Resolve conflicts. Known issues:

 - sshd fails to set TERM correctly.
 - privilege separation may break PAM and is currently turned off.
 - man pages have not yet been updated

I will have these issues resolved, and privilege separation turned on by
default, in time for DP2.

Sponsored by:	DARPA, NAI Labs

45 files changed, 2059 insertions, 1424 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
index c347446d285c..0e4f97776c8a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
+++ b/crypto/openssh/LICENCE
@@ -190,6 +190,8 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 	Aaron Campbell
 	Damien Miller
 	Kevin Steves
+	Daniel Kouril
+	Per Allansson
 
      * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -253,3 +255,4 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
      * SUCH DAMAGE.
 
 $FreeBSD$
+
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c
index 745b9c5175fb..97d2908803e4 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb4.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.25 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.27 2002/06/11 05:46:20 mpech Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ krb4_init(void *context)
 		if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
 			tkt_root = "/ticket/";
 #endif /* AFS */
-		snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d",
-		    tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, getpid());
+		snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%ld",
+		    tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, (long)getpid());
 		krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
 	}
 	/* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
 		log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
 		    "account %s", *client, authctxt->user);
 		xfree(*client);
+		*client = NULL;
 		return (0);
 	}
 	/* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
index ff23c9870fbc..94344a69cc31 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c
@@ -1,9 +1,34 @@
 /*
  *    Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.8 2002/03/19 10:49:35 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
index ab7447f7bec3..ec1b0967df6c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-passwd.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.24 2002/03/04 12:43:06 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.27 2002/05/24 16:45:16 stevesk Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ int
 auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 {
 	struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
-	char *encrypted_password;
 
 	/* deny if no user. */
 	if (pw == NULL)
@@ -86,14 +85,20 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 		return 0;
 	else
 		return 1;
-#endif
+#else
 	/* Check for users with no password. */
 	if (strcmp(password, "") == 0 && strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, "") == 0)
 		return 1;
-	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
-	encrypted_password = crypt(password,
-	    (pw->pw_passwd[0] && pw->pw_passwd[1]) ? pw->pw_passwd : "xx");
-
-	/* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords are identical. */
-	return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw->pw_passwd) == 0);
+	else {
+		/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+		char *encrypted_password = crypt(password,
+		    (pw->pw_passwd[0] && pw->pw_passwd[1]) ?
+		    pw->pw_passwd : "xx");
+		/*
+		 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+		 * are identical.
+		 */
+		return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw->pw_passwd) == 0);
+	}
+#endif
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
index e9852191d49a..e74ef3d944e0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.29 2002/03/04 12:43:06 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.34 2002/03/25 09:25:06 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -26,37 +26,48 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
- * its host key.  Returns true if authentication succeeds.
- */
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
 int
-auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, Key *client_host_key)
+auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost,
+    Key *client_host_key)
 {
-	extern ServerOptions options;
-	const char *canonical_hostname;
 	HostStatus host_status;
 
-	debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s", client_user);
-
-	if (pw == NULL || client_host_key == NULL || client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
 	/* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
-	if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user))
+	if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser))
 		return 0;
 
-	canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname(
-	    options.verify_reverse_mapping);
-
-	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", canonical_hostname);
-
 	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key,
-	    canonical_hostname, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+	    chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
 	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
 
-	if (host_status != HOST_OK) {
+	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
+ * its host key.  Returns true if authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
+{
+	char *chost;
+
+	debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
+	    cuser);
+
+	if (pw == NULL || client_host_key == NULL ||
+	    client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
+	debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
+
+	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
 		debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
 		packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
 		return 0;
@@ -64,9 +75,9 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, Key *client_host_key
 	/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
 
 	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
-	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key->rsa)) {
+	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
 		log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
-		    canonical_hostname);
+		    chost);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -75,7 +86,7 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, Key *client_host_key
 	 */
 
 	verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
-	   pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname);
+	   pw->pw_name, cuser, chost);
 	packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
index 77ea57b583b3..17d7ae924928 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.50 2001/12/28 14:50:54 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.56 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -53,6 +55,58 @@ extern u_char session_id[16];
  * description of the options.
  */
 
+BIGNUM *
+auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
+{
+	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
+	/* Generate a random challenge. */
+	BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new() failed");
+	BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+	return challenge;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
+{
+	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
+	MD5_CTX md;
+	int len;
+
+	/* don't allow short keys */
+	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
+		fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len);
+	memset(buf, 0, 32);
+	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+	MD5_Init(&md);
+	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+
+	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
+	if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
+		/* Wrong answer. */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* Correct answer. */
+	return (1);
+}
+
 /*
  * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
  * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
@@ -60,29 +114,19 @@ extern u_char session_id[16];
  */
 
 int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk)
+auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
 {
 	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
-	BN_CTX *ctx;
-	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16];
-	MD5_CTX md;
-	u_int i;
-	int len;
+	u_char response[16];
+	int i, success;
 
 	if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
-	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
 
-	/* Generate a random challenge. */
-	BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
-	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_CTX_new() failed");
-	BN_mod(challenge, challenge, pk->n, ctx);
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
 
 	/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
-	rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, pk);
+	rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
 
 	/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
 	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
@@ -97,48 +141,26 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk)
 		response[i] = packet_get_char();
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
-	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
-	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
-		fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: bad challenge length %d", len);
-	memset(buf, 0, 32);
-	BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
-	MD5_Init(&md);
-	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
-	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
-	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+	success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
 	BN_clear_free(challenge);
-
-	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
-	if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
-		/* Wrong answer. */
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* Correct answer. */
-	return 1;
+	return (success);
 }
 
 /*
- * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client.  This returns
- * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
- * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
+ * check if there's user key matching client_n,
+ * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
  */
 
 int
-auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
+auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 {
 	char line[8192], *file;
-	int authenticated;
+	int allowed = 0;
 	u_int bits;
 	FILE *f;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
 	struct stat st;
 	Key *key;
-	char *fp;
-
-	/* no user given */
-	if (pw == NULL)
-		return 0;
 
 	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
@@ -152,29 +174,27 @@ auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
 		/* Restore the privileged uid. */
 		restore_uid();
 		xfree(file);
-		return 0;
+		return (0);
 	}
 	/* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
 	f = fopen(file, "r");
 	if (!f) {
 		/* Restore the privileged uid. */
 		restore_uid();
-		packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file);
-		packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable.");
 		xfree(file);
-		return 0;
+		return (0);
 	}
 	if (options.strict_modes &&
 	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
 		xfree(file);
 		fclose(f);
 		log("Authentication refused: %s", line);
-		packet_send_debug("Authentication refused: %s", line);
 		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
+		return (0);
 	}
-	/* Flag indicating whether authentication has succeeded. */
-	authenticated = 0;
+
+	/* Flag indicating whether the key is allowed. */
+	allowed = 0;
 
 	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
 
@@ -239,32 +259,8 @@ auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
 		if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum))
 			continue;
 
-		/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
-		if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key->rsa)) {
-			/* Wrong response. */
-			verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-			packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
-			/*
-			 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
-			 * another challenge and break the protocol.
-			 */
-			break;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Correct response.  The client has been successfully
-		 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
-		 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
-		 * authentication to be rejected.
-		 * Break out of the loop if authentication was successful;
-		 * otherwise continue searching.
-		 */
-		authenticated = 1;
-
-	 	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-		verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
-		    key_type(key), fp);
-		xfree(fp);
-
+		/* break out, this key is allowed */
+		allowed = 1;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -275,13 +271,58 @@ auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
 	xfree(file);
 	fclose(f);
 
-	key_free(key);
-
-	if (authenticated)
-		packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
+	/* return key if allowed */
+	if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
+		*rkey = key;
 	else
+		key_free(key);
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client.  This returns
+ * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
+ * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
+ */
+int
+auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
+{
+	Key *key;
+	char *fp;
+
+	/* no user given */
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
 		auth_clear_options();
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
+	if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
+		/* Wrong response. */
+		verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+		packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+		/*
+		 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
+		 * another challenge and break the protocol.
+		 */
+		key_free(key);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Correct response.  The client has been successfully
+	 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
+	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
+	 * authentication to be rejected.
+	 */
+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
+	    key_type(key), fp);
+	xfree(fp);
+	key_free(key);
 
-	/* Return authentication result. */
-	return authenticated;
+	packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
+	return (1);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
index b538b395a25c..18243ee7693d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-skey.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.16 2002/01/12 13:10:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.19 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #ifdef SKEY
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "auth.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 static void *
 skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
@@ -38,9 +39,7 @@ skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	return authctxt;
 }
 
-#define PROMPT "\nOPIE Password: "
-
-static int
+int
 skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
     u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
 {
@@ -54,23 +53,23 @@ skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
 	if (opiechallenge(&opie, authctxt->user, challenge) == -1)
 		return -1;
 
-	*name       = xstrdup("");
-	*infotxt    = xstrdup("");
+	*name  = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt  = xstrdup("");
 	*numprompts = 1;
 	*prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*));
 	*echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
 	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
 
-	len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(PROMPT) + 1;
+	len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(SKEY_PROMPT) + 1;
 	p = xmalloc(len);
 	strlcpy(p, challenge, len);
-	strlcat(p, PROMPT, len);
+	strlcat(p, SKEY_PROMPT, len);
 	(*prompts)[0] = p;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int
+int
 skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
@@ -96,4 +95,12 @@ KbdintDevice skey_device = {
 	skey_respond,
 	skey_free_ctx
 };
+
+KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = {
+	"skey",
+	skey_init_ctx,
+	mm_skey_query,
+	mm_skey_respond,
+	skey_free_ctx
+};
 #endif /* SKEY */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
index 79332a81f2f3..fbd1361d69f0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.35 2002/03/01 13:12:10 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.43 2002/05/17 14:27:55 millert Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <libgen.h>
@@ -40,10 +40,17 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "bufaux.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "tildexpand.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "packet.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 
+/* Debugging messages */
+Buffer auth_debug;
+int auth_debug_init;
+
 /*
  * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
  * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
@@ -77,7 +84,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 		    pw->pw_name, shell);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)))) {
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
+	    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
 		log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
 		    pw->pw_name, shell);
 		return 0;
@@ -91,17 +99,17 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
- 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
 			    options.deny_users[i])) {
- 				log("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
- 				    pw->pw_name);
+				log("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
+				    pw->pw_name);
 				return 0;
 			}
 	}
 	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
 	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
 		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
- 			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
 			    options.allow_users[i]))
 				break;
 		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
@@ -387,3 +395,77 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
+
+struct passwd *
+getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	auth_session_t *as;
+#endif
+#endif
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	pw = getpwnam(user);
+	if (pw == NULL || !allowed_user(pw))
+		return (NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
+		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
+	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
+		pw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (as != NULL)
+		auth_close(as);
+#endif
+#endif
+	if (pw != NULL)
+		return (pwcopy(pw));
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (!auth_debug_init)
+		return;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_send(void)
+{
+	char *msg;
+
+	if (!auth_debug_init)
+		return;
+	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
+		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
+		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_reset(void)
+{
+	if (auth_debug_init)
+		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
+	else {
+		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
+		auth_debug_init = 1;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.h b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
index a6265f3947cf..3fc7954aec7e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.29 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.39 2002/05/31 11:35:15 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #endif
 
 typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
 typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
 
 struct Authctxt {
@@ -72,6 +73,12 @@ struct Authctxt {
 #endif
 };
 
+struct Authmethod {
+	char	*name;
+	int	(*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+	int	*enabled;
+};
+
 /*
  * Keyboard interactive device:
  * init_ctx	returns: non NULL upon success
@@ -89,14 +96,21 @@ struct KbdintDevice
 	void	(*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
 };
 
-int     auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
+int      auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
 int
 auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 
-int	 auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *, const char *, Key *);
+int	 auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *, char *, Key *);
 int      auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
 int      auth_rsa(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *);
-int      auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *);
+int      auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *);
+BIGNUM	*auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
+int	 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]);
+int	 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+
+int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
 
 #ifdef KRB4
 #include <krb.h>
@@ -119,18 +133,27 @@ int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
 void	krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt);
 #endif /* KRB5 */
 
-void	do_authentication(void);
-void	do_authentication2(void);
+Authctxt *do_authentication(void);
+Authctxt *do_authentication2(void);
 
 Authctxt *authctxt_new(void);
 void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
 void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
 int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
 
+char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
+
+void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
+
 int	auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
 void	auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *);
+int	bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+int	skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int	skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
 
 int	allowed_user(struct passwd *);
+struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user);
 
 char	*get_challenge(Authctxt *);
 int	verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
@@ -148,8 +171,20 @@ HostStatus
 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
     const char *, const char *);
 
+/* hostkey handling */
+Key	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+Key	*get_hostkey_by_type(int);
+int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
+int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+
+/* debug messages during authentication */
+void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void	 auth_debug_send(void);
+void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
+
 #define AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6
 #define AUTH_FAIL_LOG (AUTH_FAIL_MAX/2)
 #define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
 
+#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nOPIE Password: "
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
index 9611c6d58fee..8d8b5ce4f99f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.35 2002/02/03 17:53:25 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.41 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-#include "misc.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 #include <login_cap.h>
 #include "auth-pam.h"
@@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	    auth_pam_password(authctxt, "")) {
+	    /* XXX PRIVSEP */ auth_pam_password(authctxt, "")) {
 #else
-	    auth_password(authctxt, "")) {
+	    PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) {
 #endif
 		auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
 		return;
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 			if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n))
 				verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
 				    "actual %d, announced %d",
-				     BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
+				    BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
 			packet_check_eom();
 
 			authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user,
@@ -267,10 +267,10 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 			/* Do PAM auth with password */
-			authenticated = auth_pam_password(authctxt, password);
+			authenticated = /* XXX PRIVSEP */ auth_pam_password(authctxt, password);
 #else /* !USE_PAM */
 			/* Try authentication with the password. */
-			authenticated = auth_password(authctxt, password);
+			authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
 			memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
@@ -418,13 +418,12 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
  * Performs authentication of an incoming connection.  Session key has already
  * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
  */
-void
+Authctxt *
 do_authentication(void)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt;
-	struct passwd *pw;
 	u_int ulen;
-	char *p, *user, *style = NULL;
+	char *user, *style = NULL;
 
 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
@@ -436,36 +435,39 @@ do_authentication(void)
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = '\0';
 
+#ifdef KRB5
 	/* XXX - SSH.com Kerberos v5 braindeath. */
-	if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL)
-		*p = '\0';
+	if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_K5USER) &&
+	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
+		char *p;
+		if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL)
+			*p = '\0';
+	}
+#endif
 
 	authctxt = authctxt_new();
 	authctxt->user = user;
 	authctxt->style = style;
 
 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
-	pw = getpwnam(user);
-	if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) {
+	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
 		authctxt->valid = 1;
-		pw = pwcopy(pw);
-	} else {
+	else
 		debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user);
-		pw = NULL;
-	}
-	authctxt->pw = pw;
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (pw != NULL)
-		start_pam(pw);
+	if (authctxt->pw != NULL)
+		start_pam(authctxt->pw);
 #endif
-	setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
+	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->pw ? user : "unknown",
+	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 
 	/*
 	 * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
 	 * the server.
 	 */
-	if (getuid() != 0 && pw && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
+	if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
+	    authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid())
 		packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
 
 	/*
@@ -479,6 +481,5 @@ do_authentication(void)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
-	/* Perform session preparation. */
-	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+	return (authctxt);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
index 34fc8f37d1ed..1db7a811e4b5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.16 2002/01/13 17:57:37 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.18 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
 	packet_put_cstring(name);
 	packet_put_cstring(instr);
-	packet_put_cstring(""); 	/* language not used */
+	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language not used */
 	packet_put_int(numprompts);
 	for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) {
 		packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
@@ -311,3 +311,22 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
 	xfree(method);
 }
+
+void
+privsep_challenge_enable(void)
+{
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device;
+#endif
+	/* As long as SSHv1 has devices[0] hard coded this is fine */
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	devices[0] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef SKEY
+	devices[0] = &mm_skey_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
index 117415da89bc..72fad089bb71 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
@@ -23,35 +23,20 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.85 2002/02/24 19:14:59 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.93 2002/05/31 11:35:15 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "auth.h"
-#include "session.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-#include "match.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 #include <login_cap.h>
@@ -62,14 +47,23 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 extern u_char *session_id2;
 extern int session_id2_len;
 
-static Authctxt	*x_authctxt = NULL;
-static int one = 1;
+Authctxt *x_authctxt = NULL;
+
+/* methods */
 
-typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
-struct Authmethod {
-	char	*name;
-	int	(*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
-	int	*enabled;
+extern Authmethod method_none;
+extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
+extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+
+Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+	&method_none,
+	&method_pubkey,
+	&method_passwd,
+	&method_kbdint,
+	&method_hostbased,
+	NULL
 };
 
 /* protocol */
@@ -80,41 +74,14 @@ static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 /* helper */
 static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
 static char *authmethods_get(void);
-static int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
-static int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
-
-/* auth */
-static void userauth_banner(void);
-static int userauth_none(Authctxt *);
-static int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
-static int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
-static int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
-static int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
-
-Authmethod authmethods[] = {
-	{"none",
-		userauth_none,
-		&one},
-	{"publickey",
-		userauth_pubkey,
-		&options.pubkey_authentication},
-	{"password",
-		userauth_passwd,
-		&options.password_authentication},
-	{"keyboard-interactive",
-		userauth_kbdint,
-		&options.kbd_interactive_authentication},
-	{"hostbased",
-		userauth_hostbased,
-		&options.hostbased_authentication},
-	{NULL, NULL, NULL}
-};
+int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
 
 /*
  * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
  */
 
-void
+Authctxt *
 do_authentication2(void)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = authctxt_new();
@@ -128,7 +95,8 @@ do_authentication2(void)
 	dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
-	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
+	return (authctxt);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -195,23 +163,24 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
 		/* setup auth context */
-		struct passwd *pw = NULL;
-		pw = getpwnam(user);
-		if (pw && allowed_user(pw) && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
-			authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw);
+		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user));
+		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
 			authctxt->valid = 1;
 			debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-			start_pam(pw);
+			start_pam(authctxt->pw);
 #endif
 		} else {
 			log("input_userauth_request: illegal user %s", user);
 			authctxt->pw = NULL;
 		}
-		setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
+		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->pw ? user : "unknown",
+		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
 		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+		if (use_privsep)
+			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
 	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
 		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
@@ -301,289 +270,6 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
 	}
 }
 
-static void
-userauth_banner(void)
-{
-	struct stat st;
-	char *banner = NULL;
-	off_t len, n;
-	int fd;
-
-	if (options.banner == NULL || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER))
-		return;
-	if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
-		return;
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
-		goto done;
-	len = st.st_size;
-	banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
-	if ((n = read(fd, banner, len)) < 0)
-		goto done;
-	banner[n] = '\0';
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
-	packet_put_cstring(banner);
-	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language, unused */
-	packet_send();
-	debug("userauth_banner: sent");
-done:
-	if (banner)
-		xfree(banner);
-	close(fd);
-	return;
-}
-
-static int
-userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	/* disable method "none", only allowed one time */
-	Authmethod *m = authmethod_lookup("none");
-	if (m != NULL)
-		m->enabled = NULL;
-	packet_check_eom();
-	userauth_banner();
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	return authctxt->valid ? auth_pam_password(authctxt, "") : 0;
-#else /* !USE_PAM */
-	return authctxt->valid ? auth_password(authctxt, "") : 0;
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
-}
-
-static int
-userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	char *password;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	int change;
-	u_int len;
-	change = packet_get_char();
-	if (change)
-		log("password change not supported");
-	password = packet_get_string(&len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-	if (authctxt->valid &&
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-	    auth_password(authctxt, password) == 1)
-#else
-	    auth_password(authctxt, password) == 1)
-#endif
-		authenticated = 1;
-	memset(password, 0, len);
-	xfree(password);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-static int
-userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-	char *lang, *devs;
-
-	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	devs = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
-
-	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
-		authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs);
-
-	xfree(devs);
-	xfree(lang);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-static int
-userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	Key *key = NULL;
-	char *pkalg;
-	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
-	u_int alen, blen, slen;
-	int have_sig, pktype;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid) {
-		debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	have_sig = packet_get_char();
-	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
-		debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
-		/* no explicit pkalg given */
-		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
-		buffer_init(&b);
-		buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
-		/* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
-		pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
-		buffer_free(&b);
-	} else {
-		pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
-		pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
-	}
-	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
-	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
-		/* this is perfectly legal */
-		log("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
-		    pkalg);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
-	if (key == NULL) {
-		error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (key->type != pktype) {
-		error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
-		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (have_sig) {
-		sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
-		packet_check_eom();
-		buffer_init(&b);
-		if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
-			buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
-		} else {
-			buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
-		}
-		/* reconstruct packet */
-		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
-		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
-		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
-		    "ssh-userauth" :
-		    authctxt->service);
-		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
-			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-		} else {
-			buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
-			buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-			buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
-		}
-		buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
-		buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
-		/* test for correct signature */
-		if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) &&
-		    key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-			authenticated = 1;
-		buffer_clear(&b);
-		xfree(sig);
-	} else {
-		debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
-		packet_check_eom();
-
-		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
-		/*
-		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
-		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
-		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
-		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
-		 * issue? -markus
-		 */
-		if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) {
-			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
-			packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
-			packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
-			packet_send();
-			packet_write_wait();
-			authctxt->postponed = 1;
-		}
-	}
-	if (authenticated != 1)
-		auth_clear_options();
-done:
-	debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
-	if (key != NULL)
-		key_free(key);
-	xfree(pkalg);
-	xfree(pkblob);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-static int
-userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	Buffer b;
-	Key *key = NULL;
-	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
-	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
-	u_int alen, blen, slen;
-	int pktype;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	if (!authctxt->valid) {
-		debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
-	pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
-	chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
-	sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
-
-	debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
-	    cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
-	debug("signature:");
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
-	buffer_dump(&b);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-#endif
-	pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
-	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
-		/* this is perfectly legal */
-		log("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
-		    "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
-	if (key == NULL) {
-		error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (key->type != pktype) {
-		error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key "
-		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
-		goto done;
-	}
-	service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
-	    authctxt->service;
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
-	/* reconstruct packet */
-	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
-	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
-	buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PK
-	buffer_dump(&b);
-#endif
-	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
-	if (hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key) &&
-	    key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-		authenticated = 1;
-
-	buffer_clear(&b);
-done:
-	debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
-	if (key != NULL)
-		key_free(key);
-	xfree(pkalg);
-	xfree(pkblob);
-	xfree(cuser);
-	xfree(chost);
-	xfree(sig);
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
 /* get current user */
 
 struct passwd*
@@ -597,18 +283,20 @@ auth_get_user(void)
 static char *
 authmethods_get(void)
 {
-	Authmethod *method = NULL;
 	Buffer b;
 	char *list;
+	int i;
 
 	buffer_init(&b);
-	for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
-		if (strcmp(method->name, "none") == 0)
+	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
 			continue;
-		if (method->enabled != NULL && *(method->enabled) != 0) {
+		if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0) {
 			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
 				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-			buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name));
+			buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
+			    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
 		}
 	}
 	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
@@ -620,174 +308,15 @@ authmethods_get(void)
 static Authmethod *
 authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
 {
-	Authmethod *method = NULL;
+	int i;
+
 	if (name != NULL)
-		for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
-			if (method->enabled != NULL &&
-			    *(method->enabled) != 0 &&
-			    strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
-				return method;
-	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
+		for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
+			if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+			    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
+			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0)
+				return authmethods[i];
+	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
+	    name ? name : "NULL");
 	return NULL;
 }
-
-/* return 1 if user allows given key */
-static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
-{
-	char line[8192];
-	int found_key = 0;
-	FILE *f;
-	u_long linenum = 0;
-	struct stat st;
-	Key *found;
-	char *fp;
-
-	if (pw == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
-
-	/* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
-	if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
-		/* Restore the privileged uid. */
-		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
-	}
-	/* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
-	f = fopen(file, "r");
-	if (!f) {
-		/* Restore the privileged uid. */
-		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
-	}
-	if (options.strict_modes &&
-	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
-		fclose(f);
-		log("Authentication refused: %s", line);
-		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	found_key = 0;
-	found = key_new(key->type);
-
-	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
-		char *cp, *options = NULL;
-		linenum++;
-		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-			;
-		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-			continue;
-
-		if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-			/* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
-			int quoted = 0;
-			debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-			options = cp;
-			for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-				if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-					cp++;	/* Skip both */
-				else if (*cp == '"')
-					quoted = !quoted;
-			}
-			/* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-			for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-				;
-			if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-				debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-				/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
-				continue;
-			}
-		}
-		if (key_equal(found, key) &&
-		    auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum) == 1) {
-			found_key = 1;
-			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
-			    file, linenum);
-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
-			    key_type(found), fp);
-			xfree(fp);
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	restore_uid();
-	fclose(f);
-	key_free(found);
-	if (!found_key)
-		debug2("key not found");
-	return found_key;
-}
-
-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
-static int
-user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
-{
-	int success;
-	char *file;
-
-	file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
-	success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
-	xfree(file);
-	if (success)
-		return success;
-
-	/* try suffix "2" for backward compat, too */
-	file = authorized_keys_file2(pw);
-	success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
-	xfree(file);
-	return success;
-}
-
-/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
-static int
-hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
-    Key *key)
-{
-	const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup;
-	HostStatus host_status;
-	int len;
-
-	resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
-	ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-
-	debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
-	    chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
-
-	if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
-		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
-			return 0;
-		lookup = chost;
-	} else {
-		if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
-			debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
-			chost[len - 1] = '\0';
-		}
-		if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
-			log("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
-			    "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
-			    chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
-		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0)
-			return 0;
-		lookup = resolvedname;
-	}
-	debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
-
-	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
-	    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
-	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
-
-	/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
-	if (host_status == HOST_NEW)
-		host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
-		    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
-		    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
-		    _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
-
-	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
-}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
index 35a6a3f057aa..69fa6608ae3f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.48 2002/02/24 19:14:59 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.55 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ int	decode_reply(int type);
 /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
 #define agent_failed(x) \
     ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
-     (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
 
 /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
 
@@ -208,6 +208,26 @@ ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
 	xfree(auth);
 }
 
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+	int type;
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
 /*
  * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
  */
@@ -420,8 +440,6 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 static void
 ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 {
-	buffer_clear(b);
-	buffer_put_char(b, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY);
 	buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
 	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
 	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
@@ -436,8 +454,6 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 static void
 ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
 {
-	buffer_clear(b);
-	buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY);
 	buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA:
@@ -465,19 +481,28 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
+    const char *comment, u_int life)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
-	int type;
+	int type, constrained = (life != 0);
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA1:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
 		ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
 		break;
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_DSA:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
 		ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -485,6 +510,12 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
 		return 0;
 		break;
 	}
+	if (constrained) {
+		if (life != 0) {
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+		}
+	}
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
@@ -494,6 +525,12 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
 	return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
+int
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+	return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0);
+}
+
 /*
  * Removes an identity from the authentication server.  This call is not
  * meant to be used by normal applications.
@@ -533,7 +570,7 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
 }
 
 int
-ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id)
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
 	int type;
@@ -542,6 +579,7 @@ ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id)
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, add ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY :
 	    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
index 80b2fc5de33e..6b632299e604 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.48 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.49 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ fail:
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static Key *
+Key *
 key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
     char **commentp)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
index b7f990900156..17f08552c126 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.22 2002/01/18 18:14:17 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.25 2002/04/20 09:14:58 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -138,10 +138,18 @@ buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 	BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
 	xfree(bin);
 }
-
 /*
- * Returns an integer from the buffer (4 bytes, msb first).
+ * Returns integers from the buffer (msb first).
  */
+
+u_short
+buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+	u_char buf[2];
+	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 2);
+	return GET_16BIT(buf);
+}
+
 u_int
 buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
 {
@@ -159,9 +167,17 @@ buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
 }
 
 /*
- * Stores an integer in the buffer in 4 bytes, msb first.
+ * Stores integers in the buffer, msb first.
  */
 void
+buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
+{
+	char buf[2];
+	PUT_16BIT(buf, value);
+	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2);
+}
+
+void
 buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
 {
 	char buf[4];
@@ -193,7 +209,7 @@ buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
 	/* Get the length. */
 	len = buffer_get_int(buffer);
 	if (len > 256 * 1024)
-		fatal("Received packet with bad string length %d", len);
+		fatal("buffer_get_string: bad string length %d", len);
 	/* Allocate space for the string.  Add one byte for a null character. */
 	value = xmalloc(len + 1);
 	/* Get the string. */
@@ -218,6 +234,8 @@ buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
 void
 buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
 {
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("buffer_put_cstring: s == NULL");
 	buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s));
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
index 2892aaa715fb..b0a0eb6888cd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/canohost.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.31 2002/02/27 21:23:13 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.32 2002/06/11 08:11:45 itojun Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -43,13 +43,14 @@ get_remote_hostname(int socket, int verify_reverse_mapping)
 		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
-		check_ip_options(socket, ntop);
 
 	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
 	    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
 		fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
 
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
+		check_ip_options(socket, ntop);
+
 	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
 	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
 	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
index 9fea66079e8d..00cf29d03851 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.171 2002/03/04 19:37:58 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.175 2002/06/10 22:28:41 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "channels.h"
@@ -130,10 +129,6 @@ static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
 
 #define	NUM_SOCKS	10
 
-/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
-static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
-static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
-
 /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
 int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
 
@@ -707,7 +702,11 @@ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 		if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
 			FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
 		} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
-			chan_obuf_empty(c);
+			if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+			       debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+				   c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+			else
+				chan_obuf_empty(c);
 		}
 	}
 	/** XXX check close conditions, too */
@@ -715,7 +714,8 @@ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
 		    buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
 			FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
-		else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
+		else if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
 		    buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window)
 			FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
 	}
@@ -1633,12 +1633,18 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
 				fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3");
 			/*
 			 * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
-			 * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF
+			 * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF.
+			 * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use.
 			 */
-			chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+			if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+			       debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)",
+				   c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended));
+			else
+				chan_ibuf_empty(c);
 		}
 		/* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
 		if (compat20 &&
+		    !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
 		    c->remote_window > 0 &&
 		    (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 &&
 		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) {
@@ -1727,6 +1733,13 @@ channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		log("channel %d: ext data for non open", id);
 		return;
 	}
+	if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
+		if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
+			debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id);
+		else
+			packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF "
+			    "on channel %d.", id);
+	}
 	tcode = packet_get_int();
 	if (c->efd == -1 ||
 	    c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
@@ -2109,7 +2122,7 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short listen_port,
 		const char *address_to_bind = "0.0.0.0";
 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
 		packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward");
-		packet_put_char(0);			/* boolean: want reply */
+		packet_put_char(1);			/* boolean: want reply */
 		packet_put_cstring(address_to_bind);
 		packet_put_int(listen_port);
 		packet_send();
@@ -2655,105 +2668,6 @@ auth_request_forwarding(void)
 	packet_write_wait();
 }
 
-/*
- * Returns the name of the forwarded authentication socket.  Returns NULL if
- * there is no forwarded authentication socket.  The returned value points to
- * a static buffer.
- */
-
-char *
-auth_get_socket_name(void)
-{
-	return auth_sock_name;
-}
-
-/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
-
-void
-auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *_pw)
-{
-	struct passwd *pw = _pw;
-
-	if (auth_sock_name) {
-		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-		unlink(auth_sock_name);
-		rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
-		auth_sock_name = NULL;
-		restore_uid();
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * This is called to process SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING on the server.
- * This starts forwarding authentication requests.
- */
-
-int
-auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
-{
-	Channel *nc;
-	int sock;
-	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-
-	if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL) {
-		error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-	/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
-	auth_sock_name = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-	auth_sock_dir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-	strlcpy(auth_sock_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
-
-	/* Create private directory for socket */
-	if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
-		packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
-		    "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-		restore_uid();
-		xfree(auth_sock_name);
-		xfree(auth_sock_dir);
-		auth_sock_name = NULL;
-		auth_sock_dir = NULL;
-		return 0;
-	}
-	snprintf(auth_sock_name, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/agent.%d",
-		 auth_sock_dir, (int) getpid());
-
-	/* delete agent socket on fatal() */
-	fatal_add_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw);
-
-	/* Create the socket. */
-	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-	if (sock < 0)
-		packet_disconnect("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
-	/* Bind it to the name. */
-	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
-	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-
-	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
-		packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
-	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
-	restore_uid();
-
-	/* Start listening on the socket. */
-	if (listen(sock, 5) < 0)
-		packet_disconnect("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
-	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
-	nc = channel_new("auth socket",
-	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
-	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
-	    0, xstrdup("auth socket"), 1);
-	strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path));
-	return 1;
-}
-
 /* This is called to process an SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN message. */
 
 void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
index 942573929e1a..12876d3eb36a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.65 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.68 2002/06/10 22:28:41 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ struct Channel {
 
 #define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT			0x01
 #define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD			0x02
+#define CHAN_EOF_SENT			0x04
+#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD			0x08
+
+/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+	(compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
+	(c->efd != -1 || \
+	buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+	(compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
+	((c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) || \
+	buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0))
 
 /* channel management */
 
@@ -202,8 +214,6 @@ void	 deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 /* agent forwarding */
 
 void	 auth_request_forwarding(void);
-char	*auth_get_socket_name(void);
-int	 auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd *);
 void	 auth_input_open_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 /* channel close */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
index 806c5c1ddda1..0892423bed20 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.52 2002/02/18 13:05:32 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.59 2002/06/19 18:01:00 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -43,18 +43,20 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "cipher.h"
 
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include "rijndael.h"
 
-static EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
-static EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
-static EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+#include "rijndael.h"
+static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
+#endif
+static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
 
 struct Cipher {
 	char	*name;
 	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
 	u_int	block_size;
 	u_int	key_len;
-	EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
+	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
 } ciphers[] = {
 	{ "none", 		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, EVP_enc_null },
 	{ "des", 		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, EVP_des_cbc },
@@ -65,25 +67,40 @@ struct Cipher {
 	{ "blowfish-cbc", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_bf_cbc },
 	{ "cast128-cbc", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_cast5_cbc },
 	{ "arcfour", 		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_rc4 },
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
 	{ "aes128-cbc", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, evp_rijndael },
 	{ "aes192-cbc", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, evp_rijndael },
 	{ "aes256-cbc", 	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_rijndael },
+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_rijndael },
+#else
+	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+#endif
 
 	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL, 0, 0, NULL }
 };
 
 /*--*/
 
-u_int	
+u_int
 cipher_blocksize(Cipher *c)
 {
 	return (c->block_size);
 }
-u_int	
+u_int
 cipher_keylen(Cipher *c)
 {
 	return (c->key_len);
 }
+u_int
+cipher_get_number(Cipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->number);
+}
 
 u_int
 cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
@@ -334,7 +351,7 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	}
 	return (1);
 }
-static EVP_CIPHER *
+static const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_3des(void)
 {
 	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des;
@@ -384,7 +401,7 @@ bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in, u_int len)
 	swap_bytes(out, out, len);
 	return (ret);
 }
-static EVP_CIPHER *
+static const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_bf(void)
 {
 	static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_bf;
@@ -397,6 +414,7 @@ evp_ssh1_bf(void)
 	return (&ssh1_bf);
 }
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
 /* RIJNDAEL */
 #define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
 struct ssh_rijndael_ctx
@@ -482,7 +500,7 @@ ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	}
 	return (1);
 }
-static EVP_CIPHER *
+static const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_rijndael(void)
 {
 	static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc;
@@ -499,3 +517,155 @@ evp_rijndael(void)
 	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT;
 	return (&rijndal_cbc);
 }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+
+int
+cipher_get_keyiv_len(CipherContext *cc)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int ivlen;
+
+	if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+		ivlen = 24;
+	else
+		ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+	return (ivlen);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	u_char *civ = NULL;
+	int evplen;
+
+	switch (c->number) {
+	case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+		evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+		if (evplen == 0)
+			return;
+		if (evplen != len)
+			fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
+			    evplen, len);
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) {
+			struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *aesc;
+
+			aesc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
+			if (aesc == NULL)
+				fatal("%s: no rijndael context", __func__);
+			civ = aesc->r_iv;
+		} else
+#endif
+		{
+			civ = cc->evp.iv;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: {
+		struct ssh1_3des_ctx *desc;
+		if (len != 24)
+			fatal("%s: bad 3des iv length: %d", __func__, len);
+		desc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
+		if (desc == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
+		debug3("%s: Copying 3DES IV", __func__);
+		memcpy(iv, desc->k1.iv, 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 8, desc->k2.iv, 8);
+		memcpy(iv + 16, desc->k3.iv, 8);
+		return;
+	}
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
+	}
+	memcpy(iv, civ, len);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	u_char *div = NULL;
+	int evplen = 0;
+
+	switch (c->number) {
+	case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+		evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+		if (evplen == 0)
+			return;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+		if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) {
+			struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *aesc;
+
+			aesc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
+			if (aesc == NULL)
+				fatal("%s: no rijndael context", __func__);
+			div = aesc->r_iv;
+		} else
+#endif
+		{
+			div = cc->evp.iv;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: {
+		struct ssh1_3des_ctx *desc;
+		desc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
+		if (desc == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__);
+		debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__);
+		memcpy(desc->k1.iv, iv, 8);
+		memcpy(desc->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8);
+		memcpy(desc->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8);
+		return;
+	}
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number);
+	}
+	memcpy(div, iv, evplen);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	&(evp).c
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	sizeof((evp).c)
+#else
+#define EVP_X_STATE(evp)	(evp).cipher_data
+#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp)	(evp).cipher->ctx_size
+#endif
+
+int
+cipher_get_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int plen = 0;
+
+	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
+		plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
+		if (dat == NULL)
+			return (plen);
+		memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen);
+	}
+	return (plen);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat)
+{
+	Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int plen;
+
+	if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) {
+		plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp);
+		memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
index 8aa5982102cc..3847bda8ae3e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.32 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.33 2002/03/18 17:13:15 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -82,4 +82,11 @@ void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
 void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
 u_int	 cipher_blocksize(Cipher *);
 u_int	 cipher_keylen(Cipher *);
+
+u_int	 cipher_get_number(Cipher *);
+void	 cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int);
+void	 cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *);
+int	 cipher_get_keyiv_len(CipherContext *);
+int	 cipher_get_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
+void	 cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
 #endif				/* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.c b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
index 576943277e78..3344dd608968 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.61 2002/03/06 00:24:39 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.63 2002/04/10 08:21:47 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -62,20 +62,26 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "OpenSSH-2.1*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.1*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.2*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER|
-					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.3.0*",	SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|
-					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY},
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.3.*",	SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
-					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY},
+					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*",
 					SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
-					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+					SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.0*,"
 		  "OpenSSH_2.5.1*,"
-		  "OpenSSH_2.5.2*",	SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
-		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.3*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
-		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+		  "OpenSSH_2.5.2*",	SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|
+					SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.5.3*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
+		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
 		{ "OpenSSH*",		0 },
 		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
 		{ "2.1.0*",		SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
@@ -122,8 +128,12 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
 		  "1.2.19*,"
 		  "1.2.20*,"
 		  "1.2.21*,"
-		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
-		{ "1.3.2*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },	/* f-secure */
+		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG|SSH_BUG_K5USER },
+		{ "1.3.2*",		/* F-Secure */
+					SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG|SSH_BUG_K5USER },
+		{ "1.2.1*,"
+		  "1.2.2*,"
+		  "1.2.3*",		SSH_BUG_K5USER },
 		{ "*SSH Compatible Server*",			/* Netscreen */
 					SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
 		{ "*OSU_0*,"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/compat.h b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
index 82acc5b6e5ce..a0d25345af1c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/compat.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/compat.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.30 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.32 2002/04/10 08:21:47 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
 #define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE	0x00020000
 #define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY	0x00040000
 #define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN	0x00100000
+#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
+#define SSH_BUG_K5USER		0x00400000
 
 void     enable_compat13(void);
 void     enable_compat20(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c
index 05780ab082bd..610ce4ad2697 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.41 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.44 2002/05/31 13:16:48 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -780,6 +780,10 @@ key_sign(
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature
+ * and -1 on error.
+ */
 int
 key_verify(
     Key *key,
@@ -802,3 +806,46 @@ key_verify(
 		break;
 	}
 }
+
+/* Converts a private to a public key */
+
+Key *
+key_demote(Key *k)
+{
+	Key *pk;
+
+	pk = xmalloc(sizeof(*pk));
+	pk->type = k->type;
+	pk->flags = k->flags;
+	pk->dsa = NULL;
+	pk->rsa = NULL;
+
+	switch (k->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA1:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
+		if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+			fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return (pk);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index 4957be9cd07a..c37da1921cd7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -26,11 +26,12 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.16 2002/06/21 05:50:51 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 
 #ifdef SKEY
-#include <skey.h>
+#include <opie.h>
 #endif
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -656,11 +657,11 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
 {
-	struct skey skey;
+	struct opie opie;
 	char challenge[1024];
 	int res;
 
-	res = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge);
+	res = opiechallenge(&opie, authctxt->user, challenge);
 
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	buffer_put_int(m, res);
@@ -683,8 +684,8 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
 
 	authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
 	    authctxt->valid &&
-	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
-	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
+	    opie_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+	    opie_passverify(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
 
 	xfree(response);
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
index ca2c25964117..372ac7e17d63 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.13 2002/01/21 22:30:12 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.14 2002/04/03 09:26:11 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	"ssh-dss,ssh-rsa"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
 	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour," \
-	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc"
+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
 #define	KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
 	"hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160," \
 	"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
index deaf81cb7bc3..a97d082784d7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.33 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.35 2002/06/19 18:01:00 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ int      packet_get_connection_in(void);
 int      packet_get_connection_out(void);
 void     packet_close(void);
 void	 packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *, u_int, int);
+u_int	 packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *);
 void     packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int);
 u_int	 packet_get_protocol_flags(void);
 void     packet_start_compression(int);
@@ -57,6 +58,16 @@ void	*packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
 void     packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 
+void	 set_newkeys(int mode);
+int	 packet_get_keyiv_len(int);
+void	 packet_get_keyiv(int, u_char *, u_int);
+int	 packet_get_keycontext(int, u_char *);
+void	 packet_set_keycontext(int, u_char *);
+u_int32_t packet_get_seqnr(int);
+void	 packet_set_seqnr(int, u_int32_t);
+int	 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void);
+void	 packet_set_iv(int, u_char *);
+
 void     packet_write_poll(void);
 void     packet_write_wait(void);
 int      packet_have_data_to_write(void);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
index 6f4dfc178889..2c3989ca0a58 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/pathnames.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.11 2002/02/09 17:37:34 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.13 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@
  */
 #define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT	"/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass"
 
+/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
+#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN	 	"/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
+
 /* xauth for X11 forwarding */
 #define _PATH_XAUTH			"/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth"
 
@@ -120,3 +123,6 @@
 /* for sftp */
 #define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER		"/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
 #define _PATH_LS			"ls"
+
+/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
+#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR	"/var/empty"
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
index e1eb46931609..ca5b27ffaaec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.95 2002/02/04 12:15:25 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.100 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
    # that they are given in.
 
    Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
-     FallBackToRsh no
+     User foo
 
    Host fake.com
      HostName another.host.name.real.org
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
      ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
 
    Host *.fr
-     UseRsh yes
+     PublicKeyAuthentication no
 
    Host *.su
      Cipher none
@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
      PasswordAuthentication yes
      RSAAuthentication yes
      RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
-     FallBackToRsh no
-     UseRsh no
      StrictHostKeyChecking yes
      KeepAlives no
      IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
@@ -95,7 +93,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 typedef enum {
 	oBadOption,
 	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oGatewayPorts, oRhostsAuthentication,
-	oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oFallBackToRsh, oUseRsh,
+	oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
 	oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
 #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	oKerberosAuthentication,
@@ -117,7 +115,8 @@ typedef enum {
 	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
 	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice,
 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
-	oVersionAddendum
+	oVersionAddendum,
+	oDeprecated
 } OpCodes;
 
 /* Textual representations of the tokens. */
@@ -152,8 +151,8 @@ static struct {
 #ifdef AFS
 	{ "afstokenpassing", oAFSTokenPassing },
 #endif
-	{ "fallbacktorsh", oFallBackToRsh },
-	{ "usersh", oUseRsh },
+	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
 	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* alias */
 	{ "hostname", oHostName },
@@ -374,14 +373,6 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
 		goto parse_flag;
 #endif
-	case oFallBackToRsh:
-		intptr = &options->fallback_to_rsh;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
-	case oUseRsh:
-		intptr = &options->use_rsh;
-		goto parse_flag;
-
 	case oBatchMode:
 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -686,6 +677,11 @@ parse_int:
 		} while (arg != NULL && *arg != '\0');
 		break;
 
+	case oDeprecated:
+		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		return 0;
+
 	default:
 		fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode);
 	}
@@ -773,8 +769,6 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
 	options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
 	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
-	options->fallback_to_rsh = -1;
-	options->use_rsh = -1;
 	options->batch_mode = -1;
 	options->check_host_ip = -1;
 	options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
@@ -830,7 +824,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
 		options->use_privileged_port = 0;
 	if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
-		options->rhosts_authentication = 1;
+		options->rhosts_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
 		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
@@ -854,13 +848,9 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
-		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 1;
+		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
 		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
-	if (options->fallback_to_rsh == -1)
-		options->fallback_to_rsh = 0;
-	if (options->use_rsh == -1)
-		options->use_rsh = 0;
 	if (options->batch_mode == -1)
 		options->batch_mode = 0;
 	if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
index c310137a2afb..9d326229508e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.42 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.43 2002/06/08 05:17:01 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -55,8 +55,6 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * authentication. */
 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
 	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
-	int     fallback_to_rsh;/* Use rsh if cannot connect with ssh. */
-	int     use_rsh;	/* Always use rsh (don\'t try ssh). */
 	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
 	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
 	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index 1cf7f9d90e6d..415ecca28d72 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.101 2002/02/04 12:15:25 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.111 2002/06/20 23:05:55 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #if defined(KRB4)
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
 
 /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
 extern int IPv4or6;
+/* Use of privilege separation or not */
+extern int use_privsep;
 
 /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
 
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
 	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 	options->use_login = -1;
+	options->compression = -1;
 	options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
 	options->num_allow_users = 0;
 	options->num_deny_users = 0;
@@ -111,6 +114,9 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->authorized_keys_file = NULL;
 	options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL;
 	options->check_mail = -1;
+
+	/* Needs to be accessable in many places */
+	use_privsep = -1;
 }
 
 void
@@ -205,7 +211,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 #endif
 #ifdef AFS
 	if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
-		options->afs_token_passing = k_hasafs();
+		options->afs_token_passing = 0;
 #endif
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
@@ -217,6 +223,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
 	if (options->use_login == -1)
 		options->use_login = 0;
+	if (options->compression == -1)
+		options->compression = 1;
 	if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
 		options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1;
 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
@@ -242,6 +250,10 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	}
 	if (options->authorized_keys_file == NULL)
 		options->authorized_keys_file = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS;
+
+	/* Turn privilege separation off by default */
+	if (use_privsep == -1)
+		use_privsep = 0;
 }
 
 /* Keyword tokens. */
@@ -264,13 +276,14 @@ typedef enum {
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 	sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sKeepAlives,
-	sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding,
+	sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
 	sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups,
 	sBanner, sVerifyReverseMapping, sHostbasedAuthentication,
 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+	sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
 	sCheckMail, sVersionAddendum,
 	sDeprecated
 } ServerOpCodes;
@@ -324,6 +337,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes },
 	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd },
 	{ "uselogin", sUseLogin },
+	{ "compression", sCompression },
 	{ "keepalive", sKeepAlives },
 	{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding },
 	{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers },
@@ -343,6 +357,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile },
 	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2 },
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation},
 	{ "checkmail", sCheckMail },
 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum },
 	{ NULL, sBadOption }
@@ -681,6 +696,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->use_login;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case sCompression:
+		intptr = &options->compression;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case sGatewayPorts:
 		intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
 		goto parse_flag;
@@ -715,6 +734,10 @@ parse_flag:
 		intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
+		intptr = &use_privsep;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case sAllowUsers:
 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
index d5bf6bea1142..862832ab69f2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.54 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.58 2002/06/20 23:05:55 markus Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
 					 * passwords. */
 	int     use_login;	/* If true, login(1) is used */
+	int     compression;	/* If true, compression is allowed */
 	int	allow_tcp_forwarding;
 	u_int num_allow_users;
 	char   *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS];
@@ -132,7 +133,6 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	char   *authorized_keys_file;	/* File containing public keys */
 	char   *authorized_keys_file2;
-
 }       ServerOptions;
 
 void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index c5731d4d3f1e..921005082e21 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.98 2002/02/06 14:55:16 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.102 2002/06/11 05:46:20 mpech Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -319,9 +319,6 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
 		tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000);
 		tvp = &tv;
 	}
-	if (tvp!=NULL)
-		debug3("tvp!=NULL kid %d mili %d", (int) child_terminated,
-		    max_time_milliseconds);
 
 	/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
 	ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
@@ -674,12 +671,12 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
 	/* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
 	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
 
-	wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0);
-	if (wait_pid == -1)
-		packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	else if (wait_pid != pid)
-		error("Strange, wait returned pid %d, expected %d",
-		    wait_pid, pid);
+	while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	if (wait_pid != pid)
+		error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld",
+		    (long)wait_pid, (long)pid);
 
 	/* Check if it exited normally. */
 	if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
@@ -727,8 +724,10 @@ collect_children(void)
 	sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
 	sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
 	if (child_terminated) {
-		while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0)
-			session_close_by_pid(pid, status);
+		while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+		    (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
+			if (pid > 0)
+				session_close_by_pid(pid, status);
 		child_terminated = 0;
 	}
 	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
@@ -785,7 +784,7 @@ server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	channel_free_all();
 
 	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
-	session_destroy_all();
+	session_destroy_all(NULL);
 }
 
 static void
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index eddcf6c6a34c..2992794623d2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.128 2002/02/16 00:51:44 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.138 2002/06/20 23:05:55 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "serverloop.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "session.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 #ifdef __FreeBSD__
 #define _PATH_CHPASS "/usr/bin/passwd"
@@ -69,39 +70,11 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <login_cap.h>
 #endif
 
-/* types */
-
-#define TTYSZ 64
-typedef struct Session Session;
-struct Session {
-	int	used;
-	int	self;
-	struct passwd *pw;
-	Authctxt *authctxt;
-	pid_t	pid;
-	/* tty */
-	char	*term;
-	int	ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
-	int	row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
-	char	tty[TTYSZ];
-	/* X11 */
-	int	display_number;
-	char	*display;
-	int	screen;
-	char	*auth_display;
-	char	*auth_proto;
-	char	*auth_data;
-	int	single_connection;
-	/* proto 2 */
-	int	chanid;
-	int	is_subsystem;
-};
-
 /* func */
 
 Session *session_new(void);
 void	session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int);
-static void	session_pty_cleanup(void *);
+void	session_pty_cleanup(void *);
 void	session_proctitle(Session *);
 int	session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
 void	do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
@@ -115,7 +88,6 @@ int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
 static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
 static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
 
-static void session_close(Session *);
 static int session_pty_req(Session *);
 
 /* import */
@@ -135,9 +107,96 @@ const char *original_command = NULL;
 Session	sessions[MAX_SESSIONS];
 
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-static login_cap_t *lc;
+login_cap_t *lc;
 #endif
 
+/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+
+/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
+
+static void
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *_pw)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw = _pw;
+
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+		unlink(auth_sock_name);
+		rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+		auth_sock_name = NULL;
+		restore_uid();
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	int sock;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+		error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
+	auth_sock_name = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+	auth_sock_dir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+	strlcpy(auth_sock_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
+
+	/* Create private directory for socket */
+	if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
+		packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
+		    "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		xfree(auth_sock_name);
+		xfree(auth_sock_dir);
+		auth_sock_name = NULL;
+		auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	snprintf(auth_sock_name, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/agent.%ld",
+		 auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
+
+	/* delete agent socket on fatal() */
+	fatal_add_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw);
+
+	/* Create the socket. */
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		packet_disconnect("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Bind it to the name. */
+	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
+		packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	/* Start listening on the socket. */
+	if (listen(sock, 5) < 0)
+		packet_disconnect("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
+	nc = channel_new("auth socket",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, xstrdup("auth socket"), 1);
+	strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path));
+	return 1;
+}
+
+
 void
 do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
@@ -150,18 +209,6 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		close(startup_pipe);
 		startup_pipe = -1;
 	}
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-	if ((lc = login_getpwclass(authctxt->pw)) == NULL) {
-		error("unable to get login class");
-		return;
-	}
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-	if (auth_approval(NULL, lc, authctxt->pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
-		packet_disconnect("Approval failure for %s",
-		    authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-	}
-#endif
-#endif
 	/* setup the channel layer */
 	if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
 		channel_permit_all_opens();
@@ -172,7 +219,7 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		do_authenticated1(authctxt);
 
 	/* remove agent socket */
-	if (auth_get_socket_name())
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
 		auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
 #ifdef KRB4
 	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
@@ -223,6 +270,10 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 				    compression_level);
 				break;
 			}
+			if (!options.compression) {
+				debug2("compression disabled");
+				break;
+			}
 			/* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
 			enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
 			success = 1;
@@ -379,7 +430,7 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 void
 do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
 {
-	int pid;
+	pid_t pid;
 
 #ifdef USE_PIPES
 	int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
@@ -603,22 +654,13 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 void
 do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 {
-	FILE *f;
 #ifndef USE_PAM
 	char *time_string;
-	char *newcommand = NULL;
 #endif
-	char buf[256];
-#ifndef USE_PAM
-	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
 	socklen_t fromlen;
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
-	time_t last_login_time;
-#endif
 	struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
-#ifndef USE_PAM
 	pid_t pid = getpid();
-#endif
 #ifdef __FreeBSD__
 #define DEFAULT_WARN  (2L * 7L * 86400L)  /* Two weeks */
 	struct timeval tv;
@@ -644,20 +686,6 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 	}
 #endif
 
-#ifndef USE_PAM
-	/* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */
-	if (options.print_lastlog) {
-		hostname[0] = '\0';
-		last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
-		    hostname, sizeof(hostname));
-	}
-
-	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
-	record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
-	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from);
-#endif
-
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	/*
 	 * If password change is needed, do it now.
@@ -729,6 +757,13 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 	}
 #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
 
+	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+		    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+		    options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (command == NULL && options.print_lastlog &&
 	    !check_quietlogin(s, command) &&
@@ -745,22 +780,27 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 */
 
 	if (command == NULL && options.print_lastlog &&
-	    last_login_time != 0 && !check_quietlogin(s, command) &&
+	    s->last_login_time != 0 && !check_quietlogin(s, command) &&
 	    !options.use_login) {
-		time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
+		time_string = ctime(&s->last_login_time);
 		if (strchr(time_string, '\n'))
 			*strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0;
-		if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
+		if (strcmp(s->hostname, "") == 0)
 			printf("Last login: %s\r\n", time_string);
 		else
-			printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname);
+			printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string,
+			    s->hostname);
 	}
 #endif /* !USE_PAM */
 
 	if (command == NULL && !check_quietlogin(s, command) &&
 	    !options.use_login) {
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-		const char *fname = login_getcapstr(lc, "copyright", NULL, NULL);
+		const char *fname;
+		char buf[256];
+		FILE *f;
+
+		fname = login_getcapstr(lc, "copyright", NULL, NULL);
 		if (fname != NULL && (f = fopen(fname, "r")) != NULL) {
 			while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL)
 				fputs(buf, stdout);
@@ -1033,9 +1073,9 @@ do_setup_env(char **env, Session *s, const char *shell)
 	do_pam_environment(&env, &envsize);
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
-	if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL)
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
-		    auth_get_socket_name());
+		    auth_sock_name);
 
 	/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
 	if (!options.use_login) {
@@ -1099,7 +1139,7 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
 		/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
 		if (debug_flag) {
 			fprintf(stderr,
-			    "Running %.100s add "
+			    "Running %.500s add "
 			    "%.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
 			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
 			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
@@ -1143,11 +1183,10 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
 }
 
 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
-static char **
-do_setusercontext(Session *s)
+void
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	char **env = NULL;
-	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 	char buf[256];
 	char **tmpenv;
@@ -1170,9 +1209,6 @@ do_setusercontext(Session *s)
 	if (getenv("TZ"))
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
 
-	if (s->term)
-		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
-
 	/* Save parent environment */
 	tmpenv = environ;
 	/* Switch to env */
@@ -1207,7 +1243,21 @@ do_setusercontext(Session *s)
 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
 		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
 #endif  /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
-	return env;
+	return;
+}
+
+static void
+launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname)
+{
+	/* Launch login(1). */
+
+	execl("/usr/bin/login", "login", "-h", hostname,
+	    "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+
+	/* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
+
+	perror("login");
+	exit(1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1242,7 +1292,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	 */
 	if (!options.use_login) {
 		do_nologin(pw);
-		env = do_setusercontext(s);
+		do_setusercontext(pw);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1336,15 +1386,8 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 	signal(SIGPIPE,  SIG_DFL);
 
 	if (options.use_login) {
-		/* Launch login(1). */
-
-		execl("/usr/bin/login", "login", "-h", hostname,
-		    "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-
-		/* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
-
-		perror("login");
-		exit(1);
+		launch_login(pw, hostname);
+		/* NEVERREACHED */
 	}
 
 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
@@ -1450,12 +1493,12 @@ session_dump(void)
 	int i;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
 		Session *s = &sessions[i];
-		debug("dump: used %d session %d %p channel %d pid %d",
+		debug("dump: used %d session %d %p channel %d pid %ld",
 		    s->used,
 		    s->self,
 		    s,
 		    s->chanid,
-		    s->pid);
+		    (long)s->pid);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1477,6 +1520,22 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+Session *
+session_by_tty(char *tty)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
+			debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
+			return s;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static Session *
 session_by_channel(int id)
 {
@@ -1497,13 +1556,13 @@ static Session *
 session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
 {
 	int i;
-	debug("session_by_pid: pid %d", pid);
+	debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
 		Session *s = &sessions[i];
 		if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
 			return s;
 	}
-	error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %d", pid);
+	error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
 	session_dump();
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1534,6 +1593,12 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
 		packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
 		return 0;
 	}
+	/* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */
+	if (options.print_lastlog) {
+		s->hostname[0] = '\0';
+		s->last_login_time = get_last_login_time(s->pw->pw_uid,
+		    s->pw->pw_name, s->hostname, sizeof(s->hostname));
+	}
 
 	s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
 
@@ -1554,7 +1619,7 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
 
 	/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
 	debug("Allocating pty.");
-	if (!pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty))) {
+	if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)))) {
 		if (s->term)
 			xfree(s->term);
 		s->term = NULL;
@@ -1575,7 +1640,8 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
 	 * time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed).
 	 */
 	fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
-	pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
 
 	/* Set window size from the packet. */
 	pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
@@ -1738,8 +1804,8 @@ session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr)
  * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
  * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
  */
-static void
-session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
+void
+session_pty_cleanup2(void *session)
 {
 	Session *s = session;
 
@@ -1757,7 +1823,8 @@ session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
 		record_logout(s->pid, s->tty);
 
 	/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
-	pty_release(s->tty);
+	if (getuid() == 0)
+		pty_release(s->tty);
 
 	/*
 	 * Close the server side of the socket pairs.  We must do this after
@@ -1765,12 +1832,18 @@ session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
 	 * while we're still cleaning up.
 	 */
 	if (close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
-		error("close(s->ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno));
+		error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
 
 	/* unlink pty from session */
 	s->ttyfd = -1;
 }
 
+void
+session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
+{
+	PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(session));
+}
+
 static void
 session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
 {
@@ -1779,8 +1852,8 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
 	if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL)
 		fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
 		    s->self, s->chanid);
-	debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %d",
-	    s->self, s->chanid, s->pid);
+	debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
+	    s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
 
 	if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
 		channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
@@ -1812,10 +1885,10 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
 	s->chanid = -1;
 }
 
-static void
+void
 session_close(Session *s)
 {
-	debug("session_close: session %d pid %d", s->self, s->pid);
+	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
 		fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
@@ -1839,7 +1912,8 @@ session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status)
 {
 	Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
 	if (s == NULL) {
-		debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %d", pid);
+		debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld",
+		    (long)pid);
 		return;
 	}
 	if (s->chanid != -1)
@@ -1859,7 +1933,8 @@ session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
 		debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
 		return;
 	}
-	debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %d", id, s->pid);
+	debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld",
+	    id, (long)s->pid);
 	if (s->pid != 0) {
 		debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id);
 		/*
@@ -1879,13 +1954,17 @@ session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
 }
 
 void
-session_destroy_all(void)
+session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *))
 {
 	int i;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
 		Session *s = &sessions[i];
-		if (s->used)
-			session_close(s);
+		if (s->used) {
+			if (closefunc != NULL)
+				closefunc(s);
+			else
+				session_close(s);
+		}
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
index 526a187a0373..3680c0628d77 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.50 2002/01/29 14:27:57 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.61 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "readpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 
 /* argv0 */
 extern char *__progname;
@@ -57,10 +58,12 @@ extern char *__progname;
 static char *default_files[] = {
 	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
 	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
-	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
 	NULL
 };
 
+/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
 
 /* we keep a cache of one passphrases */
 static char *pass = NULL;
@@ -156,11 +159,19 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
 			strlcpy(msg, "Bad passphrase, try again: ", sizeof msg);
 		}
 	}
-	if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) {
+
+	if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
 		ret = 0;
-	} else
+		if (lifetime != 0)
+                        fprintf(stderr,
+			    "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+	} else if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+		ret = 0;
+	} else {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
+	}
 
 	xfree(comment);
 	key_free(private);
@@ -171,7 +182,13 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
 static int
 update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
 {
-	if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id)) {
+	char *pin;
+
+	pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for smartcard: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (pin == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin)) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
 		    add ? "added" : "removed", id);
 		return 0;
@@ -218,6 +235,34 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
 }
 
 static int
+lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock)
+{
+	char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
+	int passok = 1, ret = -1;
+
+	strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
+	p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (lock) {
+		strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
+		p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
+			passok = 0;
+		}
+		memset(p2, 0, strlen(p2));
+		xfree(p2);
+	}
+	if (passok && ssh_lock_agent(ac, lock, p1)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+		ret = 0;
+	} else
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+	memset(p1, 0, strlen(p1));
+	xfree(p1);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
 do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, char *file)
 {
 	if (deleting) {
@@ -239,6 +284,9 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -L          List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -d          Delete identity.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -D          Delete all identities.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Lock agent.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Unlock agent.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -t life     Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n");
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -s reader   Add key in smartcard reader.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -e reader   Remove key in smartcard reader.\n");
@@ -262,7 +310,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
 		exit(2);
 	}
-	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLdDe:s:")) != -1) {
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'l':
 		case 'L':
@@ -270,6 +318,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 				ret = 1;
 			goto done;
 			break;
+		case 'x':
+		case 'X':
+			if (lock_agent(ac, ch == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+			break;
 		case 'd':
 			deleting = 1;
 			break;
@@ -285,6 +339,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			deleting = 1;
 			sc_reader_id = optarg;
 			break;
+		case 't':
+			if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+				ret = 1;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			break;
 		default:
 			usage();
 			ret = 1;
@@ -301,6 +362,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (argc == 0) {
 		char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
 		struct passwd *pw;
+		struct stat st;
+		int count = 0;
 
 		if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
 			fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
@@ -310,11 +373,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 
 		for(i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
-			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, 
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
 			    default_files[i]);
+			if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+				continue;
 			if (do_file(ac, deleting, buf) == -1)
 				ret = 1;
+			else
+				count++;
 		}
+		if (count == 0)
+			ret = 1;
 	} else {
 		for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
 			if (do_file(ac, deleting, argv[i]) == -1)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index 07df7476b983..4fc0f23e9e0d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #include <sys/queue.h>
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.82 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.95 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "log.h"
 
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
 #include "scard.h"
 #endif
 
@@ -68,6 +67,7 @@ typedef struct {
 	sock_type type;
 	Buffer input;
 	Buffer output;
+	Buffer request;
 } SocketEntry;
 
 u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ typedef struct identity {
 	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
 	Key *key;
 	char *comment;
+	u_int death;
 } Identity;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -96,6 +97,10 @@ pid_t parent_pid = -1;
 char socket_name[1024];
 char socket_dir[1024];
 
+/* locking */
+int locked = 0;
+char *lock_passwd = NULL;
+
 extern char *__progname;
 
 static void
@@ -117,6 +122,14 @@ idtab_lookup(int version)
 	return &idtable[version];
 }
 
+static void
+free_identity(Identity *id)
+{
+	key_free(id->key);
+	xfree(id->comment);
+	xfree(id);
+}
+
 /* return matching private key for given public key */
 static Identity *
 lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
@@ -131,14 +144,6 @@ lookup_identity(Key *key, int version)
 	return (NULL);
 }
 
-static void
-free_identity(Identity *id)
-{
-	key_free(id->key);
-	xfree(id->comment);
-	xfree(id);
-}
-
 /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
 static void
 process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
@@ -188,16 +193,16 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("process_authentication_challenge1: BN_new failed");
 
-	buffer_get_int(&e->input);				/* ignored */
-	buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e);
-	buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n);
-	buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, challenge);
+	buffer_get_int(&e->request);				/* ignored */
+	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
+	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, challenge);
 
 	/* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
-	if (buffer_len(&e->input) == 0)
+	if (buffer_len(&e->request) == 0)
 		goto failure;
-	buffer_get(&e->input, session_id, 16);
-	response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
+	buffer_get(&e->request, session_id, 16);
+	response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
 	if (response_type != 1)
 		goto failure;
 
@@ -253,10 +258,10 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
 
 	datafellows = 0;
 
-	blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen);
-	data = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &dlen);
+	blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
+	data = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &dlen);
 
-	flags = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
+	flags = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
 	if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE)
 		datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB;
 
@@ -297,16 +302,16 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	switch (version) {
 	case 1:
 		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-		bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n);
+		bits = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
 
 		if (bits != key_size(key))
 			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d",
 			    key_size(key), bits);
 		break;
 	case 2:
-		blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen);
+		blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
 		key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
 		xfree(blob);
 		break;
@@ -357,7 +362,27 @@ process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	/* Send success. */
 	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
 	buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
-	return;
+}
+
+static void
+reaper(void)
+{
+	Idtab *tab;
+	Identity *id, *nxt;
+	int version;
+	u_int now = time(NULL);
+
+	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+		for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+			nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
+			if (id->death != 0 && now >= id->death) {
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+				free_identity(id);
+				tab->nentries--;
+			}
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 static void
@@ -366,66 +391,76 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 	Key *k = NULL;
 	char *type_name;
 	char *comment;
-	int type, success = 0;
+	int type, success = 0, death = 0;
 	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
 
 	switch (version) {
 	case 1:
 		k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
-		buffer_get_int(&e->input);			/* ignored */
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->n);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->e);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->d);
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->iqmp);
+		buffer_get_int(&e->request);			/* ignored */
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->d);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp);
 
 		/* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->q);	/* p */
-		buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->p);	/* q */
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->q);	/* p */
+		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->p);	/* q */
 
 		/* Generate additional parameters */
 		rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
 		break;
 	case 2:
-		type_name = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
+		type_name = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 		type = key_type_from_name(type_name);
 		xfree(type_name);
 		switch (type) {
 		case KEY_DSA:
 			k = key_new_private(type);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->p);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->q);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->g);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->pub_key);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->priv_key);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->p);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->q);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->g);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->pub_key);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key);
 			break;
 		case KEY_RSA:
 			k = key_new_private(type);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->n);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->e);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->d);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->iqmp);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->p);
-			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->q);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->e);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->d);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->p);
+			buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->q);
 
 			/* Generate additional parameters */
 			rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
 			break;
 		default:
-			buffer_clear(&e->input);
+			buffer_clear(&e->request);
 			goto send;
 		}
 		break;
 	}
-	comment = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
+	comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 	if (k == NULL) {
 		xfree(comment);
 		goto send;
 	}
 	success = 1;
+	while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
+		switch (buffer_get_char(&e->request)) {
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+			death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
 	if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
 		Identity *id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
 		id->key = k;
 		id->comment = comment;
+		id->death = death;
 		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
 		/* Increment the number of identities. */
 		tab->nentries++;
@@ -439,53 +474,86 @@ send:
 	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
 }
 
+/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
+static void
+process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
+{
+	char *passwd;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
+		locked = 0;
+		memset(lock_passwd, 0, strlen(lock_passwd));
+		xfree(lock_passwd);
+		lock_passwd = NULL;
+		success = 1;
+	} else if (!locked && lock) {
+		locked = 1;
+		lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
+		success = 1;
+	}
+	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+	xfree(passwd);
+
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static void
+no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg,
+	    (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ?
+	    SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
+	buffer_put_int(&msg, 0);
+	buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+}
 
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
 static void
 process_add_smartcard_key (SocketEntry *e)
 {
+	Identity *id;
 	Idtab *tab;
-	Key *n = NULL, *k = NULL;
-	char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
-	int success = 0;
+	Key **keys, *k;
+	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
+	int i, version, success = 0;
 
-	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
-	k = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id);
+	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin);
 	xfree(sc_reader_id);
+	xfree(pin);
 
-	if (k == NULL) {
-		error("sc_get_pubkey failed");
+	if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) {
+		error("sc_get_keys failed");
 		goto send;
 	}
-	success = 1;
-
-	tab = idtab_lookup(1);
-	k->type = KEY_RSA1;
-	if (lookup_identity(k, 1) == NULL) {
-		Identity *id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
-		n = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-		BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n);
-		BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e);
-		RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_engine());
-		id->key = n;
-		id->comment = xstrdup("rsa1 smartcard");
-		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
-		tab->nentries++;
-	}
-	k->type = KEY_RSA;
-	tab = idtab_lookup(2);
-	if (lookup_identity(k, 2) == NULL) {
-		Identity *id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
-		n = key_new(KEY_RSA);
-		BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n);
-		BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e);
-		RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_engine());
-		id->key = n;
-		id->comment = xstrdup("rsa smartcard");
-		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
-		tab->nentries++;
+	for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		k = keys[i];
+		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+		if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
+			id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
+			id->key = k;
+			id->comment = xstrdup("smartcard key");
+			id->death = 0;
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+			tab->nentries++;
+			success = 1;
+		} else {
+			key_free(k);
+		}
+		keys[i] = NULL;
 	}
-	key_free(k);
+	xfree(keys);
 send:
 	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
 	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
@@ -495,39 +563,37 @@ send:
 static void
 process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	Key *k = NULL;
-	int success = 0;
-	char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+	Identity *id;
+	Idtab *tab;
+	Key **keys, *k = NULL;
+	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
+	int i, version, success = 0;
 
-	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
-	k = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id);
+	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+	keys = sc_get_keys(sc_reader_id, pin);
 	xfree(sc_reader_id);
+	xfree(pin);
 
-	if (k == NULL) {
-		error("sc_get_pubkey failed");
-	} else {
-		Identity *id;
-		k->type = KEY_RSA1;
-		id = lookup_identity(k, 1);
-		if (id != NULL) {
-			Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(1);
+	if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) {
+		error("sc_get_keys failed");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		k = keys[i];
+		version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
+		if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) != NULL) {
+			tab = idtab_lookup(version);
 			TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
-			free_identity(id);
 			tab->nentries--;
-			success = 1;
-		}
-		k->type = KEY_RSA;
-		id = lookup_identity(k, 2);
-		if (id != NULL) {
-			Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(2);
-			TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
 			free_identity(id);
-			tab->nentries--;
 			success = 1;
 		}
 		key_free(k);
+		keys[i] = NULL;
 	}
-
+	xfree(keys);
+send:
 	buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
 	buffer_put_char(&e->output,
 	    success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
@@ -542,6 +608,10 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 	u_int msg_len;
 	u_int type;
 	u_char *cp;
+
+	/* kill dead keys */
+	reaper();
+
 	if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
 		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
 	cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input);
@@ -550,15 +620,44 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 		shutdown(e->fd, SHUT_RDWR);
 		close(e->fd);
 		e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+		buffer_free(&e->input);
+		buffer_free(&e->output);
+		buffer_free(&e->request);
 		return;
 	}
 	if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4)
 		return;
+
+	/* move the current input to e->request */
 	buffer_consume(&e->input, 4);
-	type = buffer_get_char(&e->input);
+	buffer_clear(&e->request);
+	buffer_append(&e->request, buffer_ptr(&e->input), msg_len);
+	buffer_consume(&e->input, msg_len);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&e->request);
+
+	/* check wheter agent is locked */
+	if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
+		buffer_clear(&e->request);
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+		case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+			/* send empty lists */
+			no_identities(e, type);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
+			buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+			buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+		}
+		return;
+	}
 
 	debug("type %d", type);
 	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
+		process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
+		break;
 	/* ssh1 */
 	case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
 		process_authentication_challenge1(e);
@@ -567,6 +666,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 		process_request_identities(e, 1);
 		break;
 	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED:
 		process_add_identity(e, 1);
 		break;
 	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY:
@@ -583,6 +683,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 		process_request_identities(e, 2);
 		break;
 	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
 		process_add_identity(e, 2);
 		break;
 	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
@@ -602,7 +703,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 	default:
 		/* Unknown message.  Respond with failure. */
 		error("Unknown message %d", type);
-		buffer_clear(&e->input);
+		buffer_clear(&e->request);
 		buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
 		buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
 		break;
@@ -625,6 +726,7 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
 			sockets[i].type = type;
 			buffer_init(&sockets[i].input);
 			buffer_init(&sockets[i].output);
+			buffer_init(&sockets[i].request);
 			return;
 		}
 	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
@@ -639,6 +741,7 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
 	sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
 	buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input);
 	buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output);
+	buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].request);
 }
 
 static int
@@ -736,6 +839,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 					sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
+					buffer_free(&sockets[i].request);
 					break;
 				}
 				buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len);
@@ -754,6 +858,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 					sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
+					buffer_free(&sockets[i].request);
 					break;
 				}
 				buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len);
@@ -812,6 +917,7 @@ usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -s          Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -k          Kill the current agent.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -d          Debug mode.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -a socket   Bind agent socket to given name.\n");
 	exit(1);
 }
 
@@ -823,12 +929,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	struct rlimit rlim;
 	pid_t pid;
 	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
+	char *agentsocket = NULL;
 	extern int optind;
 	fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
 
 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
 
-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdks")) != -1) {
+	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:")) != -1) {
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'c':
 			if (s_flag)
@@ -848,6 +955,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 				usage();
 			d_flag++;
 			break;
+		case 'a':
+			agentsocket = optarg;
+			break;
 		default:
 			usage();
 		}
@@ -858,7 +968,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag))
 		usage();
 
-	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !k_flag && !s_flag && !d_flag) {
+	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
 		shell = getenv("SHELL");
 		if (shell != NULL && strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
 			c_flag = 1;
@@ -883,19 +993,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
 		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
 		printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
-		printf("echo Agent pid %d killed;\n", pid);
+		printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
 		exit(0);
 	}
 	parent_pid = getpid();
 
-	/* Create private directory for agent socket */
-	strlcpy(socket_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", sizeof socket_dir);
-	if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
-		perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
-		exit(1);
+	if (agentsocket == NULL) {
+		/* Create private directory for agent socket */
+		strlcpy(socket_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", sizeof socket_dir);
+		if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
+			perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
+		    (long)parent_pid);
+	} else {
+		/* Try to use specified agent socket */
+		socket_dir[0] = '\0';
+		strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
 	}
-	snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%d", socket_dir,
-	    parent_pid);
 
 	/*
 	 * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
@@ -928,7 +1044,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
 		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
 		    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-		printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", parent_pid);
+		printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
 		goto skip;
 	}
 	pid = fork();
@@ -938,14 +1054,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 	if (pid != 0) {		/* Parent - execute the given command. */
 		close(sock);
-		snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%d", pid);
+		snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
 		if (ac == 0) {
 			format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
 			printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
 			    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
 			printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
 			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
-			printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", pid);
+			printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
 			exit(0);
 		}
 		if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index e99192045510..cf01550bb719 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  *
  * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * in Canada (German citizen).
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.164 2002/02/14 23:28:00 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.179 2002/06/12 01:09:52 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -53,7 +54,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "sshtty.h"
 
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
 #include "scard.h"
 #endif
 
@@ -100,7 +99,7 @@ int stdin_null_flag = 0;
 
 /*
  * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication.  This is useful
- * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
  * background.
  */
 int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
@@ -125,13 +124,11 @@ char *host;
 struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
 
 /* Private host keys. */
-struct {
-	Key     **keys;
-	int	nkeys;
-} sensitive_data;
+Sensitive sensitive_data;
 
 /* Original real UID. */
 uid_t original_real_uid;
+uid_t original_effective_uid;
 
 /* command to be executed */
 Buffer command;
@@ -139,6 +136,9 @@ Buffer command;
 /* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
 int subsystem_flag = 0;
 
+/* # of replies received for global requests */
+static int client_global_request_id = 0;
+
 /* Prints a help message to the user.  This function never returns. */
 
 static void
@@ -193,47 +193,6 @@ usage(void)
 	exit(1);
 }
 
-/*
- * Connects to the given host using rsh (or prints an error message and exits
- * if rsh is not available).  This function never returns.
- */
-static void
-rsh_connect(char *host, char *user, Buffer * command)
-{
-	char *args[10];
-	int i;
-
-	log("Using rsh.  WARNING: Connection will not be encrypted.");
-	/* Build argument list for rsh. */
-	i = 0;
-#ifndef	_PATH_RSH
-#define	_PATH_RSH	"/usr/bin/rsh"
-#endif
-	args[i++] = _PATH_RSH;
-	/* host may have to come after user on some systems */
-	args[i++] = host;
-	if (user) {
-		args[i++] = "-l";
-		args[i++] = user;
-	}
-	if (buffer_len(command) > 0) {
-		buffer_append(command, "\0", 1);
-		args[i++] = buffer_ptr(command);
-	}
-	args[i++] = NULL;
-	if (debug_flag) {
-		for (i = 0; args[i]; i++) {
-			if (i != 0)
-				fprintf(stderr, " ");
-			fprintf(stderr, "%s", args[i]);
-		}
-		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-	}
-	execv(_PATH_RSH, args);
-	perror(_PATH_RSH);
-	exit(1);
-}
-
 static int ssh_session(void);
 static int ssh_session2(void);
 static void load_public_identity_files(void);
@@ -244,14 +203,13 @@ static void load_public_identity_files(void);
 int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
-	int i, opt, exit_status, cerr;
+	int i, opt, exit_status;
 	u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
 	char sfwd_port[6], sfwd_host_port[6];
 	char *p, *cp, buf[256];
 	struct stat st;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int dummy;
-	uid_t original_effective_uid;
 	extern int optind, optreset;
 	extern char *optarg;
 
@@ -285,7 +243,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
 	 * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
 	 */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	PRIV_END;
 
 	/*
 	 * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
@@ -466,7 +424,7 @@ again:
 				/* NOTREACHED */
 			}
 			if ((fwd_port = a2port(sfwd_port)) == 0 ||
-	  		    (fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0) {
+			    (fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0) {
 				fprintf(stderr,
 				    "Bad forwarding port(s) '%s'\n", optarg);
 				exit(1);
@@ -650,52 +608,48 @@ again:
 		    "originating port will not be trusted.");
 		options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
 	}
-	/*
-	 * If using rsh has been selected, exec it now (without trying
-	 * anything else).  Note that we must release privileges first.
-	 */
-	if (options.use_rsh) {
-		/*
-		 * Restore our superuser privileges.  This must be done
-		 * before permanently setting the uid.
-		 */
-		restore_uid();
-
-		/* Switch to the original uid permanently. */
-		permanently_set_uid(pw);
-
-		/* Execute rsh. */
-		rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
-		fatal("rsh_connect returned");
-	}
-	/* Restore our superuser privileges. */
-	restore_uid();
-
 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
 
-	cerr = ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, IPv4or6,
+	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, IPv4or6,
 	    options.connection_attempts,
-	    original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port,
-	    pw, options.proxy_command);
+	    original_effective_uid == 0 && options.use_privileged_port,
+	    options.proxy_command) != 0)
+		exit(1);
 
 	/*
 	 * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
 	 * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts
 	 * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
 	 * privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
+	 * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys
+	 * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead.
 	 */
 	sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
 	sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
-	if (!cerr && (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
-	    options.hostbased_authentication)) {
+	sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0;
+	if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
+	    options.hostbased_authentication) {
 		sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
 		sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys*sizeof(Key));
+
+		PRIV_START;
 		sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
 		    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
 		sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
 		    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
 		sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
 		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+		PRIV_END;
+
+		if (sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL &&
+		    sensitive_data.keys[1] == NULL &&
+		    sensitive_data.keys[2] == NULL) {
+			sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_public(
+			    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+			sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_public(
+			    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+			sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1;
+		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have.  We will no
@@ -704,15 +658,8 @@ again:
 	 * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
 	 * root is mapped to nobody.
 	 */
-
-	/*
-	 * Note that some legacy systems need to postpone the following call
-	 * to permanently_set_uid() until the private hostkey is destroyed
-	 * with RSA_free().  Otherwise the calling user could ptrace() the
-	 * process, read the private hostkey and impersonate the host.
-	 * OpenBSD does not allow ptracing of setuid processes.
-	 */
-	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+	seteuid(original_real_uid);
+	setuid(original_real_uid);
 
 	/*
 	 * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
@@ -723,21 +670,6 @@ again:
 		if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
 			error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
 
-	/* Check if the connection failed, and try "rsh" if appropriate. */
-	if (cerr) {
-		if (!options.fallback_to_rsh)
-			exit(1);
-		if (options.port != 0)
-			log("Secure connection to %.100s on port %hu refused; "
-			    "reverting to insecure method",
-			    host, options.port);
-		else
-			log("Secure connection to %.100s refused; "
-			    "reverting to insecure method.", host);
-
-		rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
-		fatal("rsh_connect returned");
-	}
 	/* load options.identity_files */
 	load_public_identity_files();
 
@@ -755,8 +687,7 @@ again:
 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
 
 	/* Log into the remote system.  This never returns if the login fails. */
-	ssh_login(sensitive_data.keys, sensitive_data.nkeys,
-	    host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, pw);
+	ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, pw);
 
 	/* We no longer need the private host keys.  Clear them now. */
 	if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
@@ -808,10 +739,10 @@ x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data)
 			 * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
 			 *      is not perfect.
 			 */
-			snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list unix:%s 2>"
+			snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%s list unix:%s 2>"
 			    _PATH_DEVNULL, options.xauth_location, display+10);
 		else
-			snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>"
+			snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%s list %.200s 2>"
 			    _PATH_DEVNULL, options.xauth_location, display);
 		debug2("x11_get_proto %s", line);
 		f = popen(line, "r");
@@ -1041,6 +972,27 @@ client_subsystem_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		    len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command), id);
 }
 
+void
+client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	i = client_global_request_id++;
+	if (i >= options.num_remote_forwards) {
+		debug("client_global_request_reply: too many replies %d > %d",
+		    i, options.num_remote_forwards);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
+	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+	    options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+	    options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+	    options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)
+		log("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen port %d",
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].port);
+}
+
 /* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */
 static void
 ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
@@ -1100,7 +1052,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
 			debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
 			channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1);
 			/* register callback for reply */
-			/* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */
+			/* XXX we assume that client_loop has already been called */
 			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply);
 			dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply);
 		} else {
@@ -1187,40 +1139,29 @@ static void
 load_public_identity_files(void)
 {
 	char *filename;
-	Key *public;
 	int i = 0;
-
+	Key *public;
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
+	Key **keys;
+
 	if (options.smartcard_device != NULL &&
-	    options.num_identity_files + 1 < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
-	    (public = sc_get_key(options.smartcard_device)) != NULL ) {
-		Key *new;
-
-		if (options.num_identity_files + 2 > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
-			options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 2;
-		memmove(&options.identity_files[2], &options.identity_files[0],
-		    sizeof(char *) * options.num_identity_files);
-		options.num_identity_files += 2;
-		i = 2;
-
-		/* XXX ssh1 vs ssh2 */
-		new = key_new(KEY_RSA);
-		new->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT;
-		BN_copy(new->rsa->n, public->rsa->n);
-		BN_copy(new->rsa->e, public->rsa->e);
-		RSA_set_method(new->rsa, sc_get_engine());
-		options.identity_keys[0] = new;
-		options.identity_files[0] = xstrdup("smartcard rsa key");;
-
-		new = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
-		new->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT;
-		BN_copy(new->rsa->n, public->rsa->n);
-		BN_copy(new->rsa->e, public->rsa->e);
-		RSA_set_method(new->rsa, sc_get_engine());
-		options.identity_keys[1] = new;
-		options.identity_files[1] = xstrdup("smartcard rsa1 key");
-
-		key_free(public);
+	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+	    (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL ) {
+		int count = 0;
+		for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			count++;
+			memmove(&options.identity_files[1], &options.identity_files[0],
+			    sizeof(char *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1));
+			memmove(&options.identity_keys[1], &options.identity_keys[0],
+			    sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1));
+			options.num_identity_files++;
+			options.identity_keys[0] = keys[i];
+			options.identity_files[0] = xstrdup("smartcard key");;
+		}
+		if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+			options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES;
+		i = count;
+		xfree(keys);
 	}
 #endif /* SMARTCARD */
 	for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
index 6848e1e9f160..fd9fd50945b3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.64 2002/03/04 17:27:39 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.70 2002/06/03 12:04:07 deraadt Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES		100
 
 /*
- * Major protocol version.  Different version indicates major incompatiblity
+ * Major protocol version.  Different version indicates major incompatibility
  * that prevents communication.
  *
  * Minor protocol version.  Different version indicates minor incompatibility
@@ -86,6 +86,16 @@
 /* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
 #define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE		-2
 
+/*
+ * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
+ * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
+ * primary group.
+ */
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER		"sshd"
+
+/* Minimum modulus size (n) for RSA keys. */
+#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE	768
+
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 #include "auth-pam.h"
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
index 07814b6ec1d0..ab6206e449d6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh_config
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.12 2002/01/16 17:55:33 stevesk Exp $
-# $FreeBSD$
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.15 2002/06/20 20:03:34 stevesk Exp $
+#	$FreeBSD$
 
-# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See ssh(1)
-# for more information.  This file provides defaults for users, and
-# the values can be changed in per-user configuration files or on the
-# command line.
+# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
+# ssh_config(5) for more information.  This file provides defaults for
+# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
+# or on the command line.
 
 # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
 #  1. command line options
@@ -19,12 +19,10 @@
 # Host *
 #   ForwardAgent no
 #   ForwardX11 no
-#   RhostsAuthentication yes
-#   RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+#   RhostsAuthentication no
+#   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
 #   RSAAuthentication yes
 #   PasswordAuthentication yes
-#   FallBackToRsh no
-#   UseRsh no
 #   BatchMode no
 #   CheckHostIP yes
 #   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index 1a6f8e4759ce..707a9c0088c0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.119 2002/01/21 15:13:51 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.125 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -37,27 +37,20 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 char *client_version_string = NULL;
 char *server_version_string = NULL;
 
+/* import */
 extern Options options;
 extern char *__progname;
+extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
 
 static const char *
-sockaddr_ntop(struct sockaddr *sa)
+sockaddr_ntop(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
 {
-	void *addr;
-	static char addrbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	static char addrbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
 
-	switch (sa->sa_family) {
-	case AF_INET:
-		addr = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr;
-		break;
-	case AF_INET6:
-		addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr;
-		break;
-	default:
-		/* This case should be protected against elsewhere */
-		abort();	/* XXX abort is bad -- do something else */
-	}
-	inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, addr, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
+	if (getnameinfo(sa, salen, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0,
+	    NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+		fatal("sockaddr_ntop: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
 	return addrbuf;
 }
 
@@ -65,8 +58,7 @@ sockaddr_ntop(struct sockaddr *sa)
  * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
  */
 static int
-ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, struct passwd *pw,
-		  const char *proxy_command)
+ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 {
 	Buffer command;
 	const char *cp;
@@ -116,7 +108,8 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, struct passwd *pw,
 		char *argv[10];
 
 		/* Child.  Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
-		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+		seteuid(original_real_uid);
+		setuid(original_real_uid);
 
 		/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
 		close(pin[1]);
@@ -166,7 +159,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, struct passwd *pw,
  * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
  */
 static int
-ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family)
+ssh_create_socket(int privileged, int family)
 {
 	int sock, gaierr;
 	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
@@ -177,22 +170,18 @@ ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family)
 	 */
 	if (privileged) {
 		int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
+		PRIV_START;
 		sock = rresvport_af(&p, family);
+		PRIV_END;
 		if (sock < 0)
 			error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
 		else
 			debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
 		return sock;
 	}
-	/*
-	 * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port.  We use
-	 * the user's uid to create the socket.
-	 */
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 	sock = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	if (sock < 0)
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-	restore_uid();
 
 	/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
 	if (options.bind_address == NULL)
@@ -222,9 +211,9 @@ ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family)
 /*
  * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
  * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
- * If port is 0, the default port will be used.  If anonymous is zero,
+ * If port is 0, the default port will be used.  If needpriv is true,
  * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
- * This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false.
+ * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true.
  * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
  * second).  If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
  * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
@@ -239,7 +228,7 @@ ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family)
 int
 ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
     u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts,
-    int anonymous, struct passwd *pw, const char *proxy_command)
+    int needpriv, const char *proxy_command)
 {
 	int gaierr;
 	int on = 1;
@@ -255,8 +244,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	 */
 	int full_failure = 1;
 
-	debug("ssh_connect: getuid %u geteuid %u anon %d",
-	    (u_int) getuid(), (u_int) geteuid(), anonymous);
+	debug("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
 
 	/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
 	if (port == 0) {
@@ -268,7 +256,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	}
 	/* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */
 	if (proxy_command != NULL)
-		return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, pw, proxy_command);
+		return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, proxy_command);
 
 	/* No proxy command. */
 
@@ -304,30 +292,21 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 				host, ntop, strport);
 
 			/* Create a socket for connecting. */
-			sock = ssh_create_socket(pw,
-			    !anonymous && geteuid() == 0,
-			    ai->ai_family);
+			sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai->ai_family);
 			if (sock < 0)
 				/* Any error is already output */
 				continue;
 
-			/* Connect to the host.  We use the user's uid in the
-			 * hope that it will help with tcp_wrappers showing
-			 * the remote uid as root.
-			 */
-			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 			if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) {
 				/* Successful connection. */
 				memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
-				restore_uid();
 				break;
 			} else {
 				if (errno == ECONNREFUSED)
 					full_failure = 0;
 				log("ssh: connect to address %s port %s: %s",
-				    sockaddr_ntop(ai->ai_addr), strport,
-				    strerror(errno));
-				restore_uid();
+				    sockaddr_ntop(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen),
+				    strport, strerror(errno));
 				/*
 				 * Close the failed socket; there appear to
 				 * be some problems when reusing a socket for
@@ -785,7 +764,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
 			len = strlen(msg);
 			snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
 			    "\nMatching host key in %s:%d",
-			     host_file, host_line);
+			    host_file, host_line);
 		}
 		if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
 			log(msg);
@@ -833,7 +812,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
  * This function does not require super-user privileges.
  */
 void
-ssh_login(Key **keys, int nkeys, const char *orighost,
+ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
     struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw)
 {
 	char *host, *cp;
@@ -858,10 +837,10 @@ ssh_login(Key **keys, int nkeys, const char *orighost,
 	/* authenticate user */
 	if (compat20) {
 		ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr);
-		ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys);
+		ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
 	} else {
 		ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
-		ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys);
+		ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
index 5c1d326643eb..47bbfd5e5f83 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.13 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.17 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $	*/
 /*	$FreeBSD$	*/
 
 /*
@@ -27,21 +27,44 @@
 #ifndef SSHCONNECT_H
 #define SSHCONNECT_H
 
+typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
+struct Sensitive {
+	Key	**keys;
+	int	nkeys;
+	int	external_keysign;
+};
+
 int
 ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int,
-    int, struct passwd *, const char *);
+    int, const char *);
 
 void
-ssh_login(Key **, int, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *);
+ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *);
 
 int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
 
 void	 ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
 void	 ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *);
 
-void	 ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Key **, int);
-void	 ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Key **, int);
+void	 ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
+void	 ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *);
 
 void	 ssh_put_password(char *);
 
+
+/*
+ * Macros to raise/lower permissions.
+ */
+#define PRIV_START do {				\
+	int save_errno = errno;			\
+	(void)seteuid(original_effective_uid);	\
+	errno = save_errno;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define PRIV_END do {				\
+	int save_errno = errno;			\
+	(void)seteuid(original_real_uid);	\
+	errno = save_errno;			\
+} while (0)
+
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
index f021bec20f2d..3cb2d18cfe39 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.48 2002/02/11 16:15:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.51 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -460,6 +460,8 @@ try_krb4_authentication(void)
 
 		/* Get server's response. */
 		reply = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length);
+		if (auth.length >= MAX_KTXT_LEN)
+			fatal("Kerberos v4: Malformed response from server");
 		memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length);
 		xfree(reply);
 
@@ -844,7 +846,7 @@ try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
 			error("Permission denied, please try again.");
 		if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
 			log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
-			    "Reponse will be transmitted in clear text.");
+			    "Response will be transmitted in clear text.");
 		response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
 		if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) {
 			xfree(response);
@@ -1091,7 +1093,7 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
  */
 void
 ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
-    Key **keys, int nkeys)
+    Sensitive *sensitive)
 {
 #ifdef KRB5
 	krb5_context context = NULL;
@@ -1177,9 +1179,11 @@ ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 	 */
 	if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
 	    options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
-		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
-			if (keys[i] != NULL && keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
-			    try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, keys[i]))
+		for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL &&
+			    sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+			    try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user,
+			    sensitive->keys[i]))
 				goto success;
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index 283b8d29daa5..7ecbe74cf70d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.97 2002/02/25 16:33:27 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.104 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "match.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern char *client_version_string;
@@ -155,8 +157,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	int last_key_hint;
 	AuthenticationConnection *agent;
 	/* hostbased */
-	Key **keys;
-	int nkeys;
+	Sensitive *sensitive;
 	/* kbd-interactive */
 	int info_req_seen;
 };
@@ -173,6 +174,7 @@ void	input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 
 int	userauth_none(Authctxt *);
 int	userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
@@ -215,7 +217,7 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
 
 void
 ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
-    Key **keys, int nkeys)
+    Sensitive *sensitive)
 {
 	Authctxt authctxt;
 	int type;
@@ -255,8 +257,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
 	authctxt.success = 0;
 	authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
 	authctxt.authlist = NULL;
-	authctxt.keys = keys;
-	authctxt.nkeys = nkeys;
+	authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
 	authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
 	if (authctxt.method == NULL)
 		fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
@@ -392,10 +393,10 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
 			break;
 		}
-		if (key->type != pktype) { 
+		if (key->type != pktype) {
 			error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
 			    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
-			     key->type, pktype);
+			    key->type, pktype);
 			break;
 		}
 		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
@@ -440,7 +441,7 @@ int
 userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	static int attempt = 0;
-	char prompt[80];
+	char prompt[150];
 	char *password;
 
 	if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
@@ -462,13 +463,85 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	xfree(password);
 	packet_add_padding(64);
 	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+
 	return 1;
 }
+/*
+ * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+ */
+void
+input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, uint32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+	char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
+	char prompt[150];
+
+	debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
+		    "no authentication context");
+
+	info = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+	if (strlen(info) > 0)
+		log("%s", info);
+	xfree(info);
+	xfree(lang);
+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+	packet_put_char(1);			/* additional info */
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+	    "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
+	    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+	packet_put_cstring(password);
+	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	xfree(password);
+	password = NULL;
+	while (password == NULL) {
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+		    "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+		    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+		password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+		if (password == NULL) {
+			/* bail out */
+			return;
+		}
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+		    "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+		    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+		retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+		if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
+			memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+			xfree(password);
+			log("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
+			password = NULL;
+		}
+		memset(retype, 0, strlen(retype));
+		xfree(retype);
+	}
+	packet_put_cstring(password);
+	memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+	xfree(password);
+	packet_add_padding(64);
+	packet_send();
+
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+}
 
 static void
 clear_auth_state(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	/* XXX clear authentication state */
+	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, NULL);
+
 	if (authctxt->last_key != NULL && authctxt->last_key_hint == -1) {
 		debug3("clear_auth_state: key_free %p", authctxt->last_key);
 		key_free(authctxt->last_key);
@@ -821,14 +894,88 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	packet_send();
 }
 
-/*
- * this will be move to an external program (ssh-keysign) ASAP. ssh-keysign
- * will be setuid-root and the sbit can be removed from /usr/bin/ssh.
- */
+static int
+ssh_keysign(
+    Key *key,
+    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	struct stat st;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int to[2], from[2], status, version = 2;
+
+	debug("ssh_keysign called");
+
+	if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: no installed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
+		error("ssh_keysign: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (pipe(to) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(from) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		seteuid(getuid());
+		setuid(getuid());
+		close(from[0]);
+		if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+			fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(to[1]);
+		if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+			fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(from[1]);
+		close(to[0]);
+		execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0);
+		fatal("ssh_keysign: exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+	close(from[1]);
+	close(to[0]);
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	buffer_put_int(&b, packet_get_connection_in()); /* send # of socket */
+	buffer_put_string(&b, data, datalen);
+	msg_send(to[1], version, &b);
+
+	if (msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: no reply");
+		buffer_clear(&b);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	close(from[0]);
+	close(to[1]);
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+
+	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) {
+		error("ssh_keysign: bad version");
+		buffer_clear(&b);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*sigp = buffer_get_string(&b, lenp);
+	buffer_clear(&b);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int
 userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	Key *private = NULL;
+	Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive;
 	Buffer b;
 	u_char *signature, *blob;
 	char *chost, *pkalg, *p;
@@ -837,12 +984,12 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	int ok, i, len, found = 0;
 
 	/* check for a useful key */
-	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nkeys; i++) {
-		private = authctxt->keys[i];
+	for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+		private = sensitive->keys[i];
 		if (private && private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
 			found = 1;
 			/* we take and free the key */
-			authctxt->keys[i] = NULL;
+			sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -884,7 +1031,12 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
 	buffer_dump(&b);
 #endif
-	ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	if (sensitive->external_keysign)
+		ok = ssh_keysign(private, &signature, &slen,
+		    buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+	else
+		ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen,
+		    buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
 	key_free(private);
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	if (ok != 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index a48fa8c6bc10..fb6cf98b8ee3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@
  * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
  *
  * SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
  *
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -40,12 +42,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.228 2002/02/27 21:23:13 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.246 2002/06/20 23:05:56 markus Exp $");
 RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -76,6 +79,11 @@ RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
 
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 #include <tcpd.h>
@@ -184,8 +192,13 @@ u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
 int startup_pipe;		/* in child */
 
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
 
 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
@@ -258,10 +271,12 @@ sigterm_handler(int sig)
 static void
 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 {
+	pid_t pid;
 	int save_errno = errno;
 	int status;
 
-	while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0)
+	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+	    (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
 		;
 
 	signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
@@ -354,7 +369,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 			fatal_cleanup();
 		}
 
-		/* Read other side's version identification. */
+		/* Read other sides version identification. */
 		memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
 		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
 			if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
@@ -472,6 +487,160 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
 	memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
 }
 
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+	Key *tmp;
+	int i;
+
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+		tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
+				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie.  XXX - Okay Niels? */
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_preauth_child(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t rand[256];
+	int i;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+	privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+		rand[i] = arc4random();
+	RAND_seed(rand, sizeof(rand));
+
+	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+	demote_sensitive_data();
+
+	if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+		fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+		    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+	memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
+	endpwent();
+
+	/* Change our root directory*/
+	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+		fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Drop our privileges */
+	debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+	    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+	do_setusercontext(pw);
+}
+
+static Authctxt*
+privsep_preauth(void)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = NULL;
+	int status;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+	pmonitor = monitor_init();
+	/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
+	pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == -1) {
+		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+	} else if (pid != 0) {
+		debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
+
+		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+		authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor);
+		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+		/* Sync memory */
+		monitor_sync(pmonitor);
+
+		/* Wait for the child's exit status */
+		while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+		return (authctxt);
+	} else {
+		/* child */
+
+		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+		/* Demote the child */
+		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+			privsep_preauth_child();
+		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	extern Authctxt *x_authctxt;
+
+	/* XXX - Remote port forwarding */
+	x_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+		/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
+		monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+		use_privsep = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Authentication complete */
+	alarm(0);
+	if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+		close(startup_pipe);
+		startup_pipe = -1;
+	}
+
+	/* New socket pair */
+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+
+	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+		debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+
+		/* NEVERREACHED */
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+
+	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+	demote_sensitive_data();
+
+	/* Drop privileges */
+	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+
+	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+}
+
 static char *
 list_hostkey_types(void)
 {
@@ -501,7 +670,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
 	return p;
 }
 
-static Key *
+Key *
 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -513,6 +682,25 @@ get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+Key *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+	if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+		return (NULL);
+	return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
+			return (i);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+}
+
 /*
  * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
  * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
@@ -589,6 +777,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	int listen_sock, maxfd;
 	int startup_p[2];
 	int startups = 0;
+	Authctxt *authctxt;
 	Key *key;
 	int ret, key_used = 0;
 
@@ -787,6 +976,19 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		struct passwd *pw;
+		struct stat st;
+
+		if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+			    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+		if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+		    (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+			fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+			    _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+	}
+
 	/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
 	if (test_flag)
 		exit(0);
@@ -933,7 +1135,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			 */
 			f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
 			if (f) {
-				fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid());
+				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
 				fclose(f);
 			}
 		}
@@ -1080,7 +1282,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 				if (pid < 0)
 					error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 				else
-					debug("Forked child %d.", pid);
+					debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
 
 				close(startup_p[1]);
 
@@ -1107,6 +1309,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
 
 	/*
+	 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+	 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't
+	 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+	 */
+	if (setsid() < 0)
+		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/*
 	 * Disable the key regeneration alarm.  We will not regenerate the
 	 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
 	 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
@@ -1179,7 +1389,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
 	/*
 	 * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
-	 * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
+	 * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
 	 * programs.  Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
 	 * machine, he can connect from any port.  So do not use these
 	 * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
@@ -1208,15 +1418,43 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
+	if (use_privsep)
+		if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL)
+			goto authenticated;
+
 	/* perform the key exchange */
 	/* authenticate user and start session */
 	if (compat20) {
 		do_ssh2_kex();
-		do_authentication2();
+		authctxt = do_authentication2();
 	} else {
 		do_ssh1_kex();
-		do_authentication();
+		authctxt = do_authentication();
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
+	 * the current keystate and exits
+	 */
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+ authenticated:
+	/*
+	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+	 * file descriptor passing.
+	 */
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+		if (!compat20)
+			destroy_sensitive_data();
 	}
+
+	/* Perform session preparation. */
+	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 	verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
 
@@ -1225,10 +1463,58 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #endif /* USE_PAM */
 
 	packet_close();
+
+	if (use_privsep)
+		mm_terminate();
+
 	exit(0);
 }
 
 /*
+ * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
+ * (key with larger modulus first).
+ */
+int
+ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
+{
+	int rsafail = 0;
+
+	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+		/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
+		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		}
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
+			rsafail++;
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
+			rsafail++;
+	} else {
+		/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
+		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		}
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
+			rsafail++;
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
+			rsafail++;
+	}
+	return (rsafail);
+}
+/*
  * SSH1 key exchange
  */
 static void
@@ -1343,43 +1629,9 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 	packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	/*
-	 * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key
-	 * with larger modulus first).
-	 */
-	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
-		/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
-		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
-			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
-		}
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
-			rsafail++;
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
-			rsafail++;
-	} else {
-		/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
-		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
-		}
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
-			rsafail++;
-		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
-			rsafail++;
-	}
+	/* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
+	rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
+
 	/*
 	 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer.  The key is in the
 	 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
@@ -1430,9 +1682,12 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
 			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
 	}
-	/* Destroy the private and public keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
+	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
 	destroy_sensitive_data();
 
+	if (use_privsep)
+		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
+
 	/* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
 	BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
 
@@ -1444,7 +1699,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 
 	debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
 
-	/* Send an acknowledgement packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+	/* Send an acknowledgment packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
 	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
@@ -1471,6 +1726,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
 	}
+	if (!options.compression) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+	}
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
 
 	/* start key exchange */
@@ -1479,6 +1738,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
 	kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
 
 	xxx_kex = kex;
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
index 9bd2d19bde6c..3f39debb905f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-#	$OpenBSD: src/usr.bin/ssh/sshd_config,v 1.48 2002/02/19 02:50:59 deraadt Exp $
-# $FreeBSD$
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.56 2002/06/20 23:37:12 markus Exp $
+#	$FreeBSD$
 
-# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See sshd(8)
-# for more information.
+# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
+# sshd_config(5) for more information.
 
 # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
 # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
@@ -64,13 +64,11 @@
 #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
 
 # Kerberos options
-# KerberosAuthentication automatically enabled if keyfile exists
-#KerberosAuthentication yes
+#KerberosAuthentication no
 #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
 #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
 
-# AFSTokenPassing automatically enabled if k_hasafs() is true
-#AFSTokenPassing yes
+#AFSTokenPassing no
 
 # Kerberos TGT Passing only works with the AFS kaserver
 #KerberosTgtPassing no
@@ -83,6 +81,8 @@
 #KeepAlive yes
 #UseLogin no
 #CheckMail yes
+#UsePrivilegeSeparation no
+#Compression yes
 
 #MaxStartups 10
 # no default banner path
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index 084dd226cdea..93b15ffa7268 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.28 2002/03/06 00:25:55 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.33 2002/06/21 15:41:20 markus Exp $ */
 /* $FreeBSD$ */
 
 #ifndef SSH_VERSION
 
 #define SSH_VERSION             (ssh_version_get())
-#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_3.1"
-#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20020402"
+#define SSH_VERSION_BASE        "OpenSSH_3.3"
+#define SSH_VERSION_ADDENDUM    "FreeBSD-20020623"
 
 const char *ssh_version_get(void);
 void ssh_version_set_addendum(const char *add);