- Pretend to accelerate various HMAC algorithms, so padlock(4) can be used

  with fast_ipsec(4) and geli(8) authentication (comming soon).
  If consumer requests only for HMAC algorithm (without encryption), return
  EINVAL.
- Add support for the CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag, for both encryption and
  authentication.

1 files changed, 266 insertions, 91 deletions

diff --git a/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c b/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c
index 606747f02725..69904200b593 100644
--- a/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c
+++ b/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c
@@ -55,14 +55,14 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <sys/mutex.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/libkern.h>
-#include <sys/mbuf.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
 #if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98)
 #include <machine/cpufunc.h>
 #include <machine/cputypes.h>
 #endif
 
 #include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
+#include <opencrypto/cryptosoft.h> /* for hmac_ipad_buffer and hmac_opad_buffer */
+#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
 #include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
 
 
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ struct padlock_session {
 	uint32_t	ses_ekey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16);	/* 128 bit aligned */
 	uint32_t	ses_dkey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16);	/* 128 bit aligned */
 	uint8_t		ses_iv[16] __aligned(16);			/* 128 bit aligned */
+	struct auth_hash *ses_axf;
+	uint8_t		*ses_ictx;
+	uint8_t		*ses_octx;
+	int		ses_mlen;
 	int		ses_used;
 	uint32_t	ses_id;
 	TAILQ_ENTRY(padlock_session) ses_next;
@@ -194,6 +198,18 @@ padlock_init(void)
 	mtx_init(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx, "padlock_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
 	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_AES_CBC, 0, 0, padlock_newsession,
 	    padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
+	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, 0, 0, padlock_newsession,
+	    padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
+	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, 0, 0, padlock_newsession,
+	    padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
+	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 0, 0,
+	    padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
+	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, 0, 0,
+	    padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
+	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC, 0, 0,
+	    padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
+	crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC, 0, 0,
+	    padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
 	return (0);
 }
 
@@ -229,20 +245,131 @@ padlock_destroy(void)
 	return (0);
 }
 
+static void
+padlock_setup_enckey(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen)
+{
+	union padlock_cw *cw;
+	int i;
+
+	cw = &ses->ses_cw;
+	if (cw->cw_key_generation == PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW) {
+		/* Build expanded keys for both directions */
+		rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ses->ses_ekey, key, klen);
+		rijndaelKeySetupDec(ses->ses_dkey, key, klen);
+		for (i = 0; i < 4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1); i++) {
+			ses->ses_ekey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_ekey[i]);
+			ses->ses_dkey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_dkey[i]);
+		}
+	} else {
+		bcopy(key, ses->ses_ekey, klen);
+		bcopy(key, ses->ses_dkey, klen);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+padlock_setup_mackey(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen)
+{
+	struct auth_hash *axf;
+	int i;
+
+	klen /= 8;
+	axf = ses->ses_axf;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
+		key[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL;
+
+	axf->Init(ses->ses_ictx);
+	axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, key, klen);
+	axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, hmac_ipad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
+		key[i] ^= (HMAC_IPAD_VAL ^ HMAC_OPAD_VAL);
+
+	axf->Init(ses->ses_octx); 
+	axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, key, klen);
+	axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, hmac_opad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
+		key[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute keyed-hash authenticator.
+ */
+static int
+padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *crd,
+    caddr_t buf, int flags)
+{
+	u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN];
+	struct auth_hash *axf;
+	union authctx ctx;
+	int error;
+
+	axf = ses->ses_axf;
+
+	bcopy(ses->ses_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
+
+	error = crypto_apply(flags, buf, crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len,
+	    (int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx);
+	if (error != 0)
+		return (error);
+
+	axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
+	bcopy(ses->ses_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
+	axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize);
+	axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
+
+	/* Inject the authentication data */
+	crypto_copyback(flags, buf, crd->crd_inject,
+	    ses->ses_mlen == 0 ? axf->hashsize : ses->ses_mlen, hash);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
 static int
 padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
 {
 	struct padlock_softc *sc = padlock_sc;
 	struct padlock_session *ses = NULL;
+	struct cryptoini *encini, *macini;
 	union padlock_cw *cw;
-	int i;
 
-	if (sc == NULL || sidp == NULL || cri == NULL ||
-	    cri->cri_next != NULL || cri->cri_alg != CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
+	if (sc == NULL || sidp == NULL || cri == NULL)
 		return (EINVAL);
+
+	encini = macini = NULL;
+	for (; cri != NULL; cri = cri->cri_next) {
+		switch (cri->cri_alg) {
+		case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
+			if (macini != NULL)
+				return (EINVAL);
+			macini = cri;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
+			if (encini != NULL)
+				return (EINVAL);
+			encini = cri;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return (EINVAL);
+		}
 	}
-	if (cri->cri_klen != 128 && cri->cri_klen != 192 &&
-	    cri->cri_klen != 256) {
+
+	/*
+	 * We only support HMAC algorithms to be able to work with
+	 * fast_ipsec(4), so if we are asked only for authentication without
+	 * encryption, don't pretend we can accellerate it.
+	 */
+	if (encini == NULL)
+		return (EINVAL);
+	if (encini->cri_klen != 128 && encini->cri_klen != 192 &&
+	    encini->cri_klen != 256) {
 		return (EINVAL);
 	}
 
@@ -279,7 +406,7 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
 	cw->cw_algorithm_type = PADLOCK_ALGORITHM_TYPE_AES;
 	cw->cw_key_generation = PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW;
 	cw->cw_intermediate = 0;
-	switch (cri->cri_klen) {
+	switch (encini->cri_klen) {
 	case 128:
 		cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES128;
 		cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_128;
@@ -297,20 +424,54 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
 		cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_256;
 		break;
 	}
+	if (encini->cri_key != NULL)
+		padlock_setup_enckey(ses, encini->cri_key, encini->cri_klen);
 
 	arc4rand(ses->ses_iv, sizeof(ses->ses_iv), 0);
 
-	if (cw->cw_key_generation == PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW) {
-		/* Build expanded keys for both directions */
-		rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ses->ses_ekey, cri->cri_key, cri->cri_klen);
-		rijndaelKeySetupDec(ses->ses_dkey, cri->cri_key, cri->cri_klen);
-		for (i = 0; i < 4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1); i++) {
-			ses->ses_ekey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_ekey[i]);
-			ses->ses_dkey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_dkey[i]);
+	if (macini != NULL) {
+		ses->ses_mlen = macini->cri_mlen;
+
+		/* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */
+		switch (macini->cri_alg) {
+		case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_null;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
+			ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */
+		ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
+		    M_NOWAIT);
+		ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
+		    M_NOWAIT);
+		if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL) {
+			padlock_freesession(NULL, ses->ses_id);
+			return (ENOMEM);
+		}
+
+		/* Setup key if given. */
+		if (macini->cri_key != NULL) {
+			padlock_setup_mackey(ses, macini->cri_key,
+			    macini->cri_klen);
 		}
-	} else {
-		bcopy(cri->cri_key, ses->ses_ekey, cri->cri_klen);
-		bcopy(cri->cri_key, ses->ses_dkey, cri->cri_klen);
 	}
 
 	*sidp = ses->ses_id;
@@ -336,6 +497,14 @@ padlock_freesession(void *arg __unused, uint64_t tid)
 		return (EINVAL);
 	}
 	TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
+	if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) {
+		bzero(ses->ses_ictx, sizeof(ses->ses_ictx));
+		free(ses->ses_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
+	}
+	if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) {
+		bzero(ses->ses_octx, sizeof(ses->ses_octx));
+		free(ses->ses_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
+	}
 	bzero(ses, sizeof(ses));
 	ses->ses_used = 0;
 	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
@@ -349,25 +518,46 @@ padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused)
 	struct padlock_softc *sc = padlock_sc;
 	struct padlock_session *ses;
 	union padlock_cw *cw;
-	struct cryptodesc *crd = NULL;
+	struct cryptodesc *crd, *enccrd, *maccrd;
 	uint32_t *key;
 	u_char *buf, *abuf;
-	int err = 0;
+	int error = 0;
 
 	buf = NULL;
-	if (crp == NULL || crp->crp_callback == NULL) {
-		err = EINVAL;
+	if (crp == NULL || crp->crp_callback == NULL || crp->crp_desc == NULL) {
+		error = EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	crd = crp->crp_desc;
-	if (crd == NULL || crd->crd_next != NULL ||
-	    crd->crd_alg != CRYPTO_AES_CBC || 
-	    (crd->crd_len % 16) != 0) {
-		err = EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+
+	enccrd = maccrd = NULL;
+	for (crd = crp->crp_desc; crd != NULL; crd = crd->crd_next) {
+		switch (crd->crd_alg) {
+		case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
+		case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
+			if (maccrd != NULL) {
+				error = EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			maccrd = crd;
+			break;
+		case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
+			if (enccrd != NULL) {
+				error = EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			enccrd = crd;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return (EINVAL);
+		}
 	}
-	if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) {
-		err = EINVAL;
+	if (enccrd == NULL || (enccrd->crd_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) {
+		error = EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -378,103 +568,88 @@ padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused)
 	}
 	mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx);
 	if (ses == NULL) {
-		err = EINVAL;
+		error = EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	buf = malloc(crd->crd_len + 16, M_DEVBUF, M_NOWAIT);
+	buf = malloc(enccrd->crd_len + 16, M_DEVBUF, M_NOWAIT);
 	if (buf == NULL) {
-		err = ENOMEM;
+		error = ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/* Buffer has to be 16 bytes aligned. */
 	abuf = buf + 16 - ((uintptr_t)buf % 16);
 
+	if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0)
+		padlock_setup_enckey(ses, enccrd->crd_key, enccrd->crd_klen);
+	if (maccrd != NULL && (maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0)
+		padlock_setup_mackey(ses, maccrd->crd_key, maccrd->crd_klen);
+
 	cw = &ses->ses_cw;
 	cw->cw_filler0 = 0;
 	cw->cw_filler1 = 0;
 	cw->cw_filler2 = 0;
 	cw->cw_filler3 = 0;
-	if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
+	if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
 		cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT;
 		key = ses->ses_ekey;
-		if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
-			bcopy(crd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16);
-
-		if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) {
-			if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
-				m_copyback((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf,
-				    crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
-			} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
-				cuio_copyback((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf,
-				    crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
-			} else {
-				bcopy(ses->ses_iv,
-				    crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_inject, 16);
-			}
+		if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
+			bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16);
+
+		if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) {
+			crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
+			    enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv);
 		}
 	} else {
 		cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_DECRYPT;
 		key = ses->ses_dkey;
-		if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
-			bcopy(crd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16);
+		if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
+			bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
 		else {
-			if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
-				m_copydata((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf,
-				    crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
-			} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
-				cuio_copydata((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf,
-				    crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
-			} else {
-				bcopy(crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_inject,
-				    ses->ses_iv, 16);
-			}
+			crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
+			    enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv);
 		}
 	}
 
-	if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
-		m_copydata((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
-		    crd->crd_len, abuf);
-	} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
-		cuio_copydata((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
-		    crd->crd_len, abuf);
-	} else {
-		bcopy(crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_skip, abuf, crd->crd_len);
+	/* Perform data authentication if requested before encryption. */
+	if (maccrd != NULL && maccrd->crd_next == enccrd) {
+		error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf,
+		    crp->crp_flags);
+		if (error != 0)
+			goto out;
 	}
 
-	padlock_cbc(abuf, abuf, crd->crd_len / 16, key, cw, ses->ses_iv);
+	crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip,
+	    enccrd->crd_len, abuf);
 
-	if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
-		m_copyback((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
-		    crd->crd_len, abuf);
-	} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
-		cuio_copyback((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
-		    crd->crd_len, abuf);
-	} else {
-		bcopy(abuf, crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len);
+	padlock_cbc(abuf, abuf, enccrd->crd_len / 16, key, cw, ses->ses_iv);
+
+	crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip,
+	    enccrd->crd_len, abuf);
+
+	/* Perform data authentication if requested after encryption. */
+	if (maccrd != NULL && enccrd->crd_next == maccrd) {
+		error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf,
+		    crp->crp_flags);
+		if (error != 0)
+			goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* copy out last block for use as next session IV */
-	if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
-		if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
-			m_copydata((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf,
-			    crd->crd_skip + crd->crd_len - 16, 16, ses->ses_iv);
-		} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
-			cuio_copydata((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf,
-			    crd->crd_skip + crd->crd_len - 16, 16, ses->ses_iv);
-		} else {
-			bcopy(crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_skip + crd->crd_len - 16,
-			    ses->ses_iv, 16);
-		}
+	if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
+		crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
+		    enccrd->crd_skip + enccrd->crd_len - AES_BLOCK_LEN,
+		    AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv);
 	}
 
 out:
 	if (buf != NULL) {
-		bzero(buf, crd->crd_len + 16);
+		bzero(buf, enccrd->crd_len + 16);
 		free(buf, M_DEVBUF);
 	}
-	crp->crp_etype = err;
+	crp->crp_etype = error;
 	crypto_done(crp);
-	return (err);
+	return (error);
 }
 
 static int