:31 2016 +1000 +commit e5c7ec67cdc42ae2584085e0fc5cc5ee91133cf5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:26:10 2017 +0000 - add a --disable-pkcs11 knob + upstream commit + + Account for timeouts in the integrity tests as failures. + + If the first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low + bytes of a packet length, then ssh will time out and this will be + interpreted as a test failure. Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via + bz#2658. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e7467613b0badedaa300bc6fc7495ec2f44e2fb9 -commit 679ce88ec2a8e2fe6515261c489e8c1449bb9da9 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 15 13:44:38 2016 +1000 +commit dbaf599b61bd6e0f8469363a8c8e7f633b334018 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:09:25 2017 +0000 - fix newline escaping for unsupported_algorithms + upstream commit - The hmac-ripemd160 was incorrect and could lead to broken - Makefiles on systems that lacked support for it, but I made - all the others consistent too. + Make forwarding test less racy by using unix domain + sockets instead of TCP ports where possible. Patch from cjwatson at + debian.org via bz#2659. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4756375aac5916ef9d25452a1c1d5fa9e90299a9 -commit ed877ef653847d056bb433975d731b7a1132a979 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 15 00:24:30 2016 +0000 +commit 9390b0031ebd6eb5488d3bc4d4333c528dffc0a6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jan 29 21:35:23 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add a ProxyJump ssh_config(5) option and corresponding -J - ssh(1) command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a SSH - bastion or "jump host". + Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward + cancellation. bz#2672, from Brad Marshall via Colin Watson and Ubuntu's + bugtracker. - These options construct a proxy command that connects to the - specified jump host(s) (more than one may be specified) and uses - port-forwarding to establish a connection to the next destination. + Upstream-ID: 0d4a7e5ead6cc59c9a44b4c1e5435ab3aada09af + +commit 4ba15462ca38883b8a61a1eccc093c79462d5414 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 21 11:32:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit - This codifies the safest way of indirecting connections through SSH - servers and makes it easy to use. + The POSIX APIs that that sockaddrs all ignore the s*_len + field in the incoming socket, so userspace doesn't need to set it unless it + has its own reasons for tracking the size along with the sockaddr. - ok markus@ + ok phessler@ deraadt@ florian@ - Upstream-ID: fa899cb8b26d889da8f142eb9774c1ea36b04397 + Upstream-ID: ca6e49e2f22f2b9e81d6d924b90ecd7e422e7437 -commit 5c02dd126206a26785379e80f2d3848e4470b711 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 12:56:39 2016 +1000 +commit a1187bd3ef3e4940af849ca953a1b849dae78445 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 16:28:12 2017 +0000 - Map umac_ctx struct name too. + upstream commit - Prevents size mismatch linker warnings on Solaris 11. + keep the tokens list sorted; + + Upstream-ID: b96239dae4fb3aa94146bb381afabcc7740a1638 -commit 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 13:49:44 2016 +1000 +commit b64077f9767634715402014f509e58decf1e140d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 09:27:52 2017 +0000 - Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins. + upstream commit - When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and - it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for - the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password - is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long - password string which is slower to hash than the fake password. + fix previous - Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length - as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash. - Diff from djm@ + Upstream-ID: c107d6a69bc22325d79fbf78a2a62e04bcac6895 -commit 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 15 13:32:45 2016 +1000 +commit 5e820e9ea2e949aeb93071fe31c80b0c42f2b2de +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 03:53:58 2017 +0000 - Determine appropriate salt for invalid users. + upstream commit - When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses - the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the - password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on - systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid - salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing - from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows - user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted - by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210). + show a useful error message when included config files + can't be opened; bz#2653, ok dtucker@ - To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing - passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@ + Upstream-ID: f598b73b5dfe497344cec9efc9386b4e5a3cb95b -commit a162dd5e58ca5b224d7500abe35e1ef32b5de071 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 21:19:59 2016 +1000 +commit 13bd2e2d622d01dc85d22b94520a5b243d006049 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 03:45:41 2017 +0000 - OpenSSL 1.1.x not currently supported. + upstream commit + + sshd_config is documented to set + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes by default, so actually make it do this. + bz#2637 ok dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 99ef8ac51f17f0f7aec166cb2e34228d4d72a665 -commit 7df91b01fc558a33941c5c5f31abbcdc53a729fb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 12:25:24 2016 +1000 +commit f89b928534c9e77f608806a217d39a2960cc7fd0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 03:41:58 2017 +0000 - Check for VIS_ALL. + upstream commit - If we don't have it, set BROKEN_STRNVIS to activate the compat replacement. + Avoid confusing error message when attempting to use + ssh-keyscan built without SSH protocol v.1 to scan for v.1 keys; bz#2583 + + Upstream-ID: 5d214abd3a21337d67c6dcc5aa6f313298d0d165 -commit ee67716f61f1042d5e67f91c23707cca5dcdd7d0 +commit 0999533014784579aa6f01c2d3a06e3e8804b680 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 14 01:24:21 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:34:54 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Correct equal in test. + Re-add '%k' token for AuthorizedKeysCommand which was + lost during the re-org in rev 1.235. bz#2656, from jboning at gmail.com. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 4e32f7a5c57a619c4e8766cb193be2a1327ec37a + Upstream-ID: 2884e203c02764d7b3fe7472710d9c24bdc73e38 -commit 372807c2065c8572fdc6478b25cc5ac363743073 -Author: tb@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 11 21:38:13 2016 +0000 +commit 51045869fa084cdd016fdd721ea760417c0a3bf3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 4 05:37:40 2017 +0000 upstream commit - Add missing "recvfd" pledge promise: Raf Czlonka reported - ssh coredumps when Control* keywords were set in ssh_config. This patch also - fixes similar problems with scp and sftp. + unbreak Unix domain socket forwarding for root; ok + markus@ - ok deraadt, looks good to millert + Upstream-ID: 6649c76eb7a3fa15409373295ca71badf56920a2 + +commit 58fca12ba967ea5c768653535604e1522d177e44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jan 16 09:08:32 2017 +1100 + + Remove LOGIN_PROGRAM. - Upstream-ID: ca2099eade1ef3e87a79614fefa26a0297ad8a3b + UseLogin is gone, remove leftover. bz#2665, from cjwatson at debian.org -commit e0453f3df64bf485c61c7eb6bd12893eee9fe2cd -Author: tedu@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 11 03:19:44 2016 +0000 +commit b108ce92aae0ca0376dce9513d953be60e449ae1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 4 02:21:43 2017 +0000 upstream commit - obsolete note about fascistloggin is obsolete. ok djm - dtucker + relax PKCS#11 whitelist a bit to allow libexec as well as + lib directories. - Upstream-ID: dae60df23b2bb0e89f42661ddd96a7b0d1b7215a + Upstream-ID: cf5617958e2e2d39f8285fd3bc63b557da484702 -commit a2333584170a565adf4f209586772ef8053b10b8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jul 14 10:59:09 2016 +1000 +commit c7995f296b9222df2846f56ecf61e5ae13d7a53d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 3 05:46:51 2017 +0000 - Add compat code for missing wcwidth. + upstream commit - If we don't have wcwidth force fallback implementations of nl_langinfo - and mbtowc. Based on advice from Ingo Schwarze. + check number of entries in SSH2_FXP_NAME response; avoids + unreachable overflow later. Reported by Jann Horn + + Upstream-ID: b6b2b434a6d6035b1644ca44f24cd8104057420f -commit 8aaec7050614494014c47510b7e94daf6e644c62 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jul 14 09:48:48 2016 +1000 +commit ddd3d34e5c7979ca6f4a3a98a7d219a4ed3d98c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 30 22:08:02 2016 +0000 - fix missing include for systems with err.h + upstream commit + + fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of + output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com + + Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe -commit 6310ef27a2567cda66d6cf0c1ad290ee1167f243 +commit 30eee7d1b2fec33c14870cc11910610be5d2aa6f Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jul 13 14:42:35 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Dec 20 12:16:11 2016 +1100 - Move err.h replacements into compat lib. + Re-add missing "Prerequisites" header and fix typo - Move implementations of err.h replacement functions into their own file - in the libopenbsd-compat so we can use them in kexfuzz.c too. ok djm@ + Patch from HARUYAMA Seigo . -commit f3f2cc8386868f51440c45210098f65f9787449a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 11 17:23:38 2016 +1000 +commit c8c60f3663165edd6a52632c6ddbfabfce1ca865 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 22:35:23 2016 +0000 - Check for wchar.h and langinfo.h + upstream commit - Wrap includes in the appropriate #ifdefs. + use standard /bin/sh equality test; from Mike Frysinger + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7b6f0b63525f399844c8ac211003acb8e4b0bec2 -commit b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278 +commit 4a354fc231174901f2629437c2a6e924a2dd6772 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000 +Date: Mon Dec 19 15:59:26 2016 +1100 - whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf - - bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen + crank version numbers for release -commit 18813a32b6fd964037e0f5e1893cb4468ac6a758 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 4 18:01:44 2016 +0000 +commit 5f8d0bb8413d4d909cc7aa3c616fb0538224c3c9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:51 2016 +0000 upstream commit - DEBUGLIBS has been broken since the gcc4 switch, so delete - it. CFLAGS contains -g by default anyway - - problem noted by Edgar Pettijohn (edgar (at) pettijohn-web.com) - ok millert@ kettenis@ deraadt@ + openssh-7.4 - Upstream-Regress-ID: 4a0bb72f95c63f2ae9daa8a040ac23914bddb542 + Upstream-ID: 1ee404adba6bbe10ae9277cbae3a94abe2867b79 -commit 6d31193d0baa3da339c196ac49625b7ba1c2ecc7 +commit 3a8213ea0ed843523e34e55ab9c852332bab4c7b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 8 03:44:42 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:18 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Improve crypto ordering for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode - MAC algorithms. - - Previously we were computing the MAC, decrypting the packet and then - checking the MAC. This gave rise to the possibility of creating a - side-channel oracle in the decryption step, though no such oracle has - been identified. - - This adds a mac_check() function that computes and checks the MAC in - one pass, and uses it to advance MAC checking for EtM algorithms to - before payload decryption. - - Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and - Martin Albrecht. feedback and ok markus@ + remove testcase that depends on exact output and + behaviour of snprintf(..., "%s", NULL) - Upstream-ID: 1999bb67cab47dda5b10b80d8155fe83d4a1867b + Upstream-Regress-ID: cab4288531766bd9593cb556613b91a2eeefb56f -commit 71f5598f06941f645a451948c4a5125c83828e1c -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 4 18:01:44 2016 +0000 +commit eae735a82d759054f6ec7b4e887fb7a5692c66d7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 03:32:57 2016 +0000 upstream commit - DEBUGLIBS has been broken since the gcc4 switch, so - delete it. CFLAGS contains -g by default anyway - - problem noted by Edgar Pettijohn (edgar (at) pettijohn-web.com) - ok millert@ kettenis@ deraadt@ + Use LOGNAME to get current user and fall back to whoami if + not set. Mainly to benefit -portable since some platforms don't have whoami. - Upstream-ID: 96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 + Upstream-Regress-ID: e3a16b7836a3ae24dc8f8a4e43fdf8127a60bdfa -commit e683fc6f1c8c7295648dbda679df8307786ec1ce +commit 0d2f88428487518eea60602bd593989013831dcf Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 30 05:17:05 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 16 03:51:19 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Explicitly check for 100% completion to avoid potential - floating point rounding error, which could cause progressmeter to report 99% - on completion. While there invert the test so the 100% case is clearer. with - & ok djm@ + Add regression test for AllowUsers and DenyUsers. Patch from + Zev Weiss - Upstream-ID: a166870c5878e422f3c71ff802e2ccd7032f715d + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8f1aac24d52728398871dac14ad26ea38b533fb9 -commit 772e6cec0ed740fc7db618dc30b4134f5a358b43 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 29 17:14:28 2016 +0000 +commit 3bc8180a008929f6fe98af4a56fb37d04444b417 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 16 15:02:24 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - sort the -o list; + Add missing monitor.h include. - Upstream-ID: 1a97465ede8790b4d47cb618269978e07f41f8ac + Fixes warning pointed out by Zev Weiss -commit 46ecd19e554ccca15a7309cd1b6b44bc8e6b84af +commit 410681f9015d76cc7b137dd90dac897f673244a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 23 05:17:51 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 16 02:48:55 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix AuthenticationMethods during configuration re-parse; - reported by Juan Francisco Cantero Hurtado + revert to rev1.2; the new bits in this test depend on changes + to ssh that aren't yet committed - Upstream-ID: 8ffa1dac25c7577eca8238e825317ab20848f9b4 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 828ffc2c7afcf65d50ff2cf3dfc47a073ad39123 -commit 3147e7595d0f2f842a666c844ac53e6c7a253d7e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Jun 19 07:48:02 2016 +0000 +commit 2f2ffa4fbe4b671bbffa0611f15ba44cff64d58e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 01:06:27 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revert 1.34; causes problems loading public keys - - reported by semarie@ + Move the "stop sshd" code into its own helper function. + Patch from Zev Weiss , ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: b393794f8935c8b15d98a407fe7721c62d2ed179 + Upstream-Regress-ID: a113dea77df5bd97fb4633ea31f3d72dbe356329 -commit ad23a75509f4320d43f628c50f0817e3ad12bfa7 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 17 06:33:30 2016 +0000 +commit e15e7152331e3976b35475fd4e9c72897ad0f074 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 01:01:07 2016 +0000 upstream commit - grammar fix; + regression test for certificates along with private key + with no public half. bz#2617, mostly from Adam Eijdenberg - Upstream-ID: 5d5b21c80f1e81db367333ce0bb3e5874fb3e463 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 2e74dc2c726f4dc839609b3ce045466b69f01115 -commit 5e28b1a2a3757548b40018cc2493540a17c82e27 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 17 05:06:23 2016 +0000 +commit 9a70ec085faf6e55db311cd1a329f1a35ad2a500 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 15 23:50:37 2016 +0000 upstream commit - translate OpenSSL error codes to something more - meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@ + Use $SUDO to read pidfile in case root's umask is + restricted. From portable. - Upstream-ID: 4cb0795a366381724314e6515d57790c5930ffe5 + Upstream-Regress-ID: f6b1c7ffbc5a0dfb7d430adb2883344899174a98 -commit b64faeb5eda7eff8210c754d00464f9fe9d23de5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 17 05:03:40 2016 +0000 +commit fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 15 21:29:05 2016 +0000 upstream commit - ban AuthenticationMethods="" and accept - AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not requiring multiple - authentication - - bz#2398 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@ + Add missing braces in DenyUsers code. Patch from zev at + bewilderbeest.net, ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: fabd7f44d59e4518d241d0d01e226435cc23cf27 + Upstream-ID: d747ace338dcf943b077925f90f85f789714b54e -commit 9816fc5daee5ca924dd5c4781825afbaab728877 +commit dcc7d74242a574fd5c4afbb4224795b1644321e7 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 16 11:00:17 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Dec 15 21:20:41 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Include stdarg.h for va_copy as per man page. + Fix text in error message. Patch from zev at + bewilderbeest.net. - Upstream-ID: 105d6b2f1af2fbd9d91c893c436ab121434470bd + Upstream-ID: deb0486e175e7282f98f9a15035d76c55c84f7f6 -commit b6cf84b51bc0f5889db48bf29a0c771954ade283 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jun 16 06:10:45 2016 +0000 +commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 14 00:36:34 2016 +0000 upstream commit - keys stored in openssh format can have comments too; diff - from yonas yanfa, tweaked a bit; - - ok djm + disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is + disabled - Upstream-ID: 03d48536da6e51510d73ade6fcd44ace731ceb27 + Upstream-ID: ab61516ae0faadad407857808517efa900a0d6d0 -commit aa37768f17d01974b6bfa481e5e83841b6c76f86 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 20 15:55:34 2016 +1000 +commit 08a1e7014d65c5b59416a0e138c1f73f417496eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 9 03:04:29 2016 +0000 - get_remote_name_or_ip inside LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX + upstream commit - Apply the same get_remote_name_or_ip -> session_get_remote_name_or_ip - change as commit 95767262 to the code inside #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX. - Fixes build on AIX. + log connections dropped in excess of MaxStartups at + verbose LogLevel; bz#2613 based on diff from Tomas Kuthan; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 703ae690dbf9b56620a6018f8a3b2389ce76d92b -commit 009891afc8df37bc2101e15d1e0b6433cfb90549 +commit 10e290ec00964b2bf70faab15a10a5574bb80527 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 17 14:34:09 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Dec 13 13:51:32 2016 +1100 - Remove duplicate code from PAM. ok djm@ + Get default of TEST_SSH_UTF8 from environment. -commit e690fe85750e93fca1fb7c7c8587d4130a4f7aba -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 15 00:40:40 2016 +0000 +commit b9b8ba3f9ed92c6220b58d70d1e6d8aa3eea1104 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 12:56:40 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Remove "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!" from log message - about forward and reverse DNS not matching. We haven't supported IP-based - auth methods for a very long time so it's now misleading. part of bz#2585, - ok markus@ + Remove commented-out includes. - Upstream-ID: 5565ef0ee0599b27f0bd1d3bb1f8a323d8274e29 + These commented-out includes have "Still needed?" comments. Since + they've been commented out for ~13 years I assert that they're not. -commit 57b4ee04cad0d3e0fec1194753b0c4d31e39a1cd +commit 25275f1c9d5f01a0877d39444e8f90521a598ea0 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 15 11:22:38 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Dec 13 12:54:23 2016 +1100 - Move platform_disable_tracing into its own file. - - Prevents link errors resolving the extern "options" when platform.o - gets linked into ssh-agent when building --with-pam. + Add prototype for strcasestr in compat library. -commit 78dc8e3724e30ee3e1983ce013e80277dc6ca070 +commit afec07732aa2985142f3e0b9a01eb6391f523dec Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 14 13:55:12 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Dec 13 10:23:03 2016 +1100 - Track skipped upstream commit IDs. + Add strcasestr to compat library. - There are a small number of "upstream" commits that do not correspond to - a file in -portable. This file tracks those so that we can reconcile - OpenBSD and Portable to ensure that no commits are accidentally missed. + Fixes build on (at least) Solaris 10. + +commit dda78a03af32e7994f132d923c2046e98b7c56c8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Dec 12 13:57:10 2016 +1100 + + Force Turkish locales back to C/POSIX; bz#2643 - If you add something to .skipped-commit-ids please also add an upstream - ID line in the following format when you commit it. + Turkish locales are unique in their handling of the letters 'i' and + 'I' (yes, they are different letters) and OpenSSH isn't remotely + prepared to deal with that. For now, the best we can do is to force + OpenSSH to use the C/POSIX locale and try to preserve the UTF-8 + encoding if possible. - Upstream-ID: 321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 - Upstream-ID: d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca - Upstream-ID: aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 - Upstream-ID: 8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 - Upstream-ID: f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a - Upstream-ID: edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef - Upstream-ID: 052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 - Upstream-ID: 7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 - Upstream-ID: 180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae - Upstream-ID: f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee + ok dtucker@ -commit 9f919d1a3219d476d6a662d18df058e1c4f36a6f +commit c35995048f41239fc8895aadc3374c5f75180554 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 14 13:51:01 2016 +1000 - - Remove now-defunct .cvsignore files. ok djm - -commit 68777faf271efb2713960605c748f6c8a4b26d55 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 8 02:13:01 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 9 12:52:02 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Back out rev 1.28 "Check min and max sizes sent by the - client" change. It caused "key_verify failed for server_host_key" in clients - that send a DH-GEX min value less that DH_GRP_MIN, eg old OpenSSH and PuTTY. - ok djm@ - - Upstream-ID: 452979d3ca5c1e9dff063287ea0a5314dd091f65 + exit is in stdlib.h not unistd.h (that's _exit). -commit a86ec4d0737ac5879223e7cd9d68c448df46e169 +commit d399a8b914aace62418c0cfa20341aa37a192f98 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 14 10:48:27 2016 +1000 +Date: Fri Dec 9 12:33:25 2016 +1100 - Use Solaris setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). - - Where possible, use Solaris setpflags to disable process tracing on - ssh-agent and sftp-server. bz#2584, based on a patch from huieying.lee - at oracle.com, ok djm. + Include for exit in utf8 locale test. -commit 0f916d39b039fdc0b5baf9b5ab0754c0f11ec573 +commit 47b8c99ab3221188ad3926108dd9d36da3b528ec Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 14 10:43:53 2016 +1000 +Date: Thu Dec 8 15:48:34 2016 +1100 - Shorten prctl code a tiny bit. + Check for utf8 local support before testing it. + + Check for utf8 local support and if not found, do not attempt to run the + utf8 tests. Suggested by djm@ -commit 0fb7f5985351fbbcd2613d8485482c538e5123be +commit 4089fc1885b3a2822204effbb02b74e3da58240d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 9 16:23:07 2016 +1000 +Date: Thu Dec 8 12:57:24 2016 +1100 - Move prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE into platform.c. + Use AC_PATH_TOOL for krb5-config. - This should make it easier to add additional platform support such as - Solaris (bz#2584). + This will use the host-prefixed version when cross compiling; patch from + david.michael at coreos.com. -commit e6508898c3cd838324ecfe1abd0eb8cf802e7106 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 04:10:41 2016 +0000 +commit b4867e0712c89b93be905220c82f0a15e6865d1e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 6 07:48:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add a test for ssh(1)'s config file parsing. + make IdentityFile successfully load and use certificates that + have no corresponding bare public key. E.g. just a private id_rsa and + certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub). - Upstream-Regress-ID: 558b7f4dc45cc3761cc3d3e889b9f3c5bc91e601 + bz#2617 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c1e9699b8c0e3b63cc4189e6972e3522b6292604 -commit ab0a536066dfa32def0bd7272c096ebb5eb25b11 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 03:47:59 2016 +0000 +commit c9792783a98881eb7ed295680013ca97a958f8ac +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Nov 25 14:04:21 2016 +1100 - upstream commit + Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 target for GTK+3 version - Add 'sshd' to the test ID as I'm about to add a similar - set for ssh. + Based on patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640 + +commit 7be85ae02b9de0993ce0a1d1e978e11329f6e763 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Nov 25 14:03:53 2016 +1100 + + Make gnome-ssh-askpass2.c GTK+3-friendly - Upstream-Regress-ID: aea7a9c3bac638530165c801ce836875b228ae7a + Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640 -commit a5577c1ed3ecdfe4b7b1107c526cae886fc91afb -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 30 12:14:08 2016 +0000 +commit b9844a45c7f0162fd1b5465683879793d4cc4aaa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 4 23:54:02 2016 +0000 upstream commit - stricter malloc.conf(5) options for utf8 tests + Fix public key authentication when multiple + authentication is in use. Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire + keys list, just reset the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good + order (with already- tried keys at the back) - Upstream-Regress-ID: 111efe20a0fb692fa1a987f6e823310f9b25abf6 + Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7123f12dc2f3bcaae715853035a97923d7300176 -commit 75f0844b4f29d62ec3a5e166d2ee94b02df819fc -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 30 12:05:56 2016 +0000 +commit f2398eb774075c687b13af5bc22009eb08889abe +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 4 22:27:25 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix two rare edge cases: 1. If vasprintf() returns < 0, - do not access a NULL pointer in snmprintf(), and do not free() the pointer - returned from vasprintf() because on some systems other than OpenBSD, it - might be a bogus pointer. 2. If vasprintf() returns == 0, return 0 and "" - rather than -1 and NULL. - - Besides, free(dst) is pointless after failure (not a bug). - - One half OK martijn@, the other half OK deraadt@; - committing quickly before people get hurt. + Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the + new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the + pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain + a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: b164f20923812c9bac69856dbc1385eb1522cba4 + Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870 -commit 016881eb33a7948028848c90f4c7ac42e3af0e87 -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 26 19:14:25 2016 +0000 +commit 85aa2efeba51a96bf6834f9accf2935d96150296 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 03:01:33 2016 +0000 upstream commit - test the new utf8 module + test new behaviour of cert force-command restriction vs. + authorized_key/ principals - Upstream-Regress-ID: c923d05a20e84e4ef152cbec947fdc4ce6eabbe3 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 399efa7469d40c404c0b0a295064ce75d495387c -commit d4219028bdef448e089376f3afe81ef6079da264 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 15:30:46 2016 +0000 +commit 5d333131cd8519d022389cfd3236280818dae1bc +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 06:54:26 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Set umask to prevent "Bad owner or permissions" errors. + tweak previous; while here fix up FILES and AUTHORS; - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8fdf2fc4eb595ccd80c443f474d639f851145417 + Upstream-ID: 93f6e54086145a75df8d8ec7d8689bdadbbac8fa -commit 07d5608bb237e9b3fe86a2aeaa429392230faebf +commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 14:41:04 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 30 03:07:37 2016 +0000 upstream commit - support doas + add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load + (via ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8d5572b27ea810394eeda432d8b4e9e1064a7c38 + Upstream-ID: fe79769469d9cd6d26fe0dc15751b83ef2a06e8f -commit 01cabf10adc7676cba5f40536a34d3b246edb73f +commit 7844f357cdd90530eec81340847783f1f1da010b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 13:48:33 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 30 03:00:05 2016 +0000 upstream commit - unit tests for sshbuf_dup_string() + Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables + X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as + anything else we might implement in the future. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 7521ff150dc7f20511d1c2c48fd3318e5850a96d + This, like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, is intended to be a + simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. Suggested as + a complement to 'restrict' by Jann Horn; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 203803f66e533a474086b38a59ceb4cf2410fcf7 -commit 6915f1698e3d1dd4e22eac20f435e1dfc1d46372 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 06:44:12 2016 +0000 +commit fd6dcef2030d23c43f986d26979f84619c10589d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 02:57:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - tweak previous; + When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and + an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the + certificate unless they are identical. - Upstream-ID: 92979f1a0b63e041a0e5b08c9ed0ba9b683a3698 + The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced- + command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone. + + Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f -commit 0cb2f4c2494b115d0f346ed2d8b603ab3ba643f4 +commit 7fc4766ac78abae81ee75b22b7550720bfa28a33 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 04:09:38 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 30 00:28:31 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be - overridden when using ssh -W (but still default to yes in that case). - bz#2577, ok djm@. + On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized + and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This + means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer + change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@. - Upstream-ID: 4b20c419e93ca11a861c81c284090cfabc8c54d4 + Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9 -commit 8543ff3f5020fe659839b15f05b8c522bde6cee5 +commit c9f880c195c65f1dddcbc4ce9d6bfea7747debcc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Nov 30 13:51:49 2016 +1100 + + factor out common PRNG reseed before privdrop + + Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets + stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann + Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@ + +commit 79e4829ec81dead1b30999e1626eca589319a47f Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 3 03:14:41 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 25 03:02:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Move the host and port used by ssh -W into the Options - struct. This will make future changes a bit easier. ok djm@ + Allow PuTTY interop tests to run unattended. bz#2639, + patch from cjwatson at debian.org. - Upstream-ID: 151bce5ecab2fbedf0d836250a27968d30389382 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4345253558ac23b2082aebabccd48377433b6fe0 -commit 6b87311d3acdc460f926b2c40f4c4f3fd345f368 +commit 504c3a9a1bf090f6b27260fc3e8ea7d984d163dc Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 1 04:19:49 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 25 02:56:49 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Check min and max sizes sent by the client against what - we support before passing them to the monitor. ok djm@ + Reverse args to sshd-log-wrapper. Matches change in + portable, where it allows sshd do be optionally run under Valgrind. - Upstream-ID: 750627e8117084215412bff00a25b1586ab17ece + Upstream-Regress-ID: b438d1c6726dc5caa2a45153e6103a0393faa906 -commit 564cd2a8926ccb1dca43a535073540935b5e0373 +commit bd13017736ec2f8f9ca498fe109fb0035f322733 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 31 23:46:14 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 25 02:49:18 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Ensure that the client's proposed DH-GEX max value is at - least as big as the minimum the server will accept. ok djm@ + Fix typo in trace message; from portable. - Upstream-ID: b4b84fa04aab2de7e79a6fee4a6e1c189c0fe775 - -commit df820722e40309c9b3f360ea4ed47a584ed74333 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 6 11:36:13 2016 +1000 - - Add compat bits to utf8.c. - -commit 05c6574652571becfe9d924226c967a3f4b3f879 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 6 11:33:43 2016 +1000 - - Fix utf->utf8 typo. + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4c4a2ba0d37faf5fd230a91b4c7edb5699fbd73a -commit 6c1717190b4d5ddd729cd9e24e8ed71ed4f087ce -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 30 18:34:41 2016 +0000 +commit 7da751d8b007c7f3e814fd5737c2351440d78b4c +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 1 13:43:27 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Backout rev. 1.43 for now. - - The function update_progress_meter() calls refresh_progress_meter() - which calls snmprintf() which calls malloc(); but update_progress_meter() - acts as the SIGALRM signal handler. + Clean up MALLOC_OPTIONS. For the unittests, move + MALLOC_OPTIONS and TEST_ENV to unittets/Makefile.inc. - "malloc(): error: recursive call" reported by sobrado@. + ok otto - Upstream-ID: aaae57989431e5239c101f8310f74ccc83aeb93e + Upstream-Regress-ID: 890d497e0a38eeddfebb11cc429098d76cf29f12 -commit cd9e1eabeb4137182200035ab6fa4522f8d24044 -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 30 12:57:21 2016 +0000 +commit 36f58e68221bced35e06d1cca8d97c48807a8b71 +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 31 23:45:08 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Even when only writing an unescaped character, the dst - buffer may need to grow, or it would be overrun; issue found by tb@ with - malloc.conf(5) 'C'. - - While here, reserve an additional byte for the terminating NUL - up front such that we don't have to realloc() later just for that. + Remove the obsolete A and P flags from MALLOC_OPTIONS. - OK tb@ + ok dtucker - Upstream-ID: 30ebcc0c097c4571b16f0a78b44969f170db0cff + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6cc25024c8174a87e5734a0dc830194be216dd59 -commit ac284a355f8065eaef2a16f446f3c44cdd17371d -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 30 12:05:56 2016 +0000 +commit b0899ee26a6630883c0f2350098b6a35e647f512 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 29 03:54:50 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix two rare edge cases: 1. If vasprintf() returns < 0, - do not access a NULL pointer in snmprintf(), and do not free() the pointer - returned from vasprintf() because on some systems other than OpenBSD, it - might be a bogus pointer. 2. If vasprintf() returns == 0, return 0 and "" - rather than -1 and NULL. - - Besides, free(dst) is pointless after failure (not a bug). - - One half OK martijn@, the other half OK deraadt@; - committing quickly before people get hurt. + Factor out code to disconnect from controlling terminal + into its own function. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: b7bcd2e82fc168a8eff94e41f5db336ed986fed0 + Upstream-ID: 39fd9e8ebd7222615a837312face5cc7ae962885 -commit 0e059cdf5fd86297546c63fa8607c24059118832 -Author: schwarze@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 25 23:48:45 2016 +0000 +commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 23:24:45 2016 +0000 upstream commit - To prevent screwing up terminal settings when printing to - the terminal, for ASCII and UTF-8, escape bytes not forming characters and - bytes forming non-printable characters with vis(3) VIS_OCTAL. For other - character sets, abort printing of the current string in these cases. In - particular, * let scp(1) respect the local user's LC_CTYPE locale(1); * - sanitize data received from the remote host; * sanitize filenames, usernames, - and similar data even locally; * take character display widths into account - for the progressmeter. - - This is believed to be sufficient to keep the local terminal safe - on OpenBSD, but bad things can still happen on other systems with - state-dependent locales because many places in the code print - unencoded ASCII characters into the output stream. - - Using feedback from djm@ and martijn@, - various aspects discussed with many others. + use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for + loading keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which + might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This doesn't + appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but was observed for + novelty oversize ones. - deraadt@ says it should go in now, i probably already hesitated too long + Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: e66afbc94ee396ddcaffd433b9a3b80f387647e0 + Upstream-ID: d620e1d46a29fdea56aeadeda120879eddc60ab1 -commit 8c02e3639acefe1e447e293dbe23a0917abd3734 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 24 04:43:45 2016 +0000 +commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 23:22:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - KNF compression proposal and simplify the client side a - little. ok djm@ + split allocation out of sshbuf_reserve() into a separate + sshbuf_allocate() function; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: aa814b694efe9e5af8a26e4c80a05526ae6d6605 + Upstream-ID: 11b8a2795afeeb1418d508a2c8095b3355577ec2 -commit 7ec4946fb686813eb5f8c57397e465f5485159f4 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 24 02:31:57 2016 +0000 +commit f0ddedee460486fa0e32fefb2950548009e5026e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 23 23:14:15 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Back out 'plug memleak'. + allow ClientAlive{Interval,CountMax} in Match; ok dtucker, + djm - Upstream-ID: 4faacdde136c24a961e24538de373660f869dbc0 + Upstream-ID: 8beb4c1eadd588f1080b58932281983864979f55 -commit 82f24c3ddc52053aeb7beb3332fa94c92014b0c5 +commit 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 23 23:30:50 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Nov 8 22:04:34 2016 +0000 upstream commit - prefer agent-hosted keys to keys from PKCS#11; ok markus + unbreak DenyUsers; reported by henning@ - Upstream-ID: 7417f7653d58d6306d9f8c08d0263d050e2fd8f4 + Upstream-ID: 1c67d4148f5e953c35acdb62e7c08ae8e33f7cb2 -commit a0cb7778fbc9b43458f7072eb68dd858766384d1 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 23 00:17:27 2016 +0000 +commit 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 6 05:46:37 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Plug mem leak in filter_proposal. ok djm@ + Validate address ranges for AllowUser/DenyUsers at + configuration load time and refuse to accept bad ones. It was previously + possible to specify invalid CIDR address ranges (e.g. djm@127.1.2.3/55) and + these would always match. - Upstream-ID: bf968da7cfcea2a41902832e7d548356a4e2af34 - -commit ae9c0d4d5c581b3040d1f16b5c5f4b1cd1616743 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 3 16:03:44 2016 +1000 - - Update vis.h and vis.c from OpenBSD. + Thanks to Laurence Parry for a detailed bug report. ok markus (for + a previous diff version) - This will be needed for the upcoming utf8 changes. - -commit e1d93705f8f48f519433d6ca9fc3d0abe92a1b77 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Tue May 31 11:13:22 2016 -0700 - - modified: configure.ac - whitspace clean up. No code changes. - -commit 604a037d84e41e31f0aec9075df0b8740c130200 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue May 31 16:45:28 2016 +1000 - - whitespace at EOL + Upstream-ID: 9dfcdd9672b06e65233ea4434c38226680d40bfb -commit 18424200160ff5c923113e0a37ebe21ab7bcd17c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon May 30 19:35:28 2016 +1000 +commit efb494e81d1317209256b38b49f4280897c61e69 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 03:33:52 2016 +0000 - Add missing ssh-host-config --name option + upstream commit - Patch from vinschen@redhat.com. + Improve pkcs11_add_provider() logging: demote some + excessively verbose error()s to debug()s, include PKCS#11 provider name and + slot in log messages where possible. bz#2610, based on patch from Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: 3223ef693cfcbff9079edfc7e89f55bf63e1973d -commit 39c0cecaa188a37a2e134795caa68e03f3ced592 +commit 5ee3fb5affd7646f141749483205ade5fc54adaf Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 20 10:01:58 2016 +1000 +Date: Tue Nov 1 08:12:33 2016 +1100 - Fix comment about sshpam_const and AIX. - - From mschwager via github. + Use ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..) on OS X. -commit f64062b1f74ad5ee20a8a49aab2732efd0f7ce30 +commit 315d2a4e674d0b7115574645cb51f968420ebb34 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri May 20 09:56:53 2016 +1000 +Date: Fri Oct 28 14:34:07 2016 +1100 - Deny lstat syscalls in seccomp sandbox + Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8) OpenSSL - Avoids sandbox violations for some krb/gssapi libraries. + ok dtucker@ -commit 531c135409b8d8810795b1f3692a4ebfd5c9cae0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 19 07:45:32 2016 +0000 +commit a9ff3950b8e80ff971b4d44bbce96df27aed28af +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 28 14:26:58 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix type of ed25519 values + Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat. - Upstream-ID: b32d0cb372bbe918ca2de56906901eae225a59b0 + Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat and add ifdefs to mac.c around the + ripemd160 MACs. -commit 75e21688f523799c9e0cc6601d76a9c5ca79f787 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 14:32:26 2016 +0000 +commit bce58885160e5db2adda3054c3b81fe770f7285a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 28 13:52:31 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - add IdentityAgent; noticed & ok jmc@ + Check if RIPEMD160 is disabled in OpenSSL. + +commit d924640d4c355d1b5eca1f4cc60146a9975dbbff +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 28 13:38:19 2016 +1100 + + Skip ssh1 specfic ciphers. - Upstream-ID: 4ba9034b00a4cf1beae627f0728da897802df88a + cipher-3des1.c and cipher-bf1.c are specific to sshv1 so don't even try + to compile them when Protocol 1 is not enabled. -commit 1a75d14daf4b60db903e6103cf50e74e0cd0a76b -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 14:29:58 2016 +0000 +commit 79d078e7a49caef746516d9710ec369ba45feab6 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 25 04:08:13 2016 +0000 upstream commit - allow setting IdentityAgent to SSH_AUTH_SOCK; ok djm@ + Fix logic in add_local_forward() that inverted a test + when code was refactored out into bind_permitted(). This broke ssh port + forwarding for non-priv ports as a non root user. - Upstream-ID: 20c508480d8db3eef18942c0fc39b1fcf25652ac + ok dtucker@ 'looks good' deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: ddb8156ca03cc99997de284ce7777536ff9570c9 -commit 0516454151ae722fc8256c3c56115c6baf24c5b0 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 14:22:33 2016 +0000 +commit a903e315dee483e555c8a3a02c2946937f9b4e5d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 24 01:09:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - move SSH_MSG_NONE, so we don't have to include ssh1.h; - ok deraadt@ + Remove dead breaks, found via opencoverage.net. ok + deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: c2f97502efc761a41b18c17ddf460e138ca7994e + Upstream-ID: ad9cc655829d67fad219762810770787ba913069 -commit 332ff3d770631e7513fea38cf0d3689f673f0e3f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue May 10 09:51:06 2016 +1000 +commit b4e96b4c9bea4182846e4942ba2048e6d708ee54 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Oct 26 08:43:25 2016 +1100 - initialise salen in binresvport_sa - - avoids failures with UsePrivilegedPort=yes + Use !=NULL instead of >0 for getdefaultproj. - patch from Juan Gallego + getdefaultproj() returns a pointer so test it for NULL inequality + instead of >0. Fixes compiler warning and is more correct. Patch from + David Binderman. -commit c5c1d5d2f04ce00d2ddd6647e61b32f28be39804 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 14:04:40 2016 +0000 +commit 1c4ef0b808d3d38232aeeb1cebb7e9a43def42c5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Oct 23 22:04:05 2016 +0000 upstream commit - missing const in prototypes (ssh1) + Factor out "can bind to low ports" check into its own function. This will + make it easier for Portable to support platforms with permissions models + other than uid==0 (eg bz#2625). ok djm@, "doesn't offend me too much" + deraadt@. - Upstream-ID: 789c6ad4928b5fa557369b88c3a6a34926082c05 + Upstream-ID: 86213df4183e92b8f189a6d2dac858c994bfface -commit 9faae50e2e82ba42eb0cb2726bf6830fe7948f28 +commit 0b9ee623d57e5de7e83e66fd61a7ba9a5be98894 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 14:00:09 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Oct 19 23:21:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix inverted logic for updating StreamLocalBindMask which - would cause the server to set an invalid mask. ok djm@ + When tearing down ControlMaster connecctions, don't + pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet. Patch from Tim Kuijsten via tech@. - Upstream-ID: 8a4404c8307a5ef9e07ee2169fc6d8106b527587 + Upstream-ID: d9b3a68b2a7c2f2fc7f74678e29a4618d55ceced -commit b02ad1ce9105bfa7394ac7590c0729dd52e26a81 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 12:21:53 2016 +0000 +commit 09e6a7d8354224933febc08ddcbc2010f542284e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Oct 24 09:06:18 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - IdentityAgent for specifying specific agent sockets; ok - djm@ - - Upstream-ID: 3e6a15eb89ea0fd406f108826b7dc7dec4fbfac1 + Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef. -commit 910e59bba09ac309d78ce61e356da35292212935 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 4 12:16:39 2016 +0000 +commit 08d9e9516e587b25127545c029e5464b2e7f2919 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 09:46:46 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix junk characters after quotes - - Upstream-ID: cc4d0cd32cb6b55a2ef98975d2f7ae857d0dc578 + Fix formatting. -commit 9283884e647b8be50ccd2997537af0065672107d -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 18:38:12 2016 +0000 +commit 461f50e7ab8751d3a55e9158c44c13031db7ba1d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 06:55:58 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - correct article; + Update links to https. - Upstream-ID: 1fbd5b7ab16d2d9834ec79c3cedd4738fa42a168 + www.openssh.com now supports https and ftp.openbsd.org no longer + supports ftp. Make all links to these https. -commit cfefbcea1057c2623e76c579174a4107a0b6e6cd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 15:57:39 2016 +0000 +commit dd4e7212a6141f37742de97795e79db51e4427ad +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 06:48:46 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix overriding of StreamLocalBindMask and - StreamLocalBindUnlink in Match blocks; found the hard way Rogan Dawes + Update host key generation examples. - Upstream-ID: 940bc69ec0249ab428d24ccd0722ce35cb932ee2 + Remove ssh1 host key generation, add ssh-keygen -A -commit 771c2f51ffc0c9a2877b7892fada0c77bd1f6549 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 15:25:06 2016 +0000 +commit 6d49ae82634c67e9a4d4af882bee20b40bb8c639 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 05:22:55 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - don't forget to include StreamLocalBindUnlink in the - config dump output + Update links. - Upstream-ID: 14a6d970b3b45c8e94272e3c661e9a0b2a0ee7cb + Make links to openssh.com HTTPS now that it's supported, point release + notes link to the HTML release notes page, and update a couple of other + links and bits of text. -commit cdcd941994dc430f50d0a4e6a712d32b66e6199e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 14:54:08 2016 +0000 +commit fe0d1ca6ace06376625084b004ee533f2c2ea9d6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 20 03:42:09 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - make nethack^wrandomart fingerprint flag more readily - searchable pointed out by Matt Johnston + Remote channels .orig and .rej files. - Upstream-ID: cb40d0235dc153c478c1aad3bc60b195422a54fb + These files were incorrectly added during an OpenBSD sync. -commit 05855bf2ce7d5cd0a6db18bc0b4214ed5ef7516d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 13:10:24 2016 +0000 +commit 246aa842a4ad368d8ce030495e657ef3a0e1f95c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 18 17:32:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - clarify ordering of subkeys; pointed out by ietf-ssh AT - stbuehler.de + Remove channel_input_port_forward_request(); the only caller + was the recently-removed SSH1 server code so it's now dead code. ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 05ebe9f949449a555ebce8e0aad7c8c9acaf8463 + Upstream-ID: 05453983230a1f439562535fec2818f63f297af9 -commit cca3b4395807bfb7aaeb83d2838f5c062ce30566 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 12:15:49 2016 +0000 +commit 2c6697c443d2c9c908260eed73eb9143223e3ec9 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 18 12:41:22 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Use a subshell for constructing key types to work around - different sed behaviours for -portable. + Install a signal handler for tty-generated signals and + wait for the ssh child to suspend before suspending sftp. This lets ssh + restore the terminal mode as needed when it is suspended at the password + prompt. OK dtucker@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 0f6eb673162df229eda9a134a0f10da16151552d + Upstream-ID: a31c1f42aa3e2985dcc91e46e6a17bd22e372d69 -commit fa58208c6502dcce3e0daac0ca991ee657daf1f5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 10:27:59 2016 +0000 +commit fd2a8f1033fa2316fff719fd5176968277560158 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 15 19:56:25 2016 +0000 upstream commit - correct some typos and remove a long-stale XXX note. - - add specification for ed25519 certificates - - mention no host certificate options/extensions are currently defined - - pointed out by Simon Tatham + various formatting fixes, specifically removing Dq; - Upstream-ID: 7b535ab7dba3340b7d8210ede6791fdaefdf839a + Upstream-ID: 81e85df2b8e474f5f93d66e61d9a4419ce87347c -commit b466f956c32cbaff4200bfcd5db6739fe4bc7d04 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 10:24:27 2016 +0000 +commit 8f866d8a57b9a2dc5dd04504e27f593b551618e3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Oct 19 03:26:09 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - add ed25519 keys that are supported but missing from this - documents; from Peter Moody + Import readpassphrase.c rev 1.26. - Upstream-ID: 8caac2d8e8cfd2fca6dc304877346e0a064b014b + Author: miller@openbsd.org: + Avoid generate SIGTTOU when restoring the terminal mode. If we get + SIGTTOU it means the process is not in the foreground process group + which, in most cases, means that the shell has taken control of the tty. + Requiring the user the fg the process in this case doesn't make sense + and can result in both SIGTSTP and SIGTTOU being sent which can lead to + the process being suspended again immediately after being brought into + the foreground. -commit 7f3d76319a69dab2efe3a520a8fef5b97e923636 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 3 09:03:49 2016 +0000 +commit f901440cc844062c9bab0183d133f7ccc58ac3a5 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Oct 19 03:23:16 2016 +1100 - upstream commit + Import readpassphrase.c rev 1.25. - Implement IUTF8 as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00. Patch - from Simon Tatham, ok markus@ + Wrap so internal calls go direct and + readpassphrase is weak. + + (DEF_WEAK is a no-op in portable.) + +commit 032147b69527e5448a511049b2d43dbcae582624 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Oct 15 05:51:12 2016 +1100 + + Move DEF_WEAK into defines.h. - Upstream-ID: 58268ebdf37d9d467f78216c681705a5e10c58e8 + As well pull in more recent changes from OpenBSD these will start to + arrive so put it where the definition is shared. -commit 31bc01c05d9f51bee3ebe33dc57c4fafb059fb62 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 2 14:10:58 2016 +0000 +commit e0259a82ddd950cfb109ddee86fcebbc09c6bd04 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Oct 15 04:34:46 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - unbreak config parsing on reexec from previous commit + Remove do_pam_set_tty which is dead code. - Upstream-ID: bc69932638a291770955bd05ca55a32660a613ab + The callers of do_pam_set_tty were removed in 2008, so this is now dead + code. bz#2604, pointed out by jjelen at redhat.com. -commit 67f1459efd2e85bf03d032539283fa8107218936 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 2 09:52:00 2016 +0000 +commit ca04de83f210959ad2ed870a30ba1732c3ae00e3 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 13 18:53:43 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - unit and regress tests for SHA256/512; ok markus + unbreak principals-command test - Upstream-Regress-ID: a0cd1a92dc824067076a5fcef83c18df9b0bf2c6 + Undo inconsistetly updated variable name. -commit 0e8eeec8e75f6d0eaf33317376f773160018a9c7 +commit 1723ec92eb485ce06b4cbf49712d21975d873909 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 2 10:26:04 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 11 21:49:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add support for additional fixed DH groups from - draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 - - diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group) - diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group) - diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group) - - based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker - ok markus@ + fix the KEX fuzzer - the previous method of obtaining the + packet contents was broken. This now uses the new per-packet input hook, so + it sees exact post-decrypt packets and doesn't have to pass packet integrity + checks. ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f + Upstream-Regress-ID: 402fb6ffabd97de590e8e57b25788949dce8d2fd -commit 57464e3934ba53ad8590ee3ccd840f693407fc1e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 2 09:36:42 2016 +0000 +commit 09f997893f109799cddbfce6d7e67f787045cbb2 +Author: natano@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 6 09:31:38 2016 +0000 upstream commit - support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA signatures in certificates; - ok markus@ + Move USER out of the way to unbreak the BUILDUSER + mechanism. ok tb - Upstream-ID: b45be2f2ce8cacd794dc5730edaabc90e5eb434a + Upstream-Regress-ID: 74ab9687417dd071d62316eaadd20ddad1d5af3c -commit 1a31d02b2411c4718de58ce796dbb7b5e14db93e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 2 08:49:03 2016 +0000 +commit 3049a012c482a7016f674db168f23fd524edce27 +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 30 11:55:20 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix signed/unsigned errors reported by clang-3.7; add - sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with - better safety checking; feedback and ok markus@ + In ssh tests set REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY with ?= so that the + environment can change it. OK djm@ - Upstream-ID: 71f926d9bb3f1efed51319a6daf37e93d57c8820 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b -commit d2d6bf864e52af8491a60dd507f85b74361f5da3 +commit 39af7b444db28c1cb01b7ea468a4f574a44f375b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 29 08:07:53 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 11 21:47:45 2016 +0000 upstream commit - close ControlPersist background process stderr when not - in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog. bz#1988 ok dtucker + Add a per-packet input hook that is called with the + decrypted packet contents. This will be used for fuzzing; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 4fb726f0fdcb155ad419913cea10dc4afd409d24 + Upstream-ID: a3221cee6b1725dd4ae1dd2c13841b4784cb75dc -commit 9ee692fa1146e887e008a2b9a3d3ea81770c9fc8 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 28 14:30:21 2016 +0000 +commit ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 10 19:28:48 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix comment + Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been + received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause + allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by + shilei-c at 360.cn - Upstream-ID: 313a385bd7b69a82f8e28ecbaf5789c774457b15 + Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05 -commit ee1e0a16ff2ba41a4d203c7670b54644b6c57fa6 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 27 13:53:48 2016 +0000 +commit 29d40319392e6e19deeca9d45468aa1119846e50 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 13 04:07:20 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - cidr permitted for {allow,deny}users; from lars nooden ok djm + Import rev 1.24 from OpenBSD. - Upstream-ID: 13e7327fe85f6c63f3f7f069e0fdc8c351515d11 + revision 1.24 + date: 2013/11/24 23:51:29; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; + most obvious unsigned char casts for ctype + ok jca krw ingo -commit b6e0140a5aa883c27b98415bd8aa9f65fc04ee22 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 21 06:08:02 2016 +0000 +commit 12069e56221de207ed666c2449dedb431a2a7ca2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 13 04:04:44 2016 +1100 - upstream commit + Import rev 1.23 from OpenBSD. Fixes bz#2619. - make argument == NULL tests more consistent + revision 1.23 + date: 2010/05/14 13:30:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +41 -39; + Defer installing signal handlers until echo is disabled so that we + get suspended normally when not the foreground process. Fix potential + infinite loop when restoring terminal settings if process is in the + background when restore occurs. OK miod@ + +commit 7508d83eff89af069760b4cc587305588a64e415 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 13 03:53:51 2016 +1100 + + If we don't have TCSASOFT, define it to zero. - Upstream-ID: dc4816678704aa5cbda3a702e0fa2033ff04581d + This makes it a no-op when we use it below, which allows us to re-sync + those lines with the upstream and make future updates easier. -commit 6aaabc2b610e44bae473457ad9556ffb43d90ee3 +commit aae4dbd4c058d3b1fe1eb5c4e6ddf35827271377 Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Apr 17 14:34:46 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 7 14:41:52 2016 +0000 upstream commit - tweak previous; + tidy up the formatting in this file. more specifically, + replace .Dq, which looks appalling, with .Cm, where appropriate; - Upstream-ID: 46c1bab91c164078edbccd5f7d06b9058edd814f + Upstream-ID: ff8e90aa0343d9bb56f40a535e148607973cc738 -commit 0f839e5969efa3bda615991be8a9d9311554c573 +commit a571dbcc7b7b25371174569b13df5159bc4c6c7a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 15 02:57:10 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 4 21:34:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - missing bit of Include regress + add a comment about implicitly-expected checks to + sshkey_ec_validate_public() - Upstream-Regress-ID: 1063595f7f40f8489a1b7a27230b9e8acccea34f + Upstream-ID: 74a7f71c28f7c13a50f89fc78e7863b9cd61713f -commit 12e4ac46aed681da55c2bba3cd11dfcab23591be +commit 2f78a2a698f4222f8e05cad57ac6e0c3d1faff00 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 15 02:55:53 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 30 20:24:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - remove redundant CLEANFILES section + fix some -Wpointer-sign warnings in the new mux proxy; ok + markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 29ef1b267fa56daa60a1463396635e7d53afb587 + Upstream-ID: b1ba7b3769fbc6b7f526792a215b0197f5e55dfd -commit b1d05aa653ae560c44baf8e8a9756e33f98ea75c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 15 00:48:01 2016 +0000 +commit ca71c36645fc26fcd739a8cfdc702cec85607761 +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 28 20:09:52 2016 +0000 upstream commit - sync CLEANFILES with portable, sort + Add a makefile rule to create the ssh library when + regress needs it. This allows to run the ssh regression tests without doing + a "make build" before. Discussed with dtucker@ and djm@; OK djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: cb782f4f1ab3e079efbc335c6b64942f790766ed + Upstream-Regress-ID: ce489bd53afcd471225a125b4b94565d4717c025 -commit 35f22dad263cce5c61d933ae439998cb965b8748 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 15 00:31:10 2016 +0000 +commit ce44c970f913d2a047903dba8670554ac42fc479 +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 26 21:34:38 2016 +0000 upstream commit - regression test for ssh_config Include directive + Allow to run ssh regression tests as root. If the user + is already root, the test should not expect that SUDO is set. If ssh needs + another user, use sudo or doas to switch from root if necessary. OK dtucker@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 46a38c8101f635461c506d1aac2d96af80f97f1e + Upstream-Regress-ID: b464e55185ac4303529e3e6927db41683aaeace2 -commit 6b8a1a87005818d4700ce8b42faef746e82c1f51 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 14 23:57:17 2016 +0000 +commit 8d0578478586e283e751ca51e7b0690631da139a +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 30 09:19:13 2016 +0000 upstream commit - unbreak test for recent ssh de-duplicated forwarding - change + ssh proxy mux mode (-O proxy; idea from Simon Tatham): - mux + client speaks the ssh-packet protocol directly over unix-domain socket. - mux + server acts as a proxy, translates channel IDs and relays to the server. - no + filedescriptor passing necessary. - combined with unix-domain forwarding it's + even possible to run mux client and server on different machines. feedback + & ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b2b115d99acd7cff13986e6739ea214cf2a3da3 + Upstream-ID: 666a2fb79f58e5c50e246265fb2b9251e505c25b -commit 076787702418985a2cc6808212dc28ce7afc01f0 +commit b7689155f3f5c4999846c07a852b1c7a43b09cec Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 14 23:21:42 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 28 21:44:52 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add test knob and warning for StrictModes + put back some pre-auth zlib bits that I shouldn't have + removed - they are still used by the client. Spotted by naddy@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 8cd10952ce7898655ee58945904f2a0a3bdf7682 + Upstream-ID: 80919468056031037d56a1f5b261c164a6f90dc2 -commit dc7990be865450574c7940c9880567f5d2555b37 +commit 4577adead6a7d600c8e764619d99477a08192c8f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 15 00:30:19 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 28 20:32:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Include directive for ssh_config(5); feedback & ok markus@ + restore pre-auth compression support in the client -- the + previous commit was intended to remove it from the server only. - Upstream-ID: ae3b76e2e343322b9f74acde6f1e1c5f027d5fff - -commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Apr 13 10:39:57 2016 +1000 - - ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes + remove a few server-side pre-auth compression bits that escaped - If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables - and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may - attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables - set via PAM. + adjust wording of Compression directive in sshd_config(5) - CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson + pointed out by naddy@ ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: d23696ed72a228dacd4839dd9f2dec424ba2016b -commit dce19bf6e4a2a3d0b13a81224de63fc316461ab9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 9 12:39:30 2016 +0000 +commit 80d1c963b4dc84ffd11d09617b39c4bffda08956 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 28 17:59:22 2016 +0000 upstream commit - make private key loading functions consistently handle NULL - key pointer arguments; ok markus@ + use a separate TOKENS section, as we've done for + sshd_config(5); help/ok djm - Upstream-ID: 92038726ef4a338169c35dacc9c5a07fcc7fa761 + Upstream-ID: 640e32b5e4838e4363738cdec955084b3579481d -commit 5f41f030e2feb5295657285aa8c6602c7810bc4b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 8 21:14:13 2016 +1000 +commit 1cfd5c06efb121e58e8b6671548fda77ef4b4455 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 29 03:19:23 2016 +1000 - Remove NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT + Remove portability support for mmap - Replace by defining IPPORT_RESERVED to zero on Cygwin, which should have - the same effect without causing problems syncing patches with OpenBSD. - Resync the two affected functions with OpenBSD. ok djm, sanity checked - by Corinna. + We no longer need to wrap/replace mmap for portability now that + pre-auth compression has been removed from OpenSSH. -commit 34a01b2cf737d946ddb140618e28c3048ab7a229 +commit 0082fba4efdd492f765ed4c53f0d0fbd3bdbdf7f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 8 08:19:17 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 28 16:33:06 2016 +0000 upstream commit - whitespace at EOL + Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing + compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, + but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple + compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. - Upstream-ID: 5beffd4e001515da12851b974e2323ae4aa313b6 + Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed + the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the + required attack surface considerably larger. + + Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security + check in the shared memory manager found by Stack + (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ + + NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd + for >10 years. + + Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf -commit 90ee563fa6b54c59896c6c332c5188f866c5e75f +commit 27c3a9c2aede2184856b5de1e6eca414bb751c38 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 8 06:35:54 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 26 21:16:11 2016 +0000 upstream commit - We accidentally send an empty string and a zero uint32 with - every direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open, in contravention of our - own spec. + Avoid a theoretical signed integer overflow should + BN_num_bytes() ever violate its manpage and return a negative value. Improve + order of tests to avoid confusing increasingly pedantic compilers. - Fixing this is too hard wrt existing versions that expect these - fields to be present and fatal() if they aren't, so document them - as "reserved" fields in the PROTOCOL spec as though we always - intended this and let us never speak of it again. + Reported by Guido Vranken from stack (css.csail.mit.edu/stack) + unstable optimisation analyser output. ok deraadt@ - bz#2529, reported by Ron Frederick + Upstream-ID: f8508c830c86d8f36c113985e52bf8eedae23505 + +commit 8663e51c80c6aa3d750c6d3bcff6ee05091922be +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Sep 28 07:40:33 2016 +1000 + + fix mdoc2man.awk formatting for top-level lists - Upstream-ID: 34cd326a4d236ca6e39084c4ff796bd97ab833e7 + Reported by Glenn Golden + Diagnosis and fix from Ingo Schwarze -commit 0ccbd5eca0f0dd78e71a4b69c66f03a66908d558 +commit b97739dc21570209ed9d4e7beee0c669ed23b097 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 6 06:42:17 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 22 21:15:41 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't record duplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward - entries; fixes failure with ExitOnForwardFailure+hostname canonicalisation - where the same forwards are added on the second pass through the - configuration file. bz#2562; ok dtucker@ + missing bit from previous commit - Upstream-ID: 40a51d68b6300f1cc61deecdb7d4847b8b7b0de1 + Upstream-ID: 438d5ed6338b28b46e822eb13eee448aca31df37 -commit 574def0eb493cd6efeffd4ff2e9257abcffee0c8 -Author: krw@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Apr 2 14:37:42 2016 +0000 +commit de6a175a99d22444e10d19ad3fffef39bc3ee3bb +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 22 19:19:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Another use for fcntl() and thus of the superfluous 3rd - parameter is when sanitising standard fd's before calling daemon(). - - Use a tweaked version of the ssh(1) function in all three places - found using fcntl() this way. - - ok jca@ beck@ + organise the token stuff into a separate section; ok + markus for an earlier version of the diff ok/tweaks djm - Upstream-ID: f16811ffa19a1c5f4ef383c5f0fecb843c84e218 - -commit b3413534aa9d71a941005df2760d1eec2c2b0854 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 4 11:09:21 2016 +1000 - - Tidy up openssl header test. + Upstream-ID: 81a6daa506a4a5af985fce7cf9e59699156527c8 -commit 815bcac0b94bb448de5acdd6ba925b8725240b4f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 4 11:07:59 2016 +1000 +commit 16277fc45ffc95e4ffc3d45971ff8320b974de2b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 22 17:55:13 2016 +0000 - Fix configure-time warnings for openssl test. + upstream commit + + mention curve25519-sha256 KEX + + Upstream-ID: 33ae1f433ce4795ffa6203761fbdf86e0d7ffbaf -commit 95687f5831ae680f7959446d8ae4b52452ee05dd +commit 0493766d5676c7ca358824ea8d3c90f6047953df Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 1 02:34:10 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 22 17:52:53 2016 +0000 upstream commit - whitespace at EOL + support plain curve25519-sha256 KEX algorithm now that it + is approaching standardisation (same algorithm is currently supported as + curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) - Upstream-ID: 40ae2203d07cb14e0a89e1a0d4c6120ee8fd8c3a + Upstream-ID: 5e2b6db2e72667048cf426da43c0ee3fc777baa2 -commit fdfbf4580de09d84a974211715e14f88a5704b8e +commit f31c654b30a6f02ce0b8ea8ab81791b675489628 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 31 05:24:06 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 22 02:29:57 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Remove fallback from moduli to "primes" file that was - deprecated in 2001 and fix log messages referring to primes file. Based on - patch from xnox at ubuntu.com via bz#2559. "kill it" deraadt@ + If ssh receives a PACKET_DISCONNECT during userauth it + will cause ssh_dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, ...) to return without the + session being authenticated. Check for this and exit if necessary. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 0d4f8c70e2fa7431a83b95f8ca81033147ba8713 + Upstream-ID: b3afe126c0839d2eae6cddd41ff2ba317eda0903 -commit 0235a5fa67fcac51adb564cba69011a535f86f6b +commit 1622649b7a829fc8dc313042a43a974f0f3e8a99 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 17 17:19:43 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 21 19:53:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - UseDNS affects ssh hostname processing in authorized_keys, - not known_hosts; bz#2554 reported by jjelen AT redhat.com - - Upstream-ID: c1c1bb895dde46095fc6d81d8653703928437591 - -commit 8c4739338f5e379d05b19d6e544540114965f07e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 15 09:24:43 2016 +1100 - - Don't call Solaris setproject() with UsePAM=yes. + correctly return errors from kex_send_ext_info(). Fix from + Sami Farin via https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/50 - When Solaris Projects are enabled along with PAM setting the project - is PAM's responsiblity. bz#2425, based on patch from - brent.paulson at gmail.com. - -commit cff26f373c58457a32cb263e212cfff53fca987b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 15 04:30:21 2016 +1100 - - remove slogin from *.spec + Upstream-ID: c85999af28aaecbf92cfa2283381df81e839b42c -commit c38905ba391434834da86abfc988a2b8b9b62477 +commit f83a0cfe16c7a73627b46a9a94e40087d60f32fb Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 14 16:20:54 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 21 17:44:20 2016 +0000 upstream commit - unbreak authentication using lone certificate keys in - ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate - private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate key itself. - - bz#2550 reported by Peter Moody + cast uint64_t for printf - Upstream-ID: f939cd76d68e6a9a3d1711b5a943d6ed1e623966 + Upstream-ID: 76d23e89419ccbd2320f92792a6d878211666ac1 -commit 4b4bfb01cd40b9ddb948e6026ddd287cc303d871 +commit 5f63ab474f58834feca4f35c498be03b7dd38a16 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 10 11:47:57 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 21 17:03:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - sanitise characters destined for xauth reported by - github.com/tintinweb feedback and ok deraadt and markus + disable tests for affirmative negated match after backout of + match change - Upstream-ID: 18ad8d0d74cbd2ea3306a16595a306ee356aa261 + Upstream-Regress-ID: acebb8e5042f03d66d86a50405c46c4de0badcfd -commit 732b463d37221722b1206f43aa59563766a6a968 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Mar 14 16:04:23 2016 +1100 +commit a5ad3a9db5a48f350f257a67b62fafd719ecb7e0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 21 16:55:42 2016 +0000 - Pass supported malloc options to connect-privsep. + upstream commit - This allows us to activate only the supported options during the malloc - option portion of the connect-privsep test. - -commit d29c5b9b3e9f27394ca97a364ed4bb4a55a59744 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Mar 14 09:30:58 2016 +1100 - - Remove leftover roaming.h file. + Revert two recent changes to negated address matching. The + new behaviour offers unintuitive surprises. We'll find a better way to deal + with single negated matches. - Pointed out by des at des.no. - -commit 8ff20ec95f4377021ed5e9b2331320f5c5a34cea -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Mar 14 09:24:03 2016 +1100 - - Quote variables that may contain whitespace. + match.c 1.31: + > fix matching for pattern lists that contain a single negated match, + > e.g. "Host !example" + > + > report and patch from Robin Becker. bz#1918 ok dtucker@ - The variable $L_TMP_ID_FILE needs to be surrounded by quotes in order to - survive paths containing whitespace. bz#2551, from Corinna Vinschen via - Philip Hands. - -commit 627824480c01f0b24541842c7206ab9009644d02 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 11 14:47:41 2016 +1100 - - Include priv.h for priv_set_t. + addrmatch.c 1.11: + > fix negated address matching where the address list consists of a + > single negated match, e.g. "Match addr !192.20.0.1" + > + > Report and patch from Jakub Jelen. bz#2397 ok dtucker@ - From alex at cooperi.net. - -commit e960051f9a264f682c4d2fefbeecffcfc66b0ddf -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Mar 9 13:14:18 2016 +1100 - - Wrap stdint.h inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. + Upstream-ID: ec96c770f0f5b9a54e5e72fda25387545e9c80c6 -commit 2c48bd344d2c4b5e08dae9aea5ff44fc19a5e363 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Mar 9 12:46:50 2016 +1100 +commit 119b7a2ca0ef2bf3f81897ae10301b8ca8cba844 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 21 01:35:12 2016 +0000 - Add compat to monotime_double(). + upstream commit - Apply all of the portability changes in monotime() to monotime() double. - Fixes build on at least older FreeBSD systems. - -commit 7b40ef6c2eef40c339f6ea8920cb8a44838e10c9 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 8 14:12:58 2016 -0800 - - make a regress-binaries target + test all the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand % expansions - Easier to build all the regression/unit test binaries in one pass - than going through all of ${REGRESS_BINARIES} - -commit c425494d6b6181beb54a1b3763ef9e944fd3c214 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 8 14:03:54 2016 -0800 - - unbreak kexfuzz for -Werror without __bounded__ - -commit 3ed9218c336607846563daea5d5ab4f701f4e042 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Mar 8 14:01:29 2016 -0800 - - unbreak PAM after canohost refactor + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0a79a84dfaa59f958e46b474c3db780b454d30e3 -commit 885fb2a44ff694f01e4f6470f803629e11f62961 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 8 11:58:43 2016 +1100 +commit bfa9d969ab6235d4938ce069d4db7e5825c56a19 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 21 01:34:45 2016 +0000 - auth_get_canonical_hostname in portable code. + upstream commit - "refactor canohost.c" replaced get_canonical_hostname, this makes the - same change to some portable-specific code. + add a way for principals command to get see key ID and serial + too + + Upstream-ID: 0d30978bdcf7e8eaeee4eea1b030eb2eb1823fcb -commit 95767262caa6692eff1e1565be1f5cb297949a89 +commit 920585b826af1c639e4ed78b2eba01fd2337b127 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 7 19:02:43 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Sep 16 06:09:31 2016 +0000 upstream commit - refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer - to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is - cached in canohost.c + add a note on kexfuzz' limitations - feedback and ok markus@ + Upstream-Regress-ID: 03804d4a0dbc5163e1a285a4c8cc0a76a4e864ec + +commit 0445ff184080b196e12321998b4ce80b0f33f8d1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 16 01:01:41 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit - Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e + fix for newer modp DH groups + (diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 etc) + + Upstream-Regress-ID: fe942c669959462b507516ae1634fde0725f1c68 -commit af0bb38ffd1f2c4f9f43b0029be2efe922815255 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Mar 4 15:11:55 2016 +1100 +commit 28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 19 19:02:19 2016 +0000 - hook unittests/misc/kexfuzz into build + upstream commit + + move inbound NEWKEYS handling to kex layer; otherwise + early NEWKEYS causes NULL deref; found by Robert Swiecki/honggfuzz; fixed + with & ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 9a68b882892e9f51dc7bfa9f5a423858af358b2f -commit 331b8e07ee5bcbdca12c11cc8f51a7e8de09b248 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 4 02:48:06 2016 +0000 +commit 492710894acfcc2f173d14d1d45bd2e688df605d +Author: natano@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 19 07:52:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Filter debug messages out of log before picking the last - two lines. Should prevent problems if any more debug output is added late in - the connection. + Replace two more arc4random() loops with + arc4random_buf(). - Upstream-Regress-ID: 345d0a9589c381e7d640a4ead06cfaadf4db1363 + tweaks and ok dtucker + ok deraadt + + Upstream-ID: 738d3229130ccc7eac975c190276ca6fcf0208e4 -commit 0892edaa3ce623381d3a7635544cbc69b31cf9cb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 4 02:30:36 2016 +0000 +commit 1036356324fecc13099ac6e986b549f6219327d7 +Author: tedu@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 17 18:00:27 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add KEX fuzzer harness; ok deraadt@ + replace two arc4random loops with arc4random_buf ok + deraadt natano - Upstream-Regress-ID: 3df5242d30551b12b828aa9ba4a4cec0846be8d1 + Upstream-ID: e18ede972d1737df54b49f011fa4f3917a403f48 -commit ae2562c47d41b68dbb00240fd6dd60bed205367a -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 3 00:46:53 2016 +0000 +commit 00df97ff68a49a756d4b977cd02283690f5dfa34 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 14 20:11:26 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Look back 3 lines for possible error messages. Changes - to the code mean that "Bad packet length" errors are 3 lines back instead of - the previous two, which meant we didn't skip some offsets that we intended - to. + take fingerprint of correct key for + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand - Upstream-Regress-ID: 24f36912740a634d509a3144ebc8eb7c09b9c684 + Upstream-ID: 553581a549cd6a3e73ce9f57559a325cc2cb1f38 -commit 988e429d903acfb298bfddfd75e7994327adfed0 +commit e7907c1cb938b96dd33d27c2fea72c4e08c6b2f6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Mar 4 03:35:44 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 14 05:42:25 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix ClientAliveInterval when a time-based RekeyLimit is - set; previously keepalive packets were not being sent. bz#2252 report and - analysis by Christian Wittenhorst and Garrett Lee feedback and ok dtucker@ + add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match those + supported for AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, fingerprint, etc) and a + few more to provide access to the certificate's CA key; 'looks ok' dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: d48f9deadd35fdacdd5106b41bb07630ddd4aa81 + Upstream-ID: 6b00fd446dbebe67f4e4e146d2e492d650ae04eb -commit 8ef04d7a94bcdb8b0085fdd2a79a844b7d40792d +commit 2b939c272a81c4d0c47badeedbcb2ba7c128ccda Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 2 22:43:52 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Sep 14 00:45:31 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Improve accuracy of reported transfer speeds by waiting - for the ack from the other end. Pointed out by mmcc@, ok deraadt@ markus@ + Improve test coverage of ssh-keygen -T a bit. - Upstream-ID: 99f1cf15c9a8f161086b814d414d862795ae153d + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8851668c721bcc2b400600cfc5a87644cc024e72 -commit b8d4eafe29684fe4f5bb587f7eab948e6ed62723 +commit 44d82fc83be6c5ccd70881c2dac1a73e5050398b Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 2 22:42:40 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 12 02:25:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Improve precision of progressmeter for sftp and scp by - storing sub-second timestamps. Pointed out by mmcc@, ok deraadt@ markus@ + Add testcase for ssh-keygen -j, -J and -K options for + moduli screening. Does not currently test generation as that is extremely + slow. - Upstream-ID: 38fd83a3d83dbf81c8ff7b5d1302382fe54970ab + Upstream-Regress-ID: 9de6ce801377ed3ce0a63a1413f1cd5fd3c2d062 -commit 18f64b969c70ed00e74b9d8e50359dbe698ce4c0 -Author: jca@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 29 20:22:36 2016 +0000 +commit 44e5f756d286bc3a1a5272ea484ee276ba3ac5c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 23 08:17:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Print ssize_t with %zd; ok deraadt@ mmcc@ + add tests for addr_match_list() - Upstream-ID: 0590313bbb013ff6692298c98f7e0be349d124bd + Upstream-Regress-ID: fae2d1fef84687ece584738a924c7bf969616c8e -commit 6e7f68ce38130c794ec1fb8d2a6091fbe982628d +commit 445e218878035b59c704c18406e8aeaff4c8aa25 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Feb 28 22:27:00 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Sep 12 23:39:34 2016 +0000 upstream commit - rearrange DH public value tests to be a little more clear + handle certs in rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(), saving an + unnecessary special case elsewhere. - rearrange DH private value generation to explain rationale more - clearly and include an extra sanity check. + Upstream-ID: 901cb081c59d6d2698b57901c427f3f6dc7397d4 + +commit 130f5df4fa37cace8c079dccb690e5cafbf00751 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 12 23:31:27 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit - ok deraadt + list all supported signature algorithms in the + server-sig-algs Reported by mb AT smartftp.com in bz#2547 and (independantly) + Ron Frederick; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 9ad8a07e1a12684e1b329f9bd88941b249d4b2ad + Upstream-ID: ddf702d721f54646b11ef2cee6d916666cb685cd -commit 2ed17aa34008bdfc8db674315adc425a0712be11 +commit 8f750ccfc07acb8aa98be5a5dd935033a6468cfd Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Mar 1 15:24:20 2016 +1100 +Date: Mon Sep 12 14:43:58 2016 +1000 - Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. - - Note that 1.5k bit groups have been removed. + Remove no-op brackets to resync with upstream. -commit 72b061d4ba0f909501c595d709ea76e06b01e5c9 +commit 7050896e7395866278c19c2ff080c26152619d1d Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 26 14:40:04 2016 +1100 +Date: Mon Sep 12 13:57:28 2016 +1000 - Add a note about using xlc on AIX. + Resync ssh-keygen -W error message with upstream. -commit fd4e4f2416baa2e6565ea49d52aade296bad3e28 +commit 43cceff82cc20413cce58ba3375e19684e62cec4 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 24 10:44:25 2016 +1100 +Date: Mon Sep 12 13:55:37 2016 +1000 - Skip PrintLastLog in config dump mode. - - When DISABLE_LASTLOG is set, do not try to include PrintLastLog in the - config dump since it'll be reported as UNKNOWN. + Move ssh-keygen -W handling code to match upstream -commit 99135c764fa250801da5ec3b8d06cbd0111caae8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 23 20:17:23 2016 +1100 +commit af48d541360b1d7737b35740a4b1ca34e1652cd9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Sep 12 13:52:17 2016 +1000 - update spec/README versions ahead of release + Move ssh-keygen -T handling code to match upstream. -commit b86a334aaaa4d1e643eb1fd71f718573d6d948b5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 23 20:16:53 2016 +1100 +commit d8c3cfbb018825c6c86547165ddaf11924901c49 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Sep 12 13:30:50 2016 +1000 - put back portable patchlevel to p1 + Move -M handling code to match upstream. -commit 555dd35ff176847e3c6bd068ba2e8db4022eb24f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 23 09:14:34 2016 +0000 +commit 7b63cf6dbbfa841c003de57d1061acbf2ff22364 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 12 03:29:16 2016 +0000 upstream commit - openssh-7.2 + Spaces->tabs. - Upstream-ID: 9db776b26014147fc907ece8460ef2bcb0f11e78 + Upstream-ID: f4829dfc3f36318273f6082b379ac562eead70b7 -commit 1acc058d0a7913838c830ed998a1a1fb5b7864bf -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 23 16:12:13 2016 +1100 +commit 11e5e644536821ceb3bb4dd8487fbf0588522887 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 12 03:25:20 2016 +0000 - Disable tests where fs perms are incorrect + upstream commit - Some tests have strict requirements on the filesystem permissions - for certain files and directories. This adds a regress/check-perm - tool that copies the relevant logic from sshd to exactly test - the paths in question. This lets us skip tests when the local - filesystem doesn't conform to our expectations rather than - continuing and failing the test run. + Style whitespace fix. Also happens to remove a no-op + diff with portable. - ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: 45d90f9a62ad56340913a433a9453eb30ceb8bf3 -commit 39f303b1f36d934d8410b05625f25c7bcb75db4d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 23 12:56:59 2016 +1100 +commit 9136ec134c97a8aff2917760c03134f52945ff3c +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 12 01:22:38 2016 +0000 - fix sandbox on OSX Lion + upstream commit - sshd was failing with: + Add MAXIMUM(), MINIMUM(), and ROUNDUP() to misc.h, then + use those definitions rather than pulling and unknown namespace + pollution. ok djm markus dtucker - ssh_sandbox_child: sandbox_init: dlopen(/usr/lib/libsandbox.1.dylib, 261):cw - image not found [preauth] + Upstream-ID: 712cafa816c9f012a61628b66b9fbd5687223fb8 + +commit f219fc8f03caca7ac82a38ed74bbd6432a1195e7 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 7 18:39:24 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit - caused by chroot before sandboxing. Avoid by explicitly linking libsandbox - to sshd. Spotted by Darren. + sort; from matthew martin + + Upstream-ID: 73cec7f7ecc82d37a4adffad7745e4684de67ce7 -commit 0d1451a32c7436e6d3d482351e776bc5e7824ce4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 23 01:34:14 2016 +0000 +commit 06ce56b05def9460aecc7cdb40e861a346214793 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 6 09:22:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix spurious error message when incorrect passphrase - entered for keys; reported by espie@ ok deraadt@ + ssh_set_newkeys: print correct block counters on + rekeying; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 58b2e46e63ed6912ed1ee780bd3bd8560f9a5899 + Upstream-ID: 32bb7a9cb9919ff5bab28d50ecef3a2b2045dd1e -commit 09d87d79741beb85768b5e788d7dfdf4bc3543dc -Author: sobrado@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Feb 20 23:06:23 2016 +0000 +commit e5e8d9114ac6837a038f4952994ca95a97fafe8d +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 6 09:14:05 2016 +0000 upstream commit - set ssh(1) protocol version to 2 only. - - ok djm@ + update ext_info_c every time we receive a kexinit msg; + fixes sending of ext_info if privsep is disabled; report Aris Adamantiadis & + Mancha; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: e168daf9d27d7e392e3c9923826bd8e87b2b3a10 + Upstream-ID: 2ceaa1076e19dbd3542254b4fb8e42d608f28856 -commit 9262e07826ba5eebf8423f7ac9e47ec488c47869 -Author: sobrado@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Feb 20 23:02:39 2016 +0000 +commit da95318dbedbaa1335323dba370975c2f251afd8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 5 14:02:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add missing ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 to - IdentityFile. + remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal; + 64-bit block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until + attacks like sweet32 are extended to SSH. - ok djm@ + As 3des-cbc was the only mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may + cause problems connecting to older devices using the defaults, but + it's highly likely that such devices already need explicit + configuration for KEX and hostkeys anyway. - Upstream-ID: 6ce99466312e4ae7708017c3665e3edb976f70cf + ok deraadt, markus, dtucker + + Upstream-ID: a505dfe65c6733af0f751b64cbc4bb7e0761bc2f -commit c12f0fdce8f985fca8d71829fd64c5b89dc777f5 -Author: sobrado@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Feb 20 23:01:46 2016 +0000 +commit b33ad6d997d36edfea65e243cd12ccd01f413549 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 5 13:57:31 2016 +0000 upstream commit - AddressFamily defaults to any. - - ok djm@ + enforce expected request flow for GSSAPI calls; thanks to + Jakub Jelen for testing; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 0d94aa06a4b889bf57a7f631c45ba36d24c13e0c + Upstream-ID: d4bc0e70e1be403735d3d9d7e176309b1fd626b9 -commit 907091acb188b1057d50c2158f74c3ecf1c2302b +commit 0bb2980260fb24e5e0b51adac471395781b66261 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Feb 19 09:05:39 2016 +1100 +Date: Mon Sep 12 11:07:00 2016 +1000 - Make Solaris privs code build on older systems. + Restore ssh-keygen's -J and -j option handling. - Not all systems with Solaris privs have priv_basicset so factor that - out and provide backward compatibility code. Similarly, not all have - PRIV_NET_ACCESS so wrap that in #ifdef. Based on code from - alex at cooperi.net and djm@ with help from carson at taltos.org and - wieland at purdue.edu. + These were incorrectly removed in the 1d9a2e28 sync commit. -commit 292a8dee14e5e67dcd1b49ba5c7b9023e8420d59 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 17 22:20:14 2016 +0000 +commit 775f8a23f2353f5869003c57a213d14b28e0736e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Aug 31 10:48:07 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - rekey refactor broke SSH1; spotted by Tom G. Christensen + tighten PAM monitor calls - Upstream-ID: 43f0d57928cc077c949af0bfa71ef574dcb58243 + only allow kbd-interactive ones when that authentication method is + enabled. Prompted by Solar Designer -commit 3a13cb543df9919aec2fc6b75f3dd3802facaeca +commit 7fd0ea8a1db4bcfb3d8cd9df149e5d571ebea1f4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 17 08:57:34 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 30 07:50:21 2016 +0000 upstream commit - rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 cannot be selected explicitly - in *KeyTypes options yet. Remove them from the lists of algorithms for now. - committing on behalf of markus@ ok djm@ + restrict monitor auth calls to be allowed only when their + respective authentication methods are enabled in the configuration. - Upstream-ID: c6e8820eb8e610ac21551832c0c89684a9a51bb7 + prompted by Solar Designer; ok markus dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 6eb3f89332b3546d41d6dbf5a8e6ff920142b553 -commit a685ae8d1c24fb7c712c55a4f3280ee76f5f1e4b -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 17 07:38:19 2016 +0000 +commit b38b95f5bcc52278feb839afda2987933f68ff96 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Aug 29 11:47:07 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - since these pages now clearly tell folks to avoid v1, - normalise the docs from a v2 perspective (i.e. stop pointing out which bits - are v2 only); - - ok/tweaks djm ok markus + Tighten monitor state-machine flow for PAM calls - Upstream-ID: eb474f8c36fb6a532dc05c282f7965e38dcfa129 + (attack surface reduction) -commit c5c3f3279a0e4044b8de71b70d3570d692d0f29d +commit dc664d1bd0fc91b24406a3e9575b81c285b8342b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 17 05:29:04 2016 +0000 +Date: Sun Aug 28 22:28:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - make sandboxed privilege separation the default, not just - for new installs; "absolutely" deraadt@ + fix uninitialised optlen in getsockopt() call; harmless + on Unix/BSD but potentially crashy on Cygwin. Reported by James Slepicka ok + deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 5221ef3b927d2df044e9aa3f5db74ae91743f69b + Upstream-ID: 1987ccee508ba5b18f016c85100d7ac3f70ff965 -commit eb3f7337a651aa01d5dec019025e6cdc124ed081 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 16 07:47:54 2016 +0000 +commit 5bcc1e2769f7d6927d41daf0719a9446ceab8dd7 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 27 04:05:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - no need to state that protocol 2 is the default twice; + Pull in for struct timeval - Upstream-ID: b1e4c36b0c2e12e338e5b66e2978f2ac953b95eb + ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: ae34525485a173bccd61ac8eefeb91c57e3b7df6 -commit e7901efa9b24e5b0c7e74f2c5520d47eead4d005 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 16 05:11:04 2016 +0000 +commit fa4a4c96b19127dc2fd4e92f20d99c0c7f34b538 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 27 04:04:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Replace list of ciphers and MACs adjacent to -1/-2 flag - descriptions in ssh(1) with a strong recommendation not to use protocol 1. - Add a similar warning to the Protocol option descriptions in ssh_config(5) - and sshd_config(5); + Pull in for NULL - prompted by and ok mmcc@ + ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 961f99e5437d50e636feca023978950a232ead5e + Upstream-ID: 7baa6a0f1e049bb3682522b4b95a26c866bfc043 -commit 5a0fcb77287342e2fc2ba1cee79b6af108973dc2 +commit ae363d74ccc1451185c0c8bd4631e28c67c7fd36 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 16 03:37:48 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Aug 25 23:57:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add a "Close session" log entry (at loglevel=verbose) to - correspond to the existing "Starting session" one. Also include the session - id number to make multiplexed sessions more apparent. + add a sIgnore opcode that silently ignores options and + use it to suppress noisy deprecation warnings for the Protocol directive. - feedback and ok dtucker@ + req henning, ok markus - Upstream-ID: e72d2ac080e02774376325136e532cb24c2e617c + Upstream-ID: 9fe040aca3d6ff393f6f7e60045cdd821dc4cbe0 -commit 624fd395b559820705171f460dd33d67743d13d6 +commit a94c60306643ae904add6e8ed219e4be3494255c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Feb 17 02:24:17 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Aug 25 23:56:51 2016 +0000 upstream commit - include bad $SSH_CONNECTION in failure output + remove superfluous NOTREACHED comment - Upstream-Regress-ID: b22d72edfde78c403aaec2b9c9753ef633cc0529 + Upstream-ID: a7485c1f1be618e8c9e38fd9be46c13b2d03b90c -commit 60d860e54b4f199e5e89963b1c086981309753cb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 13:37:09 2016 +1100 +commit fc041c47144ce28cf71353124a8a5d183cd6a251 +Author: otto@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 23 16:21:45 2016 +0000 - Rollback addition of va_start. + upstream commit - va_start was added in 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e, however - it has the wrong number of args and it's not usable in non-variadic - functions anyway so it breaks things (for example Solaris 2.6 as - reported by Tom G. Christensen).i ok djm@ - -commit 2fee909c3cee2472a98b26eb82696297b81e0d38 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Feb 17 09:48:15 2016 +1100 - - Look for gethostbyname in libresolv and libnsl. + fix previous, a condition was modified incorrectly; ok + markus@ deraadt@ - Should fix build problem on Solaris 2.6 reported by Tom G. Christensen. - -commit 5ac712d81a84396aab441a272ec429af5b738302 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 16 10:45:02 2016 +1100 - - make existing ssh_malloc_init only for __OpenBSD__ + Upstream-ID: c443e339768e7ed396dff3bb55f693e7d3641453 -commit 24c9bded569d9f2449ded73f92fb6d12db7a9eec +commit 23555eb13a9b0550371a16dcf8beaab7a5806a64 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 15 23:32:37 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 23 08:17:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - memleak of algorithm name in mm_answer_sign; reported by - Jakub Jelen + downgrade an error() to a debug2() to match similar cases + in addr_match_list() - Upstream-ID: ccd742cd25952240ebd23d7d4d6b605862584d08 + Upstream-ID: 07c3d53e357214153d9d08f234411e0d1a3d6f5c -commit ffb1e7e896139a42ceb78676f637658f44612411 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 15 09:47:49 2016 +0000 +commit a39627134f6d90e7009eeb14e9582ecbc7a99192 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 23 06:36:23 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add a function to enable security-related malloc_options. - With and ok deraadt@, something similar has been in the snaps for a while. + remove Protocol directive from client/server configs that + causes spammy deprecation warnings - Upstream-ID: 43a95523b832b7f3b943d2908662191110c380ed + hardcode SSH_PROTOCOLS=2, since that's all we support on the server + now (the client still may support both, so it could get confused) + + Upstream-Regress-ID: c16662c631af51633f9fd06aca552a70535de181 -commit ef39e8c0497ff0564990a4f9e8b7338b3ba3507c +commit 6ee4f1c01ee31e65245881d49d4bccf014956066 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Feb 16 10:34:39 2016 +1100 +Date: Tue Aug 23 16:33:48 2016 +1000 - sync ssh-copy-id with upstream 783ef08b0a75 + hook match and utf8 unittests up to Makefile -commit d2d772f55b19bb0e8d03c2fe1b9bb176d9779efd +commit 114efe2bc0dd2842d997940a833f115e6fc04854 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 12 00:20:30 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 06:44:13 2016 +0000 upstream commit - avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present empty key IDs - bz#1773, ok markus@ + add tests for matching functions - Upstream-ID: 044a764fee526f2c4a9d530bd10695422d01fc54 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0869d4f5c5d627c583c6a929d69c17d5dd65882c -commit e4c918a6c721410792b287c9fd21356a1bed5805 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 11 02:56:32 2016 +0000 +commit 857568d2ac81c14bcfd625b27536c1e28c992b3c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Aug 23 14:32:37 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - sync crypto algorithm lists in ssh_config(5) and - sshd_config(5) with current reality. bz#2527 - - Upstream-ID: d7fd1b6c1ed848d866236bcb1d7049d2bb9b2ff6 + removing UseLogin bits from configure.ac -commit e30cabfa4ab456a30b3224f7f545f1bdfc4a2517 +commit cc182d01cef8ca35a1d25ea9bf4e2ff72e588208 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 11 02:21:34 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 23 03:24:10 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix regression in openssh-6.8 sftp client: existing - destination directories would incorrectly terminate recursive uploads; - bz#2528 + fix negated address matching where the address list + consists of a single negated match, e.g. "Match addr !192.20.0.1" + + Report and patch from Jakub Jelen. bz#2397 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 3306be469f41f26758e3d447987ac6d662623e18 + Upstream-ID: 01dcac3f3e6ca47518cf293e31c73597a4bb40d8 -commit 714e367226ded4dc3897078be48b961637350b05 +commit 4067ec8a4c64ccf16250c35ff577b4422767da64 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Feb 9 05:30:04 2016 +0000 +Date: Tue Aug 23 03:22:49 2016 +0000 upstream commit - turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd, - truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@ + fix matching for pattern lists that contain a single + negated match, e.g. "Host !example" - Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e + report and patch from Robin Becker. bz#1918 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 05a0cb323ea4bc20e98db099b42c067bfb9ea1ea -commit 5a622844ff7f78dcb75e223399f9ef0977e8d0a3 +commit 83b581862a1dbb06fc859959f829dde2654aef3c Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 8 23:40:12 2016 +0000 +Date: Fri Aug 19 03:18:06 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't attempt to percent_expand() already-canonicalised - addresses, avoiding unnecessary failures when attempting to connect to scoped - IPv6 addresses (that naturally contain '%' characters) + remove UseLogin option and support for having /bin/login + manage login sessions; ok deraadt markus dtucker - Upstream-ID: f24569cffa1a7cbde5f08dc739a72f4d78aa5c6a + Upstream-ID: bea7213fbf158efab7e602d9d844fba4837d2712 -commit 19bcf2ea2d17413f2d9730dd2a19575ff86b9b6a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 8 10:57:07 2016 +0000 +commit ffe6549c2f7a999cc5264b873a60322e91862581 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 15 12:32:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - refactor activation of rekeying - - This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously - the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes - application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets - about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events - themselves. - - Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch - Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@ + Catch up with the SSH1 code removal and delete all + mention of protocol 1 particularities, key files and formats, command line + options, and configuration keywords from the server documentation and + examples. ok jmc@ - Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8 + Upstream-ID: 850328854675b4b6a0d4a90f0b4a9dd9ca4e905f -commit 603ba41179e4b53951c7b90ee95b6ef3faa3f15d +commit c38ea634893a1975dbbec798fb968c9488013f4a Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 13:28:19 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 15 12:27:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Only check errno if read() has returned an error. EOF is - not an error. This fixes a problem where the mux master would sporadically - fail to notice that the client had exited. ok mikeb@ djm@ + Remove more SSH1 server code: * Drop sshd's -k option. * + Retire configuration keywords that only apply to protocol 1, as well as the + "protocol" keyword. * Remove some related vestiges of protocol 1 support. - Upstream-ID: 3c2dadc21fac6ef64665688aac8a75fffd57ae53 + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 9402f82886de917779db12f8ee3f03d4decc244d -commit 56d7dac790693ce420d225119283bc355cff9185 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 04:31:21 2016 +0000 +commit 33ba55d9e358c07f069e579bfab80eccaaad52cb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 16:26:04 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - avoid an uninitialised value when NumberOfPasswordPrompts - is 0 ok markus@ djm@ + Only check for prctl once. + +commit 976ba8a8fd66a969bf658280c1e5adf694cc2fc6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 15:33:10 2016 +1000 + + Fix typo. + +commit 9abf84c25ff4448891edcde60533a6e7b2870de1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 14:25:43 2016 +1000 + + Correct LDFLAGS for clang example. - Upstream-ID: 11b068d83c2865343aeb46acf1e9eec00f829b6b + --with-ldflags isn't used until after the -ftrapv test, so mention + LDFLAGS instead for now. -commit deae7d52d59c5019c528f977360d87fdda15d20b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 03:07:06 2016 +0000 +commit 1e8013a17ff11e3c6bd0012fb1fc8d5f1330eb21 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 14:08:42 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Remove obsolete CVS $Id from source files. - mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups; bz#2302 + Since -portable switched to git the CVS $Id tags are no longer being + updated and are becoming increasingly misleading. Remove them. + +commit adab758242121181700e48b4f6c60d6b660411fe +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 13:40:58 2016 +1000 + + Remove now-obsolete CVS $Id tags from text files. - Upstream-ID: e7b395fcca3122cd825515f45a2e41c9a157e09e + Since -portable switched to git, the CVS $Id tags are no longer being + updated and are becoming increasingly misleading. Remove them. -commit cac3b6665f884d46192c0dc98a64112e8b11a766 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Feb 5 02:37:56 2016 +0000 +commit 560c0068541315002ec4c1c00a560bbd30f2d671 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 13:38:30 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Add a section for compiler specifics. - better description for MaxSessions; bz#2531 + Add a section for compiler specifics and document the runtime requirements + for clang's integer sanitization. + +commit a8fc0f42e1eda2fa3393d1ea5e61322d5e07a9cd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Aug 17 13:35:43 2016 +1000 + + Test multiplying two long long ints. - Upstream-ID: e2c0d74ee185cd1a3e9d4ca1f1b939b745b354da + When using clang with -ftrapv or -sanitize=integer the tests would pass + but linking would fail with "undefined reference to __mulodi4". + Explicitly test for this before enabling -trapv. -commit 5ef4b0fdcc7a239577a754829b50022b91ab4712 +commit a1cc637e7e11778eb727559634a6ef1c19c619f6 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jan 27 17:45:56 2016 +1100 +Date: Tue Aug 16 14:47:34 2016 +1000 - avoid FreeBSD RCS Id in comment + add a --with-login-program configure argument - Change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't - become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no + Saves messing around with LOGIN_PROGRAM env var, which come + packaging environments make hard to do during configure phase. -commit 696d12683c90d20a0a9c5f4275fc916b7011fb04 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Feb 4 23:43:48 2016 +0000 +commit 8bd81e1596ab1bab355146cb65e82fb96ade3b23 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Aug 16 13:30:56 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - printf argument casts to avoid warnings on strict - compilers + add --with-pam-service to specify PAM service name - Upstream-ID: 7b9f6712cef01865ad29070262d366cf13587c9c + Saves messing around with CFLAGS to do it. -commit 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Feb 1 21:18:17 2016 +0000 +commit 74433a19bb6f4cef607680fa4d1d7d81ca3826aa +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Aug 16 13:28:23 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11 - forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set. This could also result in a - crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL. OK djm@ + fix false positives when compiled with msan - Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412 + Our explicit_bzero successfully confused clang -fsanitize-memory + in to thinking that memset is never called to initialise memory. + Ensure that it is called in a way that the compiler recognises. -commit 537f88ec7bcf40bd444ac5584c707c5588c55c43 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 29 05:18:15 2016 +0000 +commit 6cb6dcffe1a2204ba9006de20f73255c268fcb6b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 13 17:47:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add regression test for RekeyLimit parsing of >32bit values - (4G and 8G). + remove ssh1 server code; ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 548390350c62747b6234f522a99c319eee401328 + Upstream-ID: c24c0c32c49b91740d5a94ae914fb1898ea5f534 -commit 4c6cb8330460f94e6c7ae28a364236d4188156a3 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 29 23:04:46 2016 +0000 +commit 42d47adc5ad1187f22c726cbc52e71d6b1767ca2 +Author: jca@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 12 19:19:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Remove leftover roaming dead code. ok djm markus. + Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet for + configuration examples. - Upstream-ID: 13d1f9c8b65a5109756bcfd3b74df949d53615be - -commit 28136471809806d6246ef41e4341467a39fe2f91 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 29 05:46:01 2016 +0000 - - upstream commit + This makes the IPv6 example consistent with IPv4, and removes a dubious + mention of a 6bone subnet. - include packet type of non-data packets in debug3 output; - ok markus dtucker + ok sthen@ millert@ - Upstream-ID: 034eaf639acc96459b9c5ce782db9fcd8bd02d41 + Upstream-ID: b027f3d0e0073419a132fd1bf002e8089b233634 -commit 6fd6e28daccafaa35f02741036abe64534c361a1 +commit b61f53c0c3b43c28e013d3b3696d64d1c0204821 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 29 03:31:03 2016 +0000 +Date: Thu Aug 11 01:42:11 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Revert "account for packets buffered but not yet - processed" change as it breaks for very small RekeyLimit values due to - continuous rekeying. ok djm@ + Update moduli file. - Upstream-ID: 7e03f636cb45ab60db18850236ccf19079182a19 + Upstream-ID: 6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 -commit 921ff00b0ac429666fb361d2d6cb1c8fff0006cb +commit f217d9bd42d306f69f56335231036b44502d8191 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Aug 11 11:42:48 2016 +1000 + + Import updated moduli. + +commit 67dca60fbb4923b7a11c1645b90a5ca57c03d8be Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 29 02:54:45 2016 +0000 +Date: Mon Aug 8 22:40:57 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Allow RekeyLimits in excess of 4G up to 2**63 bits - (limited by the return type of scan_scaled). Part of bz#2521, ok djm. + Improve error message for overlong ControlPath. ok markus@ + djm@ - Upstream-ID: 13bea82be566b9704821b1ea05bf7804335c7979 + Upstream-ID: aed374e2e88dd3eb41390003e5303d0089861eb5 -commit c0060a65296f01d4634f274eee184c0e93ba0f23 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jan 29 02:42:46 2016 +0000 +commit 4706c1d8c15cd5565b59512853c2da9bd4ca26c9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 3 05:41:57 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Account for packets buffered but not yet processed when - computing whether or not it is time to perform rekeying. bz#2521, based - loosely on a patch from olo at fb.com, ok djm@ + small refactor of cipher.c: make ciphercontext opaque to + callers feedback and ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 67e268b547f990ed220f3cb70a5624d9bda12b8c + Upstream-ID: 094849f8be68c3bdad2c0f3dee551ecf7be87f6f -commit 44cf930e670488c85c9efeb373fa5f4b455692ac -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 27 06:44:58 2016 +0000 +commit e600348a7afd6325cc5cd783cb424065cbc20434 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 3 04:23:55 2016 +0000 upstream commit - change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't - become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no + Fix bug introduced in rev 1.467 which causes + "buffer_get_bignum_ret: incomplete message" errors when built with WITH_SSH1 + and run such that no Protocol 1 ephemeral host key is generated (eg "Protocol + 2", no SSH1 host key supplied). Reported by rainer.laatsch at t-online.de, + ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 8ca558c01f184e596b45e4fc8885534b2c864722 + Upstream-ID: aa6b132da5c325523aed7989cc5a320497c919dc -commit ebacd377769ac07d1bf3c75169644336056b7060 +commit d7e7348e72f9b203189e3fffb75605afecba4fda Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 27 00:53:12 2016 +0000 +Date: Wed Jul 27 23:18:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - make the debug messages a bit more useful here + better bounds check on iovcnt (we only ever use fixed, + positive values) - Upstream-ID: 478ccd4e897e0af8486b294aa63aa3f90ab78d64 + Upstream-ID: 9baa6eb5cd6e30c9dc7398e5fe853721a3a5bdee -commit 458abc2934e82034c5c281336d8dc0f910aecad3 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jan 23 05:31:35 2016 +0000 +commit 5faa52d295f764562ed6dd75c4a4ce9134ae71e3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 2 15:22:40 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Use tabs consistently inside "case $host". + +commit 20e5e8ba9c5d868d897896190542213a60fffbd2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 2 12:16:34 2016 +1000 + + Explicitly test for broken strnvis. - Zero a stack buffer with explicit_bzero() instead of - memset() when returning from client_loop() for consistency with - buffer_free()/sshbuf_free(). + NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the + existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed + for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during + development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it. + Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible + implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option + if we're cross compiling. - ok dtucker@ deraadt@ djm@ + OpenBSD 2.9 (2001): strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag); + NetBSD 6.0 (2012): strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag); - Upstream-ID: bc9975b2095339811c3b954694d7d15ea5c58f66 + ok djm@ -commit 65a3c0dacbc7dbb75ddb6a70ebe22d8de084d0b0 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 20 09:22:39 2016 +0000 +commit b0b48beab1b74100b61ecbadb9140c9ab4c2ea8c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Aug 2 11:06:23 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Include sys/time.h for gettimeofday. From sortie at - maxsi.org. - - Upstream-ID: 6ed0c33b836d9de0a664cd091e86523ecaa2fb3b + update recommended autoconf version -commit fc77ccdc2ce6d5d06628b8da5048a6a5f6ffca5a -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 14 22:56:56 2016 +0000 +commit 23902e31dfd18c6d7bb41ccd73de3b5358a377da +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Aug 2 10:48:04 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - fd leaks; report Qualys Security Advisory team; ok - deraadt@ + update config.guess and config.sub to current - Upstream-ID: 4ec0f12b9d8fa202293c9effa115464185aa071d + upstream commit 562f3512b3911ba0c77a7f68214881d1f241f46e -commit a306863831c57ec5fad918687cc5d289ee8e2635 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 14 16:17:39 2016 +0000 +commit dd1031b78b83083615b68d7163c44f4408635be2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 2 10:01:52 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - remove roaming support; ok djm@ + Replace spaces with tabs. - Upstream-ID: 2cab8f4b197bc95776fb1c8dc2859dad0c64dc56 + Mechanically replace spaces with tabs in compat files not synced with + OpenBSD. -commit 6ef49e83e30688504552ac10875feabd5521565f -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jan 14 14:34:34 2016 +0000 +commit c20dccb5614c5714f4155dda01bcdebf97cfae7e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 2 09:44:25 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Disable experimental client-side roaming support. Server - side was disabled/gutted for years already, but this aspect was surprisingly - forgotten. Thanks for report from Qualys + Strip trailing whitespace. - Upstream-ID: 2328004b58f431a554d4c1bf67f5407eae3389df + Mechanically strip trailing whitespace on files not synced with OpenBSD + (or in the case of bsd-snprint.c, rsync). -commit 8d7b523b96d3be180572d9d338cedaafc0570f60 +commit 30f9bd1c0963c23bfba8468dfd26aa17609ba42f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 2 09:06:27 2016 +1000 + + Repair $OpenBSD markers. + +commit 9715d4ad4b53877ec23dc8681dd7a405de9419a6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Aug 2 09:02:42 2016 +1000 + + Repair $OpenBSD marker. + +commit cf3e0be7f5828a5e5f6c296a607d20be2f07d60c +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Mon Aug 1 14:31:52 2016 -0700 + + modified: configure.ac opensshd.init.in + Skip generating missing RSA1 key on startup unless ssh1 support is enabled. + Spotted by Jean-Pierre Radley + +commit 99522ba7ec6963a05c04a156bf20e3ba3605987c Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 14 11:08:19 2016 +1100 +Date: Thu Jul 28 08:54:27 2016 +1000 - bump version numbers + define _OPENBSD_SOURCE for reallocarray on NetBSD + + Report by and debugged with Hisashi T Fujinaka, dtucker nailed + the problem (lack of prototype causing return type confusion). -commit 8c3d512a1fac8b9c83b4d0c9c3f2376290bd84ca +commit 3e1e076550c27c6bbdddf36d8f42bd79fbaaa187 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jan 14 11:04:04 2016 +1100 +Date: Wed Jul 27 08:25:42 2016 +1000 - openssh-7.1p2 + KNF -commit e6c85f8889c5c9eb04796fdb76d2807636b9eef5 +commit d99ee9c4e5e217e7d05eeec84e9ce641f4675331 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 15 01:30:36 2016 +1100 +Date: Wed Jul 27 08:25:23 2016 +1000 - forcibly disable roaming support in the client + Linux auditing also needs packet.h -commit ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jan 13 23:04:47 2016 +0000 +commit 393bd381a45884b589baa9aed4394f1d250255ca +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jul 27 08:18:05 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted - forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by - Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@ + fix auditing on Linux - Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938 + get_remote_ipaddr() was replaced with ssh_remote_ipaddr() -commit 9a728cc918fad67c8a9a71201088b1e150340ba4 +commit 80e766fb089de4f3c92b1600eb99e9495e37c992 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Jul 24 21:50:13 2016 +1000 + + crank version numbers + +commit b1a478792d458f2e938a302e64bab2b520edc1b3 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jan 12 23:42:54 2016 +0000 +Date: Sun Jul 24 11:45:36 2016 +0000 upstream commit - use explicit_bzero() more liberally in the buffer code; ok - deraadt + openssh-7.3 - Upstream-ID: 0ece37069fd66bc6e4f55eb1321f93df372b65bf + Upstream-ID: af106a7eb665f642648cf1993e162c899f358718 -commit 4626cbaf78767fc8e9c86dd04785386c59ae0839 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Jan 8 14:24:56 2016 +1100 +commit 353766e0881f069aeca30275ab706cd60a1a8fdd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 23 16:14:42 2016 +1000 - Support Illumos/Solaris fine-grained privileges - - Includes a pre-auth privsep sandbox and several pledge() - emulations. bz#2511, patch by Alex Wilson. + Move Cygwin IPPORT_RESERVED overrride to defines.h - ok dtucker@ + Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. -commit 422d1b3ee977ff4c724b597fb2e437d38fc8de9d +commit 368dd977ae07afb93f4ecea23615128c95ab2b32 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 31 00:33:52 2015 +0000 +Date: Sat Jul 23 02:54:08 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix three bugs in KRL code related to (unused) signature - support: verification length was being incorrectly calculated, multiple - signatures were being incorrectly processed and a NULL dereference that - occurred when signatures were verified. Reported by Carl Jackson + fix pledge violation with ssh -f; reported by Valentin + Kozamernik ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: e705e97ad3ccce84291eaa651708dd1b9692576b + Upstream-ID: a61db7988db88d9dac3c4dd70e18876a8edf84aa -commit 6074c84bf95d00f29cc7d5d3cd3798737851aa1a +commit f00211e3c6d24d6ea2b64b4b1209f671f6c1d42e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Dec 30 23:46:14 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 22 07:00:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - unused prototype + improve wording; suggested by jmc@ - Upstream-ID: f3eef4389d53ed6c0d5c77dcdcca3060c745da97 + Upstream-ID: 55cb0a24c8e0618b3ceec80998dc82c85db2d2f8 -commit 6213f0e180e54122bb1ba928e11c784e2b4e5380 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Dec 26 20:51:35 2015 +0000 +commit 83cbca693c3b0719270e6a0f2efe3f9ee93a65b8 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 22 05:46:11 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Use pread/pwrite instead separate lseek+read/write for - lastlog. Cast to off_t before multiplication to avoid truncation on ILP32 - - ok kettenis@ mmcc@ + Lower loglevel for "Authenticated with partial success" + message similar to other similar level. bz#2599, patch from cgallek at + gmail.com, ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: fc40092568cd195719ddf1a00aa0742340d616cf + Upstream-ID: 3faab814e947dc7b2e292edede23e94c608cb4dd -commit d7d2bc95045a43dd56ea696cc1d030ac9d77e81f -Author: semarie@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Dec 26 07:46:03 2015 +0000 +commit 10358abd087ab228b7ce2048efc4f3854a9ab9a6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 22 14:06:36 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - adjust pledge promises for ControlMaster: when using - "ask" or "autoask", the process will use ssh-askpass for asking confirmation. - - problem found by halex@ - - ok halex@ + retry waitpid on EINTR failure - Upstream-ID: 38a58b30ae3eef85051c74d3c247216ec0735f80 + patch from Jakub Jelen on bz#2581; ok dtucker@ -commit 271df8185d9689b3fb0523f58514481b858f6843 +commit da88a70a89c800e74ea8e5661ffa127a3cc79a92 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Dec 13 22:42:23 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit - - unbreak connections with peers that set - first_kex_follows; fix from Matt Johnston va bz#2515 - - Upstream-ID: decc88ec4fc7515594fdb42b04aa03189a44184b - -commit 43849a47c5f8687699eafbcb5604f6b9c395179f -Author: doug@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 17:41:37 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 22 03:47:36 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add "id" to ssh-agent pledge for subprocess support. - - Found the hard way by Jan Johansson when using ssh-agent with X. Also, - rearranged proc/exec and retval to match other pledge calls in the tree. - - ok djm@ + constify a few functions' arguments; patch from Jakub + Jelen bz#2581 - Upstream-ID: 914255f6850e5e7fa830a2de6c38605333b584db + Upstream-ID: f2043f51454ea37830ff6ad60c8b32b4220f448d -commit 52d7078421844b2f88329f5be3de370b0a938636 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 04:21:11 2015 +0000 +commit c36d91bd4ebf767f310f7cea88d61d1c15f53ddf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 22 03:39:13 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Remove NULL-checks before sshbuf_free(). - - ok djm@ + move debug("%p", key) to before key is free'd; probable + undefined behaviour on strict compilers; reported by Jakub Jelen bz#2581 - Upstream-ID: 5ebed00ed5f9f03b119a345085e8774565466917 + Upstream-ID: 767f323e1f5819508a0e35e388ec241bac2f953a -commit a4b9e0f4e4a6980a0eb8072f76ea611cab5b77e7 +commit 286f5a77c3bfec1e8892ca268087ac885ac871bf Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 03:24:25 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 22 03:35:11 2016 +0000 upstream commit - include remote port number in a few more messages; makes - tying log messages together into a session a bit easier; bz#2503 ok dtucker@ + reverse the order in which -J/JumpHost proxies are visited to + be more intuitive and document - Upstream-ID: 9300dc354015f7a7368d94a8ff4a4266a69d237e + reported by and manpage bits naddy@ + + Upstream-ID: 3a68fd6a841fd6cf8cedf6552a9607ba99df179a -commit 6091c362e89079397e68744ae30df121b0a72c07 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 03:20:09 2015 +0000 +commit fcd135c9df440bcd2d5870405ad3311743d78d97 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 21 01:39:35 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled without - SSHv1 support. From Iain Morgan bz#2505 + Skip passwords longer than 1k in length so clients can't + easily DoS sshd by sending very long passwords, causing it to spend CPU + hashing them. feedback djm@, ok markus@. - Upstream-ID: 8b8e7b02a448cf5e5635979df2d83028f58868a7 + Brought to our attention by tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, shilei-c at + 360.cn and coredump at autistici.org + + Upstream-ID: d0af7d4a2190b63ba1d38eec502bc4be0be9e333 -commit cce6a36bb95e81fa8bfb46daf22eabcf13afc352 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 03:19:09 2015 +0000 +commit 324583e8fb3935690be58790425793df619c6d4d +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 20 10:45:27 2016 +0000 upstream commit - use SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES consistently as buffer size when - reading key files. Increase it to match the size of the buffers already being - used. + Do not clobber the global jump_host variables when + parsing an inactive configuration. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 1b60586b484b55a947d99a0b32bd25e0ced56fae + Upstream-ID: 5362210944d91417d5976346d41ac0b244350d31 -commit 89540b6de025b80404a0cb8418c06377f3f98848 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 02:31:47 2015 +0000 +commit 32d921c323b989d28405e78d0a8923d12913d737 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 19 12:59:16 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Remove NULL-checks before sshkey_free(). - - ok djm@ + tweak previous; - Upstream-ID: 3e35afe8a25e021216696b5d6cde7f5d2e5e3f52 + Upstream-ID: f3c1a5b3f05dff366f60c028728a2b43f15ff534 -commit 79394ed6d74572c2d2643d73937dad33727fc240 +commit d7eabc86fa049a12ba2c3fb198bd1d51b37f7025 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 02:29:03 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Jul 19 11:38:53 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fflush stdout so that output is seen even when running in - debug mode when output may otherwise not be flushed. Patch from dustin at - null-ptr.net. + Allow wildcard for PermitOpen hosts as well as ports. + bz#2582, patch from openssh at mzpqnxow.com and jjelen at redhat.com. ok + markus@ - Upstream-ID: b0c6b4cd2cdb01d7e9eefbffdc522e35b5bc4acc + Upstream-ID: af0294e9b9394c4e16e991424ca0a47a7cc605f2 -commit ee607cccb6636eb543282ba90e0677b0604d8b7a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 15 15:23:49 2015 +1100 +commit b98a2a8348e907b3d71caafd80f0be8fdd075943 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 18 11:35:33 2016 +0000 - Increase robustness of redhat/openssh.spec + upstream commit - - remove configure --with-rsh, because this option isn't supported anymore - - replace last occurrence of BuildPreReq by BuildRequires - - update grep statement to query the krb5 include directory + Reduce timing attack against obsolete CBC modes by always + computing the MAC over a fixed size of data. Reported by Jean Paul + Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. ok djm@ - Patch from CarstenGrohmann via github, ok djm. + Upstream-ID: f20a13279b00ba0afbacbcc1f04e62e9d41c2912 -commit b5fa0cd73555b991a543145603658d7088ec6b60 +commit dbf788b4d9d9490a5fff08a7b09888272bb10fcc Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 15 15:10:32 2015 +1100 +Date: Thu Jul 21 14:17:31 2016 +1000 - Allow --without-ssl-engine with --without-openssl + Search users for one with a valid salt. - Patch from Mike Frysinger via github. + If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking + until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of + invalid users. ok djm@ -commit c1d7e546f6029024f3257cc25c92f2bddf163125 +commit e8b58f48fbb1b524fb4f0d4865fa0005d6a4b782 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 15 14:27:09 2015 +1100 +Date: Mon Jul 18 17:22:49 2016 +1000 - Include openssl crypto.h for SSLeay. + Explicitly specify source files for regress tools. - Patch from doughdemon via github. + Since adding $(REGRESSLIBS), $? is wrong because it includes only the + changed source files. $< seems like it'd be right however it doesn't + seem to work on some non-GNU makes, so do what works everywhere. -commit c6f5f01651526e88c00d988ce59d71f481ebac62 +commit eac1bbd06872c273f16ac0f9976b0aef026b701b Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Dec 15 13:59:12 2015 +1100 +Date: Mon Jul 18 17:12:22 2016 +1000 - Add sys/time.h for gettimeofday. + Conditionally include err.h. + +commit 0a454147568746c503f669e1ba861f76a2e7a585 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 18 16:26:26 2016 +1000 + + Remove local implementation of err, errx. - Should allow it it compile with MUSL libc. Based on patch from - doughdemon via github. + We now have a shared implementation in libopenbsd-compat. -commit 39736be06c7498ef57d6970f2d85cf066ae57c82 +commit eb999a4590846ba4d56ddc90bd07c23abfbab7b1 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 02:20:28 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Jul 18 06:08:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - correct error messages; from Tomas Kuthan bz#2507 + Add some unsigned overflow checks for extra_pad. None of + these are reachable with the amount of padding that we use internally. + bz#2566, pointed out by Torben Hansen. ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 7454a0affeab772398052954c79300aa82077093 + Upstream-ID: 4d4be8450ab2fc1b852d5884339f8e8c31c3fd76 -commit 94141b7ade24afceeb6762a3f99e09e47a6c42b6 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 11 00:20:04 2015 +0000 +commit c71ba790c304545464bb494de974cdf0f4b5cf1e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 18 15:43:25 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Add dependency on libs for unit tests. - Pass (char *)NULL rather than (char *)0 to execl and - execlp. + Makes "./configure && make tests" work again. ok djm@ + +commit 8199d0311aea3e6fd0284c9025e7a83f4ece79e8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 18 13:47:39 2016 +1000 + + Correct location for kexfuzz in clean target. + +commit 01558b7b07af43da774d3a11a5c51fa9c310849d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 18 09:33:25 2016 +1000 + + Handle PAM_MAXTRIES from modules. - ok dtucker@ + bz#2249: handle the case where PAM returns PAM_MAXTRIES by ceasing to offer + password and keyboard-interative authentication methods. Should prevent + "sshd ignoring max retries" warnings in the log. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 56c955106cbddba86c3dd9bbf786ac0d1b361492 + It probably won't trigger with keyboard-interactive in the default + configuration because the retry counter is stored in module-private + storage which goes away with the sshd PAM process (see bz#688). On the + other hand, those cases probably won't log a warning either. -commit d59ce08811bf94111c2f442184cf7d1257ffae24 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 10 17:08:40 2015 +0000 +commit 65c6c6b567ab5ab12945a5ad8e0ab3a8c26119cc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jul 17 04:20:16 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Remove NULL-checks before free(). + support UTF-8 characters in ssh(1) banners using + schwarze@'s safe fmprintf printer; bz#2058 - ok dtucker@ + feedback schwarze@ ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8 + Upstream-ID: a72ce4e3644c957643c9524eea2959e41b91eea7 -commit 8e56dd46cb37879c73bce2d6032cf5e7f82d5a71 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 10 07:01:35 2015 +0000 +commit e4eb7d910976fbfc7ce3e90c95c11b07b483d0d7 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 16 06:57:55 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix a couple "the the" typos. ok dtucker@ + - add proxyjump to the options list - formatting fixes - + update usage() - Upstream-ID: ec364c5af32031f013001fd28d1bd3dfacfe9a72 + ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 43d318e14ce677a2eec8f21ef5ba2f9f68a59457 -commit 6262a0522ddc2c0f2e9358dcb68d59b46e9c533e -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 7 20:04:09 2015 +0000 +commit af1f084857621f14bd9391aba8033d35886c2455 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 15 05:01:58 2016 +0000 upstream commit - stricter encoding type checks for ssh-rsa; ok djm@ + Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common protocol + events from LOG_CRIT by replacing fatal() calls with logdie(). Part of + bz#2585, ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 8cca7c787599a5e8391e184d0b4f36fdc3665650 + Upstream-ID: 9005805227c94edf6ac02a160f0e199638d288e5 -commit d86a3ba7af160c13496102aed861ae48a4297072 +commit bd5f2b78b69cf38d6049a0de445a79c8595e4a1f Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Dec 9 09:18:45 2015 +1100 +Date: Fri Jul 15 19:14:48 2016 +1000 - Don't set IPV6_V6ONLY on OpenBSD - - It isn't necessary and runs afoul of pledge(2) restrictions. + missing openssl/dh.h -commit da98c11d03d819a15429d8fff9688acd7505439f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Dec 7 02:20:46 2015 +0000 +commit 4a984fd342effe5f0aad874a0d538c4322d973c0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 15 18:47:07 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - basic unit tests for rsa-sha2-* signature types - - Upstream-Regress-ID: 7dc4b9db809d578ff104d591b4d86560c3598d3c + cast to avoid type warning in error message -commit 3da893fdec9936dd2c23739cdb3c0c9d4c59fca0 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Dec 5 20:53:21 2015 +0000 +commit 5abfb15ced985c340359ae7fb65a625ed3692b3e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 15 14:48:30 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - prefer rsa-sha2-512 over -256 for hostkeys, too; noticed - by naddy@ + Move VA_COPY macro into compat header. - Upstream-ID: 685f55f7ec566a8caca587750672723a0faf3ffe + Some AIX compilers unconditionally undefine va_copy but don't set it back + to an internal function, causing link errors. In some compat code we + already use VA_COPY instead so move the two existing instances into the + shared header and use for sshbuf-getput-basic.c too. Should fix building + with at lease some versions of AIX's compiler. bz#2589, ok djm@ -commit 8b56e59714d87181505e4678f0d6d39955caf10e -Author: tobias@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 4 21:51:06 2015 +0000 +commit 832b7443b7a8e181c95898bc5d73497b7190decd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 15 14:45:34 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Properly handle invalid %-format by calling fatal. - - ok deraadt, djm + disable ciphers not supported by OpenSSL - Upstream-ID: 5692bce7d9f6eaa9c488cb93d3b55e758bef1eac + bz#2466 ok dtucker@ + +commit 5fbe93fc6fbb2fe211e035703dec759d095e3dd8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 15 13:54:31 2016 +1000 -commit 76c9fbbe35aabc1db977fb78e827644345e9442e -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 4 16:41:28 2015 +0000 + add a --disable-pkcs11 knob - upstream commit - - implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures - (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and - draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ +commit 679ce88ec2a8e2fe6515261c489e8c1449bb9da9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 15 13:44:38 2016 +1000 + + fix newline escaping for unsupported_algorithms - Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309 + The hmac-ripemd160 was incorrect and could lead to broken + Makefiles on systems that lacked support for it, but I made + all the others consistent too. -commit 6064a8b8295cb5a17b5ebcfade53053377714f40 +commit ed877ef653847d056bb433975d731b7a1132a979 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Dec 4 00:24:55 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 15 00:24:30 2016 +0000 upstream commit - clean up agent_fd handling; properly initialise it to -1 - and make tests consistent - - ok markus@ - - Upstream-ID: ac9554323d5065745caf17b5e37cb0f0d4825707 - -commit b91926a97620f3e51761c271ba57aa5db790f48d -Author: semarie@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Dec 3 17:00:18 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + Add a ProxyJump ssh_config(5) option and corresponding -J + ssh(1) command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a SSH + bastion or "jump host". - pledges ssh client: - mux client: which is used when - ControlMaster is in use. will end with "stdio proc tty" (proc is to - permit sending SIGWINCH to mux master on window resize) + These options construct a proxy command that connects to the + specified jump host(s) (more than one may be specified) and uses + port-forwarding to establish a connection to the next destination. - - client loop: several levels of pledging depending of your used options + This codifies the safest way of indirecting connections through SSH + servers and makes it easy to use. - ok deraadt@ + ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 21676155a700e51f2ce911e33538e92a2cd1d94b + Upstream-ID: fa899cb8b26d889da8f142eb9774c1ea36b04397 -commit bcce47466bbc974636f588b5e4a9a18ae386f64a -Author: doug@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Dec 2 08:30:50 2015 +0000 +commit 5c02dd126206a26785379e80f2d3848e4470b711 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 15 12:56:39 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Add "cpath" to the ssh-agent pledge so the cleanup - handler can unlink(). - - ok djm@ + Map umac_ctx struct name too. - Upstream-ID: 9e632991d48241d56db645602d381253a3d8c29d + Prevents size mismatch linker warnings on Solaris 11. -commit a90d001543f46716b6590c6dcc681d5f5322f8cf -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Dec 2 08:00:58 2015 +0000 +commit 283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 15 13:49:44 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins. - ssh-agent pledge needs proc for askpass; spotted by todd@ + When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and + it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for + the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password + is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long + password string which is slower to hash than the fake password. - Upstream-ID: 349aa261b29cc0e7de47ef56167769c432630b2a + Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length + as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash. + Diff from djm@ -commit d952162b3c158a8f23220587bb6c8fcda75da551 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Dec 1 23:29:24 2015 +0000 +commit 9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 15 13:32:45 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Determine appropriate salt for invalid users. - basic pledge() for ssh-agent, more refinement needed + When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses + the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the + password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on + systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid + salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing + from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows + user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted + by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210). - Upstream-ID: 5b5b03c88162fce549e45e1b6dd833f20bbb5e13 + To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing + passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@ -commit f0191d7c8e76e30551084b79341886d9bb38e453 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Nov 30 10:53:25 2015 +1100 +commit a162dd5e58ca5b224d7500abe35e1ef32b5de071 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 14 21:19:59 2016 +1000 - Revert "stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it" - - This reverts commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c. - - dtucker beat me to it :/ + OpenSSL 1.1.x not currently supported. -commit 6283cc72eb0e49a3470d30e07ca99a1ba9e89676 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Nov 30 10:37:03 2015 +1100 +commit 7df91b01fc558a33941c5c5f31abbcdc53a729fb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 14 12:25:24 2016 +1000 - revert 7d4c7513: bring back S/Key prototypes + Check for VIS_ALL. - (but leave RCSID changes) + If we don't have it, set BROKEN_STRNVIS to activate the compat replacement. -commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Nov 30 09:45:29 2015 +1100 +commit ee67716f61f1042d5e67f91c23707cca5dcdd7d0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 14 01:24:21 2016 +0000 - stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it + upstream commit + + Correct equal in test. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4e32f7a5c57a619c4e8766cb193be2a1327ec37a -commit 452c0b6af5d14c37553e30059bf74456012493f3 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 29 22:18:37 2015 +0000 +commit 372807c2065c8572fdc6478b25cc5ac363743073 +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 11 21:38:13 2016 +0000 upstream commit - pledge, better fatal() messages; feedback deraadt@ + Add missing "recvfd" pledge promise: Raf Czlonka reported + ssh coredumps when Control* keywords were set in ssh_config. This patch also + fixes similar problems with scp and sftp. - Upstream-ID: 3e00f6ccfe2b9a7a2d1dbba5409586180801488f + ok deraadt, looks good to millert + + Upstream-ID: ca2099eade1ef3e87a79614fefa26a0297ad8a3b -commit 6da413c085dba37127687b2617a415602505729b -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 28 06:50:52 2015 +0000 +commit e0453f3df64bf485c61c7eb6bd12893eee9fe2cd +Author: tedu@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 11 03:19:44 2016 +0000 upstream commit - do not leak temp file if there is no known_hosts file - from craig leres, ok djm + obsolete note about fascistloggin is obsolete. ok djm + dtucker - Upstream-ID: c820497fd5574844c782e79405c55860f170e426 + Upstream-ID: dae60df23b2bb0e89f42661ddd96a7b0d1b7215a -commit 3ddd15e1b63a4d4f06c8ab16fbdd8a5a61764f16 +commit a2333584170a565adf4f209586772ef8053b10b8 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Nov 30 07:23:53 2015 +1100 +Date: Thu Jul 14 10:59:09 2016 +1000 - Add a null implementation of pledge. + Add compat code for missing wcwidth. - Fixes builds on almost everything. + If we don't have wcwidth force fallback implementations of nl_langinfo + and mbtowc. Based on advice from Ingo Schwarze. -commit b1d6b3971ef256a08692efc409fc9ada719111cc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Nov 28 06:41:03 2015 +0000 +commit 8aaec7050614494014c47510b7e94daf6e644c62 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jul 14 09:48:48 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - don't include port number in tcpip-forward replies for - requests that don't allocate a port; bz#2509 diagnosed by Ron Frederick ok - markus + fix missing include for systems with err.h + +commit 6310ef27a2567cda66d6cf0c1ad290ee1167f243 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 13 14:42:35 2016 +1000 + + Move err.h replacements into compat lib. - Upstream-ID: 77efad818addb61ec638b5a2362f1554e21a970a + Move implementations of err.h replacement functions into their own file + in the libopenbsd-compat so we can use them in kexfuzz.c too. ok djm@ -commit 9080bd0b9cf10d0f13b1f642f20cb84285cb8d65 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 27 00:49:31 2015 +0000 +commit f3f2cc8386868f51440c45210098f65f9787449a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 11 17:23:38 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Check for wchar.h and langinfo.h - pledge "stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec" - except for the -p option (which sadly has insane semantics...) ok semarie - dtucker + Wrap includes in the appropriate #ifdefs. + +commit b9c50614eba9d90939b2b119b6e1b7e03b462278 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 8 13:59:13 2016 +1000 + + whitelist more architectures for seccomp-bpf - Upstream-ID: 8854bbd58279abe00f6c33f8094bdc02c8c65059 + bz#2590 - testing and patch from Jakub Jelen -commit 4d90625b229cf6b3551d81550a9861897509a65f -Author: halex@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 20 23:04:01 2015 +0000 +commit 18813a32b6fd964037e0f5e1893cb4468ac6a758 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 4 18:01:44 2016 +0000 upstream commit - allow comment change for all supported formats + DEBUGLIBS has been broken since the gcc4 switch, so delete + it. CFLAGS contains -g by default anyway - ok djm@ + problem noted by Edgar Pettijohn (edgar (at) pettijohn-web.com) + ok millert@ kettenis@ deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 5fc477cf2f119b2d44aa9c683af16cb00bb3744b + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4a0bb72f95c63f2ae9daa8a040ac23914bddb542 -commit 8ca915fc761519dd1f7766a550ec597a81db5646 +commit 6d31193d0baa3da339c196ac49625b7ba1c2ecc7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 20 01:45:29 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jul 8 03:44:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add cast to make -Werror clean + Improve crypto ordering for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode + MAC algorithms. - Upstream-ID: 288db4f8f810bd475be01320c198250a04ff064d - -commit ac9473580dcd401f8281305af98635cdaae9bf96 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Nov 20 12:35:41 2015 +1100 - - fix multiple authentication using S/Key w/ privsep + Previously we were computing the MAC, decrypting the packet and then + checking the MAC. This gave rise to the possibility of creating a + side-channel oracle in the decryption step, though no such oracle has + been identified. - bz#2502, patch from Kevin Korb and feandil_ + This adds a mac_check() function that computes and checks the MAC in + one pass, and uses it to advance MAC checking for EtM algorithms to + before payload decryption. + + Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and + Martin Albrecht. feedback and ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 1999bb67cab47dda5b10b80d8155fe83d4a1867b -commit 88b6fcdeb87a2fb76767854d9eb15006662dca57 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 19 08:23:27 2015 +0000 +commit 71f5598f06941f645a451948c4a5125c83828e1c +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 4 18:01:44 2016 +0000 upstream commit - ban ConnectionAttempts=0, it makes no sense and would cause - ssh_connect_direct() to print an uninitialised stack variable; bz#2500 - reported by dvw AT phas.ubc.ca + DEBUGLIBS has been broken since the gcc4 switch, so + delete it. CFLAGS contains -g by default anyway - Upstream-ID: 32b5134c608270583a90b93a07b3feb3cbd5f7d5 + problem noted by Edgar Pettijohn (edgar (at) pettijohn-web.com) + ok millert@ kettenis@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 -commit 964ab3ee7a8f96bdbc963d5b5a91933d6045ebe7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 19 01:12:32 2015 +0000 +commit e683fc6f1c8c7295648dbda679df8307786ec1ce +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 30 05:17:05 2016 +0000 upstream commit - trailing whitespace + Explicitly check for 100% completion to avoid potential + floating point rounding error, which could cause progressmeter to report 99% + on completion. While there invert the test so the 100% case is clearer. with + & ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 31fe0ad7c4d08e87f1d69c79372f5e3c5cd79051 + Upstream-ID: a166870c5878e422f3c71ff802e2ccd7032f715d -commit f96516d052dbe38561f6b92b0e4365d8e24bb686 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 19 01:09:38 2015 +0000 +commit 772e6cec0ed740fc7db618dc30b4134f5a358b43 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 29 17:14:28 2016 +0000 upstream commit - print host certificate contents at debug level + sort the -o list; - Upstream-ID: 39354cdd8a2b32b308fd03f98645f877f540f00d + Upstream-ID: 1a97465ede8790b4d47cb618269978e07f41f8ac -commit 499cf36fecd6040e30e2912dd25655bc574739a7 +commit 46ecd19e554ccca15a7309cd1b6b44bc8e6b84af Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 19 01:08:55 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Jun 23 05:17:51 2016 +0000 upstream commit - move the certificate validity formatting code to - sshkey.[ch] + fix AuthenticationMethods during configuration re-parse; + reported by Juan Francisco Cantero Hurtado - Upstream-ID: f05f7c78fab20d02ff1d5ceeda533ef52e8fe523 + Upstream-ID: 8ffa1dac25c7577eca8238e825317ab20848f9b4 -commit bcb7bc77bbb1535d1008c7714085556f3065d99d +commit 3147e7595d0f2f842a666c844ac53e6c7a253d7e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 18 08:37:28 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Jun 19 07:48:02 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix "ssh-keygen -l" of private key, broken in support for - multiple plain keys on stdin + revert 1.34; causes problems loading public keys - Upstream-ID: 6b3132d2c62d03d0bad6f2bcd7e2d8b7dab5cd9d + reported by semarie@ + + Upstream-ID: b393794f8935c8b15d98a407fe7721c62d2ed179 -commit 259adb6179e23195c8f6913635ea71040d1ccd63 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 16 23:47:52 2015 +0000 +commit ad23a75509f4320d43f628c50f0817e3ad12bfa7 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 17 06:33:30 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Replace remaining calls to index(3) with strchr(3). OK - jca@ krw@ + grammar fix; - Upstream-ID: 33837d767a0cf1db1489b96055f9e330bc0bab6d + Upstream-ID: 5d5b21c80f1e81db367333ce0bb3e5874fb3e463 -commit c56a255162c2166884539c0a1f7511575325b477 +commit 5e28b1a2a3757548b40018cc2493540a17c82e27 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 16 22:53:07 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 17 05:06:23 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Allow fingerprinting from standard input "ssh-keygen -lf - -" - - Support fingerprinting multiple plain keys in a file and authorized_keys - files too (bz#1319) - - ok markus@ + translate OpenSSL error codes to something more + meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 903f8b4502929d6ccf53509e4e07eae084574b77 + Upstream-ID: 4cb0795a366381724314e6515d57790c5930ffe5 -commit 5b4010d9b923cf1b46c9c7b1887c013c2967e204 +commit b64faeb5eda7eff8210c754d00464f9fe9d23de5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 16 22:51:05 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 17 05:03:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - always call privsep_preauth_child() regardless of whether - sshd was started by root; it does important priming before sandboxing and - failing to call it could result in sandbox violations later; ok markus@ + ban AuthenticationMethods="" and accept + AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not requiring multiple + authentication - Upstream-ID: c8a6d0d56c42f3faab38460dc917ca0d1705d383 + bz#2398 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: fabd7f44d59e4518d241d0d01e226435cc23cf27 -commit 3a9f84b58b0534bbb485f1eeab75665e2d03371f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 16 22:50:01 2015 +0000 +commit 9816fc5daee5ca924dd5c4781825afbaab728877 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 16 11:00:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - improve sshkey_read() semantics; only update *cpp when a - key is successfully read; ok markus@ + Include stdarg.h for va_copy as per man page. - Upstream-ID: f371e78e8f4fab366cf69a42bdecedaed5d1b089 + Upstream-ID: 105d6b2f1af2fbd9d91c893c436ab121434470bd -commit db6f8dc5dd5655b59368efd074994d4568bc3556 -Author: logan@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 16 06:13:04 2015 +0000 +commit b6cf84b51bc0f5889db48bf29a0c771954ade283 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 16 06:10:45 2016 +0000 upstream commit - 1) Use xcalloc() instead of xmalloc() to check for - potential overflow. (Feedback from both mmcc@ and djm@) 2) move set_size - just before the for loop. (suggested by djm@) + keys stored in openssh format can have comments too; diff + from yonas yanfa, tweaked a bit; - OK djm@ + ok djm - Upstream-ID: 013534c308187284756c3141f11d2c0f33c47213 + Upstream-ID: 03d48536da6e51510d73ade6fcd44ace731ceb27 -commit 383f10fb84a0fee3c01f9d97594f3e22aa3cd5e0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Nov 16 00:30:02 2015 +0000 +commit aa37768f17d01974b6bfa481e5e83841b6c76f86 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jun 20 15:55:34 2016 +1000 + + get_remote_name_or_ip inside LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX + + Apply the same get_remote_name_or_ip -> session_get_remote_name_or_ip + change as commit 95767262 to the code inside #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX. + Fixes build on AIX. + +commit 009891afc8df37bc2101e15d1e0b6433cfb90549 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 17 14:34:09 2016 +1000 + + Remove duplicate code from PAM. ok djm@ + +commit e690fe85750e93fca1fb7c7c8587d4130a4f7aba +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 15 00:40:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that - includes all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc). Also - add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty". - This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures they are - maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions we might implement in the - future. + Remove "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!" from log message + about forward and reverse DNS not matching. We haven't supported IP-based + auth methods for a very long time so it's now misleading. part of bz#2585, + ok markus@ - Example: + Upstream-ID: 5565ef0ee0599b27f0bd1d3bb1f8a323d8274e29 + +commit 57b4ee04cad0d3e0fec1194753b0c4d31e39a1cd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jun 15 11:22:38 2016 +1000 + + Move platform_disable_tracing into its own file. - restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1... + Prevents link errors resolving the extern "options" when platform.o + gets linked into ssh-agent when building --with-pam. + +commit 78dc8e3724e30ee3e1983ce013e80277dc6ca070 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jun 14 13:55:12 2016 +1000 + + Track skipped upstream commit IDs. - Idea from Jann Horn; ok markus@ + There are a small number of "upstream" commits that do not correspond to + a file in -portable. This file tracks those so that we can reconcile + OpenBSD and Portable to ensure that no commits are accidentally missed. - Upstream-ID: 04ceb9d448e46e67e13887a7ae5ea45b4f1719d0 + If you add something to .skipped-commit-ids please also add an upstream + ID line in the following format when you commit it. + + Upstream-ID: 321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 + Upstream-ID: d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca + Upstream-ID: aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 + Upstream-ID: 8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 + Upstream-ID: f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a + Upstream-ID: edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef + Upstream-ID: 052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 + Upstream-ID: 7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 + Upstream-ID: 180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae + Upstream-ID: f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee -commit e41a071f7bda6af1fb3f081bed0151235fa61f15 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 15 23:58:04 2015 +0000 +commit 9f919d1a3219d476d6a662d18df058e1c4f36a6f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jun 14 13:51:01 2016 +1000 + + Remove now-defunct .cvsignore files. ok djm + +commit 68777faf271efb2713960605c748f6c8a4b26d55 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 8 02:13:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - correct section number for ssh-agent; + Back out rev 1.28 "Check min and max sizes sent by the + client" change. It caused "key_verify failed for server_host_key" in clients + that send a DH-GEX min value less that DH_GRP_MIN, eg old OpenSSH and PuTTY. + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 44be72fd8bcc167635c49b357b1beea8d5674bd6 + Upstream-ID: 452979d3ca5c1e9dff063287ea0a5314dd091f65 -commit 1a11670286acddcc19f5eff0966c380831fc4638 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 15 23:54:15 2015 +0000 +commit a86ec4d0737ac5879223e7cd9d68c448df46e169 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jun 14 10:48:27 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + Use Solaris setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, ...). - do not confuse mandoc by presenting "Dd"; + Where possible, use Solaris setpflags to disable process tracing on + ssh-agent and sftp-server. bz#2584, based on a patch from huieying.lee + at oracle.com, ok djm. + +commit 0f916d39b039fdc0b5baf9b5ab0754c0f11ec573 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jun 14 10:43:53 2016 +1000 + + Shorten prctl code a tiny bit. + +commit 0fb7f5985351fbbcd2613d8485482c538e5123be +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jun 9 16:23:07 2016 +1000 + + Move prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE into platform.c. - Upstream-ID: 1470fce171c47b60bbc7ecd0fc717a442c2cfe65 + This should make it easier to add additional platform support such as + Solaris (bz#2584). -commit f361df474c49a097bfcf16d1b7b5c36fcd844b4b -Author: jcs@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 15 22:26:49 2015 +0000 +commit e6508898c3cd838324ecfe1abd0eb8cf802e7106 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 04:10:41 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to - 'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a - private key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if - it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm'). - - Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago. - - ok markus@ + Add a test for ssh(1)'s config file parsing. - Upstream-ID: a680db2248e8064ec55f8be72d539458c987d5f4 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 558b7f4dc45cc3761cc3d3e889b9f3c5bc91e601 -commit d87063d9baf5479b6e813d47dfb694a97df6f6f5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 13 04:39:35 2015 +0000 +commit ab0a536066dfa32def0bd7272c096ebb5eb25b11 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 03:47:59 2016 +0000 upstream commit - send SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED replies to unexpected - messages during KEX; bz#2949, ok dtucker@ + Add 'sshd' to the test ID as I'm about to add a similar + set for ssh. - Upstream-ID: 2b3abdff344d53c8d505f45c83a7b12e84935786 + Upstream-Regress-ID: aea7a9c3bac638530165c801ce836875b228ae7a -commit 9fd04681a1e9b0af21e08ff82eb674cf0a499bfc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 13 04:38:06 2015 +0000 +commit a5577c1ed3ecdfe4b7b1107c526cae886fc91afb +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 30 12:14:08 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config - ForceCommand and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to override a - global default. bz#2486 ok dtucker@ + stricter malloc.conf(5) options for utf8 tests - Upstream-ID: 7ef478d6592bc7db5c7376fc33b4443e63dccfa5 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 111efe20a0fb692fa1a987f6e823310f9b25abf6 -commit 94bc0b72c29e511cbbc5772190d43282e5acfdfe -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 13 04:34:15 2015 +0000 +commit 75f0844b4f29d62ec3a5e166d2ee94b02df819fc +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 30 12:05:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - support multiple certificates (one per line) and - reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"; ok dtucker@ + Fix two rare edge cases: 1. If vasprintf() returns < 0, + do not access a NULL pointer in snmprintf(), and do not free() the pointer + returned from vasprintf() because on some systems other than OpenBSD, it + might be a bogus pointer. 2. If vasprintf() returns == 0, return 0 and "" + rather than -1 and NULL. - Upstream-ID: ecbadeeef3926e5be6281689b7250a32a80e88db + Besides, free(dst) is pointless after failure (not a bug). + + One half OK martijn@, the other half OK deraadt@; + committing quickly before people get hurt. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: b164f20923812c9bac69856dbc1385eb1522cba4 -commit b6b9108f5b561c83612cb97ece4134eb59fde071 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 13 02:57:46 2015 +0000 +commit 016881eb33a7948028848c90f4c7ac42e3af0e87 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 26 19:14:25 2016 +0000 upstream commit - list a couple more options usable in Match blocks; - bz#2489 + test the new utf8 module - Upstream-ID: e4d03f39d254db4c0cc54101921bb89fbda19879 + Upstream-Regress-ID: c923d05a20e84e4ef152cbec947fdc4ce6eabbe3 -commit a7994b3f5a5a5a33b52b0a6065d08e888f0a99fb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 11 04:56:39 2015 +0000 +commit d4219028bdef448e089376f3afe81ef6079da264 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 15:30:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - improve PEEK/POKE macros: better casts, don't multiply - evaluate arguments; ok deraadt@ + Set umask to prevent "Bad owner or permissions" errors. - Upstream-ID: 9a1889e19647615ededbbabab89064843ba92d3e + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8fdf2fc4eb595ccd80c443f474d639f851145417 -commit 7d4c7513a7f209cb303a608ac6e46b3f1dfc11ec +commit 07d5608bb237e9b3fe86a2aeaa429392230faebf Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Nov 11 01:48:01 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue May 3 14:41:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - remove prototypes for long-gone s/key support; ok - dtucker@ + support doas - Upstream-ID: db5bed3c57118af986490ab23d399df807359a79 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8d5572b27ea810394eeda432d8b4e9e1064a7c38 -commit 07889c75926c040b8e095949c724e66af26441cb -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Sat Nov 14 18:44:49 2015 +1100 +commit 01cabf10adc7676cba5f40536a34d3b246edb73f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 13:48:33 2016 +0000 - read back from libcrypto RAND when privdropping + upstream commit - makes certain libcrypto implementations cache a /dev/urandom fd - in preparation of sandboxing. Based on patch by Greg Hartman. - -commit 1560596f44c01bb0cef977816410950ed17b8ecd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Nov 10 11:14:47 2015 +1100 - - Fix compiler warnings in the openssl header check. + unit tests for sshbuf_dup_string() - Noted by Austin English. + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7521ff150dc7f20511d1c2c48fd3318e5850a96d -commit e72a8575ffe1d8adff42c9abe9ca36938acc036b +commit 6915f1698e3d1dd4e22eac20f435e1dfc1d46372 Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 8 23:24:03 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jun 3 06:44:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - -c before -H, in SYNOPSIS and usage(); + tweak previous; - Upstream-ID: 25e8c58a69e1f37fcd54ac2cd1699370acb5e404 + Upstream-ID: 92979f1a0b63e041a0e5b08c9ed0ba9b683a3698 -commit 3a424cdd21db08c7b0ded902f97b8f02af5aa485 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 8 22:30:20 2015 +0000 +commit 0cb2f4c2494b115d0f346ed2d8b603ab3ba643f4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 04:09:38 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching - certificates instead of plain keys; ok markus@ + Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be + overridden when using ssh -W (but still default to yes in that case). + bz#2577, ok djm@. - Upstream-ID: 0947e2177dba92339eced9e49d3c5bf7dda69f82 + Upstream-ID: 4b20c419e93ca11a861c81c284090cfabc8c54d4 -commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 8 22:08:38 2015 +0000 +commit 8543ff3f5020fe659839b15f05b8c522bde6cee5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 3 03:14:41 2016 +0000 upstream commit - remove slogin links; ok deraadt markus djm + Move the host and port used by ssh -W into the Options + struct. This will make future changes a bit easier. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 39ba08548acde4c54f2d4520c202c2a863a3c730 + Upstream-ID: 151bce5ecab2fbedf0d836250a27968d30389382 -commit 2fecfd486bdba9f51b3a789277bb0733ca36e1c0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Nov 8 21:59:11 2015 +0000 +commit 6b87311d3acdc460f926b2c40f4c4f3fd345f368 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 1 04:19:49 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return - statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@ + Check min and max sizes sent by the client against what + we support before passing them to the monitor. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62 + Upstream-ID: 750627e8117084215412bff00a25b1586ab17ece -commit 5e288923a303ca672b686908320bc5368ebec6e6 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Nov 6 00:31:41 2015 +0000 +commit 564cd2a8926ccb1dca43a535073540935b5e0373 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 31 23:46:14 2016 +0000 upstream commit - 1. rlogin and rsh are long gone 2. protocol version isn't - of core relevance here, and v1 is going away - - ok markus@, deraadt@ + Ensure that the client's proposed DH-GEX max value is at + least as big as the minimum the server will accept. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 8b46bc94cf1ca7c8c1a75b1c958b2bb38d7579c8 + Upstream-ID: b4b84fa04aab2de7e79a6fee4a6e1c189c0fe775 -commit 8b29008bbe97f33381d9b4b93fcfa304168d0286 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Nov 5 09:48:05 2015 +0000 +commit df820722e40309c9b3f360ea4ed47a584ed74333 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jun 6 11:36:13 2016 +1000 + + Add compat bits to utf8.c. + +commit 05c6574652571becfe9d924226c967a3f4b3f879 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jun 6 11:33:43 2016 +1000 + + Fix utf->utf8 typo. + +commit 6c1717190b4d5ddd729cd9e24e8ed71ed4f087ce +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 30 18:34:41 2016 +0000 upstream commit - "commandline" -> "command line", since there are so few - examples of the former in the pages, so many of the latter, and in some of - these pages we had multiple spellings; + Backout rev. 1.43 for now. - prompted by tj + The function update_progress_meter() calls refresh_progress_meter() + which calls snmprintf() which calls malloc(); but update_progress_meter() + acts as the SIGALRM signal handler. - Upstream-ID: 78459d59bff74223f8139d9001ccd56fc4310659 - -commit 996b24cebf20077fbe5db07b3a2c20c2d9db736e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 29 20:57:34 2015 +1100 - - (re)wrap SYS_sendsyslog in ifdef. + "malloc(): error: recursive call" reported by sobrado@. - Replace ifdef that went missing in commit - c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac. Fixes build on older - OpenBSDs. + Upstream-ID: aaae57989431e5239c101f8310f74ccc83aeb93e -commit b67e2e76fcf1ae7c802eb27ca927e16c91a513ff -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:17 2015 +0000 +commit cd9e1eabeb4137182200035ab6fa4522f8d24044 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 30 12:57:21 2016 +0000 upstream commit - regress test for "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a - Match block + Even when only writing an unescaped character, the dst + buffer may need to grow, or it would be overrun; issue found by tb@ with + malloc.conf(5) 'C'. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 246c37ed64a2e5704d4c158ccdca1ff700e10647 + While here, reserve an additional byte for the terminating NUL + up front such that we don't have to realloc() later just for that. + + OK tb@ + + Upstream-ID: 30ebcc0c097c4571b16f0a78b44969f170db0cff -commit abd9dbc3c0d8c8c7561347cfa22166156e78c077 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 26 02:50:58 2015 +0000 +commit ac284a355f8065eaef2a16f446f3c44cdd17371d +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 30 12:05:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix typo certopt->certopts in shell variable. This would - cause the test to hang at a host key prompt if you have an A or CNAME for - "proxy" in your local domain. + Fix two rare edge cases: 1. If vasprintf() returns < 0, + do not access a NULL pointer in snmprintf(), and do not free() the pointer + returned from vasprintf() because on some systems other than OpenBSD, it + might be a bogus pointer. 2. If vasprintf() returns == 0, return 0 and "" + rather than -1 and NULL. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 6ea03bcd39443a83c89e2c5606392ceb9585836a + Besides, free(dst) is pointless after failure (not a bug). + + One half OK martijn@, the other half OK deraadt@; + committing quickly before people get hurt. + + Upstream-ID: b7bcd2e82fc168a8eff94e41f5db336ed986fed0 -commit ed08510d38aef930a061ae30d10f2a9cf233bafa -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:01 2015 +0000 +commit 0e059cdf5fd86297546c63fa8607c24059118832 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 25 23:48:45 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match block; - ok dtucker@ + To prevent screwing up terminal settings when printing to + the terminal, for ASCII and UTF-8, escape bytes not forming characters and + bytes forming non-printable characters with vis(3) VIS_OCTAL. For other + character sets, abort printing of the current string in these cases. In + particular, * let scp(1) respect the local user's LC_CTYPE locale(1); * + sanitize data received from the remote host; * sanitize filenames, usernames, + and similar data even locally; * take character display widths into account + for the progressmeter. + + This is believed to be sufficient to keep the local terminal safe + on OpenBSD, but bad things can still happen on other systems with + state-dependent locales because many places in the code print + unencoded ASCII characters into the output stream. + + Using feedback from djm@ and martijn@, + various aspects discussed with many others. + + deraadt@ says it should go in now, i probably already hesitated too long - Upstream-ID: 853662c4036730b966aab77684390c47b9738c69 + Upstream-ID: e66afbc94ee396ddcaffd433b9a3b80f387647e0 -commit a4aef3ed29071719b2af82fdf1ac3c2514f82bc5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 27 08:54:52 2015 +0000 +commit 8c02e3639acefe1e447e293dbe23a0917abd3734 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 24 04:43:45 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix execv arguments in a way less likely to cause grief - for -portable; ok dtucker@ + KNF compression proposal and simplify the client side a + little. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 5902bf0ea0371f39f1300698dc3b8e4105fc0fc5 + Upstream-ID: aa814b694efe9e5af8a26e4c80a05526ae6d6605 -commit 63d188175accea83305e89fafa011136ff3d96ad -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 27 01:44:45 2015 +0000 +commit 7ec4946fb686813eb5f8c57397e465f5485159f4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 24 02:31:57 2016 +0000 upstream commit - log certificate serial in verbose() messages to match the - main auth success/fail message; ok dtucker@ + Back out 'plug memleak'. - Upstream-ID: dfc48b417c320b97c36ff351d303c142f2186288 + Upstream-ID: 4faacdde136c24a961e24538de373660f869dbc0 -commit 2aaba0cfd560ecfe92aa50c00750e6143842cf1f +commit 82f24c3ddc52053aeb7beb3332fa94c92014b0c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 27 00:49:53 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon May 23 23:30:50 2016 +0000 upstream commit - avoid de-const warning & shrink; ok dtucker@ + prefer agent-hosted keys to keys from PKCS#11; ok markus - Upstream-ID: 69a85ef94832378952a22c172009cbf52aaa11db + Upstream-ID: 7417f7653d58d6306d9f8c08d0263d050e2fd8f4 -commit 03239c18312b9bab7d1c3b03062c61e8bbc1ca6e +commit a0cb7778fbc9b43458f7072eb68dd858766384d1 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Oct 25 23:42:00 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon May 23 00:17:27 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Expand tildes in filenames passed to -i before checking - whether or not the identity file exists. This means that if the shell - doesn't do the expansion (eg because the option and filename were given as a - single argument) then we'll still add the key. bz#2481, ok markus@ + Plug mem leak in filter_proposal. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: db1757178a14ac519e9a3e1a2dbd21113cb3bfc6 + Upstream-ID: bf968da7cfcea2a41902832e7d548356a4e2af34 -commit 97e184e508dd33c37860c732c0eca3fc57698b40 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Oct 25 23:14:03 2015 +0000 +commit ae9c0d4d5c581b3040d1f16b5c5f4b1cd1616743 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 3 16:03:44 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by "Match - exec" in a config file. It's an unnecessary optimization from repurposed - ProxyCommand code and prevents some things working with some shells. - bz#2471, pointed out by res at qoxp.net. ok markus@ + Update vis.h and vis.c from OpenBSD. - Upstream-ID: a1ead25ae336bfa15fb58d8c6b5589f85b4c33a3 + This will be needed for the upcoming utf8 changes. -commit 8db134e7f457bcb069ec72bc4ee722e2af557c69 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Oct 29 10:48:23 2015 +1100 +commit e1d93705f8f48f519433d6ca9fc3d0abe92a1b77 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Tue May 31 11:13:22 2016 -0700 - Prevent name collisions with system glob (bz#2463) - - Move glob.h from includes.h to the only caller (sftp) and override the - names for the symbols. This prevents name collisions with the system glob - in the case where something other than ssh uses it (eg kerberos). With - jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@ + modified: configure.ac + whitspace clean up. No code changes. -commit 86c10dbbef6a5800d2431a66cf7f41a954bb62b5 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 23 02:22:01 2015 +0000 +commit 604a037d84e41e31f0aec9075df0b8740c130200 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue May 31 16:45:28 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - Update expected group sizes to match recent code changes. - - Upstream-Regress-ID: 0004f0ea93428969fe75bcfff0d521c553977794 + whitespace at EOL -commit 9ada37d36003a77902e90a3214981e417457cf13 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Oct 24 22:56:19 2015 +0000 +commit 18424200160ff5c923113e0a37ebe21ab7bcd17c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon May 30 19:35:28 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - fix keyscan output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line - when host hashing or a non standard port is in use; bz#2479 ok dtucker@ + Add missing ssh-host-config --name option - Upstream-ID: 5321dabfaeceba343da3c8a8b5754c6f4a0a307b + Patch from vinschen@redhat.com. -commit 44fc7cd7dcef6c52c6b7e9ff830dfa32879bd319 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Oct 24 22:52:22 2015 +0000 +commit 39c0cecaa188a37a2e134795caa68e03f3ced592 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri May 20 10:01:58 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message when - chrooted + Fix comment about sshpam_const and AIX. - patch from Christian Hesse in bz#2485 ok dtucker@ + From mschwager via github. + +commit f64062b1f74ad5ee20a8a49aab2732efd0f7ce30 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 20 09:56:53 2016 +1000 + + Deny lstat syscalls in seccomp sandbox - Upstream-ID: 86783c1953da426dff5b03b03ce46e699d9e5431 + Avoids sandbox violations for some krb/gssapi libraries. -commit a820a8618ec44735dabc688fab96fba38ad66bb2 -Author: sthen@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Oct 24 08:34:09 2015 +0000 +commit 531c135409b8d8810795b1f3692a4ebfd5c9cae0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 19 07:45:32 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Handle the split of tun(4) "link0" into tap(4) in ssh - tun-forwarding. Adapted from portable (using separate devices for this is the - normal case in most OS). ok djm@ + fix type of ed25519 values - Upstream-ID: 90facf4c59ce73d6741db1bc926e578ef465cd39 + Upstream-ID: b32d0cb372bbe918ca2de56906901eae225a59b0 -commit 66d2e229baa9fe57b868c373b05f7ff3bb20055b -Author: gsoares@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Oct 21 11:33:03 2015 +0000 +commit 75e21688f523799c9e0cc6601d76a9c5ca79f787 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 14:32:26 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix memory leak in error path ok djm@ + add IdentityAgent; noticed & ok jmc@ - Upstream-ID: dd2f402b0a0029b755df029fc7f0679e1365ce35 + Upstream-ID: 4ba9034b00a4cf1beae627f0728da897802df88a -commit 7d6c0362039ceacdc1366b5df29ad5d2693c13e5 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 20 23:24:25 2015 +0000 +commit 1a75d14daf4b60db903e6103cf50e74e0cd0a76b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 14:29:58 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Compare pointers to NULL rather than 0. - - ok djm@ + allow setting IdentityAgent to SSH_AUTH_SOCK; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 21616cfea27eda65a06e772cc887530b9a1a27f8 + Upstream-ID: 20c508480d8db3eef18942c0fc39b1fcf25652ac -commit f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 20 03:36:35 2015 +0000 +commit 0516454151ae722fc8256c3c56115c6baf24c5b0 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 14:22:33 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory. - - ok djm@ + move SSH_MSG_NONE, so we don't have to include ssh1.h; + ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e + Upstream-ID: c2f97502efc761a41b18c17ddf460e138ca7994e -commit ac908c1eeacccfa85659594d92428659320fd57e +commit 332ff3d770631e7513fea38cf0d3689f673f0e3f Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Oct 22 09:35:24 2015 +1100 +Date: Tue May 10 09:51:06 2016 +1000 - turn off PrintLastLog when --disable-lastlog + initialise salen in binresvport_sa - bz#2278 from Brent Paulson + avoids failures with UsePrivilegedPort=yes + + patch from Juan Gallego -commit b56deb847f4a0115a8bf488bf6ee8524658162fd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 16 22:32:22 2015 +0000 +commit c5c1d5d2f04ce00d2ddd6647e61b32f28be39804 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 14:04:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - increase the minimum modulus that we will send or accept in - diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits; ok markus@ + missing const in prototypes (ssh1) - Upstream-ID: 06dce7a24c17b999a0f5fadfe95de1ed6a1a9b6a + Upstream-ID: 789c6ad4928b5fa557369b88c3a6a34926082c05 -commit 5ee0063f024bf5b3f3ffb275b8cd20055d62b4b9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 16 18:40:49 2015 +0000 +commit 9faae50e2e82ba42eb0cb2726bf6830fe7948f28 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 14:00:09 2016 +0000 upstream commit - better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in - hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and remove the - trailing '.' before matching ssh_config; ok markus@ + Fix inverted logic for updating StreamLocalBindMask which + would cause the server to set an invalid mask. ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: f7619652e074ac3febe8363f19622aa4853b679a + Upstream-ID: 8a4404c8307a5ef9e07ee2169fc6d8106b527587 -commit e92c499a75477ecfe94dd7b4aed89f20b1fac5a7 -Author: mmcc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 16 17:07:24 2015 +0000 +commit b02ad1ce9105bfa7394ac7590c0729dd52e26a81 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 4 12:21:53 2016 +0000 upstream commit - 0 -> NULL when comparing with a char*. - - ok dtucker@, djm@. + IdentityAgent for specifying specific agent sockets; ok + djm@ - Upstream-ID: a928e9c21c0a9020727d99738ff64027c1272300 + Upstream-ID: 3e6a15eb89ea0fd406f108826b7dc7dec4fbfac1 -commit b1d38a3cc6fe349feb8d16a5f520ef12d1de7cb2 +commit 910e59bba09ac309d78ce61e356da35292212935 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 15 23:51:40 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed May 4 12:16:39 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix some signed/unsigned integer type mismatches in - format strings; reported by Nicholas Lemonias + fix junk characters after quotes - Upstream-ID: 78cd55420a0eef68c4095bdfddd1af84afe5f95c + Upstream-ID: cc4d0cd32cb6b55a2ef98975d2f7ae857d0dc578 -commit 1a2663a15d356bb188196b6414b4c50dc12fd42b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Oct 15 23:08:23 2015 +0000 +commit 9283884e647b8be50ccd2997537af0065672107d +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 18:38:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - argument to sshkey_from_private() and sshkey_demote() - can't be NULL + correct article; - Upstream-ID: 0111245b1641d387977a9b38da15916820a5fd1f + Upstream-ID: 1fbd5b7ab16d2d9834ec79c3cedd4738fa42a168 -commit 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Oct 16 10:53:14 2015 +1100 +commit cfefbcea1057c2623e76c579174a4107a0b6e6cd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 15:57:39 2016 +0000 - need va_copy before va_start + upstream commit - reported by Nicholas Lemonias - -commit eb6c50d82aa1f0d3fc95f5630ea69761e918bfcd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Oct 15 15:48:28 2015 -0700 - - fix compilation on systems without SYMLOOP_MAX - -commit fafe1d84a210fb3dae7744f268059cc583db8c12 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 09:22:15 2015 -0700 - - s/SANDBOX_TAME/SANDBOX_PLEDGE/g + fix overriding of StreamLocalBindMask and + StreamLocalBindUnlink in Match blocks; found the hard way Rogan Dawes + + Upstream-ID: 940bc69ec0249ab428d24ccd0722ce35cb932ee2 -commit 8f22911027ff6c17d7226d232ccd20727f389310 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:28:19 2015 +1100 +commit 771c2f51ffc0c9a2877b7892fada0c77bd1f6549 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 15:25:06 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.20 - date: 2015/10/13 20:55:37; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: X39sl5ay1czgFIgp; - In rev 1.15 the sizeof argument was fixed in a strlcat() call but - the truncation check immediately following it was not updated to - match. Not an issue in practice since the buffers are the same - size. OK deraadt@ + don't forget to include StreamLocalBindUnlink in the + config dump output + + Upstream-ID: 14a6d970b3b45c8e94272e3c661e9a0b2a0ee7cb -commit 23fa695bb735f54f04d46123662609edb6c76767 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:51 2015 +1100 +commit cdcd941994dc430f50d0a4e6a712d32b66e6199e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 14:54:08 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.19 - date: 2015/01/16 16:48:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: 0DYulI8hhujBHMcR; - Move to the universe. - review by millert, binary checking process with doug, concept with guenther + make nethack^wrandomart fingerprint flag more readily + searchable pointed out by Matt Johnston + + Upstream-ID: cb40d0235dc153c478c1aad3bc60b195422a54fb -commit c71be375a69af00c2d0a0c24d8752bec12d8fd1b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:08 2015 +1100 +commit 05855bf2ce7d5cd0a6db18bc0b4214ed5ef7516d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 13:10:24 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.18 - date: 2014/10/19 03:56:28; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +9 -9; commitid: U6QxmtbXrGoc02S5; - Revert last commit due to changed semantics found by make release. + clarify ordering of subkeys; pointed out by ietf-ssh AT + stbuehler.de + + Upstream-ID: 05ebe9f949449a555ebce8e0aad7c8c9acaf8463 -commit c39ad23b06e9aecc3ff788e92f787a08472905b1 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:26:24 2015 +1100 +commit cca3b4395807bfb7aaeb83d2838f5c062ce30566 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 12:15:49 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.17 - date: 2014/10/18 20:43:52; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +10 -10; commitid: I74hI1tVZtsspKEt; - Better POSIX compliance in realpath(3). - - millert@ made changes to realpath.c based on FreeBSD's version. I merged - Todd's changes into dl_realpath.c. + Use a subshell for constructing key types to work around + different sed behaviours for -portable. - ok millert@, guenther@ + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0f6eb673162df229eda9a134a0f10da16151552d -commit e929a43f957dbd1254aca2aaf85c8c00cbfc25f4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:55 2015 +1100 +commit fa58208c6502dcce3e0daac0ca991ee657daf1f5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 10:27:59 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.16 - date: 2013/04/05 12:59:54; author: kurt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -1; - - Add comments regarding copies of these files also in libexec/ld.so - okay guenther@ + correct some typos and remove a long-stale XXX note. + + add specification for ed25519 certificates + + mention no host certificate options/extensions are currently defined + + pointed out by Simon Tatham + + Upstream-ID: 7b535ab7dba3340b7d8210ede6791fdaefdf839a -commit 5225db68e58a1048cb17f0e36e0d33bc4a8fc410 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:32 2015 +1100 +commit b466f956c32cbaff4200bfcd5db6739fe4bc7d04 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 10:24:27 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.15 - date: 2012/09/13 15:39:05; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; - specify the bounds of the dst to strlcat (both values were static and - equal, but it is more correct) - from Michal Mazurek + add ed25519 keys that are supported but missing from this + documents; from Peter Moody + + Upstream-ID: 8caac2d8e8cfd2fca6dc304877346e0a064b014b -commit 7365fe5b4859de2305e40ea132da3823830fa710 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:09 2015 +1100 +commit 7f3d76319a69dab2efe3a520a8fef5b97e923636 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 3 09:03:49 2016 +0000 upstream commit - revision 1.14 - date: 2011/07/24 21:03:00; author: miod; state: Exp; lines: +35 -13; - Recent Single Unix will malloc memory if the second argument of realpath() - is NULL, and third-party software is starting to rely upon this. - Adapted from FreeBSD via Jona Joachim (jaj ; hcl-club , .lu), with minor - tweaks from nicm@ and yours truly. + Implement IUTF8 as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00. Patch + from Simon Tatham, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 58268ebdf37d9d467f78216c681705a5e10c58e8 -commit e679c09cd1951f963793aa3d9748d1c3fdcf808f +commit 31bc01c05d9f51bee3ebe33dc57c4fafb059fb62 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 13 16:15:21 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon May 2 14:10:58 2016 +0000 upstream commit - apply PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes filtering earlier, so all - skipped keys are noted before pubkey authentication starts. ok dtucker@ + unbreak config parsing on reexec from previous commit - Upstream-ID: ba4f52f54268a421a2a5f98bb375403f4cb044b8 + Upstream-ID: bc69932638a291770955bd05ca55a32660a613ab -commit 179c353f564ec7ada64b87730b25fb41107babd7 +commit 67f1459efd2e85bf03d032539283fa8107218936 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 13 00:21:27 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon May 2 09:52:00 2016 +0000 upstream commit - free the correct IV length, don't assume it's always the - cipher blocksize; ok dtucker@ + unit and regress tests for SHA256/512; ok markus - Upstream-ID: c260d9e5ec73628d9ff4b067fbb060eff5a7d298 + Upstream-Regress-ID: a0cd1a92dc824067076a5fcef83c18df9b0bf2c6 -commit 2539dce2a049a8f6bb0d44cac51f07ad48e691d3 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 9 01:37:08 2015 +0000 +commit 0e8eeec8e75f6d0eaf33317376f773160018a9c7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 2 10:26:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Change all tame callers to namechange to pledge(2). + add support for additional fixed DH groups from + draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 - Upstream-ID: 17e654fc27ceaf523c60f4ffd9ec7ae4e7efc7f2 + diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group) + diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group) + diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group) + + based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f -commit 9846a2f4067383bb76b4e31a9d2303e0a9c13a73 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Oct 8 04:30:48 2015 +1100 +commit 57464e3934ba53ad8590ee3ccd840f693407fc1e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 2 09:36:42 2016 +0000 - hook tame(2) sandbox up to build + upstream commit - OpenBSD only for now + support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA signatures in certificates; + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: b45be2f2ce8cacd794dc5730edaabc90e5eb434a -commit 0c46bbe68b70bdf0d6d20588e5847e71f3739fe6 +commit 1a31d02b2411c4718de58ce796dbb7b5e14db93e Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Oct 7 15:59:12 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon May 2 08:49:03 2016 +0000 upstream commit - include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump + fix signed/unsigned errors reported by clang-3.7; add + sshbuf_dup_string() to replace a common idiom of strdup(sshbuf_ptr()) with + better safety checking; feedback and ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 6c097ce6ffebf6fe393fb7988b5d152a5d6b36bb + Upstream-ID: 71f926d9bb3f1efed51319a6daf37e93d57c8820 -commit bdcb73fb7641b1cf73c0065d1a0dd57b1e8b778e -Author: sobrado@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Oct 7 14:45:30 2015 +0000 +commit d2d6bf864e52af8491a60dd507f85b74361f5da3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 29 08:07:53 2016 +0000 upstream commit - UsePrivilegeSeparation defaults to sandbox now. - - ok djm@ + close ControlPersist background process stderr when not + in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog. bz#1988 ok dtucker - Upstream-ID: bff136c38bcae89df82e044d2f42de21e1ad914f + Upstream-ID: 4fb726f0fdcb155ad419913cea10dc4afd409d24 -commit 2905d6f99c837bb699b6ebc61711b19acd030709 +commit 9ee692fa1146e887e008a2b9a3d3ea81770c9fc8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Oct 7 00:54:06 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Apr 28 14:30:21 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't try to change tun device flags if they are already - what we need; makes it possible to use tun/tap networking as non- root user - if device permissions and interface flags are pre-established; based on patch - by Ossi Herrala + fix comment - Upstream-ID: 89099ac4634cd477b066865acf54cb230780fd21 + Upstream-ID: 313a385bd7b69a82f8e28ecbaf5789c774457b15 -commit 0dc74512bdb105b048883f07de538b37e5e024d4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Oct 5 18:33:05 2015 -0700 +commit ee1e0a16ff2ba41a4d203c7670b54644b6c57fa6 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 27 13:53:48 2016 +0000 - unbreak merge botch + upstream commit + + cidr permitted for {allow,deny}users; from lars nooden ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 13e7327fe85f6c63f3f7f069e0fdc8c351515d11 -commit fdd020e86439afa7f537e2429d29d4b744c94331 +commit b6e0140a5aa883c27b98415bd8aa9f65fc04ee22 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Oct 6 01:20:59 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Apr 21 06:08:02 2016 +0000 upstream commit - adapt to recent sshkey_parse_private_fileblob() API - change + make argument == NULL tests more consistent - Upstream-Regress-ID: 5c0d818da511e33e0abf6a92a31bd7163b7ad988 + Upstream-ID: dc4816678704aa5cbda3a702e0fa2033ff04581d -commit 21ae8ee3b630b0925f973db647a1b9aa5fcdd4c5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 24 07:15:39 2015 +0000 +commit 6aaabc2b610e44bae473457ad9556ffb43d90ee3 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 17 14:34:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix command-line option to match what was actually - committed + tweak previous; - Upstream-Regress-ID: 3e8c24a2044e8afd37e7ce17b69002ca817ac699 + Upstream-ID: 46c1bab91c164078edbccd5f7d06b9058edd814f -commit e14ac43b75e68f1ffbd3e1a5e44143c8ae578dcd +commit 0f839e5969efa3bda615991be8a9d9311554c573 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 24 06:16:53 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 15 02:57:10 2016 +0000 upstream commit - regress test for CertificateFile; patch from Meghana Bhat - via bz#2436 + missing bit of Include regress - Upstream-Regress-ID: e7a6e980cbe0f8081ba2e83de40d06c17be8bd25 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 1063595f7f40f8489a1b7a27230b9e8acccea34f -commit 905b054ed24e0d5b4ef226ebf2c8bfc02ae6d4ad +commit 12e4ac46aed681da55c2bba3cd11dfcab23591be Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Oct 5 17:11:21 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 15 02:55:53 2016 +0000 upstream commit - some more bzero->explicit_bzero, from Michael McConville + remove redundant CLEANFILES section - Upstream-ID: 17f19545685c33327db2efdc357c1c9225ff00d0 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 29ef1b267fa56daa60a1463396635e7d53afb587 -commit b007159a0acdbcf65814b3ee05dbe2cf4ea46011 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 2 15:52:55 2015 +0000 +commit b1d05aa653ae560c44baf8e8a9756e33f98ea75c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 15 00:48:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix email + sync CLEANFILES with portable, sort - Upstream-ID: 72150f2d54b94de14ebef1ea054ef974281bf834 - -commit b19e1b4ab11884c4f62aee9f8ab53127a4732658 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:52 2015 +0000 + Upstream-Regress-ID: cb782f4f1ab3e079efbc335c6b64942f790766ed + +commit 35f22dad263cce5c61d933ae439998cb965b8748 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 15 00:31:10 2016 +0000 upstream commit - a sandbox using tame ok djm + regression test for ssh_config Include directive - Upstream-ID: 4ca24e47895e72f5daaa02f3e3d3e5ca2d820fa3 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 46a38c8101f635461c506d1aac2d96af80f97f1e -commit c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:26 2015 +0000 +commit 6b8a1a87005818d4700ce8b42faef746e82c1f51 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 14 23:57:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - re-order system calls in order of risk, ok i'll be - honest, ordered this way they look like tame... ok djm + unbreak test for recent ssh de-duplicated forwarding + change - Upstream-ID: 42a1e6d251fd8be13c8262bee026059ae6328813 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b2b115d99acd7cff13986e6739ea214cf2a3da3 -commit c5f7c0843cb6e6074a93c8ac34e49ce33a6f5546 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 25 18:19:54 2015 +0000 +commit 076787702418985a2cc6808212dc28ce7afc01f0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 14 23:21:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - some certificatefile tweaks; ok djm + add test knob and warning for StrictModes - Upstream-ID: 0e5a7852c28c05fc193419cc7e50e64c1c535af0 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8cd10952ce7898655ee58945904f2a0a3bdf7682 -commit 4e44a79a07d4b88b6a4e5e8c1bed5f58c841b1b8 +commit dc7990be865450574c7940c9880567f5d2555b37 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Sep 24 06:15:11 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 15 00:30:19 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list - a certificate; patch from Meghana Bhat on bz#2436; ok markus@ + Include directive for ssh_config(5); feedback & ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 58648ec53c510b41c1f46d8fe293aadc87229ab8 + Upstream-ID: ae3b76e2e343322b9f74acde6f1e1c5f027d5fff -commit e3cbb06ade83c72b640a53728d362bbefa0008e2 -Author: sobrado@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Sep 22 08:33:23 2015 +0000 +commit 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Apr 13 10:39:57 2016 +1000 - upstream commit + ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes - fix two typos. + If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables + and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may + attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables + set via PAM. - Upstream-ID: 424402c0d8863a11b51749bacd7f8d932083b709 + CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson -commit 8408218c1ca88cb17d15278174a24a94a6f65fe1 +commit dce19bf6e4a2a3d0b13a81224de63fc316461ab9 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Sep 21 04:31:00 2015 +0000 +Date: Sat Apr 9 12:39:30 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix possible hang on closed output; bz#2469 reported by Tomas - Kuthan ok markus@ + make private key loading functions consistently handle NULL + key pointer arguments; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: f7afd41810f8540f524284f1be6b970859f94fe3 + Upstream-ID: 92038726ef4a338169c35dacc9c5a07fcc7fa761 -commit 0097248f90a00865082e8c146b905a6555cc146f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 04:55:01 2015 +0000 +commit 5f41f030e2feb5295657285aa8c6602c7810bc4b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 8 21:14:13 2016 +1000 - upstream commit - - skip if running as root; many systems (inc OpenBSD) allow - root to ptrace arbitrary processes + Remove NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT - Upstream-Regress-ID: be2b925df89360dff36f972951fa0fa793769038 + Replace by defining IPPORT_RESERVED to zero on Cygwin, which should have + the same effect without causing problems syncing patches with OpenBSD. + Resync the two affected functions with OpenBSD. ok djm, sanity checked + by Corinna. -commit 9c06c814aff925e11a5cc592c06929c258a014f6 +commit 34a01b2cf737d946ddb140618e28c3048ab7a229 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 03:44:21 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Apr 8 08:19:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - try all supported key types here; bz#2455 reported by - Jakub Jelen + whitespace at EOL - Upstream-Regress-ID: 188cb7d9031cdbac3a0fa58b428b8fa2b2482bba + Upstream-ID: 5beffd4e001515da12851b974e2323ae4aa313b6 -commit 3c019a936b43f3e2773f3edbde7c114d73caaa4c -Author: tim@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Sep 13 14:39:16 2015 +0000 +commit 90ee563fa6b54c59896c6c332c5188f866c5e75f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 8 06:35:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - - Fix error message: passphrase needs to be at least 5 - characters, not 4. - Remove unused function argument. - Remove two - unnecessary variables. + We accidentally send an empty string and a zero uint32 with + every direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open, in contravention of our + own spec. + + Fixing this is too hard wrt existing versions that expect these + fields to be present and fatal() if they aren't, so document them + as "reserved" fields in the PROTOCOL spec as though we always + intended this and let us never speak of it again. - OK djm@ + bz#2529, reported by Ron Frederick - Upstream-ID: 13010c05bfa8b523da1c0dc19e81dd180662bc30 + Upstream-ID: 34cd326a4d236ca6e39084c4ff796bd97ab833e7 -commit 2681cdb6e0de7c1af549dac37a9531af202b4434 -Author: tim@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Sep 13 13:48:19 2015 +0000 +commit 0ccbd5eca0f0dd78e71a4b69c66f03a66908d558 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 6 06:42:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - When adding keys to the agent, don't ignore the comment - of keys for which the user is prompted for a passphrase. - - Tweak and OK djm@ + don't record duplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward + entries; fixes failure with ExitOnForwardFailure+hostname canonicalisation + where the same forwards are added on the second pass through the + configuration file. bz#2562; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: dc737c620a5a8d282cc4f66e3b9b624e9abefbec + Upstream-ID: 40a51d68b6300f1cc61deecdb7d4847b8b7b0de1 -commit 14692f7b8251cdda847e648a82735eef8a4d2a33 -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 08:50:04 2015 +0000 +commit 574def0eb493cd6efeffd4ff2e9257abcffee0c8 +Author: krw@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 2 14:37:42 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Use explicit_bzero() when zeroing before free() + Another use for fcntl() and thus of the superfluous 3rd + parameter is when sanitising standard fd's before calling daemon(). + + Use a tweaked version of the ssh(1) function in all three places + found using fcntl() this way. - from Michael McConville (mmcconv1 (at) sccs.swarthmore.edu) - ok millert@ djm@ + ok jca@ beck@ - Upstream-ID: 2e3337db046c3fe70c7369ee31515ac73ec00f50 + Upstream-ID: f16811ffa19a1c5f4ef383c5f0fecb843c84e218 -commit 846f6fa4cfa8483a9195971dbdd162220f199d85 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 06:55:46 2015 +0000 +commit b3413534aa9d71a941005df2760d1eec2c2b0854 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 4 11:09:21 2016 +1000 + + Tidy up openssl header test. + +commit 815bcac0b94bb448de5acdd6ba925b8725240b4f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 4 11:07:59 2016 +1000 + + Fix configure-time warnings for openssl test. + +commit 95687f5831ae680f7959446d8ae4b52452ee05dd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 1 02:34:10 2016 +0000 upstream commit - sync -Q in usage() to SYNOPSIS; since it's drastically - shorter, i've reformatted the block to sync with the man (80 cols) and saved - a line; + whitespace at EOL - Upstream-ID: 86e2c65c3989a0777a6258a77e589b9f6f354abd + Upstream-ID: 40ae2203d07cb14e0a89e1a0d4c6120ee8fd8c3a -commit 95923e0520a8647417ee6dcdff44694703dfeef0 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 06:51:39 2015 +0000 +commit fdfbf4580de09d84a974211715e14f88a5704b8e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 31 05:24:06 2016 +0000 upstream commit - tweak previous; + Remove fallback from moduli to "primes" file that was + deprecated in 2001 and fix log messages referring to primes file. Based on + patch from xnox at ubuntu.com via bz#2559. "kill it" deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: f29b3cfcfd9aa31fa140c393e7bd48c1c74139d6 + Upstream-ID: 0d4f8c70e2fa7431a83b95f8ca81033147ba8713 -commit 86ac462f833b05d8ed9de9c50ccb295d7faa79ff -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 05:27:02 2015 +0000 +commit 0235a5fa67fcac51adb564cba69011a535f86f6b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 17 17:19:43 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Update usage to match man page. + UseDNS affects ssh hostname processing in authorized_keys, + not known_hosts; bz#2554 reported by jjelen AT redhat.com + + Upstream-ID: c1c1bb895dde46095fc6d81d8653703928437591 + +commit 8c4739338f5e379d05b19d6e544540114965f07e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 15 09:24:43 2016 +1100 + + Don't call Solaris setproject() with UsePAM=yes. - Upstream-ID: 9e85aefaecfb6aaf34c7cfd0700cd21783a35675 + When Solaris Projects are enabled along with PAM setting the project + is PAM's responsiblity. bz#2425, based on patch from + brent.paulson at gmail.com. + +commit cff26f373c58457a32cb263e212cfff53fca987b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 15 04:30:21 2016 +1100 + + remove slogin from *.spec -commit 674b3b68c1d36b2562324927cd03857b565e05e8 +commit c38905ba391434834da86abfc988a2b8b9b62477 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 03:47:28 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Mar 14 16:20:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - expand %i in ControlPath to UID; bz#2449 + unbreak authentication using lone certificate keys in + ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no separate + private key is found among the keys then try with the certificate key itself. - patch from Christian Hesse w/ feedback from dtucker@ + bz#2550 reported by Peter Moody - Upstream-ID: 2ba8d303e555a84e2f2165ab4b324b41e80ab925 + Upstream-ID: f939cd76d68e6a9a3d1711b5a943d6ed1e623966 -commit c0f55db7ee00c8202b05cb4b9ad4ce72cc45df41 +commit 4b4bfb01cd40b9ddb948e6026ddd287cc303d871 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 03:42:32 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Mar 10 11:47:57 2016 +0000 upstream commit - mention -Q key-plain and -Q key-cert; bz#2455 pointed out - by Jakub Jelen + sanitise characters destined for xauth reported by + github.com/tintinweb feedback and ok deraadt and markus - Upstream-ID: c8f1f8169332e4fa73ac96b0043e3b84e01d4896 + Upstream-ID: 18ad8d0d74cbd2ea3306a16595a306ee356aa261 -commit cfffbdb10fdf0f02d3f4232232eef7ec3876c383 +commit 732b463d37221722b1206f43aa59563766a6a968 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Sep 14 16:24:21 2015 +1000 +Date: Mon Mar 14 16:04:23 2016 +1100 - Use ssh-keygen -A when generating host keys. + Pass supported malloc options to connect-privsep. - Use ssh-keygen -A instead of per-keytype invocations when generating host - keys. Add tests when doing host-key-force since we can't use ssh-keygen -A - since it can't specify alternate locations. bz#2459, ok djm@ + This allows us to activate only the supported options during the malloc + option portion of the connect-privsep test. -commit 366bada1e9e124654aac55b72b6ccf878755b0dc +commit d29c5b9b3e9f27394ca97a364ed4bb4a55a59744 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 11 13:29:22 2015 +1000 +Date: Mon Mar 14 09:30:58 2016 +1100 - Correct default value for --with-ssh1. + Remove leftover roaming.h file. - bz#2457, from konto-mindrot.org at walimnieto.com. + Pointed out by des at des.no. -commit 2bca8a43e7dd9b04d7070824ffebb823c72587b2 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 11 03:13:36 2015 +0000 +commit 8ff20ec95f4377021ed5e9b2331320f5c5a34cea +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 14 09:24:03 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - more clarity on what AuthorizedKeysFile=none does; based - on diff by Thiebaud Weksteen + Quote variables that may contain whitespace. - Upstream-ID: 78ab87f069080f0cc3bc353bb04eddd9e8ad3704 + The variable $L_TMP_ID_FILE needs to be surrounded by quotes in order to + survive paths containing whitespace. bz#2551, from Corinna Vinschen via + Philip Hands. -commit 61942ea4a01e6db4fdf37ad61de81312ffe310e9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 9 00:52:44 2015 +0000 +commit 627824480c01f0b24541842c7206ab9009644d02 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 11 14:47:41 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - openssh_RSA_verify return type is int, so don't make it - size_t within the function itself with only negative numbers or zero assigned - to it. bz#2460 + Include priv.h for priv_set_t. - Upstream-ID: b6e794b0c7fc4f9f329509263c8668d35f83ea55 + From alex at cooperi.net. -commit 4f7cc2f8cc861a21e6dbd7f6c25652afb38b9b96 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 08:21:47 2015 +0000 +commit e960051f9a264f682c4d2fefbeecffcfc66b0ddf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 9 13:14:18 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Plug minor memory leaks when options are used more than - once. bz#2182, patch from Tiago Cunha, ok deraadt djm - - Upstream-ID: 5b84d0401e27fe1614c10997010cc55933adb48e + Wrap stdint.h inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. -commit 7ad8b287c8453a3e61dbc0d34d467632b8b06fc8 +commit 2c48bd344d2c4b5e08dae9aea5ff44fc19a5e363 Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Sep 11 13:11:02 2015 +1000 +Date: Wed Mar 9 12:46:50 2016 +1100 - Force resolution of _res for correct detection. + Add compat to monotime_double(). - bz#2259, from sconeu at yahoo.com. + Apply all of the portability changes in monotime() to monotime() double. + Fixes build on at least older FreeBSD systems. -commit 26ad18247213ff72b4438abe7fc660c958810fa2 +commit 7b40ef6c2eef40c339f6ea8920cb8a44838e10c9 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 10 10:57:41 2015 +1000 +Date: Tue Mar 8 14:12:58 2016 -0800 + + make a regress-binaries target + + Easier to build all the regression/unit test binaries in one pass + than going through all of ${REGRESS_BINARIES} - allow getrandom syscall; from Felix von Leitner +commit c425494d6b6181beb54a1b3763ef9e944fd3c214 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 8 14:03:54 2016 -0800 -commit 5245bc1e6b129a10a928f73f11c3aa32656c44b4 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 06:40:45 2015 +0000 + unbreak kexfuzz for -Werror without __bounded__ + +commit 3ed9218c336607846563daea5d5ab4f701f4e042 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 8 14:01:29 2016 -0800 + + unbreak PAM after canohost refactor + +commit 885fb2a44ff694f01e4f6470f803629e11f62961 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 8 11:58:43 2016 +1100 + + auth_get_canonical_hostname in portable code. + + "refactor canohost.c" replaced get_canonical_hostname, this makes the + same change to some portable-specific code. + +commit 95767262caa6692eff1e1565be1f5cb297949a89 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 7 19:02:43 2016 +0000 upstream commit - full stop belongs outside the brackets, not inside; + refactor canohost.c: move functions that cache results closer + to the places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is + cached in canohost.c + + feedback and ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 99d098287767799ac33d2442a05b5053fa5a551a + Upstream-ID: 5f2e4df88d4803fc8ec59ec53629105e23ce625e -commit a85768a9321d74b41219eeb3c9be9f1702cbf6a5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 04:56:09 2015 +0000 +commit af0bb38ffd1f2c4f9f43b0029be2efe922815255 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Mar 4 15:11:55 2016 +1100 + + hook unittests/misc/kexfuzz into build + +commit 331b8e07ee5bcbdca12c11cc8f51a7e8de09b248 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 4 02:48:06 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add a debug2() right before DNS resolution; it's a place - where ssh could previously silently hang for a while. bz#2433 + Filter debug messages out of log before picking the last + two lines. Should prevent problems if any more debug output is added late in + the connection. - Upstream-ID: 52a1a3e0748db66518e7598352c427145692a6a0 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 345d0a9589c381e7d640a4ead06cfaadf4db1363 -commit 46152af8d27aa34d5d26ed1c371dc8aa142d4730 +commit 0892edaa3ce623381d3a7635544cbc69b31cf9cb Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 04:55:24 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 4 02:30:36 2016 +0000 upstream commit - correct function name in error messages + add KEX fuzzer harness; ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 92fb2798617ad9561370897f4ab60adef2ff4c0e + Upstream-Regress-ID: 3df5242d30551b12b828aa9ba4a4cec0846be8d1 -commit a954cdb799a4d83c2d40fbf3e7b9f187fbfd72fc -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 04:47:50 2015 +0000 +commit ae2562c47d41b68dbb00240fd6dd60bed205367a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 3 00:46:53 2016 +0000 upstream commit - better document ExitOnForwardFailure; bz#2444, ok - dtucker@ + Look back 3 lines for possible error messages. Changes + to the code mean that "Bad packet length" errors are 3 lines back instead of + the previous two, which meant we didn't skip some offsets that we intended + to. - Upstream-ID: a126209b5a6d9cb3117ac7ab5bc63d284538bfc2 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 24f36912740a634d509a3144ebc8eb7c09b9c684 -commit f54d8ac2474b6fc3afa081cf759b48a6c89d3319 +commit 988e429d903acfb298bfddfd75e7994327adfed0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 04:44:08 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Mar 4 03:35:44 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't record hostbased authentication hostkeys as user - keys in test for multiple authentication with the same key + fix ClientAliveInterval when a time-based RekeyLimit is + set; previously keepalive packets were not being sent. bz#2252 report and + analysis by Christian Wittenhorst and Garrett Lee feedback and ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 26b368fa2cff481f47f37e01b8da1ae5b57b1adc + Upstream-ID: d48f9deadd35fdacdd5106b41bb07630ddd4aa81 -commit ac3451dd65f27ecf85dc045c46d49e2bbcb8dddd -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 03:57:38 2015 +0000 +commit 8ef04d7a94bcdb8b0085fdd2a79a844b7d40792d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 2 22:43:52 2016 +0000 upstream commit - remove extra newline in nethack-mode hostkey; from - Christian Hesse bz#2686 + Improve accuracy of reported transfer speeds by waiting + for the ack from the other end. Pointed out by mmcc@, ok deraadt@ markus@ - Upstream-ID: 4f56368b1cc47baeea0531912186f66007fd5b92 + Upstream-ID: 99f1cf15c9a8f161086b814d414d862795ae153d -commit 9e3ed9ebb1a7e47c155c28399ddf09b306ea05df -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Sep 4 04:23:10 2015 +0000 +commit b8d4eafe29684fe4f5bb587f7eab948e6ed62723 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 2 22:42:40 2016 +0000 upstream commit - trim junk from end of file; bz#2455 from Jakub Jelen + Improve precision of progressmeter for sftp and scp by + storing sub-second timestamps. Pointed out by mmcc@, ok deraadt@ markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: a4e64e8931e40d23874b047074444eff919cdfe6 + Upstream-ID: 38fd83a3d83dbf81c8ff7b5d1302382fe54970ab -commit f3a3ea180afff080bab82087ee0b60db9fd84f6c -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Sep 2 07:51:12 2015 +0000 +commit 18f64b969c70ed00e74b9d8e50359dbe698ce4c0 +Author: jca@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 29 20:22:36 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Fix occurrences of "r = func() != 0" which result in the - wrong error codes being returned due to != having higher precedence than =. - - ok deraadt@ markus@ + Print ssize_t with %zd; ok deraadt@ mmcc@ - Upstream-ID: 5fc35c9fc0319cc6fca243632662d2f06b5fd840 - -commit f498a98cf83feeb7ea01c15cd1c98b3111361f3a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Sep 3 09:11:22 2015 +1000 - - don't check for yp_match; ok tim@ + Upstream-ID: 0590313bbb013ff6692298c98f7e0be349d124bd -commit 9690b78b7848b0b376980a61d51b1613e187ddb5 +commit 6e7f68ce38130c794ec1fb8d2a6091fbe982628d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 21 23:57:48 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Feb 28 22:27:00 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Improve printing of KEX offers and decisions + rearrange DH public value tests to be a little more clear + + rearrange DH private value generation to explain rationale more + clearly and include an extra sanity check. - The debug output now labels the client and server offers and the - negotiated options. ok markus@ + ok deraadt - Upstream-ID: 8db921b3f92a4565271b1c1fbce6e7f508e1a2cb + Upstream-ID: 9ad8a07e1a12684e1b329f9bd88941b249d4b2ad -commit 60a92470e21340e1a3fc10f9c7140d8e1519dc55 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 21 23:53:08 2015 +0000 +commit 2ed17aa34008bdfc8db674315adc425a0712be11 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 1 15:24:20 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Fix printing (ssh -G ...) of HostKeyAlgorithms=+... - Reported by Bryan Drewery + Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. - Upstream-ID: 19ad20c41bd5971e006289b6f9af829dd46c1293 + Note that 1.5k bit groups have been removed. -commit 6310f60fffca2d1e464168e7d1f7e3b6b0268897 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 21 23:52:30 2015 +0000 +commit 72b061d4ba0f909501c595d709ea76e06b01e5c9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 26 14:40:04 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Fix expansion of HostkeyAlgorithms=+... - - Reported by Bryan Drewery - - Upstream-ID: 70ca1deea39d758ba36d36428ae832e28566f78d + Add a note about using xlc on AIX. -commit e774e5ea56237fd626a8161f9005023dff3e76c9 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 21 23:29:31 2015 +0000 +commit fd4e4f2416baa2e6565ea49d52aade296bad3e28 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 24 10:44:25 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Improve size == 0, count == 0 checking in mm_zalloc, - which is "array" like. Discussed with tedu, millert, otto.... and ok djm + Skip PrintLastLog in config dump mode. - Upstream-ID: 899b021be43b913fad3eca1aef44efe710c53e29 + When DISABLE_LASTLOG is set, do not try to include PrintLastLog in the + config dump since it'll be reported as UNKNOWN. -commit 189de02d9ad6f3645417c0ddf359b923aae5f926 +commit 99135c764fa250801da5ec3b8d06cbd0111caae8 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 21 15:45:02 2015 +1000 +Date: Tue Feb 23 20:17:23 2016 +1100 - expose POLLHUP and POLLNVAL for netcat.c + update spec/README versions ahead of release -commit e91346dc2bbf460246df2ab591b7613908c1b0ad +commit b86a334aaaa4d1e643eb1fd71f718573d6d948b5 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 21 14:49:03 2015 +1000 +Date: Tue Feb 23 20:16:53 2016 +1100 - we don't use Github for issues/pull-requests + put back portable patchlevel to p1 -commit a4f5b507c708cc3dc2c8dd2d02e4416d7514dc23 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 21 14:43:55 2015 +1000 +commit 555dd35ff176847e3c6bd068ba2e8db4022eb24f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 23 09:14:34 2016 +0000 - fix URL for connect.c + upstream commit + + openssh-7.2 + + Upstream-ID: 9db776b26014147fc907ece8460ef2bcb0f11e78 -commit d026a8d3da0f8186598442997c7d0a28e7275414 +commit 1acc058d0a7913838c830ed998a1a1fb5b7864bf Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Aug 21 13:47:10 2015 +1000 +Date: Tue Feb 23 16:12:13 2016 +1100 - update version numbers for 7.1 + Disable tests where fs perms are incorrect + + Some tests have strict requirements on the filesystem permissions + for certain files and directories. This adds a regress/check-perm + tool that copies the relevant logic from sshd to exactly test + the paths in question. This lets us skip tests when the local + filesystem doesn't conform to our expectations rather than + continuing and failing the test run. + + ok dtucker@ -commit 78f8f589f0ca1c9f41e5a9bae3cda5ce8a6b42ed -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 21 03:45:26 2015 +0000 +commit 39f303b1f36d934d8410b05625f25c7bcb75db4d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 23 12:56:59 2016 +1100 - upstream commit + fix sandbox on OSX Lion + + sshd was failing with: - openssh-7.1 + ssh_sandbox_child: sandbox_init: dlopen(/usr/lib/libsandbox.1.dylib, 261):cw + image not found [preauth] - Upstream-ID: ff7b1ef4b06caddfb45e08ba998128c88be3d73f + caused by chroot before sandboxing. Avoid by explicitly linking libsandbox + to sshd. Spotted by Darren. -commit 32a181980c62fce94f7f9ffaf6a79d90f0c309cf +commit 0d1451a32c7436e6d3d482351e776bc5e7824ce4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 21 03:42:19 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 23 01:34:14 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix inverted logic that broke PermitRootLogin; reported - by Mantas Mikulenas; ok markus@ + fix spurious error message when incorrect passphrase + entered for keys; reported by espie@ ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 260dd6a904c1bb7e43267e394b1c9cf70bdd5ea5 + Upstream-ID: 58b2e46e63ed6912ed1ee780bd3bd8560f9a5899 -commit ce445b0ed927e45bd5bdce8f836eb353998dd65c -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 20 22:32:42 2015 +0000 +commit 09d87d79741beb85768b5e788d7dfdf4bc3543dc +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 20 23:06:23 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Do not cast result of malloc/calloc/realloc* if stdlib.h - is in scope ok krw millert + set ssh(1) protocol version to 2 only. + + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 5e50ded78cadf3841556649a16cc4b1cb6c58667 + Upstream-ID: e168daf9d27d7e392e3c9923826bd8e87b2b3a10 -commit 05291e5288704d1a98bacda269eb5a0153599146 -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 20 19:20:06 2015 +0000 +commit 9262e07826ba5eebf8423f7ac9e47ec488c47869 +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 20 23:02:39 2016 +0000 upstream commit - In the certificates section, be consistent about using - "host_key" and "user_key" for the respective key types. ok sthen@ deraadt@ + add missing ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 to + IdentityFile. + + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 9e037ea3b15577b238604c5533e082a3947f13cb + Upstream-ID: 6ce99466312e4ae7708017c3665e3edb976f70cf -commit 8543d4ef6f2e9f98c3e6b77c894ceec30c5e4ae4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 19 23:21:42 2015 +0000 +commit c12f0fdce8f985fca8d71829fd64c5b89dc777f5 +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 20 23:01:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Better compat matching for WinSCP, add compat matching - for FuTTY (fork of PuTTY); ok markus@ deraadt@ + AddressFamily defaults to any. + + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 24001d1ac115fa3260fbdc329a4b9aeb283c5389 + Upstream-ID: 0d94aa06a4b889bf57a7f631c45ba36d24c13e0c -commit ec6eda16ebab771aa3dfc90629b41953b999cb1e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 19 23:19:01 2015 +0000 +commit 907091acb188b1057d50c2158f74c3ecf1c2302b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 19 09:05:39 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix double-free() in error path of DSA key generation - reported by Mateusz Kocielski; ok markus@ + Make Solaris privs code build on older systems. - Upstream-ID: 4735d8f888b10599a935fa1b374787089116713c + Not all systems with Solaris privs have priv_basicset so factor that + out and provide backward compatibility code. Similarly, not all have + PRIV_NET_ACCESS so wrap that in #ifdef. Based on code from + alex at cooperi.net and djm@ with help from carson at taltos.org and + wieland at purdue.edu. -commit 45b0eb752c94954a6de046bfaaf129e518ad4b5b +commit 292a8dee14e5e67dcd1b49ba5c7b9023e8420d59 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 19 23:18:26 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 17 22:20:14 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix free() of uninitialised pointer reported by Mateusz - Kocielski; ok markus@ + rekey refactor broke SSH1; spotted by Tom G. Christensen - Upstream-ID: 519552b050618501a06b7b023de5cb104e2c5663 + Upstream-ID: 43f0d57928cc077c949af0bfa71ef574dcb58243 -commit c837643b93509a3ef538cb6624b678c5fe32ff79 +commit 3a13cb543df9919aec2fc6b75f3dd3802facaeca Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 19 23:17:51 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 17 08:57:34 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fixed unlink([uninitialised memory]) reported by Mateusz - Kocielski; ok markus@ + rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256 cannot be selected explicitly + in *KeyTypes options yet. Remove them from the lists of algorithms for now. + committing on behalf of markus@ ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 14a0c4e7d891f5a8dabc4b89d4f6b7c0d5a20109 + Upstream-ID: c6e8820eb8e610ac21551832c0c89684a9a51bb7 -commit 1f8d3d629cd553031021068eb9c646a5f1e50994 +commit a685ae8d1c24fb7c712c55a4f3280ee76f5f1e4b Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Aug 14 15:32:41 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 17 07:38:19 2016 +0000 upstream commit - match myproposal.h order; from brian conway (i snuck in a - tweak while here) + since these pages now clearly tell folks to avoid v1, + normalise the docs from a v2 perspective (i.e. stop pointing out which bits + are v2 only); - ok dtucker + ok/tweaks djm ok markus - Upstream-ID: 35174a19b5237ea36aa3798f042bf5933b772c67 + Upstream-ID: eb474f8c36fb6a532dc05c282f7965e38dcfa129 -commit 1dc8d93ce69d6565747eb44446ed117187621b26 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Aug 6 14:53:21 2015 +0000 +commit c5c3f3279a0e4044b8de71b70d3570d692d0f29d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 17 05:29:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - add prohibit-password as a synonymn for without-password, - since the without-password is causing too many questions. Harden it to ban - all but pubkey, hostbased, and GSSAPI auth (when the latter is enabled) from - djm, ok markus + make sandboxed privilege separation the default, not just + for new installs; "absolutely" deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: d53317d7b28942153e6236d3fd6e12ceb482db7a - -commit 90a95a4745a531b62b81ce3b025e892bdc434de5 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 11 13:53:41 2015 +1000 - - update version in README - -commit 318c37743534b58124f1bab37a8a0087a3a9bd2f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 11 13:53:09 2015 +1000 - - update versions in *.spec + Upstream-ID: 5221ef3b927d2df044e9aa3f5db74ae91743f69b -commit 5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 11 13:34:12 2015 +1000 +commit eb3f7337a651aa01d5dec019025e6cdc124ed081 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 16 07:47:54 2016 +0000 - set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free + upstream commit - Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised. - Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ - -commit d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Aug 11 13:33:24 2015 +1000 - - Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it. + no need to state that protocol 2 is the default twice; - Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ - -commit 88763a6c893bf3dfe951ba9271bf09715e8d91ca -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jul 27 12:14:25 2015 +1000 - - Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. - -commit 55b263fb7cfeacb81aaf1c2036e0394c881637da -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Aug 10 11:13:44 2015 +1000 - - let principals-command.sh work for noexec /var/run - -commit 2651e34cd11b1aac3a0fe23b86d8c2ff35c07897 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Aug 6 11:43:42 2015 +1000 - - work around echo -n / sed behaviour in tests + Upstream-ID: b1e4c36b0c2e12e338e5b66e2978f2ac953b95eb -commit d85dad81778c1aa8106acd46930b25fdf0d15b2a +commit e7901efa9b24e5b0c7e74f2c5520d47eead4d005 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Aug 5 05:27:33 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 16 05:11:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - adjust for RSA minimum modulus switch; ok deraadt@ + Replace list of ciphers and MACs adjacent to -1/-2 flag + descriptions in ssh(1) with a strong recommendation not to use protocol 1. + Add a similar warning to the Protocol option descriptions in ssh_config(5) + and sshd_config(5); + + prompted by and ok mmcc@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 5a72c83431b96224d583c573ca281cd3a3ebfdae + Upstream-ID: 961f99e5437d50e636feca023978950a232ead5e -commit 57e8e229bad5fe6056b5f1199665f5f7008192c6 +commit 5a0fcb77287342e2fc2ba1cee79b6af108973dc2 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Aug 4 05:23:06 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 16 03:37:48 2016 +0000 upstream commit - backout SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE increase for this - release; problems spotted by sthen@ ok deraadt@ markus@ + add a "Close session" log entry (at loglevel=verbose) to + correspond to the existing "Starting session" one. Also include the session + id number to make multiplexed sessions more apparent. + + feedback and ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: d0bd60dde9e8c3cd7030007680371894c1499822 + Upstream-ID: e72d2ac080e02774376325136e532cb24c2e617c -commit f097d0ea1e0889ca0fa2e53a00214e43ab7fa22a +commit 624fd395b559820705171f460dd33d67743d13d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Aug 2 09:56:42 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Feb 17 02:24:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - openssh 7.0; ok deraadt@ + include bad $SSH_CONNECTION in failure output + + Upstream-Regress-ID: b22d72edfde78c403aaec2b9c9753ef633cc0529 + +commit 60d860e54b4f199e5e89963b1c086981309753cb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 17 13:37:09 2016 +1100 + + Rollback addition of va_start. + + va_start was added in 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e, however + it has the wrong number of args and it's not usable in non-variadic + functions anyway so it breaks things (for example Solaris 2.6 as + reported by Tom G. Christensen).i ok djm@ + +commit 2fee909c3cee2472a98b26eb82696297b81e0d38 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 17 09:48:15 2016 +1100 + + Look for gethostbyname in libresolv and libnsl. - Upstream-ID: c63afdef537f57f28ae84145c5a8e29e9250221f + Should fix build problem on Solaris 2.6 reported by Tom G. Christensen. -commit 3d5728a0f6874ce4efb16913a12963595070f3a9 -Author: chris@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 31 15:38:09 2015 +0000 +commit 5ac712d81a84396aab441a272ec429af5b738302 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Feb 16 10:45:02 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - Allow PermitRootLogin to be overridden by config - - ok markus@ deeradt@ - - Upstream-ID: 5cf3e26ed702888de84e2dc9d0054ccf4d9125b4 + make existing ssh_malloc_init only for __OpenBSD__ -commit 6f941396b6835ad18018845f515b0c4fe20be21a +commit 24c9bded569d9f2449ded73f92fb6d12db7a9eec Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 30 23:09:15 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Feb 15 23:32:37 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix pty permissions; patch from Nikolay Edigaryev; ok - deraadt + memleak of algorithm name in mm_answer_sign; reported by + Jakub Jelen - Upstream-ID: 40ff076d2878b916fbfd8e4f45dbe5bec019e550 + Upstream-ID: ccd742cd25952240ebd23d7d4d6b605862584d08 -commit f4373ed1e8fbc7c8ce3fc4ea97d0ba2e0c1d7ef0 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 30 19:23:02 2015 +0000 +commit ffb1e7e896139a42ceb78676f637658f44612411 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 15 09:47:49 2016 +0000 upstream commit - change default: PermitRootLogin without-password matching - install script changes coming as well ok djm markus + Add a function to enable security-related malloc_options. + With and ok deraadt@, something similar has been in the snaps for a while. - Upstream-ID: 0e2a6c4441daf5498b47a61767382bead5eb8ea6 + Upstream-ID: 43a95523b832b7f3b943d2908662191110c380ed -commit 0c30ba91f87fcda7e975e6ff8a057f624e87ea1c +commit ef39e8c0497ff0564990a4f9e8b7338b3ba3507c Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jul 30 12:31:39 2015 +1000 +Date: Tue Feb 16 10:34:39 2016 +1100 - downgrade OOM adjustment logging: verbose -> debug + sync ssh-copy-id with upstream 783ef08b0a75 -commit f9eca249d4961f28ae4b09186d7dc91de74b5895 +commit d2d772f55b19bb0e8d03c2fe1b9bb176d9779efd Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 30 00:01:34 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 12 00:20:30 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Allow ssh_config and sshd_config kex parameters options be - prefixed by a '+' to indicate that the specified items be appended to the - default rather than replacing it. - - approach suggested by dtucker@, feedback dlg@, ok markus@ + avoid fatal() for PKCS11 tokens that present empty key IDs + bz#1773, ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 0f901137298fc17095d5756ff1561a7028e8882a + Upstream-ID: 044a764fee526f2c4a9d530bd10695422d01fc54 -commit 5cefe769105a2a2e3ca7479d28d9a325d5ef0163 +commit e4c918a6c721410792b287c9fd21356a1bed5805 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 29 08:34:54 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Feb 11 02:56:32 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix bug in previous; was printing incorrect string for - failed host key algorithms negotiation + sync crypto algorithm lists in ssh_config(5) and + sshd_config(5) with current reality. bz#2527 - Upstream-ID: 22c0dc6bc61930513065d92e11f0753adc4c6e6e + Upstream-ID: d7fd1b6c1ed848d866236bcb1d7049d2bb9b2ff6 -commit f319912b0d0e1675b8bb051ed8213792c788bcb2 +commit e30cabfa4ab456a30b3224f7f545f1bdfc4a2517 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 29 04:43:06 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Feb 11 02:21:34 2016 +0000 upstream commit - include the peer's offer when logging a failure to - negotiate a mutual set of algorithms (kex, pubkey, ciphers, etc.) ok markus@ + fix regression in openssh-6.8 sftp client: existing + destination directories would incorrectly terminate recursive uploads; + bz#2528 - Upstream-ID: bbb8caabf5c01790bb845f5ce135565248d7c796 + Upstream-ID: 3306be469f41f26758e3d447987ac6d662623e18 -commit b6ea0e573042eb85d84defb19227c89eb74cf05a +commit 714e367226ded4dc3897078be48b961637350b05 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 28 23:20:42 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit - - add Cisco to the list of clients that choke on the - hostkeys update extension. Pointed out by Howard Kash - - Upstream-ID: c9eadde28ecec056c73d09ee10ba4570dfba7e84 - -commit 3f628c7b537291c1019ce86af90756fb4e66d0fd -Author: guenther@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 27 16:29:23 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Feb 9 05:30:04 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Permit kbind(2) use in the sandbox now, to ease testing - of ld.so work using it - - reminded by miod@, ok deraadt@ + turn off more old crypto in the client: hmac-md5, ripemd, + truncated HMACs, RC4, blowfish. ok markus@ dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 523922e4d1ba7a091e3824e77a8a3c818ee97413 + Upstream-ID: 96aa11c2c082be45267a690c12f1d2aae6acd46e -commit ebe27ebe520098bbc0fe58945a87ce8490121edb -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 20 18:44:12 2015 +0000 +commit 5a622844ff7f78dcb75e223399f9ef0977e8d0a3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 8 23:40:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Move .Pp before .Bl, not after to quiet mandoc -Tlint. - Noticed by jmc@ + don't attempt to percent_expand() already-canonicalised + addresses, avoiding unnecessary failures when attempting to connect to scoped + IPv6 addresses (that naturally contain '%' characters) - Upstream-ID: 59fadbf8407cec4e6931e50c53cfa0214a848e23 + Upstream-ID: f24569cffa1a7cbde5f08dc739a72f4d78aa5c6a -commit d5d91d0da819611167782c66ab629159169d94d4 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 20 18:42:35 2015 +0000 +commit 19bcf2ea2d17413f2d9730dd2a19575ff86b9b6a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 8 10:57:07 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Sync usage with SYNOPSIS + refactor activation of rekeying - Upstream-ID: 7a321a170181a54f6450deabaccb6ef60cf3f0b7 - -commit 79ec2142fbc68dd2ed9688608da355fc0b1ed743 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 20 15:39:52 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + This makes automatic rekeying internal to the packet code (previously + the server and client loops needed to assist). In doing to it makes + application of rekey limits more accurate by accounting for packets + about to be sent as well as packets queued during rekeying events + themselves. - Better desciption of Unix domain socket forwarding. - bz#2423; ok jmc@ + Based on a patch from dtucker@ which was in turn based on a patch + Aleksander Adamowski in bz#2521; ok markus@ - Upstream-ID: 85e28874726897e3f26ae50dfa2e8d2de683805d - -commit d56fd1828074a4031b18b8faa0bf949669eb18a0 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Jul 20 11:19:51 2015 +1000 - - make realpath.c compile -Wsign-compare clean + Upstream-ID: a441227fd64f9739850ca97b4cf794202860fcd8 -commit c63c9a691dca26bb7648827f5a13668832948929 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 20 00:30:01 2015 +0000 +commit 603ba41179e4b53951c7b90ee95b6ef3faa3f15d +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 5 13:28:19 2016 +0000 upstream commit - mention that the default of UseDNS=no implies that - hostnames cannot be used for host matching in sshd_config and - authorized_keys; bz#2045, ok dtucker@ + Only check errno if read() has returned an error. EOF is + not an error. This fixes a problem where the mux master would sporadically + fail to notice that the client had exited. ok mikeb@ djm@ - Upstream-ID: 0812705d5f2dfa59aab01f2764ee800b1741c4e1 + Upstream-ID: 3c2dadc21fac6ef64665688aac8a75fffd57ae53 -commit 63ebcd0005e9894fcd6871b7b80aeea1fec0ff76 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 18 08:02:17 2015 +0000 +commit 56d7dac790693ce420d225119283bc355cff9185 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 5 04:31:21 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that return empty - CKA_ID; patch by Jakub Jelen via bz#2429; ok markus + avoid an uninitialised value when NumberOfPasswordPrompts + is 0 ok markus@ djm@ - Upstream-ID: 2f7c94744eb0342f8ee8bf97b2351d4e00116485 + Upstream-ID: 11b068d83c2865343aeb46acf1e9eec00f829b6b -commit b15fd989c8c62074397160147a8d5bc34b3f3c63 +commit deae7d52d59c5019c528f977360d87fdda15d20b Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 18 08:00:21 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 5 03:07:06 2016 +0000 upstream commit - skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots; patch from Jakub Jelen - in bz#2427 ok markus@ + mention internal DH-GEX fallback groups; bz#2302 - Upstream-ID: 744c1e7796e237ad32992d0d02148e8a18f27d29 + Upstream-ID: e7b395fcca3122cd825515f45a2e41c9a157e09e -commit 5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18 +commit cac3b6665f884d46192c0dc98a64112e8b11a766 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sat Jul 18 07:57:14 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Feb 5 02:37:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - only query each keyboard-interactive device once per - authentication request regardless of how many times it is listed; ok markus@ + better description for MaxSessions; bz#2531 - Upstream-ID: d73fafba6e86030436ff673656ec1f33d9ffeda1 + Upstream-ID: e2c0d74ee185cd1a3e9d4ca1f1b939b745b354da -commit cd7324d0667794eb5c236d8a4e0f236251babc2d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 17 03:34:27 2015 +0000 +commit 5ef4b0fdcc7a239577a754829b50022b91ab4712 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 27 17:45:56 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - remove -u flag to diff (only used for error output) to make - things easier for -portable + avoid FreeBSD RCS Id in comment - Upstream-Regress-ID: a5d6777d2909540d87afec3039d9bb2414ade548 + Change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't + become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no -commit deb8d99ecba70b67f4af7880b11ca8768df9ec3a +commit 696d12683c90d20a0a9c5f4275fc916b7011fb04 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 17 03:09:19 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Feb 4 23:43:48 2016 +0000 upstream commit - direct-streamlocal@openssh.com Unix domain foward - messages do not contain a "reserved for future use" field and in fact, - serverloop.c checks that there isn't one. Remove erroneous mention from - PROTOCOL description. bz#2421 from Daniel Black + printf argument casts to avoid warnings on strict + compilers - Upstream-ID: 3d51a19e64f72f764682f1b08f35a8aa810a43ac + Upstream-ID: 7b9f6712cef01865ad29070262d366cf13587c9c -commit 356b61f365405b5257f5b2ab446e5d7bd33a7b52 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 17 03:04:27 2015 +0000 +commit 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 1 21:18:17 2016 +0000 upstream commit - describe magic for setting up Unix domain socket fowards - via the mux channel; bz#2422 patch from Daniel Black - - Upstream-ID: 943080fe3864715c423bdeb7c920bb30c4eee861 - -commit d3e2aee41487d55b8d7d40f538b84ff1db7989bc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jul 17 12:52:34 2015 +1000 - - Check if realpath works on nonexistent files. - - On some platforms the native realpath doesn't work with non-existent - files (this is actually specified in some versions of POSIX), however - the sftp spec says its realpath with "canonicalize any given path name". - On those platforms, use realpath from the compat library. - - In addition, when compiling with -DFORTIFY_SOURCE, glibc redefines - the realpath symbol to the checked version, so redefine ours to - something else so we pick up the compat version we want. + Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11 + forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set. This could also result in a + crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL. OK djm@ - bz#2428, ok djm@ + Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412 -commit 25b14610dab655646a109db5ef8cb4c4bf2a48a0 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 17 02:47:45 2015 +0000 +commit 537f88ec7bcf40bd444ac5584c707c5588c55c43 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 05:18:15 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix incorrect test for SSH1 keys when compiled without SSH1 - support + Add regression test for RekeyLimit parsing of >32bit values + (4G and 8G). - Upstream-ID: 6004d720345b8e481c405e8ad05ce2271726e451 + Upstream-Regress-ID: 548390350c62747b6234f522a99c319eee401328 -commit df56a8035d429b2184ee94aaa7e580c1ff67f73a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 15 08:00:11 2015 +0000 +commit 4c6cb8330460f94e6c7ae28a364236d4188156a3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 23:04:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - fix NULL-deref when SSH1 reenabled + Remove leftover roaming dead code. ok djm markus. - Upstream-ID: f22fd805288c92b3e9646782d15b48894b2d5295 + Upstream-ID: 13d1f9c8b65a5109756bcfd3b74df949d53615be -commit 41e38c4d49dd60908484e6703316651333f16b93 +commit 28136471809806d6246ef41e4341467a39fe2f91 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 15 07:19:50 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Jan 29 05:46:01 2016 +0000 upstream commit - regen RSA1 test keys; the last batch was missing their - private parts + include packet type of non-data packets in debug3 output; + ok markus dtucker - Upstream-Regress-ID: 7ccf437305dd63ff0b48dd50c5fd0f4d4230c10a + Upstream-ID: 034eaf639acc96459b9c5ce782db9fcd8bd02d41 -commit 5bf0933184cb622ca3f96d224bf3299fd2285acc -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 10 06:23:25 2015 +0000 +commit 6fd6e28daccafaa35f02741036abe64534c361a1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 03:31:03 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Adapt tests, now that DSA if off by default; use - PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to test DSA. + Revert "account for packets buffered but not yet + processed" change as it breaks for very small RekeyLimit values due to + continuous rekeying. ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 0ff2a3ff5ac1ce5f92321d27aa07b98656efcc5c + Upstream-ID: 7e03f636cb45ab60db18850236ccf19079182a19 -commit 7a6e3fd7b41dbd3756b6bf9acd67954c0b1564cc -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 7 14:54:16 2015 +0000 +commit 921ff00b0ac429666fb361d2d6cb1c8fff0006cb +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 02:54:45 2016 +0000 upstream commit - regen test data after mktestdata.sh changes + Allow RekeyLimits in excess of 4G up to 2**63 bits + (limited by the return type of scan_scaled). Part of bz#2521, ok djm. - Upstream-Regress-ID: 3495ecb082b9a7c048a2d7c5c845d3bf181d25a4 + Upstream-ID: 13bea82be566b9704821b1ea05bf7804335c7979 -commit 7c8c174c69f681d4910fa41c37646763692b28e2 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jul 7 14:53:30 2015 +0000 +commit c0060a65296f01d4634f274eee184c0e93ba0f23 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 29 02:42:46 2016 +0000 upstream commit - adapt tests to new minimum RSA size and default FP format + Account for packets buffered but not yet processed when + computing whether or not it is time to perform rekeying. bz#2521, based + loosely on a patch from olo at fb.com, ok djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: a4b30afd174ce82b96df14eb49fb0b81398ffd0e + Upstream-ID: 67e268b547f990ed220f3cb70a5624d9bda12b8c -commit 6a977a4b68747ade189e43d302f33403fd4a47ac +commit 44cf930e670488c85c9efeb373fa5f4b455692ac Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 3 04:39:23 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 27 06:44:58 2016 +0000 upstream commit - legacy v00 certificates are gone; adapt and don't try to - test them; "sure" markus@ dtucker@ + change old $FreeBSD version string in comment so it doesn't + become an RCS ident downstream; requested by des AT des.no - Upstream-Regress-ID: c57321e69b3cd4a3b3396dfcc43f0803d047da12 + Upstream-ID: 8ca558c01f184e596b45e4fc8885534b2c864722 -commit 0c4123ad5e93fb90fee9c6635b13a6cdabaac385 +commit ebacd377769ac07d1bf3c75169644336056b7060 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 23:11:18 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 27 00:53:12 2016 +0000 upstream commit - don't expect SSH v.1 in unittests + make the debug messages a bit more useful here - Upstream-Regress-ID: f8812b16668ba78e6a698646b2a652b90b653397 + Upstream-ID: 478ccd4e897e0af8486b294aa63aa3f90ab78d64 -commit 3c099845798a817cdde513c39074ec2063781f18 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 15 06:38:50 2015 +0000 +commit 458abc2934e82034c5c281336d8dc0f910aecad3 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 23 05:31:35 2016 +0000 upstream commit - turn SSH1 back on to match src/usr.bin/ssh being tested + Zero a stack buffer with explicit_bzero() instead of + memset() when returning from client_loop() for consistency with + buffer_free()/sshbuf_free(). + + ok dtucker@ deraadt@ djm@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 6c4f763a2f0cc6893bf33983919e9030ae638333 + Upstream-ID: bc9975b2095339811c3b954694d7d15ea5c58f66 -commit b1dc2b33689668c75e95f873a42d5aea1f4af1db +commit 65a3c0dacbc7dbb75ddb6a70ebe22d8de084d0b0 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jul 13 04:57:14 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Jan 20 09:22:39 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Add "PuTTY_Local:" to the clients to which we do not - offer DH-GEX. This was the string that was used for development versions - prior to September 2014 and they don't do RFC4419 DH-GEX, but unfortunately - there are some extant products based on those versions. bx2424 from Jay - Rouman, ok markus@ djm@ + Include sys/time.h for gettimeofday. From sortie at + maxsi.org. - Upstream-ID: be34d41e18b966832fe09ca243d275b81882e1d5 + Upstream-ID: 6ed0c33b836d9de0a664cd091e86523ecaa2fb3b -commit 3a1638dda19bbc73d0ae02b4c251ce08e564b4b9 +commit fc77ccdc2ce6d5d06628b8da5048a6a5f6ffca5a Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 10 06:21:53 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Jan 14 22:56:56 2016 +0000 upstream commit - Turn off DSA by default; add HostKeyAlgorithms to the - server and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the client side, so it still can be - tested or turned back on; feedback and ok djm@ + fd leaks; report Qualys Security Advisory team; ok + deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 8450a9e6d83f80c9bfed864ff061dfc9323cec21 + Upstream-ID: 4ec0f12b9d8fa202293c9effa115464185aa071d -commit 16db0a7ee9a87945cc594d13863cfcb86038db59 +commit a306863831c57ec5fad918687cc5d289ee8e2635 Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Jul 9 09:49:46 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Jan 14 16:17:39 2016 +0000 upstream commit - re-enable ed25519-certs if compiled w/o openssl; ok djm + remove roaming support; ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: e10c90808b001fd2c7a93778418e9b318f5c4c49 + Upstream-ID: 2cab8f4b197bc95776fb1c8dc2859dad0c64dc56 -commit c355bf306ac33de6545ce9dac22b84a194601e2f -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 8 20:24:02 2015 +0000 +commit 6ef49e83e30688504552ac10875feabd5521565f +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 14 14:34:34 2016 +0000 upstream commit - no need to include the old buffer/key API + Disable experimental client-side roaming support. Server + side was disabled/gutted for years already, but this aspect was surprisingly + forgotten. Thanks for report from Qualys - Upstream-ID: fb13c9f7c0bba2545f3eb0a0e69cb0030819f52b + Upstream-ID: 2328004b58f431a554d4c1bf67f5407eae3389df -commit a3cc48cdf9853f1e832d78cb29bedfab7adce1ee -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 8 19:09:25 2015 +0000 +commit 8d7b523b96d3be180572d9d338cedaafc0570f60 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jan 14 11:08:19 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - typedefs for Cipher&CipherContext are unused - - Upstream-ID: 50e6a18ee92221d23ad173a96d5b6c42207cf9a7 + bump version numbers -commit a635bd06b5c427a57c3ae760d3a2730bb2c863c0 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 8 19:04:21 2015 +0000 +commit 8c3d512a1fac8b9c83b4d0c9c3f2376290bd84ca +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jan 14 11:04:04 2016 +1100 - upstream commit - - xmalloc.h is unused - - Upstream-ID: afb532355b7fa7135a60d944ca1e644d1d63cb58 + openssh-7.1p2 -commit 2521cf0e36c7f3f6b19f206da0af134f535e4a31 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 8 19:01:15 2015 +0000 +commit e6c85f8889c5c9eb04796fdb76d2807636b9eef5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jan 15 01:30:36 2016 +1100 + + forcibly disable roaming support in the client + +commit ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 13 23:04:47 2016 +0000 upstream commit - compress.c is gone + eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted + forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by + Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 174fa7faa9b9643cba06164b5e498591356fbced + Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938 -commit c65a7aa6c43aa7a308ee1ab8a96f216169ae9615 +commit 9a728cc918fad67c8a9a71201088b1e150340ba4 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 3 04:05:54 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Jan 12 23:42:54 2016 +0000 upstream commit - another SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE that needed - cranking + use explicit_bzero() more liberally in the buffer code; ok + deraadt - Upstream-ID: 9d8826cafe96aab4ae8e2f6fd22800874b7ffef1 + Upstream-ID: 0ece37069fd66bc6e4f55eb1321f93df372b65bf -commit b1f383da5cd3cb921fc7776f17a14f44b8a31757 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 3 03:56:25 2015 +0000 +commit 4626cbaf78767fc8e9c86dd04785386c59ae0839 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jan 8 14:24:56 2016 +1100 - upstream commit + Support Illumos/Solaris fine-grained privileges - add an XXX reminder for getting correct key paths from - sshd_config + Includes a pre-auth privsep sandbox and several pledge() + emulations. bz#2511, patch by Alex Wilson. - Upstream-ID: feae52b209d7782ad742df04a4260e9fe41741db + ok dtucker@ -commit 933935ce8d093996c34d7efa4d59113163080680 +commit 422d1b3ee977ff4c724b597fb2e437d38fc8de9d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 3 03:49:45 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Dec 31 00:33:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit - refuse to generate or accept RSA keys smaller than 1024 - bits; feedback and ok dtucker@ + fix three bugs in KRL code related to (unused) signature + support: verification length was being incorrectly calculated, multiple + signatures were being incorrectly processed and a NULL dereference that + occurred when signatures were verified. Reported by Carl Jackson - Upstream-ID: 7ea3d31271366ba264f06e34a3539bf1ac30f0ba + Upstream-ID: e705e97ad3ccce84291eaa651708dd1b9692576b -commit bdfd29f60b74f3e678297269dc6247a5699583c1 +commit 6074c84bf95d00f29cc7d5d3cd3798737851aa1a Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 3 03:47:00 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Dec 30 23:46:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit - turn off 1024 bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key - exchange method (already off in server, this turns it off in the client by - default too) ok dtucker@ + unused prototype - Upstream-ID: f59b88f449210ab7acf7d9d88f20f1daee97a4fa + Upstream-ID: f3eef4389d53ed6c0d5c77dcdcca3060c745da97 -commit c28fc62d789d860c75e23a9fa9fb250eb2beca57 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jul 3 03:43:18 2015 +0000 +commit 6213f0e180e54122bb1ba928e11c784e2b4e5380 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 26 20:51:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit - delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure" - markus@ dtucker@ + Use pread/pwrite instead separate lseek+read/write for + lastlog. Cast to off_t before multiplication to avoid truncation on ILP32 + + ok kettenis@ mmcc@ - Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f + Upstream-ID: fc40092568cd195719ddf1a00aa0742340d616cf -commit 564d63e1b4a9637a209d42a9d49646781fc9caef -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 23:10:47 2015 +0000 +commit d7d2bc95045a43dd56ea696cc1d030ac9d77e81f +Author: semarie@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 26 07:46:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Compile-time disable SSH v.1 again + adjust pledge promises for ControlMaster: when using + "ask" or "autoask", the process will use ssh-askpass for asking confirmation. - Upstream-ID: 1d4b513a3a06232f02650b73bad25100d1b800af - -commit 868109b650504dd9bcccdb1f51d0906f967c20ff -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 02:39:06 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + problem found by halex@ - twiddle PermitRootLogin back + ok halex@ - Upstream-ID: 2bd23976305d0512e9f84d054e1fc23cd70b89f2 + Upstream-ID: 38a58b30ae3eef85051c74d3c247216ec0735f80 -commit 7de4b03a6e4071d454b72927ffaf52949fa34545 +commit 271df8185d9689b3fb0523f58514481b858f6843 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 02:32:17 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Dec 13 22:42:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit - twiddle; (this commit marks the openssh-6.9 release) + unbreak connections with peers that set + first_kex_follows; fix from Matt Johnston va bz#2515 - Upstream-ID: 78500582819f61dd8adee36ec5cc9b9ac9351234 + Upstream-ID: decc88ec4fc7515594fdb42b04aa03189a44184b -commit 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 02:26:31 2015 +0000 +commit 43849a47c5f8687699eafbcb5604f6b9c395179f +Author: doug@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 17:41:37 2015 +0000 upstream commit - better refuse ForwardX11Trusted=no connections attempted - after ForwardX11Timeout expires; reported by Jann Horn + Add "id" to ssh-agent pledge for subprocess support. - Upstream-ID: bf0fddadc1b46a0334e26c080038313b4b6dea21 - -commit 47aa7a0f8551b471fcae0447c1d78464f6dba869 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 01:56:13 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + Found the hard way by Jan Johansson when using ssh-agent with X. Also, + rearranged proc/exec and retval to match other pledge calls in the tree. - put back default PermitRootLogin=no + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 7bdedd5cead99c57ed5571f3b6b7840922d5f728 + Upstream-ID: 914255f6850e5e7fa830a2de6c38605333b584db -commit 984b064fe2a23733733262f88d2e1b2a1a501662 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:13 2015 +0000 +commit 52d7078421844b2f88329f5be3de370b0a938636 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 04:21:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit - openssh-6.9 + Remove NULL-checks before sshbuf_free(). + + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 6cfe8e1904812531080e6ab6e752d7001b5b2d45 + Upstream-ID: 5ebed00ed5f9f03b119a345085e8774565466917 -commit d921082ed670f516652eeba50705e1e9f6325346 +commit a4b9e0f4e4a6980a0eb8072f76ea611cab5b77e7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:00 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 11 03:24:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit - reset default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' (momentarily, for - release) + include remote port number in a few more messages; makes + tying log messages together into a session a bit easier; bz#2503 ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: cad8513527066e65dd7a1c16363d6903e8cefa24 - -commit 66295e0e1ba860e527f191b6325d2d77dec4dbce -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jul 1 11:49:12 2015 +1000 - - crank version numbers for release - -commit 37035c07d4f26bb1fbe000d2acf78efdb008681d -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jul 1 10:49:37 2015 +1000 - - s/--with-ssh1/--without-ssh1/ + Upstream-ID: 9300dc354015f7a7368d94a8ff4a4266a69d237e -commit 629df770dbadc2accfbe1c81b3f31f876d0acd84 +commit 6091c362e89079397e68744ae30df121b0a72c07 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 30 05:25:07 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 11 03:20:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit - fatal() when a remote window update causes the window - value to overflow. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@ + don't try to load SSHv1 private key when compiled without + SSHv1 support. From Iain Morgan bz#2505 - Upstream-ID: ead397a9aceb3bf74ebfa5fcaf259d72e569f351 + Upstream-ID: 8b8e7b02a448cf5e5635979df2d83028f58868a7 -commit f715afebe735d61df3fd30ad72d9ac1c8bd3b5f2 +commit cce6a36bb95e81fa8bfb46daf22eabcf13afc352 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 30 05:23:25 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 11 03:19:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Fix math error in remote window calculations that causes - eventual stalls for datagram channels. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok - markus@ - - Upstream-ID: be54059d11bf64e0d85061f7257f53067842e2ab - -commit 52fb6b9b034fcfd24bf88cc7be313e9c31de9889 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Jun 30 16:05:40 2015 +1000 - - skip IPv6-related portions on hosts without IPv6 + use SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES consistently as buffer size when + reading key files. Increase it to match the size of the buffers already being + used. - with Tim Rice + Upstream-ID: 1b60586b484b55a947d99a0b32bd25e0ced56fae -commit 512caddf590857af6aa12218461b5c0441028cf5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 29 22:35:12 2015 +0000 +commit 89540b6de025b80404a0cb8418c06377f3f98848 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 02:31:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit - add getpid to sandbox, reachable by grace_alarm_handler + Remove NULL-checks before sshkey_free(). - reported by Jakub Jelen; bz#2419 + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: d0da1117c16d4c223954995d35b0f47c8f684cd8 + Upstream-ID: 3e35afe8a25e021216696b5d6cde7f5d2e5e3f52 -commit 78c2a4f883ea9aba866358e2acd9793a7f42ca93 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 26 05:13:20 2015 +0000 +commit 79394ed6d74572c2d2643d73937dad33727fc240 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 02:29:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Fix \-escaping bug that caused forward path parsing to skip - two characters and skip past the end of the string. - - Based on patch by Salvador Fandino; ok dtucker@ + fflush stdout so that output is seen even when running in + debug mode when output may otherwise not be flushed. Patch from dustin at + null-ptr.net. - Upstream-ID: 7b879dc446335677cbe4cb549495636a0535f3bd + Upstream-ID: b0c6b4cd2cdb01d7e9eefbffdc522e35b5bc4acc -commit bc20205c91c9920361d12b15d253d4997dba494a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jun 25 09:51:39 2015 +1000 +commit ee607cccb6636eb543282ba90e0677b0604d8b7a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 15:23:49 2015 +1100 - add missing pselect6 + Increase robustness of redhat/openssh.spec + + - remove configure --with-rsh, because this option isn't supported anymore + - replace last occurrence of BuildPreReq by BuildRequires + - update grep statement to query the krb5 include directory - patch from Jakub Jelen + Patch from CarstenGrohmann via github, ok djm. -commit 9d27fb73b4a4e5e99cb880af790d5b1ce44f720a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 24 23:47:23 2015 +0000 +commit b5fa0cd73555b991a543145603658d7088ec6b60 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 15:10:32 2015 +1100 - upstream commit - - correct test to sshkey_sign(); spotted by Albert S. + Allow --without-ssl-engine with --without-openssl - Upstream-ID: 5f7347f40f0ca6abdaca2edb3bd62f4776518933 + Patch from Mike Frysinger via github. -commit 7ed01a96a1911d8b4a9ef4f3d064e1923bfad7e3 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 +commit c1d7e546f6029024f3257cc25c92f2bddf163125 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 14:27:09 2015 +1100 - upstream commit - - Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups - in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise - inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument - to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in - this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ + Include openssl crypto.h for SSLeay. - Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 + Patch from doughdemon via github. -commit 882f8bf94f79528caa65b0ba71c185d705bb7195 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 +commit c6f5f01651526e88c00d988ce59d71f481ebac62 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 15 13:59:12 2015 +1100 - upstream commit - - Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups in - the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise - inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument - to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in - this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ + Add sys/time.h for gettimeofday. - Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 + Should allow it it compile with MUSL libc. Based on patch from + doughdemon via github. -commit 9488538a726951e82b3a4374f3c558d72c80a89b +commit 39736be06c7498ef57d6970f2d85cf066ae57c82 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 22 23:42:16 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 11 02:20:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Don't count successful partial authentication as failures - in monitor; this may have caused the monitor to refuse multiple - authentications that would otherwise have successfully completed; ok markus@ + correct error messages; from Tomas Kuthan bz#2507 - Upstream-ID: eb74b8e506714d0f649bd5c300f762a527af04a3 + Upstream-ID: 7454a0affeab772398052954c79300aa82077093 -commit 63b78d003bd8ca111a736e6cea6333da50f5f09b -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 22 12:29:57 2015 +0000 +commit 94141b7ade24afceeb6762a3f99e09e47a6c42b6 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 11 00:20:04 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Don't call setgroups if we have zero groups; there's no - guarantee that it won't try to deref the pointer. Based on a patch from mail - at quitesimple.org, ok djm deraadt + Pass (char *)NULL rather than (char *)0 to execl and + execlp. - Upstream-ID: 2fff85e11d7a9a387ef7fddf41fbfaf566708ab1 - -commit 5c15e22c691c79a47747bcf5490126656f97cecd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Jun 18 15:07:56 2015 +1000 - - fix syntax error + ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 56c955106cbddba86c3dd9bbf786ac0d1b361492 -commit 596dbca82f3f567fb3d2d69af4b4e1d3ba1e6403 -Author: jsing@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 15 18:44:22 2015 +0000 +commit d59ce08811bf94111c2f442184cf7d1257ffae24 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 10 17:08:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit - If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however - AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will - potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a - principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has - already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the - same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to - determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on. + Remove NULL-checks before free(). - ok djm@ + ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d + Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8 -commit aff3e94c0d75d0d0fa84ea392b50ab04f8c57905 -Author: jsing@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 15 18:42:19 2015 +0000 +commit 8e56dd46cb37879c73bce2d6032cf5e7f82d5a71 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 10 07:01:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar - to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct - sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller. - - No functional change. - - ok djm@ + Fix a couple "the the" typos. ok dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c + Upstream-ID: ec364c5af32031f013001fd28d1bd3dfacfe9a72 -commit 97e2e1596c202a4693468378b16b2353fd2d6c5e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jun 17 14:36:54 2015 +1000 +commit 6262a0522ddc2c0f2e9358dcb68d59b46e9c533e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 7 20:04:09 2015 +0000 - trivial optimisation for seccomp-bpf + upstream commit - When doing arg inspection and the syscall doesn't match, skip - past the instruction that reloads the syscall into the accumulator, - since the accumulator hasn't been modified at this point. + stricter encoding type checks for ssh-rsa; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8cca7c787599a5e8391e184d0b4f36fdc3665650 -commit 99f33d7304893bd9fa04d227cb6e870171cded19 +commit d86a3ba7af160c13496102aed861ae48a4297072 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Jun 17 10:50:51 2015 +1000 +Date: Wed Dec 9 09:18:45 2015 +1100 - aarch64 support for seccomp-bpf sandbox + Don't set IPV6_V6ONLY on OpenBSD - Also resort and tidy syscall list. Based on patches by Jakub Jelen - bz#2361; ok dtucker@ + It isn't necessary and runs afoul of pledge(2) restrictions. -commit 4ef702e1244633c1025ec7cfe044b9ab267097bf +commit da98c11d03d819a15429d8fff9688acd7505439f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Jun 15 01:32:50 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Dec 7 02:20:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit - return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S + basic unit tests for rsa-sha2-* signature types - Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa - -commit a170f22baf18af0b1acf2788b8b715605f41a1f9 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Tue Jun 9 22:41:13 2015 -0700 - - Fix t12 rules for out of tree builds. + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7dc4b9db809d578ff104d591b4d86560c3598d3c -commit ec04dc4a5515c913121bc04ed261857e68fa5c18 -Author: millert@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 5 15:13:13 2015 +0000 +commit 3da893fdec9936dd2c23739cdb3c0c9d4c59fca0 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Dec 5 20:53:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit - For "ssh -L 12345:/tmp/sock" don't fail with "No forward host - name." (we have a path, not a host name). Based on a diff from Jared - Yanovich. OK djm@ + prefer rsa-sha2-512 over -256 for hostkeys, too; noticed + by naddy@ - Upstream-ID: 2846b0a8c7de037e33657f95afbd282837fc213f + Upstream-ID: 685f55f7ec566a8caca587750672723a0faf3ffe -commit 732d61f417a6aea0aa5308b59cb0f563bcd6edd6 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Jun 5 03:44:14 2015 +0000 +commit 8b56e59714d87181505e4678f0d6d39955caf10e +Author: tobias@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 4 21:51:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit - typo: accidental repetition; bz#2386 + Properly handle invalid %-format by calling fatal. - Upstream-ID: 45e620d99f6bc301e5949d34a54027374991c88b - -commit adfb24c69d1b6f5e758db200866c711e25a2ba73 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Jun 5 14:51:40 2015 +1000 - - Add Linux powerpc64le and powerpcle entries. + ok deraadt, djm - Stopgap to resolve bz#2409 because we are so close to release and will - update config.guess and friends shortly after the release. ok djm@ - -commit a1195a0fdc9eddddb04d3e9e44c4775431cb77da -Merge: 6397eed d2480bc -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Wed Jun 3 21:43:13 2015 -0700 - - Merge branch 'master' of git.mindrot.org:/var/git/openssh - -commit 6397eedf953b2b973d2d7cbb504ab501a07f8ddc -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Wed Jun 3 21:41:11 2015 -0700 - - Remove unneeded backslashes. Patch from Ángel González - -commit d2480bcac1caf31b03068de877a47d6e1027bf6d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 4 14:10:55 2015 +1000 - - Remove redundant include of stdarg.h. bz#2410 + Upstream-ID: 5692bce7d9f6eaa9c488cb93d3b55e758bef1eac -commit 5e67859a623826ccdf2df284cbb37e2d8e2787eb -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Jun 2 09:10:40 2015 +0000 +commit 76c9fbbe35aabc1db977fb78e827644345e9442e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 4 16:41:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit - mention CheckHostIP adding addresses to known_hosts; - bz#1993; ok dtucker@ - - Upstream-ID: fd44b68440fd0dc29abf9f2d3f703d74a2396cb7 - -commit d7a58bbac6583e33fd5eca8e2c2cc70c57617818 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 2 20:15:26 2015 +1000 - - Replace strcpy with strlcpy. + implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures + (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and + draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ - ok djm, sanity check by Corinna Vinschen. - -commit 51a1c2115265c6e80ede8a5c9dccada9aeed7143 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri May 29 18:27:21 2015 +1000 - - skip, rather than fatal when run without SUDO set - -commit 599f01142a376645b15cbc9349d7e8975e1cf245 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri May 29 18:03:15 2015 +1000 - - fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs - -commit 0c2a81dfc21822f2423edd30751e5ec53467b347 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri May 29 17:08:28 2015 +1000 - - re-enable SSH protocol 1 at compile time + Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309 -commit db438f9285d64282d3ac9e8c0944f59f037c0151 +commit 6064a8b8295cb5a17b5ebcfade53053377714f40 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 29 03:05:13 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Dec 4 00:24:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit - make this work without SUDO set; ok dtucker@ + clean up agent_fd handling; properly initialise it to -1 + and make tests consistent + + ok markus@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: bca88217b70bce2fe52b23b8e06bdeb82d98c715 + Upstream-ID: ac9554323d5065745caf17b5e37cb0f0d4825707 -commit 1d9a2e2849c9864fe75daabf433436341c968e14 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 28 07:37:31 2015 +0000 +commit b91926a97620f3e51761c271ba57aa5db790f48d +Author: semarie@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 3 17:00:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit - wrap all moduli-related code in #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. - based on patch from Reuben Hawkins; bz#2388 feedback and ok dtucker@ + pledges ssh client: - mux client: which is used when + ControlMaster is in use. will end with "stdio proc tty" (proc is to + permit sending SIGWINCH to mux master on window resize) - Upstream-ID: d80cfc8be3e6ec65b3fac9e87c4466533b31b7cf - -commit 496aeb25bc2d6c434171292e4714771b594bd00e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 28 05:41:29 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + - client loop: several levels of pledging depending of your used options - Increase the allowed length of the known host file name - in the log message to be consistent with other cases. Part of bz#1993, ok - deraadt. + ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: a9e97567be49f25daf286721450968251ff78397 + Upstream-ID: 21676155a700e51f2ce911e33538e92a2cd1d94b -commit dd2cfeb586c646ff8d70eb93567b2e559ace5b14 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 28 05:09:45 2015 +0000 +commit bcce47466bbc974636f588b5e4a9a18ae386f64a +Author: doug@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 2 08:30:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Fix typo (keywork->keyword) + Add "cpath" to the ssh-agent pledge so the cleanup + handler can unlink(). + + ok djm@ - Upstream-ID: 8aacd0f4089c0a244cf43417f4f9045dfaeab534 + Upstream-ID: 9e632991d48241d56db645602d381253a3d8c29d -commit 9cc6842493fbf23025ccc1edab064869640d3bec +commit a90d001543f46716b6590c6dcc681d5f5322f8cf Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 28 04:50:53 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Dec 2 08:00:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit - add error message on ftruncate failure; bz#2176 + ssh-agent pledge needs proc for askpass; spotted by todd@ - Upstream-ID: cbcc606e0b748520c74a210d8f3cc9718d3148cf + Upstream-ID: 349aa261b29cc0e7de47ef56167769c432630b2a -commit d1958793a0072c22be26d136dbda5ae263e717a0 +commit d952162b3c158a8f23220587bb6c8fcda75da551 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 28 04:40:13 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Dec 1 23:29:24 2015 +0000 upstream commit - make ssh-keygen default to ed25519 keys when compiled - without OpenSSL; bz#2388, ok dtucker@ + basic pledge() for ssh-agent, more refinement needed - Upstream-ID: 85a471fa6d3fa57a7b8e882d22cfbfc1d84cdc71 + Upstream-ID: 5b5b03c88162fce549e45e1b6dd833f20bbb5e13 -commit 3ecde664c9fc5fb3667aedf9e6671462600f6496 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 27 23:51:10 2015 +0000 +commit f0191d7c8e76e30551084b79341886d9bb38e453 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Nov 30 10:53:25 2015 +1100 - upstream commit + Revert "stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it" - Reorder client proposal to prefer - diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ + This reverts commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c. - Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058 + dtucker beat me to it :/ -commit 40f64292b907afd0a674fdbf3e4c2356d17a7d68 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 27 23:39:18 2015 +0000 +commit 6283cc72eb0e49a3470d30e07ca99a1ba9e89676 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Nov 30 10:37:03 2015 +1100 - upstream commit - - Add a stronger (4k bit) fallback group that sshd can use - when the moduli file is missing or broken, sourced from RFC3526. bz#2302, ok - markus@ (earlier version), djm@ + revert 7d4c7513: bring back S/Key prototypes - Upstream-ID: b635215746a25a829d117673d5e5a76d4baee7f4 + (but leave RCSID changes) -commit 5ab7d5fa03ad55bc438fab45dfb3aeb30a3c237a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 28 10:03:40 2015 +1000 +commit 14c887c8393adde2d9fd437d498be30f8c98535c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Nov 30 09:45:29 2015 +1100 - New moduli file from OpenBSD, removing 1k groups. - - Remove 1k bit groups. ok deraadt@, markus@ + stub for pledge(2) for systems that lack it -commit a71ba58adf34e599f30cdda6e9b93ae6e3937eea +commit 452c0b6af5d14c37553e30059bf74456012493f3 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 27 05:15:02 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit - - support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry devices - bz#2240, based on patch from Dirk-Willem van Gulik; feedback and ok dtucker@ - - Upstream-ID: 504568992b55a8fc984375242b1bd505ced61b0d - -commit b282fec1aa05246ed3482270eb70fc3ec5f39a00 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 26 23:23:40 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Nov 29 22:18:37 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Cap DH-GEX group size at 4kbits for Cisco implementations. - Some of them will choke when asked for preferred sizes >4k instead of - returning the 4k group that they do have. bz#2209, ok djm@ + pledge, better fatal() messages; feedback deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 54b863a19713446b7431f9d06ad0532b4fcfef8d + Upstream-ID: 3e00f6ccfe2b9a7a2d1dbba5409586180801488f -commit 3e91b4e8b0dc2b4b7e7d42cf6e8994a32e4cb55e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Sun May 24 23:39:16 2015 +0000 +commit 6da413c085dba37127687b2617a415602505729b +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 28 06:50:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit - add missing 'c' option to getopt(), case statement was - already there; from Felix Bolte + do not leak temp file if there is no known_hosts file + from craig leres, ok djm - Upstream-ID: 9b19b4e2e0b54d6fefa0dfac707c51cf4bae3081 + Upstream-ID: c820497fd5574844c782e79405c55860f170e426 -commit 64a89ec07660abba4d0da7c0095b7371c98bab62 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Sat May 23 14:28:37 2015 +0000 +commit 3ddd15e1b63a4d4f06c8ab16fbdd8a5a61764f16 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Nov 30 07:23:53 2015 +1100 - upstream commit - - fix a memory leak in an error path ok markus@ dtucker@ + Add a null implementation of pledge. - Upstream-ID: bc1da0f205494944918533d8780fde65dff6c598 + Fixes builds on almost everything. -commit f948737449257d2cb83ffcfe7275eb79b677fd4a +commit b1d6b3971ef256a08692efc409fc9ada719111cc Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 22 05:28:45 2015 +0000 +Date: Sat Nov 28 06:41:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit - mention ssh-keygen -E for comparing legacy MD5 - fingerprints; bz#2332 + don't include port number in tcpip-forward replies for + requests that don't allocate a port; bz#2509 diagnosed by Ron Frederick ok + markus - Upstream-ID: 079a3669549041dbf10dbc072d9563f0dc3b2859 + Upstream-ID: 77efad818addb61ec638b5a2362f1554e21a970a -commit 0882332616e4f0272c31cc47bf2018f9cb258a4e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 22 04:45:52 2015 +0000 +commit 9080bd0b9cf10d0f13b1f642f20cb84285cb8d65 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 27 00:49:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Reorder EscapeChar option parsing to avoid a single-byte - out- of-bounds read. bz#2396 from Jaak Ristioja; ok dtucker@ + pledge "stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec" + except for the -p option (which sadly has insane semantics...) ok semarie + dtucker - Upstream-ID: 1dc6b5b63d1c8d9a88619da0b27ade461d79b060 + Upstream-ID: 8854bbd58279abe00f6c33f8094bdc02c8c65059 -commit d7c31da4d42c115843edee2074d7d501f8804420 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 22 03:50:02 2015 +0000 +commit 4d90625b229cf6b3551d81550a9861897509a65f +Author: halex@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 20 23:04:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit - add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for - multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker - (kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD) + allow comment change for all supported formats - Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d - -commit aa72196a00be6e0b666215edcffbc10af234cb0e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 22 17:49:46 2015 +1000 - - Include signal.h for sig_atomic_t, used by kex.h. + ok djm@ - bz#2402, from tomas.kuthan at oracle com. - -commit 8b02481143d75e91c49d1bfae0876ac1fbf9511a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 22 12:47:24 2015 +1000 - - Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. + Upstream-ID: 5fc477cf2f119b2d44aa9c683af16cb00bb3744b -commit 4739e8d5e1c0be49624082bd9f6b077e9e758db9 +commit 8ca915fc761519dd1f7766a550ec597a81db5646 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 21 12:01:19 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 20 01:45:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to find search known_hosts - and print key hashes. Already advertised by ssh-keygen(1), but not delivered - by code; ok dtucker@ + add cast to make -Werror clean - Upstream-ID: 459e0e2bf39825e41b0811c336db2d56a1c23387 + Upstream-ID: 288db4f8f810bd475be01320c198250a04ff064d -commit e97201feca10b5196da35819ae516d0b87cf3a50 +commit ac9473580dcd401f8281305af98635cdaae9bf96 Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu May 21 17:55:15 2015 +1000 +Date: Fri Nov 20 12:35:41 2015 +1100 - conditionalise util.h inclusion + fix multiple authentication using S/Key w/ privsep + + bz#2502, patch from Kevin Korb and feandil_ -commit 13640798c7dd011ece0a7d02841fe48e94cfa0e0 +commit 88b6fcdeb87a2fb76767854d9eb15006662dca57 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 21 06:44:25 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 19 08:23:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit - regress test for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + ban ConnectionAttempts=0, it makes no sense and would cause + ssh_connect_direct() to print an uninitialised stack variable; bz#2500 + reported by dvw AT phas.ubc.ca - Upstream-Regress-ID: c658fbf1ab6b6011dc83b73402322e396f1e1219 + Upstream-ID: 32b5134c608270583a90b93a07b3feb3cbd5f7d5 -commit 84452c5d03c21f9bfb28c234e0dc1dc67dd817b1 +commit 964ab3ee7a8f96bdbc963d5b5a91933d6045ebe7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 21 06:40:02 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 19 01:12:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit - regress test for AuthorizedKeysCommand arguments + trailing whitespace - Upstream-Regress-ID: bbd65c13c6b3be9a442ec115800bff9625898f12 + Upstream-ID: 31fe0ad7c4d08e87f1d69c79372f5e3c5cd79051 -commit bcc50d816187fa9a03907ac1f3a52f04a52e10d1 +commit f96516d052dbe38561f6b92b0e4365d8e24bb686 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 21 06:43:30 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 19 01:09:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit - add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting - authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite - useful in deployments with large userbases - - feedback and ok markus@ + print host certificate contents at debug level - Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6 + Upstream-ID: 39354cdd8a2b32b308fd03f98645f877f540f00d -commit 24232a3e5ab467678a86aa67968bbb915caffed4 +commit 499cf36fecd6040e30e2912dd25655bc574739a7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 21 06:38:35 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Nov 19 01:08:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit - support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand - - bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen - feedback and ok markus@ + move the certificate validity formatting code to + sshkey.[ch] - Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7 + Upstream-ID: f05f7c78fab20d02ff1d5ceeda533ef52e8fe523 -commit d80fbe41a57c72420c87a628444da16d09d66ca7 +commit bcb7bc77bbb1535d1008c7714085556f3065d99d Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu May 21 04:55:51 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 18 08:37:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit - refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own - sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@ + fix "ssh-keygen -l" of private key, broken in support for + multiple plain keys on stdin - Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a + Upstream-ID: 6b3132d2c62d03d0bad6f2bcd7e2d8b7dab5cd9d -commit 7cc44ef74133a473734bbcbd3484f24d6a7328c5 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 18 15:06:05 2015 +0000 +commit 259adb6179e23195c8f6913635ea71040d1ccd63 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 23:47:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit - getentropy() and sendsyslog() have been around long - enough. openssh-portable may want the #ifdef's but not base. discussed with - djm few weeks back + Replace remaining calls to index(3) with strchr(3). OK + jca@ krw@ - Upstream-ID: 0506a4334de108e3fb6c66f8d6e0f9c112866926 + Upstream-ID: 33837d767a0cf1db1489b96055f9e330bc0bab6d -commit 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 15 05:44:21 2015 +0000 +commit c56a255162c2166884539c0a1f7511575325b477 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 22:53:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain - text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any - information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci. Add a 0.1s - incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s. ok markus@ - (earlier version), djm@ + Allow fingerprinting from standard input "ssh-keygen -lf + -" - Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f - -commit d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue May 5 19:10:58 2015 +1000 - - upstream commit + Support fingerprinting multiple plain keys in a file and authorized_keys + files too (bz#1319) - - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/12 03:20:04 - [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] - rename blocks to words. bcrypt "blocks" are unrelated to blowfish blocks, - nor are they the same size. - -commit f6391d4e59b058984163ab28f4e317e7a72478f1 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue May 5 19:10:23 2015 +1000 - - upstream commit + ok markus@ - - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/08 00:30:07 - [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] - declare a local version of MIN(), call it MINIMUM() + Upstream-ID: 903f8b4502929d6ccf53509e4e07eae084574b77 -commit 8ac6b13cc9113eb47cd9e86c97d7b26b4b71b77f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue May 5 19:09:46 2015 +1000 +commit 5b4010d9b923cf1b46c9c7b1887c013c2967e204 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 22:51:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/12/30 01:41:43 - [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] - typo in comment: ouput => output + always call privsep_preauth_child() regardless of whether + sshd was started by root; it does important priming before sandboxing and + failing to call it could result in sandbox violations later; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: c8a6d0d56c42f3faab38460dc917ca0d1705d383 -commit 1f792489d5cf86a4f4e3003e6e9177654033f0f2 +commit 3a9f84b58b0534bbb485f1eeab75665e2d03371f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 16 22:50:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we - only ever use it for strlen(pattern). - - Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read - error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL - and his own tools. + improve sshkey_read() semantics; only update *cpp when a + key is successfully read; ok markus@ - ok markus@ + Upstream-ID: f371e78e8f4fab366cf69a42bdecedaed5d1b089 -commit 639d6bc57b1942393ed12fb48f00bc05d4e093e4 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 07:10:01 2015 +0000 +commit db6f8dc5dd5655b59368efd074994d4568bc3556 +Author: logan@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Nov 16 06:13:04 2015 +0000 upstream commit - refactor ssh_dispatch_run_fatal() to use sshpkt_fatal() - to better report error conditions. Teach sshpkt_fatal() about ECONNRESET. + 1) Use xcalloc() instead of xmalloc() to check for + potential overflow. (Feedback from both mmcc@ and djm@) 2) move set_size + just before the for loop. (suggested by djm@) - Improves error messages on TCP connection resets. bz#2257 + OK djm@ - ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: 013534c308187284756c3141f11d2c0f33c47213 -commit 9559d7de34c572d4d3fd990ca211f8ec99f62c4d +commit 383f10fb84a0fee3c01f9d97594f3e22aa3cd5e0 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 07:08:08 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Nov 16 00:30:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit - a couple of parse targets were missing activep checks, - causing them to be misapplied in match context; bz#2272 diagnosis and - original patch from Sami Hartikainen ok dtucker@ - -commit 7e8528cad04b2775c3b7db08abf8fb42e47e6b2a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 04:17:51 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that + includes all current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc). Also + add permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g. "no-pty" -> "pty". + This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and ensures they are + maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions we might implement in the + future. - make handling of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none more - consistent with other =none options; bz#2288 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@ - -commit ca430d4d9cc0f62eca3b1fb1e2928395b7ce80f7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 04:03:20 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + Example: - remove failed remote forwards established by muliplexing - from the list of active forwards; bz#2363, patch mostly by Yoann Ricordel; ok - dtucker@ - -commit 8312cfb8ad88657517b3e23ac8c56c8e38eb9792 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 04:01:58 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1... + + Idea from Jann Horn; ok markus@ - reduce stderr spam when using ssh -S /path/mux -O forward - -R 0:... ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: 04ceb9d448e46e67e13887a7ae5ea45b4f1719d0 -commit 179be0f5e62f1f492462571944e45a3da660d82b -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 03:23:51 2015 +0000 +commit e41a071f7bda6af1fb3f081bed0151235fa61f15 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 15 23:58:04 2015 +0000 upstream commit - prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key - tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to - other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@ + correct section number for ssh-agent; + + Upstream-ID: 44be72fd8bcc167635c49b357b1beea8d5674bd6 -commit a42d67be65b719a430b7fcaba2a4e4118382723a -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 03:20:54 2015 +0000 +commit 1a11670286acddcc19f5eff0966c380831fc4638 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 15 23:54:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Don't make parsing of authorized_keys' environment= - option conditional on PermitUserEnv - always parse it, but only use the - result if the option is enabled. This prevents the syntax of authorized_keys - changing depending on which sshd_config options were enabled. + do not confuse mandoc by presenting "Dd"; - bz#2329; based on patch from coladict AT gmail.com, ok dtucker@ + Upstream-ID: 1470fce171c47b60bbc7ecd0fc717a442c2cfe65 -commit e661a86353e11592c7ed6a847e19a83609f49e77 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 +commit f361df474c49a097bfcf16d1b7b5c36fcd844b4b +Author: jcs@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 15 22:26:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we - only ever use it for strlen(pattern). + Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to + 'yes', 'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'. When enabled, a + private key that is used during authentication will be added to ssh-agent if + it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to 'confirm'). - Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read - error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL - and his own tools. + Initial version from Joachim Schipper many years ago. ok markus@ - -commit 0ef1de742be2ee4b10381193fe90730925b7f027 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 23 05:01:19 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit - Add a simple regression test for sshd's configuration - parser. Right now, all it does is run the output of sshd -T back through - itself and ensure the output is valid and invariant. + Upstream-ID: a680db2248e8064ec55f8be72d539458c987d5f4 -commit 368f83c793275faa2c52f60eaa9bdac155c4254b +commit d87063d9baf5479b6e813d47dfb694a97df6f6f5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 22 01:38:36 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 13 04:39:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit - use correct key for nested certificate test + send SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED replies to unexpected + messages during KEX; bz#2949, ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 2b3abdff344d53c8d505f45c83a7b12e84935786 -commit 8d4d1bfddbbd7d21f545dc6997081d1ea1fbc99a +commit 9fd04681a1e9b0af21e08ff82eb674cf0a499bfc Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 1 07:11:47 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 13 04:38:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit - mention that the user's shell from /etc/passwd is used - for commands too; bz#1459 ok dtucker@ + Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config + ForceCommand and ChrootDirectory. Useful inside Match blocks to override a + global default. bz#2486 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7ef478d6592bc7db5c7376fc33b4443e63dccfa5 -commit 5ab283d0016bbc9d4d71e8e5284d011bc5a930cf +commit 94bc0b72c29e511cbbc5772190d43282e5acfdfe Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 07:29:00 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 13 04:34:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit - whitespace + support multiple certificates (one per line) and + reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"; ok dtucker@ - Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b708a3e709d5b7fd37890f874bafdff1f597519 + Upstream-ID: ecbadeeef3926e5be6281689b7250a32a80e88db -commit 8377d5008ad260048192e1e56ad7d15a56d103dd +commit b6b9108f5b561c83612cb97ece4134eb59fde071 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 07:26:13 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Nov 13 02:57:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit - whitespace at EOL + list a couple more options usable in Match blocks; + bz#2489 - Upstream-Regress-ID: 9c48911643d5b05173b36a012041bed4080b8554 + Upstream-ID: e4d03f39d254db4c0cc54101921bb89fbda19879 -commit c28a3436fa8737709ea88e4437f8f23a6ab50359 +commit a7994b3f5a5a5a33b52b0a6065d08e888f0a99fb Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 06:45:13 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 11 04:56:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit - moar whitespace at eol + improve PEEK/POKE macros: better casts, don't multiply + evaluate arguments; ok deraadt@ - Upstream-ID: 64eaf872a3ba52ed41e494287e80d40aaba4b515 + Upstream-ID: 9a1889e19647615ededbbabab89064843ba92d3e -commit 2b64c490468fd4ca35ac8d5cc31c0520dc1508bb +commit 7d4c7513a7f209cb303a608ac6e46b3f1dfc11ec Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 06:41:56 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Nov 11 01:48:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit - whitespace at EOL + remove prototypes for long-gone s/key support; ok + dtucker@ - Upstream-ID: 57bcf67d666c6fc1ad798aee448fdc3f70f7ec2c + Upstream-ID: db5bed3c57118af986490ab23d399df807359a79 -commit 4e636cf201ce6e7e3b9088568218f9d4e2c51712 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 03:56:51 2015 +0000 +commit 07889c75926c040b8e095949c724e66af26441cb +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Nov 14 18:44:49 2015 +1100 - upstream commit + read back from libcrypto RAND when privdropping - whitespace at EOL + makes certain libcrypto implementations cache a /dev/urandom fd + in preparation of sandboxing. Based on patch by Greg Hartman. -commit 38b8272f823dc1dd4e29dbcee83943ed48bb12fa -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon May 4 01:47:53 2015 +0000 +commit 1560596f44c01bb0cef977816410950ed17b8ecd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Nov 10 11:14:47 2015 +1100 - upstream commit + Fix compiler warnings in the openssl header check. - Use diff w/out -u for better portability + Noted by Austin English. -commit 297060f42d5189a4065ea1b6f0afdf6371fb0507 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 03:25:07 2015 +0000 +commit e72a8575ffe1d8adff42c9abe9ca36938acc036b +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 23:24:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Use xcalloc for permitted_adm_opens instead of xmalloc to - ensure it's zeroed. Fixes post-auth crash with permitopen=none. bz#2355, ok - djm@ + -c before -H, in SYNOPSIS and usage(); + + Upstream-ID: 25e8c58a69e1f37fcd54ac2cd1699370acb5e404 -commit 63ebf019be863b2d90492a85e248cf55a6e87403 +commit 3a424cdd21db08c7b0ded902f97b8f02af5aa485 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri May 8 03:17:49 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Nov 8 22:30:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit - don't choke on new-format private keys encrypted with an - AEAD cipher; bz#2366, patch from Ron Frederick; ok markus@ + Add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching + certificates instead of plain keys; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 0947e2177dba92339eced9e49d3c5bf7dda69f82 -commit f8484dac678ab3098ae522a5f03bb2530f822987 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 6 05:45:17 2015 +0000 +commit 69fead5d7cdaa73bdece9fcba80f8e8e70b90346 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 22:08:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use - "pseudo-terminal" consistently. bz#1716, ok jmc@ "I like it" deraadt@. + remove slogin links; ok deraadt markus djm + + Upstream-ID: 39ba08548acde4c54f2d4520c202c2a863a3c730 -commit ea139507bef8bad26e86ed99a42c7233ad115c38 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed May 6 04:07:18 2015 +0000 +commit 2fecfd486bdba9f51b3a789277bb0733ca36e1c0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 8 21:59:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Blacklist DH-GEX for specific PuTTY versions known to - send non-RFC4419 DH-GEX messages rather than all versions of PuTTY. - According to Simon Tatham, 0.65 and newer versions will send RFC4419 DH-GEX - messages. ok djm@ + fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return + statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62 -commit b58234f00ee3872eb84f6e9e572a9a34e902e36e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 5 10:17:49 2015 +0000 +commit 5e288923a303ca672b686908320bc5368ebec6e6 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 6 00:31:41 2015 +0000 upstream commit - WinSCP doesn't implement RFC4419 DH-GEX so flag it so we - don't offer that KEX method. ok markus@ + 1. rlogin and rsh are long gone 2. protocol version isn't + of core relevance here, and v1 is going away + + ok markus@, deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 8b46bc94cf1ca7c8c1a75b1c958b2bb38d7579c8 -commit d5b1507a207253b39e810e91e68f9598691b7a29 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Tue May 5 02:48:17 2015 +0000 +commit 8b29008bbe97f33381d9b4b93fcfa304168d0286 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Nov 5 09:48:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit - use the sizeof the struct not the sizeof a pointer to the - struct in ssh_digest_start() + "commandline" -> "command line", since there are so few + examples of the former in the pages, so many of the latter, and in some of + these pages we had multiple spellings; - This file is only used if ssh is built with OPENSSL=no + prompted by tj - ok markus@ + Upstream-ID: 78459d59bff74223f8139d9001ccd56fc4310659 -commit a647b9b8e616c231594b2710c925d31b1b8afea3 +commit 996b24cebf20077fbe5db07b3a2c20c2d9db736e Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 8 11:07:27 2015 +1000 +Date: Thu Oct 29 20:57:34 2015 +1100 - Put brackets around mblen() compat constant. + (re)wrap SYS_sendsyslog in ifdef. - This might help with the reported problem cross compiling for Android - ("error: expected identifier or '(' before numeric constant") but - shouldn't hurt in any case. - -commit d1680d36e17244d9af3843aeb5025cb8e40d6c07 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 30 09:18:11 2015 +1000 - - xrealloc -> xreallocarray in portable code too. + Replace ifdef that went missing in commit + c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac. Fixes build on older + OpenBSDs. -commit 531a57a3893f9fcd4aaaba8c312b612bbbcc021e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 29 03:48:56 2015 +0000 +commit b67e2e76fcf1ae7c802eb27ca927e16c91a513ff +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:17 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily in any - order. bz#68, ok djm@, jmc@ (for the man page bit). - -commit c1d5bcf1aaf1209af02f79e48ba1cbc76a87b56f -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 28 13:47:38 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + regress test for "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a + Match block - enviroment -> environment: apologies to darren for not - spotting that first time round... + Upstream-Regress-ID: 246c37ed64a2e5704d4c158ccdca1ff700e10647 -commit 43beea053db191cac47c2cd8d3dc1930158aff1a +commit abd9dbc3c0d8c8c7561347cfa22166156e78c077 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 28 10:25:15 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Oct 26 02:50:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Fix typo in previous - -commit 85b96ef41374f3ddc9139581f87da09b2cd9199e -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 28 10:17:58 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + Fix typo certopt->certopts in shell variable. This would + cause the test to hang at a host key prompt if you have an A or CNAME for + "proxy" in your local domain. - Document that the TERM environment variable is not - subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv. bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from - jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@ + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6ea03bcd39443a83c89e2c5606392ceb9585836a -commit 88a7c598a94ff53f76df228eeaae238d2d467565 +commit ed08510d38aef930a061ae30d10f2a9cf233bafa Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 27 21:42:48 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Oct 29 08:05:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Make sshd default to PermitRootLogin=no; ok deraadt@ - rpe@ + Fix "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +..." inside a Match block; + ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 853662c4036730b966aab77684390c47b9738c69 -commit 734226b4480a6c736096c729fcf6f391400599c7 +commit a4aef3ed29071719b2af82fdf1ac3c2514f82bc5 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 27 01:52:30 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 27 08:54:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit - fix compilation with OPENSSL=no; ok dtucker@ - -commit a4b9d2ce1eb7703eaf0809b0c8a82ded8aa4f1c6 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 27 00:37:53 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + fix execv arguments in a way less likely to cause grief + for -portable; ok dtucker@ - Include stdio.h for FILE (used in sshkey.h) so it - compiles with OPENSSL=no. + Upstream-ID: 5902bf0ea0371f39f1300698dc3b8e4105fc0fc5 -commit dbcc652f4ca11fe04e5930c7ef18a219318c6cda +commit 63d188175accea83305e89fafa011136ff3d96ad Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 27 00:21:21 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 27 01:44:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit - allow "sshd -f none" to skip reading the config file, - much like "ssh -F none" does. ok dtucker - -commit b7ca276fca316c952f0b90f5adb1448c8481eedc -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 24 06:26:49 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + log certificate serial in verbose() messages to match the + main auth success/fail message; ok dtucker@ - combine -Dd onto one line and update usage(); + Upstream-ID: dfc48b417c320b97c36ff351d303c142f2186288 -commit 2ea974630d7017e4c7666d14d9dc939707613e96 +commit 2aaba0cfd560ecfe92aa50c00750e6143842cf1f Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 24 05:26:44 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit - - add ssh-agent -D to leave ssh-agent in foreground - without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 ok dtucker@ - -commit 8ac2ffd7aa06042f6b924c87139f2fea5c5682f7 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:24 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 27 00:49:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit - 2*len -> use xreallocarray() ok djm - -commit 657a5fbc0d0aff309079ff8fb386f17e964963c2 -Author: deraadt@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:00 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + avoid de-const warning & shrink; ok dtucker@ - rename xrealloc() to xreallocarray() since it follows - that form. ok djm + Upstream-ID: 69a85ef94832378952a22c172009cbf52aaa11db -commit 1108ae242fdd2c304307b68ddf46aebe43ebffaa +commit 03239c18312b9bab7d1c3b03062c61e8bbc1ca6e Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 23 04:59:10 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Oct 25 23:42:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Two small fixes for sshd -T: ListenAddress'es are added - to a list head so reverse the order when printing them to ensure the - behaviour remains the same, and print StreamLocalBindMask as octal with - leading zero. ok deraadt@ + Expand tildes in filenames passed to -i before checking + whether or not the identity file exists. This means that if the shell + doesn't do the expansion (eg because the option and filename were given as a + single argument) then we'll still add the key. bz#2481, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: db1757178a14ac519e9a3e1a2dbd21113cb3bfc6 -commit bd902b8473e1168f19378d5d0ae68d0c203525df +commit 97e184e508dd33c37860c732c0eca3fc57698b40 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 23 04:53:53 2015 +0000 +Date: Sun Oct 25 23:14:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Check for and reject missing arguments for - VersionAddendum and ForceCommand. bz#2281, patch from plautrba at redhat com, - ok djm@ + Do not prepend "exec" to the shell command run by "Match + exec" in a config file. It's an unnecessary optimization from repurposed + ProxyCommand code and prevents some things working with some shells. + bz#2471, pointed out by res at qoxp.net. ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: a1ead25ae336bfa15fb58d8c6b5589f85b4c33a3 -commit ca42c1758575e592239de1d5755140e054b91a0d -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 22 01:24:01 2015 +0000 +commit 8db134e7f457bcb069ec72bc4ee722e2af557c69 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 29 10:48:23 2015 +1100 - upstream commit + Prevent name collisions with system glob (bz#2463) - unknown certificate extensions are non-fatal, so don't - fatal when they are encountered; bz#2387 reported by Bob Van Zant; ok - dtucker@ + Move glob.h from includes.h to the only caller (sftp) and override the + names for the symbols. This prevents name collisions with the system glob + in the case where something other than ssh uses it (eg kerberos). With + jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@ -commit 39bfbf7caad231cc4bda6909fb1af0705bca04d8 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 21 07:01:00 2015 +0000 +commit 86c10dbbef6a5800d2431a66cf7f41a954bb62b5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 23 02:22:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so - KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. + Update expected group sizes to match recent code changes. - ok deraadt@ + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0004f0ea93428969fe75bcfff0d521c553977794 -commit 6b0d576bb87eca3efd2b309fcfe4edfefc289f9c +commit 9ada37d36003a77902e90a3214981e417457cf13 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 17 13:32:09 2015 +0000 +Date: Sat Oct 24 22:56:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit - s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this - wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted - -commit 44a8e7ce6f3ab4c2eb1ae49115c210b98e53c4df -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 17 13:25:52 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + fix keyscan output for multiple hosts/addrs on one line + when host hashing or a non standard port is in use; bz#2479 ok dtucker@ - don't try to cleanup NULL KEX proposals in - kex_prop_free(); found by Jukka Taimisto and Markus Hietava + Upstream-ID: 5321dabfaeceba343da3c8a8b5754c6f4a0a307b -commit 3038a191872d2882052306098c1810d14835e704 +commit 44fc7cd7dcef6c52c6b7e9ff830dfa32879bd319 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 17 13:19:22 2015 +0000 +Date: Sat Oct 24 22:52:22 2015 +0000 upstream commit - use error/logit/fatal instead of fprintf(stderr, ...) - and exit(0), fix a few errors that were being printed to stdout instead of - stderr and a few non-errors that were going to stderr instead of stdout - bz#2325; ok dtucker - -commit a58be33cb6cd24441fa7e634db0e5babdd56f07f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 17 13:16:48 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + skip "Could not chdir to home directory" message when + chrooted - debug log missing DISPLAY environment when X11 - forwarding requested; bz#1682 ok dtucker@ - -commit 17d4d9d9fbc8fb80e322f94d95eecc604588a474 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 17 04:32:31 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + patch from Christian Hesse in bz#2485 ok dtucker@ - don't call record_login() in monitor when UseLogin is - enabled; bz#278 reported by drk AT sgi.com; ok dtucker + Upstream-ID: 86783c1953da426dff5b03b03ce46e699d9e5431 -commit 40132ff87b6cbc3dc05fb5df2e9d8e3afa06aafd -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 17 04:12:35 2015 +0000 +commit a820a8618ec44735dabc688fab96fba38ad66bb2 +Author: sthen@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 24 08:34:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Add some missing options to sshd -T and fix the output - of VersionAddendum HostCertificate. bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat - com, ok djm. - -commit 6cc7cfa936afde2d829e56ee6528c7ea47a42441 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Apr 16 23:25:50 2015 +0000 - - upstream commit + Handle the split of tun(4) "link0" into tap(4) in ssh + tun-forwarding. Adapted from portable (using separate devices for this is the + normal case in most OS). ok djm@ - Document "none" for PidFile XAuthLocation - TrustedUserCAKeys and RevokedKeys. bz#2382, feedback from jmc@, ok djm@ + Upstream-ID: 90facf4c59ce73d6741db1bc926e578ef465cd39 -commit 15fdfc9b1c6808b26bc54d4d61a38b54541763ed -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Apr 15 23:23:25 2015 +0000 +commit 66d2e229baa9fe57b868c373b05f7ff3bb20055b +Author: gsoares@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 21 11:33:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Plug leak of address passed to logging. bz#2373, patch - from jjelen at redhat, ok markus@ + fix memory leak in error path ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: dd2f402b0a0029b755df029fc7f0679e1365ce35 -commit bb2289e2a47d465eaaaeff3dee2a6b7777b4c291 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 14 04:17:03 2015 +0000 +commit 7d6c0362039ceacdc1366b5df29ad5d2693c13e5 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 20 23:24:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Output remote username in debug output since with Host - and Match it's not always obvious what it will be. bz#2368, ok djm@ - -commit 70860b6d07461906730632f9758ff1b7c98c695a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 17 10:56:13 2015 +1000 - - Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T. + Compare pointers to NULL rather than 0. - Part of bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com. - -commit ee15d9c9f0720f5a8b0b34e4b10ecf21f9824814 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 17 10:40:23 2015 +1000 - - Wrap endian.h include inside ifdef (bz#2370). + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 21616cfea27eda65a06e772cc887530b9a1a27f8 -commit 408f4c2ad4a4c41baa7b9b2b7423d875abbfa70b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 17 09:39:58 2015 +1000 +commit f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 20 03:36:35 2015 +0000 - Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar'. + upstream commit - This changes configure.ac to look for '${host}-ar' as set by - AC_CANONICAL_HOST before looking for the unprefixed 'ar'. - Useful when cross-compiling when all your binutils are prefixed. + Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory. - Patch from moben at exherbo org via astrand at lysator liu se and - bz#2352. - -commit 673a1c16ad078d41558247ce739fe812c960acc8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Apr 16 11:40:20 2015 +1000 - - remove dependency on arpa/telnet.h - -commit 202d443eeda1829d336595a3cfc07827e49f45ed -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Apr 15 15:59:49 2015 +1000 - - Remove duplicate include of pwd.h. bz#2337, patch from Mordy Ovits. + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e -commit 597986493412c499f2bc2209420cb195f97b3668 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Apr 9 10:14:48 2015 +1000 +commit ac908c1eeacccfa85659594d92428659320fd57e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 22 09:35:24 2015 +1100 - platform's with openpty don't need pty_release + turn off PrintLastLog when --disable-lastlog + + bz#2278 from Brent Paulson -commit 318be28cda1fd9108f2e6f2f86b0b7589ba2aed0 +commit b56deb847f4a0115a8bf488bf6ee8524658162fd Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Apr 13 02:04:08 2015 +0000 +Date: Fri Oct 16 22:32:22 2015 +0000 upstream commit - deprecate ancient, pre-RFC4419 and undocumented - SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message; ok markus@ deraadt@ "seems - reasonable" dtucker@ + increase the minimum modulus that we will send or accept in + diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 06dce7a24c17b999a0f5fadfe95de1ed6a1a9b6a -commit d8f391caef62378463a0e6b36f940170dadfe605 -Author: dtucker@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 10 05:16:50 2015 +0000 +commit 5ee0063f024bf5b3f3ffb275b8cd20055d62b4b9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 16 18:40:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Don't send hostkey advertisments - (hostkeys-00@openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't - handle them. Newer versions should be OK. Patch from Bryan Drewery and - IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@ + better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in + hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and remove the + trailing '.' before matching ssh_config; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: f7619652e074ac3febe8363f19622aa4853b679a -commit 2c2cfe1a1c97eb9a08cc9817fd0678209680c636 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 10 00:08:55 2015 +0000 +commit e92c499a75477ecfe94dd7b4aed89f20b1fac5a7 +Author: mmcc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 16 17:07:24 2015 +0000 upstream commit - include port number if a non-default one has been - specified; based on patch from Michael Handler + 0 -> NULL when comparing with a char*. + + ok dtucker@, djm@. + + Upstream-ID: a928e9c21c0a9020727d99738ff64027c1272300 -commit 4492a4f222da4cf1e8eab12689196322e27b08c4 +commit b1d38a3cc6fe349feb8d16a5f520ef12d1de7cb2 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Apr 7 23:00:42 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Oct 15 23:51:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit - treat Protocol=1,2|2,1 as Protocol=2 when compiled - without SSH1 support; ok dtucker@ millert@ + fix some signed/unsigned integer type mismatches in + format strings; reported by Nicholas Lemonias + + Upstream-ID: 78cd55420a0eef68c4095bdfddd1af84afe5f95c -commit c265e2e6e932efc6d86f6cc885dea33637a67564 -Author: miod@openbsd.org -Date: Sun Apr 5 15:43:43 2015 +0000 +commit 1a2663a15d356bb188196b6414b4c50dc12fd42b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 15 23:08:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Do not use int for sig_atomic_t; spotted by - christos@netbsd; ok markus@ - -commit e7bf3a5eda6a1b02bef6096fed78527ee11e54cc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 7 10:48:04 2015 +1000 - - Use do{}while(0) for no-op functions. + argument to sshkey_from_private() and sshkey_demote() + can't be NULL - From FreeBSD. + Upstream-ID: 0111245b1641d387977a9b38da15916820a5fd1f -commit bb99844abae2b6447272f79e7fa84134802eb4df -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 7 10:47:15 2015 +1000 +commit 0f754e29dd3760fc0b172c1220f18b753fb0957e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 16 10:53:14 2015 +1100 - Wrap blf.h include in ifdef. From FreeBSD. + need va_copy before va_start + + reported by Nicholas Lemonias -commit d9b9b43656091cf0ad55c122f08fadb07dad0abd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Apr 7 09:10:00 2015 +1000 +commit eb6c50d82aa1f0d3fc95f5630ea69761e918bfcd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 15 15:48:28 2015 -0700 - Fix misspellings of regress CONFOPTS env variables. - - Patch from Bryan Drewery. + fix compilation on systems without SYMLOOP_MAX -commit 3f4ea3c9ab1d32d43c9222c4351f58ca11144156 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Fri Apr 3 22:17:27 2015 +0000 +commit fafe1d84a210fb3dae7744f268059cc583db8c12 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 09:22:15 2015 -0700 - upstream commit - - correct return value in pubkey parsing, spotted by Ben Hawkes - ok markus@ + s/SANDBOX_TAME/SANDBOX_PLEDGE/g -commit 7da2be0cb9601ed25460c83aa4d44052b967ba0f -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 31 22:59:01 2015 +0000 +commit 8f22911027ff6c17d7226d232ccd20727f389310 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:28:19 2015 +1100 upstream commit - adapt to recent hostfile.c change: when parsing - known_hosts without fully parsing the keys therein, hostkeys_foreach() will - now correctly identify KEY_RSA1 keys; ok markus@ miod@ + revision 1.20 + date: 2015/10/13 20:55:37; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: X39sl5ay1czgFIgp; + In rev 1.15 the sizeof argument was fixed in a strlcat() call but + the truncation check immediately following it was not updated to + match. Not an issue in practice since the buffers are the same + size. OK deraadt@ -commit 9e1777a0d1c706714b055811c12ab8cc21033e4a -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 20:19:15 2015 +0000 +commit 23fa695bb735f54f04d46123662609edb6c76767 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:51 2015 +1100 upstream commit - use ${SSH} for -Q instead of installed ssh + revision 1.19 + date: 2015/01/16 16:48:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: 0DYulI8hhujBHMcR; + Move to the universe. + review by millert, binary checking process with doug, concept with guenther -commit ce1b358ea414a2cc88e4430cd5a2ea7fecd9de57 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 16 22:46:14 2015 +0000 +commit c71be375a69af00c2d0a0c24d8752bec12d8fd1b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:27:08 2015 +1100 upstream commit - make CLEANFILES clean up more of the tests' droppings + revision 1.18 + date: 2014/10/19 03:56:28; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +9 -9; commitid: U6QxmtbXrGoc02S5; + Revert last commit due to changed semantics found by make release. -commit 398f9ef192d820b67beba01ec234d66faca65775 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 31 22:57:06 2015 +0000 +commit c39ad23b06e9aecc3ff788e92f787a08472905b1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:26:24 2015 +1100 upstream commit - downgrade error() for known_hosts parse errors to debug() - to quiet warnings from ssh1 keys present when compiled !ssh1. + revision 1.17 + date: 2014/10/18 20:43:52; author: doug; state: Exp; lines: +10 -10; commitid: I74hI1tVZtsspKEt; + Better POSIX compliance in realpath(3). - also identify ssh1 keys when scanning, even when compiled !ssh1 + millert@ made changes to realpath.c based on FreeBSD's version. I merged + Todd's changes into dl_realpath.c. - ok markus@ miod@ + ok millert@, guenther@ -commit 9a47ab80030a31f2d122b8fd95bd48c408b9fcd9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:50 2015 +0000 +commit e929a43f957dbd1254aca2aaf85c8c00cbfc25f4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:55 2015 +1100 upstream commit - fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@ + revision 1.16 + date: 2013/04/05 12:59:54; author: kurt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -1; + - Add comments regarding copies of these files also in libexec/ld.so + okay guenther@ -commit c9a0805a6280681901c270755a7cd630d7c5280e -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:24 2015 +0000 +commit 5225db68e58a1048cb17f0e36e0d33bc4a8fc410 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:32 2015 +1100 upstream commit - don't fatal when a !ssh1 sshd is reexeced from a w/ssh1 - listener; reported by miod@; ok miod@ markus@ + revision 1.15 + date: 2012/09/13 15:39:05; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; + specify the bounds of the dst to strlcat (both values were static and + equal, but it is more correct) + from Michal Mazurek -commit 704d8c88988cae38fb755a6243b119731d223222 -Author: tobias@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 31 11:06:49 2015 +0000 +commit 7365fe5b4859de2305e40ea132da3823830fa710 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 14 08:25:09 2015 +1100 upstream commit - Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys. If a user - tried to add one and entered his passphrase, explicitly clear it before exit. - This is done in all other error paths, too. - - ok djm + revision 1.14 + date: 2011/07/24 21:03:00; author: miod; state: Exp; lines: +35 -13; + Recent Single Unix will malloc memory if the second argument of realpath() + is NULL, and third-party software is starting to rely upon this. + Adapted from FreeBSD via Jona Joachim (jaj ; hcl-club , .lu), with minor + tweaks from nicm@ and yours truly. -commit 78de1673c05ea2c33e0d4a4b64ecb5186b6ea2e9 -Author: jmc@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 30 18:28:37 2015 +0000 +commit e679c09cd1951f963793aa3d9748d1c3fdcf808f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 13 16:15:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit - ssh-askpass(1) is the default, overridden by SSH_ASKPASS; - diff originally from jiri b; + apply PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes filtering earlier, so all + skipped keys are noted before pubkey authentication starts. ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: ba4f52f54268a421a2a5f98bb375403f4cb044b8 -commit 26e0bcf766fadb4a44fb6199386fb1dcab65ad00 +commit 179c353f564ec7ada64b87730b25fb41107babd7 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 30 00:00:29 2015 +0000 +Date: Tue Oct 13 00:21:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit - fix uninitialised memory read when parsing a config file - consisting of a single nul byte. Found by hanno AT hboeck.de using AFL; ok - dtucker + free the correct IV length, don't assume it's always the + cipher blocksize; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c260d9e5ec73628d9ff4b067fbb060eff5a7d298 -commit fecede00a76fbb33a349f5121c0b2f9fbc04a777 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 26 19:32:19 2015 +0000 +commit 2539dce2a049a8f6bb0d44cac51f07ad48e691d3 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 9 01:37:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit - sigp and lenp are not optional in ssh_agent_sign(); ok - djm@ + Change all tame callers to namechange to pledge(2). + + Upstream-ID: 17e654fc27ceaf523c60f4ffd9ec7ae4e7efc7f2 -commit 1b0ef3813244c78669e6d4d54c624f600945327d -Author: naddy@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 26 12:32:38 2015 +0000 +commit 9846a2f4067383bb76b4e31a9d2303e0a9c13a73 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 8 04:30:48 2015 +1100 - upstream commit + hook tame(2) sandbox up to build - don't try to load .ssh/identity by default if SSH1 is - disabled; ok markus@ + OpenBSD only for now -commit f9b78852379b74a2d14e6fc94fe52af30b7e9c31 +commit 0c46bbe68b70bdf0d6d20588e5847e71f3739fe6 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 26 07:00:04 2015 +0000 +Date: Wed Oct 7 15:59:12 2015 +0000 upstream commit - ban all-zero curve25519 keys as recommended by latest - CFRG curves draft; ok markus + include PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes in ssh -G config dump + + Upstream-ID: 6c097ce6ffebf6fe393fb7988b5d152a5d6b36bb -commit b8afbe2c1aaf573565e4da775261dfafc8b1ba9c -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Thu Mar 26 06:59:28 2015 +0000 +commit bdcb73fb7641b1cf73c0065d1a0dd57b1e8b778e +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 7 14:45:30 2015 +0000 upstream commit - relax bits needed check to allow - diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange to complete for chacha20-poly1305 was - selected as symmetric cipher; ok markus + UsePrivilegeSeparation defaults to sandbox now. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: bff136c38bcae89df82e044d2f42de21e1ad914f -commit 47842f71e31da130555353c1d57a1e5a8937f1c0 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 25 19:29:58 2015 +0000 +commit 2905d6f99c837bb699b6ebc61711b19acd030709 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 7 00:54:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit - ignore v1 errors on ssh-add -D; only try v2 keys on - -l/-L (unless WITH_SSH1) ok djm@ + don't try to change tun device flags if they are already + what we need; makes it possible to use tun/tap networking as non- root user + if device permissions and interface flags are pre-established; based on patch + by Ossi Herrala + + Upstream-ID: 89099ac4634cd477b066865acf54cb230780fd21 -commit 5f57e77f91bf2230c09eca96eb5ecec39e5f2da6 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 25 19:21:48 2015 +0000 +commit 0dc74512bdb105b048883f07de538b37e5e024d4 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Oct 5 18:33:05 2015 -0700 - upstream commit - - unbreak ssh_agent_sign (lenp vs *lenp) + unbreak merge botch -commit 4daeb67181054f2a377677fac919ee8f9ed3490e -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 20:10:08 2015 +0000 +commit fdd020e86439afa7f537e2429d29d4b744c94331 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 6 01:20:59 2015 +0000 upstream commit - don't leak 'setp' on error; noted by Nicholas Lemonias; - ok djm@ + adapt to recent sshkey_parse_private_fileblob() API + change + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 5c0d818da511e33e0abf6a92a31bd7163b7ad988 -commit 7d4f96f9de2a18af0d9fa75ea89a4990de0344f5 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 20:09:11 2015 +0000 +commit 21ae8ee3b630b0925f973db647a1b9aa5fcdd4c5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 24 07:15:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit - consistent check for NULL as noted by Nicholas - Lemonias; ok djm@ + fix command-line option to match what was actually + committed + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 3e8c24a2044e8afd37e7ce17b69002ca817ac699 -commit df100be51354e447d9345cf1ec22e6013c0eed50 -Author: markus@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 20:03:44 2015 +0000 +commit e14ac43b75e68f1ffbd3e1a5e44143c8ae578dcd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 24 06:16:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit - correct fmt-string for size_t as noted by Nicholas - Lemonias; ok djm@ + regress test for CertificateFile; patch from Meghana Bhat + via bz#2436 + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e7a6e980cbe0f8081ba2e83de40d06c17be8bd25 -commit a22b9ef21285e81775732436f7c84a27bd3f71e0 +commit 905b054ed24e0d5b4ef226ebf2c8bfc02ae6d4ad Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 09:17:21 2015 +0000 +Date: Mon Oct 5 17:11:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit - promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default - cipher; ok markus + some more bzero->explicit_bzero, from Michael McConville + + Upstream-ID: 17f19545685c33327db2efdc357c1c9225ff00d0 -commit 2aa9da1a3b360cf7b13e96fe1521534b91501fb5 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 01:29:19 2015 +0000 +commit b007159a0acdbcf65814b3ee05dbe2cf4ea46011 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 2 15:52:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit - Compile-time disable SSH protocol 1. You can turn it - back on using the Makefile.inc knob if you need it to talk to ancient - devices. + fix email + + Upstream-ID: 72150f2d54b94de14ebef1ea054ef974281bf834 -commit 53097b2022154edf96b4e8526af5666f979503f7 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Tue Mar 24 01:11:12 2015 +0000 +commit b19e1b4ab11884c4f62aee9f8ab53127a4732658 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:52 2015 +0000 upstream commit - fix double-negative error message "ssh1 is not - unsupported" + a sandbox using tame ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 4ca24e47895e72f5daaa02f3e3d3e5ca2d820fa3 -commit 5c27e3b6ec2db711dfcd40e6359c0bcdd0b62ea9 -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 23 06:06:38 2015 +0000 +commit c61b42f2678f21f05653ac2d3d241b48ab5d59ac +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 2 01:39:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit - for ssh-keygen -A, don't try (and fail) to generate ssh - v.1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support RSA/DSA/ECDSA keys when compiled - without OpenSSL based on patch by Mike Frysinger; bz#2369 + re-order system calls in order of risk, ok i'll be + honest, ordered this way they look like tame... ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 42a1e6d251fd8be13c8262bee026059ae6328813 -commit 725fd22a8c41db7de73a638539a5157b7e4424ae -Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 18 01:44:21 2015 +0000 +commit c5f7c0843cb6e6074a93c8ac34e49ce33a6f5546 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 25 18:19:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit - KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs - from around call + some certificatefile tweaks; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 0e5a7852c28c05fc193419cc7e50e64c1c535af0 -commit b07011c18e0b2e172c5fd09d21fb159a0bf5fcc7 +commit 4e44a79a07d4b88b6a4e5e8c1bed5f58c841b1b8 Author: djm@openbsd.org -Date: Mon Mar 16 11:09:52 2015 +0000 +Date: Thu Sep 24 06:15:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit - #if 0 some more arrays used only for decrypting (we don't - use since we only need encrypt for AES-CTR) + add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list + a certificate; patch from Meghana Bhat on bz#2436; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 58648ec53c510b41c1f46d8fe293aadc87229ab8 -commit 1cb3016635898d287e9d58b50c430995652d5358 -Author: jsg@openbsd.org -Date: Wed Mar 11 00:48:39 2015 +0000 +commit e3cbb06ade83c72b640a53728d362bbefa0008e2 +Author: sobrado@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 22 08:33:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit - add back the changes from rev 1.206, djm reverted this by - mistake in rev 1.207 + fix two typos. + + Upstream-ID: 424402c0d8863a11b51749bacd7f8d932083b709 diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL index 92106bf02183..e4865bbb4d9a 100644 --- a/INSTALL +++ b/INSTALL @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/ Basic Security Module (BSM): -Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1, +Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1, FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM implementation (http://www.openbsm.org). diff --git a/LICENCE b/LICENCE index f52387139da7..15248212a80d 100644 --- a/LICENCE +++ b/LICENCE @@ -75,27 +75,6 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code. PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. -2) - The 32-bit CRC compensation attack detector in deattack.c was - contributed by CORE SDI S.A. under a BSD-style license. - - * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code - * - * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. - * - * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary - * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that - * this copyright notice is retained. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE - * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE. - * - * Ariel Futoransky - * - 3) ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style license. @@ -337,4 +316,4 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code. ------ -$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.19 2004/08/30 09:18:08 markus Exp $ +$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:26:16 djm Exp $ diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index 5870e9e6e6b9..c52ce191fe95 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -78,10 +78,10 @@ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o bufec.o buffer.o \ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ - cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \ - compat.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ - log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \ - readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ + cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \ + compat.o crc32.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ + log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \ + readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ @@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \ - platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o + platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o + sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ @@ -228,26 +228,27 @@ umac128.o: umac.c clean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core survey + rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap + rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion + rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys + rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex + rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match + rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o - rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o - rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz + rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) distclean: regressclean diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL index 192da55b2c01..4e9e8757566f 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL +++ b/PROTOCOL @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ The method is documented in: https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt -1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", - "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", +1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", + "ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" @@ -454,4 +454,4 @@ respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.30 2016/04/08 06:35:54 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.31 2017/05/26 01:40:07 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent index 60d36f912c68..da3381942e08 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.agent +++ b/PROTOCOL.agent @@ -1,582 +1,5 @@ -This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent. +This file used to contain a description of the SSH agent protocol +implemented by OpenSSH. It has since been superseded by an Internet- +draft that is available from: -OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol -2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types -is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on -protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa. - -Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing -cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt -challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key, -whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with -a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It -is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and -encryption. - -With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this -document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_* -messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to -protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the -message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the -agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the -protocol message names to their integer values. - -1. Data types - -Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent -protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251. - -1.1 uint16 - -The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer -encoded in two bytes. - -1.2 mpint1 - -The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum). -Its format is as follows: - - uint16 bits - byte[(bits + 7) / 8] bignum - -"bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as -eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format. - -Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint" -encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded -integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of -the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the -nearest eight. - -2. Protocol Messages - -All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded -as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically: - - uint32 message_length - byte[message_length] message - -The following message descriptions refer only to the content the -"message" field. - -2.1 Generic server responses - -The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to -requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with: - - byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS - -or a request-specific success message. - -On failure, the agent may reply with: - - byte SSH_AGENT_FAILURE - -SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request -types. - -2.2 Adding keys to the agent - -Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and -SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys -respectively. - -Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED -and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional -"constraints" on their usage. - -OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard -or other hardware security module. These keys may be added -to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and -SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests. - -2.2.1 Key constraints - -The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage. -At present there are two constraints defined. - -The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is -encoded as: - - byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME - uint32 seconds - -Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain -valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the -validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from -memory. - -The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user -confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded -key. This constraint is encoded as: - - byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM - -Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one -of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended -consecutively to the end of the request: - - byte constraint1_type - .... constraint1_data - byte constraint2_type - .... constraint2_data - .... - byte constraintN_type - .... constraintN_data - -Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below -as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints -by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request -after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it -contains unknown constraints. - -2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key - -A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following -request: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED - uint32 ignored - mpint1 rsa_n - mpint1 rsa_e - mpint1 rsa_d - mpint1 rsa_iqmp - mpint1 rsa_q - mpint1 rsa_p - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be -fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra -computation. - -"key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is -SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED. - -The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been -successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. - -2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key - -The OpenSSH agent supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA -keys may be added using the following request - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ssh-dss" - mpint dsa_p - mpint dsa_q - mpint dsa_g - mpint dsa_public_key - mpint dsa_private_key - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -DSA certificates may be added with: - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com" - string certificate - mpint dsa_private_key - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -ECDSA keys may be added using the following request - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" | - "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" | - "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" - string ecdsa_curve_name - string ecdsa_public_key - mpint ecdsa_private - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -ECDSA certificates may be added with: - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" | - "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" | - "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" - string certificate - mpint ecdsa_private_key - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -ED25519 keys may be added using the following request - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ssh-ed25519" - string ed25519_public_key - string ed25519_private_key || ed25519_public_key - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -ED25519 certificates may be added with: - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" - string certificate - string ed25519_public_key - string ed25519_private_key || ed25519_public_key - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -For both ssh-ed25519 and ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com keys, the private -key has the public key appended (for historical reasons). - -RSA keys may be added with this request: - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ssh-rsa" - mpint rsa_n - mpint rsa_e - mpint rsa_d - mpint rsa_iqmp - mpint rsa_p - mpint rsa_q - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -RSA certificates may be added with this request: - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" - string certificate - mpint rsa_d - mpint rsa_iqmp - mpint rsa_p - mpint rsa_q - string key_comment - constraint[] key_constraints - -Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse -order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding -protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid -redundant processing. - -For DSA, ECDSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be -present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED. - -The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been -successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. - -2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard - -The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If -so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically, -only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so -this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be -delegated to the smartcard. - - byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED - string reader_id - string pin - constraint[] key_constraints - -"reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" -is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the -device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is -SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED. - -This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the -"pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1 -or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not -client-specified. - -The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have -been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. -The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support -smartcards. - -2.3 Removing multiple keys - -A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the -following request: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES - -This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys: - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES - -On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and -reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent -will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client -must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a -SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request. - -2.4 Removing specific keys - -2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key - -Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY - uint32 key_bits - mpint1 rsa_e - mpint1 rsa_n - -Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the -length of rsa_n. - -The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key -and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will -return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key - -Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request: - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY - string key_blob - -Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key -Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. - -The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key -and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will -return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard - -A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted -keys using this message: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY - string reader_id - string pin - -"reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN -or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device. - -When this message is received, and if the agent supports -smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the -specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin". - -The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have -been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. -The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support -smartcards. - -2.5 Requesting a list of known keys - -An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different -requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. - -2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys - -To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a -client may send the following message: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES - -The agent will reply with the following message: - - byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER - uint32 num_keys - -Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as: - - uint32 bits - mpint1 rsa_e - mpint1 rsa_n - string key_comment - -2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys - -A client may send the following message to request a list of -protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent: - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES - -The agent will reply with the following message header: - - byte SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER - uint32 num_keys - -Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as: - - string key_blob - string key_comment - -Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key -Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. - -2.6 Private key operations - -The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as -signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the -key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There -are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key -operations. - -2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge - -The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is -decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key. -It may be requested using this message: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE - uint32 ignored - mpint1 rsa_e - mpint1 rsa_n - mpint1 encrypted_challenge - byte[16] session_id - uint32 response_type /* must be 1 */ - -"rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use. -"encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably) -been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range -1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1 -session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral -key and the session cookie). - -"ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy -implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response -types are not supported. - -On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge" -using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For -the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an -unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values -smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes). - -The response value is then calculated as: - - response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id) - -and returned in the following message - - byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE - byte[16] response - -If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e, -rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request - -A client may use the following message to request signing of data using -a protocol 2 key: - - byte SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST - string key_blob - string data - uint32 flags - -Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key -Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. "flags" is -a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value is defined (see below -for its meaning): - - SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 1 - -Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that -corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this -private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the -key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key -Algorithms". - -An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word -contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy -signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case, -the DSA signature blob is encoded as: - - byte[40] signature - -The signature will be returned in the response message: - - byte SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE - string signature_blob - -If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then -it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent - -The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend -processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the -same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_LOCK - string passphrase - -Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked, -it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS -reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except -SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and -SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are -treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list -of keys. - -To unlock an agent, a client may request: - - byte SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK - string passphrase - -If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume -processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent -is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return -SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. - -Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. - -3. Protocol message numbers - -3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations - - SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 - SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 - SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 - SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24 - -3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations - - SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 - SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 - SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 - SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 - SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 - -3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent - - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 - SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 - SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22 - SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23 - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 - -3.4 Generic replies from agent to client - - SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 - SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 - -3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations - - SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 - SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 - -3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations - - SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 - SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 - -3.7 Key constraint identifiers - - SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 - SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 - -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.11 2016/05/19 07:45:32 djm Exp $ +https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02 diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys index aa6f5ae4c776..42aa8c2a1734 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.certkeys +++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys @@ -192,12 +192,13 @@ compatibility. The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of the protocol. -signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate. -The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, ssh-dss and the ECDSA types -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" -certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself -are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to -be signed by a DSS or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa. +The signature key field contains the CA key used to sign the +certificate. The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, +ssh-dss, ssh-ed25519 and the ECDSA types ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" certificates, where +the signature key type is a certificate type itself are NOT supported. +Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to be signed by a +Ed25519 or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa. signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and @@ -223,6 +224,9 @@ option-specific information (see below). All options are "critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate. +Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's +domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com". + No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of their data fields are: @@ -254,6 +258,9 @@ as is the requirement that each name appear only once. If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should ignore it. +Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's +domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com". + No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of their data fields are: @@ -284,4 +291,4 @@ permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of of this script will not be permitted if this option is not present. -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.10 2016/05/03 10:27:59 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.12 2017/05/31 04:29:44 djm Exp $ diff --git a/README b/README index bda852548a2a..103d43e9b7b7 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.5p1 for the release notes. +See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.6p1 for the release notes. Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for all logins, not just when using password authentication. -OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5]. +OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4], and optionally PAM[5] and +libedit[6] There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed users. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD -style guidelines[6]. +style guidelines[7]. Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install OpenSSH on your system. @@ -61,4 +62,5 @@ References - [5] http://www.openpam.org http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11) -[6] http://man.openbsd.org/style.9 +[6] http://thrysoee.dk/editline/ (portable version) +[7] http://man.openbsd.org/style.9 diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c index 57b49f7fd751..bed00eef0fe3 100644 --- a/auth-options.c +++ b/auth-options.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.72 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.74 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -61,9 +61,13 @@ char *authorized_principals = NULL; extern ServerOptions options; +/* XXX refactor to be stateless */ + void auth_clear_options(void) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; no_pty_flag = 0; @@ -81,7 +85,7 @@ auth_clear_options(void) free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = NULL; forced_tun_device = -1; - channel_clear_permitted_opens(); + channel_clear_permitted_opens(ssh); } /* @@ -117,9 +121,11 @@ match_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, char **optsp, const char *msg) /* * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not. * side effect: sets key option flags + * XXX remove side effects; fill structure instead. */ int -auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) +auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, const char *file, + u_long linenum) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ const char *cp; @@ -379,7 +385,7 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) goto bad_option; } if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) - channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port); + channel_add_permitted_opens(ssh, host, port); free(patterns); goto next_option; } diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h index 52cbb42aaf87..547f016355a9 100644 --- a/auth-options.h +++ b/auth-options.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.22 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.23 2017/05/31 10:54:00 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ extern int forced_tun_device; extern int key_is_cert_authority; extern char *authorized_principals; -int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long); +int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, const char *, u_long); void auth_clear_options(void); int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **); diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c index bc8e5e02d834..de29c04c9c81 100644 --- a/auth-pam.c +++ b/auth-pam.c @@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ extern char *__progname; extern ServerOptions options; extern Buffer loginmsg; -extern int compat20; extern u_int utmp_len; /* so we don't silently change behaviour */ @@ -468,18 +467,16 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; - if (compat20) { - if (!do_pam_account()) { - sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; + if (!do_pam_account()) { + sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; + goto auth_fail; + } + if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { + sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, + PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; - } - if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { - sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, - PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); - if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto auth_fail; - sshpam_password_change_required(0); - } + sshpam_password_change_required(0); } buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK"); @@ -929,6 +926,27 @@ finish_pam(void) sshpam_cleanup(); } +static void +expose_authinfo(const char *caller) +{ + char *auth_info; + + /* + * Expose authentication information to PAM. + * The enviornment variable is versioned. Please increment the + * version suffix if the format of session_info changes. + */ + if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL) + auth_info = xstrdup(""); + else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string( + sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + + debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller); + do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info); + free(auth_info); +} + u_int do_pam_account(void) { @@ -936,6 +954,8 @@ do_pam_account(void) if (sshpam_account_status != -1) return (sshpam_account_status); + expose_authinfo(__func__); + sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); @@ -1060,6 +1080,9 @@ void do_pam_session(void) { debug3("PAM: opening session"); + + expose_authinfo(__func__); + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c index 6ee6116dfb2f..a449061741af 100644 --- a/auth.c +++ b/auth.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.119 2016/12/15 21:29:05 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.124 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -43,9 +43,6 @@ #ifdef USE_SHADOW #include #endif -#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H -#include -#endif #include #include #include @@ -267,21 +264,41 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) return 1; } -void -auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) +/* + * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in + * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present. + */ +static char * +format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt) { - va_list ap; - int i; - - free(authctxt->info); - authctxt->info = NULL; + const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key; + const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info; + char *fp, *ret = NULL; - va_start(ap, fmt); - i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap); - va_end(ap); + if (key == NULL) + return NULL; - if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL) - fatal("vasprintf failed"); + if (key_is_cert(key)) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", + sshkey_type(key), key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), + fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, + methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", + methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); + free(fp); + } else { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), + fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, + methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", + methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); + free(fp); + } + return ret; } void @@ -290,7 +307,8 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; - char *authmsg; + const char *authmsg; + char *extra = NULL; if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) return; @@ -309,6 +327,11 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, else authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; + if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) { + if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) + extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info); + } + authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s", authmsg, method, @@ -317,10 +340,10 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), - authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "", - authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : ""); - free(authctxt->info); - authctxt->info = NULL; + extra != NULL ? ": " : "", + extra != NULL ? extra : ""); + + free(extra); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && @@ -428,7 +451,7 @@ authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ HostStatus -check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host, const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) { char *user_hostfile; @@ -472,98 +495,6 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, return host_status; } -/* - * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components - * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of - * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. - * - * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? - * - * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to - * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an - * error buffer plus max size as arguments. - * - * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure - */ -int -auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, - uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) -{ - char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; - char *cp; - int comparehome = 0; - struct stat st; - - if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, - strerror(errno)); - return -1; - } - if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) - comparehome = 1; - - if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); - return -1; - } - if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || - (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", - buf); - return -1; - } - - /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ - for (;;) { - if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); - return -1; - } - strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); - - if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || - (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || - (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { - snprintf(err, errlen, - "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); - return -1; - } - - /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ - if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) - break; - - /* - * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, - * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too - */ - if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) - break; - } - return 0; -} - -/* - * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to - * avoid races. - * - * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure - */ -static int -secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, - char *err, size_t errlen) -{ - struct stat st; - - /* check the open file to avoid races */ - if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { - snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", - file, strerror(errno)); - return -1; - } - return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); -} - static FILE * auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, int log_missing, char *file_type) @@ -596,7 +527,7 @@ auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, return NULL; } if (strict_modes && - secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { + safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { fclose(f); logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); @@ -635,6 +566,8 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) ci->user = user; parse_server_match_config(&options, ci); + log_change_level(options.log_level); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_setauthdb(user); @@ -694,7 +627,7 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ int -auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) +auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key) { char *fp = NULL; int r; diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h index 338a62da72a4..29835ae92750 100644 --- a/auth.h +++ b/auth.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.93 2017/08/18 05:36:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct ssh; struct sshkey; +struct sshbuf; typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; @@ -62,13 +63,17 @@ struct Authctxt { char *service; struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ char *style; + + /* Method lists for multiple authentication */ + char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ + u_int num_auth_methods; + + /* Authentication method-specific data */ + void *methoddata; void *kbdintctxt; - char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif - char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ - u_int num_auth_methods; #ifdef KRB5 krb5_context krb5_ctx; krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; @@ -76,12 +81,20 @@ struct Authctxt { char *krb5_ticket_file; char *krb5_ccname; #endif - Buffer *loginmsg; - void *methoddata; + struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + + /* Authentication keys already used; these will be refused henceforth */ + struct sshkey **prev_keys; + u_int nprev_keys; - struct sshkey **prev_userkeys; - u_int nprev_userkeys; + /* Last used key and ancilliary information from active auth method */ + struct sshkey *auth_method_key; + char *auth_method_info; + + /* Information exposed to session */ + struct sshbuf *session_info; /* Auth info for environment */ }; + /* * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this @@ -91,7 +104,7 @@ struct Authctxt { struct Authmethod { char *name; - int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); + int (*userauth)(struct ssh *); int *enabled; }; @@ -117,16 +130,21 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *); -int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); -int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); -void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...) - __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))); -void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); -int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); +int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, + struct sshkey *); +int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int); +int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *); -struct stat; -int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, - char *, size_t); +/* + * Handling auth method-specific information for logging and prevention + * of key reuse during multiple authentication. + */ +void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *); +void auth2_record_key(Authctxt *, int, const struct sshkey *); +void auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); +void auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); #ifdef KRB5 int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); @@ -149,12 +167,9 @@ void disable_forwarding(void); void do_authentication2(Authctxt *); -void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) - __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) - __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *); void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn)); -void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *); +void userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *); int auth_root_allowed(const char *); void userauth_send_banner(const char *); @@ -167,8 +182,8 @@ int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); void privsep_challenge_enable(void); -int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *); -void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *); +int auth2_challenge(struct ssh *, char *); +void auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *); int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); @@ -182,22 +197,22 @@ char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); -int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *); +int auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *); const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int); HostStatus -check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, const char *); /* hostkey handling */ -Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); -Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); -Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); -Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); -int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *); -int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, - const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_by_index(int); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); +int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); +int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, + size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c index ead48031808d..11c8d31b3566 100644 --- a/auth2-chall.c +++ b/auth2-chall.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.44 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.48 2017/05/30 14:29:59 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved. @@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; -static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *); +static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *); static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *); -static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); #ifdef BSD_AUTH extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device; @@ -195,8 +195,9 @@ kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) * wait for the response. */ int -auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs) +auth2_challenge(struct ssh *ssh, char *devs) { + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s", authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "", devs ? devs : ""); @@ -205,15 +206,16 @@ auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs) return 0; if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs); - return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt); + return auth2_challenge_start(ssh); } /* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */ void -auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt) +auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *ssh) { + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; /* unregister callback */ - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) { kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; @@ -222,29 +224,30 @@ auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt) /* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/ static int -auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt) +auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *ssh) { + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) { - auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); return 0; } debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'", kbdintctxt->device->name); if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) { - auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); return 0; } if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) { - auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); return 0; } - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, &input_userauth_info_response); authctxt->postponed = 1; @@ -285,9 +288,9 @@ send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt) } static int -input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; int authenticated = 0, res; u_int i, nresp; @@ -340,14 +343,14 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name; if (!authctxt->postponed) { if (authenticated) { - auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); } else { /* start next device */ /* may set authctxt->postponed */ - auth2_challenge_start(authctxt); + auth2_challenge_start(ssh); } } - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive", + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive", devicename); return 0; } diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c index 1ca8357731ca..589283b72041 100644 --- a/auth2-gss.c +++ b/auth2-gss.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.26 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. @@ -48,18 +48,19 @@ extern ServerOptions options; -static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); -static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); -static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); -static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know * how to check local user kuserok and the like) */ static int -userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) +userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) { + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL}; Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; int mechs; @@ -119,17 +120,17 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) packet_send(); free(doid); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); authctxt->postponed = 1; return (0); } static int -input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; @@ -157,8 +158,8 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) packet_send(); } authctxt->postponed = 0; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); - userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } else { if (send_tok.length != 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN); @@ -166,12 +167,12 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) packet_send(); } if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, &input_gssapi_mic); else - dispatch_set( + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, &input_gssapi_exchange_complete); } @@ -182,9 +183,9 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) } static int -input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; @@ -207,8 +208,8 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) free(recv_tok.value); /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */ - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */ @@ -223,10 +224,11 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) */ static int -input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; int authenticated; + const char *displayname; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); @@ -240,24 +242,29 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && + (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); + authctxt->postponed = 0; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); return 0; } static int -input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int authenticated = 0; Buffer b; gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; u_int len; + const char *displayname; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); @@ -281,12 +288,16 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) buffer_free(&b); free(mic.value); + if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && + (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); + authctxt->postponed = 0; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); return 0; } diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c index 1b3c3b20297f..92758b38c19d 100644 --- a/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.26 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.31 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "canohost.h" @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "pathnames.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "match.h" /* import */ @@ -56,54 +57,56 @@ extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int -userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) +userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) { - Buffer b; - Key *key = NULL; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service; u_char *pkblob, *sig; - u_int alen, blen, slen; - int pktype; - int authenticated = 0; + size_t alen, blen, slen; + int r, pktype, authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { - debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user"); + debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); return 0; } - pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); - pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); - chost = packet_get_string(NULL); - cuser = packet_get_string(NULL); - sig = packet_get_string(&slen); + /* XXX use sshkey_froms() */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d", + debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__, cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK debug("signature:"); - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, sig, slen); - buffer_dump(&b); - buffer_free(&b); + sshbuf_dump_data(sig, siglen, stderr); #endif - pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); + pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ - logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported " - "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); + logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", + __func__, pkalg); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } - key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { - error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); + error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { - error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key " - "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); + error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " + "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); goto done; } - if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe " "signature format"); goto done; @@ -115,38 +118,40 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) goto done; } - service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : + service = ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service; - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* reconstruct packet */ - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); - buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); - buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef DEBUG_PK - buffer_dump(&b); + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif - pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), - buffer_len(&b))) == 1) + PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat)) == 0) authenticated = 1; - buffer_free(&b); + auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); + sshbuf_free(b); done: - debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated); - if (key != NULL) - key_free(key); + debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated); + sshkey_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(cuser); @@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ done: /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, - Key *key) + struct sshkey *key) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; @@ -203,8 +208,8 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, } debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__); - if (key_is_cert(key) && - key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) { + if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && + sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) { error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); return 0; @@ -223,20 +228,20 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, } if (host_status == HOST_OK) { - if (key_is_cert(key)) { + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, - key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, cuser, lookup); } else { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", - key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); + sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); } free(fp); } diff --git a/auth2-kbdint.c b/auth2-kbdint.c index bf75c6059f1e..86aad8ddce8b 100644 --- a/auth2-kbdint.c +++ b/auth2-kbdint.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.7 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.8 2017/05/30 14:29:59 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options; static int -userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) +userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh) { int authenticated = 0; char *lang, *devs; @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs); if (options.challenge_response_authentication) - authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs); + authenticated = auth2_challenge(ssh, devs); free(devs); free(lang); diff --git a/auth2-none.c b/auth2-none.c index e71e2219cff1..35d25fa6349f 100644 --- a/auth2-none.c +++ b/auth2-none.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.20 2017/05/30 14:29:59 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "packet.h" @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif @@ -59,12 +60,15 @@ extern ServerOptions options; static int none_enabled = 1; static int -userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) +userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh) { + int r; + none_enabled = 0; - packet_check_eom(); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication) - return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))); + return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh->authctxt, ""))); return (0); } diff --git a/auth2-passwd.c b/auth2-passwd.c index b638e8715bb2..5f7ba32440b0 100644 --- a/auth2-passwd.c +++ b/auth2-passwd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.12 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.14 2017/05/30 14:29:59 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ #include #include -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "buffer.h" @@ -48,26 +48,22 @@ extern ServerOptions options; static int -userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) +userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh) { - char *password, *newpass; - int authenticated = 0; - int change; - u_int len, newlen; + char *password; + int authenticated = 0, r; + u_char change; + size_t len; - change = packet_get_char(); - password = packet_get_string(&len); - if (change) { - /* discard new password from packet */ - newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen); - explicit_bzero(newpass, newlen); - free(newpass); - } - packet_check_eom(); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &change)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &password, &len)) != 0 || + (change && (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (change) logit("password change not supported"); - else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1) + else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh->authctxt, password)) == 1) authenticated = 1; explicit_bzero(password, len); free(password); diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c index 3e5706f4dbef..169839b01ed7 100644 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.71 2017/09/07 23:48:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "pathnames.h" @@ -75,42 +74,52 @@ extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int -userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) +userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) { - Buffer b; - Key *key = NULL; - char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL; - u_char *pkblob, *sig; - u_int alen, blen, slen; - int have_sig, pktype; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *fp = NULL; + u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig; + size_t blen, slen; + int r, pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); return 0; } - have_sig = packet_get_char(); - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_u8 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* no explicit pkalg given */ - pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ - pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); - buffer_free(&b); + /* XXX use sshbuf_from() */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(b); } else { - pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); - pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_cstring failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } - pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); + pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } - key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } if (key == NULL) { error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; @@ -120,15 +129,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); goto done; } - if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " "signature scheme"); goto done; } fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); - if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) { - logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key)); + if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) { + logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), @@ -141,54 +150,65 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) if (have_sig) { debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); - sig = packet_get_string(&slen); - packet_check_eom(); - buffer_init(&b); - if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { - buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { - buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* reconstruct packet */ - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); - free(userstyle); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? - "ssh-userauth" : - authctxt->service); - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { - buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? + "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service)) != 0) + fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0) + fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); - buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0)) + fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } - buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); #ifdef DEBUG_PK - buffer_dump(&b); + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif - pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), - buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { + PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), + sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat)) == 0) { authenticated = 1; - /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ - auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); - key = NULL; /* Don't free below */ } - buffer_free(&b); + sshbuf_free(b); free(sig); + auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); } else { debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); - packet_check_eom(); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* @@ -199,11 +219,13 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) * issue? -markus */ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); - packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); - packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK)) + != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh); authctxt->postponed = 1; } } @@ -211,333 +233,14 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) auth_clear_options(); done: debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg); - if (key != NULL) - key_free(key); + sshkey_free(key); + free(userstyle); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(fp); return authenticated; } -void -pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) -{ - char *fp, *extra; - va_list ap; - int i; - - extra = NULL; - if (fmt != NULL) { - va_start(ap, fmt); - i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap); - va_end(ap); - if (i < 0 || extra == NULL) - fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); - } - - if (key_is_cert(key)) { - fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, - options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); - auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", - key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, - (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, - key_type(key->cert->signature_key), - fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, - extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); - free(fp); - } else { - fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, - SSH_FP_DEFAULT); - auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), - fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, - extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); - free(fp); - } - free(extra); -} - -/* - * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic - * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector - * and its members. - */ -static int -split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) -{ - int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - int argc = 0, quote, i, j; - char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); - - *argvp = NULL; - *argcp = 0; - - for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { - /* Skip leading whitespace */ - if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') - continue; - - /* Start of a token */ - quote = 0; - if (s[i] == '\\' && - (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) - i++; - else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') - quote = s[i++]; - - argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); - arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); - argv[argc] = NULL; - - /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ - for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { - if (s[i] == '\\') { - if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || - s[i + 1] == '\"' || - s[i + 1] == '\\') { - i++; /* Skip '\' */ - arg[j++] = s[i]; - } else { - /* Unrecognised escape */ - arg[j++] = s[i]; - } - } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) - break; /* done */ - else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) - break; /* done */ - else - arg[j++] = s[i]; - } - if (s[i] == '\0') { - if (quote != 0) { - /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } - break; - } - } - /* Success */ - *argcp = argc; - *argvp = argv; - argc = 0; - argv = NULL; - r = 0; - out: - if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) - free(argv[i]); - free(argv); - } - return r; -} - -/* - * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as - * necessary. Caller must free returned string. - */ -static char * -assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv) -{ - int i, j, ws, r; - char c, *ret; - struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; - - if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - - for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { - ws = 0; - sshbuf_reset(arg); - for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { - r = 0; - c = argv[i][j]; - switch (c) { - case ' ': - case '\t': - ws = 1; - r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); - break; - case '\\': - case '\'': - case '"': - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) - break; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - default: - r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); - break; - } - if (r != 0) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || - (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || - (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || - (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); - memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; - sshbuf_free(buf); - sshbuf_free(arg); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the - * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure. - * NB. "command" is only used for logging. - */ -static pid_t -subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, - int ac, char **av, FILE **child) -{ - FILE *f; - struct stat st; - int devnull, p[2], i; - pid_t pid; - char *cp, errmsg[512]; - u_int envsize; - char **child_env; - - *child = NULL; - - debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__, - tag, command, pw->pw_name); - - /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */ - if (*av[0] != '/') { - error("%s path is not absolute", tag); - return 0; - } - temporarily_use_uid(pw); - if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { - error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, - av[0], strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - return 0; - } - if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, - errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { - error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); - restore_uid(); - return 0; - } - - /* - * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the - * authorized_keys output. - */ - if (pipe(p) != 0) { - error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - return 0; - } - - /* - * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and - * run cleanup_exit() code. - */ - restore_uid(); - - switch ((pid = fork())) { - case -1: /* error */ - error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); - close(p[0]); - close(p[1]); - return 0; - case 0: /* child */ - /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ - envsize = 5; - child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); - child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); - child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); - child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); - child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); - if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) - child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); - - for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) - signal(i, SIG_DFL); - - if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { - error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ - if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || - dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { - error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); - - /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ - if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { - error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { - error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ - if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { - error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - - execve(av[0], av, child_env); - error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); - _exit(127); - default: /* parent */ - break; - } - - close(p[1]); - if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { - error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); - close(p[0]); - /* Don't leave zombie child */ - kill(pid, SIGTERM); - while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) - ; - return 0; - } - /* Success */ - debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); - *child = f; - return pid; -} - -/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ -static int -exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd) -{ - int status; - - while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { - if (errno != EINTR) { - error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); - return -1; - } - } - if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { - error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); - return -1; - } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { - error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { @@ -559,7 +262,7 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) } static int -process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, +process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, const struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; @@ -597,8 +300,7 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"", - file == NULL ? "(command)" : file, - linenum, cert->principals[i]); + file, linenum, cert->principals[i]); if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, file, linenum) != 1) continue; @@ -671,7 +373,7 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key) } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ - if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " "invalid quotes", command); goto out; @@ -720,21 +422,22 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key) av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ - command = assemble_argv(ac, av); + command = argv_assemble(ac, av); if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command, - ac, av, &f)) == 0) + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(pw); - ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert); + ok = process_principals(f, "(command)", pw, cert); fclose(f); f = NULL; - if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0) + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ @@ -761,26 +464,25 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key) * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int -check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) +check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0; - Key *found; - - found_key = 0; + struct sshkey *found = NULL; - found = NULL; while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; const char *reason = NULL; - /* Always consume entrire file */ + /* Always consume entire file */ if (found_key) continue; if (found != NULL) - key_free(found); - found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); + sshkey_free(found); + found = sshkey_new(sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); + if (found == NULL) + goto done; auth_clear_options(); /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ @@ -789,7 +491,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; - if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { + if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ int quoted = 0; debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); @@ -803,14 +505,14 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; - if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { + if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); /* still no key? advance to next line*/ continue; } } - if (key_is_cert(key)) { - if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) continue; if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) @@ -821,7 +523,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) continue; debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", - file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); + file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp); /* * If the user has specified a list of principals as * a key option, then prefer that list to matching @@ -838,7 +540,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) auth_debug_add("%s", reason); continue; } - if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, + if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; @@ -847,11 +549,11 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, - key_type(found), fp, file); + sshkey_type(found), fp, file); free(fp); found_key = 1; break; - } else if (key_equal(found, key)) { + } else if (sshkey_equal(found, key)) { if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; @@ -861,14 +563,15 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) continue; debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", - file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); + file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp); free(fp); found_key = 1; continue; } } + done: if (found != NULL) - key_free(found); + sshkey_free(found); if (!found_key) debug2("key not found"); return found_key; @@ -876,24 +579,24 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ static int -user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; - int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; + int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; - if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; - if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, - options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) { - debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, - key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, - options.trusted_user_ca_keys); + if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) { + debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* @@ -918,7 +621,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) auth_debug_add("%s", reason); goto out; } - if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, + if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0) @@ -927,7 +630,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, - key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); ret = 1; @@ -942,7 +645,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int -user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) +user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; @@ -965,7 +668,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int -user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) +user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key) { FILE *f = NULL; int r, ok, found_key = 0; @@ -1011,7 +714,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) } /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ - if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", command); goto out; @@ -1035,7 +738,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) av[i] = tmp; } /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ - command = assemble_argv(ac, av); + command = argv_assemble(ac, av); /* * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments @@ -1052,7 +755,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) } if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command, - ac, av, &f)) == 0) + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) goto out; uid_swapped = 1; @@ -1063,7 +767,7 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) fclose(f); f = NULL; - if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0) + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0) goto out; /* Read completed successfully */ @@ -1088,14 +792,15 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int -user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt) +user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt) { u_int success, i; char *file; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; - if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) + if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && + auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) return 0; success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); @@ -1120,35 +825,6 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt) return success; } -/* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */ -void -auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) -{ - struct sshkey **tmp; - - if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX || - (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys, - authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) - fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); - authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp; - authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key; - authctxt->nprev_userkeys++; -} - -/* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */ -int -auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) -{ - u_int i; - - for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) { - if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) { - return 1; - } - } - return 0; -} - Authmethod method_pubkey = { "publickey", userauth_pubkey, diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c index 97dd2ef0a4ff..862e09960b29 100644 --- a/auth2.c +++ b/auth2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.137 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.143 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "ssherr.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; @@ -87,8 +89,8 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { /* protocol */ -static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); -static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* helper */ static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *); @@ -168,16 +170,19 @@ done: void do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt) { - dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt); + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + ssh->authctxt = authctxt; /* XXX move to caller */ + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success); + ssh->authctxt = NULL; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int -input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; u_int len; int acceptit = 0; char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len); @@ -190,7 +195,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if (!authctxt->success) { acceptit = 1; /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); } } /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ @@ -210,10 +215,9 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /*ARGSUSED*/ static int -input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Authmethod *m = NULL; char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; int authenticated = 0; @@ -267,14 +271,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); } /* reset state */ - auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); #ifdef GSSAPI /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */ - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); #endif + auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); authctxt->postponed = 0; authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; @@ -282,9 +287,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method); if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) { debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); - authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt); + authenticated = m->userauth(ssh); } - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL); free(service); free(user); @@ -293,10 +298,10 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } void -userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, +userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *method, const char *submethod) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *methods; int partial = 0; @@ -325,6 +330,10 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod); + /* Update information exposed to session */ + if (authenticated || partial) + auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod); + if (authctxt->postponed) return; @@ -352,7 +361,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, if (authenticated == 1) { /* turn off userauth */ - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); @@ -622,4 +631,128 @@ auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, return 0; } +/* Reset method-specific information */ +void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); + free(authctxt->auth_method_info); + authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL; + authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; +} + +/* Record auth method-specific information for logs */ +void +auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int i; + + free(authctxt->auth_method_info); + authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (i < 0 || authctxt->auth_method_info == NULL) + fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); +} + +/* + * Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging + * and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for + * multiple authentication. + */ +void +auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, + const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct sshkey **tmp, *dup; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_demote(key, &dup)) != 0) + fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); + authctxt->auth_method_key = dup; + + if (!authenticated) + return; + + /* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */ + if ((r = sshkey_demote(key, &dup)) != 0) + fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX || + (tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys, + authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); + authctxt->prev_keys = tmp; + authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup; + authctxt->nprev_keys++; + +} + +/* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */ +int +auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + u_int i; + char *fp; + + for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i], + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + debug3("%s: key already used: %s %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]), + fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp); + free(fp); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be + * whenever an authentication method succeeds. + */ +void +auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, + const char *submethod) +{ + int r; + + if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) { + if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + } + + /* Append method[/submethod] */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s", + method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/", + submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append method: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Append key if present */ + if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key, + authctxt->session_info)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) { + /* Ensure no ambiguity here */ + if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL) + fatal("%s: auth_method_info contains \\n", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s", + authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: append method info: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0) + fatal("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c index a634bcb81c58..a460fa350c8a 100644 --- a/authfd.c +++ b/authfd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.100 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.105 2017/07/01 13:50:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" @@ -199,43 +198,6 @@ ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password) return r; } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -static int -deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) -{ - struct sshkey *key; - int r, keybits; - u_int32_t bits; - char *comment = NULL; - - if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) - goto out; - keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); - /* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */ - if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; - goto out; - } - if (keyp != NULL) { - *keyp = key; - key = NULL; - } - if (commentp != NULL) { - *commentp = comment; - comment = NULL; - } - r = 0; - out: - sshkey_free(key); - free(comment); - return r; -} -#endif static int deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) @@ -264,35 +226,21 @@ deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) * Fetch list of identities held by the agent. */ int -ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) +ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) { - u_char type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; + u_char type; u_int32_t num, i; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL; int r; - /* Determine request and expected response types */ - switch (version) { - case 1: - code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; - code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; - break; - case 2: - code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; - code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; - break; - default: - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code1)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) @@ -304,7 +252,7 @@ ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; - } else if (type != code2) { + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } @@ -329,25 +277,14 @@ ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num;) { - switch (version) { - case 1: -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - if ((r = deserialise_identity1(msg, - &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) + if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), + &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { + /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ + num--; + continue; + } else goto out; -#endif - break; - case 2: - if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, - &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { - if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { - /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ - num--; - continue; - } else - goto out; - } - break; } i++; } @@ -385,50 +322,10 @@ ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) * otherwise. */ -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -int -ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge, - u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]) -{ - struct sshbuf *msg; - int r; - u_char type; - - if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */ - goto out; - if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) - goto out; - if (agent_failed(type)) { - r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; - goto out; - } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_get(msg, response, 16)) != 0) - goto out; - r = 0; - out: - sshbuf_free(msg); - return r; -} -#endif /* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */ static u_int -agent_encode_alg(struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) +agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) { if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) { if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) @@ -441,7 +338,7 @@ agent_encode_alg(struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) /* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */ int -ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, +ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) { @@ -494,25 +391,6 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -static int -ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment) -{ - int r; - - /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0) - return r; - return 0; -} -#endif static int ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, @@ -561,16 +439,6 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case KEY_RSA1: - type = constrained ? - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED : - SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY; - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || - (r = ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(msg, key->rsa, comment)) != 0) - goto out; - break; -#endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: @@ -620,16 +488,6 @@ ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key) if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, - SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0) - goto out; - } else -#endif if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; @@ -696,6 +554,10 @@ ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, /* * Removes all identities from the agent. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. + * + * This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all + * keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2 + * keys. */ int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version) diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h index 4b417e3f4a22..43abf85dadfe 100644 --- a/authfd.h +++ b/authfd.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.39 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.41 2017/06/28 01:09:22 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp); void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock); int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password); -int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, - struct ssh_identitylist **idlp); +int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp); void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl); int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm); @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version); int ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]); -int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, +int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat); diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c index 7411b68f6e42..d09b700d21d9 100644 --- a/authfile.c +++ b/authfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.122 2016/11/25 23:24:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.127 2017/07/01 13:50:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "misc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshkey.h" @@ -100,25 +99,13 @@ sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob) u_char buf[1024]; size_t len; struct stat st; - int r, dontmax = 0; + int r; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - /* - * Pre-allocate the buffer used for the key contents and clamp its - * maximum size. This ensures that key contents are never leaked via - * implicit realloc() in the sshbuf code. - */ - if ((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) == 0 || st.st_size <= 0) { - st.st_size = 64*1024; /* 64k should be enough for anyone :) */ - dontmax = 1; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(blob, st.st_size)) != 0 || - (dontmax && (r = sshbuf_set_max_size(blob, st.st_size)) != 0)) - return r; for (;;) { if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) { if (errno == EPIPE) @@ -147,35 +134,6 @@ sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob) return r; } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -/* - * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was - * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key - * otherwise. - */ -static int -sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) -{ - struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - int r; - - if (keyp != NULL) - *keyp = NULL; - if (commentp != NULL) - *commentp = NULL; - - if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, b)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0) - goto out; - r = 0; - out: - sshbuf_free(b); - return r; -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ int @@ -345,75 +303,48 @@ sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } -/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */ +/* load public key from any pubkey file */ int sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; - char file[PATH_MAX]; - int r, fd; + char *file = NULL; + int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; - /* XXX should load file once and attempt to parse each format */ - - if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) - goto skip; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - /* try rsa1 private key */ - r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, keyp, commentp); - close(fd); - switch (r) { - case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: - case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: - case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: - case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: - case 0: - return r; - } -#else /* WITH_SSH1 */ - close(fd); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - - /* try ssh2 public key */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { - if (keyp != NULL) - *keyp = pub; - return 0; - } - sshkey_free(pub); - -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - /* try rsa1 public key */ - if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { - if (keyp != NULL) + if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = pub; - return 0; + pub = NULL; + } + r = 0; + goto out; } sshkey_free(pub); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - skip: /* try .pub suffix */ - if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + if (asprintf(&file, "%s.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* in case strlcpy or strlcat fail */ - if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && - (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && - (r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { - if (keyp != NULL) + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { + if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = pub; - return 0; + pub = NULL; + } + r = 0; } + out: + free(file); sshkey_free(pub); - return r; } diff --git a/bitmap.c b/bitmap.c index f95032250e7c..5089b04070e7 100644 --- a/bitmap.c +++ b/bitmap.c @@ -53,8 +53,9 @@ void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b) { if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(b->d, b->len); + bitmap_zero(b); free(b->d); + b->d = NULL; } free(b); } @@ -86,10 +87,10 @@ reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) return -1; /* invalid */ nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1; if (b->len < nlen) { - if ((tmp = reallocarray(b->d, nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) + if ((tmp = recallocarray(b->d, b->len, + nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) return -1; b->d = tmp; - memset(b->d + b->len, 0, (nlen - b->len) * BITMAP_BYTES); b->len = nlen; } return 0; @@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l) { int r; size_t i, offset, shift; - u_char *s = (u_char *)p; + const u_char *s = (const u_char *)p; if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8) return -1; diff --git a/bufbn.c b/bufbn.c index 33ae7f73fd9c..98f9466bc8a2 100644 --- a/bufbn.c +++ b/bufbn.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.12 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.13 2017/04/30 23:23:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller @@ -28,46 +28,6 @@ #include "log.h" #include "ssherr.h" -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -int -buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) -{ - int ret; - - if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) { - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - -void -buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) -{ - if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1) - fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); -} - -int -buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) -{ - int ret; - - if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) { - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - -void -buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) -{ - if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1) - fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) { diff --git a/buffer.h b/buffer.h index df1aebc02cc6..56174394c959 100644 --- a/buffer.h +++ b/buffer.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.25 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.26 2017/04/30 23:23:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller @@ -49,9 +49,7 @@ int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int); #include #include -void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); -void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int); @@ -75,8 +73,6 @@ void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *); #define buffer_skip_string(b) (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(b, NULL); -int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); -int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); int buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); int buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *); diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c index d030fcdd9010..83442be06432 100644 --- a/channels.c +++ b/channels.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.357 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.375 2017/09/24 13:45:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -55,27 +55,27 @@ #include #include +#include #include +#include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H -#include + #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include -#include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" -#include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" @@ -83,28 +83,19 @@ #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" -/* -- channel core */ - -/* - * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is - * dynamically extended as needed. - */ -static Channel **channels = NULL; - -/* - * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be - * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL - */ -static u_int channels_alloc = 0; +/* -- agent forwarding */ +#define NUM_SOCKS 10 -/* - * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is - * updated in channel_new. - */ -static int channel_max_fd = 0; +/* -- tcp forwarding */ +/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ +#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 +/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */ +#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" -/* -- tcp forwarding */ +/* -- X11 forwarding */ +/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ +#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. @@ -124,101 +115,153 @@ typedef struct { Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/ } ForwardPermission; -/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */ -static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL; +typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); -/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */ -static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL; - -/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */ -static int num_permitted_opens = 0; +/* Master structure for channels state */ +struct ssh_channels { + /* + * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array + * is dynamically extended as needed. + */ + Channel **channels; -/* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */ -static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; + /* + * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be + * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL + */ + u_int channels_alloc; -/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ -#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 + /* + * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is + * updated in channel_new. + */ + int channel_max_fd; -/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */ -#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" + /* + * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits + * relevant to channels in the select bitmasks. + * + * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for + * channels which have events pending. + */ + chan_fn **channel_pre; + chan_fn **channel_post; -/* - * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server - * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do - * anything after logging in anyway. - */ -static int all_opens_permitted = 0; + /* -- tcp forwarding */ + /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */ + ForwardPermission *permitted_opens; -/* -- X11 forwarding */ + /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */ + ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens; -/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ -#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 + /* + * Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by + * the user. + */ + u_int num_permitted_opens; -/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ -static char *x11_saved_display = NULL; + /* + * Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by + * the admin. + */ + u_int num_adm_permitted_opens; -/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ -static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL; + /* + * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on + * the server on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the + * user could do anything after logging in anyway. + */ + int all_opens_permitted; -/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ -static char *x11_saved_data = NULL; -static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0; + /* -- X11 forwarding */ -/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ -static u_int x11_refuse_time; + /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ + char *x11_saved_display; -/* - * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us; - * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data. - */ -static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL; -static u_int x11_fake_data_len; + /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ + char *x11_saved_proto; + /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ + char *x11_saved_data; + u_int x11_saved_data_len; -/* -- agent forwarding */ + /* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ + u_int x11_refuse_time; -#define NUM_SOCKS 10 + /* + * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be + * sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the + * real data. + */ + u_char *x11_fake_data; + u_int x11_fake_data_len; -/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ -static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; + /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ + int IPv4or6; +}; /* helper */ -static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype); +static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype); static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); +static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *); +static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +/* Setup helper */ +static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); /* -- channel core */ +void +channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc; + + if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL || + (sc->channel_pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, + sizeof(*sc->channel_pre))) == NULL || + (sc->channel_post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, + sizeof(*sc->channel_post))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__); + sc->channels_alloc = 10; + sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels)); + sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; + channel_handler_init(sc); + + ssh->chanctxt = sc; +} + Channel * -channel_by_id(int id) +channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; - if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) { - logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id); + if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return NULL; } - c = channels[id]; + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { - logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id); + logit("%s: %d: bad id: channel free", __func__, id); return NULL; } return c; } Channel * -channel_by_remote_id(int remote_id) +channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id) { Channel *c; u_int i; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; - if (c != NULL && c->remote_id == remote_id) + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id) return c; } return NULL; @@ -229,28 +272,28 @@ channel_by_remote_id(int remote_id) * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * -channel_lookup(int id) +channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; - if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) - return (NULL); + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) + return NULL; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: - case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: - case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: - return (c); + return c; } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); - return (NULL); + return NULL; } /* @@ -258,13 +301,15 @@ channel_lookup(int id) * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void -channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, +channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ - channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, rfd); - channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, wfd); - channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, efd); + sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd); + sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd); + sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd); if (rfd != -1) fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); @@ -302,192 +347,220 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, * remote_name to be freed. */ Channel * -channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, +channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) { - int found; - u_int i; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_int i, found; Channel *c; - /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */ - if (channels_alloc == 0) { - channels_alloc = 10; - channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *)); - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) - channels[i] = NULL; - } /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ - for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) - if (channels[i] == NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ - found = (int)i; + found = i; break; } - if (found < 0) { - /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */ - found = channels_alloc; - if (channels_alloc > 10000) - fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d " - "too big.", channels_alloc); - channels = xreallocarray(channels, channels_alloc + 10, - sizeof(Channel *)); - channels_alloc += 10; - debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc); - for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++) - channels[i] = NULL; + } + if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) { + /* + * There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand + * the array. + */ + found = sc->channels_alloc; + if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS) + fatal("%s: internal error: channels_alloc %d too big", + __func__, sc->channels_alloc); + sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc, + sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels)); + sc->channels_alloc += 10; + debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc); } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ - c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); - buffer_init(&c->input); - buffer_init(&c->output); - buffer_init(&c->extended); - c->path = NULL; - c->listening_addr = NULL; - c->listening_port = 0; + c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); + if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; - c->flags = 0; - channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); - c->notbefore = 0; + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; - c->local_consumed = 0; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; - c->remote_id = -1; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); - c->remote_window = 0; - c->remote_maxpacket = 0; - c->force_drain = 0; - c->single_connection = 0; - c->detach_user = NULL; - c->detach_close = 0; - c->open_confirm = NULL; - c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; - c->input_filter = NULL; - c->output_filter = NULL; - c->filter_ctx = NULL; - c->filter_cleanup = NULL; c->ctl_chan = -1; - c->mux_rcb = NULL; - c->mux_ctx = NULL; - c->mux_pause = 0; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return c; } -static int -channel_find_maxfd(void) +static void +channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc) { u_int i; int max = 0; Channel *c; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd); max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd); max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd); } } - return max; + sc->channel_max_fd = max; } int -channel_close_fd(int *fdp) +channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp) { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; if (fd != -1) { ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; - if (fd == channel_max_fd) - channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); + if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd) + channel_find_maxfd(sc); } return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void -channel_close_fds(Channel *c) +channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); +} + +static void +fwd_perm_clear(ForwardPermission *fp) +{ + free(fp->host_to_connect); + free(fp->listen_host); + free(fp->listen_path); + bzero(fp, sizeof(*fp)); +} + +enum { FWDPERM_USER, FWDPERM_ADMIN }; + +static int +fwd_perm_list_add(struct ssh *ssh, int which, + const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect, + const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port, + Channel *downstream) +{ + ForwardPermission **fpl; + u_int n, *nfpl; + + switch (which) { + case FWDPERM_USER: + fpl = &ssh->chanctxt->permitted_opens; + nfpl = &ssh->chanctxt->num_permitted_opens; + break; + case FWDPERM_ADMIN: + fpl = &ssh->chanctxt->permitted_adm_opens; + nfpl = &ssh->chanctxt->num_adm_permitted_opens; + break; + default: + fatal("%s: invalid list %d", __func__, which); + } + + if (*nfpl >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: overflow", __func__); + + *fpl = xrecallocarray(*fpl, *nfpl, *nfpl + 1, sizeof(**fpl)); + n = (*nfpl)++; +#define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s)) + (*fpl)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect); + (*fpl)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; + (*fpl)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host); + (*fpl)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path); + (*fpl)[n].listen_port = listen_port; + (*fpl)[n].downstream = downstream; +#undef MAYBE_DUP + return (int)n; +} + +static void +mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { - channel_close_fd(&c->sock); - channel_close_fd(&c->rfd); - channel_close_fd(&c->wfd); - channel_close_fd(&c->efd); + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + ForwardPermission *fp; + int r; + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (fp->downstream != c) + continue; + + /* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */ + debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u", + c->self, fp->listen_host, fp->listen_port); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + channel_rfwd_bind_host(fp->listen_host))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fp->listen_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + fwd_perm_clear(fp); /* unregister */ + } } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void -channel_free(Channel *c) +channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; char *s; u_int i, n; Channel *other; struct channel_confirm *cc; - for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - if ((other = channels[i]) != NULL) { - n++; - - /* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */ - if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT && - other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY && - other->mux_ctx == c) { - other->mux_ctx = NULL; - other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; - other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; - other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; - } + for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL) + continue; + n++; + /* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT && + other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY && + other->mux_ctx == c) { + other->mux_ctx = NULL; + other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; } } debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); - /* XXX more MUX cleanup: remove remote forwardings */ - if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { - for (i = 0; i < (u_int)num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (permitted_opens[i].downstream != c) - continue; - /* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */ - debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u", - c->self, - permitted_opens[i].listen_host, - permitted_opens[i].listen_port); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward"); - packet_put_char(0); - packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host( - permitted_opens[i].listen_host)); - packet_put_int(permitted_opens[i].listen_port); - packet_send(); - /* unregister */ - permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; - permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; - free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); - permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; - free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); - permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; - permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; - permitted_opens[i].downstream = NULL; - } - } + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) + mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c); - s = channel_open_message(); + s = channel_open_message(ssh); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); - if (c->sock != -1) - shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR); - channel_close_fds(c); - buffer_free(&c->input); - buffer_free(&c->output); - buffer_free(&c->extended); + channel_close_fds(ssh, c); + sshbuf_free(c->input); + sshbuf_free(c->output); + sshbuf_free(c->extended); + c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL; free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); @@ -496,25 +569,26 @@ channel_free(Channel *c) c->listening_addr = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) - cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx); + cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) - c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx); - channels[c->self] = NULL; + c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx); + sc->channels[c->self] = NULL; + explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); free(c); } void -channel_free_all(void) +channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) - if (channels[i] != NULL) - channel_free(channels[i]); + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) + if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) + channel_free(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); } /* @@ -522,26 +596,26 @@ channel_free_all(void) * descriptors after a fork. */ void -channel_close_all(void) +channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) - if (channels[i] != NULL) - channel_close_fds(channels[i]); + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) + if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) + channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void -channel_stop_listening(void) +channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: @@ -550,8 +624,8 @@ channel_stop_listening(void) case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: - channel_close_fd(&c->sock); - channel_free(c); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); + channel_free(ssh, c); break; } } @@ -563,28 +637,20 @@ channel_stop_listening(void) * more channel is overfull. */ int -channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void) +channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; + u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh); Channel *c; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; - if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { -#if 0 - if (!compat20 && - buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) { - debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d", - c->self, buffer_len(&c->input)); - return 0; - } -#endif - if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) { - debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u", - c->self, buffer_len(&c->output), - packet_get_maxsize()); - return 0; - } + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + continue; + if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) { + debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u", + c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize); + return 0; } } return 1; @@ -592,13 +658,13 @@ channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void) /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int -channel_still_open(void) +channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { @@ -609,6 +675,7 @@ channel_still_open(void) case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: @@ -616,22 +683,16 @@ channel_still_open(void) case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: - if (!compat20) - fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL"); continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: return 1; - case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: - case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: - if (!compat13) - fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); - return 1; default: - fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); + fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } @@ -640,18 +701,20 @@ channel_still_open(void) /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int -channel_find_open(void) +channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int i; Channel *c; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; - if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0) + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: @@ -670,13 +733,8 @@ channel_find_open(void) case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; - case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: - case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: - if (!compat13) - fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); - return i; default: - fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); + fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } @@ -689,18 +747,21 @@ channel_find_open(void) * newlines. */ char * -channel_open_message(void) +channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh) { - Buffer buffer; + struct sshbuf *buf; Channel *c; - char buf[1024], *cp; u_int i; - - buffer_init(&buffer); - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n"); - buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; + int r; + char *ret; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, + "The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { @@ -719,75 +780,95 @@ channel_open_message(void) case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: - case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: - case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, - " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%u/%d o%u/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n", + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s " + "(t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, - c->type, c->remote_id, - c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input), - c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output), - c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan); - buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + c->type, + c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id, + c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input), + c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output), + c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; default: - fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type); + fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } - buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); - cp = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&buffer)); - buffer_free(&buffer); - return cp; + if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string", __func__); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return ret; +} + +static void +open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: open: %s", where, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } } void -channel_send_open(int id) +channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + int r; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); - packet_put_cstring(c->ctype); - packet_put_int(c->self); - packet_put_int(c->local_window); - packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); - packet_send(); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } void -channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) +channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + int r; if (c == NULL) { - logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id); + logit("%s: %d: unknown channel id", __func__, id); return; } + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_cstring(service); - packet_put_char(wantconfirm); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } } void -channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, - channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) +channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, + channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; - if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) - fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id); + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; @@ -797,12 +878,13 @@ channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, } void -channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) +channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, + channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { - logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id); + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; @@ -810,12 +892,13 @@ channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) } void -channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) +channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, + channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { - Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); + Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { - logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; @@ -823,12 +906,12 @@ channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) } void -channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) +channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { - Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); + Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { - logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; @@ -836,13 +919,13 @@ channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) } void -channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, +channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); if (c == NULL) { - logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; @@ -852,118 +935,80 @@ channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, } void -channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, +channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + int r; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); - channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_int(c->local_window); - packet_send(); -} -/* - * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to - * channels in the select bitmasks. - */ -/* - * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which - * have events pending. - */ -typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); -chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; -chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); +} -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void -channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) -{ - if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize()) - FD_SET(c->sock, readset); - if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) - FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); -} - -static void -channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { - u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize(); - if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && - limit > 0 && - buffer_len(&c->input) < limit && - buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) + c->remote_window > 0 && + sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window && + sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { - if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { + if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) { FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) - debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", - c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); + debug2("channel %d: " + "obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, + c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); else - chan_obuf_empty(c); + chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ - if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 && - !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { + if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && - buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && - buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window) + sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window) FD_SET(c->efd, readset); } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } -/* ARGSUSED */ -static void -channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) -{ - if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) { - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; - debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self); - } -} - -/* ARGSUSED */ -static void -channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) -{ - if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0) - chan_mark_dead(c); - else - FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); -} - /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this @@ -974,24 +1019,26 @@ channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int -x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) +x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b) { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ - if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 && + (u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return -1; } /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ - if (buffer_len(b) < 12) + if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ - ucp = buffer_ptr(b); + ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; @@ -1005,27 +1052,27 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ - if (buffer_len(b) < + if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ - if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) || - memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { + if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) || + memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ - if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len || + if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), - x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { + sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ - if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) { + if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", - x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len); + sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* @@ -1034,90 +1081,63 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), - x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len); + sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } static void -channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) -{ - int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); - - if (ret == 1) { - /* Start normal processing for the channel. */ - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; - channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset); - } else if (ret == -1) { - /* - * We have received an X11 connection that has bad - * authentication information. - */ - logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); - buffer_clear(&c->input); - buffer_clear(&c->output); - channel_close_fd(&c->sock); - c->sock = -1; - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); - } -} - -static void -channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { - int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); + int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; - channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset); + channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); - debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); - chan_read_failed(c); - buffer_clear(&c->input); - chan_ibuf_empty(c); - buffer_clear(&c->output); - /* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */ - if (compat20) - chan_write_failed(c); - else - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", + c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->output); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } } static void -channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, + Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && - buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) + sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ - buffer_clear(&c->input); - chan_ibuf_empty(c); + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ - chan_rcvd_oclose(c); + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { - if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) + if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) - chan_obuf_empty(c); + chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static int -channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { - char *p, *host; + const u_char *p; + char *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { @@ -1126,14 +1146,15 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; + int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); - have = buffer_len(&c->input); + have = sshbuf_len(input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; - p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ @@ -1158,46 +1179,55 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) } if (found < need) return 0; - buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1); - buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1); - buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2); - buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4); - have = buffer_len(&c->input); - p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); - if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) - fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", + if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) { + debug("channels %d: decode socks4: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + have = sshbuf_len(input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); + if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { + error("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", c->self); + return -1; + } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); - len++; /* trailing '\0' */ - if (len > have) - fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d", - c->self, len, have); + len++; /* trailing '\0' */ strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); - buffer_consume(&c->input, len); - + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ - have = buffer_len(&c->input); - p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); + have = sshbuf_len(input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); + if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { + error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul " + "terminated", c->self); + return -1; + } len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ - if (len > have) - fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d", - c->self, len, have); if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); - buffer_consume(&c->input, len); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); @@ -1213,7 +1243,10 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ - buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } return 1; } @@ -1226,10 +1259,10 @@ channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 -/* ARGSUSED */ static int -channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) { + /* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */ struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; @@ -1238,14 +1271,15 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; - u_char *p; + const u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; + int r; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); - p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; - have = buffer_len(&c->input); + have = sshbuf_len(input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) @@ -1265,10 +1299,16 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) c->self); return -1; } - buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2); - buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05); /* version */ - buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH); /* method */ - FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + /* version, method */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ @@ -1305,11 +1345,22 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) need++; if (have < need) return 0; - buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req)); - if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) - buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* host string length */ - buffer_get(&c->input, &dest_addr, addrlen); - buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { + /* host string length */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) { + debug("channel %d: parse addr/port: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; @@ -1336,22 +1387,23 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ - buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp)); - buffer_put_int(&c->output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY)); /* bind address */ - buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); return 1; } Channel * -channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, - int in, int out) +channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) { Channel *c; - debug("channel_connect_stdio_fwd %s:%d", host_to_connect, - port_to_connect); + debug("%s %s:%d", __func__, host_to_connect, port_to_connect); - c = channel_new("stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, + c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); @@ -1360,23 +1412,24 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; - channel_register_fds(c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); - port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); + port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void -channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { - u_char *p; + const u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; - have = buffer_len(&c->input); + have = sshbuf_len(c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); - /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */ + /* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ @@ -1384,105 +1437,174 @@ channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ - p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input); + /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */ switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: - ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset); + ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output); break; case 0x05: - ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset); + ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { - chan_mark_dead(c); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; - port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); + port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); + } +} + +/* simulate read-error */ +static void +rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->output); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); +} + +/* reverse dynamic port forwarding */ +static void +channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + const u_char *p; + u_int have, len; + int r, ret; + + have = sshbuf_len(c->output); + debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have); + /* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */ + /* EOF received */ + if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); + return; + } + /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ + if (have < 3) + return; + /* try to guess the protocol */ + p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output); + switch (p[0]) { + case 0x04: + /* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */ + ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input); + break; + case 0x05: + ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input); + break; + default: + ret = -1; + break; + } + if (ret < 0) { + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); + } else if (ret == 0) { + debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self); + /* send socks request to peer */ + len = sshbuf_len(c->input); + if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: rdynamic: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->remote_window -= len; + } + } else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) { + /* the connect failed */ + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; - int newsock, oerrno; + int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; - int remote_port; - - if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { - debug("X11 connection requested."); - addrlen = sizeof(addr); - newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); - if (c->single_connection) { - oerrno = errno; - debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); - channel_close_fd(&c->sock); - chan_mark_dead(c); - errno = oerrno; - } - if (newsock < 0) { - if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && - errno != ECONNABORTED) - error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) - c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; - return; - } - set_nodelay(newsock); - remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); - remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", - remote_ipaddr, remote_port); - - nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket", - SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, - c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); - packet_put_cstring("x11"); - packet_put_int(nc->self); - packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max); - packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket); - /* originator ipaddr and port */ - packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { - debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode"); - } else { - packet_put_int(remote_port); - } - packet_send(); - } else { - packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN); - packet_put_int(nc->self); - if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & - SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) - packet_put_cstring(buf); - packet_send(); - } - free(remote_ipaddr); + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; + + debug("X11 connection requested."); + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (c->single_connection) { + oerrno = errno; + debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + errno = oerrno; + } + if (newsock < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && + errno != ECONNABORTED) + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; } + set_nodelay(newsock); + remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); + remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", + remote_ipaddr, remote_port); + + nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11"); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) != 0) + debug2("channel %d: ssh2 x11 bug compat mode", nc->self); + else if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + free(remote_ipaddr); } static void -port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype) +port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype) { - char buf[1024]; char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); + int r; if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ @@ -1491,55 +1613,57 @@ port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype) remote_port = 65535; } - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, + free(c->remote_name); + xasprintf(&c->remote_name, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); - free(c->remote_name); - c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf); - - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); - packet_put_cstring(rtype); - packet_put_int(c->self); - packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); - packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); - if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { - /* target host, port */ - packet_put_cstring(c->path); - packet_put_int(c->host_port); - } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { - /* target path */ - packet_put_cstring(c->path); - } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { - /* listen path */ - packet_put_cstring(c->path); - } else { - /* listen address, port */ - packet_put_cstring(c->path); - packet_put_int(local_port); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype); + if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { + /* target host, port */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); } - if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { - /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ - packet_put_cstring(""); - } else { - /* originator host and port */ - packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); - packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* target path */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* listen path */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); } - packet_send(); } else { - packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN); - packet_put_int(c->self); - packet_put_cstring(c->path); - packet_put_int(c->host_port); - if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & - SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) - packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name); - packet_send(); + /* listen address, port */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + /* originator host and port */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } @@ -1558,17 +1682,17 @@ channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd) } void -channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time) +channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time) { - x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; + ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; } /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; @@ -1576,360 +1700,406 @@ channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; - if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { - debug("Connection to port %d forwarding " - "to %.100s port %d requested.", - c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); - - if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; - rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; - } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; - rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; - } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; - rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; - } else if (c->host_port == 0) { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; - rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; - } else { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; - rtype = "direct-tcpip"; - } + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; - addrlen = sizeof(addr); - newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); - if (newsock < 0) { - if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && - errno != ECONNABORTED) - error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) - c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; - return; - } - if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) - set_nodelay(newsock); - nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, - c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); - nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; - nc->host_port = c->host_port; - if (c->path != NULL) - nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); - - if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) - port_open_helper(nc, rtype); + debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.", + c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); + + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; + } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; + } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; + } else if (c->host_port == 0) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; + rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; + } else { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } -} -/* - * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from - * clients. + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && + errno != ECONNABORTED) + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; + } + if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + set_nodelay(newsock); + nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); + nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; + nc->host_port = c->host_port; + if (c->path != NULL) + nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); + + if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) + port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype); +} + +/* + * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from + * clients. */ -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; - int newsock; + int r, newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; - if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { - addrlen = sizeof(addr); - newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); - if (newsock < 0) { - error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", - strerror(errno)); - if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) - c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; - return; - } - nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket", - SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, - c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, - 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); - packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com"); - packet_put_int(nc->self); - packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); - packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); - } else { - packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN); - packet_put_int(nc->self); - } - packet_send(); + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; + + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; } + nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, + 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com"); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { - int err = 0, sock; + int err = 0, sock, isopen, r; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); - if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) { - if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) { - err = errno; - error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) + return; + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + /* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */ + isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH); + if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) { + err = errno; + error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); + } + if (err == 0) { + debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", + c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); + channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + if (isopen) { + /* no message necessary */ + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) + != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, + ssh_err(r)); } - if (err == 0) { - debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", - c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); - channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_int(c->self); - packet_put_int(c->local_window); - packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); - } else { - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_int(c->self); - } + } else { + debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", + c->self, strerror(err)); + /* Try next address, if any */ + if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { + close(c->sock); + c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; + channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt); + return; + } + /* Exhausted all addresses */ + error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", + c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); + channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); + if (isopen) { + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); } else { - debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", - c->self, strerror(err)); - /* Try next address, if any */ - if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { - close(c->sock); - c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; - channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); - return; - } - /* Exhausted all addresses */ - error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", - c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); - channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED); - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { - packet_put_cstring(strerror(err)); - packet_put_cstring(""); - } - } else { - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - } - chan_mark_dead(c); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) + != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE) == 0 && + ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0)) + fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, + ssh_err(r)); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } - packet_send(); } } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int -channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; - int len, force; + ssize_t len; + int r, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; - if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) { - errno = 0; - len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); - if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || - ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) - return 1; + + if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) + return 1; + + errno = 0; + len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || + ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) + return 1; #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD - if (len <= 0) { + if (len <= 0) { #else - if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || - (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { + if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || + (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif - debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d", - c->self, c->rfd, len); - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { - debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); - chan_mark_dead(c); - return -1; - } else if (compat13) { - buffer_clear(&c->output); - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; - debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); - } else { - chan_read_failed(c); - } + debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", + c->self, c->rfd, len); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; - } - if (c->input_filter != NULL) { - if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { - debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); - chan_read_failed(c); - } - } else if (c->datagram) { - buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len); } else { - buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + } + return -1; + } + if (c->input_filter != NULL) { + if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) { + debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); } + } else if (c->datagram) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: put datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: put data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); } return 1; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static int -channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; - u_char *data = NULL, *buf; - u_int dlen, olen = 0; - int len; + u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */ + size_t dlen, olen = 0; + int r, len; + + if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || + sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) + return 1; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ - if (c->wfd != -1 && - FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && - buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { - olen = buffer_len(&c->output); - if (c->output_filter != NULL) { - if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { - debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) - chan_mark_dead(c); - else - chan_write_failed(c); - return -1; - } - } else if (c->datagram) { - buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen); - } else { - buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output); - dlen = buffer_len(&c->output); + olen = sshbuf_len(c->output); + if (c->output_filter != NULL) { + if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { + debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + else + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + return -1; } + } else if (c->datagram) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + buf = data; + } else { + buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output); + dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output); + } + + if (c->datagram) { + /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ + len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); + free(data); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) + goto write_fail; + goto out; + } - if (c->datagram) { - /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ - len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); - free(data); - if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) - return 1; - if (len <= 0) { - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) - chan_mark_dead(c); - else - chan_write_failed(c); - return -1; - } - goto out; - } #ifdef _AIX - /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ - if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty) - dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); + /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ + if (c->wfd_isatty) + dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); #endif - len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); - if (len < 0 && - (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) - return 1; - if (len <= 0) { - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { - debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); - chan_mark_dead(c); - return -1; - } else if (compat13) { - buffer_clear(&c->output); - debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; - } else { - chan_write_failed(c); - } + len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); + if (len < 0 && + (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + write_fail: + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return -1; + } else { + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } + return -1; + } #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON - if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { - if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && - !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { - /* - * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of - * traffic analysis. We need to match the - * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message - * (4 byte channel id + buf) - */ - packet_send_ignore(4 + len); - packet_send(); - } + if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { + if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && + !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { + /* + * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of + * traffic analysis. We need to match the + * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message + * (4 byte channel id + buf) + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: ignore: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } -#endif - buffer_consume(&c->output, len); + } +#endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } out: - if (compat20 && olen > 0) - c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output); + c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output); + return 1; } static int -channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + int r; + ssize_t len; + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0) + return 1; + + len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), + sshbuf_len(c->extended)); + debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->local_consumed += len; + } + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; - int len; + int r; + ssize_t len; -/** XXX handle drain efd, too */ - if (c->efd != -1) { - if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && - FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) && - buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) { - len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended), - buffer_len(&c->extended)); - debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d", - c->self, len, c->efd); - if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) - return 1; - if (len <= 0) { - debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", - c->self, c->efd); - channel_close_fd(&c->efd); - } else { - buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); - c->local_consumed += len; - } - } else if (c->efd != -1 && - (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || - c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && - (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) { - len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); - debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d", - c->self, len, c->efd); - if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close))) - return 1; - if (len <= 0) { - debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", - c->self, c->efd); - channel_close_fd(&c->efd); - } else { - if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { - debug3("channel %d: discard efd", - c->self); - } else - buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len); - } + if (!c->detach_close && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)) + return 1; + + len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close))) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", + c->self, c->efd); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); + } else { + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { + debug3("channel %d: discard efd", + c->self); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); } } return 1; } static int -channel_check_window(Channel *c) +channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + if (c->efd == -1) + return 1; + + /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ + + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) + return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) + return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { + int r; + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_int(c->local_consumed); - packet_send(); + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", + __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); @@ -1940,90 +2110,112 @@ channel_check_window(Channel *c) } static void -channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { - channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset); - channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset); - if (!compat20) - return; - channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset); - channel_check_window(c); + channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_check_window(ssh, c); } static u_int -read_mux(Channel *c, u_int need) +read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; - int len; + ssize_t len; u_int rlen; + int r; - if (buffer_len(&c->input) < need) { - rlen = need - buffer_len(&c->input); + if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) { + rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) - return buffer_len(&c->input); + return sshbuf_len(c->input); if (len <= 0) { - debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d", + debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", c->self, c->rfd, len); - chan_read_failed(c); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); return 0; - } else - buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } } - return buffer_len(&c->input); + return sshbuf_len(c->input); } static void -channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int need; - ssize_t len; - if (!compat20) - fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__); + if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) + return; + if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) + return; + if (c->mux_pause) + return; - if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) && - (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || - c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) { - /* - * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to - * avoid disrupting fd passing. - */ - if (read_mux(c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ - return; - need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&c->input)); + /* + * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to + * avoid disrupting fd passing. + */ + if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ + return; + /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */ + need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) - if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { - debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", - c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); - chan_rcvd_oclose(c); - return; - } - if (read_mux(c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ - return; - if (c->mux_rcb(c) != 0) { - debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); - chan_mark_dead(c); - return; - } + if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { + debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", + c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); + return; } + if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ + return; + if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) { + debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return; + } +} - if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && - buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { - len = write(c->wfd, buffer_ptr(&c->output), - buffer_len(&c->output)); - if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) - return; - if (len <= 0) { - chan_mark_dead(c); - return; - } - buffer_consume(&c->output, len); +static void +channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + ssize_t len; + int r; + + if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || + sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) + return; + + len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return; + if (len <= 0) { + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return; } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); } static void -channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; @@ -2062,166 +2254,100 @@ channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) close(newsock); return; } - nc = channel_new("multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, + nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; - debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, - nc->self, nc->sock); + debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ - nc->mux_rcb(nc); + nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } -/* ARGSUSED */ static void -channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc) { - int len; - - /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ - if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { - len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output), - buffer_len(&c->output)); - if (len <= 0) - buffer_clear(&c->output); - else - buffer_consume(&c->output, len); - } -} - -static void -channel_handler_init_20(void) -{ - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; - - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; -} - -static void -channel_handler_init_13(void) -{ - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; - - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; -} - -static void -channel_handler_init_15(void) -{ - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; - channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; - - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; - channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; -} - -static void -channel_handler_init(void) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) { - channel_pre[i] = NULL; - channel_post[i] = NULL; - } - if (compat20) - channel_handler_init_20(); - else if (compat13) - channel_handler_init_13(); - else - channel_handler_init_15(); + chan_fn **pre, **post; + + if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL || + (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__); + + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; + + post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; + + sc->channel_pre = pre; + sc->channel_post = post; } /* gc dead channels */ static void -channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c) +channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { - if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close)) + if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); - c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); + c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } - if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1)) + if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); } +enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST }; + static void -channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, - time_t *unpause_secs) +channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) { - static int did_init = 0; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; - if (!did_init) { - channel_handler_init(); - did_init = 1; - } now = monotime(); if (unpause_secs != NULL) *unpause_secs = 0; - for (i = 0, oalloc = channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->delayed) { - if (ftab == channel_pre) + if (table == CHAN_PRE) c->delayed = 0; else continue; @@ -2231,7 +2357,7 @@ channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, * Run handlers that are not paused. */ if (c->notbefore <= now) - (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset); + (*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset); else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { /* * Collect the time that the earliest @@ -2245,24 +2371,47 @@ channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; } } - channel_garbage_collect(c); + channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c); } if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds", __func__, (int)*unpause_secs); } +/* + * Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks. + * This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading + * the network-input but before channel_prepare_select(). + */ +static void +channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + Channel *c; + u_int i, oalloc; + + for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN) + channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c); + } +} + /* * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in * select bitmasks. */ void -channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, - u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs, int rekeying) +channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, + int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs) { u_int n, sz, nfdset; - n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd); + channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */ + + n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd); nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ @@ -2280,8 +2429,8 @@ channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); - if (!rekeying) - channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp, + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp, minwait_secs); } @@ -2290,21 +2439,136 @@ channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, * events pending. */ void -channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { - channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset, NULL); + channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL); } +/* + * Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input. + */ +static void +channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + size_t len, plen; + const u_char *pkt; + int r; + + if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) { + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + /* + * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: + * tell peer, that we will not send more data: + * send IEOF. + * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still + * in use. + */ + if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) + debug2("channel %d: " + "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", + c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); + else + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + } + return; + } + + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + + if (c->datagram) { + /* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + /* + * XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is + * usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have + * backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard) + */ + if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) { + debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self); + return; + } + /* Enqueue it */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->remote_window -= plen; + return; + } + + /* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */ + if (len > c->remote_window) + len = c->remote_window; + if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) + len = c->remote_maxpacket; + if (len == 0) + return; + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + c->remote_window -= len; +} + +/* + * Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode. + */ +static void +channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + size_t len; + int r; + + if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0) + return; + + debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self, + c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage); + if (len > c->remote_window) + len = c->remote_window; + if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) + len = c->remote_maxpacket; + if (len == 0) + return; + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + c->remote_window -= len; + debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len); +} /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void -channel_output_poll(void) +channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; Channel *c; - u_int i, len; + u_int i; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; @@ -2312,113 +2576,23 @@ channel_output_poll(void) * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ - if (compat13) { - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && - c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING) - continue; - } else { - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) - continue; - } - if (compat20 && - (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + continue; + if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ - debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); + debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", + c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ - if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || - c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) && - (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) { - if (c->datagram) { - if (len > 0) { - u_char *data; - u_int dlen; - - data = buffer_get_string(&c->input, - &dlen); - if (dlen > c->remote_window || - dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) { - debug("channel %d: datagram " - "too big for channel", - c->self); - free(data); - continue; - } - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_string(data, dlen); - packet_send(); - c->remote_window -= dlen; - free(data); - } - continue; - } - /* - * Send some data for the other side over the secure - * connection. - */ - if (compat20) { - if (len > c->remote_window) - len = c->remote_window; - if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) - len = c->remote_maxpacket; - } else { - if (packet_is_interactive()) { - if (len > 1024) - len = 512; - } else { - /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ - if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2) - len = packet_get_maxsize()/2; - } - } - if (len > 0) { - packet_start(compat20 ? - SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len); - packet_send(); - buffer_consume(&c->input, len); - c->remote_window -= len; - } - } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { - if (compat13) - fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3"); - /* - * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: - * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF. - * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use. - */ - if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) - debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", - c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); - else - chan_ibuf_empty(c); - } + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || + c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) + channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c); /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ - if (compat20 && - !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && - c->remote_window > 0 && - (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 && - c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) { - debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d", - c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended), - c->extended_usage); - if (len > c->remote_window) - len = c->remote_window; - if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) - len = c->remote_maxpacket; - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR); - packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len); - packet_send(); - buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); - c->remote_window -= len; - debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len); - } + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) + channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c); } } @@ -2463,20 +2637,19 @@ channel_output_poll(void) * on channel creation. */ int -channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *downstream) +channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream) { Channel *c = NULL; - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL; const u_char *cp; char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL; u_char type; size_t have; - int ret = -1, r, idx; + int ret = -1, r; u_int id, remote_id, listen_port; - /* sshbuf_dump(&downstream->input, stderr); */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(&downstream->input, &cp, &have)) + /* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have)) != 0) { error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; @@ -2505,7 +2678,7 @@ channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *downstream) error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } - c = channel_new("mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, + c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */ @@ -2513,7 +2686,7 @@ channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *downstream) (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; @@ -2532,16 +2705,17 @@ channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *downstream) error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } - c = channel_new("mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, + c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1); c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ c->mux_downstream_id = id; c->remote_id = remote_id; + c->have_remote_id = 1; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); goto out; } break; @@ -2570,23 +2744,17 @@ channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *downstream) goto out; } /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ - permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, - num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); - idx = num_permitted_opens++; - permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(""); - permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = -1; - permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = listen_host; - permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = (int)listen_port; - permitted_opens[idx].downstream = downstream; + fwd_perm_list_add(ssh, FWDPERM_USER, "", -1, + listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream); listen_host = NULL; break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (have < 4) break; remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); - if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(remote_id)) != NULL) { + if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) { if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; } @@ -2623,9 +2791,8 @@ channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *downstream) * replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID. */ int -channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; Channel *downstream; const u_char *cp = NULL; @@ -2674,7 +2841,7 @@ channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(&downstream->output, b)) != 0) { + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) { error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } @@ -2687,12 +2854,14 @@ channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: /* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */ - if (cp && len > 4) + if (cp && len > 4) { c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); + c->have_remote_id = 1; + } break; case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); else c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; break; @@ -2703,257 +2872,221 @@ channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* -- protocol input */ -/* ARGSUSED */ +/* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */ +static int +channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) +{ + u_int32_t id; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse id: %s", where, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what); + } + if (id > INT_MAX) { + error("%s: bad channel id %u: %s", where, id, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what); + } + return (int)id; +} + +/* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */ +static Channel * +channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) +{ + int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what); + Channel *c; + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, + "%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id); + } + return c; +} + int -channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - int id; const u_char *data; - u_int data_len, win_len; - Channel *c; + size_t data_len, win_len; + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data"); + int r; - /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ - id = packet_get_int(); - c = channel_lookup(id); - if (c == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return 0; /* Get the data. */ - data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: get data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* - * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open. - * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends - * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure - * that window updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might - * deadlock. + * The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we + * must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window + * updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock. */ - if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { - if (compat20) { - c->local_window -= win_len; - c->local_consumed += win_len; - } + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { + c->local_window -= win_len; + c->local_consumed += win_len; return 0; } - if (compat20) { - if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { - logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d", - c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); - } - if (win_len > c->local_window) { - logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d", - c->self, win_len, c->local_window); - return 0; - } - c->local_window -= win_len; + if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { + logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u", + c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); + return 0; } - if (c->datagram) - buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len); - else - buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len); - packet_check_eom(); + if (win_len > c->local_window) { + logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u", + c->self, win_len, c->local_window); + return 0; + } + c->local_window -= win_len; + + if (c->datagram) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: append datagram: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: append data: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - int id; - char *data; - u_int data_len, tcode; - Channel *c; - - /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ - id = packet_get_int(); - c = channel_lookup(id); + const u_char *data; + size_t data_len; + u_int32_t tcode; + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data"); + int r; - if (c == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { - logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id); + logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) - debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id); + debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", + c->self); else - packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF " - "on channel %d.", id); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data " + "after EOF on channel %d.", c->self); + } + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse tcode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); } - tcode = packet_get_int(); if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return 0; } - data = packet_get_string(&data_len); - packet_check_eom(); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + if (data_len > c->local_window) { - logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d", + logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); - free(data); return 0; } - debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len); + debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len); + /* XXX sshpkt_getb? */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0) + error("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); c->local_window -= data_len; - buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len); - free(data); return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - int id; - Channel *c; + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof"); - id = packet_get_int(); - packet_check_eom(); - c = channel_lookup(id); - if (c == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; - chan_rcvd_ieof(c); + chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; - if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) - chan_ibuf_empty(c); - } - return 0; -} - -/* ARGSUSED */ -int -channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - int id; - Channel *c; - - id = packet_get_int(); - packet_check_eom(); - c = channel_lookup(id); - if (c == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) - return 0; - /* - * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more - * data is coming for it. - */ - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); - - /* - * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request, - * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation. - * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be - * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when - * the confirmation arrives. - */ - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) { - /* - * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will - * cause it to be freed later. - */ - buffer_clear(&c->input); - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING; + if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0) + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); } return 0; } -/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -int -channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - int id = packet_get_int(); - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); - - if (c == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) - return 0; - packet_check_eom(); - chan_rcvd_oclose(c); - return 0; -} - -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - int id = packet_get_int(); - Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose"); - if (c == NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " - "out-of-range channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; - packet_check_eom(); - if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED) - packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " - "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type); - channel_free(c); + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - int id, remote_id; - Channel *c; - - id = packet_get_int(); - c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation"); + u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket; + int r; - if (c==NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " - "unknown channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " - "non-opening channel %d.", id); - remote_id = packet_get_int(); - /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */ - c->remote_id = remote_id; - c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); + /* + * Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel + * is now open. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0) { + error("%s: window/maxpacket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid open confirmation message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); - if (compat20) { - c->remote_window = packet_get_int(); - c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int(); - if (c->open_confirm) { - debug2("callback start"); - c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); - debug2("callback done"); - } - debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, - c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); + c->have_remote_id = 1; + c->remote_window = remote_window; + c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket; + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + if (c->open_confirm) { + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self); + c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self); } - packet_check_eom(); + debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, + c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); return 0; } @@ -2973,134 +3106,97 @@ reason2txt(int reason) return "unknown reason"; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - int id, reason; - char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL; - Channel *c; - - id = packet_get_int(); - c = channel_lookup(id); + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure"); + u_int32_t reason; + char *msg = NULL; + int r; - if (c==NULL) - packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " - "unknown channel %d.", id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " - "non-opening channel %d.", id); - if (compat20) { - reason = packet_get_int(); - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { - msg = packet_get_string(NULL); - lang = packet_get_string(NULL); - } - logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id, - reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); - free(msg); - free(lang); - if (c->open_confirm) { - debug2("callback start"); - c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); - debug2("callback done"); + "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) { + error("%s: reason: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid open failure message"); + } + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE) == 0) { + /* skip language */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: message/lang: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid open failure message"); } } - packet_check_eom(); + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self, + reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); + free(msg); + if (c->open_confirm) { + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self); + c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self); + } /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ - chan_mark_dead(c); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { + int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust"); Channel *c; - int id; - u_int adjust, tmp; - - if (!compat20) - return 0; - - /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ - id = packet_get_int(); - c = channel_lookup(id); + u_int32_t adjust; + u_int new_rwin; + int r; - if (c == NULL) { + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return 0; } - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; - adjust = packet_get_int(); - packet_check_eom(); - debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust); - if ((tmp = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0) { + error("%s: adjust: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid window adjust message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); + if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) { fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", - id, adjust, c->remote_window); - c->remote_window = tmp; - return 0; -} - -/* ARGSUSED */ -int -channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - Channel *c = NULL; - u_short host_port; - char *host, *originator_string; - int remote_id; - - remote_id = packet_get_int(); - host = packet_get_string(NULL); - host_port = packet_get_int(); - - if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { - originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL); - } else { - originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); + c->self, adjust, c->remote_window); } - packet_check_eom(); - c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port, - "connected socket", originator_string, NULL, NULL); - free(originator_string); - free(host); - if (c == NULL) { - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); - packet_put_int(remote_id); - packet_send(); - } else - c->remote_id = remote_id; + c->remote_window = new_rwin; return 0; } -/* ARGSUSED */ int -channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { + int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm"); Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; - int id; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); - id = packet_get_int(); - debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id); + debug2("%s: type %d id %d", __func__, type, id); - if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { - logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id); + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: unknown", __func__, id); return 0; - } - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + } + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; - packet_check_eom(); + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; - cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx); + cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); @@ -3110,9 +3206,9 @@ channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* -- tcp forwarding */ void -channel_set_af(int af) +channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af) { - IPv4or6 = af; + ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af; } @@ -3180,8 +3276,9 @@ channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, } static int -channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, - int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, + struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; @@ -3218,7 +3315,7 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); @@ -3252,12 +3349,14 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ - if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && - allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) + if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && + fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && + *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), - strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); continue; } @@ -3278,7 +3377,10 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { - /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */ + /* + * address can be in if use ipv6 address is + * already bound + */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else @@ -3298,7 +3400,8 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ - if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && + if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && + fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock); @@ -3307,7 +3410,7 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ - c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, + c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); @@ -3328,8 +3431,8 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, } static int -channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd, - struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; const char *path; @@ -3391,7 +3494,7 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd, debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ - c = channel_new("unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, + c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "unix listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(path); @@ -3402,66 +3505,71 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd, } static int -channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) +channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *host, u_short port) { u_int i; int found = 0; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - Channel *c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } - return (found); + return found; } static int -channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) +channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - Channel *c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->path == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } - return (found); + return found; } int -channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *fwd) +channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { - if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) - return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); - else - return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, + fwd->listen_path); + } else { + return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh, + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); + } } static int -channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(const char *lhost, u_short lport, - int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, + struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { u_int i; int found = 0; const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - Channel *c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) @@ -3479,16 +3587,16 @@ channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(const char *lhost, u_short lport, continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } - return (found); + return found; } static int -channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) +channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; @@ -3498,54 +3606,59 @@ channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) return 0; } - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - Channel *c = channels[i]; + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_addr == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); found = 1; } } - return (found); + return found; } int -channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, + struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { - if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) - return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); - else - return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, + fwd->listen_path); + } else { + return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh, + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); + } } -/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */ +/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */ int -channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, + struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { - return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { - return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, - fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, + SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); } } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int -channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, +channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { - return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { - return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip( + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, fwd_opts); } @@ -3579,81 +3692,61 @@ channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) * channel_update_permitted_opens(). */ int -channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd) +channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { - int type, success = 0, idx = -1; + int r, success = 0, idx = -1; + char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path; + int port_to_connect, listen_port; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { - packet_put_cstring("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); - packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ - packet_put_cstring(fwd->listen_path); - } else { - packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward"); - packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ - packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host)); - packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); - } - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - /* Assume that server accepts the request */ - success = 1; - } else if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST); - packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); - packet_put_cstring(fwd->connect_host); - packet_put_int(fwd->connect_port); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for response from the remote side. */ - type = packet_read(); - switch (type) { - case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS: - success = 1; - break; - case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: - break; - default: - /* Unknown packet */ - packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:" - "received packet type %d.", type); - } + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request streamlocal: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { - logit("Warning: Server does not support remote stream local forwarding."); - } + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request tcpip-forward: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + /* Assume that server accepts the request */ + success = 1; if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ - permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, - num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); - idx = num_permitted_opens++; + host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL; + port_to_connect = listen_port = 0; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { - permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = - xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); - permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = - PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); + port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { - permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = - xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); - permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = - fwd->connect_port; + host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); + port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { - permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; - permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = - xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); - permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); + listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { - permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = - fwd->listen_host ? xstrdup(fwd->listen_host) : NULL; - permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; - permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = fwd->listen_port; + if (fwd->listen_host != NULL) + listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); + listen_port = fwd->listen_port; } - permitted_opens[idx].downstream = NULL; + idx = fwd_perm_list_add(ssh, FWDPERM_USER, + host_to_connect, port_to_connect, + listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL); } - return (idx); + return idx; } static int @@ -3718,36 +3811,33 @@ open_listen_match_streamlocal(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, * local side. */ static int -channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) +channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *host, u_short port) { - int i; - - if (!compat20) - return -1; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + int r; + u_int i; + ForwardPermission *fp; - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], host, port, 0)) + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (open_listen_match_tcpip(fp, host, port, 0)) break; + fp = NULL; } - if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { + if (fp == NULL) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward"); - packet_put_char(0); - packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(host)); - packet_put_int(port); - packet_send(); - - permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; - permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; - free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); - permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; - free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); - permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; - permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; - permitted_opens[i].downstream = NULL; + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + fwd_perm_clear(fp); /* unregister */ return 0; } @@ -3757,35 +3847,32 @@ channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) * path from local side. */ static int -channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(const char *path) +channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) { - int i; - - if (!compat20) - return -1; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + int r; + u_int i; + ForwardPermission *fp; - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(fp, path)) break; + fp = NULL; } - if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { + if (fp == NULL) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); - packet_put_char(0); - packet_put_cstring(path); - packet_send(); - - permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; - permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; - free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); - permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; - permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; - free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); - permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; - permitted_opens[i].downstream = NULL; + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + fwd_perm_clear(fp); /* unregister */ return 0; } @@ -3794,14 +3881,15 @@ channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(const char *path) * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. */ int -channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *fwd) +channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { - return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal( - fwd->listen_path)); + return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh, + fwd->listen_path); } else { - return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, - fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port)); + return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh, + fwd->listen_host, + fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port); } } @@ -3811,28 +3899,20 @@ channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *fwd) * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void -channel_permit_all_opens(void) +channel_permit_all_opens(struct ssh *ssh) { - if (num_permitted_opens == 0) - all_opens_permitted = 1; + if (ssh->chanctxt->num_permitted_opens == 0) + ssh->chanctxt->all_opens_permitted = 1; } void -channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) +channel_add_permitted_opens(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, int port) { - debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; - permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, - num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); - permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); - permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; - permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; - permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; - permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; - permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].downstream = NULL; - num_permitted_opens++; - - all_opens_permitted = 0; + debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); + fwd_perm_list_add(ssh, FWDPERM_USER, host, port, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); + sc->all_opens_permitted = 0; } /* @@ -3841,105 +3921,61 @@ channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void -channel_update_permitted_opens(int idx, int newport) +channel_update_permitted_opens(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport) { - if (idx < 0 || idx >= num_permitted_opens) { - debug("channel_update_permitted_opens: index out of range:" - " %d num_permitted_opens %d", idx, num_permitted_opens); + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + + if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= sc->num_permitted_opens) { + debug("%s: index out of range: %d num_permitted_opens %d", + __func__, idx, sc->num_permitted_opens); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, - permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect, - permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect); - if (newport >= 0) { - permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = + sc->permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect, + sc->permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect); + if (newport <= 0) + fwd_perm_clear(&sc->permitted_opens[idx]); + else { + sc->permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; - } else { - permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = 0; - permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = 0; - free(permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect); - permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = NULL; - free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_host); - permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; - free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_path); - permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; } } int -channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) +channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, int port) { debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); - - permitted_adm_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_adm_opens, - num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); - permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect - = xstrdup(host); - permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; - permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; - permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; - permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; - return ++num_adm_permitted_opens; -} - -void -channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void) -{ - channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); - permitted_adm_opens = xcalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens), 1); - permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL; - num_adm_permitted_opens = 1; + return fwd_perm_list_add(ssh, FWDPERM_ADMIN, host, port, + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } void -channel_clear_permitted_opens(void) +channel_disable_adm_local_opens(struct ssh *ssh) { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); - free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); - free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); - } - free(permitted_opens); - permitted_opens = NULL; - num_permitted_opens = 0; + channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(ssh); + fwd_perm_list_add(ssh, FWDPERM_ADMIN, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } void -channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void) +channel_clear_permitted_opens(struct ssh *ssh) { - int i; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; - for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) { - free(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect); - free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_host); - free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_path); - } - free(permitted_adm_opens); - permitted_adm_opens = NULL; - num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; + sc->permitted_opens = xrecallocarray(sc->permitted_opens, + sc->num_permitted_opens, 0, sizeof(*sc->permitted_opens)); + sc->num_permitted_opens = 0; } void -channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void) +channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(struct ssh *ssh) { - int i; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; - printf("permitopen"); - if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) { - printf(" any\n"); - return; - } - for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) - if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect == NULL) - printf(" none"); - else - printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, - permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect); - printf("\n"); + sc->permitted_adm_opens = xrecallocarray(sc->permitted_adm_opens, + sc->num_adm_permitted_opens, 0, sizeof(*sc->permitted_adm_opens)); + sc->num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ @@ -3961,7 +3997,8 @@ connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; - char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV,sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { @@ -4027,21 +4064,18 @@ channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) } /* - * Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path, + * Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path, * passing back the failure reason if appropriate. */ -static Channel * -connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname, - int *reason, const char **errmsg) +static int +connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype, + char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx, + int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; - struct channel_connect cctx; - Channel *c; - - memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; @@ -4049,7 +4083,7 @@ connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname, if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); - return (NULL); + return -1; } /* @@ -4062,18 +4096,18 @@ connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname, ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; - ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + ai->ai_socktype = socktype; ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); - cctx.aitop = ai; + cctx->aitop = ai; } else { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = socktype; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop)) != 0) { if (errmsg != NULL) *errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr); @@ -4081,31 +4115,46 @@ connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname, *reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); - return NULL; + return -1; } } - cctx.host = xstrdup(name); - cctx.port = port; - cctx.ai = cctx.aitop; + cctx->host = xstrdup(name); + cctx->port = port; + cctx->ai = cctx->aitop; - if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) { + if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", name, port, strerror(errno)); - channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); - return NULL; + return -1; } - c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, - CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); - c->connect_ctx = cctx; - return c; + + return sock; } /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * -connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) +connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port, + char *ctype, char *rname) { - return connect_to_reason(name, port, ctype, rname, NULL, NULL); + struct channel_connect cctx; + Channel *c; + int sock; + + memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); + sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, + &cctx, NULL, NULL); + if (sock == -1) { + channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); + return NULL; + } + c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); + c->host_port = port; + c->path = xstrdup(host); + c->connect_ctx = cctx; + + return c; } /* @@ -4113,19 +4162,24 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) * that needs to deal with this connection. */ Channel * -channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *listen_host, +channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], listen_host, - listen_port, 1)) { - if (permitted_opens[i].downstream) - return permitted_opens[i].downstream; - return connect_to( - permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, - permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_int i; + ForwardPermission *fp; + + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (open_listen_match_tcpip(fp, listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { + if (fp->downstream) + return fp->downstream; + if (fp->port_to_connect == 0) + return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh, + ctype, rname); + return connect_to(ssh, + fp->host_to_connect, fp->port_to_connect, + ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", @@ -4134,15 +4188,19 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *listen_host, } Channel * -channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) +channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, + char *ctype, char *rname) { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) { - return connect_to( - permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, - permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_int i; + ForwardPermission *fp; + + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(fp, path)) { + return connect_to(ssh, + fp->host_to_connect, fp->port_to_connect, + ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", @@ -4152,27 +4210,36 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * -channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, - char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) +channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, + char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { - int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct channel_connect cctx; + Channel *c; + u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + int sock; + ForwardPermission *fp; - permit = all_opens_permitted; + permit = sc->all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) - if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], host, port)) { + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (open_match(fp, host, port)) { permit = 1; break; } + } } - if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { + if (sc->num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) - if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], host, port)) { + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_adm_opens[i]; + if (open_match(fp, host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } + } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { @@ -4182,31 +4249,53 @@ channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; return NULL; } - return connect_to_reason(host, port, ctype, rname, reason, errmsg); + + memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); + sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, + &cctx, reason, errmsg); + if (sock == -1) { + channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); + return NULL; + } + + c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); + c->host_port = port; + c->path = xstrdup(host); + c->connect_ctx = cctx; + + return c; } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ Channel * -channel_connect_to_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) +channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, + char *ctype, char *rname) { - int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + ForwardPermission *fp; - permit = all_opens_permitted; + permit = sc->all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) - if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_opens[i]; + if (open_match(fp, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit = 1; break; } + } } - if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { + if (sc->num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) - if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { + for (i = 0; i < sc->num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) { + fp = &sc->permitted_adm_opens[i]; + if (open_match(fp, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } + } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { @@ -4214,28 +4303,80 @@ channel_connect_to_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) "but the request was denied.", path); return NULL; } - return connect_to(path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); + return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void -channel_send_window_changes(void) +channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh) { - u_int i; + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; struct winsize ws; + int r; + u_int i; - for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { - if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty || - channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty || + sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; - if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) + if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) continue; - channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); - packet_send(); + channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %u: send window-change: %s", + __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +/* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */ +static Channel * +rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + Channel *c; + int r; + + c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); + c->host_port = 0; + c->path = NULL; + + /* + * We need to open the channel before we have a FD, + * so that we can get SOCKS header from peer. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + return c; +} + +/* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */ +static int +rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + struct channel_connect cctx; + int sock; + + memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); + sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL, + NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL); + if (sock == -1) + channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); + else { + /* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH; + c->connect_ctx = cctx; + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0); } + return sock; } /* -- X11 forwarding */ @@ -4246,8 +4387,9 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void) * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int -x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, - int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) +x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, + int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, + u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; @@ -4264,16 +4406,18 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, + &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { - if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && + ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); @@ -4297,12 +4441,11 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, if (x11_use_localhost) channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { - debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); + debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__, + port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); - - for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) close(socks[n]); - } num_socks = 0; break; } @@ -4332,7 +4475,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; - nc = channel_new("x11 listener", + nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); @@ -4343,7 +4486,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; - return (0); + return 0; } static int @@ -4401,7 +4544,7 @@ is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen) #endif int -x11_connect_display(void) +x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh) { u_int display_number; const char *display; @@ -4446,9 +4589,10 @@ x11_connect_display(void) if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ - if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { - error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", - display); + if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", + &display_number) != 1) { + error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: " + "%.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ @@ -4470,7 +4614,10 @@ x11_connect_display(void) return -1; } *cp = 0; - /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */ + /* + * buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the + * display number. + */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); @@ -4479,7 +4626,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void) /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { @@ -4506,107 +4653,33 @@ x11_connect_display(void) } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { - error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, - strerror(errno)); + error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, + 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } -/* - * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains - * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond - * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE. - */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ -int -x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - Channel *c = NULL; - int remote_id, sock = 0; - char *remote_host; - - debug("Received X11 open request."); - - remote_id = packet_get_int(); - - if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { - remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL); - } else { - remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); - } - packet_check_eom(); - - /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */ - sock = x11_connect_display(); - if (sock != -1) { - /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */ - c = channel_new("connected x11 socket", - SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, - remote_host, 1); - c->remote_id = remote_id; - c->force_drain = 1; - } - free(remote_host); - if (c == NULL) { - /* Send refusal to the remote host. */ - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); - packet_put_int(remote_id); - } else { - /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); - packet_put_int(remote_id); - packet_put_int(c->self); - } - packet_send(); - return 0; -} - -/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */ -/* ARGSUSED */ -int -deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - int rchan = packet_get_int(); - - switch (type) { - case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN: - error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); - break; - case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN: - error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); - break; - default: - error("deny_input_open: type %d", type); - break; - } - error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server."); - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); - packet_put_int(rchan); - packet_send(); - return 0; -} - /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void -x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp, - const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) +x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id, + const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; - char *new_data; - int screen_number; const char *cp; + char *new_data; + int r, screen_number; - if (x11_saved_display == NULL) - x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); - else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) { + if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL) + sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); + else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; @@ -4620,53 +4693,37 @@ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp, else screen_number = 0; - if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) { + if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ - x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); + sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* Extract real authentication data. */ - x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); + sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); - x11_saved_data[i] = value; + sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value; } - x11_saved_data_len = data_len; + sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len; /* Generate fake data of the same length. */ - x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); - arc4random_buf(x11_fake_data, data_len); - x11_fake_data_len = data_len; + sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); + arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); + sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ - new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len); + new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ - if (compat20) { - channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); - packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */ - } else { - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING); - } - packet_put_cstring(proto); - packet_put_cstring(new_data); - packet_put_int(screen_number); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); + channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send x11-req: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(new_data); } - - -/* -- agent forwarding */ - -/* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */ - -void -auth_request_forwarding(void) -{ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); -} diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h index ce43236d5459..126b043454eb 100644 --- a/channels.h +++ b/channels.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.121 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.130 2017/09/21 19:16:53 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ -#define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */ -#define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 @@ -59,22 +57,27 @@ #define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-slave */ -#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 21 +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 +struct ssh; struct Channel; typedef struct Channel Channel; +struct fwd_perm_list; -typedef void channel_open_fn(int, int, void *); -typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *); -typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int); -typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *); -typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *); +typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); +typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); +typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); +typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); +typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, + u_char **, size_t *); /* Channel success/failure callbacks */ -typedef void channel_confirm_cb(int, struct Channel *, void *); -typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct Channel *, void *); +typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *); +typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *); struct channel_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry; channel_confirm_cb *cb; @@ -91,12 +94,14 @@ struct channel_connect { }; /* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */ -typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct Channel *); +typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *); struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ - int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ + uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ + int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */ + u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ @@ -117,11 +122,12 @@ struct Channel { * to a matching pre-select handler. * this way post-select handlers are not * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ - Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over + struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over * encrypted connection */ - Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for + struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for * send on socket */ - Buffer extended; + struct sshbuf *extended; + char *path; /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ @@ -157,6 +163,7 @@ struct Channel { int datagram; /* non-blocking connect */ + /* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */ struct channel_connect connect_ctx; /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */ @@ -196,128 +203,137 @@ struct Channel { #define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08 #define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10 -#define CHAN_RBUF 16*1024 +/* Read buffer size */ +#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024) + +/* Hard limit on number of channels */ +#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024) /* check whether 'efd' is still in use */ #define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ - (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ + (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ (c->efd != -1 || \ - buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)) + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) #define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ - (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ + (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \ - buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)) + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) + +/* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */ +void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh); /* channel management */ -Channel *channel_by_id(int); -Channel *channel_by_remote_id(int); -Channel *channel_lookup(int); -Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int); -void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int); -void channel_free(Channel *); -void channel_free_all(void); -void channel_stop_listening(void); - -void channel_send_open(int); -void channel_request_start(int, char *, int); -void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int); -void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_open_fn *, void *); -void channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *, - channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); -void channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *, - channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); -void channel_cancel_cleanup(int); -int channel_close_fd(int *); -void channel_send_window_changes(void); +Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int); +Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int); +Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int); +Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int, + u_int, u_int, int, char *, int); +void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int, + int, int, u_int); +void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void channel_free_all(struct ssh *); +void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *); + +void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int); +void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); +void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, + channel_callback_fn *, int); +void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int, + channel_open_fn *, void *); +void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *, + channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); +void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int, + channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); +void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int); +int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *); +void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *); /* mux proxy support */ -int channel_proxy_downstream(Channel *mc); -int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, void *); +int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc); +int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* protocol handler */ -int channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); /* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ -void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*, - time_t*, int); -void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *); -void channel_output_poll(void); +void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *, fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, + u_int*, time_t*); +void channel_after_select(struct ssh *, fd_set *, fd_set *); +void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *); -int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void); -void channel_close_all(void); -int channel_still_open(void); -char *channel_open_message(void); -int channel_find_open(void); +int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *); +void channel_close_all(struct ssh *); +int channel_still_open(struct ssh *); +char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *); +int channel_find_open(struct ssh *); /* tcp forwarding */ struct Forward; struct ForwardOptions; -void channel_set_af(int af); -void channel_permit_all_opens(void); -void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int); -int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int); -void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void); -void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int); -void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void); -void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void); -void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void); -Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *, - const char **); -Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *); -Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int); -Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short, - char *, char *); -Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *, char *, char *); -int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *); -int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *); -int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *); -int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *); -int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *); -int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *); +void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af); +void channel_permit_all_opens(struct ssh *); +void channel_add_permitted_opens(struct ssh *, char *, int); +int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(struct ssh *, char *, int); +void channel_copy_adm_permitted_opens(struct ssh *, + const struct fwd_perm_list *); +void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(struct ssh *); +void channel_update_permitted_opens(struct ssh *, int, int); +void channel_clear_permitted_opens(struct ssh *); +void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(struct ssh *); +void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(struct ssh *); +Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, + char *, char *, int *, const char **); +Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*, + u_short, int, int); +Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *, + u_short, char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *, + char *, char *); +int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); +int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, + struct ForwardOptions *); +int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); +int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, + int *, struct ForwardOptions *); +int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); +int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, + int, struct ForwardOptions *); int permitopen_port(const char *); /* x11 forwarding */ -void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int); -int x11_connect_display(void); -int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **); -int x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); -void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *, - const char *, int); -int deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); - -/* agent forwarding */ - -void auth_request_forwarding(void); +void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int); +int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *); +int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); +void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int, + const char *, const char *, const char *, int); /* channel close */ -int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int); -void chan_mark_dead(Channel *); +int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); +void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* channel events */ -void chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *); -void chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *); /* SSH2-only */ -void chan_read_failed(Channel *); -void chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *); - -void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *); -void chan_write_failed(Channel *); -void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *); +void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); #endif diff --git a/cipher-3des1.c b/cipher-3des1.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9fcc2785a3fb..000000000000 --- a/cipher-3des1.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.12 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "ssherr.h" - -/* - * This is used by SSH1: - * - * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines? - * - * Why is there a redundant initialization vector? - * - * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been - * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which - * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the - * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a - * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when - * choosing the X block. - */ -struct ssh1_3des_ctx -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX k1, k2, k3; -}; - -const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void); -int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); - -static int -ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, - int enc) -{ - struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; - u_char *k1, *k2, *k3; - - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { - if ((c = calloc(1, sizeof(*c))) == NULL) - return 0; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); - } - if (key == NULL) - return 1; - if (enc == -1) - enc = ctx->encrypt; - k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key; - k2 += 8; - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) { - if (enc) - k3 += 16; - else - k1 += 16; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3); - if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 || - EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 || - EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) { - explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); - free(c); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static int -ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, size_t len) -{ - struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; - - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) - return 0; - if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 || - EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 || - EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static int -ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) -{ - struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; - - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3); - explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); - free(c); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); - } - return 1; -} - -int -ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len) -{ - struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; - - if (len != 24) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (doset) { - memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8); - memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8); - memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8); - } else { - memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8); - memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8); - memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8); - } - return 0; -} - -const EVP_CIPHER * -evp_ssh1_3des(void) -{ - static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des; - - memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(ssh1_3des)); - ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef; - ssh1_3des.block_size = 8; - ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0; - ssh1_3des.key_len = 16; - ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init; - ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup; - ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc; - ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH; - return &ssh1_3des; -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ diff --git a/cipher-bf1.c b/cipher-bf1.c deleted file mode 100644 index c205b077ca42..000000000000 --- a/cipher-bf1.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,106 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.7 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF) - -#include - -#include -#include - -#include - -#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - -/* - * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before - * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk). - */ - -const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_bf(void); - -static void -swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n) -{ - u_char c[4]; - - /* Process 4 bytes every lap. */ - for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) { - c[3] = *src++; - c[2] = *src++; - c[1] = *src++; - c[0] = *src++; - - *dst++ = c[0]; - *dst++ = c[1]; - *dst++ = c[2]; - *dst++ = c[3]; - } -} - -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP -static void bf_ssh1_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - if (iv != NULL) - memcpy (&(ctx->oiv[0]), iv, 8); - memcpy (&(ctx->iv[0]), &(ctx->oiv[0]), 8); - if (key != NULL) - BF_set_key (&(ctx->c.bf_ks), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx), - key); -} -#endif - -static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *, - const u_char *, LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE) = NULL; - -static int -bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in, - LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len) -{ - int ret; - - swap_bytes(in, out, len); - ret = (*orig_bf)(ctx, out, out, len); - swap_bytes(out, out, len); - return (ret); -} - -const EVP_CIPHER * -evp_ssh1_bf(void) -{ - static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf; - - memcpy(&ssh1_bf, EVP_bf_cbc(), sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); - orig_bf = ssh1_bf.do_cipher; - ssh1_bf.nid = NID_undef; -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP - ssh1_bf.init = bf_ssh1_init; -#endif - ssh1_bf.do_cipher = bf_ssh1_cipher; - ssh1_bf.key_len = 32; - return (&ssh1_bf); -} -#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BF) */ - -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c index 2def333b14d2..c3cd5dcf4405 100644 --- a/cipher.c +++ b/cipher.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.102 2016/08/03 05:41:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.107 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -51,11 +51,6 @@ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void); -extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); -extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); -#endif struct sshcipher_ctx { int plaintext; @@ -68,17 +63,16 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx { struct sshcipher { char *name; - int number; /* for ssh1 only */ u_int block_size; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ u_int auth_len; - u_int discard_len; u_int flags; #define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) #define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) #define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) #define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); #else @@ -87,53 +81,32 @@ struct sshcipher { }; static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, - { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF - { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BF */ -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, - { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF - { "blowfish-cbc", - SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BF */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST - { "cast128-cbc", - SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAST */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 - { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 }, - { "arcfour128", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 }, - { "arcfour256", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */ - { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, - { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, - { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, + { "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, + { "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, + { "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, + { "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", - SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, - { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, - { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, - { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, + 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, + { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, + { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, + { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", - SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, + 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", - SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, + 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ -#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, - { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, - { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, - { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +#else + { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, +#endif { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", - SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, + 8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, + { "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, - { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } }; /*--*/ @@ -147,7 +120,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { - if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) + if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) continue; if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) continue; @@ -202,12 +175,6 @@ cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c) c->iv_len : c->block_size; } -u_int -cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *c) -{ - return (c->number); -} - u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c) { @@ -220,24 +187,6 @@ cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) return cc->plaintext; } -u_int -cipher_ctx_get_number(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) -{ - return cc->cipher->number; -} - -u_int -cipher_mask_ssh1(int client) -{ - u_int mask = 0; - mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */ - mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH; - if (client) { - mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES; - } - return mask; -} - const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_name(const char *name) { @@ -248,16 +197,6 @@ cipher_by_name(const char *name) return NULL; } -const struct sshcipher * -cipher_by_number(int id) -{ - const struct sshcipher *c; - for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (c->number == id) - return c; - return NULL; -} - #define CIPHER_SEP "," int ciphers_valid(const char *names) @@ -273,7 +212,7 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names) for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { c = cipher_by_name(p); - if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { + if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) { free(cipher_list); return 0; } @@ -282,38 +221,12 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names) return 1; } -/* - * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding - * cipher, or -1 on error. - */ - -int -cipher_number(const char *name) -{ - const struct sshcipher *c; - if (name == NULL) - return -1; - for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) - return c->number; - return -1; -} - -char * -cipher_name(int id) -{ - const struct sshcipher *c = cipher_by_number(id); - return (c==NULL) ? "" : c->name; -} - const char * cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) return NULL; - if (cc->cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) - return "use of DES is strongly discouraged due to " - "cryptographic weaknesses"; + /* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */ return NULL; } @@ -327,19 +240,13 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *type; int klen; - u_char *junk, *discard; #endif *ccp = NULL; if ((cc = calloc(sizeof(*cc), 1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) { - if (keylen > 8) - keylen = 8; - } - - cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE); + cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0; cc->encrypt = do_encrypt; if (keylen < cipher->key_len || @@ -353,6 +260,10 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, ret = chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen); goto out; } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { + ret = 0; + goto out; + } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen); @@ -360,10 +271,6 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, ret = 0; goto out; } - if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { - ret = 0; - goto out; - } ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ @@ -394,23 +301,6 @@ cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } - - if (cipher->discard_len > 0) { - if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL || - (discard = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL) { - free(junk); - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - ret = EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, discard, junk, cipher->discard_len); - explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len); - free(junk); - free(discard); - if (ret != 1) { - ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - } ret = 0; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ out: @@ -448,6 +338,10 @@ cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { + memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len); + return 0; + } #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { if (aadlen) @@ -456,10 +350,6 @@ cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, dest + aadlen, len); return 0; } - if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { - memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len); - return 0; - } return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #else if (authlen) { @@ -535,28 +425,6 @@ cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) free(cc); } -/* - * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the - * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. - */ -int -cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, - const struct sshcipher *cipher, const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) -{ - u_char digest[16]; - int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, - passphrase, strlen(passphrase), - digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) - goto out; - - r = cipher_init(ccp, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt); - out: - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - return r; -} - /* * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent @@ -566,19 +434,16 @@ int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; - int ivlen = 0; - if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) - ivlen = 24; - else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) - ivlen = 0; - else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) - ivlen = sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr); + if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) + return 0; + else if ((c->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) + return sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - else - ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - return (ivlen); + return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); +#else + return 0; +#endif } int @@ -603,38 +468,26 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len) if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; - switch (c->number) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2: - case SSH_CIPHER_DES: - case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH: - evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); - if (evplen == 0) - return 0; - else if (evplen < 0) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - if ((u_int)evplen != len) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); + if (evplen == 0) + return 0; + else if (evplen < 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + if ((u_int)evplen != len) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR - if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) - ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len); - else -#endif - if (cipher_authlen(c)) { - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, - len, iv)) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } else - memcpy(iv, cc->evp->iv, len); - break; + if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) + ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len); + else #endif -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: - return ssh1_3des_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, 24); + if (cipher_authlen(c)) { + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, + len, iv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } else + memcpy(iv, cc->evp->iv, len); #endif - default: - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } return 0; } @@ -651,36 +504,24 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv) if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) return 0; - switch (c->number) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2: - case SSH_CIPHER_DES: - case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH: - evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); - if (evplen <= 0) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); + if (evplen <= 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR - /* XXX iv arg is const, but ssh_aes_ctr_iv isn't */ - if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) - ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen); - else -#endif - if (cipher_authlen(c)) { - /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */ - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, - EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) - return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } else - memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen); - break; + /* XXX iv arg is const, but ssh_aes_ctr_iv isn't */ + if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) + ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen); + else #endif -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: - return ssh1_3des_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, 24); + if (cipher_authlen(c)) { + /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */ + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } else + memcpy(cc->evp->iv, iv, evplen); #endif - default: - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } return 0; } diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h index f4bca6285fa3..dc7ecf1139d4 100644 --- a/cipher.h +++ b/cipher.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.49 2016/08/03 05:41:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.52 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -42,34 +42,13 @@ #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" #include "cipher-aesctr.h" -/* - * Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not - * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31. - */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 -3 -#define SSH_CIPHER_INVALID -2 /* No valid cipher selected. */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET -1 /* None selected (invalid number). */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 /* no encryption */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */ -#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6 -#define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7 -#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31 - #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 struct sshcipher; struct sshcipher_ctx; -u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int); const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); -const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_number(int); -int cipher_number(const char *); -char *cipher_name(int); const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); int ciphers_valid(const char *); char *cipher_alg_list(char, int); @@ -80,8 +59,6 @@ int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *); -int cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx **, - const struct sshcipher *, const char *, int); u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *); @@ -90,13 +67,9 @@ u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *); u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *); -u_int cipher_ctx_get_number(struct sshcipher_ctx *); -u_int cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *); int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, u_int); int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *); int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); -int cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *); -void cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *); #endif /* CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c index 0648162341f7..791d336e359e 100644 --- a/clientloop.c +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.291 2017/03/10 05:01:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.305 2017/09/19 04:24:22 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" @@ -152,15 +151,9 @@ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ -static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */ -static int escape_pending1; /* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ -static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */ -static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ -static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ -static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ -static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */ +static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ @@ -184,6 +177,7 @@ struct channel_reply_ctx { }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ +/* XXX move to struct ssh? */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; @@ -207,15 +201,6 @@ leave_non_blocking(void) } } -/* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */ - -static void -enter_non_blocking(void) -{ - in_non_blocking_mode = 1; - set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); -} - /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. @@ -260,13 +245,13 @@ get_current_time(void) * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void -set_control_persist_exit_time(void) +set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; - } else if (channel_still_open()) { + } else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__); @@ -304,8 +289,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 int -client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, - u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) +client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display, + const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, + char **_proto, char **_data) { char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512]; char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; @@ -389,7 +375,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; - channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time); + channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh, + x11_refuse_time); } if (system(cmd) == 0) generated = 1; @@ -454,91 +441,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, return 0; } -/* - * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is - * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does - * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null. - */ - -static void -client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void) -{ - int len; - char buf[1]; - - /* - * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply - * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the - * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears - * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for - * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This - * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar. - */ - if (stdin_null_flag) { - /* Fake EOF on stdin. */ - debug("Sending eof."); - stdin_eof = 1; - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); - packet_send(); - } else { - enter_non_blocking(); - - /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */ - len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1); - if (len == 0) { - /* - * EOF. Record that we have seen it and send - * EOF to server. - */ - debug("Sending eof."); - stdin_eof = 1; - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); - packet_send(); - } else if (len > 0) { - /* - * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer, - * and also process it as an escape character if - * appropriate. - */ - if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1) - escape_pending1 = 1; - else - buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1); - } - leave_non_blocking(); - } -} - - -/* - * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the - * connection. - */ - -static void -client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void) -{ - u_int len; - - /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */ - while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 && - packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { - len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); - /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ - if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) - len = packet_get_maxsize(); - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); - packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len); - packet_send(); - buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); - /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */ - if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); - packet_send(); - } - } -} - /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software @@ -547,40 +449,27 @@ client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void) */ static void -client_check_window_change(void) +client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh) { - struct winsize ws; - - if (! received_window_change_signal) + if (!received_window_change_signal) return; /** XXX race */ received_window_change_signal = 0; - debug2("client_check_window_change: changed"); + debug2("%s: changed", __func__); - if (compat20) { - channel_send_window_changes(); - } else { - if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) - return; - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); - packet_send(); - } + channel_send_window_changes(ssh); } static int -client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; if (gc->cb != NULL) - gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx); + gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); @@ -611,7 +500,8 @@ server_alive_check(void) * one of the file descriptors). */ static void -client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, +client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, + fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; @@ -620,40 +510,20 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int ret; /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ - channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, - &minwait_secs, rekeying); - - if (!compat20) { - /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */ - if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high && - buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high && - channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) - FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); - /* - * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much - * buffered data to send to the server. - */ - if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) - FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp); - - /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */ - if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) - FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp); - if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) - FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp); - } else { - /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ - if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() && - !packet_have_data_to_write()) { - /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ - memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); - memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); - return; - } else { - FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); - } + channel_prepare_select(active_state, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, + nallocp, &minwait_secs); + + /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ + if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) && + !packet_have_data_to_write()) { + /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + return; } + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ if (packet_have_data_to_write()) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); @@ -665,13 +535,13 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, */ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ - if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) { + if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) { timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval; server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval; } - if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying) + if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying) timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout()); - set_control_persist_exit_time(); + set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, control_persist_exit_time - now); @@ -730,13 +600,9 @@ client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); - /* - * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets - * written to swap. - */ - buffer_free(bin); - buffer_free(bout); - buffer_free(berr); + sshbuf_reset(bin); + sshbuf_reset(bout); + sshbuf_reset(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); @@ -744,11 +610,6 @@ client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; - /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */ - buffer_init(bin); - buffer_init(bout); - buffer_init(berr); - enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } @@ -802,7 +663,7 @@ client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset) } static void -client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) +client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; @@ -841,8 +702,7 @@ client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { - buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg, - strlen(errmsg)); + buffer_append(c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg)); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { @@ -853,23 +713,23 @@ client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else - mux_tty_alloc_failed(c); + mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { - chan_read_failed(c); - chan_write_failed(c); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } } free(cr); } static void -client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx) +client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void -client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request, +client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); @@ -877,7 +737,7 @@ client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request, cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; - channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm, + channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } @@ -903,7 +763,7 @@ client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) } static void -process_cmdline(void) +process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh) { void (*handler)(int); char *s, *cmd; @@ -966,11 +826,6 @@ process_cmdline(void) goto out; } - if (delete && !compat20) { - logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1."); - goto out; - } - while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; @@ -982,12 +837,12 @@ process_cmdline(void) goto out; } if (remote) - ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(&fwd) == 0; + ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) - ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, + ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else - ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, + ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { @@ -1001,13 +856,13 @@ process_cmdline(void) goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { - if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, + if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { - if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd) < 0) { + if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } @@ -1027,10 +882,9 @@ out: /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ -#define SUPPRESS_PROTO1 1 /* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */ -#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 2 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ -#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 4 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ -#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 8 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ +#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ +#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ +#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; @@ -1040,9 +894,9 @@ static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, - {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, + {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, - {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, + {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, @@ -1052,8 +906,7 @@ static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { }; static void -print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client, - int using_stderr) +print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; char string[1024]; @@ -1062,7 +915,7 @@ print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client, "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); - suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) | + suppress_flags = (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); @@ -1083,10 +936,11 @@ print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client, } /* - * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case. + * Process the characters one by one. */ static int -process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, +process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) { char string[1024]; @@ -1095,19 +949,11 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; - int *escape_pendingp, escape_char; - struct escape_filter_ctx *efc; + struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ? + NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; - if (c == NULL) { - escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1; - escape_char = escape_char1; - } else { - if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) - return 0; - efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; - escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending; - escape_char = efc->escape_char; - } + if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) + return 0; if (len <= 0) return (0); @@ -1116,27 +962,29 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; - if (*escape_pendingp) { + if (efc->escape_pending) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ - *escape_pendingp = 0; + efc->escape_pending = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", - escape_char); + efc->escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { - chan_read_failed(c); - chan_write_failed(c); - if (c->detach_user) - c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + if (c->detach_user) { + c->detach_user(ssh, + c->self, NULL); + } c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; - buffer_clear(&c->input); - chan_ibuf_empty(c); + buffer_clear(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; @@ -1154,14 +1002,14 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", - escape_char, b); + efc->escape_char, b); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, - "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char); + "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", efc->escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ @@ -1171,26 +1019,20 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, continue; case 'B': - if (compat20) { - snprintf(string, sizeof string, - "%cB\r\n", escape_char); - buffer_append(berr, string, - strlen(string)); - channel_request_start(c->self, - "break", 0); - packet_put_int(1000); - packet_send(); - } + snprintf(string, sizeof string, + "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0); + packet_put_int(1000); + packet_send(); continue; case 'R': - if (compat20) { - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) - logit("Server does not " - "support re-keying"); - else - need_rekeying = 1; - } + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) + logit("Server does not " + "support re-keying"); + else + need_rekeying = 1; continue; case 'V': @@ -1201,7 +1043,7 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", - escape_char, ch); + efc->escape_char, ch); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; @@ -1213,7 +1055,8 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); snprintf(string, sizeof string, - "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch, + "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", + efc->escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level)); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; @@ -1231,10 +1074,10 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ - channel_stop_listening(); + channel_stop_listening(ssh); snprintf(string, sizeof string, - "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); + "%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Fork into background. */ @@ -1248,39 +1091,20 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ - if (compat20) { - buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1); - /* fake EOF on stdin */ - return -1; - } else if (!stdin_eof) { - /* - * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not - * always appear to be enough. So we - * try to send an EOF character first. - */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); - packet_put_string("\004", 1); - packet_send(); - /* Close stdin. */ - stdin_eof = 1; - if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) { - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); - packet_send(); - } - } - continue; - + buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1); + /* fake EOF on stdin */ + return -1; case '?': - print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20, + print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", - escape_char); + efc->escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); - s = channel_open_message(); + s = channel_open_message(ssh); buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s)); free(s); continue; @@ -1288,12 +1112,12 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; - process_cmdline(); + process_cmdline(ssh); continue; default: - if (ch != escape_char) { - buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char); + if (ch != efc->escape_char) { + buffer_put_char(bin, efc->escape_char); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ @@ -1304,12 +1128,12 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ - if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { + if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ - *escape_pendingp = 1; + efc->escape_pending = 1; continue; } } @@ -1325,115 +1149,6 @@ process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, return bytes; } -static void -client_process_input(fd_set *readset) -{ - int len; - char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; - - /* Read input from stdin. */ - if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) { - /* Read as much as possible. */ - len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf)); - if (len < 0 && - (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) - return; /* we'll try again later */ - if (len <= 0) { - /* - * Received EOF or error. They are treated - * similarly, except that an error message is printed - * if it was an error condition. - */ - if (len < 0) { - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n", - strerror(errno)); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - } - /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */ - stdin_eof = 1; - /* - * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is - * data in the buffer. If there is data in the - * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code - * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer - * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set. - */ - if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); - packet_send(); - } - } else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { - /* - * Normal successful read, and no escape character. - * Just append the data to buffer. - */ - buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len); - } else { - /* - * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape - * character and have to process the characters one - * by one. - */ - if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer, - &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1) - return; - } - } -} - -static void -client_process_output(fd_set *writeset) -{ - int len; - char buf[100]; - - /* Write buffered output to stdout. */ - if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) { - /* Write as much data as possible. */ - len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), - buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); - if (len <= 0) { - if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK) - len = 0; - else { - /* - * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an - * error message to stderr buffer. - */ - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, - "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno)); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - quit_pending = 1; - return; - } - } - /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */ - buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); - } - /* Write buffered output to stderr. */ - if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) { - /* Write as much data as possible. */ - len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), - buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); - if (len <= 0) { - if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK) - len = 0; - else { - /* - * EOF or error, but can't even print - * error message. - */ - quit_pending = 1; - return; - } - } - /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */ - buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); - } -} - /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. @@ -1449,7 +1164,7 @@ client_process_output(fd_set *writeset) static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(void) { - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, active_state); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ @@ -1468,25 +1183,25 @@ client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void -client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx) +client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int -client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len) +client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; - return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, + return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended, buf, len); } static void -client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg) +client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { - channel_cancel_cleanup(id); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } @@ -1497,9 +1212,9 @@ client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg) * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ - int -client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) +client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, + int ssh2_chan_id) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; double start_time, total_time; @@ -1537,40 +1252,22 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) } else { debug("pledge: network"); - if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns tty", NULL) == -1) + if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } start_time = get_current_time(); /* Initialize variables. */ - escape_pending1 = 0; last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; - stdin_eof = 0; - buffer_high = 64 * 1024; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out); - if (!compat20) { - /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ - if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) - set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); - if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) - set_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); - if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) - set_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); - max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, fileno(stdin)); - max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, fileno(stdout)); - max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, fileno(stderr)); - } quit_pending = 0; - escape_char1 = escape_char_arg; /* Initialize buffers. */ - buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); - buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); client_init_dispatch(); @@ -1592,22 +1289,17 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); - if (compat20) { - session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; - if (session_ident != -1) { - if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { - channel_register_filter(session_ident, - client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, - client_filter_cleanup, - client_new_escape_filter_ctx( - escape_char_arg)); - } - channel_register_cleanup(session_ident, - client_channel_closed, 0); + session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; + if (session_ident != -1) { + if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { + channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident, + client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, + client_filter_cleanup, + client_new_escape_filter_ctx( + escape_char_arg)); } - } else { - /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */ - client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident, + client_channel_closed, 0); } /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ @@ -1616,38 +1308,31 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(); - if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open()) + if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh)) break; - if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) { + if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { debug("rekeying in progress"); } else if (need_rekeying) { /* manual rekey request */ debug("need rekeying"); - if ((r = kex_start_rekex(active_state)) != 0) + if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); need_rekeying = 0; } else { - /* - * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer - * them for sending to the server. - */ - if (!compat20) - client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(); - /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) - channel_output_poll(); + channel_output_poll(ssh); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ - client_check_window_change(); + client_check_window_change(ssh); if (quit_pending) break; @@ -1657,15 +1342,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) * available on one of the descriptors). */ max_fd2 = max_fd; - client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, - &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)); + client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset, + &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ - if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) - channel_after_select(readset, writeset); + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(readset); @@ -1673,16 +1358,6 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) if (quit_pending) break; - if (!compat20) { - /* Buffer data from stdin */ - client_process_input(readset); - /* - * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to - * the connection is processed elsewhere (above). - */ - client_process_output(writeset); - } - /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. @@ -1710,16 +1385,14 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) /* Stop watching for window change. */ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); - if (compat20) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); - packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION); - packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user"); - packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */ - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - } + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); + packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION); + packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user"); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */ + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); - channel_free_all(); + channel_free_all(ssh); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); @@ -1742,8 +1415,10 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) exit_status = 0; } - if (received_signal) - fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); + if (received_signal) { + verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); + cleanup_exit(0); + } /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating @@ -1755,16 +1430,6 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } - /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */ - if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { - len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), - buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); - if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)) - error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer."); - else - buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); - } - /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), @@ -1777,8 +1442,6 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) /* Clear and free any buffers. */ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); - buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ @@ -1796,95 +1459,9 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) /*********/ -static int -client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - u_int data_len; - char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); - packet_check_eom(); - buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len); - explicit_bzero(data, data_len); - free(data); - return 0; -} -static int -client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - u_int data_len; - char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); - packet_check_eom(); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len); - explicit_bzero(data, data_len); - free(data); - return 0; -} -static int -client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - exit_status = packet_get_int(); - packet_check_eom(); - /* Acknowledge the exit. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); - packet_send(); - /* - * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are - * exiting the loop. - */ - packet_write_wait(); - /* Flag that we want to exit. */ - quit_pending = 1; - return 0; -} - -static int -client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) -{ - Channel *c = NULL; - int r, remote_id, sock; - - /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */ - remote_id = packet_get_int(); - packet_check_eom(); - - /* - * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again - * get forwarded). - */ - if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0 && - r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) - debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - - - /* - * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to - * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies, - * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an - * agent. - */ - if (sock >= 0) { - c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, - -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); - c->remote_id = remote_id; - c->force_drain = 1; - } - if (c == NULL) { - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); - packet_put_int(remote_id); - } else { - /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ - debug("Forwarding authentication connection."); - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); - packet_put_int(remote_id); - packet_put_int(c->self); - } - packet_send(); - return 0; -} - static Channel * -client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan, - u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack) +client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, + int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack) { Channel *c = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; @@ -1902,7 +1479,7 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan, debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__, listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); - c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_address, listen_port, + c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh, listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { @@ -1921,7 +1498,7 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan, (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(&c->output, b)) != 0) { + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) { error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; @@ -1936,7 +1513,8 @@ client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan, } static Channel * -client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan) +client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_path; @@ -1950,14 +1528,14 @@ client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan) debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path); - c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(listen_path, + c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); free(listen_path); return c; } static Channel * -client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) +client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; @@ -1987,10 +1565,10 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator, originator_port); free(originator); - sock = x11_connect_display(); + sock = x11_connect_display(ssh); if (sock < 0) return NULL; - c = channel_new("x11", + c = channel_new(ssh, "x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; @@ -1998,7 +1576,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) } static Channel * -client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) +client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, sock; @@ -2015,7 +1593,7 @@ client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } - c = channel_new("authentication agent connection", + c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); @@ -2024,7 +1602,8 @@ client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) } int -client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) +client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode, + int local_tun, int remote_tun) { Channel *c; int fd; @@ -2032,11 +1611,6 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; - if (!compat20) { - error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1"); - return -1; - } - debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ @@ -2045,13 +1619,13 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) return -1; } - c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, + c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) - channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, + channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif @@ -2069,7 +1643,7 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static int -client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; @@ -2085,20 +1659,21 @@ client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { - c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan, rwindow, + c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { - c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ctype, rchan); + c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { - c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan); + c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { - c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan); + c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan); } if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype); } else if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; + c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { @@ -2125,15 +1700,15 @@ client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int -client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; int exitval, id, reply, success = 0; char *rtype; id = packet_get_int(); - c = channel_lookup(id); - if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ctxt)) + c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) return 0; rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); reply = packet_get_char(); @@ -2148,11 +1723,11 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { packet_check_eom(); - chan_rcvd_eow(c); + chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { exitval = packet_get_int(); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { - mux_exit_message(c, exitval); + mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval); success = 1; } else if (id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ @@ -2166,6 +1741,9 @@ client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) packet_check_eom(); } if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); @@ -2187,9 +1765,7 @@ struct hostkeys_update_ctx { */ struct sshkey **keys; int *keys_seen; - size_t nkeys; - - size_t nnew; + size_t nkeys, nnew; /* * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update @@ -2226,8 +1802,7 @@ hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) size_t i; struct sshkey **tmp; - if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL || - l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) + if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL) return 0; /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ @@ -2242,9 +1817,9 @@ hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); - if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold + 1, + if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1, sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) - fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nold = %zu", + fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu", __func__, ctx->nold); ctx->old_keys = tmp; ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; @@ -2323,9 +1898,9 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) } static void -client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) +client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i, ndone; struct sshbuf *signdata; @@ -2476,9 +2051,9 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void) } } /* Key is good, record it */ - if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys + 1, + if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) - fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", + fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", __func__, ctx->nkeys); ctx->keys = tmp; ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; @@ -2566,7 +2141,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void) } static int -client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype; int want_reply; @@ -2589,7 +2164,7 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } void -client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, +client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env) { int len; @@ -2597,8 +2172,8 @@ client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id); - if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) - fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id); + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id); packet_set_interactive(want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); @@ -2610,8 +2185,8 @@ client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); - channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1); - client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : ""); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); @@ -2654,7 +2229,7 @@ client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, } debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val); - channel_request_start(id, "env", 0); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); packet_put_cstring(name); packet_put_cstring(val); packet_send(); @@ -2669,25 +2244,26 @@ client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); - channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1); - client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem", + CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); - channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1); - client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd)); packet_send(); } else { - channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1); - client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); packet_send(); } } static void -client_init_dispatch_20(void) +client_init_dispatch(void) { dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); @@ -2712,45 +2288,6 @@ client_init_dispatch_20(void) dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } -static void -client_init_dispatch_13(void) -{ - dispatch_init(NULL); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); - dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status); - dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data); - dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data); - - dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ? - &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open); - dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ? - &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open); -} - -static void -client_init_dispatch_15(void) -{ - client_init_dispatch_13(); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); - dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose); -} - -static void -client_init_dispatch(void) -{ - if (compat20) - client_init_dispatch_20(); - else if (compat13) - client_init_dispatch_13(); - else - client_init_dispatch_15(); -} - void client_stop_mux(void) { diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h index ae83aa8cf427..a1975ccc8a16 100644 --- a/clientloop.h +++ b/clientloop.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.33 2016/09/30 09:19:13 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.34 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -37,28 +37,31 @@ #include +struct ssh; + /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ -int client_loop(int, int, int); -int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, - char **, char **); +int client_loop(struct ssh *, int, int, int); +int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, + u_int, u_int, char **, char **); void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *); -void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *, - int, Buffer *, char **); -int client_request_tun_fwd(int, int, int); +void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *, int, int, int, + const char *, struct termios *, int, Buffer *, char **); +int client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *, int, int, int); void client_stop_mux(void); /* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */ void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int); -void client_filter_cleanup(int, void *); -int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *, char *, int); +void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, void *); +int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *, Channel *, char *, int); /* Global request confirmation callbacks */ -typedef void global_confirm_cb(int, u_int32_t seq, void *); +typedef void global_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, u_int32_t, void *); void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *); /* Channel request confirmation callbacks */ enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY }; -void client_expect_confirm(int, const char *, enum confirm_action); +void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *, int, const char *, + enum confirm_action); /* Multiplexing protocol version */ #define SSHMUX_VER 4 @@ -73,8 +76,8 @@ void client_expect_confirm(int, const char *, enum confirm_action); #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */ #define SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY 8 /* Open new connection */ -void muxserver_listen(void); +void muxserver_listen(struct ssh *); int muxclient(const char *); -void mux_exit_message(Channel *, int); -void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *); +void mux_exit_message(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); +void mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *); diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c index 1e80cfa9a73a..d82135e2b5e0 100644 --- a/compat.c +++ b/compat.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.100 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.104 2017/07/25 09:22:25 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -39,24 +39,8 @@ #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" -int compat13 = 0; -int compat20 = 0; int datafellows = 0; -void -enable_compat20(void) -{ - if (compat20) - return; - debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0"); - compat20 = 1; -} -void -enable_compat13(void) -{ - debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3"); - compat13 = 1; -} /* datafellows bug compatibility */ u_int compat_datafellows(const char *version) @@ -193,9 +177,12 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, { "WinSCP_release_4*," "WinSCP_release_5.0*," - "WinSCP_release_5.1*," - "WinSCP_release_5.5*," - "WinSCP_release_5.6*," + "WinSCP_release_5.1," + "WinSCP_release_5.1.*," + "WinSCP_release_5.5," + "WinSCP_release_5.5.*," + "WinSCP_release_5.6," + "WinSCP_release_5.6.*," "WinSCP_release_5.7," "WinSCP_release_5.7.1," "WinSCP_release_5.7.2," @@ -232,13 +219,6 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec) return ret; for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { switch (atoi(p)) { - case 1: -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) - ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED; - ret |= SSH_PROTO_1; -#endif - break; case 2: ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; break; diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h index 2be290a8a8fe..2e7830f1bc8c 100644 --- a/compat.h +++ b/compat.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.48 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.49 2017/04/30 23:13:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -63,15 +63,11 @@ #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 -void enable_compat13(void); -void enable_compat20(void); u_int compat_datafellows(const char *); int proto_spec(const char *); char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); -extern int compat13; -extern int compat20; extern int datafellows; #endif diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in index b65420e4a9dc..63fc548b5843 100644 --- a/config.h.in +++ b/config.h.in @@ -252,6 +252,9 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H +/* calloc(x, 0) returns NULL */ +#undef HAVE_CALLOC + /* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */ #undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT @@ -469,6 +472,9 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +/* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEZERO + /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */ #undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T @@ -769,6 +775,10 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H +/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and + to 0 otherwise. */ +#undef HAVE_MALLOC + /* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */ #undef HAVE_MBLEN @@ -899,12 +909,19 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H +/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function, + and to 0 otherwise. */ +#undef HAVE_REALLOC + /* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */ #undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */ #undef HAVE_REALPATH +/* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY + /* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */ #undef HAVE_RECVMSG @@ -1115,6 +1132,9 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRSEP +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSIGNAL + /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOLL @@ -1157,6 +1177,12 @@ /* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE +/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM + +/* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME + /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC @@ -1181,8 +1207,8 @@ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H -/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ -#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H @@ -1719,9 +1745,6 @@ /* Define if you want SELinux support. */ #undef WITH_SELINUX -/* include SSH protocol version 1 support */ -#undef WITH_SSH1 - /* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */ #if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD @@ -1760,11 +1783,20 @@ /* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */ #undef __res_state +/* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */ +#undef calloc + /* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */ #ifndef __cplusplus #undef inline #endif +/* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */ +#undef malloc + +/* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */ +#undef realloc + /* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */ #undef socklen_t diff --git a/configure b/configure index 5eaaa392f099..b2c2c3b91745 100755 --- a/configure +++ b/configure @@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ ac_includes_default="\ #endif" ac_subst_vars='LTLIBOBJS -LIBOBJS UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS TEST_SSH_UTF8 @@ -648,7 +647,7 @@ TEST_SSH_ECC LIBEDIT PKGCONFIG LDNSCONFIG -COMMENT_OUT_RSA1 +LIBOBJS LD PATH_PASSWD_PROG STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL @@ -735,13 +734,14 @@ ac_user_opts=' enable_option_checking enable_largefile with_openssl -with_ssh1 with_stackprotect with_hardening with_rpath with_cflags +with_cflags_after with_cppflags with_ldflags +with_ldflags_after with_libs with_Werror with_solaris_contracts @@ -1430,13 +1430,14 @@ Optional Packages: --with-PACKAGE[=ARG] use PACKAGE [ARG=yes] --without-PACKAGE do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no) --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** - --with-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1 --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler + --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker + --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental) @@ -5634,14 +5635,11 @@ fi openssl=yes -ssh1=no -COMMENT_OUT_RSA1="#no ssh1#" # Check whether --with-openssl was given. if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_openssl; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no - ssh1=no fi @@ -5657,41 +5655,6 @@ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define WITH_OPENSSL 1 _ACEOF -else - { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 -$as_echo "no" >&6; } -fi - - -# Check whether --with-ssh1 was given. -if test "${with_ssh1+set}" = set; then : - withval=$with_ssh1; - if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then - if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then - as_fn_error $? "Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5 - fi - ssh1=yes - COMMENT_OUT_RSA1="" - elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then - ssh1=no - else - as_fn_error $? "unknown --with-ssh1 argument" "$LINENO" 5 - fi - - -fi - -{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled" >&5 -$as_echo_n "checking whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled... " >&6; } -if test "x$ssh1" = "xyes" ; then - { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 -$as_echo "yes" >&6; } - -cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF -#define WITH_SSH1 1 -_ACEOF - - else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } @@ -5742,6 +5705,49 @@ rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -pipe" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pipe" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null` +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; } @@ -6215,6 +6221,7 @@ $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } + if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... " >&6; } @@ -6258,7 +6265,6 @@ $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } - if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... " >&6; } @@ -6620,6 +6626,19 @@ if test "${with_cflags+set}" = set; then : fi + +# Check whether --with-cflags-after was given. +if test "${with_cflags_after+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_cflags_after; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + + +fi + + # Check whether --with-cppflags was given. if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_cppflags; @@ -6644,6 +6663,18 @@ if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then : fi +# Check whether --with-ldflags-after was given. +if test "${with_ldflags_after+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ldflags_after; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + + +fi + + # Check whether --with-libs was given. if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_libs; @@ -6712,7 +6743,6 @@ for ac_header in \ sys/audit.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ - sys/capability.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/mman.h \ @@ -6756,6 +6786,25 @@ fi done +# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h +for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris for ac_header in lastlog.h do : @@ -8208,6 +8257,8 @@ $as_echo "#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x @@ -9631,6 +9682,8 @@ if test "$ac_res" != no; then : fi +# "Particular Function Checks" +# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html for ac_func in strftime do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime" @@ -9686,6 +9739,149 @@ fi fi done +for ac_header in stdlib.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible malloc" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible malloc... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H +# include +#else +char *malloc (); +#endif + +int +main () +{ +return ! malloc (0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=yes +else + ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&6; } +if test $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull = yes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + $as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h + + case " $LIBOBJS " in + *" malloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;; + *) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS malloc.$ac_objext" + ;; +esac + + +$as_echo "#define malloc rpl_malloc" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +for ac_header in stdlib.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible realloc" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible realloc... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H +# include +#else +char *realloc (); +#endif + +int +main () +{ +return ! realloc (0, 0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=yes +else + ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&6; } +if test $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull = yes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + $as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h + + case " $LIBOBJS " in + *" realloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;; + *) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS realloc.$ac_objext" + ;; +esac + + +$as_echo "#define realloc rpl_realloc" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL; +if test "x$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" != "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define calloc rpl_calloc" >>confdefs.h + +fi # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5 @@ -10068,6 +10264,7 @@ fi else LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" + ldns=yes fi elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" @@ -10647,6 +10844,7 @@ for ac_func in \ fchmod \ fchown \ freeaddrinfo \ + freezero \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ @@ -10655,6 +10853,7 @@ for ac_func in \ getgrouplist \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ + getpagesize \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ @@ -10685,6 +10884,7 @@ for ac_func in \ readpassphrase \ reallocarray \ recvmsg \ + recallocarray \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ @@ -10718,6 +10918,7 @@ for ac_func in \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ + strsignal \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ @@ -12484,7 +12685,11 @@ if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : 10000*|0*) as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5 ;; - *) ;; + 100*) ;; # 1.0.x + 200*) ;; # LibreSSL + *) + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.1.0 is not yet supported (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; esac { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5 $as_echo "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; } @@ -13053,9 +13258,6 @@ $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; } #include #include #include - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ - # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" - #endif int main () @@ -13091,9 +13293,6 @@ $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; } #include #include #include - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ - # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" - #endif int main () @@ -13129,9 +13328,6 @@ $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; } #include #include #include - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ - # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" - #endif int main () @@ -13858,6 +14054,7 @@ $as_echo_n "checking if select works with descriptor rlimit... " >&6; } if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + select_works_with_rlimit=yes else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext @@ -13918,6 +14115,7 @@ $as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... " >&6; } if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext @@ -14052,10 +14250,10 @@ $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ - test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then - test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \ - as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header" "$LINENO" 5 + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" @@ -16185,6 +16383,26 @@ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF _ACEOF +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtim" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtime" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1 +_ACEOF + + fi ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_gecos" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" " @@ -19055,6 +19273,9 @@ TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms +CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}" +LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}" + ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh" diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index c2878e3d4415..889f506377c0 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -109,13 +109,10 @@ AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ ]) openssl=yes -ssh1=no -COMMENT_OUT_RSA1="#no ssh1#" AC_ARG_WITH([openssl], [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no - ssh1=no fi ] ) @@ -127,31 +124,6 @@ else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi -AC_ARG_WITH([ssh1], - [ --with-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1], - [ - if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then - if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled]) - fi - ssh1=yes - COMMENT_OUT_RSA1="" - elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then - ssh1=no - else - AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown --with-ssh1 argument]) - fi - ] -) -AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled]) -if test "x$ssh1" = "xyes" ; then - AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) - AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_SSH1], [1], [include SSH protocol version 1 support]) - AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_RSA1]) -else - AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) -fi - use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], @@ -179,6 +151,7 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) @@ -190,8 +163,8 @@ if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) - OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) @@ -316,6 +289,16 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], fi ] ) + +AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after], + [ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + ] +) AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , [ @@ -334,6 +317,15 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], fi ] ) +AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after], + [ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + ] +) AC_ARG_WITH([libs], [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], [ @@ -397,7 +389,6 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ sys/audit.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ - sys/capability.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/mman.h \ @@ -429,6 +420,13 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ wchar.h \ ]) +# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +]) + # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H @@ -1007,6 +1005,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x @@ -1332,7 +1331,17 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl]) +# "Particular Function Checks" +# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html AC_FUNC_STRFTIME +AC_FUNC_MALLOC +AC_FUNC_REALLOC +# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL; +if test "x$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" != "xyes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(x, 0) returns NULL]) + AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc, + [Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.]) +fi # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) @@ -1486,6 +1495,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, else LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" + ldns=yes fi elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" @@ -1696,6 +1706,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ fchmod \ fchown \ freeaddrinfo \ + freezero \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ @@ -1704,6 +1715,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ getgrouplist \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ + getpagesize \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ @@ -1734,6 +1746,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ readpassphrase \ reallocarray \ recvmsg \ + recallocarray \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ @@ -1767,6 +1780,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ + strsignal \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ @@ -2535,7 +2549,11 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then 10000*|0*) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; - *) ;; + 100*) ;; # 1.0.x + 200*) ;; # LibreSSL + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.1.0 is not yet supported (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) + ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) ], @@ -2768,9 +2786,6 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then #include #include #include - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ - # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" - #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ @@ -2789,9 +2804,6 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then #include #include #include - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ - # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" - #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ @@ -2810,9 +2822,6 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then #include #include #include - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ - # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" - #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ @@ -3197,7 +3206,8 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE( select_works_with_rlimit=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) select_works_with_rlimit=no], - [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) + select_works_with_rlimit=yes] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) @@ -3223,7 +3233,8 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE( rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], - [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) @@ -3286,10 +3297,10 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ - test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then - test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \ - AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header]) + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header]) test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" @@ -3845,6 +3856,8 @@ OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim]) +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], [], [], [[ @@ -5044,6 +5057,9 @@ AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8]) AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) +CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}" +LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}" + AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ diff --git a/contrib/aix/README b/contrib/aix/README index 2a299350abb0..4a11ae7038f9 100644 --- a/contrib/aix/README +++ b/contrib/aix/README @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The script treats all packages as USR packages (not ROOT+USR when appropriate). It seems to work, though...... If there are any patches to this that have not yet been integrated they -may be found at http://www.zip.com.au/~dtucker/openssh/. +may be found at http://www.dtucker.net/openssh/. Disclaimer: diff --git a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec index 7de45457a742..a96a36e492d6 100644 --- a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec +++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -%define ver 7.5p1 +%define ver 7.6p1 %define rel 1 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id index bef5c95d9061..b83b83619896 100644 --- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id +++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/bin/sh -# Copyright (c) 1999-2013 Philip Hands +# Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Philip Hands # 2013 Martin Kletzander # 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= # 2010 Eric Moret @@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ then fi fi -DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="$HOME/$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)" +most_recent_id="$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)" +DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="${most_recent_id:+$HOME/}$most_recent_id" usage () { printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o ] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2 @@ -74,6 +75,11 @@ quote() { use_id_file() { local L_ID_FILE="$1" + if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then + printf "%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n" "$0" + exit 1 + fi + if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE" else @@ -287,9 +293,10 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in *) # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect populate_new_ids 0 - # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX; 'cd' to be at $HOME; and all on one line, because tcsh. + # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX; + # 'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh. [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \ - ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \ + ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \ || exit 1 ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l) ;; diff --git a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec index e62be39d0aac..fdb3578cbd4e 100644 --- a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec +++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 7.5p1 +Version: 7.6p1 URL: https://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz diff --git a/deattack.c b/deattack.c deleted file mode 100644 index e76481a6d08e..000000000000 --- a/deattack.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,165 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.32 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ -/* - * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code - * - * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. - * - * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary - * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that - * this copyright notice is retained. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE - * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE. - * - * Ariel Futoransky - * - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "deattack.h" -#include "crc32.h" -#include "sshbuf.h" -#include "misc.h" - -/* - * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over - * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be - * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack. - * - * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical - * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so. - * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks - * in a packet. - * - * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will - * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and - * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32 - * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is - * misdetected - */ -#define MAX_IDENTICAL 32 - -/* SSH Constants */ -#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024) -#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8) - -/* Hashing constants */ -#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024) -#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2) -#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2) -#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff) -#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff) -#define HASH_IV (0xfffe) - -#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE) - - -/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */ -#define HASH(x) PEEK_U32(x) - -#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) - -static void -crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b) -{ - b ^= *a; - *a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b)); -} - -/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */ -static int -check_crc(const u_char *S, const u_char *buf, u_int32_t len) -{ - u_int32_t crc; - const u_char *c; - - crc = 0; - for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { - if (!CMP(S, c)) { - crc_update(&crc, 1); - crc_update(&crc, 0); - } else { - crc_update(&crc, 0); - crc_update(&crc, 0); - } - } - return crc == 0; -} - -void -deattack_init(struct deattack_ctx *dctx) -{ - bzero(dctx, sizeof(*dctx)); - dctx->n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE; -} - -/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */ -int -detect_attack(struct deattack_ctx *dctx, const u_char *buf, u_int32_t len) -{ - u_int32_t i, j, l, same; - u_int16_t *tmp; - const u_char *c, *d; - - if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) || - len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) - return DEATTACK_ERROR; - for (l = dctx->n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2) - ; - - if (dctx->h == NULL) { - if ((dctx->h = calloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE)) == NULL) - return DEATTACK_ERROR; - dctx->n = l; - } else { - if (l > dctx->n) { - if ((tmp = reallocarray(dctx->h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE)) - == NULL) { - free(dctx->h); - dctx->h = NULL; - return DEATTACK_ERROR; - } - dctx->h = tmp; - dctx->n = l; - } - } - - if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) { - for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { - for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { - if (!CMP(c, d)) { - if ((check_crc(c, buf, len))) - return DEATTACK_DETECTED; - else - break; - } - } - } - return DEATTACK_OK; - } - memset(dctx->h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, dctx->n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE); - - for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) { - for (i = HASH(c) & (dctx->n - 1); dctx->h[i] != HASH_UNUSED; - i = (i + 1) & (dctx->n - 1)) { - if (!CMP(c, buf + dctx->h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) { - if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL) - return DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED; - if (check_crc(c, buf, len)) - return DEATTACK_DETECTED; - else - break; - } - } - dctx->h[i] = j; - } - return DEATTACK_OK; -} diff --git a/deattack.h b/deattack.h deleted file mode 100644 index ce67a30ffdd3..000000000000 --- a/deattack.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.11 2015/01/19 19:52:16 markus Exp $ */ - -/* - * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file - * - * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. - * - * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary - * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that - * this copyright notice is retained. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE - * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR - * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE. - * - * Ariel Futoransky - * - */ - -#ifndef _DEATTACK_H -#define _DEATTACK_H - -/* Return codes */ -#define DEATTACK_OK 0 -#define DEATTACK_DETECTED 1 -#define DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED 2 -#define DEATTACK_ERROR 3 - -struct deattack_ctx { - u_int16_t *h; - u_int32_t n; -}; - -void deattack_init(struct deattack_ctx *); -int detect_attack(struct deattack_ctx *, const u_char *, u_int32_t); -#endif diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h index c89f85a8d9c0..f1662edcfea0 100644 --- a/defines.h +++ b/defines.h @@ -328,6 +328,28 @@ typedef unsigned int size_t; #define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX #endif +#ifndef INT32_MAX +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) +# define INT32_MAX INT_MAX +# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4) +# define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX +# else +# error "need INT32_MAX" +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef INT64_MAX +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 8) +# define INT64_MAX INT_MAX +# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8) +# define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX +# elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +# define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX +# else +# error "need INT64_MAX" +# endif +#endif + #ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T typedef int ssize_t; # define HAVE_SSIZE_T @@ -497,6 +519,13 @@ struct winsize { } #endif +#ifndef timespeccmp +#define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp) \ + (((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ? \ + ((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) : \ + ((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec)) +#endif + #ifndef __P # define __P(x) x #endif diff --git a/digest-libc.c b/digest-libc.c index 40db00274d74..c2b0b2403d11 100644 --- a/digest-libc.c +++ b/digest-libc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.5 2015/05/05 02:48:17 jsg Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.6 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -68,16 +68,6 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = { (md_update_fn *) MD5Update, (md_final_fn *) MD5Final }, - { - SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, - "RIPEMD160", - RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH, - RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, - sizeof(RMD160_CTX), - (md_init_fn *) RMD160Init, - (md_update_fn *) RMD160Update, - (md_final_fn *) RMD160Final - }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c index c55ceb93f9d4..2770999295ea 100644 --- a/digest-openssl.c +++ b/digest-openssl.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.6 2017/03/10 02:59:51 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.7 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * @@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ struct ssh_digest { /* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = { { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 }, - { SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", 20, EVP_ripemd160 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 }, diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h index 3fe07346852b..274574d0e544 100644 --- a/digest.h +++ b/digest.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.7 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.8 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * @@ -23,12 +23,11 @@ /* Digest algorithms */ #define SSH_DIGEST_MD5 0 -#define SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160 1 -#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 2 -#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 3 -#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 4 -#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 5 -#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 6 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 1 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 2 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 3 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 4 +#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 5 struct sshbuf; struct ssh_digest_ctx; diff --git a/dispatch.c b/dispatch.c index aac933e0a501..0b3ea614e150 100644 --- a/dispatch.c +++ b/dispatch.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.27 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.31 2017/05/31 07:00:13 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ #include #include -#include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "log.h" #include "dispatch.h" @@ -39,14 +38,11 @@ #include "ssherr.h" int -dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctx) +dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ int r; logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); - if (!compat20) - fatal("protocol error"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || @@ -56,7 +52,7 @@ dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctx) } int -dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ssh) +dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq); return 0; @@ -89,8 +85,7 @@ ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn) } int -ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, - void *ctxt) +ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) { int r; u_char type; @@ -115,8 +110,7 @@ ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--; continue; } - /* XXX 'ssh' will replace 'ctxt' later */ - r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt); + r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh); if (r != 0) return r; } else { @@ -132,11 +126,10 @@ ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, } void -ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, - void *ctxt) +ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) { int r; - if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) + if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); } diff --git a/dispatch.h b/dispatch.h index cd51dbc0b666..17a6f3db6338 100644 --- a/dispatch.h +++ b/dispatch.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.14 2017/05/31 07:00:13 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ enum { struct ssh; -typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, void *); +typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -int dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *); void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *); void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *); -int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *); -void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *); +int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *); +void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *); #define dispatch_init(dflt) \ ssh_dispatch_init(active_state, (dflt)) @@ -52,7 +52,5 @@ void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *, void *); ssh_dispatch_range(active_state, (from), (to), (fn)) #define dispatch_set(type, fn) \ ssh_dispatch_set(active_state, (type), (fn)) -#define dispatch_run(mode, done, ctxt) \ - ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, (mode), (done), (ctxt)) #endif diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c index e813afeae690..6e1abb5300cd 100644 --- a/dns.c +++ b/dns.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.35 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.37 2017/09/14 04:32:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. diff --git a/dns.h b/dns.h index 30e2b19b3d94..68443f7cbbb8 100644 --- a/dns.h +++ b/dns.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.15 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.17 2017/09/14 04:32:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c index 53993d674cfb..6cae720e5d9b 100644 --- a/gss-serv.c +++ b/gss-serv.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.30 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. @@ -393,4 +393,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) return (ctx->major); } +/* Privileged */ +const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void) +{ + if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 || + gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL) + return NULL; + return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value; +} + #endif diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c index e23faa9696af..12f174ff97b1 100644 --- a/hostfile.c +++ b/hostfile.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.68 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.71 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); - if ((tmp = reallocarray(hostkeys->entries, + if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries, hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; hostkeys->entries = tmp; @@ -346,16 +346,11 @@ check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW; int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE; - int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { - if (proto == 1 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != KEY_RSA1) - continue; - if (proto == 2 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type == KEY_RSA1) - continue; if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker) continue; if (k == NULL) { @@ -490,13 +485,6 @@ host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) return 0; } - /* XXX might need a knob for this later */ - /* Don't remove RSA1 keys */ - if (l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { - fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); - return 0; - } - /* * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for @@ -789,20 +777,7 @@ hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, break; } if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); - lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1); - if (lineinfo.key == NULL) { - error("%s: sshkey_new fail", __func__); - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - break; - } - if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, - lineinfo.key)) - goto bad; -#else goto bad; -#endif } lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type; lineinfo.comment = cp; @@ -817,12 +792,12 @@ hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); /* - * Assume RSA1 if the first component is a short + * Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short * decimal number. */ if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 && strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l) - lineinfo.keytype = KEY_RSA1; + goto bad; /* * Check that something other than whitespace follows diff --git a/includes.h b/includes.h index 497a038b2373..0fd71792e1ac 100644 --- a/includes.h +++ b/includes.h @@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H # include /* For MIN, MAX, etc */ #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include /* for timespeccmp if present */ +#endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H #include /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */ #endif diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index cf4ac0dc574d..d5d5a9dae996 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.131 2017/03/15 07:07:39 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.134 2017/06/13 12:13:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -54,17 +54,9 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L -# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) -# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 -# else -extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); -# endif -#endif - /* prototype */ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); -static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { "KEX algorithms", @@ -323,9 +315,8 @@ kex_prop_free(char **proposal) /* ARGSUSED */ static int -kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ int r; error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); @@ -383,12 +374,13 @@ kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh) } int -kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_int32_t i, ninfo; - char *name, *val, *found; + char *name, *found; + u_char *val; + size_t vlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received"); @@ -398,12 +390,17 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) return r; - if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) { free(name); return r; } - debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val); if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) { + /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */ + if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) { + error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val); found = match_list("rsa-sha2-256", val, NULL); if (found) { kex->rsa_sha2 = 256; @@ -414,7 +411,8 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) kex->rsa_sha2 = 512; free(found); } - } + } else + debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name); free(name); free(val); } @@ -422,9 +420,8 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int -kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; @@ -475,9 +472,8 @@ kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh) /* ARGSUSED */ int -kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; const u_char *ptr; u_int i; @@ -988,47 +984,6 @@ kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, } #endif -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -int -derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus, - u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16]) -{ - u_int8_t hbuf[2048], sbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; - size_t hlen, slen; - int r; - - hlen = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus); - slen = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus); - if (hlen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)hlen > sizeof(hbuf) || - slen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)slen > sizeof(sbuf)) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; - if (BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, hbuf) <= 0 || - BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, sbuf) <= 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hbuf, hlen) != 0 || - ssh_digest_update(hashctx, sbuf, slen) != 0 || - ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0 || - ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)); - r = 0; - out: - ssh_digest_free(hashctx); - explicit_bzero(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)); - explicit_bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); - explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf)); - return r; -} -#endif #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h index 3794f21278c6..01bb3986abfa 100644 --- a/kex.h +++ b/kex.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.81 2016/09/28 21:44:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.83 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_prop_free(char **); int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *); -int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *); int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *); int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *); @@ -225,9 +225,6 @@ int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); -int -derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]); - #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int); #endif diff --git a/kexc25519c.c b/kexc25519c.c index b7ef65dc31ae..e488013e93cd 100644 --- a/kexc25519c.c +++ b/kexc25519c.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.7 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.8 2017/05/31 04:17:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" static int -input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt); +input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -69,9 +69,8 @@ kexc25519_client(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; diff --git a/kexc25519s.c b/kexc25519s.c index 4e77622b0b2f..0a008d44746f 100644 --- a/kexc25519s.c +++ b/kexc25519s.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" -static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -52,9 +52,8 @@ kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; diff --git a/kexdhc.c b/kexdhc.c index ad3975f09ee7..9864ee2ec92e 100644 --- a/kexdhc.c +++ b/kexdhc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.19 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.20 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -static int input_kex_dh(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_dh(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -100,9 +100,8 @@ kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; diff --git a/kexdhs.c b/kexdhs.c index 108f664278b0..81ce56d7a5ad 100644 --- a/kexdhs.c +++ b/kexdhs.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.24 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.25 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -91,9 +91,8 @@ kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) } int -input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c index 90220ce8205d..d8a8b660fd56 100644 --- a/kexecdhc.c +++ b/kexecdhc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.10 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.11 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -static int input_kex_ecdh_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_ecdh_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -95,9 +95,8 @@ kexecdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; const EC_GROUP *group; EC_POINT *server_public = NULL; diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c index ccdbf70b1cf6..dc24a3af609b 100644 --- a/kexecdhs.c +++ b/kexecdhs.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.15 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.16 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -58,9 +58,8 @@ kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; EC_POINT *client_public; EC_KEY *server_key = NULL; diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c index ad0d1c8c0ae1..cd11287525b6 100644 --- a/kexgexc.c +++ b/kexgexc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.23 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.25 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" -static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *); -static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -89,9 +89,8 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; int r, bits; @@ -143,9 +142,8 @@ out: } static int -input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; @@ -165,10 +163,6 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, &server_host_key)) != 0) goto out; - if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; - goto out; - } if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) { diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c index 449603592cc6..c5dd00578a33 100644 --- a/kexgexs.c +++ b/kexgexs.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.30 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.31 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" -static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); -static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -67,9 +67,8 @@ kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) } static int -input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; @@ -120,9 +119,8 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int -input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; diff --git a/key.c b/key.c index 93f4ccb24f45..6e338c495bbb 100644 --- a/key.c +++ b/key.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.130 2016/05/02 09:36:42 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.131 2017/05/30 14:16:41 markus Exp $ */ /* * placed in the public domain */ @@ -20,68 +20,6 @@ #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" -void -key_add_private(Key *k) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -} - -Key * -key_new_private(int type) -{ - Key *ret = NULL; - - if ((ret = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: failed", __func__); - return ret; -} - -int -key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) -{ - return sshkey_read(ret, cpp) == 0 ? 1 : -1; -} - -int -key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f) -{ - return sshkey_write(key, f) == 0 ? 1 : 0; -} - -Key * -key_generate(int type, u_int bits) -{ - int r; - Key *ret = NULL; - - if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return ret; -} - -void -key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, Key *to_key) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(from_key, to_key)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -} - -Key * -key_from_private(const Key *k) -{ - int r; - Key *ret = NULL; - - if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &ret)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return ret; -} - static void fatal_on_fatal_errors(int r, const char *func, int extra_fatal) { @@ -183,19 +121,6 @@ key_demote(const Key *k) return ret; } -int -key_to_certified(Key *k) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(k)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - int key_drop_cert(Key *k) { @@ -209,19 +134,6 @@ key_drop_cert(Key *k) return 0; } -int -key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_certify(k, ca, NULL)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal, const char *name, const char **reason) @@ -237,88 +149,8 @@ key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal, return 0; } -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) -int -key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, public)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} - -int -key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(key)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return -1; - } - return 0; -} -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - -void -key_private_serialize(const Key *key, struct sshbuf *b) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -} - -Key * -key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *blob) -{ - int r; - Key *ret = NULL; - - if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(blob, &ret)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return NULL; - } - return ret; -} - /* authfile.c */ -int -key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, - const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, - int new_format_rounds) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, filename, passphrase, comment, - force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -int -key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, blob)) != 0) { - fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); - error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - Key * key_load_cert(const char *filename) { @@ -417,10 +249,3 @@ key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, } return ret; } - -int -key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) -{ - return sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) == 0 ? 1 : 0; -} - diff --git a/key.h b/key.h index 2e501a9f492f..a14f370376c0 100644 --- a/key.h +++ b/key.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.50 2016/09/12 23:31:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.51 2017/05/30 14:16:41 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -35,51 +35,24 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key; #define fp_rep sshkey_fp_rep #ifndef SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE -#define key_new sshkey_new #define key_free sshkey_free #define key_equal_public sshkey_equal_public #define key_equal sshkey_equal #define key_type sshkey_type -#define key_cert_type sshkey_cert_type #define key_ssh_name sshkey_ssh_name #define key_ssh_name_plain sshkey_ssh_name_plain #define key_type_from_name sshkey_type_from_name -#define key_ecdsa_nid_from_name sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name -#define key_type_is_cert sshkey_type_is_cert -#define key_size sshkey_size -#define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid -#define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain -#define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid -#define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits -#define key_curve_nid_to_name sshkey_curve_nid_to_name -#define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg -#define key_dump_ec_point sshkey_dump_ec_point -#define key_dump_ec_key sshkey_dump_ec_key #endif -void key_add_private(Key *); -Key *key_new_private(int); void key_free(Key *); Key *key_demote(const Key *); -int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); -int key_read(Key *, char **); -Key *key_generate(int, u_int); -Key *key_from_private(const Key *); -int key_to_certified(Key *); int key_drop_cert(Key *); -int key_certify(Key *, Key *); -void key_cert_copy(const Key *, Key *); int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *, const char **); -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) -int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); -int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); -#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ - Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int); int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *); @@ -87,18 +60,11 @@ int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *); int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); -void key_private_serialize(const Key *, struct sshbuf *); -Key *key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *); - /* authfile.c */ -int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *, - int, const char *, int); -int key_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *); Key *key_load_cert(const char *); Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **); Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **); Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *); Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *); -int key_perm_ok(int, const char *); #endif diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c index 3f28178b7b3c..086fc20e5933 100644 --- a/krl.c +++ b/krl.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.39 2017/03/10 07:18:32 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.40 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, } } /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ - tmp_ca_used = reallocarray(ca_used, nca_used + 1, + tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; diff --git a/log.c b/log.c index d0f86cf6fb40..99450dd125c8 100644 --- a/log.c +++ b/log.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.49 2017/03/10 03:15:58 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.50 2017/05/17 01:24:17 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -256,18 +256,7 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) argv0 = av0; - switch (level) { - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: - case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: - log_level = level; - break; - default: + if (log_change_level(level) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n", (int) level); exit(1); @@ -340,13 +329,27 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) #endif } -void +int log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level) { /* no-op if log_init has not been called */ if (argv0 == NULL) - return; - log_init(argv0, new_log_level, log_facility, log_on_stderr); + return 0; + + switch (new_log_level) { + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: + log_level = new_log_level; + return 0; + default: + return -1; + } } int diff --git a/log.h b/log.h index 434b7c81a97c..78221046c26a 100644 --- a/log.h +++ b/log.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.21 2016/07/15 05:01:58 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.22 2017/05/17 01:24:17 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ typedef enum { typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *); void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); -void log_change_level(LogLevel); +int log_change_level(LogLevel); int log_is_on_stderr(void); void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *); diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c index 5ba7fae19539..51dc11d76b92 100644 --- a/mac.c +++ b/mac.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.33 2016/07/08 03:44:42 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.34 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -64,10 +64,6 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { #endif { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 - { "hmac-ripemd160", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, - { "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, -#endif { "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 }, { "umac-128@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 }, @@ -80,9 +76,6 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = { #endif { "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 - { "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, -#endif { "umac-64-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 }, { "umac-128-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 }, diff --git a/md-sha256.c b/md-sha256.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8c1b3b92da9b..000000000000 --- a/md-sha256.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: md-sha256.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ -/* - * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -/* EVP wrapper for SHA256 */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include -#include - -#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) - -#include -#include -#ifdef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE -# ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H -# include -# elif defined(HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H) -# include -# endif -#endif - -const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); - -static int -ssh_sha256_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt) -{ - SHA256_Init(ctxt->md_data); - return (1); -} - -static int -ssh_sha256_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, const void *data, unsigned long len) -{ - SHA256_Update(ctxt->md_data, data, len); - return (1); -} - -static int -ssh_sha256_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, unsigned char *digest) -{ - SHA256_Final(digest, ctxt->md_data); - return (1); -} - -static int -ssh_sha256_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt) -{ - memset(ctxt->md_data, 0, sizeof(SHA256_CTX)); - return (1); -} - -const EVP_MD * -evp_ssh_sha256(void) -{ - static EVP_MD ssh_sha256; - - memset(&ssh_sha256, 0, sizeof(ssh_sha256)); - ssh_sha256.type = NID_undef; - ssh_sha256.md_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; - ssh_sha256.init = ssh_sha256_init; - ssh_sha256.update = ssh_sha256_update; - ssh_sha256.final = ssh_sha256_final; - ssh_sha256.cleanup = ssh_sha256_cleanup; - ssh_sha256.block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; - ssh_sha256.ctx_size = sizeof(SHA256_CTX); - - return (&ssh_sha256); -} - -#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) */ - diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c index cfd32729ac7a..05950a471246 100644 --- a/misc.c +++ b/misc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.109 2017/03/14 00:55:37 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.113 2017/08/18 05:48:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -29,10 +29,16 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include +#include #include #include +#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H +# include +#endif +#include #include #include #include @@ -61,6 +67,10 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "platform.h" /* remove newline at end of string */ char * @@ -539,7 +549,7 @@ addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; - args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); + args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; @@ -1085,6 +1095,7 @@ static const struct { const char *name; int value; } ipqos[] = { + { "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */ { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, @@ -1274,3 +1285,461 @@ daemonized(void) debug3("already daemonized"); return 1; } + + +/* + * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic + * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector + * and its members. + */ +int +argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int argc = 0, quote, i, j; + char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); + + *argvp = NULL; + *argcp = 0; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') + continue; + + /* Start of a token */ + quote = 0; + if (s[i] == '\\' && + (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) + i++; + else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') + quote = s[i++]; + + argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); + arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); + argv[argc] = NULL; + + /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ + for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (s[i] == '\\') { + if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || + s[i + 1] == '\"' || + s[i + 1] == '\\') { + i++; /* Skip '\' */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } else { + /* Unrecognised escape */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) + break; /* done */ + else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) + break; /* done */ + else + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + if (s[i] == '\0') { + if (quote != 0) { + /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + break; + } + } + /* Success */ + *argcp = argc; + *argvp = argv; + argc = 0; + argv = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + free(argv[i]); + free(argv); + } + return r; +} + +/* + * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as + * necessary. Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j, ws, r; + char c, *ret; + struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + ws = 0; + sshbuf_reset(arg); + for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { + r = 0; + c = argv[i][j]; + switch (c) { + case ' ': + case '\t': + ws = 1; + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + case '\\': + case '\'': + case '"': + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) + break; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + } + if (r != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); + memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(arg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Runs command in a subprocess wuth a minimal environment. + * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. + * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to + * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags. + * "tag" is prepended to log messages. + * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is + * av[0]. + */ +pid_t +subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, + int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + struct stat st; + int fd, devnull, p[2], i; + pid_t pid; + char *cp, errmsg[512]; + u_int envsize; + char **child_env; + + if (child != NULL) + *child = NULL; + + debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__, + tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags); + + /* Check consistency */ + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && + (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) { + error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__); + return 0; + } + if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) { + error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists + * and appears safe-ish to execute + */ + if (*av[0] != '/') { + error("%s path is not absolute", tag); + return 0; + } + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { + error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, + av[0], strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { + error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */ + if (pipe(p) != 0) { + error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + restore_uid(); + + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: /* error */ + error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + return 0; + case 0: /* child */ + /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ + envsize = 5; + child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); + if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); + + for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) + signal(i, SIG_DFL); + + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */ + fd = -1; + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) + fd = p[1]; + else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0) + fd = devnull; + if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ + if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && + dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + execve(av[0], av, child_env); + error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); + default: /* parent */ + break; + } + + close(p[1]); + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) + close(p[0]); + else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { + error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + /* Don't leave zombie child */ + kill(pid, SIGTERM); + while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + ; + return 0; + } + /* Success */ + debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); + if (child != NULL) + *child = f; + return pid; +} + +/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ +int +exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet) +{ + int status; + + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR) { + error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); + return -1; + } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + "%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components + * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of + * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. + * + * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? + * + * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to + * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an + * error buffer plus max size as arguments. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure + */ +int +safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, + uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; + char *cp; + int comparehome = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) + comparehome = 1; + + if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); + return -1; + } + if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || + (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", + buf); + return -1; + } + + /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ + for (;;) { + if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || + (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, + "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); + return -1; + } + + /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ + if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) + break; + + /* + * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, + * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too + */ + if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to + * avoid races. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure + */ +int +safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, + char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + struct stat st; + + /* check the open file to avoid races */ + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", + file, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); +} + +/* + * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable + * already exists, its value is overridden. + */ +void +child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, + const char *value) +{ + char **env; + u_int envsize; + u_int i, namelen; + + if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { + error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); + return; + } + + /* + * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null + * entry before continuing. + */ + if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { + *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); + *envp[0] = NULL; + *envsizep = 1; + } + + /* + * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable + * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot + * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. + */ + env = *envp; + namelen = strlen(name); + for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) + if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') + break; + if (env[i]) { + /* Reuse the slot. */ + free(env[i]); + } else { + /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ + envsize = *envsizep; + if (i >= envsize - 1) { + if (envsize >= 1000) + fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); + envsize += 50; + env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); + *envsizep = envsize; + } + /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ + env[i + 1] = NULL; + } + + /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ + env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); + snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); +} + diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h index c242f9011f59..153d11375bf5 100644 --- a/misc.h +++ b/misc.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.61 2016/11/30 00:28:31 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.63 2017/08/18 05:48:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #define _MISC_H #include +#include /* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ struct Forward { @@ -132,6 +133,25 @@ int parse_ipqos(const char *); const char *iptos2str(int); void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t); +void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, + const char *value); + +int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***); +char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv); +int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int); + +#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */ +#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */ +#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */ +pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *, + const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags); + +struct stat; +int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, + char *, size_t); +int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *, + char *err, size_t errlen); + /* readpass.c */ #define RP_ECHO 0x0001 diff --git a/moduli.0 b/moduli.0 index dd762af85576..e319015b28a7 100644 --- a/moduli.0 +++ b/moduli.0 @@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ STANDARDS the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006, 2006. -OpenBSD 6.0 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index 96d22b7e40e9..f517da482ce5 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.174 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl @@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) partial = 0; auth_method = "unknown"; auth_submethod = NULL; + auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); + authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ @@ -347,6 +349,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) auth_method, auth_submethod); if (!partial && !authenticated) authctxt->failures++; + if (authenticated || partial) { + auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, + auth_method, auth_submethod); + } } } @@ -754,10 +760,12 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \ } while (0) +#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC(x, nx) M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT +#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC /* Create valid auth method lists */ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { @@ -1119,7 +1127,7 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) int mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { - Key *key; + struct sshkey *key; char *cuser, *chost; u_char *blob; u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt; @@ -1147,12 +1155,11 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication && - !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) && + !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 && user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, pubkey_auth_attempt); - pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); auth_method = "publickey"; if (options.pubkey_authentication && (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1)) @@ -1160,11 +1167,12 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) break; case MM_HOSTKEY: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication && + !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 && hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); - pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); auth_method = "hostbased"; @@ -1175,11 +1183,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) } } - debug3("%s: key %p is %s", - __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); + debug3("%s: key is %s", __func__, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); - if (key != NULL) - key_free(key); + auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key); + sshkey_free(key); /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); @@ -1330,33 +1337,35 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, } int -mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) +mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) { - Key *key; + struct sshkey *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; - u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; - int verified = 0; - int valid_data = 0; + size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; + int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret; - blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); - signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); - data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); - key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); - if (key == NULL) - fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__); + /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */ + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0) + fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); + auth_method = "publickey"; break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); + auth_method = "hostbased"; break; default: valid_data = 0; @@ -1365,29 +1374,28 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); - verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); - debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", - __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); - - /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */ - if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY) - auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); - else - key_free(key); + ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, + active_state->compat); + debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key, + (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified"); + auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key); free(blob); free(signature); free(data); - auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased"; - monitor_reset_key_state(); - buffer_clear(m); - buffer_put_int(m, verified); + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */ + encoded_ret = (ret != 0); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); - return (verified == 1); + return ret == 0; } static void @@ -1513,13 +1521,14 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m) int mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); /* The child is terminating */ - session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close); + session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) @@ -1578,6 +1587,17 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +void +monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN); + ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); + sshbuf_free(child_state); + child_state = NULL; +} + void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { @@ -1639,9 +1659,18 @@ static void monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) { int pair[2]; +#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE + int on = 1; +#endif if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); +#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE + if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; @@ -1774,6 +1803,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) { int authenticated; + const char *displayname; if (!options.gss_authentication) fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); @@ -1788,6 +1818,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; + if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c index 64ff928850c9..69212aaf330b 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/monitor_wrap.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.89 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.94 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) #endif int -mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, +mm_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *hostkey_alg) { struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; @@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, struct passwd * mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ Buffer m; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, i; @@ -289,12 +290,20 @@ out: for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \ newopts->x[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) +#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC(x, nx) do { \ + newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \ + NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx); \ + } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT +#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); + log_change_level(options.log_level); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); free(newopts); buffer_free(&m); @@ -374,7 +383,8 @@ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) } int -mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) +mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, + int pubkey_auth_attempt) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, pubkey_auth_attempt)); @@ -382,14 +392,14 @@ mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host, - Key *key) + struct sshkey *key) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0)); } int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host, - Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) + struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; @@ -434,12 +444,13 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host, */ int -mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; - int verified = 0; + u_int encoded_ret = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); @@ -458,11 +469,13 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m); - verified = buffer_get_int(&m); + encoded_ret = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); - return (verified); + if (encoded_ret != 0) + return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + return 0; } void diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h index db5902f553ab..9e032d204b40 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/monitor_wrap.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.32 2016/09/28 16:33:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.35 2017/05/31 08:09:45 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos @@ -34,22 +34,24 @@ extern int use_privsep; enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY }; struct monitor; -struct mm_master; struct Authctxt; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *); int mm_is_monitor(void); DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); -int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *); +int mm_key_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, + const char *); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); -int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, Key *, int); -int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); +int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *, + int); +int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, - const char *, Key *); -int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); + const char *, struct sshkey *); +int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, u_int); #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); @@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *); struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int); int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *); +void monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *); void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *); void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *); void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*); diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c index 2d6639c5c19a..5ae4544100e2 100644 --- a/mux.c +++ b/mux.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.64 2017/01/21 11:32:04 guenther Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.69 2017/09/20 05:19:00 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * @@ -161,22 +161,32 @@ struct mux_master_state { #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 -static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *); -static void mux_stdio_confirm(int, int, void *); - -static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_terminate(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); -static int process_mux_proxy(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); +static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); +static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); + +static int process_mux_master_hello(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int process_mux_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); static const struct { u_int type; - int (*handler)(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); + int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, + struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); } mux_master_handlers[] = { { MUX_MSG_HELLO, process_mux_master_hello }, { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, process_mux_new_session }, @@ -193,52 +203,54 @@ static const struct { /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void -mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) +mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused) { - Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); + Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { - if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); c->ctl_chan = -1; - cc->remote_id = -1; - chan_rcvd_oclose(cc); + cc->remote_id = 0; + cc->have_remote_id = 0; + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc); } - channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); } /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void -mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) +mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused) { - Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); + Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); - if (c->remote_id != -1) { - if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d", + if (c->have_remote_id) { + if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %u", __func__, c->self, c->remote_id); - c->remote_id = -1; + c->remote_id = 0; + c->have_remote_id = 0; sc->ctl_chan = -1; if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self); - chan_mark_dead(sc); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc); } else { if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) - chan_read_failed(sc); + chan_read_failed(ssh, sc); if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) - chan_write_failed(sc); + chan_write_failed(ssh, sc); } } - channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); } /* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ @@ -266,7 +278,8 @@ env_permitted(char *env) /* Mux master protocol message handlers */ static int -process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_master_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { u_int ver; struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; @@ -308,7 +321,8 @@ process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } static int -process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; @@ -401,7 +415,7 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ - if (c->remote_id != -1) { + if (c->have_remote_id) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); @@ -453,15 +467,16 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) packetmax >>= 1; } - nc = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, + nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ + c->have_remote_id = 1; if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { - channel_register_filter(nc->self, + channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); @@ -470,17 +485,19 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); - channel_send_open(nc->self); - channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); + channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self); + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ - channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, + mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } static int -process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self); @@ -493,7 +510,8 @@ process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } static int -process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self); @@ -582,7 +600,7 @@ compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) } static void -mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; char *failmsg = NULL; @@ -590,7 +608,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) Channel *c; Buffer out; - if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) { + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) { /* no channel for reply */ error("%s: unknown channel", __func__); return; @@ -616,7 +634,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port); - channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, + channel_update_permitted_opens(ssh, rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK); @@ -625,7 +643,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) goto out; } else { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) - channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); + channel_update_permitted_opens(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); @@ -651,7 +669,7 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg); free(failmsg); out: - buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); + buffer_put_string(c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); if (c->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause); @@ -659,7 +677,8 @@ mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int -process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { struct Forward fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; @@ -727,13 +746,16 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) fwd.listen_port); goto invalid; } - if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536) - || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { + if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && + fwd.connect_port >= 65536) || + (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && + fwd.connect_port == 0)) { logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__, fwd.connect_port); goto invalid; } - if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) { + if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && + fwd.connect_path == NULL) { logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__); goto invalid; } @@ -784,7 +806,7 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { - if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, + if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { fail: logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc); @@ -798,7 +820,7 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } else { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; - fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd); + fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd); if (fwd.handle < 0) goto fail; add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); @@ -827,7 +849,8 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } static int -process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; @@ -908,11 +931,11 @@ process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need * to use the actual listen port. */ - if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1) + if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1) error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ /* Ditto */ - if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port, + if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port, &options.fwd_opts) == -1) error_reason = "port not found"; } @@ -942,7 +965,8 @@ process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } static int -process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; char *reserved, *chost; @@ -986,7 +1010,7 @@ process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ - if (c->remote_id != -1) { + if (c->have_remote_id) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); @@ -1018,19 +1042,21 @@ process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); - nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); + nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ + c->have_remote_id = 1; debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); - channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, + mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->rid = rid; - channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ @@ -1039,7 +1065,7 @@ process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ static void -mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) +mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; Channel *c, *cc; @@ -1047,9 +1073,9 @@ mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); - if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); - if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); @@ -1072,7 +1098,7 @@ mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) done: /* Send reply */ - buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); + buffer_put_string(cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) @@ -1083,7 +1109,8 @@ mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) } static int -process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self); @@ -1100,7 +1127,7 @@ process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { - channel_free(mux_listener_channel); + channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel); client_stop_mux(); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; @@ -1116,7 +1143,8 @@ process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) } static int -process_mux_proxy(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) +process_mux_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug("%s: channel %d: proxy request", __func__, c->self); @@ -1129,7 +1157,7 @@ process_mux_proxy(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) /* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */ static int -mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) +mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; Buffer in, out; @@ -1141,7 +1169,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); c->mux_ctx = state; - channel_register_cleanup(c->self, + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); /* Send hello */ @@ -1149,7 +1177,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ - buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), + buffer_put_string(c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self); @@ -1160,7 +1188,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) buffer_init(&out); /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ - if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) { + if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(c->input, &have)) == NULL) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); goto out; @@ -1186,7 +1214,8 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { - ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out); + ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid, + c, &in, &out); break; } } @@ -1199,7 +1228,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) } /* Enqueue reply packet */ if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) { - buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), + buffer_put_string(c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); } out: @@ -1209,7 +1238,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) } void -mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval) +mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; @@ -1217,7 +1246,7 @@ mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval) debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self, exitval); - if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); @@ -1227,19 +1256,19 @@ mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval) buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_int(&m, exitval); - buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); + buffer_put_string(mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } void -mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c) +mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self); - if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); @@ -1248,13 +1277,13 @@ mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c) buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); - buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); + buffer_put_string(mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } /* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ void -muxserver_listen(void) +muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh) { mode_t old_umask; char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; @@ -1327,7 +1356,7 @@ muxserver_listen(void) set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); - mux_listener_channel = channel_new("mux listener", + mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, options.control_path, 1); @@ -1338,7 +1367,7 @@ muxserver_listen(void) /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ static void -mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) +mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; const char *display; @@ -1348,9 +1377,9 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); - if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); - if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); @@ -1369,27 +1398,27 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ - if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, + if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); - x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, - data, 1); + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, + display, proto, data, 1); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ - client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); } } if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); - channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } - client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, + client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env); debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); @@ -1401,7 +1430,7 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) done: /* Send reply */ - buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); + buffer_put_string(cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) @@ -1570,31 +1599,38 @@ mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) { Buffer m; u_int type, ver; + int ret = -1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ - if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) - fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { + debug("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their HELLO */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { - buffer_free(&m); - return -1; + debug("%s: read packet failed", __func__); + goto out; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); - if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) - fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", + if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) { + error("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); + goto out; + } ver = buffer_get_int(&m); - if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) - fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " + if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { + error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); + goto out; + } debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) { @@ -1605,8 +1641,11 @@ mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) free(name); free(value); } + /* success */ + ret = 0; + out: buffer_free(&m); - return 0; + return ret; } static u_int @@ -1962,7 +2001,7 @@ mux_client_request_session(int fd) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (muxclient_terminate) { - debug2("Exiting on signal %d", muxclient_terminate); + debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate)); exitval = 255; } else if (!exitval_seen) { debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h index 072e36ec7b5e..c255147aa033 100644 --- a/myproposal.h +++ b/myproposal.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.54 2016/09/28 16:33:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.55 2017/05/07 23:13:42 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \ AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES -#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \ - "aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc" +#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c index 20f6a2f4990a..24929556dda2 100644 --- a/nchan.c +++ b/nchan.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.63 2010/01/26 01:28:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.67 2017/09/12 06:35:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" -#include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "packet.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" @@ -74,18 +74,15 @@ /* * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states */ -static void chan_send_ieof1(Channel *); -static void chan_send_oclose1(Channel *); -static void chan_send_close2(Channel *); -static void chan_send_eof2(Channel *); -static void chan_send_eow2(Channel *); +static void chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *, Channel *); +static void chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *, Channel *); /* helper */ -static void chan_shutdown_write(Channel *); -static void chan_shutdown_read(Channel *); +static void chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *, Channel *); +static void chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *, Channel *); -static char *ostates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed" }; -static char *istates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed" }; +static const char *ostates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed" }; +static const char *istates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed" }; static void chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next) @@ -96,6 +93,7 @@ chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next) istates[next]); c->istate = next; } + static void chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next) { @@ -106,41 +104,13 @@ chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next) c->ostate = next; } -/* - * SSH1 specific implementation of event functions - */ - -static void -chan_rcvd_oclose1(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: rcvd oclose", c->self); - switch (c->istate) { - case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE: - chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); - break; - case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: - chan_shutdown_read(c); - chan_send_ieof1(c); - chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); - break; - case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - /* both local read_failed and remote write_failed */ - chan_send_ieof1(c); - chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); - break; - default: - error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_oclose for istate %d", - c->self, c->istate); - return; - } -} void -chan_read_failed(Channel *c) +chan_read_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: read failed", c->self); switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: - chan_shutdown_read(c); + chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); break; default: @@ -149,25 +119,21 @@ chan_read_failed(Channel *c) break; } } + void -chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *c) +chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self); - if (buffer_len(&c->input)) { + if (sshbuf_len(c->input)) { error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer", c->self); return; } switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - if (compat20) { - if (!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_LOCAL))) - chan_send_eof2(c); - chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); - } else { - chan_send_ieof1(c); - chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE); - } + if (!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_LOCAL))) + chan_send_eof2(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; default: error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d", @@ -175,58 +141,19 @@ chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *c) break; } } -static void -chan_rcvd_ieof1(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: rcvd ieof", c->self); - switch (c->ostate) { - case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: - chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); - break; - case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF: - chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); - break; - default: - error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_ieof for ostate %d", - c->self, c->ostate); - break; - } -} -static void -chan_write_failed1(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self); - switch (c->ostate) { - case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: - chan_shutdown_write(c); - chan_send_oclose1(c); - chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF); - break; - case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - chan_shutdown_write(c); - chan_send_oclose1(c); - chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); - break; - default: - error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d", - c->self, c->ostate); - break; - } -} + void -chan_obuf_empty(Channel *c) +chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self); - if (buffer_len(&c->output)) { + if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) { error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer", c->self); return; } switch (c->ostate) { case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - chan_shutdown_write(c); - if (!compat20) - chan_send_oclose1(c); + chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c); chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); break; default: @@ -235,47 +162,107 @@ chan_obuf_empty(Channel *c) break; } } -static void -chan_send_ieof1(Channel *c) + +void +chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { - debug2("channel %d: send ieof", c->self); + debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self); switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); + break; + } +} + +static void +chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT; break; default: - error("channel %d: cannot send ieof for istate %d", + error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d", c->self, c->istate); break; } } + static void -chan_send_oclose1(Channel *c) +chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { - debug2("channel %d: send oclose", c->self); - switch (c->ostate) { - case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: - case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - buffer_clear(&c->output); - packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); - break; - default: - error("channel %d: cannot send oclose for ostate %d", - c->self, c->ostate); - break; + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self); + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || + c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) { + error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d", + c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + } else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) { + error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self); + } else { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; } } -/* - * the same for SSH2 - */ static void -chan_rcvd_close2(Channel *c) +chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) { + error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output", + c->self); + return; + } + if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) + return; + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "eow@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +/* shared */ + +void +chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self); + c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD; + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) + chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN && + sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0 && + !CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) + chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); +} + +void +chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self); if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) { @@ -301,46 +288,27 @@ chan_rcvd_close2(Channel *c) } switch (c->istate) { case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: - chan_shutdown_read(c); + chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) - chan_send_eof2(c); + chan_send_eof2(ssh, c); chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); break; } } void -chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self); - switch (c->istate) { - case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: - chan_shutdown_read(c); - chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); - break; - } -} -static void -chan_rcvd_eof2(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self); - c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD; - if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) - chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); -} -static void -chan_write_failed2(Channel *c) +chan_write_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self); switch (c->ostate) { case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - chan_shutdown_write(c); + chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c); if (strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) - chan_send_eow2(c); + chan_send_eow2(ssh, c); chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); break; default: @@ -349,97 +317,15 @@ chan_write_failed2(Channel *c) break; } } -static void -chan_send_eof2(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self); - switch (c->istate) { - case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); - c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT; - break; - default: - error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d", - c->self, c->istate); - break; - } -} -static void -chan_send_close2(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self); - if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || - c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) { - error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d", - c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); - } else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) { - error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self); - } else { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_send(); - c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; - } -} -static void -chan_send_eow2(Channel *c) -{ - debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self); - if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) { - error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output", - c->self); - return; - } - if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) - return; - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST); - packet_put_int(c->remote_id); - packet_put_cstring("eow@openssh.com"); - packet_put_char(0); - packet_send(); -} - -/* shared */ void -chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *c) -{ - if (compat20) - chan_rcvd_eof2(c); - else - chan_rcvd_ieof1(c); - if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN && - buffer_len(&c->output) == 0 && - !CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) - chan_obuf_empty(c); -} -void -chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *c) -{ - if (compat20) - chan_rcvd_close2(c); - else - chan_rcvd_oclose1(c); -} -void -chan_write_failed(Channel *c) -{ - if (compat20) - chan_write_failed2(c); - else - chan_write_failed1(c); -} - -void -chan_mark_dead(Channel *c) +chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE; } int -chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int do_send) +chan_is_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int do_send) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) { debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self); @@ -447,16 +333,12 @@ chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int do_send) } if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) return 0; - if (!compat20) { - debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self); - return 1; - } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && c->efd != -1 && - buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) { - debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %d", - c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) { + debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %zu", + c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL) { @@ -465,7 +347,7 @@ chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int do_send) } if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { if (do_send) { - chan_send_close2(c); + chan_send_close2(ssh, c); } else { /* channel would be dead if we sent a close */ if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) { @@ -485,10 +367,10 @@ chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int do_send) /* helper */ static void -chan_shutdown_write(Channel *c) +chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { - buffer_clear(&c->output); - if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + sshbuf_reset(c->output); + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) return; /* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */ debug2("channel %d: close_write", c->self); @@ -498,16 +380,17 @@ chan_shutdown_write(Channel *c) "shutdown() failed for fd %d: %.100s", c->self, c->sock, strerror(errno)); } else { - if (channel_close_fd(&c->wfd) < 0) + if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) logit("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: " "close() failed for fd %d: %.100s", c->self, c->wfd, strerror(errno)); } } + static void -chan_shutdown_read(Channel *c) +chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { - if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) return; debug2("channel %d: close_read", c->self); if (c->sock != -1) { @@ -523,7 +406,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(Channel *c) c->self, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno)); } else { - if (channel_close_fd(&c->rfd) < 0) + if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) logit("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: " "close() failed for fd %d: %.100s", c->self, c->rfd, strerror(errno)); diff --git a/opacket.c b/opacket.c index 5970dd3771cc..ad244b452634 100644 --- a/opacket.c +++ b/opacket.c @@ -74,16 +74,6 @@ ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -void -ssh_packet_put_bignum(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum1(ssh, value)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -} -#endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void @@ -150,16 +140,6 @@ ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *ssh) return val; } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -void -ssh_packet_get_bignum(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) -{ - int r; - - if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum1(ssh, value)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -} -#endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void diff --git a/opacket.h b/opacket.h index c487f4f40d68..c49d0c04a790 100644 --- a/opacket.h +++ b/opacket.h @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ void ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *, u_char); void ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *, int ch); void ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *, u_int value); void ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *, u_int64_t value); -void ssh_packet_put_bignum(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); void ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len); @@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ void ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *); u_int ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *); u_int ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *); u_int64_t ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *); -void ssh_packet_get_bignum(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); void ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); void *ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); @@ -62,8 +60,6 @@ void packet_read_expect(int expected_type); ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(active_state) #define packet_start_compression(level) \ ssh_packet_start_compression(active_state, (level)) -#define packet_set_encryption_key(key, keylen, number) \ - ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(active_state, (key), (keylen), (number)) #define packet_start(type) \ ssh_packet_start(active_state, (type)) #define packet_put_char(value) \ @@ -78,8 +74,6 @@ void packet_read_expect(int expected_type); ssh_packet_put_cstring(active_state, (str)) #define packet_put_raw(buf, len) \ ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, (buf), (len)) -#define packet_put_bignum(value) \ - ssh_packet_put_bignum(active_state, (value)) #define packet_put_bignum2(value) \ ssh_packet_put_bignum2(active_state, (value)) #define packet_send() \ @@ -88,8 +82,6 @@ void packet_read_expect(int expected_type); ssh_packet_read(active_state) #define packet_get_int64() \ ssh_packet_get_int64(active_state) -#define packet_get_bignum(value) \ - ssh_packet_get_bignum(active_state, (value)) #define packet_get_bignum2(value) \ ssh_packet_get_bignum2(active_state, (value)) #define packet_remaining() \ @@ -157,5 +149,7 @@ void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...) ssh_packet_set_mux(active_state) #define packet_get_mux() \ ssh_packet_get_mux(active_state) +#define packet_clear_keys() \ + ssh_packet_clear_keys(active_state) #endif /* _OPACKET_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in index d51eacf6562a..ac8ae4305d0b 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ -OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strcasestr.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o +OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o reallocarray.o realpath.o recallocarray.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha1.o sha2.o rmd160.o md5.o sigact.o strcasestr.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o freezero.o -COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o +COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-getpagesize.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-malloc.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c index ab10646f023a..e4ed22b86a25 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c @@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ #include "includes.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + #ifndef HAVE_ERR void err(int r, const char *fmt, ...) diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9daddfbd3865 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* Placed in the public domain */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE + +#include +#include + +int +getpagesize(void) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE) + long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); + if (r > 0 && r < INT_MAX) + return (int)r; +#endif + /* + * This is at the lower end of common values and appropriate for + * our current use of getpagesize() in recallocarray(). + */ + return 4096; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_GETPAGESIZE */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6402ab588b09 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#undef malloc +#undef calloc +#undef realloc + +#include +#include + +#if defined(HAVE_MALLOC) && HAVE_MALLOC == 0 +void * +rpl_malloc(size_t size) +{ + if (size == 0) + size = 1; + return malloc(size); +} +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_CALLOC) && HAVE_CALLOC == 0 +void * +rpl_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + if (nmemb == 0) + nmemb = 1; + if (size == 0) + size = 1; + return calloc(nmemb, size); +} +#endif + +#if defined (HAVE_REALLOC) && HAVE_REALLOC == 0 +void * +rpl_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) +{ + if (size == 0) + size = 1; + return realloc(ptr, size); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c index cfd73260ae18..29f6ad38c5a1 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c @@ -104,6 +104,16 @@ const char *strerror(int e) } #endif +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL) +char *strsignal(int sig) +{ + static char buf[16]; + + (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", sig); + return buf; +} +#endif + #ifndef HAVE_UTIMES int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp) { diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h index 70a538f04e2d..0b1a3504f2cc 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ int setegid(uid_t); const char *strerror(int); #endif +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL) +char *strsignal(int); +#endif + #if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF) #define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0)) #endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c b/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c index 5078134d137a..53a003472721 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) { + if (n == 0) + return; (void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n); } @@ -34,6 +36,8 @@ static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero; void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) { + if (n == 0) + return; /* * clang -fsanitize=memory needs to intercept memset-like functions * to correctly detect memory initialisation. Make sure one is called diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c index e5533b2de90c..7c5193e26d95 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.13 2017/03/11 23:37:23 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.16 2017/03/16 02:40:46 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin. All rights reserved. @@ -125,22 +125,30 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result) /* ignore extra fractional digits */ continue; fract_digits++; /* for later scaling */ - if (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / 10) { + if (fpart > LLONG_MAX / 10) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } fpart *= 10; + if (i > LLONG_MAX - fpart) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } fpart += i; } else { /* normal digit */ if (++ndigits >= MAX_DIGITS) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } - if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / 10) { + if (whole > LLONG_MAX / 10) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } whole *= 10; + if (i > LLONG_MAX - whole) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } whole += i; } } @@ -170,7 +178,9 @@ scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result) } scale_fact = scale_factors[i]; - if (whole >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) { + /* check for overflow and underflow after scaling */ + if (whole > LLONG_MAX / scale_fact || + whole < LLONG_MIN / scale_fact) { errno = ERANGE; return -1; } diff --git a/openbsd-compat/freezero.c b/openbsd-compat/freezero.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3af8f4a733e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/freezero.c @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, 2011, 2016 Otto Moerbeek + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO + +void +freezero(void *ptr, size_t sz) +{ + explicit_bzero(ptr, sz); + free(ptr); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_FREEZERO */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h index cff547745b88..cac799e8446f 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h +++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); void closefrom(int); #endif +#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE +int getpagesize(void); +#endif + #ifndef HAVE_GETCWD char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); #endif @@ -68,6 +72,10 @@ char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); #endif +#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY +void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); +#endif + #if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) /* * glibc's FORTIFY_SOURCE can redefine this and prevent us picking up the @@ -296,6 +304,10 @@ int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t, void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); #endif +#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO +void freezero(void *, size_t); +#endif + char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c b/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c index a444adf1d593..7579c6084a1f 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-tun.c @@ -199,84 +199,81 @@ sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode) */ #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) +/* + * The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded + * IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers. + */ #define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2 #define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24 int -sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len) +sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len) { + int r; + size_t len; + char *ptr = buf; #if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF]; - struct ip *iph; + struct ip iph; #endif - u_int32_t *af; - char *ptr = buf; - int r; - -#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) - if (len <= 0 || len > (int)(sizeof(rbuf) - sizeof(*af))) - return (-1); - ptr = (char *)&rbuf[0]; - bcopy(buf, ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t), len); - len += sizeof(u_int32_t); - af = (u_int32_t *)ptr; - - iph = (struct ip *)(ptr + sizeof(u_int32_t)); - switch (iph->ip_v) { - case 6: - *af = AF_INET6; - break; - case 4: - default: - *af = AF_INET; - break; - } +#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) + u_int32_t af; #endif -#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) - if (len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t)) - return (-1); + /* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */ + if (_len < 0) + return -1; + len = _len; - af = (u_int32_t *)ptr; - if (*af == htonl(AF_INET6)) - *af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET6); - else - *af = htonl(OPENBSD_AF_INET); +#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) + if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4) + return -1; + /* Determine address family from packet IP header. */ + memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph)); + af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET; + /* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */ + memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len); + len += 4; + POKE_U32(rbuf, af); + ptr = rbuf; +#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) + /* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */ + if (len <= 4) + return -1; + af = PEEK_U32(buf); + /* Put it back */ + POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET); #endif - if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(&c->input, ptr, len)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return (0); } u_char * -sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *c, u_char **data, u_int *dlen) +sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, + u_char **data, size_t *dlen) { u_char *buf; - u_int32_t *af; + u_int32_t af; int r; - size_t xxx_dlen; /* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(&c->output, data, &xxx_dlen)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (dlen != NULL) - *dlen = xxx_dlen; - if (*dlen < sizeof(*af)) + if (*dlen < sizeof(af)) return (NULL); buf = *data; #if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) - *dlen -= sizeof(u_int32_t); - buf = *data + sizeof(u_int32_t); + /* skip address family */ + *dlen -= sizeof(af); + buf = *data + sizeof(af); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) - af = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)buf); - if (*af == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) - *af = htonl(AF_INET6); - else - *af = htonl(AF_INET); + /* translate address family */ + af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET; + POKE_U32(buf, af); #endif - return (buf); } #endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h b/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h index c53df01fceb6..103514370fd3 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-tun.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #define _PORT_TUN_H struct Channel; +struct ssh; #if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD) # define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN @@ -26,8 +27,8 @@ int sys_tun_open(int, int); #if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) # define SSH_TUN_FILTER -int sys_tun_infilter(struct Channel *, char *, int); -u_char *sys_tun_outfilter(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *); +int sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); +u_char *sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, u_char **, size_t *); #endif #endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c b/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3e1156ce2d95 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: recallocarray.c,v 1.1 2017/03/06 18:44:21 otto Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008, 2017 Otto Moerbeek + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/recallocarray.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +/* + * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX + * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW + */ +#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4)) + +void * +recallocarray(void *ptr, size_t oldnmemb, size_t newnmemb, size_t size) +{ + size_t oldsize, newsize; + void *newptr; + + if (ptr == NULL) + return calloc(newnmemb, size); + + if ((newnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && + newnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / newnmemb < size) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + newsize = newnmemb * size; + + if ((oldnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && + oldnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / oldnmemb < size) { + errno = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + oldsize = oldnmemb * size; + + /* + * Don't bother too much if we're shrinking just a bit, + * we do not shrink for series of small steps, oh well. + */ + if (newsize <= oldsize) { + size_t d = oldsize - newsize; + + if (d < oldsize / 2 && d < (size_t)getpagesize()) { + memset((char *)ptr + newsize, 0, d); + return ptr; + } + } + + newptr = malloc(newsize); + if (newptr == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (newsize > oldsize) { + memcpy(newptr, ptr, oldsize); + memset((char *)newptr + oldsize, 0, newsize - oldsize); + } else + memcpy(newptr, ptr, newsize); + + explicit_bzero(ptr, oldsize); + free(ptr); + + return newptr; +} +/* DEF_WEAK(recallocarray); */ + +#endif /* HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY */ diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c index 2f3a2ec7075c..f114ea52c648 100644 --- a/packet.c +++ b/packet.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.247 2017/03/11 13:07:35 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.264 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -68,9 +68,7 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "crc32.h" -#include "deattack.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" @@ -186,10 +184,6 @@ struct session_state { u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ - /* Session key for protocol v1 */ - u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; - u_int ssh1_keylen; - /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ u_char extra_pad; @@ -216,9 +210,6 @@ struct session_state { /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */ int cipher_warning_done; - /* SSH1 CRC compensation attack detector */ - struct deattack_ctx deattack; - /* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */ ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in; void *hook_in_ctx; @@ -278,13 +269,12 @@ ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx) int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) { - return compat20 && - (ssh->state->rekeying || (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0)); + return ssh->state->rekeying || + (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0); } /* - * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until - * packet_set_encryption_key is called. + * Sets the descriptors used for communication. */ struct ssh * ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) @@ -315,7 +305,6 @@ ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) return NULL; } state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; - deattack_init(&state->deattack); /* * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed. @@ -570,8 +559,8 @@ ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh) /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ -void -ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) +static void +ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int mode; @@ -579,20 +568,25 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; - if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { - shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); - close(state->connection_out); - } else { - close(state->connection_in); - close(state->connection_out); + if (do_close) { + if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { + close(state->connection_out); + } else { + close(state->connection_in); + close(state->connection_out); + } } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); - for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) - kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); - if (state->compression_buffer) { + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */ + } + /* comression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */ + if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) { sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); if (state->compression_out_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; @@ -606,7 +600,7 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) deflateEnd(stream); } if (state->compression_in_started) { - z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; + z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream; debug("compress incoming: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, @@ -620,10 +614,24 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) cipher_free(state->send_context); cipher_free(state->receive_context); state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; - free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); - ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; - free(ssh->state); - ssh->state = NULL; + if (do_close) { + free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); + ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; + free(ssh->state); + ssh->state = NULL; + } +} + +void +ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1); +} + +void +ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0); } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ @@ -698,7 +706,7 @@ ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { int r; - if (ssh->state->packet_compression && !compat20) + if (ssh->state->packet_compression) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->packet_compression = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0 || @@ -802,136 +810,13 @@ uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) /* NOTREACHED */ } -/* - * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same - * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are - * encrypted independently of each other. - */ - void -ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number) +ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { -#ifndef WITH_SSH1 - fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support"); -#else /* WITH_SSH1 */ - struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); - int r; - const char *wmsg; - - if (cipher == NULL) - fatal("%s: unknown cipher number %d", __func__, number); - if (keylen < 20) - fatal("%s: keylen too small: %d", __func__, keylen); - if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) - fatal("%s: keylen too big: %d", __func__, keylen); - memcpy(state->ssh1_key, key, keylen); - state->ssh1_keylen = keylen; - if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, - NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || - (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, - NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT) != 0)) - fatal("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (!state->cipher_warning_done && - ((wmsg = cipher_warning_message(state->send_context)) != NULL || - (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(state->send_context)) != NULL)) { - error("Warning: %s", wmsg); - state->cipher_warning_done = 1; + if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) { + kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]); + ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -} - -/* - * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set, - * encrypts the packet before sending. - */ - -int -ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *ssh) -{ - struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - u_char buf[8], *cp; - int r, padding, len; - u_int checksum; - - /* - * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing - * packet. - */ - if (state->packet_compression) { - sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); - /* Skip padding. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8)) != 0) - goto out; - /* padding */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->compression_buffer, - "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, - state->compression_buffer)) != 0) - goto out; - sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); - if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, - state->compression_buffer)) != 0) - goto out; - } - /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */ - len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8; - - /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */ - padding = 8 - len % 8; - if (!cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) { - cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); - if (cp == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto out; - } - arc4random_buf(cp + 8 - padding, padding); - } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Add check bytes. */ - checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), - sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); - POKE_U32(buf, checksum); - if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4)) != 0) - goto out; - -#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: "); - sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); -#endif - - /* Append to output. */ - POKE_U32(buf, len); - if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, buf, 4)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, - sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), &cp)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, 0, cp, - sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), - sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0)) != 0) - goto out; - -#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); - sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); -#endif - state->p_send.packets++; - state->p_send.bytes += len + - sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); - sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); - - /* - * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be - * actually sent until ssh_packet_write_wait or ssh_packet_write_poll - * is called. - */ - r = 0; - out: - return r; } int @@ -944,45 +829,33 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp; struct packet_state *ps; u_int64_t *max_blocks; - const char *wmsg, *dir; + const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode); if (mode == MODE_OUT) { - dir = "output"; ccp = &state->send_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; ps = &state->p_send; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out; } else { - dir = "input"; ccp = &state->receive_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; ps = &state->p_read; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in; } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { - debug("%s: rekeying after %llu %s blocks" - " (%llu bytes total)", __func__, - (unsigned long long)ps->blocks, dir, - (unsigned long long)ps->bytes); + debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, " + "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", + (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); cipher_free(*ccp); *ccp = NULL; - enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; - mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; - comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; - mac_clear(mac); - explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len); - explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); - explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); - free(enc->name); - free(enc->iv); - free(enc->key); - free(mac->name); - free(mac->key); - free(comp->name); - free(state->newkeys[mode]); + kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0; @@ -1027,7 +900,8 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) } /* * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, - * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. + * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. + * See RFC4344 section 3.2. */ if (enc->block_size >= 16) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); @@ -1071,7 +945,10 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) return 1; - /* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */ + /* + * Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction + * As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets. + */ if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS || state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) return 1; @@ -1424,13 +1301,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) break; - if (!compat20 && ( - *typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS - || *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE - || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF - || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION)) - if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) break; @@ -1524,153 +1394,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) return 0; } -/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via - * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns - * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection. - * - * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also, - * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned - * to higher levels. - */ - -int -ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep) -{ - struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - u_int len, padded_len; - const char *emsg; - const u_char *cp; - u_char *p; - u_int checksum, stored_checksum; - int r; - - *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; - - /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */ - if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8) - return 0; - /* Get length of incoming packet. */ - len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input)); - if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) { - if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u", - len)) != 0) - return r; - return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; - } - padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7; - - /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */ - if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len) - return 0; - - /* The entire packet is in buffer. */ - - /* Consume packet length. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* - * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina - * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com) - */ - if (!cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->receive_context)) { - emsg = NULL; - switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack, - sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) { - case DEATTACK_OK: - break; - case DEATTACK_DETECTED: - emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected"; - break; - case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: - emsg = "deattack denial of service detected"; - break; - default: - emsg = "deattack error"; - break; - } - if (emsg != NULL) { - error("%s", emsg); - if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 || - (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) - return r; - return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; - } - } - - /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */ - sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); - if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, 0, p, - sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0) - goto out; - - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0) - goto out; - -#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: "); - sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); -#endif - - /* Compute packet checksum. */ - checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), - sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4); - - /* Skip padding. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Test check bytes. */ - if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) { - error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__, - len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)); - if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 || - (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) - return r; - return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; - } - - cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4; - stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp); - if (checksum != stored_checksum) { - error("Corrupted check bytes on input"); - if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 || - (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) - return r; - return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0) - goto out; - - if (state->packet_compression) { - sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); - if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, - state->compression_buffer)) != 0) - goto out; - sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); - if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, - state->compression_buffer)) != 0) - goto out; - } - state->p_read.packets++; - state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) - goto out; - if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) { - error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep); - if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 || - (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) - return r; - return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; - } - r = 0; - out: - return r; -} - static int ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { @@ -1951,75 +1674,48 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) for (;;) { msg = NULL; - if (compat20) { - r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); - if (r != 0) - return r; - if (*typep) { - state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; - DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); - } - switch (*typep) { - case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: - debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); - break; - case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - free(msg); - return r; - } - debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); - free(msg); - break; - case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) - return r; - /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ - do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && - reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? - SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, - "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" - "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); - free(msg); - return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; - case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) - return r; - debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", - seqnr); - break; - default: - return 0; - } - } else { - r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep); - switch (*typep) { - case SSH_MSG_NONE: - return SSH_MSG_NONE; - case SSH_MSG_IGNORE: - break; - case SSH_MSG_DEBUG: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) - return r; - debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); - free(msg); - break; - case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) - return r; - error("Received disconnect from %s port %d: " - "%.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - ssh_remote_port(ssh), msg); + r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); + if (r != 0) + return r; + if (*typep) { + state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; + DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); + } + switch (*typep) { + case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: + debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { free(msg); - return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; - default: - DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); - return 0; + return r; } + debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); + free(msg); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ + do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && + reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, + "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" + "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); + free(msg); + return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; + case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) + return r; + debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", + seqnr); + break; + default: + return 0; } } } @@ -2071,27 +1767,19 @@ ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) va_list args; int r; - if (compat20 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); - if (compat20) { - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } else { - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } @@ -2116,15 +1804,20 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection %s %s timed out", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: - if (errno == ECONNRESET) + if (errno == ECONNRESET) { + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id); + } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: @@ -2132,12 +1825,14 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) { + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. " "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", @@ -2302,7 +1997,7 @@ void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos) { #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN - if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) + if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX) return; switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) { # ifdef IP_TOS @@ -2395,36 +2090,6 @@ ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh) return ssh->state->max_packet_size; } -/* - * 9.2. Ignored Data Message - * - * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE - * string data - * - * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any - * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is - * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional - * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. - */ -void -ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes) -{ - u_int32_t rnd = 0; - int r, i; - - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ? - SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rnd = arc4random(); - if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - rnd >>= 8; - } -} - void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds) { @@ -2528,9 +2193,7 @@ newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) return r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 || @@ -2556,54 +2219,22 @@ int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - u_char *p; - size_t slen, rlen; - int r, ssh1cipher; - - if (!compat20) { - ssh1cipher = cipher_ctx_get_number(state->receive_context); - slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context); - rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 || - (r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 || - (r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0) - return r; - } else { - if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || - (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || - (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) - return r; - } + int r; - slen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL); - rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0) - return r; - if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, p) != (int)slen) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0) - return r; - if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || + if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0) return r; @@ -2636,12 +2267,15 @@ newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) comp = &newkey->comp; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0) goto out; + if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; @@ -2659,11 +2293,6 @@ newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; - if (enc->name == NULL || - cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; @@ -2728,61 +2357,33 @@ int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; - const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output; - size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen; + const u_char *input, *output; + size_t ilen, olen; int r; - u_int ssh1cipher = 0; - - if (!compat20) { - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0) - return r; - if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; - ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen, - (int)ssh1cipher); - if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context) != (int)slen || - cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context) != (int)rlen) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 || - (r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0) - return r; - } else { - if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || - (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || - (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) - return r; - /* - * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we - * count from the completion of the authentication. - */ - state->rekey_time = monotime(); - /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ - if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || - (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) - return r; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0) + + if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we + * count from the completion of the authentication. + */ + state->rekey_time = monotime(); + /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ + if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) return r; - if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen || - cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - cipher_set_keycontext(state->send_context, keyout); - cipher_set_keycontext(state->receive_context, keyin); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0) return r; @@ -2862,13 +2463,6 @@ sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -int -sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) -{ - return sshbuf_put_bignum1(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) @@ -2915,6 +2509,12 @@ sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } +int +sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); +} + int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { @@ -2930,13 +2530,6 @@ sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -int -sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) -{ - return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v); -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) @@ -2966,15 +2559,13 @@ sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) { - u_char buf[9]; - int len; + u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */ DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); - len = compat20 ? 6 : 9; - memset(buf, 0, len - 1); - buf[len - 1] = type; + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type; sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet); - return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, len); + return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf)); } static int @@ -3007,6 +2598,37 @@ ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh) return 0; } +/* + * 9.2. Ignored Data Message + * + * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE + * string data + * + * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any + * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is + * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional + * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. + */ +int +sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes) +{ + u_int32_t rnd = 0; + int r; + u_int i; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) + return r; + for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rnd = arc4random(); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) + return r; + rnd >>= 8; + } + return 0; +} + /* send it */ int @@ -3014,10 +2636,7 @@ sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux) return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh); - if (compat20) - return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); - else - return ssh_packet_send1(ssh); + return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); } int @@ -3031,19 +2650,12 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); - if (compat20) { - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - return r; - } else { - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - return r; - } + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; return 0; } diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h index 0d25b352c73f..40837e9dbceb 100644 --- a/packet.h +++ b/packet.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.76 2017/02/03 23:03:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.82 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -77,6 +77,12 @@ struct ssh { TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys; TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys; + /* Client/Server authentication context */ + void *authctxt; + + /* Channels context */ + struct ssh_channels *chanctxt; + /* APP data */ void *app_data; }; @@ -93,8 +99,9 @@ void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *); -void ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *, const u_char *, u_int, int); void ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *); +void ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *); +void ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int); int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int); @@ -112,14 +119,12 @@ int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...) int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char); -int ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type); int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *); -int ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *, u_char *); int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len); int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); @@ -141,7 +146,6 @@ int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *); -void ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *, int); void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *); void tty_parse_modes(int, int *); @@ -172,6 +176,7 @@ int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char); void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r); +int sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *, u_int); int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b); @@ -182,7 +187,6 @@ int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v); int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v); int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); -int sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len); @@ -191,9 +195,9 @@ int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp); int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp); int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp); int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); -int sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v); int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h index a8deb9fc609b..1c221b01b47f 100644 --- a/pathnames.h +++ b/pathnames.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.25 2016/03/31 05:24:06 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.27 2017/05/05 10:42:49 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ */ #define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config" #define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config" -#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_key" #define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key" #define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key" #define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key" @@ -72,7 +71,6 @@ * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This * file should only be readable by the user him/herself. */ -#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/identity" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa" #define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa" diff --git a/platform-misc.c b/platform-misc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f396704953d --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" + +/* + * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory + * otherwise 0. + */ +int +platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) +{ + if (uid == 0) + return 1; +#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID + if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c index 973a63e40165..18c7751de9a8 100644 --- a/platform.c +++ b/platform.c @@ -197,19 +197,3 @@ platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name) return NULL; #endif } - -/* - * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory - * otherwise 0. - */ -int -platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) -{ - if (uid == 0) - return 1; -#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID - if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) - return 1; -#endif - return 0; -} diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index 9d59493f0187..f63894f9ca15 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.270 2017/03/10 04:27:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.279 2017/09/21 19:16:53 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ typedef enum { oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, - oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs, + oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ typedef enum { oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, - oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, + oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, oVisualHostKey, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, @@ -171,7 +172,7 @@ typedef enum { oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oProxyJump, - oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported + oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ @@ -181,6 +182,8 @@ static struct { OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { /* Deprecated options */ + { "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */ + { "cipher", oDeprecated }, { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, @@ -208,15 +211,9 @@ static struct { { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, - { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, - { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, -# else { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported }, -#endif { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, @@ -245,10 +242,8 @@ static struct { { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, - { "cipher", oCipher }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, - { "protocol", oProtocol }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "user", oUser }, @@ -265,6 +260,7 @@ static struct { { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, + { "syslogfacility", oLogFacility }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, @@ -289,6 +285,7 @@ static struct { { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, + { "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, @@ -443,8 +440,8 @@ add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); - else - (void)xasprintf(&path, "%.100s%.100s", dir, filename); + else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX) + fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { @@ -754,6 +751,16 @@ static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; +static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = { + { "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, + { "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, + { "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, + { "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, + { "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK }, + { "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, + { "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, @@ -829,7 +836,9 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, char **cpptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0; int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; + int remotefwd, dynamicfwd; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; + SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; struct Forward fwd; @@ -870,6 +879,8 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ return -1; + case oIgnore: + return 0; case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); @@ -953,14 +964,6 @@ parse_time: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; - case oRSAAuthentication: - intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - - case oRhostsRSAAuthentication: - intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; @@ -992,7 +995,7 @@ parse_time: case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; - multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; + multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: @@ -1011,10 +1014,6 @@ parse_time: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; - case oCompressionLevel: - intptr = &options->compression_level; - goto parse_int; - case oRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') @@ -1177,19 +1176,6 @@ parse_int: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; goto parse_int; - case oCipher: - intptr = &options->cipher; - arg = strdelim(&s); - if (!arg || *arg == '\0') - fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - value = cipher_number(arg); - if (value == -1) - fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.", - filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); - if (*activep && *intptr == -1) - *intptr = value; - break; - case oCiphers: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') @@ -1240,19 +1226,6 @@ parse_keytypes: *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; - case oProtocol: - intptr = &options->protocol; - arg = strdelim(&s); - if (!arg || *arg == '\0') - fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - value = proto_spec(arg); - if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) - fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", - filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); - if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) - *intptr = value; - break; - case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&s); @@ -1264,6 +1237,17 @@ parse_keytypes: *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; + case oLogFacility: + log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; + arg = strdelim(&s); + value = log_facility_number(arg); + if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) + *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; + break; + case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: @@ -1272,31 +1256,36 @@ parse_keytypes: fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", filename, linenum); - if (opcode == oLocalForward || - opcode == oRemoteForward) { - arg2 = strdelim(&s); - if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') - fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.", - filename, linenum); + remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward); + dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward); - /* construct a string for parse_forward */ - snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); - } else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) { - strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); + if (!dynamicfwd) { + arg2 = strdelim(&s); + if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') { + if (remotefwd) + dynamicfwd = 1; + else + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target " + "argument.", filename, linenum); + } else { + /* construct a string for parse_forward */ + snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, + arg2); + } } + if (dynamicfwd) + strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); - if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, - opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0, - opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0) + if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { - if (opcode == oLocalForward || - opcode == oDynamicForward) - add_local_forward(options, &fwd); - else if (opcode == oRemoteForward) + if (remotefwd) { add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); + } else { + add_local_forward(options, &fwd); + } } break; @@ -1469,6 +1458,10 @@ parse_keytypes: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; + case oRemoteCommand: + charptr = &options->remote_command; + goto parse_command; + case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; @@ -1794,7 +1787,6 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->use_privileged_port = -1; - options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; @@ -1802,25 +1794,21 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; - options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; - options->compression_level = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; - options->cipher = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; - options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; options->num_identity_files = 0; options->num_certificate_files = 0; options->hostname = NULL; @@ -1838,6 +1826,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; @@ -1861,6 +1850,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; + options->remote_command = NULL; options->add_keys_to_agent = -1; options->identity_agent = NULL; options->visual_host_key = -1; @@ -1934,8 +1924,6 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->use_privileged_port == -1) options->use_privileged_port = 0; - if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) - options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) @@ -1948,8 +1936,6 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; - if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) - options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) @@ -1957,13 +1943,11 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 1; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) - options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */ + options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; - if (options->compression_level == -1) - options->compression_level = 6; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) @@ -1972,31 +1956,17 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; - /* Selected in ssh_login(). */ - if (options->cipher == -1) - options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ - if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) - options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { - if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { - add_identity_file(options, "~/", - _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 0); - } - if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { - add_identity_file(options, "~/", - _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); - add_identity_file(options, "~/", - _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - add_identity_file(options, "~/", - _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); #endif - add_identity_file(options, "~/", - _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); - } + add_identity_file(options, "~/", + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; @@ -2014,6 +1984,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER; if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) @@ -2083,6 +2055,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); @@ -2372,9 +2345,10 @@ fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) case oAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: - case oStrictHostKeyChecking: case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); + case oStrictHostKeyChecking: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); case oTunnel: @@ -2385,17 +2359,6 @@ fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); case oFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); - case oProtocol: - switch (val) { - case SSH_PROTO_1: - return "1"; - case SSH_PROTO_2: - return "2"; - case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2): - return "2,1"; - default: - return "UNKNOWN"; - } default: switch (val) { case 0: @@ -2540,14 +2503,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); - dump_cfg_fmtint(oProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); -#ifdef WITH_RSA1 - dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); - dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); -#endif dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); @@ -2559,9 +2517,6 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level); -#endif dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); @@ -2579,6 +2534,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX); dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); + dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 @@ -2631,10 +2587,6 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) printf("\n"); } - /* oCipher */ - if (o->cipher != SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) - printf("Cipher %s\n", cipher_name(o->cipher)); - /* oControlPersist */ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h index cef55f71c914..22fe5c1873c3 100644 --- a/readconf.h +++ b/readconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.117 2016/07/15 00:24:30 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.123 2017/09/03 23:33:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ typedef struct { char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */ - int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA - * authentication. */ - int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int challenge_response_authentication; @@ -54,11 +51,10 @@ typedef struct { int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ - int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9 - * (best). */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ + SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ int port; /* Port to connect. */ @@ -69,12 +65,10 @@ typedef struct { * aborting connection attempt */ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password * prompts. */ - int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ - int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ @@ -140,6 +134,7 @@ typedef struct { char *local_command; int permit_local_command; + char *remote_command; int visual_host_key; int request_tty; @@ -195,6 +190,11 @@ typedef struct { #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 #define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3 + void initialize_options(Options *); void fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile index b23496b98417..7d50f9cfa437 100644 --- a/regress/Makefile +++ b/regress/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.94 2016/12/16 03:51:19 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.95 2017/06/24 06:35:24 djm Exp $ REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS) @@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ LTESTS= connect \ principals-command \ cert-file \ cfginclude \ - allow-deny-users + allow-deny-users \ + authinfo # dhgex \ @@ -89,30 +90,33 @@ INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #LTESTS= cipher-speed -USERNAME!= id -un +USERNAME= ${LOGNAME} CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \ authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \ banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \ - ed25519-agent.pub empty.in expect failed-regress.log \ - failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log hkr.* host.rsa host.rsa1 \ - host_* host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \ - key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 key.ed25519-512.pub \ - key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* known_hosts \ - known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy modpipe \ - netcat pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \ - revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa1 \ - rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ + ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \ + expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \ + hkr.* host.ed25519 host.rsa host.rsa1 host_* \ + host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \ + key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \ + key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* \ + known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ + modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ + pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log \ + remote_pid revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub \ + rsa1 rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \ - ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config.orig \ - sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak sshd_proxy_orig \ - t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub t2.out t3.out \ - t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub t8.out t8.out.pub \ - t9.out t9.out.pub testdata user_*key* user_ca* user_key* + ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \ + sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \ + sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \ + t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \ + t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \ + user_*key* user_ca* user_key* SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USERNAME} /var/run/keycommand_${USERNAME} diff --git a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh index 34bced154f72..037a5091493a 100644 --- a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh +++ b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.8 2017/01/06 02:51:16 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.9 2017/09/13 14:58:26 bluhm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="disallow agent attach from other uid" diff --git a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh index 3aa20c8b1ee0..db3018b885fe 100755 --- a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh +++ b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.2 2015/01/12 11:46:32 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="pkcs11 agent test" @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ else fi trace "pkcs11 connect via agent" - ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 r=$? if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)" diff --git a/regress/agent.sh b/regress/agent.sh index c5e2794b763c..0baf0c74a288 100644 --- a/regress/agent.sh +++ b/regress/agent.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.11 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.12 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple agent test" @@ -46,28 +46,24 @@ else fi trace "simple connect via agent" - for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then - fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed (exit code $r)" - fi - done + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" + fi trace "agent forwarding" - for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - ${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)" - fi - ${SSH} -A -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ - "${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5$p" - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then - fail "agent fwd proto $p failed (exit code $r)" - fi - done + ${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" + fi + ${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ + "${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52" + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" + fi trace "delete all agent keys" ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 diff --git a/regress/authinfo.sh b/regress/authinfo.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e725296c90aa --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/authinfo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# $OpenBSD: authinfo.sh,v 1.1 2017/06/24 06:35:24 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="authinfo" + +# Ensure the environment variable doesn't leak when ExposeAuthInfo=no. +verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=no" +env SSH_USER_AUTH=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \ + 'test -z "$SSH_USER_AUTH"' || fail "SSH_USER_AUTH present" + +verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=yes" +echo ExposeAuthInfo=yes >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \ + 'grep ^publickey "$SSH_USER_AUTH" /dev/null >/dev/null' || + fail "ssh with ExposeAuthInfo failed" + +# XXX test multiple auth and key contents diff --git a/regress/banner.sh b/regress/banner.sh index 0b9c9500749d..0d9654fe247a 100644 --- a/regress/banner.sh +++ b/regress/banner.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.2 2003/10/11 11:49:49 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="banner" @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ touch $OBJ/empty.in trace "test missing banner file" verbose "test $tid: missing banner file" -( ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ +( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ fail "missing banner file" @@ -30,14 +30,14 @@ for s in 0 10 100 1000 10000 100000 ; do trace "test banner size $s" verbose "test $tid: size $s" - ( ${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ + ( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ cmp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ fail "banner size $s mismatch" done trace "test suppress banner (-q)" verbose "test $tid: suppress banner (-q)" -( ${SSH} -q -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ +( ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ fail "suppress banner (-q)" diff --git a/regress/broken-pipe.sh b/regress/broken-pipe.sh index a416f7a3b52c..c69276e27057 100644 --- a/regress/broken-pipe.sh +++ b/regress/broken-pipe.sh @@ -1,15 +1,12 @@ -# $OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="broken pipe test" -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "protocol $p" - for i in 1 2 3 4; do - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then - fail "broken pipe returns $r for protocol $p" - fi - done +for i in 1 2 3 4; do + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "broken pipe returns $r" + fi done diff --git a/regress/brokenkeys.sh b/regress/brokenkeys.sh index 3e70c348ac36..9d5a54fa9db5 100644 --- a/regress/brokenkeys.sh +++ b/regress/brokenkeys.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: brokenkeys.sh,v 1.1 2004/10/29 23:59:22 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: brokenkeys.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="broken keys" @@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEABTM= bad key" > $KEYS cat ${KEYS}.bak >> ${KEYS} cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER -${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed" + fail "ssh connect with failed" fi mv ${KEYS}.bak ${KEYS} diff --git a/regress/cert-file.sh b/regress/cert-file.sh index 43b8e02014ce..8fd62c7730d9 100755 --- a/regress/cert-file.sh +++ b/regress/cert-file.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.5 2017/03/11 23:44:16 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="ssh with certificates" @@ -54,66 +54,64 @@ cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config # XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of # keys via enviornment variable or similar. -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do # Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub. - verbose "protocol $p: identity cert with no plain public file" - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ - -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p - [ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed" - - # CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work. - verbose "protocol $p: CertificateFile with no plain public file" - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ - -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \ - -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 5$p - [ $? -ne 5$p ] && fail "ssh failed" - - # Just keys should fail - verbose "protocol $p: plain keys" - ${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 5$p - r=$? - if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then - fail "ssh succeeded with no certs in protocol $p" - fi - - # Keys with untrusted cert should fail. - verbose "protocol $p: untrusted cert" - opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" - ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p - r=$? - if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then - fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert in protocol $p" - fi - - # Good cert with bad key should fail. - verbose "protocol $p: good cert, bad key" - opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2" - opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" - ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p - r=$? - if [ $r -eq 5$p ]; then - fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key in protocol $p" - fi - - # Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed. - verbose "protocol $p: single trusted" - opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" - ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then - fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key in protocol $p" - fi - - # Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed. - verbose "protocol $p: multiple trusted" - opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" - opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" - ${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 5$p - r=$? - if [ $r -ne 5$p ]; then - fail "ssh failed with multiple certs in protocol $p" - fi -done +verbose "identity cert with no plain public file" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ + -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52 +[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed" + +# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work. +verbose "CertificateFile with no plain public file" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ + -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \ + -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52 +[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed" + +# Just keys should fail +verbose "plain keys" +${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with no certs" +fi + +# Keys with untrusted cert should fail. +verbose "untrusted cert" +opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert" +fi + +# Good cert with bad key should fail. +verbose "good cert, bad key" +opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2" +opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key" +fi + +# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed. +verbose "single trusted" +opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key" +fi + +# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed. +verbose "multiple trusted" +opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" +opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with multiple certs" +fi #next, using an agent in combination with the keys SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 @@ -139,26 +137,25 @@ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fi # try ssh with the agent and certificates -# note: ssh agent only uses certificates in protocol 2 opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" # with no certificates, shoud fail -${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52 +${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 succeeded with no cert" + fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with no cert" fi #with an untrusted certificate, should fail opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" -${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52 +${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 succeeded with bad cert" + fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with bad cert" fi #with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" -${SSH} -2 $opts somehost exit 52 +${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with agent in protocol 2 failed with good cert" + fail "ssh connect with agent in failed with good cert" fi trace "kill agent" diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh index 62261cf8b3b5..3d5732a5d4fa 100755 --- a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh +++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.14 2016/05/02 09:52:00 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.15 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="certified host keys" @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ attempt_connect() { shift; shift verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success" cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert - ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ "$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true _r=$? @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ for privsep in yes no ; do ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert - ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert - ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ test_one() { ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert - ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 rc=$? @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy - ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert - ${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh index 7005fd55eb6f..6a23fe300bf7 100755 --- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh +++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.17 2016/11/30 03:01:33 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.18 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="certified user keys" @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do # Missing authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals" rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do # Empty authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do # Wrong authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do # Correct authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do # authorized_principals with bad key option verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ basic_tests() { echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ basic_tests() { ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \ $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" @@ -224,14 +224,14 @@ basic_tests() { rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \ $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" fi verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL" ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ basic_tests() { echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" echo "$extra_sshd" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ basic_tests() { echo "$extra_sshd" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user" - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/user_ca_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/user_ca_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ test_one() { $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 rc=$? if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert" - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh index 056296398657..2504d04f4c51 100644 --- a/regress/cfgmatch.sh +++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.9 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.10 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd_config match" @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy start_client() { rm -f $pidfile - ${SSH} -q -$p $fwd "$@" somehost \ + ${SSH} -q $fwd "$@" somehost \ exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & client_pid=$! @@ -56,22 +56,18 @@ start_sshd #set -x # Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config. This should be permitted -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p" - start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config - ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ - fail "match permitopen permit proto $p" - stop_client -done +trace "match permitopen localhost" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitopen permit" +stop_client # Same but from different source. This should not be permitted -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "match permitopen proxy proto $p" - start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy - ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ - fail "match permitopen deny proto $p" - stop_client -done +trace "match permitopen proxy" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ + fail "match permitopen deny" +stop_client # Retry previous with key option, should also be denied. cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER @@ -79,23 +75,19 @@ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p" - start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy - ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ - fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt proto $p" - stop_client -done +trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ + fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt" +stop_client # Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair. # Should be permitted. -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "match permitopen localhost proto $p" - start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config - ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ - fail "match permitopen permit proto $p" - stop_client -done +trace "match permitopen localhost" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitopen permit" +stop_client cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy @@ -103,13 +95,11 @@ echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy # Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p" - start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy - ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ - fail "match override permitopen proto $p" - stop_client -done +trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ + fail "match override permitopen" +stop_client cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy @@ -118,10 +108,8 @@ echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy # Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a # PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts proto $p" - start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy - ${SSH} -q -$p -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ - fail "nomatch override permitopen proto $p" - stop_client -done +trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "nomatch override permitopen" +stop_client diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh index 575dc23411d4..5da95b3a9e70 100644 --- a/regress/cipher-speed.sh +++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.13 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.14 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="cipher speed" @@ -12,16 +12,16 @@ getbytes () tries="1 2" for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do - trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" + trace "cipher $c mac $m" for x in $tries; do printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:" ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ - -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost \ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c" + fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi done # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored. @@ -30,22 +30,3 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do fi n=`expr $n + 1` done; done - -if ssh_version 1; then - ciphers="3des blowfish" -else - ciphers="" -fi -for c in $ciphers; do - trace "proto 1 cipher $c" - for x in $tries; do - printf "%-60s" "$c:" - ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ - -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \ - exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ - < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c" - fi - done -done diff --git a/regress/connect-privsep.sh b/regress/connect-privsep.sh index 81cedc7e5f6d..b6abb65e3566 100644 --- a/regress/connect-privsep.sh +++ b/regress/connect-privsep.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.8 2016/11/01 13:43:27 tb Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.9 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect with privsep" @@ -6,23 +6,19 @@ tid="proxy connect with privsep" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect protocol $p failed" - fi -done +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect failed" +fi cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised - warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p failed" - fi -done +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised + warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect failed" +fi # Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest # with every malloc.conf option (and none). @@ -32,10 +28,8 @@ else mopts=`echo $TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS | sed 's/./& /g'` fi for m in '' $mopts ; do - for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true + env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p mopt '$m' failed" + fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect mopt '$m' failed" fi - done done diff --git a/regress/connect.sh b/regress/connect.sh index f0d55d343d8a..1b344b6034e9 100644 --- a/regress/connect.sh +++ b/regress/connect.sh @@ -1,13 +1,11 @@ -# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple connect" start_sshd -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed" - fi -done +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed" +fi diff --git a/regress/dhgex.sh b/regress/dhgex.sh index e7c5733974a7..61fc178e890c 100755 --- a/regress/dhgex.sh +++ b/regress/dhgex.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.3 2015/10/23 02:22:01 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.4 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dhgex" @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ check() #check 2048 3des-cbc check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128` -check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192` check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256` check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com diff --git a/regress/dynamic-forward.sh b/regress/dynamic-forward.sh index dd67c9639eaf..84f8ee19280a 100644 --- a/regress/dynamic-forward.sh +++ b/regress/dynamic-forward.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.11 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.13 2017/09/21 19:18:12 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dynamic forwarding" @@ -17,33 +17,34 @@ trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" start_sshd -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do +for d in D R; do n=0 error="1" trace "start dynamic forwarding, fork to background" + while [ "$error" -ne 0 -a "$n" -lt 3 ]; do n=`expr $n + 1` - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -D $FWDPORT -q \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -$d $FWDPORT -q \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost exec sh -c \ \'"echo \$\$ > $OBJ/remote_pid; exec sleep 444"\' error=$? if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then - trace "forward failed proto $p attempt $n err $error" + trace "forward failed attempt $n err $error" sleep $n fi done if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then - fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding proto $p" + fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding" fi for s in 4 5; do for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do - trace "testing ssh protocol $p socks version $s host $h" + trace "testing ssh socks version $s host $h (-$d)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT" \ - somehost cat $DATA > $OBJ/ls.copy - test -f $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "failed copy $DATA" - cmp $DATA $OBJ/ls.copy || fail "corrupted copy of $DATA" + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" done done @@ -56,4 +57,5 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do else fail "no pid file: $OBJ/remote_pid" fi + done diff --git a/regress/exit-status.sh b/regress/exit-status.sh index 397d8d732fed..aadf99fb3c8b 100644 --- a/regress/exit-status.sh +++ b/regress/exit-status.sh @@ -1,24 +1,22 @@ -# $OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.7 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="remote exit status" -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do - trace "proto $p status $s" - verbose "test $tid: proto $p status $s" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s - r=$? - if [ $r -ne $s ]; then - fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s" - fi +for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do + trace "status $s" + verbose "test $tid: status $s" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s + r=$? + if [ $r -ne $s ]; then + fail "exit code mismatch for: $r != $s" + fi - # same with early close of stdout/err - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost \ - exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' - r=$? - if [ $r -ne $s ]; then - fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s" - fi - done + # same with early close of stdout/err + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost exec \ + sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' + r=$? + if [ $r -ne $s ]; then + fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for: $r != $s" + fi done diff --git a/regress/forcecommand.sh b/regress/forcecommand.sh index 8a9b090ea5d8..e059f1fdbc61 100644 --- a/regress/forcecommand.sh +++ b/regress/forcecommand.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="forced command" @@ -11,11 +11,8 @@ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER done -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "forced command in key option proto $p" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ || - fail "forced command in key proto $p" -done +trace "forced command in key option" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do @@ -26,19 +23,13 @@ done cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option proto $p" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ || - fail "forced command in key proto $p" -done +trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo " ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "forced command with match proto $p" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false \ || - fail "forced command in key proto $p" -done +trace "forced command with match" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh index 91957098f7db..2e9dbb53aa6b 100755 --- a/regress/forward-control.sh +++ b/regress/forward-control.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding" @@ -32,13 +32,12 @@ wait_for_process_to_exit() { return 0 } -# usage: check_lfwd protocol Y|N message +# usage: check_lfwd Y|N message check_lfwd() { - _proto=$1 - _expected=$2 - _message=$3 + _expected=$1 + _message=$2 rm -f $READY - ${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \ -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \ @@ -62,13 +61,12 @@ check_lfwd() { fi } -# usage: check_rfwd protocol Y|N message +# usage: check_rfwd Y|N message check_rfwd() { - _proto=$1 - _expected=$2 - _message=$3 + _expected=$1 + _message=$2 rm -f $READY - ${SSH} -oProtocol=$_proto -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ -R$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \ -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \ @@ -99,10 +97,8 @@ cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak # Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do - check_lfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration" - check_rfwd $p Y "proto $p, default configuration" -done +check_lfwd Y "default configuration" +check_rfwd Y "default configuration" # Usage: all_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N all_tests() { @@ -115,49 +111,46 @@ all_tests() { _permit_rfwd=$7 _badfwd=127.0.0.1:22 _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT} - for _proto in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do - cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ - ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} - _prefix="proto $_proto, AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd" - # No PermitOpen - ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; - echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ - > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy - check_lfwd $_proto $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix" - check_rfwd $_proto $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix" - # PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match - ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; - echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; - echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd" ) \ - > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy - check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" - check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" - # PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match - ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; - echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; - echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd $_goodfwd" ) \ - > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy - # NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same - # success/fail as via sshd_config - # permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match - sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\" /" \ - < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ - > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail" - ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; - echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ - > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy - check_lfwd $_proto $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" - check_rfwd $_proto $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" - # permitopen via authorized_keys that does match - sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \ - < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ - > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail" - ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; - echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ - > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy - check_lfwd $_proto $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" - check_rfwd $_proto $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" - done + cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} + _prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd" + # No PermitOpen + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix" + check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix" + # PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; + echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" + check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" + # PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; + echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd $_goodfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + # NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same + # success/fail as via sshd_config + # permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match + sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\" /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" + check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" + # permitopen via authorized_keys that does match + sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" + check_rfwd $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" } # no-permitopen mismatch-permitopen match-permitopen diff --git a/regress/forwarding.sh b/regress/forwarding.sh index 45c596d7db99..39fccba7385a 100644 --- a/regress/forwarding.sh +++ b/regress/forwarding.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.19 2017/01/30 05:22:14 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="local and remote forwarding" @@ -22,30 +22,24 @@ for j in 0 1 2; do last=$a done done -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - q=`expr 3 - $p` - if ! ssh_version $q; then - q=$p - fi - trace "start forwarding, fork to background" - rm -f $CTL - ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10 - trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result" - ${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ - somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} - test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" - cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" +trace "start forwarding, fork to background" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost -done +trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do for d in L R; do - trace "exit on -$d forward failure, proto $p" + trace "exit on -$d forward failure" # this one should succeed - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ @@ -55,7 +49,7 @@ for d in L R; do fatal "connection failed, should not" else # this one should fail - ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ @@ -68,82 +62,74 @@ for d in L R; do fi fi done -done -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "simple clear forwarding proto $p" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true - - trace "clear local forward proto $p" - rm -f $CTL - ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ - -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 - if [ $? != 0 ]; then - fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding" - else - # this one should fail - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ - >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ - fail "local forwarding not cleared" - fi - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost - - trace "clear remote forward proto $p" - rm -f $CTL - ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ - -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 - if [ $? != 0 ]; then - fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding" - else - # this one should fail - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ - >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ - fail "remote forwarding not cleared" - fi - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost -done - -for p in 2; do - trace "stdio forwarding proto $p" - cmd="${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config" - $cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" \ - somehost true - if [ $? != 0 ]; then - fail "stdio forwarding proto $p" - fi -done +trace "simple clear forwarding" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true + +trace "clear local forward" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 +if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding" +else + # this one should fail + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ + fail "local forwarding not cleared" +fi +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +trace "clear remote forward" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 +if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding" +else + # this one should fail + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ + fail "remote forwarding not cleared" +fi +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +trace "stdio forwarding" +cmd="${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config" +$cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" somehost true +if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fail "stdio forwarding" +fi echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background" - rm -f $CTL - ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10 - - trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result" - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ - somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} - test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" - cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" - - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost -done -for p in 2; do - trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result" - rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd - rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123] - ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ - somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} - test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" - cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" - - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost -done +trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10 + +trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result" +rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd +rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123] +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost + diff --git a/regress/host-expand.sh b/regress/host-expand.sh index 2a95bfe1b37b..9444f7fb619e 100755 --- a/regress/host-expand.sh +++ b/regress/host-expand.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="expand %h and %n" @@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ somehost 127.0.0.1 EOE -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "test $tid: proto $p" - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true >$OBJ/actual - diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid proto $p" -done +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >$OBJ/actual +diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid" diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh index 094700da62f7..811b6b9ab25a 100755 --- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh +++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.6 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.7 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey agent" @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ for ps in no yes; do cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "protocol $p privsep=$ps failed" + fail "privsep=$ps failed" fi if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps" diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh index 1df2924f5f09..3eda40f0a3d3 100755 --- a/regress/integrity.sh +++ b/regress/integrity.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.20 2017/01/06 02:26:10 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.23 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ for m in $macs; do macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr" fi verbose "test $tid: $m @$off" - ${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ + ${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \ 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then @@ -60,14 +60,16 @@ for m in $macs; do Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*) emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;; padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;; + *Timeout,?server*) + etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;; *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";; esac done - verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen" + verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo" if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then fail "$m: no mac errors" fi - expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen` + expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo` if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac" fi diff --git a/regress/key-options.sh b/regress/key-options.sh index 7a68ad358b76..2adee6833475 100755 --- a/regress/key-options.sh +++ b/regress/key-options.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="key options" @@ -8,64 +8,56 @@ authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}" cp $authkeys $origkeys # Test command= forced command -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do +for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys - verbose "key option proto $p $c" - r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo` + verbose "key option $c" + r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo` if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then fail "key option forced command not restricted" fi if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then fail "key option forced command not executed" fi - done done # Test no-pty sed 's/.*/no-pty &/' $origkeys >$authkeys -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "key option proto $p no-pty" - r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost tty` - if [ -f "$r" ]; then - fail "key option failed proto $p no-pty (pty $r)" - fi -done +verbose "key option proto no-pty" +r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost tty` +if [ -f "$r" ]; then + fail "key option failed no-pty (pty $r)" +fi # Test environment= echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "key option proto $p environment" - r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'` - if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then - fail "key option environment not set" - fi -done +verbose "key option environment" +r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'` +if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then + fail "key option environment not set" +fi # Test from= restriction start_sshd -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do +for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do cat $origkeys >$authkeys - ${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "key option proto $p failed without restriction" + fail "key option failed without restriction" fi sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '` - verbose "key option proto $p $from" - r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'` + verbose "key option $from" + r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'` if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then - fail "key option proto $p $from not restricted" + fail "key option $from not restricted" fi - r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'` + r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'` if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then - fail "key option proto $p $from not allowed but should be" + fail "key option $from not allowed but should be" fi - done done rm -f "$origkeys" diff --git a/regress/keygen-change.sh b/regress/keygen-change.sh index e56185050ddf..8b8acd52fb9f 100644 --- a/regress/keygen-change.sh +++ b/regress/keygen-change.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="change passphrase for key" @@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ S1="secret1" S2="2secret" KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain` -if ssh_version 1; then - KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1" -fi for t in $KEYTYPES; do # generate user key for agent diff --git a/regress/keyscan.sh b/regress/keyscan.sh index f97364b76e7d..3bde1219a605 100644 --- a/regress/keyscan.sh +++ b/regress/keyscan.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/11 03:44:21 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="keyscan" @@ -9,10 +9,6 @@ rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa start_sshd KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain` -if ssh_version 1; then - KEYTYPES="${KEYTYPES} rsa1" -fi - for t in $KEYTYPES; do trace "keyscan type $t" ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \ diff --git a/regress/keytype.sh b/regress/keytype.sh index 8f697788f865..88b022de4adb 100755 --- a/regress/keytype.sh +++ b/regress/keytype.sh @@ -1,13 +1,8 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.4 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.5 2017/03/20 22:08:06 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="login with different key types" -TIME=`which time 2>/dev/null` -if test ! -x "$TIME"; then - TIME="" -fi - cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak @@ -26,8 +21,8 @@ for kt in $ktypes; do rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'` type=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'` - printf "keygen $type, $bits bits:\t" - ${TIME} ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\ + verbose "keygen $type, $bits bits" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\ fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed" done @@ -63,8 +58,8 @@ for ut in $ktypes; do ) > $OBJ/known_hosts cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER for i in $tries; do - printf "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}:\t" - ${TIME} ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true + verbose "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed" fi diff --git a/regress/localcommand.sh b/regress/localcommand.sh index 220f19a4d48b..5224a16b24d7 100755 --- a/regress/localcommand.sh +++ b/regress/localcommand.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="localcommand" @@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ tid="localcommand" echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand" - a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -$p somehost true` - if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then - fail "$tid proto $p" - fi -done +verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand" +a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true` +if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then + fail "$tid proto $p" +fi diff --git a/regress/login-timeout.sh b/regress/login-timeout.sh index 12207fd99ee7..4c2d07dc255d 100644 --- a/regress/login-timeout.sh +++ b/regress/login-timeout.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.8 2016/12/16 01:06:27 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.9 2017/08/07 00:53:51 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect after login grace timeout" @@ -10,23 +10,9 @@ echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config start_sshd -(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & +(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & sleep 15 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed with privsep" -fi - -stop_sshd - -trace "test login grace without privsep" -echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config -start_sshd -sleep 1 - -(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & -sleep 15 -${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true -if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed without privsep" + fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed" fi diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8fbfc20c68de --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts. +CXX=clang++-3.9 +FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,undefined -fsanitize-coverage=edge +FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer + +CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS) +LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS) +LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(FUZZ_LIBS) + +all: pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz + +.cc.o: + $(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o + $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) + +sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o + $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) + +clean: + -rm -f *.o pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ae6fbe75d6b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +This directory contains fuzzing harnesses for use with clang's libfuzzer. diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8bbc110931b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +extern "C" { + +#include "sshkey.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) +{ + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + int r = sshkey_from_blob(data, size, &k); + if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k); + return 0; +} + +} // extern + diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0e535b49a5af --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// cc_fuzz_target test for public key parsing. + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern "C" { + +#include "includes.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +static struct sshkey *generate_or_die(int type, unsigned bits) { + int r; + struct sshkey *ret; + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "generate(%d, %u): %s", type, bits, ssh_err(r)); + abort(); + } + return ret; +} + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048); + static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024); + static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256); + static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384); + static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521); +#endif + static struct sshkey *ed25519 = generate_or_die(KEY_ED25519, 0); + static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had " + "run away, I don’t know how it would all end"; + static const size_t dlen = strlen(data); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, 0); + sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, 0); + sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, 0); + sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, 0); + sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, 0); +#endif + sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, 0); + return 0; +} + +} // extern diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile index 3018b632f0fe..d0aca8dfe7e7 100644 --- a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile +++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2016/03/04 02:30:37 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2017/04/17 11:02:31 jsg Exp $ .include .include @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused -.if ${COMPILER_VERSION} == "gcc4" +.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-sign CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition .endif diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c index 67058027fe52..3e2c481606c0 100644 --- a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c +++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.3 2016/10/11 21:49:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Fuzz harness for KEX code * @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) close(fd); /* XXX check that it is a private key */ /* XXX support certificates */ - if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || key->type == KEY_RSA1) + if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) badusage("Invalid key file (-k flag)"); /* Replace (fuzz) mode */ diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh index acb9234d9a94..078a53a889e5 100644 --- a/regress/multiplex.sh +++ b/regress/multiplex.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.27 2014/12/22 06:14:29 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.28 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$ @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then - fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s" + fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s" fi # same with early close of stdout/err @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then - fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s" + fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s" fi done diff --git a/regress/principals-command.sh b/regress/principals-command.sh index 9b38eb10543f..bcc68e80bca6 100755 --- a/regress/principals-command.sh +++ b/regress/principals-command.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.3 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized principals command" @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then # Empty authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then # Wrong authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then # Correct authorized_principals verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then # authorized_principals with bad key option verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER - ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cert connect failed" diff --git a/regress/proto-mismatch.sh b/regress/proto-mismatch.sh index 9e8024beb0f9..6ab28c9a7ad9 100644 --- a/regress/proto-mismatch.sh +++ b/regress/proto-mismatch.sh @@ -1,21 +1,17 @@ -# $OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="protocol version mismatch" mismatch () { - server=$1 client=$2 - banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${server}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` + banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` r=$? trace "sshd prints ${banner}" if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then - fail "sshd prints ${banner} and accepts connect with version ${client}" + fail "sshd prints ${banner} but accepts version ${client}" fi } -mismatch 2 SSH-1.5-HALLO -if ssh_version 1; then - mismatch 1 SSH-2.0-HALLO -fi +mismatch SSH-1.5-HALLO diff --git a/regress/proto-version.sh b/regress/proto-version.sh index cf4946115488..1f33b1f00b77 100644 --- a/regress/proto-version.sh +++ b/regress/proto-version.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.7 2017/06/07 01:48:15 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations" @@ -6,9 +6,8 @@ tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations" # we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner check_version () { - version=$1 - expect=$2 - banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -o "Protocol=${version}" -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` + expect=$1 + banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` case ${banner} in SSH-1.99-*) proto=199 @@ -24,13 +23,8 @@ check_version () ;; esac if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then - fail "wrong protocol version ${banner} for ${version}" + fail "wrong protocol version ${banner}" fi } -check_version 2 20 -if ssh_version 1; then - check_version 2,1 199 - check_version 1,2 199 - check_version 1 15 -fi +check_version 20 diff --git a/regress/proxy-connect.sh b/regress/proxy-connect.sh index b7a43fabe782..f1b9d9f76bd7 100644 --- a/regress/proxy-connect.sh +++ b/regress/proxy-connect.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.9 2016/02/17 02:24:17 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.10 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect" @@ -6,27 +6,22 @@ tid="proxy connect" mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig for ps in no yes; do - cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy - echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy - - for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - for c in no yes; do - verbose "plain username protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c" - opts="-$p -oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" - SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c failed" - fi - if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then - fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c: " \ - "$SSH_CONNECTION" - fi - done - done + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + for c in no yes; do + verbose "plain username privsep=$ps comp=$c" + opts="-oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" + SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh proxyconnect privsep=$ps comp=$c failed" + fi + if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then + fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION privsep=$ps comp=$c: " \ + "$SSH_CONNECTION" + fi + done done -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "username with style protocol $p" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \ - fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed" -done +verbose "username with style" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \ + fail "ssh proxyconnect failed" diff --git a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh index 9adba674e5c3..419daabbaa75 100755 --- a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh +++ b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.5 2016/11/25 03:02:01 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.6 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty ciphers" @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then exit 0 fi -for c in aes blowfish 3des arcfour aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do +for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do verbose "$tid: cipher $c" cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c diff --git a/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/regress/putty-transfer.sh index 8eb6ae0c0f11..32c79f9ea4b9 100755 --- a/regress/putty-transfer.sh +++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.4 2016/11/25 03:02:01 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="putty transfer data" @@ -8,33 +8,30 @@ if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then exit 0 fi -# XXX support protocol 1 too -for p in 2; do - for c in 0 1 ; do - verbose "$tid: proto $p compression $c" +for c in 0 1 ; do + verbose "$tid: compression $c" + rm -f ${COPY} + cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c + echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \ + -i putty.rsa cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + + for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do + trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} - cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ - ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c - echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k - env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \ - -i putty.rsa$p cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \ + -batch -i putty.rsa \ + "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi - cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" - - for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do - trace "proto $p compression $c dd-size ${s}" - rm -f ${COPY} - dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ - env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \ - -batch -i putty.rsa$p \ - "cat > ${COPY}" - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" - fi - cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" - done + cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done done rm -f ${COPY} diff --git a/regress/reconfigure.sh b/regress/reconfigure.sh index eecddd3c7302..dd15eddb2a24 100644 --- a/regress/reconfigure.sh +++ b/regress/reconfigure.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.5 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="simple connect after reconfigure" @@ -18,12 +18,10 @@ fi start_sshd trace "connect before restart" -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do - ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed before reconfigure" - fi -done +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed before reconfigure" +fi PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` rm -f $PIDFILE @@ -39,9 +37,7 @@ done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart" trace "connect after restart" -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do - ${SSH} -o "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh connect with protocol $p failed after reconfigure" - fi -done +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure" +fi diff --git a/regress/reexec.sh b/regress/reexec.sh index 72957d4cd263..2192456cd85e 100644 --- a/regress/reexec.sh +++ b/regress/reexec.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.10 2016/12/16 01:06:27 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.12 2017/08/07 03:52:55 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="reexec tests" @@ -19,16 +19,13 @@ start_sshd_copy () copy_tests () { rm -f ${COPY} - for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} ; do - verbose "$tid: proto $p" - ${SSH} -nqo "Protocol=$p" -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \ - cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" - fi - cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" - rm -f ${COPY} - done + ${SSH} -nq -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \ + cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + rm -f ${COPY} } verbose "test config passing" @@ -54,17 +51,4 @@ rm -f $SSHD_COPY copy_tests stop_sshd - -verbose "test reexec fallback without privsep" - -cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config -echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config - -start_sshd_copy -rm -f $SSHD_COPY - -copy_tests - -stop_sshd - fi diff --git a/regress/ssh-com.sh b/regress/ssh-com.sh index 4371d5279746..b1a2505d1135 100644 --- a/regress/ssh-com.sh +++ b/regress/ssh-com.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.9 2015/05/08 07:29:00 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.10 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect to ssh.com server" @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ for v in ${VERSIONS}; do fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed" fi - ciphers="3des-cbc blowfish-cbc arcfour" + ciphers="3des-cbc" macs="hmac-md5" case $v in 2.4.*) diff --git a/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh b/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh index 218ac6b68e19..9065245e84fb 100644 --- a/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh +++ b/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: stderr-after-eof.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: stderr-after-eof.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="stderr data after eof" @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do (date;echo $i) | md5 >> ${DATA} done -${SSH} -2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \ +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \ exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 2; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ 2> ${COPY} r=$? diff --git a/regress/stderr-data.sh b/regress/stderr-data.sh index 8c8149a732b7..0ceb72b3a298 100644 --- a/regress/stderr-data.sh +++ b/regress/stderr-data.sh @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ -# $OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.4 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="stderr data transfer" for n in '' -n; do -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "test $tid: proto $p ($n)" - ${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \ - exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ + verbose "test $tid: ($n)" + ${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \ + sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ 2> ${COPY} r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then @@ -16,8 +15,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" rm -f ${COPY} - ${SSH} $n -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \ - exec sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ + ${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \ + sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ > /dev/null 2> ${COPY} r=$? if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then @@ -26,4 +25,3 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" rm -f ${COPY} done -done diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh index dc033cd96203..68f010b70ddc 100644 --- a/regress/test-exec.sh +++ b/regress/test-exec.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.59 2017/02/07 23:03:11 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.61 2017/07/28 10:32:08 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. #SUDO=sudo @@ -130,12 +130,6 @@ if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then esac fi -SSH_PROTOCOLS=2 -#SSH_PROTOCOLS=`$SSH -Q protocol-version` -if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS" != "x" ]; then - SSH_PROTOCOLS="${TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS}" -fi - # Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec case "$SSHD" in /*) ;; @@ -310,8 +304,15 @@ stop_sshd () i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done - test -f $PIDFILE && \ - fatal "sshd didn't exit port $PORT pid $pid" + if test -f $PIDFILE; then + if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then + echo "sshd didn't exit " \ + "port $PORT pid $pid" + else + echo "sshd died without cleanup" + fi + exit 1 + fi fi fi fi @@ -386,22 +387,11 @@ fatal () exit $RESULT } -ssh_version () -{ - echo ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} | grep "$1" >/dev/null -} - RESULT=0 PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile trap fatal 3 2 -if ssh_version 1; then - PROTO="2,1" -else - PROTO="2" -fi - # create server config cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config StrictModes no @@ -460,11 +450,8 @@ fi rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER -if ssh_version 1; then - SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa rsa1" -else - SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519" -fi +SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519" + trace "generate keys" for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key diff --git a/regress/transfer.sh b/regress/transfer.sh index 36c14634ab9e..cf174a00678d 100644 --- a/regress/transfer.sh +++ b/regress/transfer.sh @@ -1,26 +1,23 @@ -# $OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="transfer data" -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - verbose "$tid: proto $p" +rm -f ${COPY} +${SSH} -n -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" +fi +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do + trace "dd-size ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} - ${SSH} -n -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" fi - cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" - - for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do - trace "proto $p dd-size ${s}" - rm -f ${COPY} - dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ - ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" - fi - cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" - done + cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" done rm -f ${COPY} diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh index 889a735d27dc..e04268ba35bf 100644 --- a/regress/try-ciphers.sh +++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.25 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.26 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="try ciphers" @@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0 for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do - trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" - verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" + trace "cipher $c mac $m" + verbose "test $tid: cipher $c mac $m" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c" + fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they # are ignored. @@ -26,17 +26,3 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do done done -if ssh_version 1; then - ciphers="3des blowfish" -else - ciphers="" -fi -for c in $ciphers; do - trace "proto 1 cipher $c" - verbose "test $tid: proto 1 cipher $c" - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost true - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c" - fi -done - diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc index 3d9eaba5c94e..36d1ff42c06e 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc +++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.9 2016/11/01 13:43:27 tb Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.11 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ .include .include @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused -.if ${COMPILER_VERSION} == "gcc4" +.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-sign CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition .endif diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh index 36890ba11a76..5a46de990dca 100755 --- a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ #!/bin/sh -# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ set -ex cd testdata -rm -f rsa1* rsa* dsa* ecdsa* ed25519* +rm -f rsa* dsa* ecdsa* ed25519* rm -f known_hosts* gen_all() { @@ -13,13 +13,12 @@ gen_all() { _ecdsa_bits=256 test "x$_n" = "x1" && _ecdsa_bits=384 test "x$_n" = "x2" && _ecdsa_bits=521 - ssh-keygen -qt rsa1 -b 1024 -C "RSA1 #$_n" -N "" -f rsa1_$_n ssh-keygen -qt rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA #$_n" -N "" -f rsa_$_n ssh-keygen -qt dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA #$_n" -N "" -f dsa_$_n ssh-keygen -qt ecdsa -b $_ecdsa_bits -C "ECDSA #$_n" -N "" -f ecdsa_$_n ssh-keygen -qt ed25519 -C "ED25519 #$_n" -N "" -f ed25519_$_n # Don't need private keys - rm -f rsa1_$_n rsa_$_n dsa_$_n ecdsa_$_n ed25519_$_n + rm -f rsa_$_n dsa_$_n ecdsa_$_n ed25519_$_n } hentries() { @@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag.old echo echo "# Revoked and CA keys" - printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat rsa1_4.pub printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat ed25519_4.pub printf "@cert-authority prometheus.example.com " ; cat ecdsa_4.pub printf "@cert-authority *.example.com " ; cat dsa_4.pub @@ -72,19 +70,13 @@ rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag.old printf "\n" echo "# Some invalid lines" # Invalid marker - printf "@what sisyphus.example.com " ; cat rsa1_1.pub + printf "@what sisyphus.example.com " ; cat dsa_1.pub # Key missing echo "sisyphus.example.com " # Key blob missing echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 " # Key blob truncated echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz" - # RSA1 key truncated after key bits - echo "prometheus.example.com 1024 " - # RSA1 key truncated after exponent - echo "sisyphus.example.com 1024 65535 " - # RSA1 key incorrect key bits - printf "prometheus.example.com 1025 " ; cut -d' ' -f2- < rsa1_1.pub # Invalid type echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==" # Type mismatch with blob diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c index 2eaaf063ac41..751825ddae9e 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.4 2015/03/31 22:59:01 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach() * @@ -90,14 +90,6 @@ check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ? expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype; -#ifndef WITH_SSH1 - if (parse_key && (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 || - expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1)) { - expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; - expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; - parse_key = 0; - } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA || expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) { @@ -150,10 +142,6 @@ prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n) for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (expected[i].key_file == NULL) continue; -#ifndef WITH_SSH1 - if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_RSA1) - continue; -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA) continue; @@ -217,22 +205,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #1", } }, - { "rsa1_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 5, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - "sisyphus.example.com", - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #1", - } }, { "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 6, + 5, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -245,7 +220,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 7, + 6, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -258,7 +233,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 8, + 7, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses", @@ -271,7 +246,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 9, + 8, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -284,7 +259,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 10, + 9, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -297,7 +272,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 11, + 10, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -308,22 +283,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #2", } }, - { "rsa1_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { - NULL, - 12, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #2", - } }, { "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 13, + 11, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -336,7 +298,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 14, + 12, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -349,7 +311,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 15, + 13, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs", @@ -362,7 +324,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 16, + 14, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -375,7 +337,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 17, + 15, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -388,7 +350,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 18, + 16, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -399,22 +361,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #3", } }, - { "rsa1_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { - NULL, - 19, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #3", - } }, { "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, - 20, + 17, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -427,7 +376,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 21, + 18, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -440,7 +389,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 22, + 19, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Hashed hostname and address entries", @@ -453,7 +402,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 23, + 20, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -466,7 +415,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 24, + 21, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -479,7 +428,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 25, + 22, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -490,22 +439,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #5", } }, - { "rsa1_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 26, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - NULL, - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #5", - } }, { "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 27, + 23, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -518,7 +454,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 28, + 24, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -536,7 +472,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { */ { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 29, + 25, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -549,7 +485,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, - 30, + 26, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -562,7 +498,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, - 31, + 27, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -575,7 +511,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 32, + 28, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -588,7 +524,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, - 33, + 29, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -601,7 +537,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, - 34, + 30, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -614,7 +550,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 35, + 31, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -627,7 +563,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, - 36, + 32, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -640,7 +576,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, - 37, + 33, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -651,48 +587,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, - { "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 38, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - NULL, - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #6", - } }, - { "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 39, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - NULL, - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #6", - } }, - { "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { - NULL, - 40, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - NULL, - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #6", - } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 41, + 34, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -705,7 +602,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, - 42, + 35, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -718,7 +615,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, - 43, + 36, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -731,7 +628,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 44, + 37, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -744,7 +641,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 45, + 38, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -757,7 +654,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 46, + 39, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Revoked and CA keys", @@ -768,22 +665,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, NULL, } }, - { "rsa1_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 47, - HKF_STATUS_OK, - 0, - NULL, - MRK_REVOKE, - "sisyphus.example.com", - NULL, - KEY_RSA1, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - "RSA1 #4", - } }, { "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 48, + 40, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -796,7 +680,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 49, + 41, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -809,7 +693,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 50, + 42, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, @@ -822,7 +706,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 51, + 43, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", @@ -835,7 +719,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 52, + 44, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Some invalid lines", @@ -848,7 +732,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 53, + 45, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, @@ -861,7 +745,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 54, + 46, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, @@ -874,7 +758,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 55, + 47, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, @@ -887,33 +771,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 56, - HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - "sisyphus.example.com", - NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC, - NULL, - NULL, - } }, - { NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 57, - HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - "prometheus.example.com", - NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC, - NULL, - NULL, - } }, - { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 58, + 48, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, @@ -924,22 +782,9 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { NULL, NULL, } }, - { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { - NULL, - 59, - HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ - 0, - NULL, - MRK_NONE, - "prometheus.example.com", - NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC, - NULL, /* filled at runtime */ - NULL, - } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 60, + 49, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, @@ -952,7 +797,7 @@ struct expected expected_full[] = { } }, { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, - 61, + 50, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts index 3740f674b48b..4446f45dffe8 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts @@ -2,60 +2,49 @@ sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAOqffHxEW4c+Z9q/r3l4sYK8F7qrBsU8XF9upGsW62T9InROFFq9IO0x3pQ6mDA0Wtw0sqcDmkPCHPyP4Ok/fU3/drLaZusHoVYu8pBBrWsIDrKgkeX9TEodBsSrYdl4Sqtqq9EZv9+DttV6LStZrgYyUTOKwOF95wGantpLynX5AAAAFQDdt+zjRNlETDsgmxcSYFgREirJrQAAAIBQlrPaiPhR24FhnMLcHH4016vL7AqDDID6Qw7PhbXGa4/XlxWMIigjBKrIPKvnZ6p712LSnCKtcbfdx0MtmJlNa01CYqPaRhgRaf+uGdvTkTUcdaq8R5lLJL+JMNwUhcC8ijm3NqEjXjffuebGe1EzIeiITbA7Nndcd+GytwRDegAAAIEAkRYPjSVcUxfUHhHdpP6V8CuY1+CYSs9EPJ7iiWTDuXWVIBTU32oJLAnrmAcOwtIzEfPvm+rff5FI/Yhon2pB3VTXhPPEBjYzE5qANanAT4e6tzAVc5f3DUhHaDknwRYfDz86GFvuLtDjeE/UZ9t6OofYoEsCBpYozLAprBvNIQY= DSA #1 sisyphus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1 sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1 -sisyphus.example.com 1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1 sisyphus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1 # Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-dss 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 DSA #2 prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2 prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2 -prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 1024 65537 135970715082947442639683969597180728933388298633245835186618852623800675939308729462220235058285909679252157995530180587329132927339620517781785310829060832352381015614725360278571924286986474946772141568893116432268565829418506866604294073334978275702221949783314402806080929601995102334442541344606109853641 RSA1 #2 prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2 # Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-dss 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 DSA #3 *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3 *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3 -*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* 1024 65537 125895605498029643697051635076028105429632810811904702876152645261610759866299221305725069141163240694267669117205342283569102183636228981857946763978553664895308762890072813014496700601576921921752482059207749978374872713540759920335553799711267170948655579130584031555334229966603000896364091459595522912269 RSA1 #3 *.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3 # Hashed hostname and address entries -|1|6FWxoqTCAfm8sZ7T/q73OmxCFGM=|S4eQmusok4cbyDzzGEFGIAthDbw= ssh-dss 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 DSA #5 -|1|hTrfD0CuuB9ZbOa1CHFYvIk/gKE=|tPmW50t7flncm1UyM+DR97ubDNU= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5 -|1|fOGqe75X5ZpTz4c7DitP4E8/y30=|Lmcch2fh54bUYoV//S2VqDFVeiY= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5 -|1|0RVzLjY3lwE3MRweguaAXaCCWk8=|DbcIgJQcRZJMYI6NYDOM6oJycPk= 1024 65537 127931411493401587586867047972295564331543694182352197506125410692673654572057908999642645524647232712160516076508316152810117209181150078352725299319149726341058893406440426414316276977768958023952319602422835879783057966985348561111880658922724668687074412548487722084792283453716871417610020757212399252171 RSA1 #5 -|1|4q79XnHpKBNQhyMLAqbPPDN+JKo=|k1Wvjjb52zDdrXWM801+wX5oH8U= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5 +|1|z3xOIdT5ue3Vuf3MzT67kaioqjw=|GZhhe5uwDOBQrC9N4cCjpbLpSn4= ssh-dss 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 DSA #5 +|1|B7t/AYabn8zgwU47Cb4A/Nqt3eI=|arQPZyRphkzisr7w6wwikvhaOyE= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5 +|1|JR81WxEocTP5d7goIRkl8fHBbno=|l6sj6FOsoXxgEZMzn/BnOfPKN68= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5 +|1|W7x4zY6KtTZJgsopyOusJqvVPag=|QauLt7hKezBZFZi2i4Xopho7Nsk= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5 -|1|0M6PIx6THA3ipIOvTl3fcgn2z+A=|bwEJAOwJz+Sm7orFdgj170mD/zY= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 -|1|a6WGHcL+9gX3e96tMlgDSDJwtSg=|5Dqlb/yqNEf7jgfllrp/ygLmRV8= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 -|1|OeCpi7Pn5Q6c8la4fPf9G8YctT8=|sC6D7lDXTafIpokZJ1+1xWg2R6Q= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 -|1|BHESVyiJ7G2NN0lxrw7vT109jmk=|TKof+015J77bXqibsh0N1Lp0MKk= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 -|1|wY53mZNASDJ5/P3JYCJ4FUNa6WQ=|v8p0MfV5lqlZB2J0yLxl/gsWVQo= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 -|1|horeoyFPwfKhyFN+zJZ5LCfOo/I=|2ofvp0tNwCbKsV8FuiFA4gQG2Z8= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 -|1|Aw4fXumZfx6jEIJuDGIyeEMd81A=|5FdLtdm2JeKNsS8IQeQlGYIadOE= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 -|1|+dGUNpv6GblrDd5fgHLlOWpSbEo=|He/pQ1yJjtiCyTNWpGwjBD4sZFI= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 -|1|E/PACGl8m1T7QnPedOoooozstP0=|w6DQAFT8yZgj0Hlkz5R1TppYHCA= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 -|1|SaoyMStgxpYfwedSXBAghi8Zo0s=|Gz78k69GaE6iViV3OOvbStKqyTA= 1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6 -|1|8qfGeiT5WTCzWYbXPQ+lsLg7km4=|1sIBwiSUr8IGkvrUGm3/9QYurmA= 1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6 -|1|87M1OtyHg1BZiDY3rT6lYsZFnAU=|eddAQVcMNbn2OB87XWXFQnYo6R4= 1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6 -|1|60w3wFfC0XWI+rRmRlxIRhh8lwE=|yMhsGrzBJKiesAdSQ/PVgkCrDKk= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 -|1|5gdEMmLUJC7grqWhRJPy2OTaSyE=|/XTfmLMa/B8npcVCGFRdaHl+d/0= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 -|1|6FGCWUr42GHdMB/eifnHNCuwgdk=|ONJvYZ/ANmi59R5HrOhLPmvYENM= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 +|1|mxnU8luzqWLvfVi5qBm5xVIyCRM=|9Epopft7LBd80Bf6RmWPIpwa8yU= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 +|1|klvLmvh2vCpkNMDEjVvrE8SJWTg=|e/dqEEBLnbgqmwEesl4cDRu/7TM= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 +|1|wsk3ddB3UjuxEsoeNCeZjZ6NvZs=|O3O/q2Z/u7DrxoTiIq6kzCevQT0= ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAIutigAse65TCW6hHDOEGXenE9L4L0talHbs65hj3UUNtWflKdQeXLofqXgW8AwaDKmnuRPrxRoxVNXj84n45wtBEdt4ztmdAZteAbXSnHqpcxME3jDxh3EtxzGPXLs+RUmKPVguraSgo7W2oN7KFx6VM+AcAtxANSTlvDid3s47AAAAFQCd9Q3kkHSLWe77sW0eRaayI45ovwAAAIAw6srGF6xvFasI44Y3r9JJ2K+3ezozl3ldL3p2+p2HG3iWafC4SdV8pB6ZIxKlYAywiiFb3LzH/JweGFq1jtoFDRM3MlYORBevydU4zPz7b5QLDVB0sY4evYtWmg2BFJvoWRfhLnlZVW7h5N8v4fNIwdVmVsw4Ljes7iF2HRGhHgAAAIBDFT3fww2Oby1xUA6G9pDAcVikrQFqp1sJRylNTUyeyQ37SNAGzYxwHJFgQr8gZLdRQ1UW+idYpqVbVNcYFMOiw/zSqK2OfVwPZ9U+TTKdc992ChSup6vJEKM/ZVIyDWDbJr7igQ4ahy7jo9mFvm8ljN926EnspQzCvs0Dxk6tHA== DSA #6 +|1|B8epmkLSni+vGZDijr/EwxeR2k4=|7ct8yzNOVJhKm3ZD2w0XIT7df8E= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 +|1|JojD885UhYhbCu571rgyM/5PpYU=|BJaU2aE1FebQZy3B5tzTDRWFRG0= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 +|1|5t7UDHDybVrDZVQPCpwdnr6nk4k=|EqJ73W/veIL3H2x+YWHcJxI5ETA= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 +|1|OCcBfGc/b9+ip+W6Gp+3ftdluO4=|VbrKUdzOOtIBOOmEE+jlK4SD3Xc= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 +|1|9fLN0YdP+BJ25lKuKvYuOdUo93w=|vZyr0rOiX01hv5XbghhHMW+Zb3U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 +|1|nc9RoaaQ0s5jdPxwlUmluGHU3uk=|un6OsJajokKQ3MgyS9mfDNeyP6U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 +|1|rsHB6juT9q6GOY91qOeOwL6TSJE=|ps/vXF9Izuues5PbOn887Gw/2Dg= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 +|1|BsckdLH2aRyWQooRmv+Yo3t4dKg=|Lf3tJc5Iyx0KxNwAG89FsImsfEE= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 +|1|plqkBA4hq7UATyd5+/Xl+zL7ghw=|stacofaUed46666mfqxp9gJFjt4= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 # Revoked and CA keys -@revoked sisyphus.example.com 1024 65537 174143366122697048196335388217056770310345753698079464367148030836533360510864881734142526411160017107552815906024399248049666856133771656680462456979369587903909343046704480897527203474513676654933090991684252819423129896444427656841613263783484827101210734799449281639493127615902427443211183258155381810593 RSA1 #4 @revoked sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4 @cert-authority prometheus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4 @cert-authority *.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #4 # Some invalid lines -@what sisyphus.example.com 1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1 +@what sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1 sisyphus.example.com prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz -prometheus.example.com 1024 -sisyphus.example.com 1024 65535 -prometheus.example.com 1025 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1 sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg== prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg== diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh index e11100145d49..8047bc62ffd8 100755 --- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh @@ -1,25 +1,8 @@ #!/bin/sh -# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.5 2015/07/07 14:53:30 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ PW=mekmitasdigoat -rsa1_params() { - _in="$1" - _outbase="$2" - set -e - ssh-keygen -f $_in -e -m pkcs8 | \ - openssl rsa -noout -text -pubin | \ - awk '/^Modulus:$/,/^Exponent:/' | \ - grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n - # XXX need conversion support in ssh-keygen for the other params - for x in n ; do - echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x - echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x - cat ${_outbase}.$x - echo ============ - done -} - rsa_params() { _in="$1" _outbase="$2" @@ -87,20 +70,18 @@ set -ex cd testdata -rm -f rsa1_1 rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1 -rm -f rsa1_2 rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2 +rm -f rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1 +rm -f rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2 rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys -rm -f rsa1_1_pw rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw +rm -f rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb -ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 1024 -C "RSA1 test key #1" -N "" -f rsa1_1 ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1 -ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 2048 -C "RSA1 test key #2" -N "" -f rsa1_2 ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 @@ -110,7 +91,6 @@ cp rsa_1 rsa_n cp dsa_1 dsa_n cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n -cp rsa1_1 rsa1_1_pw cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw @@ -119,7 +99,6 @@ cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw -ssh-keygen -pf rsa1_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -N "$PW" @@ -128,8 +107,6 @@ ssh-keygen -opf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -opf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW" ssh-keygen -opf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW" -rsa1_params rsa1_1 rsa1_1.param -rsa1_params rsa1_2 rsa1_2.param rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param @@ -160,12 +137,10 @@ ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub -ssh-keygen -lf rsa1_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp -ssh-keygen -lf rsa1_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp @@ -176,12 +151,10 @@ ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp -ssh-keygen -Bf rsa1_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb -ssh-keygen -Bf rsa1_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_2.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c index 906491f2bc31..99b7e21c02d4 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.5 2015/10/06 01:20:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * @@ -51,55 +51,6 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void) pw = load_text_file("pw"); TEST_DONE(); -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private"); - buf = load_file("rsa1_1"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); - sshbuf_free(buf); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); - a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n"); - ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a); - BN_free(a); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private w/ passphrase"); - buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, - (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); - sshbuf_free(buf); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); - sshkey_free(k2); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("load RSA1 from public"); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa1_1.pub"), &k2, - NULL), 0); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); - sshkey_free(k2); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("RSA1 key hex fingerprint"); - buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp"); - cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); - ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); - sshbuf_free(buf); - free(cp); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("RSA1 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); - buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp.bb"); - cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); - ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); - sshbuf_free(buf); - free(cp); - TEST_DONE(); - - sshkey_free(k1); -#endif TEST_START("parse RSA from private"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c index 1f414e0acaa2..6706045d5060 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.6 2015/12/07 02:20:46 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.7 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Fuzz tests for key parsing * @@ -104,49 +104,6 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void) struct fuzz *fuzz; int r; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 private"); - buf = load_file("rsa1_1"); - fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | - FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, - sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); - sshkey_free(k1); - sshbuf_free(buf); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); - TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); - for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { - r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) - sshkey_free(k1); - sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); - } - sshbuf_free(fuzzed); - fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); - TEST_DONE(); - - TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 public"); - buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw"); - fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | - FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, - sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buf, &k1, NULL), 0); - sshkey_free(k1); - sshbuf_free(buf); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); - TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); - for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { - r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); - ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); - if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(fuzzed, &k1, NULL) == 0) - sshkey_free(k1); - sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); - } - sshbuf_free(fuzzed); - fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); - TEST_DONE(); -#endif TEST_START("fuzz RSA private"); buf = load_file("rsa_1"); diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c index 1476dc2e305f..0a73322a34e5 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.10 2016/05/02 09:52:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.12 2017/05/08 06:08:42 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * @@ -193,16 +193,6 @@ sshkey_tests(void) sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); - TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA1"); - k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); - ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); - sshkey_free(k1); - TEST_DONE(); - TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); @@ -263,19 +253,19 @@ sshkey_tests(void) TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1), - SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1), - SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1), - SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); @@ -283,7 +273,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void) #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1), - SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); @@ -291,7 +281,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void) TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr), - SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); diff --git a/regress/yes-head.sh b/regress/yes-head.sh index 1fc754211feb..fce2f6580344 100644 --- a/regress/yes-head.sh +++ b/regress/yes-head.sh @@ -3,13 +3,11 @@ tid="yes pipe head" -for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do - lines=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)` - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "yes|head test failed" - lines = 0; - fi - if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then - fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000" - fi -done +lines=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)` +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "yes|head test failed" + lines = 0; +fi +if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then + fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000" +fi diff --git a/rsa.c b/rsa.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5ecacef9030b..000000000000 --- a/rsa.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,188 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.32 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ -/* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". - * - * - * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * - * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following - * sources: - * - * Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. - * - * Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to - * Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, 1989. - * - * Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications. McGraw-Hill, - * 1994. - * - * R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications - * System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983. - * - * Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization. - * Birkhauser, 1994. - * - * The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security, - * Inc., 1995. - * - * RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back , 1995, as - * included below: - * - * [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity] - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#include - -#include -#include - -#include "rsa.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "ssherr.h" - -int -rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key) -{ - u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL; - int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e)) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - - olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n); - if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - - ilen = BN_num_bytes(in); - if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf); - - if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key, - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - r = 0; - - out: - if (outbuf != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen); - free(outbuf); - } - if (inbuf != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen); - free(inbuf); - } - return r; -} - -int -rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key) -{ - u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL; - int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n); - if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - - ilen = BN_num_bytes(in); - if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf); - - if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key, - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } else if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - r = 0; - out: - if (outbuf != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen); - free(outbuf); - } - if (inbuf != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen); - free(inbuf); - } - return r; -} - -/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ -int -rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa) -{ - BIGNUM *aux = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int r; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - - if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || - (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) || - (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || - (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - r = 0; - out: - BN_clear_free(aux); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - return r; -} - diff --git a/rsa.h b/rsa.h deleted file mode 100644 index c476707d53b8..000000000000 --- a/rsa.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.17 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ - -/* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption. - * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". - */ - -#ifndef RSA_H -#define RSA_H - -#include -#include - -int rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); -int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); -int rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *); - -#endif /* RSA_H */ diff --git a/sandbox-capsicum.c b/sandbox-capsicum.c index 655f0d21788c..e10bad7e83df 100644 --- a/sandbox-capsicum.c +++ b/sandbox-capsicum.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c index 3a1aedce72c2..ca75cc719b18 100644 --- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ #include #include +#ifdef __s390__ +#include +#endif #include #include @@ -222,6 +225,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { #endif #ifdef __NR_socketcall SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), + SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES), #endif #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */ @@ -235,7 +239,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g. * https://bugs.debian.org/849923 */ - SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT); + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT), #endif /* Default deny */ diff --git a/sandbox-solaris.c b/sandbox-solaris.c index 343a01022850..56ddb9a9942a 100644 --- a/sandbox-solaris.c +++ b/sandbox-solaris.c @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || #ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif +#ifdef PRIV_DAX_ACCESS + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_DAX_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif +#ifdef PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO) != 0 || #endif priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || diff --git a/scp.0 b/scp.0 index 46a084698bb9..0cb7726c7552 100644 --- a/scp.0 +++ b/scp.0 @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME scp M-bM-^@M-^S secure copy (remote file copy program) SYNOPSIS - scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] + scp [-346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2 @@ -22,10 +22,6 @@ DESCRIPTION The options are as follows: - -1 Forces scp to use protocol 1. - - -2 Forces scp to use protocol 2. - -3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the @@ -75,10 +71,8 @@ DESCRIPTION CertificateFile ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP - Cipher Ciphers Compression - CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster @@ -109,14 +103,11 @@ DESCRIPTION PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications - Protocol ProxyCommand ProxyJump PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit - RhostsRSAAuthentication - RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax @@ -165,4 +156,4 @@ AUTHORS Timo Rinne Tatu Ylonen -OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 May 3, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 index 4ae8777534af..76ce33361273 100644 --- a/scp.1 +++ b/scp.1 @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.71 2016/07/16 06:57:55 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.74 2017/05/03 21:49:18 naddy Exp $ .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2016 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 3 2017 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm scp .Bk -words -.Op Fl 12346BCpqrv +.Op Fl 346BCpqrv .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file @@ -65,14 +65,6 @@ Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds -.It Fl 1 -Forces -.Nm -to use protocol 1. -.It Fl 2 -Forces -.Nm -to use protocol 2. .It Fl 3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote @@ -136,10 +128,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP -.It Cipher .It Ciphers .It Compression -.It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster @@ -170,14 +160,11 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications -.It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit -.It RhostsRSAAuthentication -.It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c index b4db851980ba..a533eb097412 100644 --- a/scp.c +++ b/scp.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.187 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.192 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). @@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ #include #include #include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif #include #include #include @@ -403,7 +406,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': + fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); + break; case '2': + /* Ignored */ + break; case '4': case '6': case 'C': @@ -915,6 +922,11 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) (void) response(); } +#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \ + ((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \ + (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \ + (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) + void sink(int argc, char **argv) { @@ -938,6 +950,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0)) + SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size"); + setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) @@ -996,8 +1011,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); - if ((time_t)ull < 0 || - (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); @@ -1009,8 +1023,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); - if ((time_t)ull < 0 || - (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); @@ -1043,10 +1056,15 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); - for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);) - size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0'); - if (*cp++ != ' ') + if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) + SCREWUP("size not present"); + ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull)) + SCREWUP("size out of range"); + size = (off_t)ull; + if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); @@ -1256,7 +1274,7 @@ void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, - "usage: scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" + "usage: scp [-346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n" " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n"); exit(1); @@ -1350,11 +1368,7 @@ allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); - if (bp->buf == NULL) - bp->buf = xmalloc(size); - else - bp->buf = xreallocarray(bp->buf, 1, size); - memset(bp->buf, 0, size); + bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index 56b831652f53..2c321a4ad4f3 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.306 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.312 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; - options->num_permitted_opens = -1; + options->permitted_opens = NULL; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->version_addendum = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->disable_forwarding = -1; + options->expose_userauth_info = -1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ @@ -333,6 +334,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; if (options->disable_forwarding == -1) options->disable_forwarding = 0; + if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1) + options->expose_userauth_info = 0; assemble_algorithms(options); @@ -418,6 +421,7 @@ typedef enum { sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding, + sExposeAuthInfo, sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; @@ -449,7 +453,7 @@ static struct { { "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -561,6 +565,7 @@ static struct { { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; @@ -692,6 +697,44 @@ process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) options->num_queued_listens = 0; } +/* + * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration. + */ +void +process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options) +{ + u_int i; + int port; + char *host, *arg, *oarg; + + channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(ssh); + if (options->num_permitted_opens == 0) + return; /* permit any */ + + /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ + if (options->num_permitted_opens == 1 && + strcmp(options->permitted_opens[0], "any") == 0) + return; + if (options->num_permitted_opens == 1 && + strcmp(options->permitted_opens[0], "none") == 0) { + channel_disable_adm_local_opens(ssh); + return; + } + /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_permitted_opens; i++) { + oarg = arg = xstrdup(options->permitted_opens[i]); + host = hpdelim(&arg); + if (host == NULL) + fatal("%s: missing host in PermitOpen", __func__); + host = cleanhostname(host); + if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) + fatal("%s: bad port number in PermitOpen", __func__); + /* Send it to channels layer */ + channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(ssh, host, port); + free(oarg); + } +} + struct connection_info * get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns) { @@ -935,13 +978,6 @@ static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; -static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = { - { "yes", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, - { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_ON }, - { "nosandbox", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, - { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF }, - { NULL, -1 } -}; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, @@ -956,7 +992,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { - char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p; + char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; @@ -1352,7 +1388,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); - if (*log_level_ptr == -1) + if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; @@ -1627,24 +1663,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification", filename, linenum); - n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */ - if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { - if (*activep && n == -1) { - channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); - options->num_permitted_opens = 0; - } - break; - } - if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { - if (*activep && n == -1) { + i = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */ + if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { + if (*activep && i == 0) { options->num_permitted_opens = 1; - channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); + options->permitted_opens = xcalloc(1, + sizeof(*options->permitted_opens)); + options->permitted_opens[0] = xstrdup(arg); } break; } - if (*activep && n == -1) - channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) { + arg2 = xstrdup(arg); p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen", @@ -1653,9 +1683,16 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in " "PermitOpen", filename, linenum); - if (*activep && n == -1) - options->num_permitted_opens = - channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port); + if (*activep && i == 0) { + options->permitted_opens = xrecallocarray( + options->permitted_opens, + options->num_permitted_opens, + options->num_permitted_opens + 1, + sizeof(*options->permitted_opens)); + i = options->num_permitted_opens++; + options->permitted_opens[i] = arg2; + } else + free(arg2); } break; @@ -1842,6 +1879,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, options->fingerprint_hash = value; break; + case sExposeAuthInfo: + intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info; + goto parse_flag; + case sDeprecated: case sIgnore: case sUnsupported: @@ -1980,6 +2021,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); @@ -1996,6 +2038,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); /* * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use @@ -2020,6 +2063,13 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \ } \ } while(0) +#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC(n, num_n) do { \ + if (src->num_n != 0) { \ + dst->n = xcalloc(src->num_n, sizeof(*dst->n)); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n); \ + dst->num_n = src->num_n; \ + } \ +} while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); @@ -2050,6 +2100,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT +#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf, @@ -2278,6 +2329,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); @@ -2347,5 +2399,12 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); - channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(); + printf("permitopen"); + if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0) + printf(" any"); + else { + for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++) + printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]); + } + printf("\n"); } diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h index 5853a97470ae..1dca702e6acb 100644 --- a/servconf.h +++ b/servconf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.123 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.126 2017/10/02 19:33:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -48,12 +48,19 @@ #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1) #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL) +/* PermitOpen */ +#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0 +#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2 + #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" +struct ssh; +struct fwd_perm_list; + typedef struct { u_int num_ports; u_int ports_from_cmdline; @@ -169,7 +176,8 @@ typedef struct { int permit_tun; - int num_permitted_opens; + char **permitted_opens; + u_int num_permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */ char *chroot_directory; char *revoked_keys_file; @@ -189,6 +197,7 @@ typedef struct { char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS]; int fingerprint_hash; + int expose_userauth_info; } ServerOptions; /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */ @@ -228,6 +237,7 @@ struct connection_info { M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT_ALLOC(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \ } while (0) struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int); @@ -235,6 +245,7 @@ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *); int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int, int *, struct connection_info *); +void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options); void load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *); void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *, struct connection_info *); diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c index 2976f55943b4..24bbae322c34 100644 --- a/serverloop.c +++ b/serverloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.191 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.198 2017/09/12 06:35:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ sigterm_handler(int sig) } static void -client_alive_check(void) +client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) { int channel_id; @@ -179,12 +179,13 @@ client_alive_check(void) * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply", * we should get back a failure */ - if ((channel_id = channel_find_open()) == -1) { + if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ } else { - channel_request_start(channel_id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); + channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id, + "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); } packet_send(); } @@ -196,7 +197,8 @@ client_alive_check(void) * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite). */ static void -wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out, +wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, + int connection_in, int connection_out, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms) { @@ -204,10 +206,11 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out, int ret; time_t minwait_secs = 0; int client_alive_scheduled = 0; + static time_t last_client_time; /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */ - channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, - &minwait_secs, 0); + channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, + nallocp, &minwait_secs); /* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */ if (minwait_secs != 0) @@ -268,8 +271,19 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out, memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - } else if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled) - client_alive_check(); + } else if (client_alive_scheduled) { + time_t now = monotime(); + + if (ret == 0) { /* timeout */ + client_alive_check(ssh); + } else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) { + last_client_time = now; + } else if (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time + + options.client_alive_interval <= now) { + client_alive_check(ssh); + last_client_time = now; + } + } notify_done(*readsetp); } @@ -279,9 +293,8 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(int connection_in, int connection_out, * in buffers and processed later. */ static int -process_input(fd_set *readset, int connection_in) +process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ int len; char buf[16384]; @@ -321,13 +334,13 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset, int connection_out) } static void -process_buffered_input_packets(void) +process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) { - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, active_state); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL); } static void -collect_children(void) +collect_children(struct ssh *ssh) { pid_t pid; sigset_t oset, nset; @@ -342,14 +355,14 @@ collect_children(void) while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) if (pid > 0) - session_close_by_pid(pid, status); + session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status); child_terminated = 0; } sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } void -server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt) +server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; int max_fd; @@ -377,18 +390,17 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt) server_init_dispatch(); for (;;) { - process_buffered_input_packets(); + process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); - if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state) && + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) - channel_output_poll(); - if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && - !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) + channel_output_poll(ssh); + if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000; else rekey_timeout_ms = 0; - wait_until_can_do_something(connection_in, connection_out, + wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out, &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms); if (received_sigterm) { @@ -397,27 +409,27 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt) cleanup_exit(255); } - collect_children(); - if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) - channel_after_select(readset, writeset); - if (process_input(readset, connection_in) < 0) + collect_children(ssh); + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); + if (process_input(ssh, readset, connection_in) < 0) break; process_output(writeset, connection_out); } - collect_children(); + collect_children(ssh); free(readset); free(writeset); /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ - channel_free_all(); + channel_free_all(ssh); /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ - session_destroy_all(NULL); + session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL); } static int -server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq); /* @@ -430,7 +442,7 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static Channel * -server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg) +server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; @@ -448,7 +460,7 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg) /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) { - c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port, + c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port, "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg); } else { logit("refused local port forward: " @@ -465,7 +477,7 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg) } static Channel * -server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) +server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; @@ -487,7 +499,7 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) { - c = channel_connect_to_path(target, + c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); } else { logit("refused streamlocal port forward: " @@ -502,7 +514,7 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) } static Channel * -server_request_tun(void) +server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; int mode, tun; @@ -532,12 +544,12 @@ server_request_tun(void) sock = tun_open(tun, mode); if (sock < 0) goto done; - c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) - channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, + channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif @@ -548,7 +560,7 @@ server_request_tun(void) } static Channel * -server_request_session(void) +server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; @@ -566,20 +578,20 @@ server_request_session(void) * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. */ - c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, + c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "server-session", 1); if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); - channel_free(c); + channel_free(ssh, c); return NULL; } - channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); return c; } static int -server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; @@ -596,17 +608,18 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { - c = server_request_session(); + c = server_request_session(ssh); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { - c = server_request_direct_tcpip(&reason, &errmsg); + c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { - c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(); + c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { - c = server_request_tun(); + c = server_request_tun(ssh); } if (c != NULL) { debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; + c->have_remote_id = 1; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { @@ -633,9 +646,8 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int -server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct sshbuf **respp) +server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL; @@ -703,7 +715,7 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct sshbuf **respp) } static int -server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *rtype; int want_reply; @@ -738,7 +750,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the port */ - success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(&fwd, + success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); } free(fwd.listen_host); @@ -756,7 +768,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__, fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); - success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd); + success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); free(fwd.listen_host); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { struct Forward fwd; @@ -775,7 +787,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) "streamlocal forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the socket */ - success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener( + success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts); } free(fwd.listen_path); @@ -787,19 +799,19 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__, fwd.listen_path); - success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd); + success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); free(fwd.listen_path); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { no_more_sessions = 1; success = 1; } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) { - success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(&resp); + success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp); } if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); if (success && resp != NULL) - ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, sshbuf_ptr(resp), + ssh_packet_put_raw(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(resp), sshbuf_len(resp)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); @@ -810,7 +822,7 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static int -server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int id, reply, success = 0; @@ -823,16 +835,19 @@ server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); - if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: " "unknown channel %d", id); if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) { packet_check_eom(); - chan_rcvd_eow(c); + chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) - success = session_input_channel_req(c, rtype); + success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype); if (reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); diff --git a/serverloop.h b/serverloop.h index d5fbda16fa62..fd2cf63f74e7 100644 --- a/serverloop.h +++ b/serverloop.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.7 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.8 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #ifndef SERVERLOOP_H #define SERVERLOOP_H -void server_loop2(Authctxt *); +struct ssh; + +void server_loop2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); #endif diff --git a/session.c b/session.c index a08aa69d1679..4bccb62d1e4d 100644 --- a/session.c +++ b/session.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.286 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.292 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "sftp.h" +#include "atomicio.h" #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) #include @@ -112,29 +113,28 @@ /* func */ Session *session_new(void); -void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int); +void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int); void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); void session_proctitle(Session *); -int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *); -int do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *); -int do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *); -int do_exec(Session *, const char *); -void do_login(Session *, const char *); +int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *); +int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s); #endif -void do_child(Session *, const char *); void do_motd(void); int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); -static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *); +static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); -static int session_pty_req(Session *); +static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; -extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; @@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ login_cap_t *lc; static int is_child = 0; static int in_chroot = 0; +/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ +static char *auth_info_file = NULL; + /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; @@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) } static int -auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) +auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; @@ -220,7 +223,7 @@ auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) goto authsock_err; /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ - nc = channel_new("auth socket", + nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "auth socket", 1); @@ -250,8 +253,42 @@ display_loginmsg(void) } } +static void +prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info) +{ + int fd = -1, success = 0; + + if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL) + return; + + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"); + if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) { + error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info), + sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) { + error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if (close(fd) != 0) { + error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + success = 1; + out: + if (!success) { + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + free(auth_info_file); + auth_info_file = NULL; + } + restore_uid(); +} + void -do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) +do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); @@ -259,14 +296,17 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) /* XXX - streamlocal? */ if (no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) - channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); + channel_disable_adm_local_opens(ssh); else - channel_permit_all_opens(); + channel_permit_all_opens(ssh); auth_debug_send(); - do_authenticated2(authctxt); - do_cleanup(authctxt); + prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info); + + do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt); + + do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt); } /* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */ @@ -291,7 +331,7 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s) * setting up file descriptors and such. */ int -do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) +do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { pid_t pid; @@ -364,10 +404,6 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) case 0: is_child = 1; - /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ - log_init(__progname, options.log_level, - options.log_facility, log_stderr); - /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. @@ -420,7 +456,7 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) #endif /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ - do_child(s, command); + do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; @@ -451,7 +487,7 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) close(pout[1]); close(perr[1]); - session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], + session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], s->is_subsystem, 0); #else /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ @@ -475,7 +511,7 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) * lastlog, and other such operations. */ int -do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) +do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; pid_t pid; @@ -522,9 +558,6 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) close(fdout); close(ptymaster); - /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ - log_init(__progname, options.log_level, - options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ptyfd); @@ -547,13 +580,13 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA - do_login(s, command); + do_login(ssh, s, command); #endif /* * Do common processing for the child, such as execing * the command. */ - do_child(s, command); + do_child(ssh, s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; @@ -575,7 +608,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); - session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); + session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); return 0; } @@ -613,9 +646,8 @@ do_pre_login(Session *s) * to be forced, execute that instead. */ int -do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) +do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ int ret; const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; char session_type[1024]; @@ -674,9 +706,9 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) } #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) - ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); + ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); else - ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command); + ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command); original_command = NULL; @@ -692,9 +724,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void -do_login(Session *s, const char *command) +do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; struct passwd * pw = s->pw; @@ -791,65 +822,6 @@ check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) return 0; } -/* - * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable - * already exists, its value is overridden. - */ -void -child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, - const char *value) -{ - char **env; - u_int envsize; - u_int i, namelen; - - if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { - error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); - return; - } - - /* - * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null - * entry before continuing. - */ - if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { - *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); - *envp[0] = NULL; - *envsizep = 1; - } - - /* - * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable - * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot - * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. - */ - env = *envp; - namelen = strlen(name); - for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) - if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') - break; - if (env[i]) { - /* Reuse the slot. */ - free(env[i]); - } else { - /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ - envsize = *envsizep; - if (i >= envsize - 1) { - if (envsize >= 1000) - fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); - envsize += 50; - env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); - *envsizep = envsize; - } - /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ - env[i + 1] = NULL; - } - - /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ - env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); - snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); -} - /* * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. @@ -951,8 +923,9 @@ read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) } #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ -void -copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) +static void +copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize, + const char *blacklist) { char *var_name, *var_val; int i; @@ -968,17 +941,25 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) } *var_val++ = '\0'; - debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); - child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); + if (blacklist == NULL || + match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) { + debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); + child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); + } free(var_name); } } +void +copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) +{ + copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL); +} + static char ** -do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) +do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ char buf[256]; u_int i, envsize; char **env, *laddr; @@ -1085,6 +1066,8 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) free(laddr); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); + if (auth_info_file != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file); if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (s->term) @@ -1134,12 +1117,16 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) if (options.use_pam) { char **p; + /* + * Don't allow SSH_AUTH_INFO variables posted to PAM to leak + * back into the environment. + */ p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); - copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); + copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*"); free_pam_environment(p); p = fetch_pam_environment(); - copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); + copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*"); free_pam_environment(p); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ @@ -1431,7 +1418,7 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s) } static void -child_close_fds(void) +child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) { extern int auth_sock; @@ -1451,7 +1438,7 @@ child_close_fds(void) * open in the parent. */ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ - channel_close_all(); + channel_close_all(ssh); /* * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be @@ -1475,7 +1462,7 @@ child_close_fds(void) */ #define ARGV_MAX 10 void -do_child(Session *s, const char *command) +do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) { extern char **environ; char **env; @@ -1486,11 +1473,12 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); + packet_clear_keys(); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); - child_close_fds(); + child_close_fds(ssh); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } @@ -1539,7 +1527,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ - env = do_setup_env(s, shell); + env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); @@ -1552,7 +1540,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) * closed before building the environment, as we call * ssh_remote_ipaddr there. */ - child_close_fds(); + child_close_fds(ssh); /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, @@ -1710,8 +1698,8 @@ session_new(void) return NULL; debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); - tmp = xreallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, - sizeof(*sessions)); + tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc, + sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1); @@ -1849,7 +1837,7 @@ session_by_pid(pid_t pid) } static int -session_window_change_req(Session *s) +session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); @@ -1861,7 +1849,7 @@ session_window_change_req(Session *s) } static int -session_pty_req(Session *s) +session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { u_int len; int n_bytes; @@ -1914,7 +1902,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s) } static int -session_subsystem_req(Session *s) +session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { struct stat st; u_int len; @@ -1941,7 +1929,7 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s) s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); } - success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0; + success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0; break; } } @@ -1954,7 +1942,7 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s) } static int -session_x11_req(Session *s) +session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { int success; @@ -1971,7 +1959,7 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s) if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) - success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s); else { success = 0; error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); @@ -1986,26 +1974,26 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s) } static int -session_shell_req(Session *s) +session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { packet_check_eom(); - return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0; + return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0; } static int -session_exec_req(Session *s) +session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { u_int len, success; char *command = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); - success = do_exec(s, command) == 0; + success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0; free(command); return success; } static int -session_break_req(Session *s) +session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { packet_get_int(); /* ignored */ @@ -2017,7 +2005,7 @@ session_break_req(Session *s) } static int -session_env_req(Session *s) +session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { char *name, *val; u_int name_len, val_len, i; @@ -2035,8 +2023,8 @@ session_env_req(Session *s) for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); - s->env = xreallocarray(s->env, s->num_env + 1, - sizeof(*s->env)); + s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env, + s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; s->num_env++; @@ -2052,7 +2040,7 @@ session_env_req(Session *s) } static int -session_auth_agent_req(Session *s) +session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { static int called = 0; packet_check_eom(); @@ -2064,22 +2052,21 @@ session_auth_agent_req(Session *s) return 0; } else { called = 1; - return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); + return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw); } } int -session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype) +session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype) { int success = 0; Session *s; if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { - logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s", - c->self, rtype); + logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype); return 0; } - debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype); + debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype); /* * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command @@ -2087,33 +2074,33 @@ session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype) */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { - success = session_shell_req(s); + success = session_shell_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { - success = session_exec_req(s); + success = session_exec_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { - success = session_pty_req(s); + success = session_pty_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { - success = session_x11_req(s); + success = session_x11_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { - success = session_auth_agent_req(s); + success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { - success = session_subsystem_req(s); + success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { - success = session_env_req(s); + success = session_env_req(ssh, s); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { - success = session_window_change_req(s); + success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { - success = session_break_req(s); + success = session_break_req(ssh, s); } return success; } void -session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, - int is_tty) +session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, + int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) { /* * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, @@ -2121,7 +2108,7 @@ session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); - channel_set_fds(s->chanid, + channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); @@ -2192,40 +2179,40 @@ sig2name(int sig) } static void -session_close_x11(int id) +session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id) { Channel *c; - if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) { - debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id); + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id); } else { /* Detach X11 listener */ - debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id); - channel_cancel_cleanup(id); + debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) - chan_mark_dead(c); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); } } static void -session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg) +session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { Session *s; u_int i; - debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id); - channel_cancel_cleanup(id); + debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) - fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id); + fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id); for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { - debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: " - "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); + debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d", + __func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); /* * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we * close all of its siblings. */ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) - session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); + session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); } free(s->x11_chanids); s->x11_chanids = NULL; @@ -2240,22 +2227,22 @@ session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg) } static void -session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) +session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status) { Channel *c; - if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL) - fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d", - s->self, s->chanid); - debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld", - s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d", + __func__, s->self, s->chanid); + debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld", + __func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { - channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); + channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); packet_send(); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { - channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); + channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); #ifdef WCOREDUMP packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0); @@ -2271,14 +2258,14 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) } /* disconnect channel */ - debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid); + debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid); /* * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds. */ - channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); /* * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be @@ -2287,13 +2274,12 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) - chan_write_failed(c); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); } void -session_close(Session *s) +session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ u_int i; verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", @@ -2323,16 +2309,15 @@ session_close(Session *s) } void -session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) +session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status) { Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); if (s == NULL) { - debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld", - (long)pid); + debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid); return; } if (s->chanid != -1) - session_exit_message(s, status); + session_exit_message(ssh, s, status); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); s->pid = 0; @@ -2343,19 +2328,18 @@ session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) * the session 'child' itself dies */ void -session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) +session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { Session *s = session_by_channel(id); u_int i; if (s == NULL) { - debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id); + debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id); return; } - debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld", - id, (long)s->pid); + debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid); if (s->pid != 0) { - debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id); + debug("%s: channel %d: has child", __func__, id); /* * delay detach of session, but release pty, since * the fd's to the child are already closed @@ -2365,22 +2349,22 @@ session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) return; } /* detach by removing callback */ - channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid); /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { - session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); + session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; } } s->chanid = -1; - session_close(s); + session_close(ssh, s); } void -session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *)) +session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { @@ -2389,7 +2373,7 @@ session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *)) if (closefunc != NULL) closefunc(s); else - session_close(s); + session_close(ssh, s); } } } @@ -2432,7 +2416,7 @@ session_proctitle(Session *s) } int -session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) +session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; @@ -2456,14 +2440,14 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) debug("X11 display already set."); return 0; } - if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset, + if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { - channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i], + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i], session_close_single_x11, 0); } @@ -2508,13 +2492,13 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) } static void -do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) +do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { - server_loop2(authctxt); + server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); } void -do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) +do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; @@ -2556,12 +2540,21 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); + /* remove userauth info */ + if (auth_info_file != NULL) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + unlink(auth_info_file); + restore_uid(); + free(auth_info_file); + auth_info_file = NULL; + } + /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) - session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); + session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); } /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ diff --git a/session.h b/session.h index 98e1dafee2b8..54dd1f0ca081 100644 --- a/session.h +++ b/session.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.33 2016/08/13 17:47:41 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.35 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -62,23 +62,21 @@ struct Session { } *env; }; -void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); -void do_cleanup(Authctxt *); +void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); +void do_cleanup(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); int session_open(Authctxt *, int); void session_unused(int); -int session_input_channel_req(Channel *, const char *); -void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); -void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); -void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); +int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *); +void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int); +void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *); +void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); Session *session_new(void); Session *session_by_tty(char *); -void session_close(Session *); +void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *); void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); -void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, - const char *value); const char *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int); diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c index a6e832270410..626330262264 100644 --- a/sftp-client.c +++ b/sftp-client.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.126 2017/01/03 05:46:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.127 2017/08/11 04:41:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) { - if (errno == EPIPE) + if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); diff --git a/sftp-common.c b/sftp-common.c index 3a70c52dd3dd..13a7f5becc24 100644 --- a/sftp-common.c +++ b/sftp-common.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.29 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.30 2017/06/10 06:36:46 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -216,22 +216,21 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units) int ulen, glen, sz = 0; struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime); char *user, *group; - char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; + char buf[1024], lc[8], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; time_t now; strmode(st->st_mode, mode); - if (!remote) { - user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0); - } else { + if (remote) { snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid); user = ubuf; - } - if (!remote) { - group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0); - } else { snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid); group = gbuf; + strlcpy(lc, "?", sizeof(lc)); + } else { + user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0); + group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0); + snprintf(lc, sizeof(lc), "%u", (u_int)st->st_nlink); } if (ltime != NULL) { now = time(NULL); @@ -247,12 +246,12 @@ ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units) glen = MAXIMUM(strlen(group), 8); if (si_units) { fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf); - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s", mode, - (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group, + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s", + mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group, sbuf, tbuf, name); } else { - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3u %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode, - (u_int)st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group, + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", + mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group, (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name); } return xstrdup(buf); diff --git a/sftp-server.0 b/sftp-server.0 index 20d477d49562..4f994f4c595f 100644 --- a/sftp-server.0 +++ b/sftp-server.0 @@ -93,4 +93,4 @@ HISTORY AUTHORS Markus Friedl -OpenBSD 6.0 December 11, 2014 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 December 11, 2014 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c index 3619cdfc0ffe..df0fb50680fe 100644 --- a/sftp-server.c +++ b/sftp-server.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.110 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.111 2017/04/04 00:24:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -691,8 +691,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && - ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY || - (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) { + ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY || + (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { diff --git a/sftp.0 b/sftp.0 index 2e0c274d9f6f..45b8faf5543d 100644 --- a/sftp.0 +++ b/sftp.0 @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME sftp M-bM-^@M-^S secure file transfer program SYNOPSIS - sftp [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher] + sftp [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host @@ -36,10 +36,6 @@ DESCRIPTION The options are as follows: - -1 Specify the use of protocol version 1. - - -2 Specify the use of protocol version 2. - -4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only. @@ -111,10 +107,8 @@ DESCRIPTION CertificateFile ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP - Cipher Ciphers Compression - CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster @@ -145,13 +139,11 @@ DESCRIPTION PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications - Protocol ProxyCommand ProxyJump + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit - RhostsRSAAuthentication - RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax @@ -187,9 +179,8 @@ DESCRIPTION -s subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on - the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over protocol - version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp - subsystem configured. + the remote host. A path is useful when the remote sshd(8) does + not have an sftp subsystem configured. -v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. @@ -383,4 +374,4 @@ SEE ALSO T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material. -OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 May 3, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1 index fbdd00a1efd1..c218376fbf0c 100644 --- a/sftp.1 +++ b/sftp.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.105 2016/07/16 06:57:55 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.110 2017/05/03 21:49:18 naddy Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2016 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 3 2017 $ .Dt SFTP 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sftp .Bk -words -.Op Fl 1246aCfpqrv +.Op Fl 46aCfpqrv .Op Fl B Ar buffer_size .Op Fl b Ar batchfile .Op Fl c Ar cipher @@ -95,10 +95,6 @@ names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds -.It Fl 1 -Specify the use of protocol version 1. -.It Fl 2 -Specify the use of protocol version 2. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm @@ -201,10 +197,8 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP -.It Cipher .It Ciphers .It Compression -.It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster @@ -235,13 +229,11 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications -.It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump +.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit -.It RhostsRSAAuthentication -.It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax @@ -282,9 +274,7 @@ options. .It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on the remote host. -A path is useful for using -.Nm -over protocol version 1, or when the remote +A path is useful when the remote .Xr sshd 8 does not have an sftp subsystem configured. .It Fl v diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c index 76add3908ca7..67110f738f79 100644 --- a/sftp.c +++ b/sftp.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.178 2017/02/15 01:46:47 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.180 2017/06/10 06:33:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; /* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ int sort_flag; +glob_t *sort_glob; /* Context used for commandline completion */ struct complete_ctx { @@ -879,6 +880,34 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, return (0); } +static int +sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) +{ + u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa; + u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb; + const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a]; + const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b]; + const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a]; + const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b]; + int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; + +#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) + if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) + return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp)); + else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) { +#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM) + return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)); +#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME) + return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime)); +#else + return rmul * 1; +#endif + } else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) + return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size)); + + fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); +} + /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ static int do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, @@ -888,7 +917,8 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, glob_t g; int err, r; struct winsize ws; - u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; + u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1; + u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); @@ -933,7 +963,26 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, colspace = width / columns; } - for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { + /* + * Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare + * an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual + * unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc. + */ + for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++) + ; /* count entries */ + indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices)); + for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) + indices[i] = i; + + if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { + sort_glob = &g; + sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); + qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp); + sort_glob = NULL; + } + + for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) { + i = indices[j]; fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { @@ -961,6 +1010,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, out: if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); + free(indices); return 0; } @@ -2246,7 +2296,7 @@ usage(void) extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, - "usage: %s [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" + "usage: %s [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] " "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n" " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] " diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0 index 706bfe661027..2ef6c3da298d 100644 --- a/ssh-add.0 +++ b/ssh-add.0 @@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ NAME ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent SYNOPSIS - ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...] + ssh-add [-cDdkLlqXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...] ssh-add -s pkcs11 ssh-add -e pkcs11 DESCRIPTION ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent, ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files - ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and - ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load - corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by - appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative - file names can be given on the command line. + ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519. + After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding + certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub + to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given + on the command line. If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ DESCRIPTION -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. + -q Be quiet after a successful operation. + -s pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. @@ -89,25 +91,17 @@ ENVIRONMENT with the agent. FILES - ~/.ssh/identity - Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of - the user. - ~/.ssh/id_dsa - Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of - the user. + Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa - Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of - the user. + Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 - Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity - of the user. + Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_rsa - Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of - the user. + Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user. Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. @@ -126,4 +120,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 6.0 March 30, 2015 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 August 29, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1 index f02b595d51e5..d5da9279c5f9 100644 --- a/ssh-add.1 +++ b/ssh-add.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.62 2015/03/30 18:28:37 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.66 2017/08/29 13:05:58 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 30 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: August 29 2017 $ .Dt SSH-ADD 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ .Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-add -.Op Fl cDdkLlXx +.Op Fl cDdkLlqXx .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar @@ -59,9 +59,8 @@ When run without arguments, it adds the files .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity . +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 . After loading a private key, .Nm will try to load corresponding certificate information from the @@ -127,6 +126,8 @@ Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. .It Fl l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. +.It Fl q +Be quiet after a successful operation. .It Fl s Ar pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . @@ -174,16 +175,14 @@ socket used to communicate with the agent. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity -Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa -Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. +Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa -Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user. +Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. +Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa -Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. +Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user. .El .Pp Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c index fb9a53e64cfe..2afd483305cc 100644 --- a/ssh-add.c +++ b/ssh-add.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.128 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.134 2017/08/29 09:42:29 dlg Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" @@ -79,9 +78,6 @@ static char *default_files[] = { #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, -#endif NULL }; @@ -106,7 +102,7 @@ clear_pass(void) } static int -delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) +delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) { struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL; char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; @@ -117,7 +113,10 @@ delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) return -1; } if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", + filename, comment); + } ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", @@ -142,8 +141,10 @@ delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) certpath, filename); if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath, - comment); + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", + certpath, comment); + } ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", @@ -164,6 +165,11 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd) { int ret = -1; + /* + * Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked + * to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2 + * keys. + */ if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) ret = 0; /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ @@ -178,7 +184,7 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd) } static int -add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) +add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) { struct sshkey *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; @@ -304,7 +310,7 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) { - error("%s: key_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } @@ -360,50 +366,36 @@ static int list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) { char *fp; - int r, had_identities = 0; + int r; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; size_t i; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - int version = 1; -#else - int version = 2; -#endif - for (; version <= 2; version++) { - if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version, - &idlist)) != 0) { - if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) - fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for " - "protocol %d: %s\n", version, ssh_err(r)); - continue; - } - for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { - had_identities = 1; - if (do_fp) { - fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], - fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); - printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", - sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), - fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, - idlist->comments[i], - sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); - free(fp); - } else { - if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], - stdout)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", - ssh_err(r)); - continue; - } - fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", idlist->comments[i]); + if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) + fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n", + ssh_err(r)); + else + printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); + return -1; + } + for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { + if (do_fp) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], + fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), + fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i], + sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); + free(fp); + } else { + if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", + ssh_err(r)); + continue; } + fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", idlist->comments[i]); } - ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); - } - if (!had_identities) { - printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); - return -1; } + ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); return 0; } @@ -440,13 +432,13 @@ lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) } static int -do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file) +do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag) { if (deleting) { - if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1) + if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) return -1; } else { - if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1) + if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) return -1; } return 0; @@ -469,6 +461,7 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -q Be quiet after a successful operation.\n"); } int @@ -479,7 +472,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) int agent_fd; char *pkcs11provider = NULL; int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0; - int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0; + int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0; ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ @@ -507,7 +500,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) exit(2); } - while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:s:t:")) != -1) { + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:qs:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); @@ -552,6 +545,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) goto done; } break; + case 'q': + qflag = 1; + break; default: usage(); ret = 1; @@ -600,7 +596,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) default_files[i]); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) continue; - if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1) + if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf, + qflag) == -1) ret = 1; else count++; @@ -610,7 +607,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, - argv[i]) == -1) + argv[i], qflag) == -1) ret = 1; } } diff --git a/ssh-agent.0 b/ssh-agent.0 index bb3c8d6055fa..86ac988bdf1a 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.0 +++ b/ssh-agent.0 @@ -117,4 +117,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 6.0 November 30, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 November 30, 2016 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c index b987562b9aa1..0c6c3659217f 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.c +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.218 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.224 2017/07/24 04:34:28 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +# include +#endif #include #include #include @@ -73,7 +76,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" @@ -92,6 +94,9 @@ # define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*" #endif +/* Maximum accepted message length */ +#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024) + typedef enum { AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, @@ -118,13 +123,13 @@ typedef struct identity { u_int confirm; } Identity; -typedef struct { +struct idtable { int nentries; TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; -} Idtab; +}; -/* private key table, one per protocol version */ -Idtab idtable[3]; +/* private key table */ +struct idtable *idtab; int max_fd = 0; @@ -171,21 +176,9 @@ close_socket(SocketEntry *e) static void idtab_init(void) { - int i; - - for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) { - TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist); - idtable[i].nentries = 0; - } -} - -/* return private key table for requested protocol version */ -static Idtab * -idtab_lookup(int version) -{ - if (version < 1 || version > 2) - fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version); - return &idtable[version]; + idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab)); + TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist); + idtab->nentries = 0; } static void @@ -199,12 +192,11 @@ free_identity(Identity *id) /* return matching private key for given public key */ static Identity * -lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key, int version) +lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key) { Identity *id; - Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); - TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) return (id); } @@ -241,135 +233,30 @@ send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success) /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ static void -process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) +process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e) { - Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (version == 1) ? - SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : - SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, tab->nentries)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { - if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, - BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, - id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, - id->key->rsa->n)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); -#endif - } else { - u_char *blob; - size_t blen; - - if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { - error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, - ssh_err(r)); - continue; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - free(blob); - } - if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - sshbuf_free(msg); -} - -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -/* ssh1 only */ -static void -process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e) -{ - u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16]; - u_int response_type; - BIGNUM *challenge; - Identity *id; - int r, len; - struct sshbuf *msg; - struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; - struct sshkey *key; - - if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); - if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */ - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge))) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - - /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */ - if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0) - goto failure; - if ((r = sshbuf_get(e->request, session_id, sizeof(session_id))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &response_type)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (response_type != 1) - goto failure; - - id = lookup_identity(key, 1); - if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) { - struct sshkey *private = id->key; - /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ - if ((r = rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, - private->rsa) != 0)) { - fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt: %s", __func__, + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { + if ((r = sshkey_puts(id->key, msg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) { + error("%s: put key/comment: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - goto failure; /* XXX ? */ + continue; } - - /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id */ - len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); - if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { - logit("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len); - goto failure; - } - memset(buf, 0, 32); - BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); - if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || - ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || - ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || - ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) - fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); - ssh_digest_free(md); - - /* Send the response. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put(msg, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf))) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - goto send; } - - failure: - /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - send: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - sshkey_free(key); - BN_clear_free(challenge); sshbuf_free(msg); } -#endif + static char * agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) @@ -387,27 +274,24 @@ agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) static void process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) { - u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; - size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0; + const u_char *data; + u_char *signature = NULL; + size_t dlen, slen = 0; u_int compat = 0, flags; int r, ok = -1; struct sshbuf *msg; - struct sshkey *key; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; struct identity *id; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE) compat = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB; - if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { - error("%s: cannot parse key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - goto send; - } - if ((id = lookup_identity(key, 2)) == NULL) { + if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto send; } @@ -435,90 +319,52 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); - free(data); - free(blob); free(signature); } /* shared */ static void -process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) +process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e) { - size_t blen; int r, success = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL; - u_char *blob; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - u_int bits; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - - switch (version) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case 1: - if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { - error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); - return; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + Identity *id; - if (bits != sshkey_size(key)) - logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: " - "actual %u, announced %u", - sshkey_size(key), bits); - break; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - case 2: - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) - error("%s: sshkey_from_blob failed: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - free(blob); - break; + if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; } - if (key != NULL) { - Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version); - if (id != NULL) { - /* - * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we - * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of - * the array, we actually free the key there and move - * all the entries between the empty slot and the end - * of the array. - */ - Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); - if (tab->nentries < 1) - fatal("process_remove_identity: " - "internal error: tab->nentries %d", - tab->nentries); - TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); - free_identity(id); - tab->nentries--; - success = 1; - } - sshkey_free(key); + if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: key not found", __func__); + goto done; } + /* We have this key, free it. */ + if (idtab->nentries < 1) + fatal("%s: internal error: nentries %d", + __func__, idtab->nentries); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + sshkey_free(key); + success = 1; + done: send_status(e, success); } static void -process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) +process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) { - Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ - for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; - id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; + id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ - tab->nentries = 0; + idtab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ send_status(e, 1); @@ -530,24 +376,19 @@ reaper(void) { time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); Identity *id, *nxt; - int version; - Idtab *tab; - - for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { - tab = idtab_lookup(version); - for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { - nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); - if (id->death == 0) - continue; - if (now >= id->death) { - debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); - TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); - free_identity(id); - tab->nentries--; - } else - deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : - MINIMUM(deadline, id->death); - } + + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + if (id->death == 0) + continue; + if (now >= id->death) { + debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + } else + deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : + MINIMUM(deadline, id->death); } if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) return 0; @@ -555,54 +396,9 @@ reaper(void) return (deadline - now); } -/* - * XXX this and the corresponding serialisation function probably belongs - * in key.c - */ -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -static int -agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp) -{ - struct sshkey *k = NULL; - int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - *kp = NULL; - if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */ - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || - /* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */ - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || /* p */ - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) /* q */ - goto out; - - /* Generate additional parameters */ - if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) - goto out; - /* enable blinding */ - if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - - r = 0; /* success */ - out: - if (r == 0) - *kp = k; - else - sshkey_free(k); - return r; -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - static void -process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) +process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) { - Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; int success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; @@ -612,17 +408,8 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) u_char ctype; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - switch (version) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case 1: - r = agent_decode_rsa1(e->request, &k); - break; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - case 2: - r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k); - break; - } - if (r != 0 || k == NULL || + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 || + k == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; @@ -658,12 +445,12 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) success = 1; if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; - if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) { + if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ - tab->nentries++; + idtab->nentries++; } else { sshkey_free(k); free(id->comment); @@ -724,17 +511,14 @@ process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) } static void -no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type) +no_identities(SocketEntry *e) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, - (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ? - SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : - SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); @@ -746,13 +530,12 @@ static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; - int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; + int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; time_t death = 0; u_char type; struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; - Idtab *tab; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) @@ -772,8 +555,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) confirm = 1; break; default: - error("process_add_smartcard_key: " - "Unknown constraint type %d", type); + error("%s: Unknown constraint type %d", __func__, type); goto send; } } @@ -794,17 +576,15 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; - version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; - tab = idtab_lookup(version); - if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { + if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */ id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); - tab->nentries++; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + idtab->nentries++; success = 1; } else { sshkey_free(k); @@ -822,9 +602,8 @@ static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; - int r, version, success = 0; + int r, success = 0; Identity *id, *nxt; - Idtab *tab; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) @@ -838,25 +617,21 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) } debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); - for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { - tab = idtab_lookup(version); - for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { - nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); - /* Skip file--based keys */ - if (id->provider == NULL) - continue; - if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); - free_identity(id); - tab->nentries--; - } + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + /* Skip file--based keys */ + if (id->provider == NULL) + continue; + if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; } } if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) success = 1; else - error("process_remove_smartcard_key:" - " pkcs11_del_provider failed"); + error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__); send: free(provider); send_status(e, success); @@ -865,88 +640,86 @@ send: /* dispatch incoming messages */ -static void -process_message(SocketEntry *e) +static int +process_message(u_int socknum) { u_int msg_len; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int r; + SocketEntry *e; + + if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { + fatal("%s: socket number %u >= allocated %u", + __func__, socknum, sockets_alloc); + } + e = &sockets[socknum]; if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5) - return; /* Incomplete message. */ + return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input); msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp); - if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { - close_socket(e); - return; + if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) { + debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u", + __func__, socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN); + return -1; } if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4) - return; + return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */ /* move the current input to e->request */ sshbuf_reset(e->request); if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) + (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) { + if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE || + r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) { + debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type); /* check wheter agent is locked */ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { sshbuf_reset(e->request); switch (type) { - case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: /* send empty lists */ - no_identities(e, type); + no_identities(e); break; default: /* send a fail message for all other request types */ send_status(e, 0); } - return; + return 0; } - debug("type %d", type); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); break; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - /* ssh1 */ - case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE: - process_authentication_challenge1(e); - break; - case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: - process_request_identities(e, 1); - break; - case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY: - case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED: - process_add_identity(e, 1); - break; - case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY: - process_remove_identity(e, 1); - break; -#endif case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: - process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ + process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ break; /* ssh2 */ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: process_sign_request2(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: - process_request_identities(e, 2); + process_request_identities(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: - process_add_identity(e, 2); + process_add_identity(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: - process_remove_identity(e, 2); + process_remove_identity(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: - process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); + process_remove_all_identities(e); break; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: @@ -964,6 +737,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) send_status(e, 0); break; } + return 0; } static void @@ -1005,19 +779,141 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) } static int -prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp, - struct timeval **tvpp) +handle_socket_read(u_int socknum) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + socklen_t slen; + uid_t euid; + gid_t egid; + int fd; + + slen = sizeof(sunaddr); + fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); + if (fd < 0) { + error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) < 0) { + error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { + error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", + (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_conn_read(u_int socknum) +{ + char buf[1024]; + ssize_t len; + int r; + + if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) { + if (len == -1) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) + return 0; + error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", + __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, + strerror(errno)); + } + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + process_message(socknum); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_conn_write(u_int socknum) { - u_int i, sz; - int n = 0; - static struct timeval tv; + ssize_t len; + int r; + + if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0) + return 0; /* shouldn't happen */ + if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd, + sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output), + sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) { + if (len == -1) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) + return 0; + error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", + __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, + strerror(errno)); + } + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; +} + +static void +after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd) +{ + size_t i; + u_int socknum; + + for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) { + if (pfd[i].revents == 0) + continue; + /* Find sockets entry */ + for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) { + if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET && + sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION) + continue; + if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd) + break; + } + if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { + error("%s: no socket for fd %d", __func__, pfd[i].fd); + continue; + } + /* Process events */ + switch (sockets[socknum].type) { + case AUTH_SOCKET: + if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 && + handle_socket_read(socknum) != 0) + close_socket(&sockets[socknum]); + break; + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 && + handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) { + close_socket(&sockets[socknum]); + break; + } + if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 && + handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) + close_socket(&sockets[socknum]); + break; + default: + break; + } + } +} + +static int +prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp) +{ + struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp; + size_t i, j, npfd = 0; time_t deadline; + /* Count active sockets */ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: - n = MAXIMUM(n, sockets[i].fd); + npfd++; break; case AUTH_UNUSED: break; @@ -1026,28 +922,23 @@ prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp, break; } } + if (npfd != *npfdp && + (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__); + *pfdp = pfd; + *npfdp = npfd; - sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); - if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { - free(*fdrp); - free(*fdwp); - *fdrp = xmalloc(sz); - *fdwp = xmalloc(sz); - *nallocp = sz; - } - if (n < *fdl) - debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl); - *fdl = n; - memset(*fdrp, 0, sz); - memset(*fdwp, 0, sz); - - for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { + for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: - FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp); + pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; + pfd[j].revents = 0; + /* XXX backoff when input buffer full */ + pfd[j].events = POLLIN; if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0) - FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp); + pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT; + j++; break; default: break; @@ -1058,98 +949,16 @@ prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp, deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval); if (deadline == 0) { - *tvpp = NULL; + *timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */ } else { - tv.tv_sec = deadline; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - *tvpp = &tv; + if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000) + *timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000; + else + *timeoutp = deadline * 1000; } return (1); } -static void -after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) -{ - struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; - socklen_t slen; - char buf[1024]; - int len, sock, r; - u_int i, orig_alloc; - uid_t euid; - gid_t egid; - - for (i = 0, orig_alloc = sockets_alloc; i < orig_alloc; i++) - switch (sockets[i].type) { - case AUTH_UNUSED: - break; - case AUTH_SOCKET: - if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { - slen = sizeof(sunaddr); - sock = accept(sockets[i].fd, - (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); - if (sock < 0) { - error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", - strerror(errno)); - break; - } - if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { - error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", - sock, strerror(errno)); - close(sock); - break; - } - if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { - error("uid mismatch: " - "peer euid %u != uid %u", - (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); - close(sock); - break; - } - new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock); - } - break; - case AUTH_CONNECTION: - if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0 && - FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) { - len = write(sockets[i].fd, - sshbuf_ptr(sockets[i].output), - sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output)); - if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK || - errno == EINTR)) - continue; - if (len <= 0) { - close_socket(&sockets[i]); - break; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[i].output, - len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { - len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); - if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || - errno == EWOULDBLOCK || - errno == EINTR)) - continue; - if (len <= 0) { - close_socket(&sockets[i]); - break; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[i].input, - buf, len)) != 0) - fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - process_message(&sockets[i]); - } - break; - default: - fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type); - } -} - static void cleanup_socket(void) { @@ -1209,9 +1018,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) { int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; - u_int nalloc; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; - fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit rlim; #endif @@ -1219,9 +1026,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) extern char *optarg; pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; - struct timeval *tvp = NULL; size_t len; mode_t prev_mask; + int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */ + struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; + size_t npfd = 0; ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ @@ -1442,15 +1251,14 @@ skip: signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); - nalloc = 0; if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); platform_pledge_agent(); while (1) { - prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp); - result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp); + prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout); + result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout); saved_errno = errno; if (parent_alive_interval != 0) check_parent_exists(); @@ -1458,9 +1266,9 @@ skip: if (result < 0) { if (saved_errno == EINTR) continue; - fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); + fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); } else if (result > 0) - after_select(readsetp, writesetp); + after_poll(pfd, npfd); } /* NOTREACHED */ } diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h index a99d7f08b30b..6593e422d929 100644 --- a/ssh-gss.h +++ b/ssh-gss.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.12 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); +const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); #endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/ssh-keygen.0 b/ssh-keygen.0 index 569297da42ed..fb2c02fe7f90 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.0 +++ b/ssh-keygen.0 @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S authentication key generation, management and conversion SYNOPSIS - ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1] + ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa] [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile] ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile] @@ -21,24 +21,21 @@ SYNOPSIS ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point] ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines] [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator] - ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals] - [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ... + ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-U] + [-D pkcs11_provider] [-n principals] [-O option] + [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ... ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile] - ssh-keygen -A + ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path] ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number] file ... ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ... DESCRIPTION ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for - ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol versions 1 - and 2. Protocol 1 should not be used and is only offered to support - legacy devices. It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and - doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2. + ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If - invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key for - use in SSH protocol 2 connections. + invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key. ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details. @@ -48,10 +45,10 @@ DESCRIPTION KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs - this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/identity, - ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. - Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host - keys, as seen in /etc/rc. + this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the + system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in + /etc/rc. Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same @@ -71,32 +68,33 @@ DESCRIPTION or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. - For RSA1 keys and keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, there is also - a comment field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user - to help identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or - whatever is useful. The comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the - key is created, but can be changed using the -c option. + For keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, there is also a comment + field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user to help + identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever + is useful. The comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is + created, but can be changed using the -c option. After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should be placed to be activated. The options are as follows: - -A For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for - which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the - default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the - key type, and default comment. This is used by /etc/rc to - generate new host keys. + -A For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which + host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default + key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key + type, and default comment. If -f has also been specified, its + argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the + resulting host key files. This is used by /etc/rc to generate + new host keys. -a rounds - When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any - SSH protocol 2 key when the -o flag is set), this option - specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds - used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification - and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should - the keys be stolen). - - When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the -T command). This + When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or when + the -o flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key + derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in + slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute- + force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). + + When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the -T command). This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key @@ -117,10 +115,10 @@ DESCRIPTION Provides a new comment. -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key - files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys and keys - stored in the newer OpenSSH format. The program will prompt for - the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the - key has one, and for the new comment. + files. This operation is only supported for keys stored in the + newer OpenSSH format. The program will prompt for the file + containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has + one, and for the new comment. -D pkcs11 Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared @@ -200,11 +198,10 @@ DESCRIPTION -L Prints the contents of one or more certificates. - -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys - are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to - find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If - combined with -v, a visual ASCII art representation of the key is - supplied with the fingerprint. + -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA + keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and + prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art + representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. -M memory Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when @@ -228,14 +225,29 @@ DESCRIPTION -O option Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may - be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES section - for details. The options that are valid for user certificates - are: + be specified multiple times. See also the CERTIFICATES section + for further details. The options that are valid for user + certificates are: clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. + critical:name[=contents] + extension:name[=contents] + Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or + extension. The specified name should include a domain + suffix, e.g. M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is + specified then it is included as the contents of the + extension/option encoded as a string, otherwise the + extension/option is created with no contents (usually + indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a + client or server that does not recognise them, whereas + unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be + refused. + + At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. + force-command=command Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is @@ -277,8 +289,6 @@ DESCRIPTION separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. - At present, no options are valid for host keys. - -o Causes ssh-keygen to save private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than the more compatible PEM format. The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking @@ -322,10 +332,13 @@ DESCRIPTION Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G option) for safety. - -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 + -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are - M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or - M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 2. + M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. + + -U When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA + key resides in a ssh-agent(1). See the CERTIFICATES section for + more information. -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL @@ -432,6 +445,12 @@ CERTIFICATES $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub + Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1). + This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be + identified by its public half. + + $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub + In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. @@ -512,44 +531,28 @@ KEY REVOCATION LISTS was revoked. FILES - ~/.ssh/identity - Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of - the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the - user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the - key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of - this file using 3DES. This file is not automatically accessed by - ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private - key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made. - - ~/.ssh/identity.pub - Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for - authentication. The contents of this file should be added to - ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to - log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the - contents of this file secret. - ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_rsa - Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA - authentication identity of the user. This file should not be - readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a - passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used - to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This - file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is - offered as the default file for the private key. ssh(1) will - read this file when a login attempt is made. + Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity + of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the + user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the + key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of + this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically + accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for + the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt + is made. ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub - Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public - key for authentication. The contents of this file should be - added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user - wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no - need to keep the contents of this file secret. + Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public key for + authentication. The contents of this file should be added to + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to + log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep + the contents of this file secret. /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format @@ -567,4 +570,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 6.0 June 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 July 8, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1 index ce2213c7802b..5f1ec09b07a2 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.1 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.133 2016/06/16 06:10:45 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.144 2017/07/08 18:32:54 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: June 16 2016 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 8 2017 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ .Nm ssh-keygen .Op Fl q .Op Fl b Ar bits -.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 +.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ .Fl s Ar ca_key .Fl I Ar certificate_identity .Op Fl h +.Op Fl U +.Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider .Op Fl n Ar principals .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl V Ar validity_interval @@ -124,6 +126,7 @@ .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl A +.Op Fl f Ar prefix_path .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl k .Fl f Ar krl_file @@ -141,18 +144,14 @@ generates, manages and converts authentication keys for .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm -can create keys for use by SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. -Protocol 1 should not be used -and is only offered to support legacy devices. -It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses -and doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2. +can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. .Pp The type of key to be generated is specified with the .Fl t option. If invoked without any arguments, .Nm -will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections. +will generate an RSA key. .Pp .Nm is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group @@ -172,7 +171,6 @@ section for details. Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 @@ -207,7 +205,7 @@ There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. .Pp -For RSA1 keys and keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, +For keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user to help identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. @@ -223,24 +221,26 @@ should be placed to be activated. The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl A -For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) +For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. +If +.Fl f +has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the +default path for the resulting host key files. This is used by .Pa /etc/rc to generate new host keys. .It Fl a Ar rounds -When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol -2 key when the +When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or when the .Fl o flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). .Pp -When screening DH-GEX candidates ( -using the +When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the .Fl T command). This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ flag will be ignored. Provides a new comment. .It Fl c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. -This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys and keys stored in the +This operation is only supported for keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. @@ -384,7 +384,6 @@ section. Prints the contents of one or more certificates. .It Fl l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. -Private RSA1 keys are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys .Nm tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. @@ -423,51 +422,81 @@ section for details. .It Fl O Ar option Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may be specified multiple times. -Please see the +See also the .Sx CERTIFICATES -section for details. +section for further details. The options that are valid for user certificates are: -.Bl -tag -width Ds +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Ic clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. +.Pp +.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents +.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents +Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension. +The specified +.Ar name +should include a domain suffix, e.g.\& +.Dq name@example.com . +If +.Ar contents +is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option +encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no +contents (usually indicating a flag). +Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them, +whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused. +.Pp +At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. +.Pp .It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command Forces the execution of .Ar command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. +.Pp .It Ic no-agent-forwarding Disable .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding (permitted by default). +.Pp .It Ic no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). +.Pp .It Ic no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). +.Pp .It Ic no-user-rc Disable execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 (permitted by default). +.Pp .It Ic no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). +.Pp .It Ic permit-agent-forwarding Allows .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding. +.Pp .It Ic permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. +.Pp .It Ic permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. +.Pp .It Ic permit-user-rc Allows execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 . +.Pp .It Ic permit-x11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. +.Pp .It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The @@ -475,8 +504,6 @@ The is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. .El -.Pp -At present, no options are valid for host keys. .It Fl o Causes .Nm @@ -530,17 +557,22 @@ section for details. Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the .Fl G option) for safety. -.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 +.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are -.Dq rsa1 -for protocol version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or -.Dq rsa -for protocol version 2. +.Dq rsa . +.It Fl U +When used in combination with +.Fl s , +this option indicates that a CA key resides in a +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +See the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for more information. .It Fl u Update a KRL. When specified with @@ -688,6 +720,14 @@ to .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub .Pp +Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +This is indicated by the +.Fl U +flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half. +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub +.Pp In all cases, .Ar key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate @@ -795,31 +835,11 @@ will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity -Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. -This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. -It is possible to -specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be -used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. -This file is not automatically accessed by -.Nm -but it is offered as the default file for the private key. -.Xr ssh 1 -will read this file when a login attempt is made. -.Pp -.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub -Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication. -The contents of this file should be added to -.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys -on all machines -where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication. -There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. -.Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa -Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA +Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to @@ -835,7 +855,7 @@ will read this file when a login attempt is made. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub -Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA +Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index f17af036bbfa..835f7d0169ba 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.299 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.307 2017/07/07 03:53:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "sshbuf.h" @@ -59,6 +58,7 @@ #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" #include "utf8.h" +#include "authfd.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ char *identity_comment = NULL; /* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */ char *ca_key_path = NULL; +/* Prefer to use agent keys for CA signing */ +int prefer_agent = 0; + /* Certificate serial number */ unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; @@ -149,6 +152,15 @@ u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; char *certflags_command = NULL; char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; +/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */ +struct cert_userext { + char *key; + char *val; + int crit; +}; +struct cert_userext *cert_userext; +size_t ncert_userext; + /* Conversion to/from various formats */ int convert_to = 0; int convert_from = 0; @@ -217,13 +229,21 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; if (*bitsp > maxbits) fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits); - if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) - fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); - else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 1024) - fatal("Key must at least be 1024 bits"); - else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) - fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are " - "256, 384 or 521 bits"); + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if (*bitsp != 1024) + fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits"); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits", + SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) + fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " + "256, 384 or 521 bits"); + } #endif } @@ -237,9 +257,6 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { - case KEY_RSA1: - name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY; - break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; @@ -311,8 +328,6 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) char comment[61]; int r; - if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) - fatal("version 1 keys are not supported"); if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ @@ -334,7 +349,6 @@ static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); @@ -359,7 +373,6 @@ static void do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); @@ -478,7 +491,7 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen) return NULL; } if ((key = sshkey_new_private(ktype)) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private failed"); + fatal("sshkey_new_private failed"); free(type); switch (key->type) { @@ -514,7 +527,7 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen) buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p); - if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0) + if ((r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key)) != 0) fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); break; } @@ -760,7 +773,7 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) - error("key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + error("sshkey_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(prv); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); exit(0); @@ -816,13 +829,6 @@ try_read_key(char **cpp) struct sshkey *ret; int r; - if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - fatal("sshkey_new failed"); - /* Try RSA1 */ - if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) - return ret; - /* Try modern */ - sshkey_free(ret); if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) @@ -978,9 +984,6 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) char *path; } key_types[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE }, -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC @@ -994,20 +997,38 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; - char comment[1024]; + char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file; int i, type, fd, r; FILE *f; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { - if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0) - continue; - if (errno != ENOENT) { + public = private = NULL; + prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL; + + xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + + /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */ + if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) { + if (st.st_size != 0) + goto next; + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); - first = 0; - continue; + goto failnext; } + /* + * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with + * key generation. + */ + xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); @@ -1015,56 +1036,76 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); - strlcpy(identity_file, key_types[i].path, sizeof(identity_file)); + if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", + prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to generate/reserve a name */ bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { - error("key_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); - first = 0; - continue; + error("sshkey_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + goto failnext; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); - if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, "", + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "", comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", - identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - sshkey_free(private); - sshkey_free(public); - first = 0; - continue; + prv_tmp, ssh_err(r)); + goto failnext; } - sshkey_free(private); - strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); - fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); - if (fd == -1) { - error("Could not save your public key in %s", - identity_file); - sshkey_free(public); - first = 0; - continue; + if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", + pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; } + (void)fchmod(fd, 0644); f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { - error("fdopen %s failed", identity_file); + error("fdopen %s failed: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); close(fd); - sshkey_free(public); - first = 0; - continue; + goto failnext; } if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) { error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(f); - sshkey_free(public); - first = 0; - continue; + goto failnext; } fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); - fclose(f); - sshkey_free(public); + if (ferror(f) != 0) { + error("write key failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + fclose(f); + goto failnext; + } + if (fclose(f) != 0) { + error("key close failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */ + if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) { + error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", + pub_file, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) { + error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", + key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); + failnext: + first = 0; + goto next; + } + next: + sshkey_free(private); + sshkey_free(public); + free(prv_tmp); + free(pub_tmp); + free(prv_file); + free(pub_file); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); @@ -1436,9 +1477,8 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) } } - if (private->type != KEY_RSA1 && private->type != KEY_ED25519 && - !use_new_format) { - error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 or keys stored in " + if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && !use_new_format) { + error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in " "the new format (-o)."); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); @@ -1476,7 +1516,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) - fatal("key_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); @@ -1531,6 +1571,8 @@ add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value) static void prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) { + size_t i; + sshbuf_reset(c); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_command != NULL) @@ -1553,6 +1595,17 @@ prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_src_addr != NULL) add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr); + for (i = 0; i < ncert_userext; i++) { + if ((cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) || + (!cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL))) + continue; + if (cert_userext[i].val == NULL) + add_flag_option(c, cert_userext[i].key); + else { + add_string_option(c, cert_userext[i].key, + cert_userext[i].val); + } + } } static struct sshkey * @@ -1585,24 +1638,66 @@ load_pkcs11_key(char *path) #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } +/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */ +static int +agent_signer(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx) +{ + int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx; + + return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp, + data, datalen, alg, compat); +} + static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { - int r, i, fd; + int r, i, fd, found, agent_fd = -1; u_int n; struct sshkey *ca, *public; char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; FILE *f; + struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids; + size_t j; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); #endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { + /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */ if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); - } else + } else if (prefer_agent) { + /* + * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making + * sure the public key specified is actually present in the + * agent. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) + fatal("Cannot use public key for CA signature: %s", + ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0) + fatal("Retrieve agent key list: %s", ssh_err(r)); + found = 0; + for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) { + if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) + fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp); + ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids); + ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + } else { + /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */ ca = load_identity(tmp); + } free(tmp); if (key_type_name != NULL && @@ -1650,10 +1745,18 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) - fatal("key_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("sshkey_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r)); - if ((r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name)) != 0) - fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); + if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) { + if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca, + key_type_name, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't certify key %s via agent: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + } if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; @@ -1789,7 +1892,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec) static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { - char *val; + char *val, *cp; + int iscrit = 0; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; @@ -1829,6 +1933,18 @@ add_cert_option(char *opt) if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); + } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 || + (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) { + val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1); + if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL) + *cp++ = '\0'; + cert_userext = xreallocarray(cert_userext, ncert_userext + 1, + sizeof(*cert_userext)); + cert_userext[ncert_userext].key = val; + cert_userext[ncert_userext].val = cp == NULL ? + NULL : xstrdup(cp); + cert_userext[ncert_userext].crit = iscrit; + ncert_userext++; } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } @@ -1955,7 +2071,7 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') continue; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) - fatal("key_new"); + fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); @@ -2101,7 +2217,7 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, */ } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) - fatal("key_new"); + fatal("sshkey_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); @@ -2209,17 +2325,11 @@ do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) exit(ret); } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -# define RSA1_USAGE " | rsa1" -#else -# define RSA1_USAGE "" -#endif - static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, - "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa%s]\n" + "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa]\n" " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" @@ -2227,7 +2337,7 @@ usage(void) " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" - " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n", RSA1_USAGE); + " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); @@ -2242,8 +2352,9 @@ usage(void) " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n" " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n" #endif - " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n" - " [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-U]\n" + " [-D pkcs11_provider] [-n principals] [-O option]\n" + " [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -A\n" " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" @@ -2301,8 +2412,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); - /* Remaining characters: UYdw */ - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy" + /* Remaining characters: Ydw */ + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQUXceghiklopquvxy" "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:" "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { @@ -2429,6 +2540,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; + case 'U': + prefer_agent = 1; + break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; @@ -2648,9 +2762,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) - fatal("key_generate failed"); + fatal("sshkey_generate failed"); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) - fatal("key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.0 b/ssh-keyscan.0 index e9d9f0d8b6e6..1a9751ef14a4 100644 --- a/ssh-keyscan.0 +++ b/ssh-keyscan.0 @@ -49,10 +49,9 @@ DESCRIPTION -t type Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. - The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], - M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] for protocol version 2. Multiple - values may be specified by separating them with commas. The - default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys. + The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. + Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. + The default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys. -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keyscan to print debugging messages about its progress. @@ -70,10 +69,6 @@ FILES 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 - Output format for RSA1 keys: - - host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus - Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 keys: host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key @@ -108,4 +103,4 @@ BUGS This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key. -OpenBSD 6.0 November 8, 2015 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 May 2, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.1 b/ssh-keyscan.1 index d29d9d906479..aa4a2ae838a0 100644 --- a/ssh-keyscan.1 +++ b/ssh-keyscan.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.38 2015/11/08 23:24:03 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.40 2017/05/02 17:04:09 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . .\" @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: November 8 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 2 2017 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -90,14 +90,11 @@ Default is 5 seconds. .It Fl t Ar type Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are -.Dq rsa1 -for protocol version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or -.Dq rsa -for protocol version 2. +.Dq rsa . Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. The default is to fetch .Dq rsa , @@ -127,11 +124,6 @@ Input format: 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 .Ed .Pp -Output format for RSA1 keys: -.Bd -literal -host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus -.Ed -.Pp Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 keys: .Bd -literal host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c index 1f95239a37c6..258123ae80a8 100644 --- a/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.109 2017/03/10 04:26:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.115 2017/06/30 04:17:23 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "ssh1.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" @@ -54,11 +53,13 @@ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; -#define KT_RSA1 1 -#define KT_DSA 2 -#define KT_RSA 4 -#define KT_ECDSA 8 -#define KT_ED25519 16 +#define KT_DSA (1) +#define KT_RSA (1<<1) +#define KT_ECDSA (1<<2) +#define KT_ED25519 (1<<3) + +#define KT_MIN KT_DSA +#define KT_MAX KT_ED25519 int get_cert = 0; int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519; @@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ typedef struct Connection { int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ - int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */ + int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */ sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ @@ -187,52 +188,6 @@ strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) return (tok); } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -static struct sshkey * -keygrab_ssh1(con *c) -{ - static struct sshkey *rsa; - static struct sshbuf *msg; - int r; - u_char type; - - if (rsa == NULL) { - if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { - error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); - return NULL; - } - if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - } - if ((r = sshbuf_put(msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7))) != 0 || /* padding */ - (r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) - goto buf_err; - if (type != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) { - error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name); - sshbuf_reset(msg); - return NULL; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */ - /* server key */ - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 || - /* host key */ - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) { - buf_err: - error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - sshbuf_reset(msg); - return NULL; - } - - sshbuf_reset(msg); - - return (rsa); -} -#endif static int key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) @@ -267,7 +222,6 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c) char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; int r; - enable_compat20(); switch (c->c_keytype) { case KT_DSA: myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? @@ -317,7 +271,7 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c) * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done. */ - ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done, c->c_ssh); + ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done); } static void @@ -436,7 +390,6 @@ confree(int s) { if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); - close(s); free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) @@ -447,7 +400,8 @@ confree(int s) ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh); free(fdcon[s].c_ssh); fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL; - } + } else + close(s); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_CLR(s, read_wait); ncon--; @@ -482,6 +436,20 @@ congreet(int s) size_t bufsiz; con *c = &fdcon[s]; + /* send client banner */ + n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); + if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { + error("snprintf: buffer too small"); + confree(s); + return; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { + error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + confree(s); + return; + } + for (;;) { memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); bufsiz = sizeof(buf); @@ -524,38 +492,14 @@ congreet(int s) c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); else c->c_ssh->compat = 0; - if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { - if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { - debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); - confree(s); - return; - } - } else if (remote_major != 1) { - debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name); + if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { + debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } fprintf(stderr, "# %s:%d %s\n", c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); - n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", - c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, - c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); - if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { - error("snprintf: buffer too small"); - confree(s); - return; - } - if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { - error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); - confree(s); - return; - } - if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { - keygrab_ssh2(c); - confree(s); - return; - } - c->c_status = CS_SIZE; - contouch(s); + keygrab_ssh2(c); + confree(s); } static void @@ -585,12 +529,6 @@ conread(int s) c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); c->c_status = CS_KEYS; break; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case CS_KEYS: - keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c)); - confree(s); - return; -#endif default: fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); break; @@ -659,7 +597,7 @@ do_host(char *host) if (name == NULL) return; - for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_ED25519; j *= 2) { + for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) { if (get_keytypes & j) { while (ncon >= MAXCON) conloop(); @@ -756,11 +694,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case KEY_RSA1: - get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1; - break; -#endif case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; diff --git a/ssh-keysign.0 b/ssh-keysign.0 index 34a451d62b59..d855ad07a8e7 100644 --- a/ssh-keysign.0 +++ b/ssh-keysign.0 @@ -49,4 +49,4 @@ HISTORY AUTHORS Markus Friedl -OpenBSD 6.0 February 17, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 February 17, 2016 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c index fac0167e6f14..a79c872101fb 100644 --- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.6 2015/12/11 00:20:04 mmcc Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.7 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { - Key key; + struct sshkey key; /* XXX */ u_char *blob, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, slen = 0; int ret = -1; @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ pkcs11_start_helper(void) int pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp) { - Key *k; + struct sshkey *k; int i, nkeys; u_char *blob; u_int blen; diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 index 1b58361a6b75..93e5565b7ae0 100644 --- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 @@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ HISTORY AUTHORS Markus Friedl -OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c index 53f41c555f40..fd3039c14272 100644 --- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.12 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.13 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ struct pkcs11_keyinfo { - Key *key; + struct sshkey *key; char *providername; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next; }; @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Buffer iqueue; Buffer oqueue; static void -add_key(Key *k, char *name) +add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; @@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ del_keys_by_name(char *name) } /* lookup matching 'private' key */ -static Key * -lookup_key(Key *k) +static struct sshkey * +lookup_key(struct sshkey *k) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static void process_add(void) { char *name, *pin; - Key **keys; + struct sshkey **keys; int i, nkeys; u_char *blob; u_int blen; @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ process_sign(void) u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0; int ok = -1; - Key *key, *found; + struct sshkey *key, *found; Buffer msg; blob = get_string(&blen); diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c index aaf712d9a5ba..b37491c5d68d 100644 --- a/ssh-pkcs11.c +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.23 2016/10/28 03:33:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.25 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -537,7 +537,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, } if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { - key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; @@ -545,8 +546,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ - *keysp = xreallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, - sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys, + *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c index cde05df10143..f570ae6d40aa 100644 --- a/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/ssh-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.60 2016/09/12 23:39:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.62 2017/07/01 13:50:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * @@ -78,6 +78,41 @@ rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) } } +/* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ +int +ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(struct sshkey *key) +{ + RSA *rsa; + BIGNUM *aux = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int r; + + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + rsa = key->rsa; + + if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || + (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) || + (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || + (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + r = 0; + out: + BN_clear_free(aux); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return r; +} + /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, @@ -99,9 +134,10 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, else hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident); if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || - sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || - BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; @@ -172,9 +208,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || - BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || sig == NULL || siglen == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; diff --git a/ssh.0 b/ssh.0 index 67ce809bb28e..f920dd97e010 100644 --- a/ssh.0 +++ b/ssh.0 @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) SYNOPSIS - ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] + ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] @@ -28,10 +28,6 @@ DESCRIPTION The options are as follows: - -1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only. - - -2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only. - -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only. @@ -58,21 +54,16 @@ DESCRIPTION -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by - gzip(1), and the M-bM-^@M-^\levelM-bM-^@M-^] can be controlled by the - CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is - desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will - only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be - set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the - Compression option. + gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow + connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. + The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the + configuration files; see the Compression option. -c cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. - - Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The - supported values are M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^]. For protocol - version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers - listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in - ssh_config(5) for more information. + cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order + of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more + information. -D [bind_address:]port Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding. @@ -137,10 +128,9 @@ DESCRIPTION -i identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public - key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for - protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, - ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. - Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the + key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity + files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the @@ -243,11 +233,9 @@ DESCRIPTION CertificateFile ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP - Cipher Ciphers ClearAllForwardings Compression - CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster @@ -292,17 +280,15 @@ DESCRIPTION PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications - Protocol ProxyCommand ProxyJump ProxyUseFdpass PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit + RemoteCommand RemoteForward RequestTTY - RhostsRSAAuthentication - RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax @@ -340,14 +326,20 @@ DESCRIPTION -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket -R remote_socket:host:hostport -R remote_socket:local_socket + -R [bind_address:]port Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket - on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the given host - and port, or Unix socket, on the local side. This works by - allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port or to a Unix - socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this - port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure - channel, and a connection is made to either host port hostport, - or local_socket, from the local machine. + on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local + side. + + This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port + or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is + made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded + over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local + machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port + hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was + specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward + connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS + client. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on @@ -438,12 +430,7 @@ DESCRIPTION and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). AUTHENTICATION - The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to - use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option - in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above). Protocol 1 should - not be used and is only offered to support legacy devices. It suffers - from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and doesn't support many of the - advanced features available for protocol 2. + The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, @@ -481,11 +468,15 @@ AUTHENTICATION proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. + The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key + authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a + different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to + DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag). + The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores - the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), - ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa - (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), - ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), + the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public + key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. @@ -845,7 +836,6 @@ FILES Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see ENVIRONMENT, above. - ~/.ssh/identity ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 @@ -858,7 +848,6 @@ FILES will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. - ~/.ssh/identity.pub ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub @@ -968,4 +957,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 6.0 July 16, 2016 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 September 21, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 index 4011c65aa662..2ab1697f95de 100644 --- a/ssh.1 +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.376 2016/07/16 06:57:55 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2016 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.384 2017/09/21 19:16:53 markus Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 21 2017 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh .Bk -words -.Op Fl 1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy +.Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port @@ -95,16 +95,6 @@ it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. The options are as follows: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -.It Fl 1 -Forces -.Nm -to try protocol version 1 only. -.Pp -.It Fl 2 -Forces -.Nm -to try protocol version 2 only. -.Pp .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm @@ -144,12 +134,7 @@ data for forwarded X11, TCP and .Ux Ns -domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by -.Xr gzip 1 , -and the -.Dq level -can be controlled by the -.Cm CompressionLevel -option for protocol version 1. +.Xr gzip 1 . Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the @@ -159,14 +144,6 @@ option. .Pp .It Fl c Ar cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. -.Pp -Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. -The supported values are -.Dq 3des , -.Dq blowfish , -and -.Dq des . -For protocol version 2, .Ar cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. @@ -290,14 +267,11 @@ private RSA key. Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity -for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa -for protocol version 2. +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple @@ -491,11 +465,9 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It CertificateFile .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP -.It Cipher .It Ciphers .It ClearAllForwardings .It Compression -.It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster @@ -540,17 +512,15 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications -.It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyJump .It ProxyUseFdpass .It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit +.It RemoteCommand .It RemoteForward .It RequestTTY -.It RhostsRSAAuthentication -.It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax @@ -622,21 +592,30 @@ Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. .Ar remote_socket : local_socket .Sm on .Xc +.It Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port +.Sm on +.Xc Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote -(server) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, -on the local side. +(server) host are to be forwarded to the local side. +.Pp This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP .Ar port or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection -is made to either +is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by .Ar host port .Ar hostport , or .Ar local_socket , -from the local machine. +or, if no explicit destination was specified, +.Nm +will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations +requested by the remote SOCKS client. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when @@ -806,21 +785,7 @@ a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Sh AUTHENTICATION -The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. -The default is to use protocol 2 only, -though this can be changed via the -.Cm Protocol -option in -.Xr ssh_config 5 -or the -.Fl 1 -and -.Fl 2 -options (see above). -Protocol 1 should not be used -and is only offered to support legacy devices. -It suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses -and doesn't support many of the advanced features available for protocol 2. +The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. .Pp The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, @@ -890,11 +855,20 @@ The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. .Pp +The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key +authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a +different method. +These may be viewed by increasing the +.Cm LogLevel +to +.Cm DEBUG +or higher (e.g. by using the +.Fl v +flag). +.Pp The user creates his/her key pair by running .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . This stores the private key in -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity -(protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa @@ -905,8 +879,6 @@ or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub -(protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub @@ -1490,7 +1462,6 @@ Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see .Sx ENVIRONMENT , above. .Pp -.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 @@ -1505,7 +1476,6 @@ It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. .Pp -.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index 32b27bbc2ce6..ae37432bd47e 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.451 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.464 2017/09/21 19:16:53 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" @@ -198,7 +197,7 @@ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, -"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n" +"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n" " [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n" " [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n" @@ -209,8 +208,7 @@ usage(void) exit(255); } -static int ssh_session(void); -static int ssh_session2(void); +static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *); static void load_public_identity_files(void); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); @@ -511,13 +509,13 @@ int main(int ac, char **av) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; - int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, config_test = 0; + int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms; + int config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *host_arg, *logfile; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; char cname[NI_MAXHOST], uidstr[32], *conn_hash_hex; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; - int timeout_ms; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; struct Forward fwd; @@ -598,6 +596,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ initialize_options(&options); + /* + * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures + */ + if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't allocate session state"); + channel_init_channels(ssh); + active_state = ssh; /* XXX legacy API compat */ + /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; @@ -609,10 +615,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) "ACD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': - options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; + fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); break; case '2': - options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; + /* Ignored */ break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; @@ -690,11 +696,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - cp = xstrdup("1\n2"); -#else cp = xstrdup("2"); -#endif } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); @@ -818,27 +820,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } break; case 'c': - if (ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ? + if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ? optarg + 1 : optarg)) { - /* SSH2 only */ - free(options.ciphers); - options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); - options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID; - break; - } - /* SSH1 only */ - options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg); - if (options.cipher == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) - options.ciphers = xstrdup("3des-cbc"); - else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH) - options.ciphers = xstrdup("blowfish-cbc"); - else - options.ciphers = xstrdup(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT); + free(options.ciphers); + options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'm': if (mac_valid(optarg)) { @@ -879,7 +868,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) break; case 'R': - if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) { + if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) || + parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, @@ -936,6 +926,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } } + if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0) + opt_terminated = 1; + ac -= optind; av += optind; @@ -950,7 +943,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) host = xstrdup(++cp); } else host = xstrdup(*av); - if (ac > 1) { + if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } @@ -992,12 +985,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } } - /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ - if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && - !no_shell_flag) - fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " - "to execute."); - /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. @@ -1007,8 +994,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); log_init(argv0, - options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, - SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); + options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, + options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility, + !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, @@ -1127,7 +1117,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); - channel_set_af(options.address_family); + channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) @@ -1149,15 +1139,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av) options.use_privileged_port = 0; #endif + if (buffer_len(&command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL) + fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command."); + + /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && + options.remote_command == NULL && !no_shell_flag) + fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " + "to execute."); + /* reinit */ - log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); + log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog); if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ - if (buffer_len(&command) == 0) + if (buffer_len(&command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ @@ -1213,6 +1212,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av) free(cp); } + if (options.remote_command != NULL) { + debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); + cp = options.remote_command; + options.remote_command = percent_expand(cp, + "C", conn_hash_hex, + "L", shorthost, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "l", thishost, + "n", host_arg, + "p", portstr, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); + debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); + free(cp); + buffer_append(&command, options.remote_command, + strlen(options.remote_command)); + + } + if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, original_real_uid); @@ -1242,9 +1262,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) if (options.control_path != NULL) { int sock; if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) { - packet_set_connection(sock, sock); - ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ - enable_compat20(); /* XXX */ + ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock); packet_set_mux(); goto skip_connect; } @@ -1264,7 +1282,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ - if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, + if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) != 0) @@ -1292,19 +1310,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0; - if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication || - options.hostbased_authentication) { + if (options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 9; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, - sizeof(Key)); + sizeof(struct sshkey)); /* XXX */ for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; PRIV_START; -#if WITH_SSH1 - sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, - _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); -#endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); @@ -1452,7 +1465,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } skip_connect: - exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session(); + exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh); packet_close(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) @@ -1525,7 +1538,7 @@ fork_postauth(void) /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void -ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; @@ -1543,10 +1556,10 @@ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); - channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, - rfwd->allocated_port); + channel_update_permitted_opens(ssh, + rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { - channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); + channel_update_permitted_opens(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); } } @@ -1575,29 +1588,27 @@ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static void -client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(int id, void *arg) +client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void -ssh_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) +ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); } static void -ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void) +ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; - if (!compat20) - fatal("stdio forwarding require Protocol 2"); debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port); @@ -1605,15 +1616,15 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void) if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0) fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); - if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(options.stdio_forward_host, + if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host, options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__); - channel_register_cleanup(c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); - channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void -ssh_init_forwarding(void) +ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) { int success = 0; int i; @@ -1632,7 +1643,7 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void) options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); - success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener( + success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) @@ -1654,7 +1665,7 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void) options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); options.remote_forwards[i].handle = - channel_request_remote_forwarding( + channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &options.remote_forwards[i]); if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) @@ -1663,14 +1674,15 @@ ssh_init_forwarding(void) logit("Warning: Could not request remote " "forwarding."); } else { - client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward, + client_register_global_confirm( + ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); } } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { - if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open, + if (client_request_tun_fwd(ssh, options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); @@ -1696,174 +1708,8 @@ check_agent_present(void) } } -static int -ssh_session(void) -{ - int type; - int interactive = 0; - int have_tty = 0; - struct winsize ws; - char *cp; - const char *display; - char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; - - /* Enable compression if requested. */ - if (options.compression) { - debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", - options.compression_level); - - if (options.compression_level < 1 || - options.compression_level > 9) - fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to " - "9 (slow, best)."); - - /* Send the request. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION); - packet_put_int(options.compression_level); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - packet_start_compression(options.compression_level); - else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression."); - else - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for " - "compression response."); - } - /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */ - if (tty_flag) { - debug("Requesting pty."); - - /* Start the packet. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY); - - /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the - length of the string. */ - cp = getenv("TERM"); - if (!cp) - cp = ""; - packet_put_cstring(cp); - - /* Store window size in the packet. */ - if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) - memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); - packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); - - /* Store tty modes in the packet. */ - tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL); - - /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */ - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Read response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { - interactive = 1; - have_tty = 1; - } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to " - "allocate a pseudo tty."); - else - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty " - "request response."); - } - /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */ - display = getenv("DISPLAY"); - if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) - debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); - if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, - options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, - options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { - /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ - debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " - "spoofing."); - x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, - data, 0); - /* Read response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { - interactive = 1; - } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { - logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding."); - } else { - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 " - "forwarding"); - } - } - /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ - packet_set_interactive(interactive, - options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); - - /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */ - check_agent_present(); - - if (options.forward_agent) { - debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); - auth_request_forwarding(); - - /* Read response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(); - packet_check_eom(); - if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding."); - } - - /* Initiate port forwardings. */ - ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); - ssh_init_forwarding(); - - /* Execute a local command */ - if (options.local_command != NULL && - options.permit_local_command) - ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); - - /* - * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote - * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. - */ - if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { - if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && - options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { - debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " - "confirmation received"); - } else - fork_postauth(); - } - - /* - * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the - * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell. - */ - if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) { - int len = buffer_len(&command); - if (len > 900) - len = 900; - debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, - (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command)); - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD); - packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - } else { - debug("Requesting shell."); - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - } - - /* Enter the interactive session. */ - return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? - options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0); -} - -/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */ static void -ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) +ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display; @@ -1876,15 +1722,15 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); - if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, + if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); - x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, data, 1); - client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } @@ -1892,7 +1738,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); - channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } @@ -1900,13 +1746,13 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); - client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), + client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int -ssh_session2_open(void) +ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; @@ -1936,34 +1782,34 @@ ssh_session2_open(void) window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } - c = channel_new( + c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); - debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self); + debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self); - channel_send_open(c->self); + channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); if (!no_shell_flag) - channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int -ssh_session2(void) +ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh) { int id = -1; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) - ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); - ssh_init_forwarding(); + ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); + ssh_init_forwarding(ssh); /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ if (!packet_get_mux()) - muxserver_listen(); + muxserver_listen(ssh); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen @@ -1991,10 +1837,10 @@ ssh_session2(void) * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) - ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); + ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN)) - id = ssh_session2_open(); + id = ssh_session2_open(ssh); else { packet_set_interactive( options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, @@ -2029,7 +1875,7 @@ ssh_session2(void) fork_postauth(); } - return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? + return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } @@ -2039,16 +1885,16 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) { char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL; - Key *public; + struct sshkey *public; struct passwd *pw; int i; u_int n_ids, n_certs; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; - Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - Key **keys; + struct sshkey **keys; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h index 50467a792bdf..12d80092250c 100644 --- a/ssh.h +++ b/ssh.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.83 2015/12/11 03:19:09 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.87 2017/05/07 23:15:59 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ /* * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file. - * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with + * Current value permits 16kbit RSA keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with * some room for options and comments. */ #define SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES 16384 @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ #define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1 #define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5 -/* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */ +/* We support only SSH2 */ #define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2 #define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0 @@ -98,8 +98,5 @@ #define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd" #endif -/* Minimum modulus size (n) for RSA keys. */ -#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768 - /* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */ #define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128 diff --git a/ssh1.h b/ssh1.h deleted file mode 100644 index 6a05c4724bb7..000000000000 --- a/ssh1.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,91 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.7 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */ - -/* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". - */ - -/* - * Definition of message types. New values can be added, but old values - * should not be removed or without careful consideration of the consequences - * for compatibility. The maximum value is 254; value 255 is reserved for - * future extension. - */ -/* Ranges */ -#define SSH_MSG_MIN 1 -#define SSH_MSG_MAX 254 -/* Message name */ /* msg code */ /* arguments */ -#define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* cause (string) */ -#define SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* ck,msk,srvk,hostk */ -#define SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* key (BIGNUM) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_USER 4 /* user (string) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS 5 /* user (string) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* modulus (BIGNUM) */ -#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* int (BIGNUM) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* int (BIGNUM) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* pass (string) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* TERM, tty modes */ -#define SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* row,col,xpix,ypix */ -#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* */ -#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* cmd (string) */ -#define SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* */ -#define SSH_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* */ -#define SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* data (string) */ -#define SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* data (string) */ -#define SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* data (string) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_EOF 19 /* */ -#define SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS 20 /* status (int) */ -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* channel (int) */ -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* channel (int) */ -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* ch,data (int,str) */ -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* channel (int) */ -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* channel (int) */ -/* SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 26 OBSOLETE */ -#define SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* channel (int) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* p,host,hp (i,s,i) */ -#define SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* ch,h,p (i,s,i) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* */ -#define SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* port (int) */ -#define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* string */ -#define SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* */ -#define SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* proto,data (s,s) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* user,mod (s,mpi) */ -#define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* string */ -#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* level 1-9 (int) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE 38 /* size 4k-1024k (int) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* we use this for s/key */ -#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* challenge (string) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* response (string) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS 42 /* (KTEXT) */ -#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE 43 /* (KTEXT) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT 44 /* credentials (s) */ -#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN 65 /* token (s) */ - -/* protocol version 1.5 overloads some version 1.3 message types */ -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE -#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION - -/* - * Authentication methods. New types can be added, but old types should not - * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31. - */ -#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 -#define SSH_AUTH_RSA 2 -#define SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 -#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 -#define SSH_AUTH_TIS 5 -#define SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS 6 -#define SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT 7 - /* 8 to 15 are reserved */ -#define SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN 21 - -/* Protocol flags. These are bit masks. */ -#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* X11 forwarding includes screen */ -#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN 2 /* forwarding opens contain host */ diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c index 2a9f1497c75a..c84b4e713bf4 100644 --- a/ssh_api.c +++ b/ssh_api.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.7 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:13:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp) } if (remote_major != 2) return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH; - enable_compat20(); chop(buf); debug("Remote version string %.100s", buf); if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL) diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config index 90fb63f0bf43..c12f5ef52f48 100644 --- a/ssh_config +++ b/ssh_config @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.30 2016/02/20 23:06:23 sobrado Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.33 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $ # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See # ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for @@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ # Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no -# RhostsRSAAuthentication no -# RSAAuthentication yes # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no @@ -31,16 +29,14 @@ # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 # StrictHostKeyChecking ask -# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 # Port 22 # Protocol 2 -# Cipher 3des -# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc -# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160 +# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc +# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com # EscapeChar ~ # Tunnel no # TunnelDevice any:any diff --git a/ssh_config.0 b/ssh_config.0 index ade8e6562013..9493953ab187 100644 --- a/ssh_config.0 +++ b/ssh_config.0 @@ -3,10 +3,6 @@ SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5) NAME ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client configuration files -SYNOPSIS - ~/.ssh/config - /etc/ssh/ssh_config - DESCRIPTION ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: @@ -189,21 +185,14 @@ DESCRIPTION process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If the option is set to no, the check will not be executed. - Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in - protocol version 1. Currently, blowfish, 3des (the default), and - des are supported, though des is only supported in the ssh(1) - client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 - implementations; its use is strongly discouraged due to - cryptographic weaknesses. - Ciphers - Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of - preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the - specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified - ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing - them. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then - the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from - the default set instead of replacing them. + Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. + Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified value + begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be + appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the + specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified + ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default + set instead of replacing them. The supported ciphers are: @@ -216,11 +205,6 @@ DESCRIPTION aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com - arcfour - arcfour128 - arcfour256 - blowfish-cbc - cast128-cbc chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: @@ -245,13 +229,6 @@ DESCRIPTION Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be yes or no (the default). - CompressionLevel - Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. - The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). - The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The - meaning of the values is the same as in gzip(1). Note that this - option applies to protocol version 1 only. - ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in @@ -491,8 +468,9 @@ DESCRIPTION HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key - database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH - connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. + database files and when validating host certificates. This + option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple + servers running on a single host. HostName Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to @@ -526,9 +504,8 @@ DESCRIPTION IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA - authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity - for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, - ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. + authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by @@ -573,13 +550,14 @@ DESCRIPTION IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6, - cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, or a numeric value. - This option may take one or two arguments, separated by - whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the - packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the - first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the - second for non-interactive sessions. The default is lowdelay for - interactive sessions and throughput for non-interactive sessions. + cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value, or + none to use the operating system default. This option may take + one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument + is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If + two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for + interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. + The default is lowdelay for interactive sessions and throughput + for non-interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. @@ -712,15 +690,6 @@ DESCRIPTION gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password - Protocol - Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of - preference. The possible values are 1 and 2. Multiple versions - must be comma-separated. When this option is set to 2,1 ssh will - try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if version 2 is not - available. The default is version 2. Protocol 1 suffers from a - number of cryptographic weaknesses and should not be used. It is - only offered to support legacy devices. - ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed @@ -799,15 +768,29 @@ DESCRIPTION rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. + RemoteCommand + Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after + successfully connecting to the server. The command string + extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's + shell. Arguments to RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in + the TOKENS section. + RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over - the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local - machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the - second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be - specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple - forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be - given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded - only when logging in as root on the remote machine. + the secure channel. The remote port may either be fowarded to a + specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a + SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to + arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first + argument must be [bind_address:]port If forwarding to a specific + destination then the second argument must be host:hostport, + otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote + forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy. + + IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square + brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional + forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports + can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote + machine. If the port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. @@ -835,19 +818,6 @@ DESCRIPTION List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). - RhostsRSAAuthentication - Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA - host authentication. The argument must be yes or no (the - default). This option applies to protocol version 1 only and - requires ssh(1) to be setuid root. - - RSAAuthentication - Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to - this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. RSA authentication - will only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an - authentication agent is running. Note that this option applies - to protocol version 1 only. - SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent to the server. The server must also support it, and the server @@ -916,14 +886,25 @@ DESCRIPTION protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. - This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If - this flag is set to no, ssh will automatically add new host keys - to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to ask (the - default), new host keys will be added to the user known host - files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really - want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host - key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified - automatically in all cases. + This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. + + If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\accept-newM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh will automatically + add new host keys to the user known hosts files, but will not + permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag + is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\offM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host keys + to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with + changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If + this flag is set to ask (the default), new host keys will be + added to the user known host files only after the user has + confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will + refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host + keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + ssh(1). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, + LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The + default is USER. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages @@ -973,9 +954,7 @@ DESCRIPTION UsePrivilegedPort Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. The argument must be yes or no (the default). If - set to yes, ssh(1) must be setuid root. Note that this option - must be set to yes for RhostsRSAAuthentication with older - servers. + set to yes, ssh(1) must be setuid root. User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves @@ -1065,6 +1044,8 @@ TOKENS ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %p, and %r. + RemoteCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. + FILES ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file @@ -1089,4 +1070,4 @@ AUTHORS created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 6.0 February 27, 2017 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 September 21, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 532745b2ff48..eab8dd01c22a 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,16 +33,13 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.242 2017/02/27 14:30:33 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 27 2017 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.256 2017/09/21 19:16:53 markus Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 21 2017 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files -.Sh SYNOPSIS -.Nm ~/.ssh/config -.Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in @@ -391,25 +388,8 @@ in the process, regardless of the setting of If the option is set to .Cm no , the check will not be executed. -.It Cm Cipher -Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session -in protocol version 1. -Currently, -.Cm blowfish , -.Cm 3des -(the default), -and -.Cm des -are supported, -though -.Cm des -is only supported in the -.Xr ssh 1 -client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations; -its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. .It Cm Ciphers -Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 -in order of preference. +Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified value begins with a .Sq + @@ -431,11 +411,6 @@ aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com -arcfour -arcfour128 -arcfour256 -blowfish-cbc -cast128-cbc chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .Ed .Pp @@ -472,13 +447,6 @@ The argument must be or .Cm no (the default). -.It Cm CompressionLevel -Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. -The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). -The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. -The meaning of the values is the same as in -.Xr gzip 1 . -Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. @@ -838,7 +806,7 @@ The list of available key types may also be obtained using .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key -in the host key database files. +in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm HostName @@ -902,14 +870,11 @@ section. Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity -for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa -for protocol version 2. +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly @@ -1004,7 +969,9 @@ Accepted values are .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , -or a numeric value. +a numeric value, or +.Cm none +to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for @@ -1192,21 +1159,6 @@ The default is: gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed -.It Cm Protocol -Specifies the protocol versions -.Xr ssh 1 -should support in order of preference. -The possible values are 1 and 2. -Multiple versions must be comma-separated. -When this option is set to -.Cm 2,1 -.Nm ssh -will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 -if version 2 is not available. -The default is version 2. -Protocol 1 suffers from a number of cryptographic weaknesses and should -not be used. -It is only offered to support legacy devices. .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command @@ -1334,15 +1286,31 @@ is .Cm default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. +.It Cm RemoteCommand +Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully +connecting to the server. +The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with +the user's shell. +Arguments to +.Cm RemoteCommand +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over -the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. +the secure channel. +The remote port may either be fowarded to a specified host and port +from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote +client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on -and the second argument must be -.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . +If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be +.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport , +otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding +will be established as a SOCKS proxy. +.Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. @@ -1397,28 +1365,6 @@ an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . -.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication -Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host -authentication. -The argument must be -.Cm yes -or -.Cm no -(the default). -This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires -.Xr ssh 1 -to be setuid root. -.It Cm RSAAuthentication -Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. -The argument to this keyword must be -.Cm yes -(the default) -or -.Cm no . -RSA authentication will only be -attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is -running. -Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 @@ -1518,10 +1464,19 @@ file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. +.Pp If this flag is set to -.Cm no , -ssh will automatically add new host keys to the -user known hosts files. +.Dq accept-new +then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user +known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with +changed host keys. +If this flag is set to +.Dq no +or +.Dq off , +ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files +and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed, +subject to some restrictions. If this flag is set to .Cm ask (the default), @@ -1531,6 +1486,12 @@ has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. +.It Cm SyslogFacility +Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +.Xr ssh 1 . +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, +LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. +The default is USER. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. @@ -1627,11 +1588,6 @@ If set to .Cm yes , .Xr ssh 1 must be setuid root. -Note that this option must be set to -.Cm yes -for -.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication -with older servers. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. @@ -1770,6 +1726,9 @@ accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Pp .Cm ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %p, and %r. +.Pp +.Cm RemoteCommand +accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c index 74c49be7cc62..50648258f48d 100644 --- a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c +++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.6 2016/06/16 11:00:17 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.7 2017/06/01 04:51:58 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v) { - return sshbuf_put_string(buf, (u_char *)v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v)); + return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v)); } int diff --git a/sshbuf.c b/sshbuf.c index cbf7ed4a428f..de783a3638f8 100644 --- a/sshbuf.c +++ b/sshbuf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.8 2016/11/25 23:22:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.11 2017/06/01 06:58:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -193,15 +193,16 @@ sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf) buf->off = buf->size; return; } - if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) == 0) - explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); + (void) sshbuf_check_sanity(buf); buf->off = buf->size = 0; if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) { - if ((d = realloc(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)) != NULL) { + if ((d = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT, + 1)) != NULL) { buf->cd = buf->d = d; buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; } } + explicit_bzero(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT); } size_t @@ -253,9 +254,8 @@ sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size) rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); if (rlen > max_size) rlen = max_size; - explicit_bzero(buf->d + buf->size, buf->alloc - buf->size); SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen)); - if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) + if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; buf->cd = buf->d = dp; buf->alloc = rlen; @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) if (rlen > buf->max_size) rlen = buf->alloc + need; SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen)); - if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) { + if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) { SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail")); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } @@ -391,6 +391,9 @@ sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; buf->off += len; + /* deal with empty buffer */ + if (buf->off == buf->size) + buf->off = buf->size = 0; SSHBUF_TELL("done"); return 0; } diff --git a/sshbuf.h b/sshbuf.h index 1ac4b8c0ac13..77f1e9e6d09a 100644 --- a/sshbuf.h +++ b/sshbuf.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.8 2016/11/25 23:22:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.9 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, /* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */ int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +/* XXX peek_u8 / peek_u32 */ /* * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c index 948b638ad114..dc7a704d2a2d 100644 --- a/sshconnect.c +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.273 2017/03/10 03:22:40 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.287 2017/09/14 04:32:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ #include #endif #include +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#endif #include #include #include @@ -45,7 +48,6 @@ #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" @@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; -Key *previous_host_key = NULL; +struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL; static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; @@ -79,8 +81,8 @@ extern char *__progname; extern uid_t original_real_uid; extern uid_t original_effective_uid; -static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *); -static void warn_changed_key(Key *); +static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); +static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * @@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, * a connected fd back to us. */ static int -ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, +ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; @@ -173,7 +175,8 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ - packet_set_connection(sock, sock); + if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ return 0; } @@ -182,7 +185,8 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int -ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) +ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, + const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; @@ -249,9 +253,9 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) free(command_string); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ - packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); + if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ - /* Indicate OK return */ return 0; } @@ -328,87 +332,71 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai) return sock; } +/* + * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates + * *timeoutp with time remaining. + * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno). + */ static int -timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, - socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) +waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) { - fd_set *fdset; - struct timeval tv, t_start; - socklen_t optlen; - int optval, rc, result = -1; + struct pollfd pfd; + struct timeval t_start; + int oerrno, r; gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); - - if (*timeoutp <= 0) { - result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); - goto done; - } - - set_nonblock(sockfd); - rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); - if (rc == 0) { - unset_nonblock(sockfd); - result = 0; - goto done; - } - if (errno != EINPROGRESS) { - result = -1; - goto done; + pfd.fd = fd; + pfd.events = POLLIN; + for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) { + r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp); + oerrno = errno; + ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); + errno = oerrno; + if (r > 0) + return 0; + else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN) + return -1; + else if (r == 0) + break; } + /* timeout */ + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + return -1; +} - fdset = xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS), - sizeof(fd_mask)); - FD_SET(sockfd, fdset); - ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp); +static int +timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, + socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) +{ + int optval = 0; + socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval); - for (;;) { - rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv); - if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR) - break; - } + /* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */ + if (*timeoutp <= 0) + return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); - switch (rc) { - case 0: - /* Timed out */ - errno = ETIMEDOUT; - break; - case -1: - /* Select error */ - debug("select: %s", strerror(errno)); - break; - case 1: - /* Completed or failed */ - optval = 0; - optlen = sizeof(optval); - if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, - &optlen) == -1) { - debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); - break; - } - if (optval != 0) { - errno = optval; - break; - } - result = 0; + set_nonblock(sockfd); + if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) { + /* Succeeded already? */ unset_nonblock(sockfd); - break; - default: - /* Should not occur */ - fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc); - } + return 0; + } else if (errno != EINPROGRESS) + return -1; - free(fdset); + if (waitrfd(sockfd, timeoutp) == -1) + return -1; - done: - if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) { - ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); - if (*timeoutp <= 0) { - errno = ETIMEDOUT; - result = -1; - } + /* Completed or failed */ + if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { + debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; } - - return (result); + if (optval != 0) { + errno = optval; + return -1; + } + unset_nonblock(sockfd); + return 0; } /* @@ -423,7 +411,7 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, * the daemon. */ static int -ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, +ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { @@ -497,40 +485,39 @@ ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection. */ - packet_set_connection(sock, sock); + if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ - return 0; + return 0; } int -ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, +ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { - return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family, - connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv); + return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port, + family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, + needpriv); } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { - packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); - return 0; /* Always succeeds */ + if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, + STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO)) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ + return 0; } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { - return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port, + return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, port, options.proxy_command); } - return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); + return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, port, options.proxy_command); } static void send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1) { /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ - if (compat20) { - xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n", - PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION); - } else { - xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", - PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION); - } + xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n", + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION); if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string, strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string)) fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -549,50 +536,27 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch; int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); - int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0; u_int i, n; size_t len; - int fdsetsz, remaining, rc; - struct timeval t_start, t_remaining; - fd_set *fdset; - - fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); - fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz); + int rc; - /* - * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and - * save a round-trip. - */ - if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) { - enable_compat20(); - send_client_banner(connection_out, 0); - client_banner_sent = 1; - } + send_client_banner(connection_out, 0); /* Read other side's version identification. */ - remaining = timeout_ms; for (n = 0;;) { for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (timeout_ms > 0) { - gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); - ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining); - FD_SET(connection_in, fdset); - rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL, - fdset, &t_remaining); - ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining); - if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0) + rc = waitrfd(connection_in, &timeout_ms); + if (rc == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) { fatal("Connection timed out during " "banner exchange"); - if (rc == -1) { - if (errno == EINTR) - continue; - fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " - "select: %s", strerror(errno)); + } else if (rc == -1) { + fatal("%s: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); } } len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); - if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "Connection closed by remote host"); @@ -618,7 +582,6 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); } server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); - free(fdset); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept @@ -634,51 +597,25 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { + case 2: + break; case 1: - if (remote_minor == 99 && - (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && - !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) { - enable_compat20(); - break; - } - if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { + if (remote_minor != 99) mismatch = 1; - break; - } - if (remote_minor < 3) { - fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); - } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) { - /* We speak 1.3, too. */ - enable_compat13(); - minor1 = 3; - if (options.forward_agent) { - logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3"); - options.forward_agent = 0; - } - } break; - case 2: - if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { - enable_compat20(); - break; - } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } if (mismatch) fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", - (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, - remote_major); + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) fatal("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); - if (!client_banner_sent) - send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1); chop(server_version_string); } @@ -707,7 +644,7 @@ confirm(const char *prompt) } static int -check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key) +check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *host_key) { const char *reason; @@ -805,13 +742,13 @@ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, #define ROQUIET 2 static int check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, - Key *host_key, int readonly, + struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) { HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; - Key *raw_key = NULL; + struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; char msg[1024]; @@ -819,7 +756,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0; int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); - int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; + int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; u_int i; @@ -870,8 +807,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, retry: /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ - want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key); - type = key_type(host_key); + want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key); + type = sshkey_type(host_key); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known @@ -891,7 +828,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (ip_found != NULL && - !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) + !sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) host_ip_differ = 1; } else ip_status = host_status; @@ -903,7 +840,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_found->file, host_found->line); - if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key)) + if (want_cert && + !check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ? + hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key)) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (readonly || want_cert) @@ -947,7 +886,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ - if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) { /* * User has requested strict host key checking. We * will not add the host key automatically. The only @@ -956,7 +896,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; - } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) @@ -1000,8 +941,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ } /* - * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the - * local known_hosts file. + * If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically + * to the local known_hosts file. */ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); @@ -1043,7 +984,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ - if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { + if (options.strict_host_key_checking != + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; @@ -1088,14 +1030,16 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfiles[0]); - error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key), + error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", + sshkey_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ - if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { + if (options.strict_host_key_checking != + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; @@ -1182,15 +1126,17 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", host_found->file, host_found->line); } - if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { - logit("%s", msg); - error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); - goto fail; - } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking != + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { + logit("%s", msg); + error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); + goto fail; } else { logit("%s", msg); } @@ -1217,14 +1163,16 @@ fail: * search normally. */ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); - raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); - if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0) - fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r)); host_key = raw_key; goto retry; } if (raw_key != NULL) - key_free(raw_key); + sshkey_free(raw_key); free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) @@ -1236,7 +1184,7 @@ fail: /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ int -verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) +verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key) { u_int i; int r = -1, flags = 0; @@ -1272,8 +1220,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) host_key->cert->principals[i]); } } else { - debug("Server host key: %s %s", compat20 ? - sshkey_ssh_name(host_key) : sshkey_type(host_key), fp); + debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp); } if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { @@ -1341,8 +1288,8 @@ out: free(fp); free(cafp); if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { - key_free(previous_host_key); - previous_host_key = key_from_private(host_key); + sshkey_free(previous_host_key); + r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key); } return r; @@ -1378,17 +1325,8 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); - if (compat20) { - ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); - ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); - } else { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); - ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); -#else - fatal("ssh1 is not supported"); -#endif - } + ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); + ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); free(local_user); } @@ -1412,10 +1350,9 @@ ssh_put_password(char *password) /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ static int -show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key) +show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int type[] = { - KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, @@ -1453,7 +1390,7 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key) } static void -warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) +warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key) { char *fp; @@ -1516,7 +1453,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) } void -maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment, +maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, struct sshkey *private, char *comment, char *passphrase) { int auth_sock = -1, r; diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h index cf1851a959b7..b5029e2347e0 100644 --- a/sshconnect.h +++ b/sshconnect.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.29 2015/11/15 22:26:49 jcs Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.31 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -26,14 +26,16 @@ typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive; struct Sensitive { - Key **keys; - int nkeys; - int external_keysign; + struct sshkey **keys; + int nkeys; + int external_keysign; }; struct addrinfo; -int ssh_connect(const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, - u_short, int, int, int *, int, int); +struct ssh; + +int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, struct addrinfo *, + struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, int *, int, int); void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, @@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, void ssh_exchange_identification(int); -int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *); +int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *); void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, char **, char **); @@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *); void ssh_put_password(char *); int ssh_local_cmd(const char *); -void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, Key *, char *, char *); +void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, struct sshkey *, char *, char *); /* * Macros to raise/lower permissions. diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c deleted file mode 100644 index dc00b4cd04d7..000000000000 --- a/sshconnect1.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,774 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.80 2017/03/10 03:53:11 dtucker Exp $ */ -/* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the - * login (authentication) dialog. - * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". - */ - -#include "includes.h" - -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - -#include -#include - -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "ssh.h" -#include "ssh1.h" -#include "rsa.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "packet.h" -#include "key.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "kex.h" -#include "uidswap.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" -#include "readconf.h" -#include "authfd.h" -#include "sshconnect.h" -#include "authfile.h" -#include "canohost.h" -#include "hostfile.h" -#include "auth.h" -#include "digest.h" -#include "ssherr.h" - -/* Session id for the current session. */ -u_char session_id[16]; -u_int supported_authentications = 0; - -extern Options options; -extern char *__progname; - -/* - * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to - * authenticate using the agent. - */ -static int -try_agent_authentication(void) -{ - int r, type, agent_fd, ret = 0; - u_char response[16]; - size_t i; - BIGNUM *challenge; - struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL; - - /* Get connection to the agent. */ - if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { - if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) - debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return 0; - } - - if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed"); - - /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ - if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 1, &idlist)) != 0) { - if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) - debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); - goto out; - } - for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { - /* Try this identity. */ - debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", - idlist->comments[i]); - - /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); - packet_put_bignum(idlist->keys[i]->rsa->n); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for server's response. */ - type = packet_read(); - - /* The server sends failure if it doesn't like our key or - does not support RSA authentication. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { - debug("Server refused our key."); - continue; - } - /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", - type); - - packet_get_bignum(challenge); - packet_check_eom(); - - debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); - - /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ - if ((r = ssh_decrypt_challenge(agent_fd, idlist->keys[i], - challenge, session_id, response)) != 0) { - /* - * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier - * although it advertised it supports this. Just - * return a wrong value. - */ - logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt " - "challenge: %s", ssh_err(r)); - explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response)); - } - debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); - - /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - packet_put_char(response[i]); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(); - - /* - * The server returns success if it accepted the - * authentication. - */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { - debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); - ret = 1; - break; - } else if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth " - "response: %d", type); - } - if (ret != 1) - debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); - out: - ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); - ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); - BN_clear_free(challenge); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to - * the server. - */ -static void -respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv) -{ - u_char buf[32], response[16]; - struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; - int i, len; - - /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ - /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */ - if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) != 0) - packet_disconnect( - "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed"); - - /* Compute the response. */ - /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ - len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); - if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf)) - packet_disconnect( - "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); - - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len); - if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || - ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || - ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || - ssh_digest_final(md, response, sizeof(response)) < 0) - fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); - ssh_digest_free(md); - - debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge."); - - /* Send the response back to the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - packet_put_char(response[i]); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response)); - explicit_bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); -} - -/* - * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate - * the user using it. - */ -static int -try_rsa_authentication(int idx) -{ - BIGNUM *challenge; - Key *public, *private; - char buf[300], *passphrase = NULL, *comment, *authfile; - int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit; - - public = options.identity_keys[idx]; - authfile = options.identity_files[idx]; - comment = xstrdup(authfile); - - debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment); - - /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); - packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for server's response. */ - type = packet_read(); - - /* - * The server responds with failure if it doesn't like our key or - * doesn't support RSA authentication. - */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { - debug("Server refused our key."); - free(comment); - return 0; - } - /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); - - /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ - if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("try_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed"); - packet_get_bignum(challenge); - packet_check_eom(); - - debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); - - /* - * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to - * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it - * fails, ask for a passphrase. - */ - if (public->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) - private = public; - else - private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL, - &perm_ok); - if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) { - snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment); - for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { - passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0); - if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) { - private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, - authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL); - quit = 0; - } else { - debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); - quit = 1; - } - if (private != NULL || quit) - break; - debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); - } - } - - if (private != NULL) - maybe_add_key_to_agent(authfile, private, comment, passphrase); - - if (passphrase != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); - free(passphrase); - } - - /* We no longer need the comment. */ - free(comment); - - if (private == NULL) { - if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok) - error("Bad passphrase."); - - /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - packet_put_char(0); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Expect the server to reject it... */ - packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); - BN_clear_free(challenge); - return 0; - } - - /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */ - respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa); - - /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */ - if (!(private->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) - key_free(private); - - /* We no longer need the challenge. */ - BN_clear_free(challenge); - - /* Wait for response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { - debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); - return 1; - } - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); - debug("RSA authentication refused."); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv - * authentication and RSA host authentication. - */ -static int -try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key) -{ - int type; - BIGNUM *challenge; - - debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication."); - - /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA); - packet_put_cstring(local_user); - packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); - packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); - packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for server's response. */ - type = packet_read(); - - /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our - .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { - debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key."); - return 0; - } - /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); - - /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ - if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("try_rhosts_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed"); - packet_get_bignum(challenge); - packet_check_eom(); - - debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server."); - - /* Compute a response to the challenge. */ - respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa); - - /* We no longer need the challenge. */ - BN_clear_free(challenge); - - /* Wait for response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { - debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server."); - return 1; - } - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); - debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused."); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system. - * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS. - */ -static int -try_challenge_response_authentication(void) -{ - int type, i; - u_int clen; - char prompt[1024]; - char *challenge, *response; - - debug("Doing challenge response authentication."); - - for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { - /* request a challenge */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - type = packet_read(); - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE && - type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " - "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type); - } - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { - debug("No challenge."); - return 0; - } - challenge = packet_get_string(&clen); - packet_check_eom(); - snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge, - strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: "); - free(challenge); - if (i != 0) - error("Permission denied, please try again."); - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! " - "Response will be transmitted in clear text."); - response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); - if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) { - free(response); - break; - } - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE); - ssh_put_password(response); - explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); - free(response); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - return 1; - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " - "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type); - } - /* failure */ - return 0; -} - -/* - * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication. - */ -static int -try_password_authentication(char *prompt) -{ - int type, i; - char *password; - - debug("Doing password authentication."); - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text."); - for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { - if (i != 0) - error("Permission denied, please try again."); - password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD); - ssh_put_password(password); - explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); - free(password); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - return 1; - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type); - } - /* failure */ - return 0; -} - -/* - * SSH1 key exchange - */ -void -ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr) -{ - int i; - BIGNUM *key; - Key *host_key, *server_key; - int bits, rbits; - int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES; - u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; - u_char cookie[8]; - u_int supported_ciphers; - u_int server_flags, client_flags; - - debug("Waiting for server public key."); - - /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */ - packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); - - /* Get cookie from the packet. */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - cookie[i] = packet_get_char(); - - /* Get the public key. */ - if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__); - bits = packet_get_int(); - packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e); - packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n); - - rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n); - if (bits != rbits) { - logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: " - "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); - logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); - } - /* Get the host key. */ - if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__); - bits = packet_get_int(); - packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); - packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); - - rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n); - if (bits != rbits) { - logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: " - "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); - logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); - } - - /* Get protocol flags. */ - server_flags = packet_get_int(); - packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags); - - supported_ciphers = packet_get_int(); - supported_authentications = packet_get_int(); - packet_check_eom(); - - debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).", - BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); - - if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1) - fatal("Host key verification failed."); - - client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN; - - derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id); - - /* - * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit - * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least - * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key. - */ - arc4random_buf(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); - - /* - * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key - * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with - * the first 16 bytes of the session id. - */ - if ((key = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("ssh_kex: BN_new failed"); - if (BN_set_word(key, 0) == 0) - fatal("ssh_kex: BN_set_word failed"); - for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { - if (BN_lshift(key, key, 8) == 0) - fatal("ssh_kex: BN_lshift failed"); - if (i < 16) { - if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]) - == 0) - fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed"); - } else { - if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]) == 0) - fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed"); - } - } - - /* - * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the - * server (key with smaller modulus first). - */ - if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) { - /* Public key has smaller modulus. */ - if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) < - BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { - fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + " - "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", - BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n), - BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); - } - if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 || - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0) - fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); - } else { - /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */ - if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) < - BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { - fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + " - "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", - BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), - BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n), - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); - } - if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 || - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0) - fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); - } - - /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */ - key_free(server_key); - key_free(host_key); - - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) { - if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default)) - options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; - } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_INVALID || - !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) { - logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.", - cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default)); - options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; - } - /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */ - if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher))) - fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.", - cipher_name(options.cipher)); - - debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher)); - - /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); - packet_put_char(options.cipher); - - /* Send the cookie back to the server. */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - packet_put_char(cookie[i]); - - /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */ - packet_put_bignum(key); - BN_clear_free(key); - - /* Send protocol flags. */ - packet_put_int(client_flags); - - /* Send the packet now. */ - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - debug("Sent encrypted session key."); - - /* Set the encryption key. */ - packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher); - - /* - * We will no longer need the session key here. - * Destroy any extra copies. - */ - explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); - - /* - * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message - * will be received in encrypted form. - */ - packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); - - debug("Received encrypted confirmation."); -} - -/* - * Authenticate user - */ -void -ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, - Sensitive *sensitive) -{ - int i, type; - - if (supported_authentications == 0) - fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods"); - - /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER); - packet_put_cstring(server_user); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* - * The server should respond with success if no authentication is - * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds - * with failure. - */ - type = packet_read(); - - /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - goto success; - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type); - - /* - * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host - * authentication. - */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) && - options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { - for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) { - if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL && - sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && - try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, - sensitive->keys[i])) - goto success; - } - } - /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) && - options.rsa_authentication) { - /* - * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The - * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for - * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases. - */ - if (try_agent_authentication()) - goto success; - - /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */ - for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) - if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL && - options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && - try_rsa_authentication(i)) - goto success; - } - /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) && - options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { - if (try_challenge_response_authentication()) - goto success; - } - /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) && - options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { - char prompt[80]; - - snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", - server_user, host); - if (try_password_authentication(prompt)) - goto success; - } - /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */ - fatal("Permission denied."); - /* NOTREACHED */ - - success: - return; /* need statement after label */ -} - -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index f8a54beea949..be9397e481bd 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.255 2017/03/11 23:40:26 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.266 2017/08/27 00:38:41 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ char *xxx_host; struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; static int -verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) +verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = @@ -287,16 +287,16 @@ struct cauthmethod { int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; -int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); int userauth_none(Authctxt *); int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); @@ -306,11 +306,11 @@ int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); -int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); +int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); #endif void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *); -static Key *load_identity_file(Identity *); +static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); @@ -397,10 +397,12 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); - ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ + ssh->authctxt = NULL; pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt); ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); @@ -412,10 +414,9 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; int r; if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { @@ -446,9 +447,9 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { - return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, active_state); + return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); } void @@ -468,7 +469,8 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) - fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist); + fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).", + authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ @@ -488,7 +490,7 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " "type %d", type); @@ -497,7 +499,7 @@ input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg, *lang; u_int len; @@ -514,9 +516,9 @@ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); @@ -531,9 +533,9 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } int -input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); @@ -545,9 +547,9 @@ input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *authlist = NULL; int partial; @@ -571,10 +573,10 @@ input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Key *key = NULL; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; Buffer b; int pktype, sent = 0; @@ -702,9 +704,9 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) } static OM_uint32 -process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) +process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; @@ -757,9 +759,9 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int oidlen; char *oidv; @@ -787,7 +789,7 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) free(oidv); - if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { + if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); @@ -798,9 +800,9 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 status; u_int slen; @@ -813,7 +815,7 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) packet_check_eom(); - status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok); + status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok); free(recv_tok.value); @@ -827,9 +829,9 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; @@ -858,7 +860,7 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { char *msg; char *lang; @@ -893,7 +895,7 @@ int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; - char prompt[150]; + char prompt[256]; char *password; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; @@ -929,11 +931,11 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) */ /* ARGSUSED */ int -input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; - char prompt[150]; + char prompt[256]; const char *host; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); @@ -1015,7 +1017,7 @@ static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - Key *prv; + struct sshkey *prv; int ret; /* the agent supports this key */ @@ -1035,6 +1037,11 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, /* load the private key from the file */ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) { + error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public", + __func__, id->filename); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + } ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, key_sign_encode(prv), compat); sshkey_free(prv); @@ -1225,10 +1232,10 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) return 1; } -static Key * +static struct sshkey * load_identity_file(Identity *id) { - Key *private = NULL; + struct sshkey *private = NULL; char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment; int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i; struct stat st; @@ -1317,8 +1324,6 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; - if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1) - continue; if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) continue; options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; @@ -1347,7 +1352,7 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 2, &idlist)) != 0) { + } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); @@ -1471,7 +1476,7 @@ try_identity(Identity *id) key_type(id->key), id->filename); return (0); } - return (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1); + return 1; } int @@ -1479,6 +1484,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; int sent = 0; + char *fp; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) @@ -1493,8 +1499,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) */ if (id->key != NULL) { if (try_identity(id)) { - debug("Offering %s public key: %s", - key_type(id->key), id->filename); + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, + options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", + __func__); + return 0; + } + debug("Offering public key: %s %s %s", + sshkey_type(id->key), fp, id->filename); + free(fp); sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id); } } else { @@ -1552,9 +1566,9 @@ userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ int -input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response; u_int num_prompts, i; int echo = 0; @@ -1755,7 +1769,6 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) private = NULL; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || - authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; if (match_pattern_list( diff --git a/sshd.0 b/sshd.0 index 6cd5f038c3c9..92c8ec53306c 100644 --- a/sshd.0 +++ b/sshd.0 @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ AUTHENTICATION client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, - umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). + umac-128, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, @@ -412,13 +412,19 @@ SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT should be used on a key line. Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as - wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host - name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name - (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to - indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not - accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. - A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y - brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y and a non-standard port number. + wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When + sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using + HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name. + When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given + by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or + the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option + was used. + + A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host + name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if + it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may + optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y + and a non-standard port number. Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed @@ -623,4 +629,4 @@ AUTHORS versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 6.0 January 30, 2017 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 June 24, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 index 7725a692c060..a4201146bc23 100644 --- a/sshd.8 +++ b/sshd.8 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.288 2017/01/30 23:27:39 dtucker Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2017 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.291 2017/06/24 06:28:50 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 24 2017 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code -(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, +(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. @@ -652,9 +652,23 @@ Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns and .Ql \&? act as -wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host -name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied -name (when authenticating a server). +wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. +When +.Nm sshd +is authenticating a client, such as when using +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication , +this will be the canonical client host name. +When +.Xr ssh 1 +is authenticating a server, this will be the host name +given by the user, the value of the +.Xr ssh 1 +.Cm HostkeyAlias +if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the +.Xr ssh 1 +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +option was used. +.Pp A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index 010a2c38ab95..51a1aaf6ec86 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.485 2017/03/15 03:52:30 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.492 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" @@ -195,10 +194,10 @@ int have_agent = 0; * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ struct { - Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ - Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ - Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ - int have_ssh2_key; + struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ + struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ + struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ + int have_ssh2_key; } sensitive_data; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ @@ -223,6 +222,7 @@ int startup_pipe; /* in child */ int use_privsep = -1; struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; +static int privsep_chroot = 1; /* global authentication context */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; @@ -449,10 +449,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out) chop(server_version_string); debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); - if (remote_major == 2 || - (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) { - enable_compat20(); - } else { + if (remote_major != 2 || + (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor != 99)) { s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); close(sock_in); @@ -487,7 +485,7 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void) void demote_sensitive_data(void) { - Key *tmp; + struct sshkey *tmp; int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { @@ -541,7 +539,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) demote_sensitive_data(); /* Demote the child */ - if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { + if (privsep_chroot) { /* Change our root directory */ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, @@ -650,6 +648,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); + monitor_clear_keystate(pmonitor); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ @@ -687,7 +686,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void) const char *p; char *ret; int i; - Key *key; + struct sshkey *key; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { @@ -743,11 +742,11 @@ list_hostkey_types(void) return ret; } -static Key * +static struct sshkey * get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) { int i; - Key *key; + struct sshkey *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { switch (type) { @@ -771,19 +770,19 @@ get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) return NULL; } -Key * +struct sshkey * get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); } -Key * +struct sshkey * get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); } -Key * +struct sshkey * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) @@ -791,7 +790,7 @@ get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } -Key * +struct sshkey * get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) @@ -800,7 +799,7 @@ get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) } int -get_hostkey_index(Key *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) +get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) { int i; @@ -1367,8 +1366,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) u_int n; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; mode_t new_umask; - Key *key; - Key *pubkey; + struct sshkey *key; + struct sshkey *pubkey; int keytype; Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); @@ -1622,9 +1621,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) "enabled authentication methods"); } - /* set default channel AF */ - channel_set_af(options.address_family); - /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); @@ -1640,8 +1636,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) ); /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ + privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { - if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication) + if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication) fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); } else { @@ -1655,9 +1652,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* load host keys */ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, - sizeof(Key *)); + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, - sizeof(Key *)); + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); if (options.host_key_agent) { if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) @@ -1676,14 +1673,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL); - if ((pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type == KEY_RSA1) || - (key != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA1)) { - verbose("Ignoring RSA1 key %s", - options.host_key_files[i]); - key_free(key); - key_free(pubkey); - continue; - } if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) pubkey = key_demote(key); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; @@ -1729,7 +1718,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) * indices to the public keys that they relate to. */ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, - sizeof(Key *)); + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; @@ -1767,7 +1756,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) key_type(key)); } - if (use_privsep) { + if (privsep_chroot) { struct stat st; if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || @@ -1963,8 +1952,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); packet_set_server(); ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + check_ip_options(ssh); + /* Prepare the channels layer */ + channel_init_channels(ssh); + channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); + /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) @@ -2040,6 +2035,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); + packet_clear_keys(); exit(0); } @@ -2087,10 +2083,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ - notify_hostkeys(active_state); + notify_hostkeys(ssh); /* Start session. */ - do_authenticated(authctxt); + do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); @@ -2117,8 +2113,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } int -sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen, - const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int flag) +sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, + u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, + const char *alg, u_int flag) { int r; u_int xxx_slen, xxx_dlen = dlen; @@ -2198,7 +2195,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; @@ -2217,8 +2214,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) void cleanup_exit(int i) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + if (the_authctxt) { - do_cleanup(the_authctxt); + do_cleanup(ssh, the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0 index b0160aa87fb9..678ee14b4d3d 100644 --- a/sshd_config.0 +++ b/sshd_config.0 @@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5) NAME sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file -SYNOPSIS - /etc/ssh/sshd_config - DESCRIPTION sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword- @@ -120,6 +117,11 @@ DESCRIPTION Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. + The available authentication methods are: "gssapi-with-mic", + "hostbased", "keyboard-interactive", "none" (used for access to + password-less accounts when PermitEmptyPassword is enabled), + "password" and "publickey". + AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or @@ -253,11 +255,6 @@ DESCRIPTION aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com - arcfour - arcfour128 - arcfour256 - blowfish-cbc - cast128-cbc chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: @@ -329,6 +326,13 @@ DESCRIPTION TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding- related options and may simplify restricted configurations. + ExposeAuthInfo + Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication + methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate + the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user + session through the SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The + default is no. + FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: md5 and sha256. The default is sha256. @@ -467,14 +471,14 @@ DESCRIPTION IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, - cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, or a - numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, - separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is - used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are - specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive - sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The - default is lowdelay for interactive sessions and throughput for - non-interactive sessions. + cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a + numeric value, or none to use the operating system default. This + option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. + If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class + unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is + automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second + for non-interactive sessions. The default is lowdelay for + interactive sessions and throughput for non-interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. @@ -573,7 +577,6 @@ DESCRIPTION hmac-md5 hmac-md5-96 - hmac-ripemd160 hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-sha2-256 @@ -582,7 +585,6 @@ DESCRIPTION umac-128@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com - hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com @@ -634,7 +636,7 @@ DESCRIPTION ClientAliveInterval, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, IPQoS, - KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, + KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, @@ -1017,4 +1019,4 @@ AUTHORS versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 6.0 March 14, 2017 OpenBSD 6.0 +OpenBSD 6.2 September 27, 2017 OpenBSD 6.2 diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index ac6ccc793fbe..251b7467fd28 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,15 +33,13 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.243 2017/03/14 07:19:07 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 14 2017 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.253 2017/09/27 06:45:53 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 27 2017 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file -.Sh SYNOPSIS -.Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from @@ -225,6 +223,18 @@ requires successful authentication using two different public keys. .Pp Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. +.Pp +The available authentication methods are: +.Qq gssapi-with-mic , +.Qq hostbased , +.Qq keyboard-interactive , +.Qq none +(used for access to password-less accounts when +.Cm PermitEmptyPassword +is enabled), +.Qq password +and +.Qq publickey . .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and @@ -464,16 +474,6 @@ aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It -arcfour -.It -arcfour128 -.It -arcfour256 -.It -blowfish-cbc -.It -cast128-cbc -.It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp @@ -574,6 +574,14 @@ Disables all forwarding features, including X11, TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may simplify restricted configurations. +.It Cm ExposeAuthInfo +Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and +public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. +The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the +.Ev SSH_USER_AUTH +environment variable. +The default is +.Cm no . .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: @@ -798,7 +806,9 @@ Accepted values are .Cm lowdelay , .Cm throughput , .Cm reliability , -or a numeric value. +a numeric value, or +.Cm none +to use the operating system default. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for @@ -962,8 +972,6 @@ hmac-md5 .It hmac-md5-96 .It -hmac-ripemd160 -.It hmac-sha1 .It hmac-sha1-96 @@ -980,8 +988,6 @@ hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com .It -hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com -.It hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com @@ -1080,6 +1086,7 @@ Available keywords are .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , +.Cm LogLevel , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , diff --git a/ssherr.c b/ssherr.c index 68020706381c..3c0009d69d83 100644 --- a/ssherr.c +++ b/ssherr.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.5 2015/09/13 14:39:16 tim Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.7 2017/09/12 06:32:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ ssh_err(int n) return "Connection corrupted"; case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR: return "Protocol error"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH: + return "Invalid key length"; + case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE: + return "number is too large"; default: return "unknown error"; } diff --git a/ssherr.h b/ssherr.h index 6f771b4b78be..c0b59211e833 100644 --- a/ssherr.h +++ b/ssherr.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:13:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.5 2017/09/12 06:32:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ #define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT -53 #define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT -54 #define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR -55 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH -56 +#define SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE -57 /* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */ const char *ssh_err(int n); diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c index 53a7674b5e74..e91c54f53bbd 100644 --- a/sshkey.c +++ b/sshkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.45 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.56 2017/08/12 06:42:52 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL @@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ #define KDFNAME "bcrypt" #define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" #define SALT_LEN 16 -#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc" +#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr" #define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ @@ -89,9 +88,6 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -# ifdef WITH_SSH1 - { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0, 0 }, -# endif { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 }, { "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, { "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, @@ -238,10 +234,6 @@ sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { type = sshkey_type_from_name(p); - if (type == KEY_RSA1) { - free(s); - return 0; - } if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { if (allow_wildcard) { /* @@ -250,8 +242,6 @@ sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) * the component is accepted. */ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->type == KEY_RSA1) - continue; if (match_pattern_list(kt->name, p, 0) != 0) break; @@ -272,7 +262,6 @@ sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); @@ -475,7 +464,6 @@ sshkey_new(int type) k->ed25519_pk = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || @@ -533,7 +521,6 @@ sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: #define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL) @@ -589,7 +576,6 @@ sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k) return; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (k->rsa != NULL) @@ -667,7 +653,6 @@ sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) switch (a->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && @@ -884,25 +869,7 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } - - if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n); - int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e); - - if (nlen < 0 || elen < 0 || nlen >= INT_MAX - elen) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } - blob_len = nlen + elen; - if ((blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob); - BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen); -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - } else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0) + if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; @@ -1194,39 +1161,6 @@ sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, return retval; } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -/* - * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances - * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is - * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the - * last processed character. - */ -static int -read_decimal_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM *v) -{ - char *cp; - size_t e; - int skip = 1; /* skip white space */ - - cp = *cpp; - while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') - cp++; - e = strspn(cp, "0123456789"); - if (e == 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - if (e > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 3) - return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; - if (cp[e] == '\0') - skip = 0; - else if (strchr(" \t\r\n", cp[e]) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - cp[e] = '\0'; - if (BN_dec2bn(&v, cp) <= 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - *cpp = cp + e + skip; - return 0; -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* returns 0 ok, and < 0 error */ int @@ -1237,9 +1171,6 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) char *ep, *cp, *space; int r, type, curve_nid = -1; struct sshbuf *blob; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - u_long bits; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ if (ret == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; @@ -1247,25 +1178,6 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) cp = *cpp; switch (ret->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - /* Get number of bits. */ - bits = strtoul(cp, &ep, 10); - if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(" \t\r\n", *ep) == NULL || - bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Bad bit count... */ - /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */ - if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0) - return r; - if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0) - return r; - /* validate the claimed number of bits */ - if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; - *cpp = ep; - retval = 0; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - break; case KEY_UNSPEC: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: @@ -1418,61 +1330,17 @@ sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p) return r; } -static int -sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) -{ - int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - u_int bits = 0; - char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL; - - if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || - key->rsa->n == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } - if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || - (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - /* size of modulus 'n' */ - if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Success */ - r = 0; - out: - if (dec_e != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(dec_e); - if (dec_n != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(dec_n); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - - return r; -} - -static int +int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *uu = NULL; - if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { - if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0) - goto out; - } else { - /* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */ - if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", - sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) - goto out; - } + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) + goto out; r = 0; out: free(uu); @@ -1523,10 +1391,11 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap) BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (rsap == NULL || - bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || - bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) + if (rsap == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || + bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; *rsap = NULL; if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; @@ -1554,8 +1423,10 @@ dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap) DSA *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (dsap == NULL || bits != 1024) + if (dsap == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (bits != 1024) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; @@ -1632,9 +1503,10 @@ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap) EC_KEY *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL || - (*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) + if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; *ecdsap = NULL; if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; @@ -1688,7 +1560,6 @@ sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp) break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA1: ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ @@ -1799,7 +1670,6 @@ sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp) break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; @@ -1893,8 +1763,9 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf) goto out; } oprincipals = key->cert->principals; - key->cert->principals = reallocarray(key->cert->principals, - key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); + key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals, + key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1, + sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); if (key->cert->principals == NULL) { free(principal); key->cert->principals = oprincipals; @@ -2009,6 +1880,10 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } + if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + goto out; + } #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); #endif @@ -2111,11 +1986,6 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, pk = NULL; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: - if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; @@ -2269,7 +2139,6 @@ sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **dkp) if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL || @@ -2378,7 +2247,8 @@ sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k) /* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ int -sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg) +sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg, + sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL; u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32]; @@ -2467,8 +2337,8 @@ sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg) goto out; /* Sign the whole mess */ - if ((ret = sshkey_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), - sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0)) != 0) + if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), + sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) goto out; /* Append signature and we are done */ @@ -2484,6 +2354,22 @@ sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg) return ret; } +static int +default_key_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx) +{ + if (ctx != NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); +} + +int +sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg) +{ + return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, default_key_sign, NULL); +} + int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k, int want_host, int require_principal, @@ -2775,8 +2661,12 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || - (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) + (r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k)) != 0) goto out; + if (BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + goto out; + } break; case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || @@ -2785,8 +2675,12 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || - (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) + (r = ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k)) != 0) goto out; + if (BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + goto out; + } break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: @@ -2828,7 +2722,6 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA1: if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; @@ -3057,12 +2950,8 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob, kdfname = "none"; } else if (ciphername == NULL) ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; - else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } @@ -3404,105 +3293,6 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, return r; } -#if WITH_SSH1 -/* - * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with - * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will - * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a - * passphrase. - */ -static int -sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, - const char *passphrase, const char *comment) -{ - struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL; - u_char buf[8]; - int r, cipher_num; - struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; - const struct sshcipher *cipher; - u_char *cp; - - /* - * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting - * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER. - */ - cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ? - SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_CIPHER_3DES; - if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* This buffer is used to build the secret part of the private key. */ - if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - - /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, 4, &cp)) != 0) - goto out; - arc4random_buf(cp, 2); - memcpy(cp + 2, cp, 2); - - /* - * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they - * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted - * format would just give known plaintext). - * Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL. - */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */ - explicit_bzero(buf, 8); - if ((r = sshbuf_put(buffer, buf, 8 - (sshbuf_len(buffer) % 8))) != 0) - goto out; - - /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */ - if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - - /* First store keyfile id string. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put(encrypted, LEGACY_BEGIN, - sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Store cipher type and "reserved" field. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, cipher_num)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, 0)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, sshbuf_len(buffer), &cp)) != 0) - goto out; - - if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, - CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, - sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0) - goto out; - - r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted); - - out: - cipher_free(ciphercontext); - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - sshbuf_free(buffer); - sshbuf_free(encrypted); - - return r; -} -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ @@ -3513,11 +3303,7 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, int success, r; int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) - const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL; -#else - const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; -#endif + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; const u_char *bptr; BIO *bio = NULL; @@ -3569,11 +3355,6 @@ sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { switch (key->type) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case KEY_RSA1: - return sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob, - passphrase, comment); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: @@ -3593,184 +3374,66 @@ sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, } } -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 -/* - * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key. - */ -int -sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, - struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) -{ - int r; - struct sshkey *pub = NULL; - struct sshbuf *copy = NULL; - - if (keyp != NULL) - *keyp = NULL; - if (commentp != NULL) - *commentp = NULL; - - /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ - if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - /* - * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string - * from the buffer. - */ - if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static int +translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err) +{ + int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err); + + switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) { + case ERR_LIB_PEM: + switch (pem_reason) { + case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ: + case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD: + case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + case ERR_LIB_EVP: + switch (pem_reason) { + case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR: + case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR: +#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR + case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR: +#endif + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + default: + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + case ERR_LIB_ASN1: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - /* Make a working copy of the keyblob and skip past the magic */ - if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Skip cipher type, reserved data and key bits. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* cipher type */ - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* key bits */ - goto out; - - /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ - if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Finally, the comment */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */ - - r = 0; - if (keyp != NULL) { - *keyp = pub; - pub = NULL; } - out: - sshbuf_free(copy); - sshkey_free(pub); - return r; + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } -static int -sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, - struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +static void +clear_libcrypto_errors(void) { - int r; - u_int16_t check1, check2; - u_int8_t cipher_type; - struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL; - u_char *cp; - char *comment = NULL; - struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; - const struct sshcipher *cipher; - struct sshkey *prv = NULL; - - if (keyp != NULL) - *keyp = NULL; - if (commentp != NULL) - *commentp = NULL; - - /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ - if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + while (ERR_get_error() != 0) + ; +} +/* + * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether + * passphrase is required/incorrect. + */ +static int +convert_libcrypto_error(void) +{ /* - * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string - * from the buffer. + * Some password errors are reported at the beginning + * of the error queue. */ - if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - - if ((prv = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL || - (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Read cipher type. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &cipher_type)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* reserved */ - goto out; - - /* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */ - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */ - cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type); - if (cipher == NULL) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; - goto out; - } - /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, sshbuf_len(copy), &cp)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ - if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, - CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) - goto out; - if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, - sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) - goto out; - - if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) - goto out; - if (check1 != check2) { - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; - goto out; - } - - /* Read the rest of the private key. */ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ - if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0) - goto out; - - /* enable blinding */ - if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - r = 0; - if (keyp != NULL) { - *keyp = prv; - prv = NULL; - } - if (commentp != NULL) { - *commentp = comment; - comment = NULL; - } - out: - cipher_free(ciphercontext); - free(comment); - sshkey_free(prv); - sshbuf_free(copy); - sshbuf_free(decrypted); - return r; + if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) == + SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error()); } -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) @@ -3791,48 +3454,10 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, goto out; } + clear_libcrypto_errors(); if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) { - unsigned long pem_err = ERR_peek_last_error(); - int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err); - - /* - * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether - * passphrase is required/incorrect. - */ - switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) { - case ERR_LIB_PEM: - switch (pem_reason) { - case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ: - case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD: - case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT: - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; - goto out; - default: - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } - case ERR_LIB_EVP: - switch (pem_reason) { - case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT: - r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; - goto out; - case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR: - case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR: -#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR - case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR: -#endif - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - default: - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - goto out; - } - case ERR_LIB_ASN1: - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; - goto out; - } - r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + r = convert_libcrypto_error(); goto out; } if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && @@ -3850,6 +3475,10 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } + if (BN_num_bits(prv->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + goto out; + } } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { @@ -3914,11 +3543,6 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, *commentp = NULL; switch (type) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case KEY_RSA1: - return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, - keyp, commentp); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: @@ -3955,13 +3579,6 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ - if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL) == 0) { - return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, - passphrase, keyp, commentp); - } -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, keyp, commentp); } diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h index 1b9e42f45be0..9093eac517d9 100644 --- a/sshkey.h +++ b/sshkey.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.15 2017/03/10 04:07:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.21 2017/07/01 13:50:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -46,14 +46,13 @@ # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768 +#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024 #define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20) struct sshbuf; /* Key types */ enum sshkey_types { - KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, @@ -125,6 +124,7 @@ int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp); const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); @@ -137,13 +137,19 @@ int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); -int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *); int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, const char *, const char **); size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *, char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3))); +int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *); +/* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */ +typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, void *); +int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *, + sshkey_certify_signer *, void *); + int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int); @@ -185,13 +191,14 @@ int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds); -int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, - struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); +/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */ +int ssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters(struct sshkey *); + #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, diff --git a/ttymodes.c b/ttymodes.c index db772c39c743..8451396353c9 100644 --- a/ttymodes.c +++ b/ttymodes.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.30 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.32 2017/04/30 23:26:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -59,12 +59,10 @@ #define TTY_OP_END 0 /* - * uint32 (u_int) follows speed in SSH1 and SSH2 + * uint32 (u_int) follows speed. */ -#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1 192 -#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1 193 -#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2 128 -#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2 129 +#define TTY_OP_ISPEED 128 +#define TTY_OP_OSPEED 129 /* * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the @@ -282,19 +280,8 @@ tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop) struct termios tio; int baud; Buffer buf; - int tty_op_ospeed, tty_op_ispeed; - void (*put_arg)(Buffer *, u_int); buffer_init(&buf); - if (compat20) { - tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2; - tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2; - put_arg = buffer_put_int; - } else { - tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1; - tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1; - put_arg = (void (*)(Buffer *, u_int)) buffer_put_char; - } if (tiop == NULL) { if (fd == -1) { @@ -310,20 +297,20 @@ tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop) /* Store input and output baud rates. */ baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio)); - buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ospeed); + buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_OSPEED); buffer_put_int(&buf, baud); baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio)); - buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ispeed); + buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_ISPEED); buffer_put_int(&buf, baud); /* Store values of mode flags. */ #define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \ - put_arg(&buf, special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME])); + buffer_put_int(&buf, special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME])); #define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \ - put_arg(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0)); + buffer_put_int(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0)); #include "ttymodes.h" @@ -333,10 +320,7 @@ tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop) end: /* Mark end of mode data. */ buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_END); - if (compat20) - packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf)); - else - packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf)); + packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf)); buffer_free(&buf); } @@ -351,19 +335,10 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr) int opcode, baud; int n_bytes = 0; int failure = 0; - u_int (*get_arg)(void); - int arg_size; - - if (compat20) { - *n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int(); - if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0) - return; - get_arg = packet_get_int; - arg_size = 4; - } else { - get_arg = packet_get_char; - arg_size = 1; - } + + *n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int(); + if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0) + return; /* * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these @@ -382,9 +357,7 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr) case TTY_OP_END: goto set; - /* XXX: future conflict possible */ - case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1: - case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2: + case TTY_OP_ISPEED: n_bytes += 4; baud = packet_get_int(); if (failure != -1 && @@ -392,9 +365,7 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr) error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud); break; - /* XXX: future conflict possible */ - case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1: - case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2: + case TTY_OP_OSPEED: n_bytes += 4; baud = packet_get_int(); if (failure != -1 && @@ -404,13 +375,13 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr) #define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ case OP: \ - n_bytes += arg_size; \ - tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(get_arg()); \ + n_bytes += 4; \ + tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(packet_get_int()); \ break; #define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ case OP: \ - n_bytes += arg_size; \ - if (get_arg()) \ + n_bytes += 4; \ + if (packet_get_int()) \ tio.FIELD |= NAME; \ else \ tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \ @@ -424,51 +395,21 @@ tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr) default: debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)", opcode, opcode); - if (!compat20) { - /* - * SSH1: - * Opcodes 1 to 127 are defined to have - * a one-byte argument. - * Opcodes 128 to 159 are defined to have - * an integer argument. - */ - if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 128) { - n_bytes += 1; - (void) packet_get_char(); - break; - } else if (opcode >= 128 && opcode < 160) { - n_bytes += 4; - (void) packet_get_int(); - break; - } else { - /* - * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255). - * We have no idea about its arguments. So we - * must stop parsing. Note that some data - * may be left in the packet; hopefully there - * is nothing more coming after the mode data. - */ - logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", - opcode); - goto set; - } + /* + * SSH2: + * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have a uint32 + * argument. + * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and cause parsing + * to stop. + */ + if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) { + n_bytes += 4; + (void) packet_get_int(); + break; } else { - /* - * SSH2: - * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have - * a uint32 argument. - * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and - * cause parsing to stop. - */ - if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) { - n_bytes += 4; - (void) packet_get_int(); - break; - } else { - logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", - opcode); - goto set; - } + logit("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", + opcode); + goto set; } } } diff --git a/ttymodes.h b/ttymodes.h index 14e177cefc31..24f07560c9fd 100644 --- a/ttymodes.h +++ b/ttymodes.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.15 2016/05/03 09:03:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.16 2017/04/30 23:26:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -38,22 +38,13 @@ */ /* - * SSH1: - * The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of + * The tty mode description is a string, consisting of * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0). - * Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have integer - * arguments. Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined, and cause parsing to - * stop (they should only be used after any other data). + * Opcodes 1-159 have uint32 arguments. + * Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined and cause parsing to stop (they + * should only be used after any other data). * - * SSH2: - * Differences between SSH1 and SSH2 terminal mode encoding include: - * 1. Encoded terminal modes are represented as a string, and a stream - * of bytes within that string. - * 2. Opcode arguments are uint32 (1-159); 160-255 remain undefined. - * 3. The values for TTY_OP_ISPEED and TTY_OP_OSPEED are different; - * 128 and 129 vs. 192 and 193 respectively. - * - * The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the + * The client puts in the string any modes it knows about, and the * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might diff --git a/umac.c b/umac.c index 6eb55b26ef7f..9f2187c9af98 100644 --- a/umac.c +++ b/umac.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.11 2014/07/22 07:13:42 guenther Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.12 2017/05/31 08:09:45 markus Exp $ */ /* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication @@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes) aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes); } + explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf)); + explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf)); } /* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom @@ -227,6 +229,7 @@ static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key) /* Initialize pdf and cache */ memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce)); aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8]) @@ -991,6 +994,7 @@ static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key) kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32), STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ @@ -1200,6 +1204,7 @@ int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx) if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr; + explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); free(ctx); } return (1); @@ -1227,6 +1232,7 @@ struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]) aes_key_setup(key, prf_key); pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key); uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key); + explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key)); } return (ctx); diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c index dead79b8a252..bc131385f536 100644 --- a/utf8.c +++ b/utf8.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.5 2017/02/19 00:10:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.7 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze * @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ dangerous_locale(void) { loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET); return strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 && - strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "646") != 0; + strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && strcmp(loc, "646") != 0 && + strcmp(loc, "") != 0; } static int @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ grow_dst(char **dst, size_t *sz, size_t maxsz, char **dp, size_t need) tsz = *sz + 128; if (tsz > maxsz) tsz = maxsz; - if ((tp = realloc(*dst, tsz)) == NULL) + if ((tp = recallocarray(*dst, *sz, tsz, 1)) == NULL) return -1; *dp = tp + (*dp - *dst); *dst = tp; diff --git a/version.h b/version.h index c86e2097c715..e093f623b227 100644 --- a/version.h +++ b/version.h @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.79 2017/03/20 01:18:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.80 2017/09/30 22:26:33 djm Exp $ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.5" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.6" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE diff --git a/xmalloc.c b/xmalloc.c index b58323677ee7..5cc0310a4766 100644 --- a/xmalloc.c +++ b/xmalloc.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.33 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.34 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -77,6 +77,18 @@ xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) return new_ptr; } +void * +xrecallocarray(void *ptr, size_t onmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + void *new_ptr; + + new_ptr = recallocarray(ptr, onmemb, nmemb, size); + if (new_ptr == NULL) + fatal("xrecallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", + nmemb, size); + return new_ptr; +} + char * xstrdup(const char *str) { diff --git a/xmalloc.h b/xmalloc.h index e4992893276d..cf38ddfa48c5 100644 --- a/xmalloc.h +++ b/xmalloc.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.16 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.17 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ void ssh_malloc_init(void); void *xmalloc(size_t); void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t); void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); +void *xrecallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); char *xstrdup(const char *); int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) -- cgit v1.3