diff options
| author | Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-06-23 21:46:17 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-06-29 19:17:30 +0000 |
| commit | 800acf75eb80d299fd8ba1e151050da58d481232 (patch) | |
| tree | 1e2471fd2343ba654bb766844535bffc52ee6164 | |
| parent | 9a6bccc57c68b7bd6fed50720d7a4aa1a4ef9d6c (diff) | |
rack: Reload the TCP stack PCB after reacquiring the inpcb lock
Malicious userspace might switch TCP stacks twice while the inpcb lock
is dropped. If it does so, the validation of tp->t_fb might succeed,
but the saved pointer to the stack PCB might be invalid. Reload it to
avoid this problem, as BBR already does.
Approved by: so
Security: FreeBSD-SA-26:43.tcp
Security: CVE-2026-49422
Reported by: Maik Münch
Reviewed by: tuexen
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57791
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c index 9b35fbb7797b..41a57eeedfde 100644 --- a/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c +++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c @@ -23936,6 +23936,7 @@ process_opt: INP_WUNLOCK(inp); return (ENOPROTOOPT); } + rack = (struct tcp_rack *)tp->t_fb_ptr; if (rack->defer_options && (rack->gp_ready == 0) && (sopt->sopt_name != TCP_DEFER_OPTIONS) && (sopt->sopt_name != TCP_HYBRID_PACING) && |