Eliminate now-unused SUSER_ALLOWJAIL arguments to priv_check_cred(); in

some cases, move to priv_check() if it was an operation on a thread and
no other flags were present.

Eliminate caller-side jail exception checking (also now-unused); jail
privilege exception code now goes solely in kern_jail.c.

We can't yet eliminate suser() due to some cases in the KAME code where
a privilege check is performed and then used in many different deferred
paths.  Do, however, move those prototypes to priv.h.

Reviewed by:	csjp
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project

6 files changed, 14 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c
index d7d829052a36..61f2894706c4 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c
@@ -340,13 +340,13 @@ in_pcbbind_setup(struct inpcb *inp, struct sockaddr *nam, in_addr_t *laddrp,
 			if (ntohs(lport) <= ipport_reservedhigh &&
 			    ntohs(lport) >= ipport_reservedlow &&
 			    priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
+			    0))
 				return (EACCES);
 			if (jailed(cred))
 				prison = 1;
 			if (!IN_MULTICAST(ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr)) &&
 			    priv_check_cred(so->so_cred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) != 0) {
+			    PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT, 0) != 0) {
 				t = in_pcblookup_local(inp->inp_pcbinfo,
 				    sin->sin_addr, lport,
 				    prison ? 0 :  INPLOOKUP_WILDCARD);
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ in_pcbbind_setup(struct inpcb *inp, struct sockaddr *nam, in_addr_t *laddrp,
 			lastport = &pcbinfo->ipi_lasthi;
 		} else if (inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) {
 			error = priv_check_cred(cred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT, 0);
 			if (error)
 				return error;
 			first = ipport_lowfirstauto;	/* 1023 */
diff --git a/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c b/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
index 3eef187c4fbe..5329c6c2df6f 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
@@ -607,13 +607,8 @@ rip_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
 
 	inp = sotoinpcb(so);
 	KASSERT(inp == NULL, ("rip_attach: inp != NULL"));
-	/*
-	 * XXXRW: Centralize privilege decision in kern_jail.c.
-	 */
-	if (jailed(td->td_ucred) && !jail_allow_raw_sockets)
-		return (EPERM);
-	error = priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_RAW,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+
+	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_NETINET_RAW);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	if (proto >= IPPROTO_MAX || proto < 0)
diff --git a/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c b/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
index a803eca1c38b..5423208e046f 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/sctp_pcb.c
@@ -2155,10 +2155,7 @@ sctp_inpcb_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *addr, struct thread *p)
 		/* got to be root to get at low ports */
 		if (ntohs(lport) < IPPORT_RESERVED) {
 			if (p && (error =
-			    priv_check_cred(p->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL
-			    )
+			    priv_check(p, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT)
 			    )) {
 				SCTP_INP_DECR_REF(inp);
 				SCTP_INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
@@ -2228,10 +2225,7 @@ sctp_inpcb_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *addr, struct thread *p)
 			last = ipport_hilastauto;
 		} else if (ip_inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) {
 			if (p && (error =
-			    priv_check_cred(p->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL
-			    )
+			    priv_check(p, PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT)
 			    )) {
 				SCTP_INP_DECR_REF(inp);
 				SCTP_INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
diff --git a/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
index cc69ba11f3a4..0bd92b31d88e 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
@@ -386,13 +386,8 @@ sctp_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	/* FIX, for non-bsd is this right? */
 	vrf_id = SCTP_DEFAULT_VRFID;
 
-	/*
-	 * XXXRW: Other instances of getcred use SUSER_ALLOWJAIL, as socket
-	 * visibility is scoped using cr_canseesocket(), which it is not
-	 * here.
-	 */
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
+
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 
@@ -3439,9 +3434,8 @@ sctp_setopt(struct socket *so, int optname, void *optval, size_t optsize,
 		{
 			union sctp_sockstore *ss;
 
-			error = priv_check_cred(curthread->td_ucred,
-			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT,
-			    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+			error = priv_check(curthread,
+			    PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT);
 			if (error)
 				break;
 
diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c
index 2f300d5b4667..64c53641360b 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c
@@ -1019,8 +1019,7 @@ tcp_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = SYSCTL_IN(req, addrs, sizeof(addrs));
@@ -1064,8 +1063,7 @@ tcp6_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error, mapped = 0;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = SYSCTL_IN(req, addrs, sizeof(addrs));
diff --git a/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c b/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
index 96dc044cd327..f6031d6d524d 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
@@ -696,8 +696,7 @@ udp_getcred(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 	int error;
 
-	error = priv_check_cred(req->td->td_ucred, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED,
-	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
+	error = priv_check(req->td, PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);
 	error = SYSCTL_IN(req, addrs, sizeof(addrs));