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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod83
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod
index c7dbb6b6c275..d7a423c30b29 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod
+++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/man3/CMS_verify.pod
@@ -15,50 +15,58 @@ CMS_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS SignedData structure
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-CMS_verify() verifies a CMS SignedData structure. B<cms> is the CMS_ContentInfo
-structure to verify. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for
-the signing certificate(s). B<store> is a trusted certificate store used for
-chain verification. B<indata> is the detached content if the content is not
-present in B<cms>. The content is written to B<out> if it is not NULL.
-
-B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify
-operation.
-
-CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from B<cms>, it may only
+CMS_verify() is very similar to L<PKCS7_verify(3)>. It verifies a
+B<CMS SignedData> structure contained in a structure of type B<CMS_ContentInfo>.
+I<cms> points to the B<CMS_ContentInfo> structure to verify.
+The optional I<certs> parameter refers to a set of certificates
+in which to search for signing certificates.
+I<cms> may contain extra untrusted CA certificates that may be used for
+chain building as well as CRLs that may be used for certificate validation.
+I<store> may be NULL or point to
+the trusted certificate store to use for chain verification.
+I<indata> refers to the signed data if the content is detached from I<cms>.
+Otherwise I<indata> should be NULL and the signed data must be in I<cms>.
+The content is written to the BIO I<out> unless it is NULL.
+I<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the operation.
+
+CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from I<cms>, it may only
be called after a successful CMS_verify() operation.
=head1 VERIFY PROCESS
Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
-Initially some sanity checks are performed on B<cms>. The type of B<cms> must
+Initially some sanity checks are performed on I<cms>. The type of I<cms> must
be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
-the content is detached B<indata> cannot be B<NULL>.
+the content is detached I<indata> cannot be NULL.
An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s), first looking in
-the B<certs> parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in any
-certificates contained in the B<cms> structure itself. If any signing
-certificate cannot be located the operation fails.
+the I<certs> parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in any
+certificates contained in the I<cms> structure unless B<CMS_NOINTERN> is set.
+If any signing certificate cannot be located the operation fails.
-Each signing certificate is chain verified using the B<smimesign> purpose and
-the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message
-are used as untrusted CAs. If CRL checking is enabled in B<store> any internal
-CRLs are used in addition to attempting to look them up in B<store>. If any
-chain verify fails an error code is returned.
+Each signing certificate is chain verified using the I<smimesign> purpose and
+using the trusted certificate store I<store> if supplied.
+Any internal certificates in the message, which may have been added using
+L<CMS_add1_cert(3)>, are used as untrusted CAs.
+If CRL checking is enabled in I<store> and B<CMS_NOCRL> is not set,
+any internal CRLs, which may have been added using L<CMS_add1_crl(3)>,
+are used in addition to attempting to look them up in I<store>.
+If I<store> is not NULL and any chain verify fails an error code is returned.
-Finally the signed content is read (and written to B<out> if it is not NULL)
-and the signature's checked.
+Finally the signed content is read (and written to I<out> unless it is NULL)
+and the signature is checked.
-If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.
+If all signatures verify correctly then the function is successful.
-Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags>
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the I<flags>
parameter to change the default verify behaviour.
If B<CMS_NOINTERN> is set the certificates in the message itself are not
-searched when locating the signing certificate(s). This means that all the
-signing certificates must be in the B<certs> parameter.
+searched when locating the signing certificate(s).
+This means that all the signing certificates must be in the I<certs> parameter.
-If B<CMS_NOCRL> is set and CRL checking is enabled in B<store> then any
+If B<CMS_NOCRL> is set and CRL checking is enabled in I<store> then any
CRLs in the message itself are ignored.
If the B<CMS_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
@@ -66,7 +74,7 @@ from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
returned.
If B<CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY> is set the signing certificates are not
-verified.
+chain verified.
If B<CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY> is set the signed attributes signature is not
verified.
@@ -77,20 +85,20 @@ If B<CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY> is set then the content digest is not checked.
One application of B<CMS_NOINTERN> is to only accept messages signed by
a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed
-in the B<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the
-certificates supplied in B<certs> then the verify will fail because the
+in the I<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer certificate is not one
+of the certificates supplied in I<certs> then the verify will fail because the
signer cannot be found.
In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and validating
certificates are not appropriate: for example an application may wish to
lookup certificates in a database or perform customised verification. This
-can be achieved by setting and verifying the signers certificates manually
+can be achieved by setting and verifying the signer certificates manually
using the signed data utility functions.
Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example
setting B<CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY> will totally disable all content verification
and any modified content will be considered valid. This combination is however
-useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B<out> and its validity
+useful if one merely wishes to write the content to I<out> and its validity
is not considered important.
Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather
@@ -100,8 +108,7 @@ timestamp).
=head1 RETURN VALUES
-CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an error
-occurred.
+CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and 0 if an error occurred.
CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred.
@@ -109,8 +116,8 @@ The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>
=head1 BUGS
-The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing certificate,
-this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE>
+The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing certificate.
+This is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE>
functionality.
The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must all
@@ -118,11 +125,13 @@ be held in memory if it is not detached.
=head1 SEE ALSO
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<CMS_add1_cert(3)>, L<CMS_add1_crl(3)>,
+L<OSSL_ESS_check_signing_certs(3)>,
L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_sign(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2008-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy