diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c | 525 |
1 files changed, 525 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ba834ac36d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,525 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2019-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * This implements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final + * section 5.1 ("counter mode") and section 5.2 ("feedback mode") in both HMAC + * and CMAC. That document does not name the KDFs it defines; the name is + * derived from + * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/Key-Derivation + * + * Note that section 5.3 ("double-pipeline mode") is not implemented, though + * it would be possible to do so in the future. + * + * These versions all assume the counter is used. It would be relatively + * straightforward to expose a configuration handle should the need arise. + * + * Variable names attempt to match those of SP800-108. + */ + +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> +#include <openssl/kdf.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> + +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "crypto/evp.h" +#include "internal/numbers.h" +#include "internal/endian.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "prov/provider_util.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "prov/securitycheck.h" +#include "internal/e_os.h" +#include "internal/params.h" + +#define ossl_min(a, b) ((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b) + +typedef enum { + COUNTER = 0, + FEEDBACK +} kbkdf_mode; + +/* Our context structure. */ +typedef struct { + void *provctx; + kbkdf_mode mode; + EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init; + + /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */ + int r; + unsigned char *ki; + size_t ki_len; + unsigned char *label; + size_t label_len; + unsigned char *context; + size_t context_len; + unsigned char *iv; + size_t iv_len; + int use_l; + int is_kmac; + int use_separator; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_DECLARE +} KBKDF; + +/* Definitions needed for typechecking. */ +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kbkdf_new; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kbkdf_dup; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kbkdf_free; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn kbkdf_reset; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kbkdf_derive; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_set_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_get_ctx_params; + +/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */ +static uint32_t be32(uint32_t host) +{ + uint32_t big = 0; + DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN; + + if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) + return host; + + big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24; + big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8; + big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8; + big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24; + return big; +} + +static void init(KBKDF *ctx) +{ + ctx->r = 32; + ctx->use_l = 1; + ctx->use_separator = 1; + ctx->is_kmac = 0; +} + +static void *kbkdf_new(void *provctx) +{ + KBKDF *ctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); + if (ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + ctx->provctx = provctx; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_INIT(ctx) + init(ctx); + return ctx; +} + +static void kbkdf_free(void *vctx) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + + if (ctx != NULL) { + kbkdf_reset(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); + } +} + +static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + void *provctx = ctx->provctx; + + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->provctx = provctx; + init(ctx); +} + +static void *kbkdf_dup(void *vctx) +{ + const KBKDF *src = (const KBKDF *)vctx; + KBKDF *dest; + + dest = kbkdf_new(src->provctx); + if (dest != NULL) { + dest->ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(src->ctx_init); + if (dest->ctx_init == NULL + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->ki, src->ki_len, + &dest->ki, &dest->ki_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->label, src->label_len, + &dest->label, &dest->label_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->context, src->context_len, + &dest->context, &dest->context_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->iv, src->iv_len, + &dest->iv, &dest->iv_len)) + goto err; + dest->mode = src->mode; + dest->r = src->r; + dest->use_l = src->use_l; + dest->use_separator = src->use_separator; + dest->is_kmac = src->is_kmac; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_COPY(dest, src) + } + return dest; + + err: + kbkdf_free(dest); + return NULL; +} + +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE +static int fips_kbkdf_key_check_passed(KBKDF *ctx) +{ + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx); + int key_approved = ossl_kdf_check_key_size(ctx->ki_len); + + if (!key_approved) { + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, + libctx, "KBKDF", "Key size", + ossl_fips_config_kbkdf_key_check)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* SP800-108 section 5.1 or section 5.2 depending on mode. */ +static int derive(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init, kbkdf_mode mode, unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + unsigned char *context, size_t context_len, + unsigned char *k_i, size_t h, uint32_t l, int has_separator, + unsigned char *ko, size_t ko_len, int r) +{ + int ret = 0; + EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; + size_t written = 0, to_write, k_i_len = iv_len; + const unsigned char zero = 0; + uint32_t counter, i; + /* + * From SP800-108: + * The fixed input data is a concatenation of a Label, + * a separation indicator 0x00, the Context, and L. + * One or more of these fixed input data fields may be omitted. + * + * has_separator == 0 means that the separator is omitted. + * Passing a value of l == 0 means that L is omitted. + * The Context and L are omitted automatically if a NULL buffer is passed. + */ + int has_l = (l != 0); + + /* Setup K(0) for feedback mode. */ + if (iv_len > 0) + memcpy(k_i, iv, iv_len); + + for (counter = 1; written < ko_len; counter++) { + i = be32(counter); + + ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto done; + + /* Perform feedback, if appropriate. */ + if (mode == FEEDBACK && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, k_i, k_i_len)) + goto done; + + if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, 4 - (r / 8) + (unsigned char *)&i, r / 8) + || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, label, label_len) + || (has_separator && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &zero, 1)) + || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, context_len) + || (has_l && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&l, 4)) + || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, k_i, NULL, h)) + goto done; + + to_write = ko_len - written; + memcpy(ko + written, k_i, ossl_min(to_write, h)); + written += h; + + k_i_len = h; + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; + } + + ret = 1; +done: + EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +/* This must be run before the key is set */ +static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom, size_t customlen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2]; + + if (custom == NULL || customlen == 0) + return 1; + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM, + (void *)custom, customlen); + params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) > 0; +} + +static int kmac_derive(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2]; + + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &outlen); + params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) > 0 + && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, contextlen) + && EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, outlen); +} + +static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *k_i = NULL; + uint32_t l = 0; + size_t h = 0; + uint64_t counter_max; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kbkdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) + return 0; + + /* label, context, and iv are permitted to be empty. Check everything + * else. */ + if (ctx->ctx_init == NULL) { + if (ctx->ki_len == 0 || ctx->ki == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET); + return 0; + } + /* Could either be missing MAC or missing message digest or missing + * cipher - arbitrarily, I pick this one. */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC); + return 0; + } + + /* Fail if the output length is zero */ + if (keylen == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->is_kmac) { + ret = kmac_derive(ctx->ctx_init, key, keylen, + ctx->context, ctx->context_len); + goto done; + } + + h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init); + if (h == 0) + goto done; + + if (ctx->iv_len != 0 && ctx->iv_len != h) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH); + goto done; + } + + if (ctx->mode == COUNTER) { + /* Fail if keylen is too large for r */ + counter_max = (uint64_t)1 << (uint64_t)ctx->r; + if ((uint64_t)(keylen / h) >= counter_max) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + goto done; + } + } + + if (ctx->use_l != 0) + l = be32(keylen * 8); + + k_i = OPENSSL_zalloc(h); + if (k_i == NULL) + goto done; + + ret = derive(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->mode, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len, ctx->label, + ctx->label_len, ctx->context, ctx->context_len, k_i, h, l, + ctx->use_separator, key, keylen, ctx->r); +done: + if (ret != 1) + OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); + OPENSSL_clear_free(k_i, h); + return ret; +} + +static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx); + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (ossl_param_is_empty(params)) + return 1; + + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, params, + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK)) + return 0; + + if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->ctx_init, params, NULL, + NULL, NULL, libctx)) + return 0; + if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL) { + ctx->is_kmac = 0; + if (EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), + OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128) + || EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), + OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) { + ctx->is_kmac = 1; + } else if (!EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), + OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC) + && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), + OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MAC); + return 0; + } + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE); + if (p != NULL + && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { + ctx->mode = COUNTER; + } else if (p != NULL + && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("feedback", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { + ctx->mode = FEEDBACK; + } else if (p != NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE); + return 0; + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY); + if (p != NULL) { + if (ossl_param_get1_octet_string(p, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, + &ctx->ki, &ctx->ki_len) == 0) + return 0; +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + if (!fips_kbkdf_key_check_passed(ctx)) + return 0; +#endif + } + + if (ossl_param_get1_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, + &ctx->label, &ctx->label_len) == 0) + return 0; + + if (ossl_param_get1_concat_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, + &ctx->context, &ctx->context_len, + 0) == 0) + return 0; + + if (ossl_param_get1_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, + &ctx->iv, &ctx->iv_len) == 0) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_L); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_l)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_R); + if (p != NULL) { + int new_r = 0; + + if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &new_r)) + return 0; + if (new_r != 8 && new_r != 16 && new_r != 24 && new_r != 32) + return 0; + ctx->r = new_r; + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_SEPARATOR); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_separator)) + return 0; + + /* Set up digest context, if we can. */ + if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL && ctx->ki_len != 0) { + if ((ctx->is_kmac && !kmac_init(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->label, ctx->label_len)) + || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len, NULL)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CIPHER, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_L, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_SEPARATOR, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_R, NULL), + OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK) + OSSL_PARAM_END, + }; + return known_settable_ctx_params; +} + +static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; +#endif + OSSL_PARAM *p; + + /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */ + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX)) + return 0; + + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, params)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_FIPS_IND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAM() + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_kbkdf_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_new }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_dup }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_free }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_reset }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_derive }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void(*)(void))kbkdf_settable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_set_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void(*)(void))kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_get_ctx_params }, + OSSL_DISPATCH_END, +}; 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