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authorGordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org>2022-03-15 19:18:42 +0000
committerGordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org>2022-03-15 19:21:16 +0000
commitba3b824455f82aeca72ef6cd34cabf09672a2640 (patch)
treeb14a0a467de12d1eb28be67d60aef47d59aa699a /website
parent00f6c1be842bbf1b20a91c10d250ae082f1fd826 (diff)
downloaddoc-ba3b824455f82aeca72ef6cd34cabf09672a2640.tar.gz
doc-ba3b824455f82aeca72ef6cd34cabf09672a2640.zip
Add EN-22:09 to EN-22:12 and SA-22:02 to SA-22:03.
Approved by: so
Diffstat (limited to 'website')
-rw-r--r--website/data/security/advisories.toml8
-rw-r--r--website/data/security/errata.toml16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update.asc125
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs.asc134
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs.asc133
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs.asc128
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi.asc165
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl.asc153
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch25
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch.asc16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch45
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch.asc16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch199
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch.asc16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch44
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch.asc16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch389
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch.asc16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch367
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch.asc16
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch92
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch.asc16
22 files changed, 2135 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/website/data/security/advisories.toml b/website/data/security/advisories.toml
index bfacfbf277..6a60b5b67b 100644
--- a/website/data/security/advisories.toml
+++ b/website/data/security/advisories.toml
@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@
# $FreeBSD$
[[advisories]]
+name = "FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl"
+date = "2022-03-15"
+
+[[advisories]]
+name = "FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi"
+date = "2022-03-15"
+
+[[advisories]]
name = "FreeBSD-SA-22:01.vt"
date = "2022-01-11"
diff --git a/website/data/security/errata.toml b/website/data/security/errata.toml
index 3ab79b1502..b246718740 100644
--- a/website/data/security/errata.toml
+++ b/website/data/security/errata.toml
@@ -2,6 +2,22 @@
# $FreeBSD$
[[notices]]
+name = "FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs"
+date = "2022-03-15"
+
+[[notices]]
+name = "FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs"
+date = "2022-03-15"
+
+[[notices]]
+name = "FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs"
+date = "2022-03-15"
+
+[[notices]]
+name = "FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update"
+date = "2022-03-15"
+
+[[notices]]
name = "FreeBSD-EN-22:08.i386"
date = "2022-02-01"
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a85ee4d0cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: freebsd-update creating erroneous boot environments
+
+Category: core
+Module: freebsd-update
+Announced: 2022-03-15
+Affects: FreeBSD 12.3
+Corrected: 2022-02-15 06:09:41 UTC (stable/12, 12.3-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 18:17:55 UTC (releng/12.3, 12.3-RELEASE-p3)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+By default, freebsd-update(8) is configured to create new ZFS boot environments
+on systems that are compatible with bectl(8).
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+When updating a jail or another root that isn't the system root using -b,
+freebsd-update(8) will create a spurious boot environment despite the updated
+root not causing a change in the boot environment.
+
+III. Impact
+
+Users that have used freebsd-update(8) with the -b or -j flags may have some
+extra boot environments present on the system that did not meaningfully impact
+the boot environment.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available. Systems with "CreateBootEnv" set to "no" in their
+/etc/freebsd-update.conf are not affected. Systems that do not use ZFS are also
+not affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date. No reboot is required.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
+(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
+freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 12.3]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify freebsd-update.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
+revision number in the following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/12/ r371637
+releng/12.3/ r371743
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+For FreeBSD 12 and earlier:
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular
+revision, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=261446>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:09.freebsd-update.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83b00d4553
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: ZFS writes fail to update file size
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: zfs
+Announced: 2022-03-15
+Affects: FreeBSD 13.0
+Corrected: 2022-02-21 14:59:58 UTC (stable/13, 13.0-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 18:09:52 UTC (releng/13.0, 13.0-RELEASE-p8)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+ZFS is one of several filesystems available on FreeBSD. ZFS supports
+many advanced features, including checksumming, transparent compression,
+and snapshots.
+
+FreeBSD's virtual filesystem layer includes a deadlock-avoidance
+mechanism to handle situations where a read(2) or write(2) system call
+is invoked and the user-supplied buffer lies within a mmap(2)-created
+mapping of the target file. Individual filesystems, such as ZFS, must
+implement a portion of the deadlock avoidance protocol.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The implementation of the deadlock avoidance protocol in ZFS's
+implementation of write(2) was incorrect and could, in certain
+circumstances, cause an appending write to a file to fail to update the
+file size despite returning success to the caller.
+
+III. Impact
+
+The bug may cause application misbehavior; the precise effects depend
+on the nature of the application triggering the bug.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but systems not using ZFS are not affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date and reboot.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
+(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
+freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for an errata update"
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify zfs.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
+revision number in the following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/13/ b55a7f3422d7 stable/13-n249621
+releng/13.0/ 9dc74c5a4b3d releng/13.0-n244783
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=260453>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:10.zfs.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+=+FRE
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60462a6f36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: ZFS lseek(2) inconsistencies
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: zfs
+Announced: 2022-03-15
+Affects: FreeBSD 13.0
+Corrected: 2021-12-19 15:25:26 UTC (stable/13, 13.0-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 18:09:52 UTC (releng/13.0, 13.0-RELEASE-p8)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+ZFS is one of several filesystems available on FreeBSD. ZFS supports
+many advanced features, including checksumming, transparent compression,
+and snapshots.
+
+File "holes" are used by filesystems to limit the amount of storage
+space occupied by a file containing long runs of zero bytes. Rather
+than filling disk blocks with zeroes, file metadata can indicate the
+extent of such a run and the filesystem hides the distinction from user
+applications.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+When a file containing holes is mapped using mmap(2), mapped regions
+of the file may be ignored by lseek(2) when SEEK_HOLE or SEEK_DATA are
+passed as the "whence" parameter.
+
+III. Impact
+
+The bug may cause application misbehavior; the precise effects depend
+on the nature of the application triggering the bug.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but systems not using ZFS are not affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date and reboot.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
+(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
+freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for an errata update"
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify zfs.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
+revision number in the following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/13/ 3aa1cabca37d stable/13-n248633
+releng/13.0/ f5be20afc356 releng/13.0-n244785
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=256205>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:11.zfs.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAmIw44wACgkQ05eS9J6n
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+=X7kd
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dcb85ca049
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: ZFS panic upon concurrent 'zfs list' calls
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: zfs
+Announced: 2022-03-15
+Affects: FreeBSD 13.0
+Corrected: 2021-04-04 13:18:45 UTC (stable/13, 13.0-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 18:09:52 UTC (releng/13.0, 13.0-RELEASE-p8)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+ZFS is one of several filesystems available on FreeBSD. ZFS supports
+many advanced features, including checksumming, transparent compression,
+and snapshots.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+A race condition due to incorrect locking can cause a panic when multiple
+invocations of 'zfs list' occur in rapid succession.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An unprivileged user can trigger the race condition, resulting in a
+panic and denial of service.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but systems not using ZFS are not affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date and reboot.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
+(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
+freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for an errata update"
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify zfs.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
+revision number in the following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/13/ cf2a72643460 stable/13-n245102
+releng/13.0/ 0abaf7f63023 releng/13.0-n244784
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+For FreeBSD 13 and later:
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=260884>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-22:12.zfs.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAmIw44wACgkQ05eS9J6n
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+4ytPNW16OO+mhpewszXvBU/3OG937W3XmFpgNjzkCtVRGBfUUts=
+=YnFH
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2ae1d0acf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Multiple WiFi issues
+
+Category: core
+Module: net80211
+Announced: 2022-03-15
+Affects: FreeBSD 12.x and FreeBSD 13.0
+Corrected: 2021-11-19 00:01:25 UTC (stable/13, 13.0-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 17:45:36 UTC (releng/13.0, 13.0-RELEASE-p8)
+ 2022-02-15 16:05:49 UTC (stable/12, 12.3-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 18:18:08 UTC (releng/12.3, 12.3-RELEASE-p3)
+ 2022-03-15 18:17:30 UTC (releng/12.2, 12.2-RELEASE-p14)
+CVE Name: CVE-2020-26147, CVE-2020-24588, CVE-2020-26144
+
+Note: This issue is already fixed in FreeBSD 13.1-BETA1.
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD's net80211 kernel subsystem provides infrastructure and drivers
+for IEEE 802.11 wireless (Wi-Fi) communications.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The paper "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and
+Fragmentation" reported a number of security vulnerabilities in 802.11
+specificaiton related to frame aggregation and fragmentation.
+
+Additionally, FreeBSD 12.x missed length validation of SSIDs and Information
+Elements (IEs).
+
+III. Impact
+
+As reported on the FragAttacks website, the "design flaws are hard to abuse
+because doing so requires user interaction or is only possible when using
+uncommon network settings." Under suitable conditions an attacker may be
+able to extract sensitive data or inject data.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but the ability to extract or inject data is
+mitigated by the use of application (e.g. HTTPS) or transport (e.g. TLS,
+IPSEC) layer encryption.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
+and reboot.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
+(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
+freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 13.0]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify wifi.13.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 12.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify wifi.12.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
+revision number in the following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/13/ 6acb9d5f955b stable/13-n248098
+releng/13.0/ 0d1db5c3257e releng/13.0-n244782
+stable/12/ r371640
+releng/12.3/ r371748
+releng/12.2/ r371740
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+For FreeBSD 13 and later:
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+For FreeBSD 12 and earlier:
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular
+revision, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26147>
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-24588>
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26144>
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=254737>
+<URL:https://www.fragattacks.com/>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAmIw5aoACgkQ05eS9J6n
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+P7PXAdRT48gcmN9gIscFuRwt2glvChYuH6ncF1jMQmfoAMTlDGRATQUuDy81fIw9
+va3fiGDy2FsenAQYa4UwaA/iCodjaC0cNjNnf2cc9nZEnuq86l8=
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79aa990d28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: OpenSSL certificate parsing infinite loop
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: openssl
+Announced: 2022-03-15
+Credits: Tavis Ormandy from Google
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2022-03-15 16:51:46 UTC (stable/13, 13.1-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 17:42:48 UTC (releng/13.1, 13.1-BETA1-p1)
+ 2022-03-15 17:43:02 UTC (releng/13.0, 13.0-RELEASE-p8)
+ 2022-03-15 16:56:09 UTC (stable/12, 12.3-STABLE)
+ 2022-03-15 18:17:50 UTC (releng/12.3, 12.3-RELEASE-p3)
+ 2022-03-15 18:17:16 UTC (releng/12.2, 12.2-RELEASE-p14)
+CVE Name: CVE-2022-0778
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a
+collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
+Open Source toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. It is
+also a general-purpose cryptography library.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The BN_mod_sqrt() function, which computes a modular square root, contains
+a bug that can cause it to loop forever for non-prime moduli. This function
+is used when parsing certificates that contain certain forms of elliptic
+curves.
+
+III. Impact
+
+A specially crafted certificate with invalid explicit curve parameters may
+trigger an infinite loop, leading to a denial of service. Since certificate
+parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate signature, any
+process that parses an externally supplied certificate may be affected.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
+(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
+freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
+revision number in the following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/13/ 5f3d952f6e6b stable/13-n250020
+releng/13.1/ 942b5e156d41 releng/13.1-n249979
+releng/13.0/ 3847c17aa23a releng/13.0-n244777
+stable/12/ r371734
+releng/12.3/ r371742
+releng/12.2/ r371735
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+For FreeBSD 13 and later:
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+For FreeBSD 12 and earlier:
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular
+revision, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-0778>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAmIw5a0ACgkQ05eS9J6n
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+=TDUh
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..abd72d631c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+--- usr.sbin/freebsd-update/freebsd-update.sh.orig
++++ usr.sbin/freebsd-update/freebsd-update.sh
+@@ -890,7 +890,12 @@
+ install_create_be () {
+ # Figure out if we're running in a jail and return if we are
+ if [ `sysctl -n security.jail.jailed` = 1 ]; then
+- return 1
++ return 1
++ fi
++ # Operating on roots that aren't located at / will, more often than not,
++ # not touch the boot environment.
++ if [ "$BASEDIR" != "/" ]; then
++ return 1
+ fi
+ # Create a boot environment if enabled
+ if [ ${BOOTENV} = yes ]; then
+@@ -911,7 +916,7 @@
+ esac
+ if [ ${CREATEBE} = yes ]; then
+ echo -n "Creating snapshot of existing boot environment... "
+- VERSION=`freebsd-version -k`
++ VERSION=`freebsd-version -ku | sort -V | tail -n 1`
+ TIMESTAMP=`date +"%Y-%m-%d_%H%M%S"`
+ bectl create ${VERSION}_${TIMESTAMP}
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5e8a302c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:09/freebsd-update.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAmIw44sACgkQ05eS9J6n
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+/Xik0c7OrKaMQ7nTRplKoTBHaUGzHxeRR88UsorB84UrjhKFe/HnzLy91dX700qR
+GgH6juctdKK637GMysM0ha+tDFBTtKZT/i/RigpKio8/hX99H8o=
+=6+my
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1432597c30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c
+@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
+ int
+ zfs_write(znode_t *zp, uio_t *uio, int ioflag, cred_t *cr)
+ {
+- int error = 0;
++ int error = 0, error1;
+ ssize_t start_resid = uio->uio_resid;
+
+ /*
+@@ -551,7 +551,11 @@
+ continue;
+ }
+ #endif
+- if (error != 0) {
++ /*
++ * On FreeBSD, EFAULT should be propagated back to the
++ * VFS, which will handle faulting and will retry.
++ */
++ if (error != 0 && error != EFAULT) {
+ dmu_tx_commit(tx);
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -635,7 +639,7 @@
+ while ((end_size = zp->z_size) < uio->uio_loffset) {
+ (void) atomic_cas_64(&zp->z_size, end_size,
+ uio->uio_loffset);
+- ASSERT(error == 0);
++ ASSERT(error == 0 || error == EFAULT);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are replaying and eof is non zero then force
+@@ -645,7 +649,10 @@
+ if (zfsvfs->z_replay && zfsvfs->z_replay_eof != 0)
+ zp->z_size = zfsvfs->z_replay_eof;
+
+- error = sa_bulk_update(zp->z_sa_hdl, bulk, count, tx);
++ error1 = sa_bulk_update(zp->z_sa_hdl, bulk, count, tx);
++ if (error1 != 0)
++ /* Avoid clobbering EFAULT. */
++ error = error1;
+
+ zfs_log_write(zilog, tx, TX_WRITE, zp, woff, tx_bytes, ioflag,
+ NULL, NULL);
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c0c2ba9cd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:10/zfs.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4859e1fa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/include/os/freebsd/spl/sys/vnode.h.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/include/os/freebsd/spl/sys/vnode.h
+@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@
+ #include <sys/file.h>
+ #include <sys/filedesc.h>
+ #include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
++#include <sys/vm.h>
++#include <vm/vm_object.h>
+
+ typedef struct vop_vector vnodeops_t;
+ #define VOP_FID VOP_VPTOFH
+@@ -88,6 +90,24 @@
+ #define vn_has_cached_data(vp) \
+ ((vp)->v_object != NULL && \
+ (vp)->v_object->resident_page_count > 0)
++
++#ifndef IN_BASE
++static __inline void
++vn_flush_cached_data(vnode_t *vp, boolean_t sync)
++{
++#if __FreeBSD_version > 1300054
++ if (vm_object_mightbedirty(vp->v_object)) {
++#else
++ if (vp->v_object->flags & OBJ_MIGHTBEDIRTY) {
++#endif
++ int flags = sync ? OBJPC_SYNC : 0;
++ zfs_vmobject_wlock(vp->v_object);
++ vm_object_page_clean(vp->v_object, 0, 0, flags);
++ zfs_vmobject_wunlock(vp->v_object);
++ }
++}
++#endif
++
+ #define vn_exists(vp) do { } while (0)
+ #define vn_invalid(vp) do { } while (0)
+ #define vn_renamepath(tdvp, svp, tnm, lentnm) do { } while (0)
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/include/os/freebsd/zfs/sys/zfs_znode_impl.h.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/include/os/freebsd/zfs/sys/zfs_znode_impl.h
+@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@
+ #define Z_ISLNK(type) ((type) == VLNK)
+ #define Z_ISDIR(type) ((type) == VDIR)
+
+-#define zn_has_cached_data(zp) vn_has_cached_data(ZTOV(zp))
++#define zn_has_cached_data(zp) vn_has_cached_data(ZTOV(zp))
++#define zn_flush_cached_data(zp, sync) vn_flush_cached_data(ZTOV(zp), sync)
+ #define zn_rlimit_fsize(zp, uio, td) vn_rlimit_fsize(ZTOV(zp), (uio), (td))
+
+ /* Called on entry to each ZFS vnode and vfs operation */
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/include/os/linux/zfs/sys/zfs_znode_impl.h.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/include/os/linux/zfs/sys/zfs_znode_impl.h
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
+ #define Z_ISDEV(type) (S_ISCHR(type) || S_ISBLK(type) || S_ISFIFO(type))
+ #define Z_ISDIR(type) S_ISDIR(type)
+
+-#define zn_has_cached_data(zp) ((zp)->z_is_mapped)
++#define zn_flush_cached_data(zp, sync) write_inode_now(ZTOI(zp), sync)
+ #define zn_rlimit_fsize(zp, uio, td) (0)
+
+ #define zhold(zp) igrab(ZTOI((zp)))
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/include/sys/dnode.h.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/include/sys/dnode.h
+@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@
+ void dnode_rele(dnode_t *dn, void *ref);
+ void dnode_rele_and_unlock(dnode_t *dn, void *tag, boolean_t evicting);
+ int dnode_try_claim(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, int slots);
++boolean_t dnode_is_dirty(dnode_t *dn);
+ void dnode_setdirty(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx);
+ void dnode_set_dirtyctx(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx, void *tag);
+ void dnode_sync(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx);
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/dmu.c.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/dmu.c
+@@ -2082,42 +2082,41 @@
+ dmu_offset_next(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, boolean_t hole, uint64_t *off)
+ {
+ dnode_t *dn;
+- int i, err;
+- boolean_t clean = B_TRUE;
++ int err;
+
++restart:
+ err = dnode_hold(os, object, FTAG, &dn);
+ if (err)
+ return (err);
+
+- /*
+- * Check if dnode is dirty
+- */
+- for (i = 0; i < TXG_SIZE; i++) {
+- if (multilist_link_active(&dn->dn_dirty_link[i])) {
+- clean = B_FALSE;
+- break;
+- }
+- }
++ rw_enter(&dn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_READER);
+
+- /*
+- * If compatibility option is on, sync any current changes before
+- * we go trundling through the block pointers.
+- */
+- if (!clean && zfs_dmu_offset_next_sync) {
+- clean = B_TRUE;
+- dnode_rele(dn, FTAG);
+- txg_wait_synced(dmu_objset_pool(os), 0);
+- err = dnode_hold(os, object, FTAG, &dn);
+- if (err)
+- return (err);
+- }
++ if (dnode_is_dirty(dn)) {
++ /*
++ * If the zfs_dmu_offset_next_sync module option is enabled
++ * then strict hole reporting has been requested. Dirty
++ * dnodes must be synced to disk to accurately report all
++ * holes. When disabled (the default) dirty dnodes are
++ * reported to not have any holes which is always safe.
++ *
++ * When called by zfs_holey_common() the zp->z_rangelock
++ * is held to prevent zfs_write() and mmap writeback from
++ * re-dirtying the dnode after txg_wait_synced().
++ */
++ if (zfs_dmu_offset_next_sync) {
++ rw_exit(&dn->dn_struct_rwlock);
++ dnode_rele(dn, FTAG);
++ txg_wait_synced(dmu_objset_pool(os), 0);
++ goto restart;
++ }
+
+- if (clean)
+- err = dnode_next_offset(dn,
+- (hole ? DNODE_FIND_HOLE : 0), off, 1, 1, 0);
+- else
+ err = SET_ERROR(EBUSY);
++ } else {
++ err = dnode_next_offset(dn, DNODE_FIND_HAVELOCK |
++ (hole ? DNODE_FIND_HOLE : 0), off, 1, 1, 0);
++ }
+
++ rw_exit(&dn->dn_struct_rwlock);
+ dnode_rele(dn, FTAG);
+
+ return (err);
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/dnode.c.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/dnode.c
+@@ -1652,6 +1652,26 @@
+ slots, NULL, NULL));
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Checks if the dnode contains any uncommitted dirty records.
++ */
++boolean_t
++dnode_is_dirty(dnode_t *dn)
++{
++ mutex_enter(&dn->dn_mtx);
++
++ for (int i = 0; i < TXG_SIZE; i++) {
++ if (list_head(&dn->dn_dirty_records[i]) != NULL) {
++ mutex_exit(&dn->dn_mtx);
++ return (B_TRUE);
++ }
++ }
++
++ mutex_exit(&dn->dn_mtx);
++
++ return (B_FALSE);
++}
++
+ void
+ dnode_setdirty(dnode_t *dn, dmu_tx_t *tx)
+ {
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
+ static int
+ zfs_holey_common(znode_t *zp, ulong_t cmd, loff_t *off)
+ {
++ zfs_locked_range_t *lr;
+ uint64_t noff = (uint64_t)*off; /* new offset */
+ uint64_t file_sz;
+ int error;
+@@ -100,12 +101,18 @@
+ else
+ hole = B_FALSE;
+
++ /* Flush any mmap()'d data to disk */
++ if (zn_has_cached_data(zp))
++ zn_flush_cached_data(zp, B_FALSE);
++
++ lr = zfs_rangelock_enter(&zp->z_rangelock, 0, file_sz, RL_READER);
+ error = dmu_offset_next(ZTOZSB(zp)->z_os, zp->z_id, hole, &noff);
++ zfs_rangelock_exit(lr);
+
+ if (error == ESRCH)
+ return (SET_ERROR(ENXIO));
+
+- /* file was dirty, so fall back to using generic logic */
++ /* File was dirty, so fall back to using generic logic */
+ if (error == EBUSY) {
+ if (hole)
+ *off = file_sz;
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0c100c447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:11/zfs.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+=yIfG
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cbcb488e34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/include/sys/zfs_ioctl.h.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/include/sys/zfs_ioctl.h
+@@ -525,7 +525,6 @@
+ } zfs_useracct_t;
+
+ #define ZFSDEV_MAX_MINOR (1 << 16)
+-#define ZFS_MIN_MINOR (ZFSDEV_MAX_MINOR + 1)
+
+ #define ZPOOL_EXPORT_AFTER_SPLIT 0x1
+
+--- sys/contrib/openzfs/module/os/freebsd/zfs/kmod_core.c.orig
++++ sys/contrib/openzfs/module/os/freebsd/zfs/kmod_core.c
+@@ -182,23 +182,21 @@
+ static void
+ zfsdev_close(void *data)
+ {
+- zfsdev_state_t *zs, *zsp = data;
++ zfsdev_state_t *zs = data;
++
++ ASSERT(zs != NULL);
+
+ mutex_enter(&zfsdev_state_lock);
+- for (zs = zfsdev_state_list; zs != NULL; zs = zs->zs_next) {
+- if (zs == zsp)
+- break;
+- }
+- if (zs == NULL || zs->zs_minor <= 0) {
+- mutex_exit(&zfsdev_state_lock);
+- return;
+- }
++
++ ASSERT(zs->zs_minor != 0);
++
+ zs->zs_minor = -1;
+ zfs_onexit_destroy(zs->zs_onexit);
+ zfs_zevent_destroy(zs->zs_zevent);
+- mutex_exit(&zfsdev_state_lock);
+ zs->zs_onexit = NULL;
+ zs->zs_zevent = NULL;
++
++ mutex_exit(&zfsdev_state_lock);
+ }
+
+ static int
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e14867c307
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/EN-22:12/zfs.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+=HnrQ
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..afa9b07d9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_adhoc.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_adhoc.c
+@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -571,7 +571,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -581,11 +584,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -598,7 +603,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_hostap.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_hostap.c
+@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -757,7 +757,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -767,11 +770,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -784,7 +789,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c
+@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@
+ * XXX should handle 3 concurrent reassemblies per-spec.
+ */
+ struct mbuf *
+-ieee80211_defrag(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m, int hdrspace)
++ieee80211_defrag(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m, int hdrspace,
++ int has_decrypted)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211vap *vap = ni->ni_vap;
+ struct ieee80211_frame *wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
+@@ -189,6 +190,11 @@
+ if (!more_frag && fragno == 0 && ni->ni_rxfrag[0] == NULL)
+ return m;
+
++ /* Temporarily set flag to remember if fragment was encrypted. */
++ /* XXX use a non-packet altering storage for this in the future. */
++ if (has_decrypted)
++ wh->i_fc[1] |= IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED;
++
+ /*
+ * Remove frag to insure it doesn't get reaped by timer.
+ */
+@@ -219,10 +225,14 @@
+
+ lwh = mtod(mfrag, struct ieee80211_frame *);
+ last_rxseq = le16toh(*(uint16_t *)lwh->i_seq);
+- /* NB: check seq # and frag together */
++ /*
++ * NB: check seq # and frag together. Also check that both
++ * fragments are plaintext or that both are encrypted.
++ */
+ if (rxseq == last_rxseq+1 &&
+ IEEE80211_ADDR_EQ(wh->i_addr1, lwh->i_addr1) &&
+- IEEE80211_ADDR_EQ(wh->i_addr2, lwh->i_addr2)) {
++ IEEE80211_ADDR_EQ(wh->i_addr2, lwh->i_addr2) &&
++ !((wh->i_fc[1] ^ lwh->i_fc[1]) & IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED)) {
+ /* XXX clear MORE_FRAG bit? */
+ /* track last seqnum and fragno */
+ *(uint16_t *) lwh->i_seq = *(uint16_t *) wh->i_seq;
+@@ -253,6 +263,11 @@
+ ni->ni_rxfrag[0] = mfrag;
+ mfrag = NULL;
+ }
++ /* Remember to clear protected flag that was temporarily set. */
++ if (mfrag != NULL) {
++ wh = mtod(mfrag, struct ieee80211_frame *);
++ wh->i_fc[1] &= ~IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED;
++ }
+ return mfrag;
+ }
+
+@@ -294,7 +309,8 @@
+ }
+
+ struct mbuf *
+-ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct mbuf *m, int hdrlen)
++ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct mbuf *m, int hdrlen,
++ uint8_t qos)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_qosframe_addr4 wh;
+ struct ether_header *eh;
+@@ -316,7 +332,9 @@
+ llc->llc_snap.org_code[1] == 0 && llc->llc_snap.org_code[2] == 0 &&
+ /* NB: preserve AppleTalk frames that have a native SNAP hdr */
+ !(llc->llc_snap.ether_type == htons(ETHERTYPE_AARP) ||
+- llc->llc_snap.ether_type == htons(ETHERTYPE_IPX))) {
++ llc->llc_snap.ether_type == htons(ETHERTYPE_IPX)) &&
++ /* Do not want to touch A-MSDU frames. */
++ !(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU)) {
+ m_adj(m, hdrlen + sizeof(struct llc) - sizeof(*eh));
+ llc = NULL;
+ } else {
+@@ -364,6 +382,10 @@
+ #define FF_LLC_SIZE (sizeof(struct ether_header) + sizeof(struct llc))
+ struct ether_header *eh;
+ struct llc *llc;
++ const uint8_t llc_hdr_mac[ETHER_ADDR_LEN] = {
++ /* MAC address matching the 802.2 LLC header */
++ LLC_SNAP_LSAP, LLC_SNAP_LSAP, LLC_UI, 0, 0, 0
++ };
+
+ /*
+ * The frame has an 802.3 header followed by an 802.2
+@@ -376,6 +398,15 @@
+ if (m->m_len < FF_LLC_SIZE && (m = m_pullup(m, FF_LLC_SIZE)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *); /* 802.3 header is first */
++
++ /*
++ * Detect possible attack where a single 802.11 frame is processed
++ * as an A-MSDU frame due to an adversary setting the A-MSDU present
++ * bit in the 802.11 QoS header. [FragAttacks]
++ */
++ if (memcmp(eh->ether_dhost, llc_hdr_mac, ETHER_ADDR_LEN) == 0)
++ return NULL;
++
+ llc = (struct llc *)&eh[1]; /* 802.2 header follows */
+ *framelen = ntohs(eh->ether_type) /* encap'd frame size */
+ + sizeof(struct ether_header) - sizeof(struct llc);
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.h.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.h
+@@ -309,9 +309,10 @@
+ void ieee80211_deliver_data(struct ieee80211vap *,
+ struct ieee80211_node *, struct mbuf *);
+ struct mbuf *ieee80211_defrag(struct ieee80211_node *,
+- struct mbuf *, int);
++ struct mbuf *, int, int);
+ struct mbuf *ieee80211_realign(struct ieee80211vap *, struct mbuf *, size_t);
+-struct mbuf *ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *, struct mbuf *, int);
++struct mbuf *ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *, struct mbuf *, int,
++ uint8_t);
+ struct mbuf *ieee80211_decap1(struct mbuf *, int *);
+ int ieee80211_setup_rates(struct ieee80211_node *ni,
+ const uint8_t *rates, const uint8_t *xrates, int flags);
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c
+@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@
+ ("expected opmode IBSS or AHDEMO not %s",
+ ieee80211_opmode_name[vap->iv_opmode]));
+
+- if (ssid_len == 0)
++ if (ssid_len == 0 || ssid_len > IEEE80211_NWID_LEN)
+ return EINVAL;
+
+ sr = IEEE80211_MALLOC(sizeof(*sr), M_TEMP,
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_mesh.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_mesh.c
+@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@
+ */
+ hdrspace = ieee80211_hdrspace(ic, wh);
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, 0);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_node.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_node.c
+@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@
+
+ ie = ies->data;
+ ielen = ies->len;
+- while (ielen > 0) {
++ while (ielen > 1) {
+ switch (ie[0]) {
+ case IEEE80211_ELEMID_VENDOR:
+ if (iswpaoui(ie))
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c
+@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -840,7 +840,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -850,11 +853,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -867,7 +872,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_wds.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_wds.c
+@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -632,7 +632,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -642,11 +645,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -659,7 +664,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56d0a6e8dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.12.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+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+=vWSs
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5005da9627
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_adhoc.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_adhoc.c
+@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -571,7 +571,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -581,11 +584,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -598,7 +603,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_hostap.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_hostap.c
+@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -757,7 +757,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -767,11 +770,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -784,7 +789,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.c
+@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@
+ * XXX should handle 3 concurrent reassemblies per-spec.
+ */
+ struct mbuf *
+-ieee80211_defrag(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m, int hdrspace)
++ieee80211_defrag(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m, int hdrspace,
++ int has_decrypted)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211vap *vap = ni->ni_vap;
+ struct ieee80211_frame *wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
+@@ -189,6 +190,11 @@
+ if (!more_frag && fragno == 0 && ni->ni_rxfrag[0] == NULL)
+ return m;
+
++ /* Temporarily set flag to remember if fragment was encrypted. */
++ /* XXX use a non-packet altering storage for this in the future. */
++ if (has_decrypted)
++ wh->i_fc[1] |= IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED;
++
+ /*
+ * Remove frag to insure it doesn't get reaped by timer.
+ */
+@@ -219,10 +225,14 @@
+
+ lwh = mtod(mfrag, struct ieee80211_frame *);
+ last_rxseq = le16toh(*(uint16_t *)lwh->i_seq);
+- /* NB: check seq # and frag together */
++ /*
++ * NB: check seq # and frag together. Also check that both
++ * fragments are plaintext or that both are encrypted.
++ */
+ if (rxseq == last_rxseq+1 &&
+ IEEE80211_ADDR_EQ(wh->i_addr1, lwh->i_addr1) &&
+- IEEE80211_ADDR_EQ(wh->i_addr2, lwh->i_addr2)) {
++ IEEE80211_ADDR_EQ(wh->i_addr2, lwh->i_addr2) &&
++ !((wh->i_fc[1] ^ lwh->i_fc[1]) & IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED)) {
+ /* XXX clear MORE_FRAG bit? */
+ /* track last seqnum and fragno */
+ *(uint16_t *) lwh->i_seq = *(uint16_t *) wh->i_seq;
+@@ -253,6 +263,11 @@
+ ni->ni_rxfrag[0] = mfrag;
+ mfrag = NULL;
+ }
++ /* Remember to clear protected flag that was temporarily set. */
++ if (mfrag != NULL) {
++ wh = mtod(mfrag, struct ieee80211_frame *);
++ wh->i_fc[1] &= ~IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED;
++ }
+ return mfrag;
+ }
+
+@@ -294,7 +309,8 @@
+ }
+
+ struct mbuf *
+-ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct mbuf *m, int hdrlen)
++ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *vap, struct mbuf *m, int hdrlen,
++ uint8_t qos)
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_qosframe_addr4 wh;
+ struct ether_header *eh;
+@@ -316,7 +332,9 @@
+ llc->llc_snap.org_code[1] == 0 && llc->llc_snap.org_code[2] == 0 &&
+ /* NB: preserve AppleTalk frames that have a native SNAP hdr */
+ !(llc->llc_snap.ether_type == htons(ETHERTYPE_AARP) ||
+- llc->llc_snap.ether_type == htons(ETHERTYPE_IPX))) {
++ llc->llc_snap.ether_type == htons(ETHERTYPE_IPX)) &&
++ /* Do not want to touch A-MSDU frames. */
++ !(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU)) {
+ m_adj(m, hdrlen + sizeof(struct llc) - sizeof(*eh));
+ llc = NULL;
+ } else {
+@@ -364,6 +382,10 @@
+ #define FF_LLC_SIZE (sizeof(struct ether_header) + sizeof(struct llc))
+ struct ether_header *eh;
+ struct llc *llc;
++ const uint8_t llc_hdr_mac[ETHER_ADDR_LEN] = {
++ /* MAC address matching the 802.2 LLC header */
++ LLC_SNAP_LSAP, LLC_SNAP_LSAP, LLC_UI, 0, 0, 0
++ };
+
+ /*
+ * The frame has an 802.3 header followed by an 802.2
+@@ -376,6 +398,15 @@
+ if (m->m_len < FF_LLC_SIZE && (m = m_pullup(m, FF_LLC_SIZE)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *); /* 802.3 header is first */
++
++ /*
++ * Detect possible attack where a single 802.11 frame is processed
++ * as an A-MSDU frame due to an adversary setting the A-MSDU present
++ * bit in the 802.11 QoS header. [FragAttacks]
++ */
++ if (memcmp(eh->ether_dhost, llc_hdr_mac, ETHER_ADDR_LEN) == 0)
++ return NULL;
++
+ llc = (struct llc *)&eh[1]; /* 802.2 header follows */
+ *framelen = ntohs(eh->ether_type) /* encap'd frame size */
+ + sizeof(struct ether_header) - sizeof(struct llc);
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.h.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_input.h
+@@ -309,9 +309,10 @@
+ void ieee80211_deliver_data(struct ieee80211vap *,
+ struct ieee80211_node *, struct mbuf *);
+ struct mbuf *ieee80211_defrag(struct ieee80211_node *,
+- struct mbuf *, int);
++ struct mbuf *, int, int);
+ struct mbuf *ieee80211_realign(struct ieee80211vap *, struct mbuf *, size_t);
+-struct mbuf *ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *, struct mbuf *, int);
++struct mbuf *ieee80211_decap(struct ieee80211vap *, struct mbuf *, int,
++ uint8_t);
+ struct mbuf *ieee80211_decap1(struct mbuf *, int *);
+ int ieee80211_setup_rates(struct ieee80211_node *ni,
+ const uint8_t *rates, const uint8_t *xrates, int flags);
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_mesh.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_mesh.c
+@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@
+ */
+ hdrspace = ieee80211_hdrspace(ic, wh);
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, 0);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c
+@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -840,7 +840,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -850,11 +853,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -867,7 +872,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
+--- sys/net80211/ieee80211_wds.c.orig
++++ sys/net80211/ieee80211_wds.c
+@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@
+ * Next up, any fragmentation.
+ */
+ if (!IEEE80211_IS_MULTICAST(wh->i_addr1)) {
+- m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_defrag(ni, m, hdrspace, has_decrypted);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* Fragment dropped or frame not complete yet */
+ goto out;
+@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Finally, strip the 802.11 header.
+ */
+- m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace);
++ m = ieee80211_decap(vap, m, hdrspace, qos);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ /* XXX mask bit to check for both */
+ /* don't count Null data frames as errors */
+@@ -634,7 +634,10 @@
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_decap);
+ goto err;
+ }
+- eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ if (!(qos & IEEE80211_QOS_AMSDU))
++ eh = mtod(m, struct ether_header *);
++ else
++ eh = NULL;
+ if (!ieee80211_node_is_authorized(ni)) {
+ /*
+ * Deny any non-PAE frames received prior to
+@@ -644,11 +647,13 @@
+ * the port is not marked authorized by the
+ * authenticator until the handshake has completed.
+ */
+- if (eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ if (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
+ IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
+- eh->ether_shost, "data",
+- "unauthorized port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
+- eh->ether_type, m->m_pkthdr.len);
++ ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "unauthorized or "
++ "unknown port: ether type 0x%x len %u",
++ eh == NULL ? -1 : eh->ether_type,
++ m->m_pkthdr.len);
+ vap->iv_stats.is_rx_unauth++;
+ IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_unauth);
+ goto err;
+@@ -661,7 +666,8 @@
+ if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
+ ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+ (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
+- eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
++ (eh == NULL ||
++ eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE))) {
+ /*
+ * Drop unencrypted frames.
+ */
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d363dbdb13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:02/wifi.13.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAmIw5a0ACgkQ05eS9J6n
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+Rr9BZxfOCR/vtcmqXfp7amABSqmlzFWpGteBj287uYMpqQa+NVc=
+=NQZB
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b0af80705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
+@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
+ /*
+ * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
+ * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
+- * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
++ * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
++ * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
+ */
+ {
+ BIGNUM *ret = in;
+@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@
+ goto vrfy;
+ }
+
+- /* find smallest i such that b^(2^i) = 1 */
+- i = 1;
+- if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
+- goto end;
+- while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
+- i++;
+- if (i == e) {
+- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
+- goto end;
++ /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
++ for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
++ if (i == 1) {
++ if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
++ goto end;
++
++ } else {
++ if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
++ goto end;
+ }
+- if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
+- goto end;
++ if (BN_is_one(t))
++ break;
++ }
++ /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
++ if (i >= e) {
++ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
++ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
+--- crypto/openssl/doc/man3/BN_add.pod.orig
++++ crypto/openssl/doc/man3/BN_add.pod
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ =head1 NAME
+
+ BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add,
+-BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
++BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_mod_sqrt, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd -
+ arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs
+
+ =head1 SYNOPSIS
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
+
+ int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
++ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
++
+ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+@@ -87,6 +89,12 @@
+ BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I<a> modulo B<m> and places the
+ result in I<r>.
+
++BN_mod_sqrt() returns the modular square root of I<a> such that
++C<in^2 = a (mod p)>. The modulus I<p> must be a
++prime, otherwise an error or an incorrect "result" will be returned.
++The result is stored into I<in> which can be NULL. The result will be
++newly allocated in that case.
++
+ BN_exp() raises I<a> to the I<p>-th power and places the result in I<r>
+ (C<r=a^p>). This function is faster than repeated applications of
+ BN_mul().
+@@ -108,7 +116,10 @@
+
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+-For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
++The BN_mod_sqrt() returns the result (possibly incorrect if I<p> is
++not a prime), or NULL.
++
++For all remaining functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return
+ value should always be checked (e.g., C<if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;>).
+ The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18a1108049
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-22:03/openssl.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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+=ygJX
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-11 14:37:28 +0000