1 files changed, 0 insertions, 111 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/doc/html/_sources/formats/cookie.rst.txt b/crypto/krb5/doc/html/_sources/formats/cookie.rst.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c7d0b03cf3c..000000000000
--- a/crypto/krb5/doc/html/_sources/formats/cookie.rst.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-.. highlight:: abnf
-
-KDC cookie format
-=================
-
-:rfc:`6113` section 5.2 specifies a pa-data type PA-FX-COOKIE, which
-clients are required to reflect back to the KDC during
-pre-authentication.  The MIT krb5 KDC uses the following formats for
-cookies.
-
-
-Trivial cookie (version 0)
---------------------------
-
-If there is no pre-authentication mechanism state information to save,
-a trivial cookie containing the value "MIT" is used.  A trivial cookie
-is needed to indicate that the conversation can continue.
-
-
-Secure cookie (version 1)
--------------------------
-
-In release 1.14 and later, a secure cookie can be sent if there is any
-mechanism state to save for the next request.  A secure cookie
-contains the concatenation of the following:
-
-* the four bytes "MIT1"
-* a four-byte big-endian kvno value
-* an :rfc:`3961` ciphertext
-
-The ciphertext is encrypted in the cookie key with key usage
-number 513.  The cookie key is derived from a key in the local krbtgt
-principal entry for the realm (e.g. ``krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM@KRBTEST.COM``
-if the request is to the ``KRBTEST.COM`` realm).  The first krbtgt key
-for the indicated kvno value is combined with the client principal as
-follows::
-
-    cookie-key <- random-to-key(PRF+(tgt-key, "COOKIE" | client-princ))
-
-where **random-to-key** is the :rfc:`3961` random-to-key operation for
-the krbtgt key's encryption type, **PRF+** is defined in :rfc:`6113`,
-and ``|`` denotes concatenation.  *client-princ* is the request client
-principal name with realm, marshalled according to :rfc:`1964` section
-2.1.1.
-
-The plain text of the encrypted part of a cookie is the DER encoding
-of the following ASN.1 type:
-
-.. code-block:: bnf
-
-    SecureCookie ::= SEQUENCE {
-        time     INTEGER,
-        data     SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-        ...
-    }
-
-The time field represents the cookie creation time; for brevity, it is
-encoded as an integer giving the POSIX timestamp rather than as an
-ASN.1 GeneralizedTime value.  The data field contains one element for
-each pre-authentication type which requires saved state.  For
-mechanisms which have separate request and reply types, the request
-type is used; this allows the KDC to determine whether a cookie is
-relevant to a request by comparing the request pa-data types to the
-cookie data types.
-
-SPAKE cookie format (version 1)
--------------------------------
-
-Inside the SecureCookie wrapper, a data value of type 151 contains
-state for SPAKE pre-authentication.  This data has the following
-binary format with big-endian integer encoding:
-
-.. code-block:: bnf
-
-    cookie ::=
-        version (16 bits) [with the value 1]
-        stage number (16 bits)
-        group number (32 bits)
-        SPAKE value length (32 bits)
-        SPAKE value
-        transcript hash length (32 bits)
-        transcript hash
-        second factor record 1 (factor-record)
-        second factor record 2 (factor-record)
-        ...
-
-    factor-record ::=
-        second factor type (32 bits)
-        second factor data length (32 bits)
-        second factor data
-
-The stage value is 0 if the cookie was sent with a challenge message.
-Otherwise it is 1 for the first encdata message sent by the KDC during
-an exchange, 2 for the second, etc..
-
-The group value indicates the group number used in the SPAKE challenge.
-
-For a stage-0 cookie, the SPAKE value is the KDC private key,
-represented in the scalar marshalling form of the group.  For other
-cookies, the SPAKE value is the SPAKE result K, represented in the
-group element marshalling form.
-
-For a stage-0 cookie, the transcript hash is the intermediate hash
-after updating with the client support message (if one was sent) and
-challenge.  For other cookies it is the final hash.
-
-For a stage-0 cookie, there may be any number of second-factor
-records, including none; a second-factor type need not create a state
-field if it does not need one, and no record is created for SF-NONE.
-For other cookies, there must be exactly one second-factor record
-corresponding to the factor type chosen by the client.