diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c | 679 |
1 files changed, 679 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..63164d8b8fbe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,679 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2019-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "internal/e_os.h" +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> +#include "internal/packet.h" +#include "internal/der.h" +#include "internal/nelem.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/provider_util.h" +#include "prov/securitycheck.h" +#include "prov/der_wrap.h" + +#define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30) + +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn x942kdf_dup; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params; + +typedef struct { + void *provctx; + PROV_DIGEST digest; + unsigned char *secret; + size_t secret_len; + unsigned char *acvpinfo; + size_t acvpinfo_len; + unsigned char *partyuinfo, *partyvinfo, *supp_pubinfo, *supp_privinfo; + size_t partyuinfo_len, partyvinfo_len, supp_pubinfo_len, supp_privinfo_len; + size_t dkm_len; + const unsigned char *cek_oid; + size_t cek_oid_len; + int use_keybits; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_DECLARE +} KDF_X942; + +/* + * A table of allowed wrapping algorithms, oids and the associated output + * lengths. + * NOTE: RC2wrap and camellia128_wrap have been removed as there are no + * corresponding ciphers for these operations. + */ +static const struct { + const char *name; + const unsigned char *oid; + size_t oid_len; + size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */ +} kek_algs[] = { + { "AES-128-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes128_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes128_wrap, + 16 }, + { "AES-192-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes192_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes192_wrap, + 24 }, + { "AES-256-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes256_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes256_wrap, + 32 }, +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + { "DES3-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap, + DER_OID_SZ_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 }, +#endif +}; + +static int find_alg_id(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algname, + const char *propq, size_t *id) +{ + int ret = 1; + size_t i; + EVP_CIPHER *cipher; + + cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, algname, propq); + if (cipher != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(cipher, kek_algs[i].name)) { + *id = i; + goto end; + } + } + } + ret = 0; + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG); +end: + EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher); + return ret; +} + +static int DER_w_keyinfo(WPACKET *pkt, + const unsigned char *der_oid, size_t der_oidlen, + unsigned char **pcounter) +{ + return ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1) + /* Store the initial value of 1 into the counter */ + && ossl_DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, -1, 1) + /* Remember where we stored the counter in the buffer */ + && (pcounter == NULL + || (*pcounter = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt)) != NULL) + && ossl_DER_w_precompiled(pkt, -1, der_oid, der_oidlen) + && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1); +} + +static int der_encode_sharedinfo(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *der_oid, size_t der_oidlen, + const unsigned char *acvp, size_t acvplen, + const unsigned char *partyu, size_t partyulen, + const unsigned char *partyv, size_t partyvlen, + const unsigned char *supp_pub, size_t supp_publen, + const unsigned char *supp_priv, size_t supp_privlen, + uint32_t keylen_bits, unsigned char **pcounter) +{ + return (buf != NULL ? WPACKET_init_der(pkt, buf, buflen) : + WPACKET_init_null_der(pkt)) + && ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1) + && (supp_priv == NULL + || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 3, supp_priv, supp_privlen)) + && (supp_pub == NULL + || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 2, supp_pub, supp_publen)) + && (keylen_bits == 0 + || ossl_DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, 2, keylen_bits)) + && (partyv == NULL || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 1, partyv, partyvlen)) + && (partyu == NULL || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 0, partyu, partyulen)) + && (acvp == NULL || ossl_DER_w_precompiled(pkt, -1, acvp, acvplen)) + && DER_w_keyinfo(pkt, der_oid, der_oidlen, pcounter) + && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1) + && WPACKET_finish(pkt); +} + +/* + * Encode the other info structure. + * + * The ANS X9.42-2003 standard uses OtherInfo: + * + * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo, + * partyUInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + * partyVInfo [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + * suppPrivInfo [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + * } + * + * KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4) + * } + * + * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for OtherInfo + * + * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo, + * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING + * } + * Where suppPubInfo is the key length (in bits) (stored into 4 bytes) + * + * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into + * suppPubInfo (in bits). It is ignored if the value is 0. + * |cek_oid| The oid of the key wrapping algorithm. + * |cek_oidlen| The length (in bytes) of the key wrapping algorithm oid, + * |acvp| is the optional blob of DER data representing one or more of the + * OtherInfo fields related to |partyu|, |partyv|, |supp_pub| and |supp_priv|. + * This field should normally be NULL. If |acvp| is non NULL then |partyu|, + * |partyv|, |supp_pub| and |supp_priv| should all be NULL. + * |acvp_len| is the |acvp| length (in bytes). + * |partyu| is the optional public info contributed by the initiator. + * It can be NULL. (It is also used as the ukm by CMS). + * |partyu_len| is the |partyu| length (in bytes). + * |partyv| is the optional public info contributed by the responder. + * It can be NULL. + * |partyv_len| is the |partyv| length (in bytes). + * |supp_pub| is the optional additional, mutually-known public information. + * It can be NULL. |keylen| should be 0 if this is not NULL. + * |supp_pub_len| is the |supp_pub| length (in bytes). + * |supp_priv| is the optional additional, mutually-known private information. + * It can be NULL. + * |supp_priv_len| is the |supp_priv| length (in bytes). + * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller. + * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data. + * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the + * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without + * re-encoding. + * + * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise. + * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL. + */ +static int +x942_encode_otherinfo(size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *cek_oid, size_t cek_oid_len, + const unsigned char *acvp, size_t acvp_len, + const unsigned char *partyu, size_t partyu_len, + const unsigned char *partyv, size_t partyv_len, + const unsigned char *supp_pub, size_t supp_pub_len, + const unsigned char *supp_priv, size_t supp_priv_len, + unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len, + unsigned char **out_ctr) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *pcounter = NULL, *der_buf = NULL; + size_t der_buflen = 0; + WPACKET pkt; + uint32_t keylen_bits; + + /* keylenbits must fit into 4 bytes */ + if (keylen > 0xFFFFFF) + return 0; + keylen_bits = 8 * keylen; + + /* Calculate the size of the buffer */ + if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, NULL, 0, cek_oid, cek_oid_len, + acvp, acvp_len, + partyu, partyu_len, partyv, partyv_len, + supp_pub, supp_pub_len, supp_priv, supp_priv_len, + keylen_bits, NULL) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &der_buflen)) + goto err; + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + /* Alloc the buffer */ + der_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(der_buflen); + if (der_buf == NULL) + goto err; + /* Encode into the buffer */ + if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, der_buf, der_buflen, cek_oid, cek_oid_len, + acvp, acvp_len, + partyu, partyu_len, partyv, partyv_len, + supp_pub, supp_pub_len, supp_priv, supp_priv_len, + keylen_bits, &pcounter)) + goto err; + /* + * Since we allocated the exact size required, the buffer should point to the + * start of the allocated buffer at this point. + */ + if (WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt) != der_buf) + goto err; + + /* + * The data for the DER encoded octet string of a 32 bit counter = 1 + * should be 04 04 00 00 00 01 + * So just check the header is correct and skip over it. + * This counter will be incremented in the kdf update loop. + */ + if (pcounter == NULL + || pcounter[0] != 0x04 + || pcounter[1] != 0x04) + goto err; + *out_ctr = (pcounter + 2); + *der = der_buf; + *der_len = der_buflen; + ret = 1; +err: + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + return ret; +} + +static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md, + const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len, + const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len, + unsigned char *ctr, + unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len) +{ + int ret = 0, hlen; + size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len; + unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *out = derived_key; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; + + if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN + || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN + || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN + || derived_key_len == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + hlen = EVP_MD_get_size(kdf_md); + if (hlen <= 0) + return 0; + out_len = (size_t)hlen; + + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) + goto end; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md)) + goto end; + + for (counter = 1;; counter++) { + /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */ + ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff); + ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff); + ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff); + ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff); + + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len)) + goto end; + if (len >= out_len) { + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL)) + goto end; + out += out_len; + len -= out_len; + if (len == 0) + break; + } else { + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL)) + goto end; + memcpy(out, mac, len); + break; + } + } + ret = 1; +end: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init); + OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac)); + return ret; +} + +static void *x942kdf_new(void *provctx) +{ + KDF_X942 *ctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); + if (ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + ctx->provctx = provctx; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_INIT(ctx) + ctx->use_keybits = 1; + return ctx; +} + +static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx) +{ + KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx; + void *provctx = ctx->provctx; + + ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->acvpinfo, ctx->acvpinfo_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->partyuinfo, ctx->partyuinfo_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->partyvinfo, ctx->partyvinfo_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->supp_pubinfo, ctx->supp_pubinfo_len); + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->supp_privinfo, ctx->supp_privinfo_len); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->provctx = provctx; + ctx->use_keybits = 1; +} + +static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx) +{ + KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx; + + if (ctx != NULL) { + x942kdf_reset(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); + } +} + +static void *x942kdf_dup(void *vctx) +{ + const KDF_X942 *src = (const KDF_X942 *)vctx; + KDF_X942 *dest; + + dest = x942kdf_new(src->provctx); + if (dest != NULL) { + if (!ossl_prov_memdup(src->secret, src->secret_len, + &dest->secret , &dest->secret_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->acvpinfo, src->acvpinfo_len, + &dest->acvpinfo , &dest->acvpinfo_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->partyuinfo, src->partyuinfo_len, + &dest->partyuinfo , &dest->partyuinfo_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->partyvinfo, src->partyvinfo_len, + &dest->partyvinfo , &dest->partyvinfo_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->supp_pubinfo, src->supp_pubinfo_len, + &dest->supp_pubinfo, + &dest->supp_pubinfo_len) + || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->supp_privinfo, src->supp_privinfo_len, + &dest->supp_privinfo, + &dest->supp_privinfo_len) + || !ossl_prov_digest_copy(&dest->digest, &src->digest)) + goto err; + dest->cek_oid = src->cek_oid; + dest->cek_oid_len = src->cek_oid_len; + dest->dkm_len = src->dkm_len; + dest->use_keybits = src->use_keybits; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_COPY(dest, src) + } + return dest; + + err: + x942kdf_free(dest); + return NULL; +} + +static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len, + const OSSL_PARAM *p) +{ + if (p->data_size == 0 || p->data == NULL) + return 1; + + OPENSSL_free(*out); + *out = NULL; + return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len); +} + +static size_t x942kdf_size(KDF_X942 *ctx) +{ + int len; + const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest); + + if (md == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); + return 0; + } + len = EVP_MD_get_size(md); + return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len; +} + +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE +static int fips_x942kdf_key_check_passed(KDF_X942 *ctx) +{ + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx); + int key_approved = ossl_kdf_check_key_size(ctx->secret_len); + + if (!key_approved) { + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, + libctx, "X942KDF", "Key size", + ossl_fips_config_x942kdf_key_check)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx; + const EVP_MD *md; + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *ctr; + unsigned char *der = NULL; + size_t der_len = 0; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !x942kdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) + return 0; + + /* + * These 2 options encode to the same field so only one of them should be + * active at once. + */ + if (ctx->use_keybits && ctx->supp_pubinfo != NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PUBINFO); + return 0; + } + /* + * If the blob of acvp data is used then the individual info fields that it + * replaces should not also be defined. + */ + if (ctx->acvpinfo != NULL + && (ctx->partyuinfo != NULL + || ctx->partyvinfo != NULL + || ctx->supp_pubinfo != NULL + || ctx->supp_privinfo != NULL)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DATA); + return 0; + } + if (ctx->secret == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET); + return 0; + } + md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest); + if (md == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST); + return 0; + } + if (ctx->cek_oid == NULL || ctx->cek_oid_len == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG); + return 0; + } + if (ctx->partyuinfo != NULL && ctx->partyuinfo_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) { + /* + * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits if it is used. + * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done. + */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_UKM_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + /* generate the otherinfo der */ + if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->use_keybits ? ctx->dkm_len : 0, + ctx->cek_oid, ctx->cek_oid_len, + ctx->acvpinfo, ctx->acvpinfo_len, + ctx->partyuinfo, ctx->partyuinfo_len, + ctx->partyvinfo, ctx->partyvinfo_len, + ctx->supp_pubinfo, ctx->supp_pubinfo_len, + ctx->supp_privinfo, ctx->supp_privinfo_len, + &der, &der_len, &ctr)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING); + return 0; + } + ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len, + der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen); + OPENSSL_free(der); + return ret; +} + +static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + const OSSL_PARAM *p, *pq; + KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx; + OSSL_LIB_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx); + const char *propq = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md; + size_t id; + + if (ossl_param_is_empty(params)) + return 1; + + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, params, + OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK)) + return 0; + + if (OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST) != NULL) { + if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx)) + return 0; + md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest); + if (EVP_MD_xof(md)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XOF_DIGESTS_NOT_ALLOWED); + return 0; + } + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET); + if (p == NULL) + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY); + if (p != NULL) { + if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p)) + return 0; +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + if (!fips_x942kdf_key_check_passed(ctx)) + return 0; +#endif + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_ACVPINFO); + if (p != NULL + && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->acvpinfo, &ctx->acvpinfo_len, p)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYUINFO); + if (p == NULL) + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM); + if (p != NULL + && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->partyuinfo, &ctx->partyuinfo_len, p)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYVINFO); + if (p != NULL + && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->partyvinfo, &ctx->partyvinfo_len, p)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_keybits)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO); + if (p != NULL) { + if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->supp_pubinfo, &ctx->supp_pubinfo_len, p)) + return 0; + ctx->use_keybits = 0; + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO); + if (p != NULL + && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->supp_privinfo, &ctx->supp_privinfo_len, p)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG); + if (p != NULL) { + if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) + return 0; + pq = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES); + /* + * We already grab the properties during ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params() + * so there is no need to check the validity again.. + */ + if (pq != NULL) + propq = p->data; + if (find_alg_id(provctx, p->data, propq, &id) == 0) + return 0; + ctx->cek_oid = kek_algs[id].oid; + ctx->cek_oid_len = kek_algs[id].oid_len; + ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[id].keklen; + } + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_ACVPINFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYUINFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYVINFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0), + OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK) + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return known_settable_ctx_params; +} + +static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx; + OSSL_PARAM *p; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx))) + return 0; + + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, params)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_FIPS_IND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAM() + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_dup }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_derive }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void(*)(void))x942kdf_settable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_set_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void(*)(void))x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params }, + OSSL_DISPATCH_END +}; |