diff options
| author | Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-07-09 17:17:11 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-07-09 17:17:11 +0000 |
| commit | bb5c77e9d281d6def6835d48249898764bc6a5fe (patch) | |
| tree | 566105bcbb97c3f87494801d3dfbf6d18e29cfbe /crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c | |
| parent | 3defe8195684c3ee4cf5295a58967e3face8dce1 (diff) | |
| parent | 3838aee84536f5957d08f2914aa03181f9c41c89 (diff) | |
OpenSSH: Update to 10.4p1
Full release notes are available at
https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-10.4
Selected highlights from the release notes:
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* sshd(8): configuration dump mode ("sshd -G") now writes directives
in mixed case (e.g. "PubkeyAuthentication") whereas previously it
emitted only lower-case names.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): make the transport protocol stricter by
disconnecting if the peer sends non-KEX messages during a post-
authentication key re-exchange. Previously a malicious peer could
continue sending non-key exchange messages without penalty. These
would be buffered, causing memory to be wasted up until the
connection terminated or the server/client hit a memory limit.
Implementations that do not restrict messages sent during key
exchange as per RFC4253 section 7.1 may be disconnected.
Reported by Marko Jevtic.
Changes since OpenSSH 10.3
==========================
This release contains a number of security fixes as well as general
bugfixes and a couple of new features.
Security
========
* sftp(1): when downloading files on the command-line using
"sftp host:/path .", a malicious server could cause the file to
be downloaded to an unexpected location. This issue was identified
by the Swival Security Scanner.
* scp(1): when copying files between two remote destinations, do
not allow a malicious server to write files to the parent
directory of the intended target directory. This issue was
identified by the Swival Security Scanner.
* sshd(8): DisableForwarding=yes didn't override PermitTunnel=yes
as it was documented to do. Note that PermitTunnel is not enabled
by default. Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of
Redhat and Marko Jevtic.
* sshd(8): avoid a potential pre-authentication denial of service
when GSSAPIAuthentication was enabled (this feature is off by
default). This was not mitigated by MaxAuthTries, but would be
penalised by PerSourcePenalties. This was reported by Manfred
Kaiser of the milCERT AT (Austrian Ministry of Defence).
* sshd(8): fix a number of cases where the minimum authentication
delay was not being enforced. Reported by the Orange Cyberdefense
Vulnerability Team.
* ssh(1): fix a possible client-side use-after-free if the server
changes its host key during a key reexchange. This was reported by
Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin of Depthfirst.
New features
------------
* All: add experimental support for a composite post-quantum
signature scheme that combines ML-DSA 44 and Ed25519 as specified
in draft-miller-sshm-mldsa44-ed25519-composite-sigs.
This scheme is not enabled by default. To use it, you'll need
to add it to HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, etc.
Keys may be generated using "ssh-keygen -t mldsa44-ed25519".
Bugfixes
--------
* sshd(8): avoid sending observably different messages for valid vs
invalid users in GSSAPIAuthentication (disabled by default).
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix several bugs that incorrectly
classified bulk traffic as interactive. bz3972, bz3958
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): skip unsupported key types when
downloading resident keys from a FIDO token. Previously, downloads
would abort when one was encountered. GHPR657
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D58083
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c | 84 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c index 81596a4cc66b..e2b9a2802898 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.146 2026/03/02 02:40:15 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.147 2026/05/31 11:30:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> @@ -302,55 +302,20 @@ mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { - const u_char *p; - size_t len; - u_int i; - ServerOptions *newopts; + struct sshbuf *config; int r; + u_int i; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &config)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse opts"); - if (len != sizeof(*newopts)) - fatal_f("option block size mismatch"); - newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1); - memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts)); - -#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ - if (newopts->x != NULL && \ - (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \ - fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \ - } while (0) -#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx, clobber) do { \ - newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \ - NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \ - for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \ - if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \ - &newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \ - fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \ - } \ - } while (0) - /* See comment in servconf.h */ - COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); -#undef M_CP_STROPT -#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT + if ((r = deserialise_server_options(config, &options)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "deserialise_server_options"); + sshbuf_free(config); - copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); log_change_level(options.log_level); log_verbose_reset(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++) log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]); - - /* use the macro hell to clean up too */ -#define M_CP_STROPT(x) free(newopts->x) -#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx, clobber) do { \ - for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \ - free(newopts->x[i]); \ - free(newopts->x); \ - } while (0) - COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); -#undef M_CP_STROPT -#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT - free(newopts); } #define GETPW(b, id) \ @@ -885,22 +850,19 @@ mm_terminate(void) /* Request state information */ void -mm_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct include_list *includes, - struct sshbuf *conf, struct sshbuf **confdatap, +mm_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, + ServerOptions *opts, struct sshbuf **confdatap, uint64_t *timing_secretp, struct sshbuf **hostkeysp, struct sshbuf **keystatep, u_char **pw_namep, struct sshbuf **authinfop, struct sshbuf **auth_optsp) { - struct sshbuf *m, *inc; - u_char *cp; - size_t len; + struct sshbuf *m, *config; int r; - struct include_item *item; debug3_f("entering"); - if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (config = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_STATE, m); @@ -909,12 +871,11 @@ mm_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct include_list *includes, mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_STATE, m); - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &config)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, timing_secretp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(m, hostkeysp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, ssh->kex->server_version)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, ssh->kex->client_version)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0) + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, ssh->kex->client_version)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse config"); /* postauth */ @@ -926,24 +887,11 @@ mm_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct include_list *includes, (r = sshbuf_froms(m, auth_optsp)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "parse config postauth"); } + if ((r = deserialise_server_options(config, opts)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "deserialise_server_options"); - if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len))) - fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put"); - - while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) { - item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item)); - if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); - if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0) - fatal_fr(r, "parse includes"); - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry); - } - - free(cp); sshbuf_free(m); - sshbuf_free(inc); + sshbuf_free(config); debug3_f("done"); } |
