diff options
| author | Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org> | 2024-12-12 14:06:06 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org> | 2025-01-14 14:14:24 +0000 |
| commit | cbf77cecec38dfcdd5fdc24fc1fba9eeae3b00f1 (patch) | |
| tree | 1810ca044839074505e53b55a8e98e3675ffc96e | |
| parent | 2c1c6bd7d5dbddd953587c1f003e6164749e087b (diff) | |
inpcb: Remove bogus SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks in in_pcbbind()
This check for SO_REUSEPORT was added way back in commit 52b65dbe85faf.
Per the commit log, this commit restricted this port-stealing check to
unicast addresses, and then only if the existing socket does not have
SO_REUSEPORT set. In other words, if there exists a socket bound to
INADDR_ANY, and we bind a socket to INADDR_ANY with the same port, then
the two sockets need not be owned by the same user if the existing
socket has SO_REUSEPORT set.
This is a surprising semantic; bugzilla PR 7713 gives some additional
context. That PR makes a case for the behaviour described above when
binding to a multicast address. But, the SO_REUSEPORT check is only
applied when binding to a non-multicast address, so it doesn't really
make sense. In the PR the committer notes that "unicast applications
don't set SO_REUSEPORT", which makes some sense, but also refers to
"multicast applications that bind to INADDR_ANY", which sounds a bit
suspicious.
OpenBSD performs the multicast check, but not the SO_REUSEPORT check.
DragonflyBSD removed the SO_REUSEPORT (and INADDR_ANY) checks back in
2014 (commit 0323d5fde12a4). NetBSD explicitly copied our logic and
still has it.
The plot thickens: 20 years later, SO_REUSEPORT_LB was ported from
DragonflyBSD: this option provides similar semantics to SO_REUSEPORT,
but for unicast addresses it causes incoming connections/datagrams to be
distributed among all sockets in the group. This commit (1a43cff92a20d)
inverted the check for SO_REUSEPORT while adding one for
SO_REUSEPORT_LB; this appears to have been inadvertent. However:
- apparently no one has noticed that the semantics were changed;
- sockets belonging to different users can now be bound to the same port
so long as they belong to a single lbgroup bound to INADDR_ANY, which
is not correct.
Simply remove the SO_REUSEPORT(_LB) checks, as their original
justification was dubious and their current implementation is wrong; add
some tests.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D47832
(cherry picked from commit 4f02a7d739b354eef38e19b25866f64842d69414)
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet/in_pcb.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tests/sys/netinet/socket_afinet.c | 240 |
3 files changed, 241 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c index 0add5a7c340b..331804545bee 100644 --- a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c +++ b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c @@ -928,9 +928,7 @@ in_pcbbind_avail(struct inpcb *inp, const struct in_addr laddr, (inp->inp_socket->so_type != SOCK_STREAM || in_nullhost(t->inp_faddr)) && (!in_nullhost(laddr) || - !in_nullhost(t->inp_laddr) || - (t->inp_socket->so_options & SO_REUSEPORT) || - (t->inp_socket->so_options & SO_REUSEPORT_LB) == 0) && + !in_nullhost(t->inp_laddr)) && (inp->inp_cred->cr_uid != t->inp_cred->cr_uid)) return (EADDRINUSE); } diff --git a/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c b/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c index de864305b434..04b87819d629 100644 --- a/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c +++ b/sys/netinet6/in6_pcb.c @@ -247,9 +247,7 @@ in6_pcbbind_avail(struct inpcb *inp, const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6, (inp->inp_socket->so_type != SOCK_STREAM || IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&t->in6p_faddr)) && (!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(laddr) || - !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&t->in6p_laddr) || - (t->inp_socket->so_options & SO_REUSEPORT) || - (t->inp_socket->so_options & SO_REUSEPORT_LB) == 0) && + !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&t->in6p_laddr)) && (inp->inp_cred->cr_uid != t->inp_cred->cr_uid)) return (EADDRINUSE); diff --git a/tests/sys/netinet/socket_afinet.c b/tests/sys/netinet/socket_afinet.c index 7076f084719a..ba8c03af46a6 100644 --- a/tests/sys/netinet/socket_afinet.c +++ b/tests/sys/netinet/socket_afinet.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause * * Copyright (c) 2019 Bjoern A. Zeeb + * Copyright (c) 2024 Stormshield * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -25,11 +26,17 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#include <sys/cdefs.h> +#include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> + #include <netinet/in.h> + #include <errno.h> #include <poll.h> +#include <pwd.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <unistd.h> #include <atf-c.h> @@ -281,6 +288,235 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_stream_reconnect, tc) ATF_CHECK_EQ(0, rc); } +/* + * Make sure that unprivileged users can't set the IP_BINDANY or IPV6_BINDANY + * socket options. + */ +ATF_TC(socket_afinet_bindany); +ATF_TC_HEAD(socket_afinet_bindany, tc) +{ + atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "unprivileged"); +} +ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_bindany, tc) +{ + int s; + + s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0); + ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM, + setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) == + -1); + ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0); + + s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0); + ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM, + setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) == + -1); + ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0); + + s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0); + ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM, + setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) == + -1); + ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0); + + s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0); + ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(EPERM, + setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_BINDANY, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) == + -1); + ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0); +} + +/* + * Bind a socket to the specified address, optionally dropping privileges and + * setting one of the SO_REUSE* options first. + * + * Returns true if the bind succeeded, and false if it failed with EADDRINUSE. + */ +static bool +child_bind(const atf_tc_t *tc, int type, struct sockaddr *sa, int opt, bool unpriv) +{ + const char *user; + pid_t child; + + if (unpriv) { + if (!atf_tc_has_config_var(tc, "unprivileged_user")) + atf_tc_skip("unprivileged_user not set"); + user = atf_tc_get_config_var(tc, "unprivileged_user"); + } else { + user = NULL; + } + + child = fork(); + ATF_REQUIRE(child != -1); + if (child == 0) { + int s; + + if (user != NULL) { + struct passwd *passwd; + + passwd = getpwnam(user); + if (seteuid(passwd->pw_uid) != 0) + _exit(1); + } + + s = socket(sa->sa_family, type, 0); + if (s < 0) + _exit(2); + if (bind(s, sa, sa->sa_len) == 0) + _exit(3); + if (errno != EADDRINUSE) + _exit(4); + if (opt != 0) { + if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, opt, &(int){1}, + sizeof(int)) != 0) + _exit(5); + } + if (bind(s, sa, sa->sa_len) == 0) + _exit(6); + if (errno != EADDRINUSE) + _exit(7); + _exit(0); + } else { + int status; + + ATF_REQUIRE_EQ(waitpid(child, &status, 0), child); + ATF_REQUIRE(WIFEXITED(status)); + status = WEXITSTATUS(status); + ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(status == 0 || status == 6, + "child exited with %d", status); + return (status == 6); + } +} + +static bool +child_bind_priv(const atf_tc_t *tc, int type, struct sockaddr *sa, int opt) +{ + return (child_bind(tc, type, sa, opt, false)); +} + +static bool +child_bind_unpriv(const atf_tc_t *tc, int type, struct sockaddr *sa, int opt) +{ + return (child_bind(tc, type, sa, opt, true)); +} + +static int +bind_socket(int domain, int type, int opt, bool unspec, struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + socklen_t slen; + int s; + + s = socket(domain, type, 0); + ATF_REQUIRE(s >= 0); + + if (domain == AF_INET) { + struct sockaddr_in sin; + + bzero(&sin, sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin); + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(unspec ? + INADDR_ANY : INADDR_LOOPBACK); + sin.sin_port = htons(0); + ATF_REQUIRE(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) == 0); + + slen = sizeof(sin); + } else /* if (domain == AF_INET6) */ { + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + + bzero(&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_len = sizeof(sin6); + sin6.sin6_addr = unspec ? in6addr_any : in6addr_loopback; + sin6.sin6_port = htons(0); + ATF_REQUIRE(bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof(sin6)) == 0); + + slen = sizeof(sin6); + } + + if (opt != 0) { + ATF_REQUIRE(setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, opt, &(int){1}, + sizeof(int)) == 0); + } + + ATF_REQUIRE(getsockname(s, sa, &slen) == 0); + + return (s); +} + +static void +multibind_test(const atf_tc_t *tc, int domain, int type) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + int opts[4] = { 0, SO_REUSEADDR, SO_REUSEPORT, SO_REUSEPORT_LB }; + int s; + bool flags[2] = { false, true }; + bool res; + + for (size_t flagi = 0; flagi < nitems(flags); flagi++) { + for (size_t opti = 0; opti < nitems(opts); opti++) { + s = bind_socket(domain, type, opts[opti], flags[flagi], + (struct sockaddr *)&ss); + for (size_t optj = 0; optj < nitems(opts); optj++) { + int opt; + + opt = opts[optj]; + res = child_bind_priv(tc, type, + (struct sockaddr *)&ss, opt); + /* + * Multi-binding is only allowed when both + * sockets have SO_REUSEPORT or SO_REUSEPORT_LB + * set. + */ + if (opts[opti] != 0 && + opts[opti] != SO_REUSEADDR && opti == optj) + ATF_REQUIRE(res); + else + ATF_REQUIRE(!res); + + res = child_bind_unpriv(tc, type, + (struct sockaddr *)&ss, opt); + /* + * Multi-binding is only allowed when both + * sockets have the same owner. + * + * XXX-MJ we for some reason permit this when + * binding to the unspecified address, but I + * don't think that's right + */ + if (flags[flagi] && opts[opti] != 0 && + opts[opti] != SO_REUSEADDR && opti == optj) + ATF_REQUIRE(res); + else + ATF_REQUIRE(!res); + } + ATF_REQUIRE(close(s) == 0); + } + } +} + +/* + * Try to bind two sockets to the same address/port tuple. Under some + * conditions this is permitted. + */ +ATF_TC(socket_afinet_multibind); +ATF_TC_HEAD(socket_afinet_multibind, tc) +{ + atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root"); + atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.config", "unprivileged_user"); +} +ATF_TC_BODY(socket_afinet_multibind, tc) +{ + multibind_test(tc, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM); + multibind_test(tc, AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM); + multibind_test(tc, AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM); + multibind_test(tc, AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM); +} + ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp) { ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet); @@ -289,6 +525,8 @@ ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp) ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_poll_no_rdhup); ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_poll_rdhup); ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_stream_reconnect); + ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_bindany); + ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, socket_afinet_multibind); return atf_no_error(); } |
