diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/macs/kmac_prov.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/macs/kmac_prov.c | 697 |
1 files changed, 697 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/macs/kmac_prov.c b/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/macs/kmac_prov.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8e583ed8f323 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/providers/implementations/macs/kmac_prov.c @@ -0,0 +1,697 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2018-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * See SP800-185 "Appendix A - KMAC, .... in Terms of Keccak[c]" + * + * Inputs are: + * K = Key (len(K) < 2^2040 bits) + * X = Input + * L = Output length (0 <= L < 2^2040 bits) + * S = Customization String Default="" (len(S) < 2^2040 bits) + * + * KMAC128(K, X, L, S) + * { + * newX = bytepad(encode_string(K), 168) || X || right_encode(L). + * T = bytepad(encode_string("KMAC") || encode_string(S), 168). + * return KECCAK[256](T || newX || 00, L). + * } + * + * KMAC256(K, X, L, S) + * { + * newX = bytepad(encode_string(K), 136) || X || right_encode(L). + * T = bytepad(encode_string("KMAC") || encode_string(S), 136). + * return KECCAK[512](T || newX || 00, L). + * } + * + * KMAC128XOF(K, X, L, S) + * { + * newX = bytepad(encode_string(K), 168) || X || right_encode(0). + * T = bytepad(encode_string("KMAC") || encode_string(S), 168). + * return KECCAK[256](T || newX || 00, L). + * } + * + * KMAC256XOF(K, X, L, S) + * { + * newX = bytepad(encode_string(K), 136) || X || right_encode(0). + * T = bytepad(encode_string("KMAC") || encode_string(S), 136). + * return KECCAK[512](T || newX || 00, L). + * } + * + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/params.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/proverr.h> +#include <openssl/fips_names.h> +#include "prov/securitycheck.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "prov/provider_util.h" +#include "prov/providercommon.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" /* ossl_assert */ + +/* + * Forward declaration of everything implemented here. This is not strictly + * necessary for the compiler, but provides an assurance that the signatures + * of the functions in the dispatch table are correct. + */ +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_newctx_fn kmac128_new; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_newctx_fn kmac256_new; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_dupctx_fn kmac_dup; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_freectx_fn kmac_free; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_gettable_ctx_params_fn kmac_gettable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_get_ctx_params_fn kmac_get_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_settable_ctx_params_fn kmac_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_set_ctx_params_fn kmac_set_ctx_params; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_init_fn kmac_init; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_update_fn kmac_update; +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_final_fn kmac_final; + +#define KMAC_MAX_BLOCKSIZE ((1600 - 128 * 2) / 8) /* 168 */ + +/* + * Length encoding will be a 1 byte size + length in bits (3 bytes max) + * This gives a range of 0..0XFFFFFF bits = 2097151 bytes). + */ +#define KMAC_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN (0xFFFFFF / 8) +#define KMAC_MAX_ENCODED_HEADER_LEN (1 + 3) + +/* + * Restrict the maximum length of the customisation string. This must not + * exceed 64 bits = 8k bytes. + */ +#define KMAC_MAX_CUSTOM 512 + +/* Maximum size of encoded custom string */ +#define KMAC_MAX_CUSTOM_ENCODED (KMAC_MAX_CUSTOM + KMAC_MAX_ENCODED_HEADER_LEN) + +/* Maximum key size in bytes = 512 (4096 bits) */ +#define KMAC_MAX_KEY 512 +#define KMAC_MIN_KEY 4 + +/* + * Maximum Encoded Key size will be padded to a multiple of the blocksize + * i.e KMAC_MAX_KEY + KMAC_MAX_ENCODED_HEADER_LEN = 512 + 4 + * Padded to a multiple of KMAC_MAX_BLOCKSIZE + */ +#define KMAC_MAX_KEY_ENCODED (KMAC_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 4) + +/* Fixed value of encode_string("KMAC") */ +static const unsigned char kmac_string[] = { + 0x01, 0x20, 0x4B, 0x4D, 0x41, 0x43 +}; + +#define KMAC_FLAG_XOF_MODE 1 + +struct kmac_data_st { + void *provctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; + PROV_DIGEST digest; + size_t out_len; + size_t key_len; + size_t custom_len; + /* If xof_mode = 1 then we use right_encode(0) */ + int xof_mode; + /* key and custom are stored in encoded form */ + unsigned char key[KMAC_MAX_KEY_ENCODED]; + unsigned char custom[KMAC_MAX_CUSTOM_ENCODED]; +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + /* + * 'internal' is set to 1 if KMAC is used inside another algorithm such as a + * KDF. In this case it is the parent algorithm that is responsible for + * performing any conditional FIPS indicator related checks for KMAC. + */ + int internal; +#endif + OSSL_FIPS_IND_DECLARE +}; + +static int encode_string(unsigned char *out, size_t out_max_len, size_t *out_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len); +static int right_encode(unsigned char *out, size_t out_max_len, size_t *out_len, + size_t bits); +static int bytepad(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1_len, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2_len, + size_t w); +static int kmac_bytepad_encode_key(unsigned char *out, size_t out_max_len, + size_t *out_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + size_t w); + +static void kmac_free(void *vmacctx) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = vmacctx; + + if (kctx != NULL) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(kctx->ctx); + ossl_prov_digest_reset(&kctx->digest); + OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->key, kctx->key_len); + OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->custom, kctx->custom_len); + OPENSSL_free(kctx); + } +} + +/* + * We have KMAC implemented as a hash, which we can use instead of + * reimplementing the EVP functionality with direct use of + * keccak_mac_init() and friends. + */ +static struct kmac_data_st *kmac_new(void *provctx) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + if ((kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx))) == NULL + || (kctx->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + kmac_free(kctx); + return NULL; + } + kctx->provctx = provctx; + OSSL_FIPS_IND_INIT(kctx) + return kctx; +} + +static void *kmac_fetch_new(void *provctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = kmac_new(provctx); + int md_size; + + if (kctx == NULL) + return 0; + if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&kctx->digest, params, + PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx))) { + kmac_free(kctx); + return 0; + } + + md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest)); + if (md_size <= 0) { + kmac_free(kctx); + return 0; + } + kctx->out_len = (size_t)md_size; + return kctx; +} + +static void *kmac128_new(void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM kmac128_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string("digest", OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_KECCAK_KMAC128, + sizeof(OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_KECCAK_KMAC128)), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return kmac_fetch_new(provctx, kmac128_params); +} + +static void *kmac256_new(void *provctx) +{ + static const OSSL_PARAM kmac256_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string("digest", OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_KECCAK_KMAC256, + sizeof(OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_KECCAK_KMAC256)), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + return kmac_fetch_new(provctx, kmac256_params); +} + +static void *kmac_dup(void *vsrc) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *src = vsrc; + struct kmac_data_st *dst; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return NULL; + + dst = kmac_new(src->provctx); + if (dst == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(dst->ctx, src->ctx) + || !ossl_prov_digest_copy(&dst->digest, &src->digest)) { + kmac_free(dst); + return NULL; + } +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + dst->internal = src->internal; +#endif + dst->out_len = src->out_len; + dst->key_len = src->key_len; + dst->custom_len = src->custom_len; + dst->xof_mode = src->xof_mode; + memcpy(dst->key, src->key, src->key_len); + memcpy(dst->custom, src->custom, dst->custom_len); + OSSL_FIPS_IND_COPY(dst, src) + + return dst; +} + +static int kmac_setkey(struct kmac_data_st *kctx, const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen) +{ + const EVP_MD *digest = ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest); + int w = EVP_MD_get_block_size(digest); + + if (keylen < KMAC_MIN_KEY || keylen > KMAC_MAX_KEY) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + /* + * Only do the key check if KMAC is fetched directly. + * Other algorithms that embed KMAC such as SSKDF will ignore this check. + */ + if (!kctx->internal) { + int approved = ossl_mac_check_key_size(keylen); + + if (!approved) { + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(kctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE1, + PROV_LIBCTX_OF(kctx->provctx), + "KMAC", "Key size", + ossl_fips_config_kmac_key_check)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + } + } +#endif + if (w <= 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + if (!kmac_bytepad_encode_key(kctx->key, sizeof(kctx->key), &kctx->key_len, + key, keylen, (size_t)w)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * The init() assumes that any ctrl methods are set beforehand for + * md, key and custom. Setting the fields afterwards will have no + * effect on the output mac. + */ +static int kmac_init(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = vmacctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = kctx->ctx; + unsigned char *out; + size_t out_len, block_len; + int res, t; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kmac_set_ctx_params(kctx, params)) + return 0; + + if (key != NULL) { + if (!kmac_setkey(kctx, key, keylen)) + return 0; + } else if (kctx->key_len == 0) { + /* Check key has been set */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(kctx->ctx, ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest), + NULL)) + return 0; + + t = EVP_MD_get_block_size(ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest)); + if (t <= 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + block_len = t; + + /* Set default custom string if it is not already set */ + if (kctx->custom_len == 0) { + const OSSL_PARAM cparams[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM, "", 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END + }; + (void)kmac_set_ctx_params(kctx, cparams); + } + + if (!bytepad(NULL, &out_len, kmac_string, sizeof(kmac_string), + kctx->custom, kctx->custom_len, block_len)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + out = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len); + if (out == NULL) + return 0; + res = bytepad(out, NULL, kmac_string, sizeof(kmac_string), + kctx->custom, kctx->custom_len, block_len) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, out, out_len) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, kctx->key, kctx->key_len); + OPENSSL_free(out); + return res; +} + +static int kmac_update(void *vmacctx, const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = vmacctx; + + return EVP_DigestUpdate(kctx->ctx, data, datalen); +} + +static int kmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, + size_t outsize) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = vmacctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = kctx->ctx; + size_t lbits, len; + unsigned char encoded_outlen[KMAC_MAX_ENCODED_HEADER_LEN]; + int ok; + + if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) + return 0; + + /* KMAC XOF mode sets the encoded length to 0 */ + lbits = (kctx->xof_mode ? 0 : (kctx->out_len * 8)); + + ok = right_encode(encoded_outlen, sizeof(encoded_outlen), &len, lbits) + && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, encoded_outlen, len) + && EVP_DigestFinalXOF(ctx, out, kctx->out_len); + *outl = kctx->out_len; + return ok; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_FIPS_IND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAM() + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; +static const OSSL_PARAM *kmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +static int kmac_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = vmacctx; + OSSL_PARAM *p; + int sz; + + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, kctx->out_len)) + return 0; + + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE)) != NULL) { + sz = EVP_MD_block_size(ossl_prov_digest_md(&kctx->digest)); + if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, sz)) + return 0; + } + + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_PARAM(kctx, params)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_XOF, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM, NULL, 0), + OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FIPS_NO_SHORT_MAC) + OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK) + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; +static const OSSL_PARAM *kmac_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, + ossl_unused void *provctx) +{ + return known_settable_ctx_params; +} + +/* + * The following params can be set any time before final(): + * - "outlen" or "size": The requested output length. + * - "xof": If set, this indicates that right_encoded(0) + * is part of the digested data, otherwise it + * uses right_encoded(requested output length). + * + * All other params should be set before init(). + */ +static int kmac_set_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, const OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + struct kmac_data_st *kctx = vmacctx; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (ossl_param_is_empty(params)) + return 1; + + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(kctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, params, + OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FIPS_NO_SHORT_MAC)) + return 0; + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(kctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE1, params, + OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK)) + return 0; + + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_XOF)) != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &kctx->xof_mode)) + return 0; + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) { + size_t sz = 0; + + if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) + return 0; + if (sz > KMAC_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + /* SP 800-185 8.4.2 mandates a minimum of 32 bits of output */ + if (sz < 32 / 8) { + if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(kctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, + PROV_LIBCTX_OF(kctx->provctx), + "KMAC", "length", + ossl_fips_config_no_short_mac)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_OUTPUT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + } +#endif + kctx->out_len = sz; + } + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL + && !kmac_setkey(kctx, p->data, p->data_size)) + return 0; + if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM)) + != NULL) { + if (p->data_size > KMAC_MAX_CUSTOM) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CUSTOM_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + if (!encode_string(kctx->custom, sizeof(kctx->custom), &kctx->custom_len, + p->data, p->data_size)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/* Encoding/Padding Methods. */ + +/* Returns the number of bytes required to store 'bits' into a byte array */ +static unsigned int get_encode_size(size_t bits) +{ + unsigned int cnt = 0, sz = sizeof(size_t); + + while (bits && (cnt < sz)) { + ++cnt; + bits >>= 8; + } + /* If bits is zero 1 byte is required */ + if (cnt == 0) + cnt = 1; + return cnt; +} + +/* + * Convert an integer into bytes . The number of bytes is appended + * to the end of the buffer. Returns an array of bytes 'out' of size + * *out_len. + * + * e.g if bits = 32, out[2] = { 0x20, 0x01 } + */ +static int right_encode(unsigned char *out, size_t out_max_len, size_t *out_len, + size_t bits) +{ + unsigned int len = get_encode_size(bits); + int i; + + if (len >= out_max_len) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_LENGTH_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + /* MSB's are at the start of the bytes array */ + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; --i) { + out[i] = (unsigned char)(bits & 0xFF); + bits >>= 8; + } + /* Tack the length onto the end */ + out[len] = (unsigned char)len; + + /* The Returned length includes the tacked on byte */ + *out_len = len + 1; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Encodes a string with a left encoded length added. Note that the + * in_len is converted to bits (*8). + * + * e.g- in="KMAC" gives out[6] = { 0x01, 0x20, 0x4B, 0x4D, 0x41, 0x43 } + * len bits K M A C + */ +static int encode_string(unsigned char *out, size_t out_max_len, size_t *out_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) +{ + if (in == NULL) { + *out_len = 0; + } else { + size_t i, bits, len, sz; + + bits = 8 * in_len; + len = get_encode_size(bits); + sz = 1 + len + in_len; + + if (sz > out_max_len) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_LENGTH_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + out[0] = (unsigned char)len; + for (i = len; i > 0; --i) { + out[i] = (bits & 0xFF); + bits >>= 8; + } + memcpy(out + len + 1, in, in_len); + *out_len = sz; + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Returns a zero padded encoding of the inputs in1 and an optional + * in2 (can be NULL). The padded output must be a multiple of the blocksize 'w'. + * The value of w is in bytes (< 256). + * + * The returned output is: + * zero_padded(multiple of w, (left_encode(w) || in1 [|| in2]) + */ +static int bytepad(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1_len, + const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2_len, size_t w) +{ + int len; + unsigned char *p = out; + int sz = w; + + if (out == NULL) { + if (out_len == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + sz = 2 + in1_len + (in2 != NULL ? in2_len : 0); + *out_len = (sz + w - 1) / w * w; + return 1; + } + + if (!ossl_assert(w <= 255)) + return 0; + + /* Left encoded w */ + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = (unsigned char)w; + /* || in1 */ + memcpy(p, in1, in1_len); + p += in1_len; + /* [ || in2 ] */ + if (in2 != NULL && in2_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, in2, in2_len); + p += in2_len; + } + /* Figure out the pad size (divisible by w) */ + len = p - out; + sz = (len + w - 1) / w * w; + /* zero pad the end of the buffer */ + if (sz != len) + memset(p, 0, sz - len); + if (out_len != NULL) + *out_len = sz; + return 1; +} + +/* Returns out = bytepad(encode_string(in), w) */ +static int kmac_bytepad_encode_key(unsigned char *out, size_t out_max_len, + size_t *out_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + size_t w) +{ + unsigned char tmp[KMAC_MAX_KEY + KMAC_MAX_ENCODED_HEADER_LEN]; + size_t tmp_len; + + if (!encode_string(tmp, sizeof(tmp), &tmp_len, in, in_len)) + return 0; + if (!bytepad(NULL, out_len, tmp, tmp_len, NULL, 0, w)) + return 0; + if (!ossl_assert(*out_len <= out_max_len)) + return 0; + return bytepad(out, NULL, tmp, tmp_len, NULL, 0, w); +} + +#define IMPLEMENT_KMAC_TABLE(size, funcname, newname) \ +const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kmac##size##_##funcname[] = \ +{ \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))kmac##size##_##newname }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))kmac_dup }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))kmac_free }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_INIT, (void (*)(void))kmac_init }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))kmac_update }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_FINAL, (void (*)(void))kmac_final }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \ + (void (*)(void))kmac_gettable_ctx_params }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))kmac_get_ctx_params }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \ + (void (*)(void))kmac_settable_ctx_params }, \ + { OSSL_FUNC_MAC_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))kmac_set_ctx_params }, \ + OSSL_DISPATCH_END \ +} + +#define KMAC_TABLE(size) IMPLEMENT_KMAC_TABLE(size, functions, new) + +KMAC_TABLE(128); +KMAC_TABLE(256); + +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE +# define KMAC_INTERNAL_TABLE(size) \ +static OSSL_FUNC_mac_newctx_fn kmac##size##_internal_new; \ +static void *kmac##size##_internal_new(void *provctx) \ +{ \ + struct kmac_data_st *macctx = kmac##size##_new(provctx); \ + \ + if (macctx != NULL) \ + macctx->internal = 1; \ + return macctx; \ +} \ +IMPLEMENT_KMAC_TABLE(size, internal_functions, internal_new) + +KMAC_INTERNAL_TABLE(128); +KMAC_INTERNAL_TABLE(256); +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |