diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c | 701 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 701 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c deleted file mode 100644 index 86ee9d893995..000000000000 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,701 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */ -/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp. - * Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com - * Jim Guilford - * Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com - * Maxim.Perminov@intel.com - * Ying.Huang@intel.com - * - * More information about algorithm used can be found at: - * http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - */ - -#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# include <openssl/rsa.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> - -/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */ -#undef COMPILE_RSAX - -#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) -# define COMPILE_RSAX -static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void); -#endif - -void ENGINE_load_rsax(void) -{ -/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */ -#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX - ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax(); - if (!toadd) - return; - ENGINE_add(toadd); - ENGINE_free(toadd); - ERR_clear_error(); -#endif -} - -#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX -# define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine" - -static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e); -static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e); -static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e); -static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* RSA stuff */ -static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, - BN_CTX *ctx); -static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r); -# endif - -static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = { - {0, NULL, NULL, 0} -}; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ -static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa = { - "Intel RSA-X method", - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL, - e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp, - NULL, - NULL, - e_rsax_rsa_finish, - RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, - NULL, - NULL, - NULL -}; -# endif - -/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ -static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax"; -static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support"; - -/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */ -static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e) -{ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - const RSA_METHOD *meth1; -# endif - if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) || - !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) || -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) || -# endif - !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) || - !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) || - !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) || - !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) || - !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns)) - return 0; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc; - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec; - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc; - e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec; - e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp; -# endif - return 1; -} - -static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void) -{ - ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); - if (!ret) - return NULL; - if (!bind_helper(ret)) { - ENGINE_free(ret); - return NULL; - } - return ret; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */ -static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1; -# endif - -static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e) -{ - return 1; -} - -/* (de)initialisation functions. */ -static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e) -{ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1) - rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); -# endif - if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e) -{ - return 1; -} - -static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) -{ - int to_return = 1; - - switch (cmd) { - /* The command isn't understood by this engine */ - default: - to_return = 0; - break; - } - - return to_return; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - -# ifdef _WIN32 -typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64; -# else -typedef unsigned long long UINT64; -# endif -typedef unsigned short UINT16; - -/* - * Table t is interleaved in the following manner: The order in memory is - * t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ... A particular 512-bit value is - * stored in t[][index] rather than the more normal t[index][]; i.e. the - * qwords of a particular entry in t are not adjacent in memory - */ - -/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */ -static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array); - -/* - * Extract array elements from BIGNUM b To set the whole array from b, call - * with n=8 - */ -static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n, - UINT64 *array); - -struct mod_ctx_512 { - UINT64 t[8][8]; - UINT64 m[8]; - UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^278 % m */ - UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */ - UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */ -}; - -static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data); - -void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ - UINT64 *g, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ - UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ - struct mod_ctx_512 *data); - -typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx { - UINT64 type; - union { - struct mod_ctx_512 b512; - } ctx; - -} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX; - -static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM *m) -{ - E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr; - - if (idx < 0 || idx > 2) - return NULL; - - hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx); - if (!hptr) { - hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3 * sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX)); - if (!hptr) - return NULL; - hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type = hptr[0].type = 0; - RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr); - } - - if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m)) - return hptr + idx; - - if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) { - UINT64 _m[8]; - bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m); - memset(&hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512)); - mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512); - } - - hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m); - return hptr + idx; -} - -static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) -{ - E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx); - if (hptr) { - OPENSSL_free(hptr); - RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL); - } - if (rsa->_method_mod_n) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - if (rsa->_method_mod_p) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - if (rsa->_method_mod_q) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - return 1; -} - -static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e, - const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, - BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont, - E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *rsax_mod_ctx) -{ - if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { - if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) { - UINT64 _r[8]; - UINT64 _g[8]; - UINT64 _e[8]; - - /* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */ - bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g); - bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e); - - mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512); - /* Return the result in the BIGNUM */ - interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r); - return 1; - } - } - - return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont); -} - -/* - * Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular - * exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the - * necessary values. These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in the - * target openssl. - */ - -/* - * Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into - * an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM - */ -static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n, - UINT64 *array) -{ - int i; - UINT64 tmp; - unsigned char bn_buff[64]; - memset(bn_buff, 0, 64); - if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) { - printf("Can't support this byte size\n"); - return 0; - } - if (BN_num_bytes(b) != 0) { - if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff + (64 - BN_num_bytes(b)))) { - printf("Error's in bn2bin\n"); - /* We have to error, here */ - return 0; - } - } - while (n-- > 0) { - array[n] = 0; - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { - tmp = bn_buff[63 - (n * 8 + i)]; - array[n] |= tmp << (8 * i); - } - } - return 1; -} - -/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */ -static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array) -{ - unsigned char tmp[64]; - int n = 8; - int i; - while (n-- > 0) { - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { - tmp[63 - (n * 8 + i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n] >> (8 * i)); - }} - BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b); - return 0; -} - -/* The main 512bit precompute call */ -static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data) -{ - BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2; - - /* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */ - BN_CTX *ctx; - /* Some tmps */ - UINT64 _t[8]; - int i, j, ret = 0; - - /* Init _m with m */ - BN_init(&_m); - interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m); - memset(_t, 0, 64); - - /* Inits */ - BN_init(&two_768); - BN_init(&two_640); - BN_init(&two_128); - BN_init(&two_512); - BN_init(&tmp); - BN_init(&tmp2); - - /* Create our context */ - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { - goto err; - } - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - /* - * For production, if you care, these only need to be set once, - * and may be made constants. - */ - BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768); - BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640); - BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128); - BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512); - - if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) { - goto err; - } - if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) { /* Odd modulus required for Mont */ - goto err; - } - - /* Precompute m1 */ - BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx); - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) { - goto err; - } - - /* Precompute m2 */ - BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx); - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) { - goto err; - } - - /* - * Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should - * be non-negative. - */ - BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx); - if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) { - BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp); - } - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) { - goto err; - } - - /* Precompute t */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - BN_zero(&tmp); - if (i & 1) { - BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); - } - if (i & 2) { - BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); - } - if (i & 4) { - BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp); - } - - BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx); - if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) { - goto err; - } - for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) - data->t[j][i] = _t[j]; - } - - /* Precompute m */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - data->m[i] = m[i]; - } - - ret = 1; - - err: - /* Cleanup */ - if (ctx != NULL) { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - BN_free(&two_768); - BN_free(&two_640); - BN_free(&two_128); - BN_free(&two_512); - BN_free(&tmp); - BN_free(&tmp2); - BN_free(&_m); - - return ret; -} - -static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, - BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; - BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; - BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; - int ret = 0; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - - { - BIGNUM local_p, local_q; - BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; - int error = 0; - - /* - * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) - */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - BN_init(&local_p); - p = &local_p; - BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - BN_init(&local_q); - q = &local_q; - BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else { - p = rsa->p; - q = rsa->q; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) - error = 1; - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) - error = 1; - } - - /* clean up */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - BN_free(&local_p); - BN_free(&local_q); - } - if (error) - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - dmq1 = &local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; - - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0, - rsa->q))) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - dmp1 = &local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; - - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1, - rsa->p))) - goto err; - - if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) - goto err; - /* - * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the - * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - pr1 = &local_r1; - BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - pr1 = r1; - if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* - * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' - * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can - * break the private key operations: the following second correction - * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen - * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) - goto err; - - if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp - (vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n, - e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n))) - goto err; - - /* - * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will - * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the - * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for - * absolute equality, just congruency. - */ - if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) - if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) - goto err; - if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { - /* - * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak - * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and - * return that instead. - */ - - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } else - d = rsa->d; - if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, - rsa->n))) - goto err; - } - } - ret = 1; - - err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - - return ret; -} -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ -#endif /* !COMPILE_RSAX */ |