diff options
| author | Kevin Bowling <kbowling@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-08-19 03:28:59 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kevin Bowling <kbowling@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-09-17 17:01:41 +0000 |
| commit | 3bdc281f5df0003d745b4e911f5d583bf5938317 (patch) | |
| tree | 84ea62e845e329732a17a2559925945b5c846671 /sys/modules/ppbus/(developers-only) | |
| parent | e70ff92d243104834ad40581c3562a55d7525cc8 (diff) | |
The SR-IOV schema enables MAC anti-spoofing by default, but the driver
never programs the VSI security section. A VF can therefore transmit
with an arbitrary source address despite the configured policy.
Program ICE_AQ_VSI_SEC_FLAG_ENA_MAC_ANTI_SPOOF when the VF VSI is
created, and replay the policy when the VSI is rebuilt after a PF or
device reset. Fail VF creation or rebuild when firmware cannot install
the security policy so an unprotected VF is never published as active.
Validated on E810 hardware with host-attached and Linux passthrough
VFs. Traffic using the assigned source MAC passed while otherwise
identical forged-source frames were dropped. After a PF reset, assigned
traffic resumed and zero of ten forged frames reached the peer.
An injected MAC anti-spoof update failure left the VF inactive.
Destroying and recreating the SR-IOV configuration restored the policy
and traffic.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: BBOX.io
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D59022
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/modules/ppbus/(developers-only)')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
