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| -rw-r--r-- | website/content/en/status/report-2026-07-2026-09/bounds-safety.adoc | 24 |
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diff --git a/website/content/en/status/report-2026-07-2026-09/bounds-safety.adoc b/website/content/en/status/report-2026-07-2026-09/bounds-safety.adoc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9915ba4f09 --- /dev/null +++ b/website/content/en/status/report-2026-07-2026-09/bounds-safety.adoc @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +=== Adopt -fbounds-safety in the FreeBSD Kernel TCP/IP Stack + +Links: + +link:https://wiki.freebsd.org/BoundsSafety[Wiki page] URL: link:https://wiki.freebsd.org/BoundsSafety[] + +link:https://freebsdfoundation.org/project/adopt-fbounds-safety-in-the-freebsd-kernel-tcp-ip-stack/[Project page] URL: link:https://freebsdfoundation.org/project/adopt-fbounds-safety-in-the-freebsd-kernel-tcp-ip-stack/[] + +Contact: Abhijeet Sharma <abhijeetsharma2002@gmail.com> + +Clang's -fbounds-safety lets C code state a buffer's length, as in `+__counted_by(len)+`. +The compiler then checks accesses through that pointer. +An out-of-bounds access traps instead of corrupting memory. +The TCP/IP stack parses untrusted network input, so it is a good place to start. +This project adds the macros and build support, then converts TCP files one at a time. +Without the flag the annotations expand to nothing. +The tree still builds with the base system compiler and with GCC. + +==== This quarter + +* External toolchain builds GENERIC on amd64, recipe on the wiki. +* Macros, build knob and soft traps posted, four reviews accepted. +* `tcp_ecn.c` runs checked, kernel boots and passes netinet tests. +* mbuf accessor RFC on arch@ and net@, discussion ongoing. + +Sponsor: The FreeBSD Foundation |
