diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
68 files changed, 860 insertions, 140 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config index 202da5f5ae8e..d5588e2b84c2 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server -# Disable HPN tuning improvements. +# Change to yes to disable HPN tuning improvements. #HPNDisabled no # Buffer size for HPN to non-HPN connections. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS b/crypto/openssl/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS index fb6dd912c430..59c6f01f97f6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS +++ b/crypto/openssl/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS @@ -10,13 +10,18 @@ OpenSSL project. We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past or current significant support of the OpenSSL project: +Major support: + + Qualys http://www.qualys.com/ + Very significant support: - OpenGear: www.opengear.com + OpenGear: http://www.opengear.com/ Significant support: - PSW Group: www.psw.net + PSW Group: http://www.psw.net/ + Acano Ltd. http://acano.com/ Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/CHANGES b/crypto/openssl/CHANGES index 4fcfd1d4be45..d161ecaf2953 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/crypto/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,50 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] + + *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted + handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL + SSL/TLS clients and servers. + + Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and + researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) + [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an + OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing + in a DoS attack. + + Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. + (CVE-2014-0221) + [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can + be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS + client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary + code on a vulnerable client or server. + + Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) + [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] + + *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites + are subject to a denial of service attack. + + Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering + this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) + [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] + + *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display + compilation flags. + [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>] + + *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure + in i2d_ECPrivateKey. + [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>] + + *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. + [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>] + Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension diff --git a/crypto/openssl/Makefile b/crypto/openssl/Makefile index 4a40b701d908..f5e7823f85cc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/Makefile +++ b/crypto/openssl/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=1.0.1g +VERSION=1.0.1h MAJOR=1 MINOR=0.1 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/NEWS b/crypto/openssl/NEWS index ed486d146d96..d0620414ab04 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/NEWS +++ b/crypto/openssl/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] + + o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 + o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 + o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 + o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 + o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0160 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/README b/crypto/openssl/README index 10b74d19d24a..95c5cd247800 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/README +++ b/crypto/openssl/README @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014 + OpenSSL 1.0.1h 5 Jun 2014 Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/enc.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/enc.c index 719acc325053..19ea3df9409e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/enc.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/enc.c @@ -331,6 +331,12 @@ bad: setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0); #endif + if (cipher && EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) + { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "AEAD ciphers not supported by the enc utility\n"); + goto end; + } + if (md && (dgst=EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s is an unsupported message digest type\n",md); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/ocsp.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/ocsp.c index 83c5a7670052..767f12c621c5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/ocsp.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/ocsp.c @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) ENGINE *e = NULL; char **args; char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/"; + char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL; char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL; char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL; char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL; @@ -204,6 +205,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url")) { + if (thost) + OPENSSL_free(thost); + if (tport) + OPENSSL_free(tport); + if (tpath) + OPENSSL_free(tpath); if (args[1]) { args++; @@ -212,6 +219,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n"); badarg = 1; } + thost = host; + tport = port; + tpath = path; } else badarg = 1; } @@ -920,12 +930,12 @@ end: sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free); - if (use_ssl != -1) - { - OPENSSL_free(host); - OPENSSL_free(port); - OPENSSL_free(path); - } + if (thost) + OPENSSL_free(thost); + if (tport) + OPENSSL_free(tport); + if (tpath) + OPENSSL_free(tpath); OPENSSL_EXIT(ret); } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/req.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/req.c index 5e034a85e802..d41385d7063a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/req.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/req.c @@ -1489,7 +1489,13 @@ start: #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif - if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start; + if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) + { + if (batch || value) + return 0; + goto start; + } + if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n,nid, chtype, (unsigned char *) buf, -1,-1,mval)) goto err; ret=1; @@ -1548,7 +1554,12 @@ start: #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif - if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start; + if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) + { + if (batch || value) + return 0; + goto start; + } if(!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)buf, -1)) { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c index 84c3b447c295..146a96079516 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c @@ -747,6 +747,10 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, break; #endif + case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding: + extname = "TLS padding"; + break; + default: extname = "unknown"; break; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/s_socket.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/s_socket.c index 380efdb1b976..94eb40f3ffc8 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/s_socket.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/s_socket.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type) { i=0; i=setsockopt(s,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i)); - if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); } + if (i < 0) { closesocket(s); perror("keepalive"); return(0); } } #endif @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ redoit: if ((*host=(char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(h1->h_name)+1)) == NULL) { perror("OPENSSL_malloc"); + closesocket(ret); return(0); } BUF_strlcpy(*host,h1->h_name,strlen(h1->h_name)+1); @@ -458,11 +459,13 @@ redoit: if (h2 == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname failure\n"); + closesocket(ret); return(0); } if (h2->h_addrtype != AF_INET) { BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n"); + closesocket(ret); return(0); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/apps/smime.c b/crypto/openssl/apps/smime.c index c583f8a0e162..d1fe32d31b3f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/apps/smime.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/apps/smime.c @@ -541,8 +541,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) { if (!cipher) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 - cipher = EVP_rc2_40_cbc(); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES + cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n"); goto end; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c index 2fc48c1551a5..2afd5a41368d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE * const *a, * certain software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them. */ -static unsigned long global_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL; +static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING; void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask) { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c index 54c012c47d7b..d9967e727267 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL; socklen_t sockopt_len = 0; struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid; - struct sctp_authkey *authkey; + struct sctp_authkey *authkey = NULL; data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *)b->ptr; @@ -1388,6 +1388,11 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) /* Add new key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkey) + 64 * sizeof(uint8_t); authkey = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len); + if (authkey == NULL) + { + ret = -1; + break; + } memset(authkey, 0x00, sockopt_len); authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1; #ifndef __FreeBSD__ @@ -1399,6 +1404,8 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) memcpy(&authkey->sca_key[0], ptr, 64 * sizeof(uint8_t)); ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_KEY, authkey, sockopt_len); + OPENSSL_free(authkey); + authkey = NULL; if (ret < 0) break; /* Reset active key */ diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c index 427b5cf4df95..ee8532c7dc33 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c @@ -478,32 +478,38 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from) BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { - int got_write_lock = 0; BN_MONT_CTX *ret; CRYPTO_r_lock(lock); - if (!*pmont) + ret = *pmont; + CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in + * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent + * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to + * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work + * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race + * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */ + ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); + if (!ret) + return NULL; + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock); - CRYPTO_w_lock(lock); - got_write_lock = 1; + BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); + return NULL; + } - if (!*pmont) - { - ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); - if (ret && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); - else - *pmont = ret; - } + /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */ + CRYPTO_w_lock(lock); + if (*pmont) + { + BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret); + ret = *pmont; } - - ret = *pmont; - - if (got_write_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock); else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock); - + *pmont = ret; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c index be20b1c024cf..add00bf99cf7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_env.c @@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { ktri->version = 2; + if (env->version < 2) + env->version = 2; type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER; } else diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c index 77fbd1359679..51dd33a1c323 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c @@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static void cms_sd_set_version(CMS_SignedData *sd) if (sd->version < 3) sd->version = 3; } - else - sd->version = 1; + else if (si->version < 1) + si->version = 1; } if (sd->version < 1) diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c index 8c56e3a8520d..1af9f3a60f8b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert) STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, r; - int debug = 0; + int debug = 0, ri_match = 0; ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms); if (ris) debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug; @@ -620,6 +620,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert) ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i); if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) continue; + ri_match = 1; /* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo * otherwise try them all. */ @@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert) } } /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */ - if (!cert && !debug) + if (ri_match && !cert && !debug) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c index 5f2254806ca9..4a56aace0e36 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int dlfcn_pathbyaddr(void *addr,char *path,int sz) return len; } - ERR_add_error_data(4, "dlfcn_pathbyaddr(): ", dlerror()); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "dlfcn_pathbyaddr(): ", dlerror()); #endif return -1; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c index 0ce4524076f1..f715a238a6fc 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c @@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags); OPENSSL_free(ep); ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + return 0; } /* restore old encoding flags */ EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c index 145807b611a5..e94f34e11b7c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c @@ -1435,8 +1435,11 @@ int i2o_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) *out, buf_len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - OPENSSL_free(*out); - *out = NULL; + if (new_buffer) + { + OPENSSL_free(*out); + *out = NULL; + } return 0; } if (!new_buffer) diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h index da7967df38a3..b0d48b6b5cc7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); -#ifndef OPENSSL_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */ int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group); int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c index ac6d441aadb9..16863fe23f0e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c @@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) else if (ctx->start) { q=p=(unsigned char *)ctx->tmp; + num = 0; for (j=0; j<i; j++) { if (*(q++) != '\n') continue; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c index 28546a84bc2b..4654bdc61a64 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, v=EVP_DecodeBlock(out,d,n); n=0; if (v < 0) { rv=0; goto end; } + if (eof > v) { rv=-1; goto end; } ret+=(v-eof); } else diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h index 5f71de1fbd3e..f998f988e3f9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000107fL +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000108fL #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1g-fips 7 Apr 2014" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1h-fips 5 Jun 2014" #else -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1g-freebsd 7 Apr 2014" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1h-freebsd 5 Jun 2014" #endif #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c index a34915d02d14..35e8a4a8d4ba 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c @@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; else #endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 + nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; +#else nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; +#endif } if (!nid_key) nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; @@ -286,7 +290,11 @@ int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, free_safes = 0; if (nid_safe == 0) +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 + nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC; +#else nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC; +#endif if (nid_safe == -1) p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c index 206b1b0b18ab..c9b7ab61d1bd 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, int len, r; unsigned char *data; len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname); - if(len > 0) { + if(len >= 0) { r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); if (!r) diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index 77fda3b82a07..d91aa116a993 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert) { case NID_pkcs7_signed: data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents); + if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) + { + PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE); + goto err; + } md_sk=p7->d.sign->md_algs; break; case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped: @@ -928,6 +933,7 @@ int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si) if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx,abuf,alen) <= 0) goto err; OPENSSL_free(abuf); + abuf = NULL; if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) goto err; abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h index e4d443193c43..04f60379fb6d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h @@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ void ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void); #define PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER 121 #define PKCS7_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 131 #define PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER 143 +#define PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE 155 #define PKCS7_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 132 #define PKCS7_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR 133 #define PKCS7_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 134 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c index d0af32a265df..f3db08e007a9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS7_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER),"error setting cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE) ,"invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER),"invalid null pointer"}, +{ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE),"invalid signed data type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE),"mime no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR) ,"mime parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR),"mime sig parse error"}, diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index 5a2062f903ae..4c8ecd9233e1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) goto err; } - else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0x14 (default)") <= 0) + else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) goto err; BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c index 4a3d13edf6cb..fdca19ff7c69 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c @@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char *src) else a[i] = loc - b64table; ++i; } + /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */ + if (i == 0) + return 0; size = i; i = size - 1; j = size; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c index afe16afbe454..b7d170afac0a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c @@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info, X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg); OPENSSL_free(*imprint); *imprint_len = 0; + *imprint = NULL; return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c index ad688657e01e..f59bfc1844cf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c @@ -389,8 +389,8 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) /* Handle proxy certificates */ if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA - || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0 - || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) { + || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 + || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; } if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, return 0; /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ - i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, 0); + i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); if (i_ext >= 0) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod index ce1f05648d5a..a76b3e0fd1c9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod @@ -90,6 +90,11 @@ decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail is written to the output file. +=item B<-debug_decrypt> + +this option sets the B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> flag. This option should be used +with caution: see the notes section below. + =item B<-sign> sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is @@ -446,6 +451,16 @@ Streaming is always used for the B<-sign> operation with detached data but since the content is no longer part of the CMS structure the encoding remains DER. +If the B<-decrypt> option is used without a recipient certificate then an +attempt is made to locate the recipient by trying each potential recipient +in turn using the supplied private key. To thwart the MMA attack +(Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are +tried whether they succeed or not and if no recipients match the message +is "decrypted" using a random key which will typically output garbage. +The B<-debug_decrypt> option can be used to disable the MMA attack protection +and return an error if no recipient can be found: this option should be used +with caution. For a fuller description see L<CMS_decrypt(3)|CMS_decrypt(3)>). + =head1 EXIT CODES =over 4 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod index 3dee4ed99238..41791ad6713c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod @@ -215,6 +215,10 @@ unsupported options (for example B<openssl enc -help>) includes a list of ciphers, supported by your versesion of OpenSSL, including ones provided by configured engines. +The B<enc> program does not support authenticated encryption modes +like CCM and GCM. The utility does not store or retrieve the +authentication tag. + base64 Base 64 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod index 6758ba308016..f9b9ca5326d9 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server> [B<-no_ssl3>] [B<-no_tls1>] [B<-no_dhe>] +[B<-no_ecdhe>] [B<-bugs>] [B<-hack>] [B<-www>] @@ -131,6 +132,11 @@ a static set of parameters hard coded into the s_server program will be used. if this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites. +=item B<-no_ecdhe> + +if this option is set then no ECDH parameters will be loaded effectively +disabling the ephemeral ECDH cipher suites. + =item B<-no_tmp_rsa> certain export cipher suites sometimes use a temporary RSA key, this option diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod index 3aa6e848afd7..d39a59a90d8c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for example B<-aes_128_cbc>. See L<B<enc>|enc(1)> for list of ciphers supported by your version of OpenSSL. -If not specified 40 bit RC2 is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>. +If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>. =item B<-nointern> diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod index da683004bd27..f35d4029506a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify> [B<-untrusted file>] [B<-help>] [B<-issuer_checks>] +[B<-attime timestamp>] [B<-verbose>] [B<->] [certificates] @@ -80,6 +81,12 @@ rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several rejections may take place. +=item B<-attime timestamp> + +Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not +current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since +01.01.1970 (UNIX time). + =item B<-policy arg> Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see @@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ an application specific error. Unused. =head1 BUGS -Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still +Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod index e00324c446cd..58f543bc3e64 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ B<openssl version> [B<-o>] [B<-f>] [B<-p>] +[B<-d>] =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ the date the current version of OpenSSL was built. option information: various options set when the library was built. -=item B<-c> +=item B<-f> compilation flags. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod index 0450067cf1d9..13ff85b17cb1 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ Example: O=Organisation CN=Some Name - + =head2 Certificate Policies. This is a I<raw> extension. All the fields of this extension can be set by @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ Examples: nameConstraints=permitted;email:.somedomain.com nameConstraints=excluded;email:.com -issuingDistributionPoint = idp_section + =head2 OCSP No Check diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod index d857e4f93f6e..3fa9212af32c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod @@ -27,7 +27,21 @@ function or errors about unknown algorithms will occur. Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS -structure. If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. +structure. + +If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however +is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on +PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or +not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt +the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed +to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an +error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could +use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> is set +then the above behaviour is modified and an error B<is> returned if no +recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B<without> generating a random +content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with +B<extreme caution> especially in automated gateways as it can leave them +open to attack. It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod index 87bc7b783c9e..347020c5fe70 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ None of the functions return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>, -L<CONF_modules_load_file(3), CONF_modules_load_file(3)> +L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)|CONF_modules_load_file(3)> =head1 HISTORY diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod index 9965d69bf2ec..0c4d926858fb 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ return value of the failing module (this will always be zero or negative). =head1 SEE ALSO L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>, -L<CONF_free(3), CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3),err(3)> +L<CONF_free(3)|CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)> =head1 HISTORY diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod index e7bba2aacae0..888de88f6bbf 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value. =head1 SEE ALSO L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<CONF_load_modules_file(3)|CONF_load_modules_file(3)>, -L<CONF_modules_free(3),CONF_modules_free(3)> +L<CONF_modules_free(3)|CONF_modules_free(3)> =head1 HISTORY diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod index 41902c0d4553..4716e7ee7542 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally. =head1 SEE ALSO L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>, -L<OBJ_nid2obj(3),OBJ_nid2obj(3)> +L<OBJ_nid2obj(3)|OBJ_nid2obj(3)> =head1 HISTORY diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod index 8d6b9dda47e7..8a9243d75613 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index, X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data, X509_STORE_CTX_get_ int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *d, int idx, void *arg); - char *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *d, int idx); + void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *d, int idx); =head1 DESCRIPTION diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/fingerprints.txt b/crypto/openssl/doc/fingerprints.txt index 7d05a855946b..4030c81fa500 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/fingerprints.txt +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/fingerprints.txt @@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ pub 2048R/F295C759 1998-12-13 Key fingerprint = D0 5D 8C 61 6E 27 E6 60 41 EC B1 B8 D5 7E E5 97 uid Dr S N Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> +pub 4096R/FA40E9E2 2005-03-19 + Key fingerprint = 6260 5AA4 334A F9F0 DDE5 D349 D357 7507 FA40 E9E2 +uid Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@opensslfoundation.com> +uid Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk> +uid Dr Stephen N Henson <steve@openssl.org> +sub 4096R/8811F530 2005-03-19 + pub 1024R/49A563D9 1997-02-24 Key fingerprint = 7B 79 19 FA 71 6B 87 25 0E 77 21 E5 52 D9 83 BF uid Mark Cox <mjc@redhat.com> diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod index 0015e6ea7923..8b82d94a389e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback, SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg, SSL_set_msg_callback, SS void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); - void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); - void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg); + void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); + void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg); =head1 DESCRIPTION diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod index fded0601b566..d8866927a262 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod @@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some broken SSL implementations. This option has no effect for connections using other ciphers. +=item SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING + +Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between +256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some +implementations. + =item SSL_OP_ALL All of the above bug workarounds. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod index 49fb88f86faf..059376c76b24 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ SSL_get_peer_cert_chain - get the X509 certificate chain of the peer #include <openssl/ssl.h> - STACKOF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl); + STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION -SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACKOF(X509) certificates +SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACK_OF(X509) certificates forming the certificate chain of the peer. If called on the client side, the stack also contains the peer's certificate; if called on the server side, the peer's certificate must be obtained separately using @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned. The peer certificate chain is not necessarily available after reusing a session, in which case a NULL pointer is returned. -The reference count of the STACKOF(X509) object is not incremented. +The reference count of the STACK_OF(X509) object is not incremented. If the corresponding session is freed, the pointer must not be used any longer. @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The following return values can occur: No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established or the certificate chain is no longer available when a session is reused. -=item Pointer to a STACKOF(X509) +=item Pointer to a STACK_OF(X509) The return value points to the certificate chain presented by the peer. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c b/crypto/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c index 2cde1fcfd9df..8b9230b9ab42 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int pkey_ctrl_gost(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: if (arg1 == 0) { - X509_ALGOR *alg; + X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; ASN1_STRING * params = encode_gost_algor_params(pkey); if (!params) { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile index debe07405bf8..0045d8983022 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES= CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com -TEST=ssltest.c +TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c index 2e8cf681ed09..04aa23107ec5 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; } else + { frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; + if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) + { + item = NULL; + frag = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a * retransmit and can be dropped. @@ -674,8 +683,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); if (item == NULL) { - goto err; i = -1; + goto err; } pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); @@ -784,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) int i,al; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; + redo: /* see if we have the required fragment already */ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) { @@ -842,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) s->msg_callback_arg); s->init_num = 0; - return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, - max, ok); + goto redo; } else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c index 106939f24177..6bde16fa212c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -176,9 +176,12 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s) while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { - frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; - OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); - OPENSSL_free(frag); + rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data; + if (rdata->rbuf.buf) + { + OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); + } + OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c index 8186462d4a6b..438c0913d24e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c @@ -239,14 +239,6 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) } #endif - /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ - if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(rdata); - pitem_free(item); - return(0); - } - s->packet = NULL; s->packet_length = 0; memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); @@ -259,7 +251,16 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) pitem_free(item); return(0); } - + + /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ + if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + return(0); + } + return(1); } diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c index 9975e20873c4..1384ab0cbf17 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c @@ -1356,6 +1356,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d8cc559981c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/heartbeat_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +/* test/heartbeat_test.c */ +/* + * Unit test for TLS heartbeats. + * + * Acts as a regression test against the Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160). + * + * Author: Mike Bland (mbland@acm.org, http://mike-bland.com/) + * Date: 2014-04-12 + * License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC By 4.0) + * http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US + * + * OUTPUT + * ------ + * The program returns zero on success. It will print a message with a count + * of the number of failed tests and return nonzero if any tests fail. + * + * It will print the contents of the request and response buffers for each + * failing test. In a "fixed" version, all the tests should pass and there + * should be no output. + * + * In a "bleeding" version, you'll see: + * + * test_dtls1_heartbleed failed: + * expected payload len: 0 + * received: 1024 + * sent 26 characters + * "HEARTBLEED " + * received 1024 characters + * "HEARTBLEED \xde\xad\xbe\xef..." + * ** test_dtls1_heartbleed failed ** + * + * The contents of the returned buffer in the failing test will depend on the + * contents of memory on your machine. + * + * MORE INFORMATION + * ---------------- + * http://mike-bland.com/2014/04/12/heartbleed.html + * http://mike-bland.com/tags/heartbleed.html + */ + +#include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h" +#include <ctype.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) + +/* As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4 */ +#define MIN_PADDING_SIZE 16 + +/* Maximum number of payload characters to print as test output */ +#define MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS 1024 + +typedef struct heartbeat_test_fixture + { + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *s; + const char* test_case_name; + int (*process_heartbeat)(SSL* s); + unsigned char* payload; + int sent_payload_len; + int expected_return_value; + int return_payload_offset; + int expected_payload_len; + const char* expected_return_payload; + } HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE; + +static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char* const test_case_name, + const SSL_METHOD* meth) + { + HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture; + int setup_ok = 1; + memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture)); + fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name; + + fixture.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); + if (!fixture.ctx) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL_CTX for test: %s\n", + test_case_name); + setup_ok = 0; + goto fail; + } + + fixture.s = SSL_new(fixture.ctx); + if (!fixture.s) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL for test: %s\n", test_case_name); + setup_ok = 0; + goto fail; + } + + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(fixture.s, 1)) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set up wbio buffer for test: %s\n", + test_case_name); + setup_ok = 0; + goto fail; + } + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(fixture.s)) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to setup buffers for test: %s\n", + test_case_name); + setup_ok = 0; + goto fail; + } + + /* Clear the memory for the return buffer, since this isn't automatically + * zeroed in opt mode and will cause spurious test failures that will change + * with each execution. + */ + memset(fixture.s->s3->wbuf.buf, 0, fixture.s->s3->wbuf.len); + + fail: + if (!setup_ok) + { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + return fixture; + } + +static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_dtls(const char* const test_case_name) + { + HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name, + DTLSv1_server_method()); + fixture.process_heartbeat = dtls1_process_heartbeat; + + /* As per dtls1_get_record(), skipping the following from the beginning of + * the returned heartbeat message: + * type-1 byte; version-2 bytes; sequence number-8 bytes; length-2 bytes + * + * And then skipping the 1-byte type encoded by process_heartbeat for + * a total of 14 bytes, at which point we can grab the length and the + * payload we seek. + */ + fixture.return_payload_offset = 14; + return fixture; + } + +/* Needed by ssl3_write_bytes() */ +static int dummy_handshake(SSL* s) + { + return 1; + } + +static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_tls(const char* const test_case_name) + { + HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name, + TLSv1_server_method()); + fixture.process_heartbeat = tls1_process_heartbeat; + fixture.s->handshake_func = dummy_handshake; + + /* As per do_ssl3_write(), skipping the following from the beginning of + * the returned heartbeat message: + * type-1 byte; version-2 bytes; length-2 bytes + * + * And then skipping the 1-byte type encoded by process_heartbeat for + * a total of 6 bytes, at which point we can grab the length and the payload + * we seek. + */ + fixture.return_payload_offset = 6; + return fixture; + } + +static void tear_down(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) + { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + SSL_free(fixture.s); + SSL_CTX_free(fixture.ctx); + } + +static void print_payload(const char* const prefix, + const unsigned char *payload, const int n) + { + const int end = n < MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS ? n + : MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; + int i = 0; + + printf("%s %d character%s", prefix, n, n == 1 ? "" : "s"); + if (end != n) printf(" (first %d shown)", end); + printf("\n \""); + + for (; i != end; ++i) + { + const unsigned char c = payload[i]; + if (isprint(c)) fputc(c, stdout); + else printf("\\x%02x", c); + } + printf("\"\n"); + } + +static int execute_heartbeat(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture) + { + int result = 0; + SSL* s = fixture.s; + unsigned char *payload = fixture.payload; + unsigned char sent_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 1]; + int return_value; + unsigned const char *p; + int actual_payload_len; + + s->s3->rrec.data = payload; + s->s3->rrec.length = strlen((const char*)payload); + *payload++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; + s2n(fixture.sent_payload_len, payload); + + /* Make a local copy of the request, since it gets overwritten at some + * point */ + memcpy((char *)sent_buf, (const char*)payload, sizeof(sent_buf)); + + return_value = fixture.process_heartbeat(s); + + if (return_value != fixture.expected_return_value) + { + printf("%s failed: expected return value %d, received %d\n", + fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_value, + return_value); + result = 1; + } + + /* If there is any byte alignment, it will be stored in wbuf.offset. */ + p = &(s->s3->wbuf.buf[ + fixture.return_payload_offset + s->s3->wbuf.offset]); + actual_payload_len = 0; + n2s(p, actual_payload_len); + + if (actual_payload_len != fixture.expected_payload_len) + { + printf("%s failed:\n expected payload len: %d\n received: %d\n", + fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_payload_len, + actual_payload_len); + print_payload("sent", sent_buf, strlen((const char*)sent_buf)); + print_payload("received", p, actual_payload_len); + result = 1; + } + else + { + char* actual_payload = BUF_strndup((const char*)p, actual_payload_len); + if (strcmp(actual_payload, fixture.expected_return_payload) != 0) + { + printf("%s failed:\n expected payload: \"%s\"\n received: \"%s\"\n", + fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_payload, + actual_payload); + result = 1; + } + OPENSSL_free(actual_payload); + } + + if (result != 0) + { + printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n", fixture.test_case_name); + } + return result; + } + +static int honest_payload_size(unsigned char payload_buf[]) + { + /* Omit three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ + return strlen((const char*)&payload_buf[3]) - MIN_PADDING_SIZE; + } + +#define SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(type)\ + HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up_##type(__func__);\ + int result = 0 + +#define EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST()\ + if (execute_heartbeat(fixture) != 0) result = 1;\ + tear_down(fixture);\ + return result + +static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); + /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ + unsigned char payload_buf[] = " Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding" + " "; + const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_payload = "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding"; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() + { + int payload_buf_len; + + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); + /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a NUL + * at the end */ + unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MIN_PADDING_SIZE]; + memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf)); + payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0'; + payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_dtls1_heartbleed() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); + /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ + unsigned char payload_buf[] = " HEARTBLEED "; + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); + /* Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length + + * minimum padding */ + unsigned char payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3]; + memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf)); + payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0'; + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls); + /* Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte in excess of maximum allowed + * heartbeat message length */ + unsigned char payload_buf[SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 2]; + memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf)); + payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0'; + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_tls1_not_bleeding() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls); + /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ + unsigned char payload_buf[] = " Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding" + " "; + const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_payload = "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding"; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_tls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() + { + int payload_buf_len; + + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls); + /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a NUL + * at the end */ + unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MIN_PADDING_SIZE]; + memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf)); + payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0'; + payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf); + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_tls1_heartbleed() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls); + /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */ + unsigned char payload_buf[] = " HEARTBLEED "; + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +static int test_tls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() + { + SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls); + /* Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length + + * minimum padding */ + unsigned char payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3]; + memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf)); + payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0'; + + fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0]; + fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS; + fixture.expected_return_value = 0; + fixture.expected_payload_len = 0; + fixture.expected_return_payload = ""; + EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST(); + } + +#undef EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST +#undef SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + int num_failed; + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + num_failed = test_dtls1_not_bleeding() + + test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() + + test_dtls1_heartbleed() + + test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() + + /* The following test causes an assertion failure at + * ssl/d1_pkt.c:dtls1_write_bytes() in versions prior to 1.0.1g: */ + (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000107fL ? + test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length() : 0) + + test_tls1_not_bleeding() + + test_tls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() + + test_tls1_heartbleed() + + test_tls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() + + 0; + + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + + if (num_failed != 0) + { + printf("%d test%s failed\n", num_failed, num_failed != 1 ? "s" : ""); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + return EXIT_SUCCESS; + } + +#else /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS*/ + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + return EXIT_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */ diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c index a6b3c01afa18..0457af878917 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->hit=1; } else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ @@ -2510,6 +2512,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + /* Did we send out the client's * ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c index 8deeab3c9fbf..59011e39c67e 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ */ #include <stdio.h> +#include <limits.h> #include <errno.h> #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" @@ -580,10 +581,11 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf=buf_; - unsigned int tot,n,nw; - int i; + unsigned int n,nw; + int i,tot; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); tot=s->s3->wnum; s->s3->wnum=0; @@ -598,6 +600,22 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) } } + /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write + * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete + * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding + * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as + * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large + * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users + * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user + * will notice + */ + if (len < tot) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return(-1); + } + + n=(len-tot); for (;;) { @@ -641,9 +659,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); SSL_SESSION *sess; - if (wb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) - return -1; /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ @@ -659,6 +674,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } + if (wb->buf == NULL) + if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) + return -1; + if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; @@ -1297,6 +1316,15 @@ start: goto f_err; } + if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + goto f_err; + } + + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + rr->length=0; if (s->msg_callback) @@ -1431,7 +1459,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { - if (s->session == NULL) + if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 9ac19c05f22d..503bed3fe0b4 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; @@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + { + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + } else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif @@ -2097,6 +2102,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ @@ -2813,6 +2823,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; size_t outlen=32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; + int Ttag, Tclass; + long Tlen; /* Get our certificate private key*/ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; @@ -2834,26 +2846,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ - if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; - } - if (p[1] == 0x81) - { - start = p+3; - inlen = p[2]; - } - else if (p[1] < 0x80) - { - start = p+2; - inlen = p[1]; - } - else + if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || + Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || + Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } + start = p; + inlen = Tlen; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) { diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h index 7219a0e64bc2..4c1242c9d20c 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ #define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L -#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L +#define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0x00000010L #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L #define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L @@ -562,6 +562,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st /* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */ #define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0 +/* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */ +#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x0 /* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h index cb8b2492ec97..37f19e3ab505 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h @@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020 +#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080 /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index 38540be1e538..477500371027 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, if (os.length != 3) { c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH; + c.line=__LINE__; goto err; } id=0x02000000L| @@ -420,6 +421,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, if (os.length != 2) { c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH; + c.line=__LINE__; goto err; } id=0x03000000L| @@ -429,6 +431,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, else { c.error=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION; + c.line=__LINE__; goto err; } @@ -521,6 +524,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { c.error=SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH; + c.line=__LINE__; goto err; } else diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c index 370fb57e3b86..49ab43e0e528 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c @@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME),"tlsv1 unrecognized name"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),"tlsv1 unsupported extension"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),"tls client cert req with anon cipher"}, -{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),"peer does not accept heartbearts"}, +{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),"peer does not accept heartbeats"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING) ,"heartbeat request already pending"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),"tls illegal exporter label"}, {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),"tls invalid ecpointformat list"}, diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 6dbc3c1f7d0a..ef6258ca9f06 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1349,6 +1349,10 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) p=buf; sk=s->session->ciphers; + + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) + return NULL; + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { int n; diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c index 0c4cddedf85c..ac8c1539968b 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -1048,14 +1048,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); #ifdef TLS_DEBUG -printf("sec="); -{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); } printf("seq="); {int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); } -printf("buf="); -{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } printf("rec="); -{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } +{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); } #endif if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) @@ -1185,7 +1181,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; - rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, + rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c index bddffd92cc04..3b8d5153eb6f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension */ + if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) + return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); s2n(1,ret); /* Set mode: @@ -661,36 +663,35 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha ret += el; } #endif - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 * * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing * extensions it MUST always appear last. */ - { - int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the - * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does - * not. */ - if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) - hlen -= 5; - if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) + if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { - hlen = 0x200 - hlen; - if (hlen >= 4) - hlen -= 4; - else - hlen = 0; + int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages + * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while + * the code in s3_clnt.c does not. + */ + if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) + hlen -= 5; + if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) + { + hlen = 0x200 - hlen; + if (hlen >= 4) + hlen -= 4; + else + hlen = 0; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); - s2n(hlen, ret); - memset(ret, 0, hlen); - ret += hlen; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); + s2n(hlen, ret); + memset(ret, 0, hlen); + ret += hlen; + } } - } -#endif if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) return p; @@ -845,6 +846,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { + if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) + return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); s2n(1,ret); /* Set mode: |