diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libc/rpc')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/Symbol.map | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/auth_des.c | 455 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/authdes_prot.c | 44 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/key_call.c | 424 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/publickey.5 | 40 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/rpc_secure.3 | 177 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.3 | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.c | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth_des.c | 460 |
10 files changed, 1595 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/Symbol.map b/lib/libc/rpc/Symbol.map index 61e8e084b1e0..105d6fb6b54e 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/Symbol.map +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/Symbol.map @@ -8,9 +8,13 @@ FBSD_1.0 { xdr_desargs; xdr_desresp; + authdes_seccreate; + authdes_pk_seccreate; authnone_create; authunix_create; authunix_create_default; + xdr_authdes_cred; + xdr_authdes_verf; xdr_authunix_parms; bindresvport; bindresvport_sa; @@ -54,6 +58,15 @@ FBSD_1.0 { endrpcent; getrpcent; getrpcport; + key_setsecret; + key_secretkey_is_set; + key_encryptsession_pk; + key_decryptsession_pk; + key_encryptsession; + key_decryptsession; + key_gendes; + key_setnet; + key_get_conv; xdr_keystatus; xdr_keybuf; xdr_netnamestr; @@ -117,6 +130,7 @@ FBSD_1.0 { callrpc; registerrpc; clnt_broadcast; + authdes_create; clntunix_create; svcunix_create; svcunixfd_create; @@ -166,6 +180,8 @@ FBSD_1.0 { _authenticate; _svcauth_null; svc_auth_reg; + _svcauth_des; + authdes_getucred; _svcauth_unix; _svcauth_short; svc_dg_create; @@ -189,6 +205,9 @@ FBSD_1.8 { FBSDprivate_1.0 { __des_crypt_LOCAL; + __key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL; + __key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL; + __key_gendes_LOCAL; __svc_clean_idle; __rpc_gss_unwrap; __rpc_gss_unwrap_stub; diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/auth_des.c b/lib/libc/rpc/auth_des.c index 754d55cbed3e..c9b20de25cda 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/auth_des.c +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/auth_des.c @@ -30,34 +30,463 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1988 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. */ - /* - * Secure RPC DES authentication was removed in FreeBSD 15.0. - * These symbols are provided for backward compatibility, but provide no - * functionality and will always return an error. + * auth_des.c, client-side implementation of DES authentication */ #include "namespace.h" #include "reentrant.h" +#include <err.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <rpc/des_crypt.h> +#include <syslog.h> #include <rpc/types.h> #include <rpc/auth.h> #include <rpc/auth_des.h> +#include <rpc/clnt.h> +#include <rpc/xdr.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#undef NIS #include <rpcsvc/nis.h> #include "un-namespace.h" +#include "mt_misc.h" + +#define USEC_PER_SEC 1000000 +#define RTIME_TIMEOUT 5 /* seconds to wait for sync */ + +#define AUTH_PRIVATE(auth) (struct ad_private *) auth->ah_private +#define ALLOC(object_type) (object_type *) mem_alloc(sizeof(object_type)) +#define FREE(ptr, size) mem_free((char *)(ptr), (int) size) +#define ATTEMPT(xdr_op) if (!(xdr_op)) return (FALSE) + +extern bool_t xdr_authdes_cred( XDR *, struct authdes_cred *); +extern bool_t xdr_authdes_verf( XDR *, struct authdes_verf *); +extern int key_encryptsession_pk(char *, netobj *, des_block *); + +extern bool_t __rpc_get_time_offset(struct timeval *, nis_server *, char *, + char **, char **); -static AUTH * -__authdes_seccreate(const char *servername, const u_int win, +/* + * DES authenticator operations vector + */ +static void authdes_nextverf(AUTH *); +static bool_t authdes_marshal(AUTH *, XDR *); +static bool_t authdes_validate(AUTH *, struct opaque_auth *); +static bool_t authdes_refresh(AUTH *, void *); +static void authdes_destroy(AUTH *); + +static struct auth_ops *authdes_ops(void); + +/* + * This struct is pointed to by the ah_private field of an "AUTH *" + */ +struct ad_private { + char *ad_fullname; /* client's full name */ + u_int ad_fullnamelen; /* length of name, rounded up */ + char *ad_servername; /* server's full name */ + u_int ad_servernamelen; /* length of name, rounded up */ + u_int ad_window; /* client specified window */ + bool_t ad_dosync; /* synchronize? */ + struct netbuf ad_syncaddr; /* remote host to synch with */ + char *ad_timehost; /* remote host to synch with */ + struct timeval ad_timediff; /* server's time - client's time */ + u_int ad_nickname; /* server's nickname for client */ + struct authdes_cred ad_cred; /* storage for credential */ + struct authdes_verf ad_verf; /* storage for verifier */ + struct timeval ad_timestamp; /* timestamp sent */ + des_block ad_xkey; /* encrypted conversation key */ + u_char ad_pkey[1024]; /* Server's actual public key */ + char *ad_netid; /* Timehost netid */ + char *ad_uaddr; /* Timehost uaddr */ + nis_server *ad_nis_srvr; /* NIS+ server struct */ +}; + +AUTH *authdes_pk_seccreate(const char *, netobj *, u_int, const char *, + const des_block *, nis_server *); + +/* + * documented version of authdes_seccreate + */ +/* + servername: network name of server + win: time to live + timehost: optional hostname to sync with + ckey: optional conversation key to use +*/ + +AUTH * +authdes_seccreate(const char *servername, const u_int win, const char *timehost, const des_block *ckey) { - return (NULL); + u_char pkey_data[1024]; + netobj pkey; + AUTH *dummy; + + if (! getpublickey(servername, (char *) pkey_data)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "authdes_seccreate: no public key found for %s", + servername); + return (NULL); + } + + pkey.n_bytes = (char *) pkey_data; + pkey.n_len = (u_int)strlen((char *)pkey_data) + 1; + dummy = authdes_pk_seccreate(servername, &pkey, win, timehost, + ckey, NULL); + return (dummy); } -__sym_compat(authdes_seccreate, __authdes_seccreate, FBSD_1.0); -static AUTH * -__authdes_pk_seccreate(const char *servername __unused, netobj *pkey __unused, - u_int window __unused, const char *timehost __unused, - const des_block *ckey __unused, nis_server *srvr __unused) +/* + * Slightly modified version of authdessec_create which takes the public key + * of the server principal as an argument. This spares us a call to + * getpublickey() which in the nameserver context can cause a deadlock. + */ +AUTH * +authdes_pk_seccreate(const char *servername, netobj *pkey, u_int window, + const char *timehost, const des_block *ckey, nis_server *srvr) { + AUTH *auth; + struct ad_private *ad; + char namebuf[MAXNETNAMELEN+1]; + + /* + * Allocate everything now + */ + auth = ALLOC(AUTH); + if (auth == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdes_pk_seccreate: out of memory"); + return (NULL); + } + ad = ALLOC(struct ad_private); + if (ad == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdes_pk_seccreate: out of memory"); + goto failed; + } + ad->ad_fullname = ad->ad_servername = NULL; /* Sanity reasons */ + ad->ad_timehost = NULL; + ad->ad_netid = NULL; + ad->ad_uaddr = NULL; + ad->ad_nis_srvr = NULL; + ad->ad_timediff.tv_sec = 0; + ad->ad_timediff.tv_usec = 0; + memcpy(ad->ad_pkey, pkey->n_bytes, pkey->n_len); + if (!getnetname(namebuf)) + goto failed; + ad->ad_fullnamelen = RNDUP((u_int) strlen(namebuf)); + ad->ad_fullname = (char *)mem_alloc(ad->ad_fullnamelen + 1); + ad->ad_servernamelen = strlen(servername); + ad->ad_servername = (char *)mem_alloc(ad->ad_servernamelen + 1); + + if (ad->ad_fullname == NULL || ad->ad_servername == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdes_seccreate: out of memory"); + goto failed; + } + if (timehost != NULL) { + ad->ad_timehost = (char *)mem_alloc(strlen(timehost) + 1); + if (ad->ad_timehost == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdes_seccreate: out of memory"); + goto failed; + } + memcpy(ad->ad_timehost, timehost, strlen(timehost) + 1); + ad->ad_dosync = TRUE; + } else if (srvr != NULL) { + ad->ad_nis_srvr = srvr; /* transient */ + ad->ad_dosync = TRUE; + } else { + ad->ad_dosync = FALSE; + } + memcpy(ad->ad_fullname, namebuf, ad->ad_fullnamelen + 1); + memcpy(ad->ad_servername, servername, ad->ad_servernamelen + 1); + ad->ad_window = window; + if (ckey == NULL) { + if (key_gendes(&auth->ah_key) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "authdes_seccreate: keyserv(1m) is unable to generate session key"); + goto failed; + } + } else { + auth->ah_key = *ckey; + } + + /* + * Set up auth handle + */ + auth->ah_cred.oa_flavor = AUTH_DES; + auth->ah_verf.oa_flavor = AUTH_DES; + auth->ah_ops = authdes_ops(); + auth->ah_private = (caddr_t)ad; + + if (!authdes_refresh(auth, NULL)) { + goto failed; + } + ad->ad_nis_srvr = NULL; /* not needed any longer */ + return (auth); + +failed: + if (auth) + FREE(auth, sizeof (AUTH)); + if (ad) { + if (ad->ad_fullname) + FREE(ad->ad_fullname, ad->ad_fullnamelen + 1); + if (ad->ad_servername) + FREE(ad->ad_servername, ad->ad_servernamelen + 1); + if (ad->ad_timehost) + FREE(ad->ad_timehost, strlen(ad->ad_timehost) + 1); + if (ad->ad_netid) + FREE(ad->ad_netid, strlen(ad->ad_netid) + 1); + if (ad->ad_uaddr) + FREE(ad->ad_uaddr, strlen(ad->ad_uaddr) + 1); + FREE(ad, sizeof (struct ad_private)); + } return (NULL); } -__sym_compat(authdes_pk_seccreate, __authdes_pk_seccreate, FBSD_1.0); + +/* + * Implement the five authentication operations + */ + + +/* + * 1. Next Verifier + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +authdes_nextverf(AUTH *auth __unused) +{ + /* what the heck am I supposed to do??? */ +} + + +/* + * 2. Marshal + */ +static bool_t +authdes_marshal(AUTH *auth, XDR *xdrs) +{ +/* LINTED pointer alignment */ + struct ad_private *ad = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + struct authdes_cred *cred = &ad->ad_cred; + struct authdes_verf *verf = &ad->ad_verf; + des_block cryptbuf[2]; + des_block ivec; + int status; + int len; + rpc_inline_t *ixdr; + + /* + * Figure out the "time", accounting for any time difference + * with the server if necessary. + */ + (void)gettimeofday(&ad->ad_timestamp, NULL); + ad->ad_timestamp.tv_sec += ad->ad_timediff.tv_sec; + ad->ad_timestamp.tv_usec += ad->ad_timediff.tv_usec; + while (ad->ad_timestamp.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) { + ad->ad_timestamp.tv_usec -= USEC_PER_SEC; + ad->ad_timestamp.tv_sec++; + } + + /* + * XDR the timestamp and possibly some other things, then + * encrypt them. + */ + ixdr = (rpc_inline_t *)cryptbuf; + IXDR_PUT_INT32(ixdr, ad->ad_timestamp.tv_sec); + IXDR_PUT_INT32(ixdr, ad->ad_timestamp.tv_usec); + if (ad->ad_cred.adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + IXDR_PUT_U_INT32(ixdr, ad->ad_window); + IXDR_PUT_U_INT32(ixdr, ad->ad_window - 1); + ivec.key.high = ivec.key.low = 0; + status = cbc_crypt((char *)&auth->ah_key, (char *)cryptbuf, + (u_int) 2 * sizeof (des_block), + DES_ENCRYPT | DES_HW, (char *)&ivec); + } else { + status = ecb_crypt((char *)&auth->ah_key, (char *)cryptbuf, + (u_int) sizeof (des_block), + DES_ENCRYPT | DES_HW); + } + if (DES_FAILED(status)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdes_marshal: DES encryption failure"); + return (FALSE); + } + ad->ad_verf.adv_xtimestamp = cryptbuf[0]; + if (ad->ad_cred.adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + ad->ad_cred.adc_fullname.window = cryptbuf[1].key.high; + ad->ad_verf.adv_winverf = cryptbuf[1].key.low; + } else { + ad->ad_cred.adc_nickname = ad->ad_nickname; + ad->ad_verf.adv_winverf = 0; + } + + /* + * Serialize the credential and verifier into opaque + * authentication data. + */ + if (ad->ad_cred.adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + len = ((1 + 1 + 2 + 1)*BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT + ad->ad_fullnamelen); + } else { + len = (1 + 1)*BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT; + } + + if ((ixdr = xdr_inline(xdrs, 2*BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT))) { + IXDR_PUT_INT32(ixdr, AUTH_DES); + IXDR_PUT_INT32(ixdr, len); + } else { + ATTEMPT(xdr_putint32(xdrs, (int *)&auth->ah_cred.oa_flavor)); + ATTEMPT(xdr_putint32(xdrs, &len)); + } + ATTEMPT(xdr_authdes_cred(xdrs, cred)); + + len = (2 + 1)*BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT; + if ((ixdr = xdr_inline(xdrs, 2*BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT))) { + IXDR_PUT_INT32(ixdr, AUTH_DES); + IXDR_PUT_INT32(ixdr, len); + } else { + ATTEMPT(xdr_putint32(xdrs, (int *)&auth->ah_verf.oa_flavor)); + ATTEMPT(xdr_putint32(xdrs, &len)); + } + ATTEMPT(xdr_authdes_verf(xdrs, verf)); + return (TRUE); +} + + +/* + * 3. Validate + */ +static bool_t +authdes_validate(AUTH *auth, struct opaque_auth *rverf) +{ +/* LINTED pointer alignment */ + struct ad_private *ad = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + struct authdes_verf verf; + int status; + uint32_t *ixdr; + des_block buf; + + if (rverf->oa_length != (2 + 1) * BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT) { + return (FALSE); + } +/* LINTED pointer alignment */ + ixdr = (uint32_t *)rverf->oa_base; + buf.key.high = (uint32_t)*ixdr++; + buf.key.low = (uint32_t)*ixdr++; + verf.adv_int_u = (uint32_t)*ixdr++; + + /* + * Decrypt the timestamp + */ + status = ecb_crypt((char *)&auth->ah_key, (char *)&buf, + (u_int)sizeof (des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW); + + if (DES_FAILED(status)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdes_validate: DES decryption failure"); + return (FALSE); + } + + /* + * xdr the decrypted timestamp + */ +/* LINTED pointer alignment */ + ixdr = (uint32_t *)buf.c; + verf.adv_timestamp.tv_sec = IXDR_GET_INT32(ixdr) + 1; + verf.adv_timestamp.tv_usec = IXDR_GET_INT32(ixdr); + + /* + * validate + */ + if (bcmp((char *)&ad->ad_timestamp, (char *)&verf.adv_timestamp, + sizeof(struct timeval)) != 0) { + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "authdes_validate: verifier mismatch"); + return (FALSE); + } + + /* + * We have a nickname now, let's use it + */ + ad->ad_nickname = verf.adv_nickname; + ad->ad_cred.adc_namekind = ADN_NICKNAME; + return (TRUE); +} + +/* + * 4. Refresh + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static bool_t +authdes_refresh(AUTH *auth, void *dummy __unused) +{ +/* LINTED pointer alignment */ + struct ad_private *ad = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + struct authdes_cred *cred = &ad->ad_cred; + int ok; + netobj pkey; + + if (ad->ad_dosync) { + ok = __rpc_get_time_offset(&ad->ad_timediff, ad->ad_nis_srvr, + ad->ad_timehost, &(ad->ad_uaddr), + &(ad->ad_netid)); + if (! ok) { + /* + * Hope the clocks are synced! + */ + ad->ad_dosync = 0; + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, + "authdes_refresh: unable to synchronize clock"); + } + } + ad->ad_xkey = auth->ah_key; + pkey.n_bytes = (char *)(ad->ad_pkey); + pkey.n_len = (u_int)strlen((char *)ad->ad_pkey) + 1; + if (key_encryptsession_pk(ad->ad_servername, &pkey, &ad->ad_xkey) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_INFO, + "authdes_refresh: keyserv(1m) is unable to encrypt session key"); + return (FALSE); + } + cred->adc_fullname.key = ad->ad_xkey; + cred->adc_namekind = ADN_FULLNAME; + cred->adc_fullname.name = ad->ad_fullname; + return (TRUE); +} + + +/* + * 5. Destroy + */ +static void +authdes_destroy(AUTH *auth) +{ +/* LINTED pointer alignment */ + struct ad_private *ad = AUTH_PRIVATE(auth); + + FREE(ad->ad_fullname, ad->ad_fullnamelen + 1); + FREE(ad->ad_servername, ad->ad_servernamelen + 1); + if (ad->ad_timehost) + FREE(ad->ad_timehost, strlen(ad->ad_timehost) + 1); + if (ad->ad_netid) + FREE(ad->ad_netid, strlen(ad->ad_netid) + 1); + if (ad->ad_uaddr) + FREE(ad->ad_uaddr, strlen(ad->ad_uaddr) + 1); + FREE(ad, sizeof (struct ad_private)); + FREE(auth, sizeof(AUTH)); +} + +static struct auth_ops * +authdes_ops(void) +{ + static struct auth_ops ops; + + /* VARIABLES PROTECTED BY ops_lock: ops */ + + mutex_lock(&authdes_ops_lock); + if (ops.ah_nextverf == NULL) { + ops.ah_nextverf = authdes_nextverf; + ops.ah_marshal = authdes_marshal; + ops.ah_validate = authdes_validate; + ops.ah_refresh = authdes_refresh; + ops.ah_destroy = authdes_destroy; + } + mutex_unlock(&authdes_ops_lock); + return (&ops); +} diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/authdes_prot.c b/lib/libc/rpc/authdes_prot.c index 56b44daafe41..79a0e5baa084 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/authdes_prot.c +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/authdes_prot.c @@ -42,16 +42,44 @@ #include <rpc/auth_des.h> #include "un-namespace.h" -static bool_t -__xdr_authdes_cred(XDR *xdrs, void *cred) +#define ATTEMPT(xdr_op) if (!(xdr_op)) return (FALSE) + +bool_t +xdr_authdes_cred(XDR *xdrs, struct authdes_cred *cred) { - return (FALSE); + enum authdes_namekind *padc_namekind = &cred->adc_namekind; + /* + * Unrolled xdr + */ + ATTEMPT(xdr_enum(xdrs, (enum_t *) padc_namekind)); + switch (cred->adc_namekind) { + case ADN_FULLNAME: + ATTEMPT(xdr_string(xdrs, &cred->adc_fullname.name, + MAXNETNAMELEN)); + ATTEMPT(xdr_opaque(xdrs, (caddr_t)&cred->adc_fullname.key, + sizeof(des_block))); + ATTEMPT(xdr_opaque(xdrs, (caddr_t)&cred->adc_fullname.window, + sizeof(cred->adc_fullname.window))); + return (TRUE); + case ADN_NICKNAME: + ATTEMPT(xdr_opaque(xdrs, (caddr_t)&cred->adc_nickname, + sizeof(cred->adc_nickname))); + return (TRUE); + default: + return (FALSE); + } } -__sym_compat(xdr_authdes_cred, __xdr_authdes_cred, FBSD_1.0); -static bool_t -__xdr_authdes_verf(XDR *xdrs, void *verf) + +bool_t +xdr_authdes_verf(XDR *xdrs, struct authdes_verf *verf) { - return (FALSE); + /* + * Unrolled xdr + */ + ATTEMPT(xdr_opaque(xdrs, (caddr_t)&verf->adv_xtimestamp, + sizeof(des_block))); + ATTEMPT(xdr_opaque(xdrs, (caddr_t)&verf->adv_int_u, + sizeof(verf->adv_int_u))); + return (TRUE); } -__sym_compat(xdr_authdes_verf, __xdr_authdes_verf, FBSD_1.0); diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/key_call.c b/lib/libc/rpc/key_call.c index eb274fcfff36..5c87881c815c 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/key_call.c +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/key_call.c @@ -32,78 +32,426 @@ */ /* - * Secure RPC keyserver support was removed in FreeBSD 15.0. - * These symbols are provided for backward compatibility, but provide no - * functionality and will always return an error. + * key_call.c, Interface to keyserver + * + * setsecretkey(key) - set your secret key + * encryptsessionkey(agent, deskey) - encrypt a session key to talk to agent + * decryptsessionkey(agent, deskey) - decrypt ditto + * gendeskey(deskey) - generate a secure des key */ #include "namespace.h" #include "reentrant.h" +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <errno.h> #include <rpc/rpc.h> -#include <rpc/key_prot.h> #include <rpc/auth.h> +#include <rpc/auth_unix.h> +#include <rpc/key_prot.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <netconfig.h> +#include <sys/utsname.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <sys/fcntl.h> #include "un-namespace.h" #include "mt_misc.h" -static int -__key_setsecret(const char *secretkey) + +#define KEY_TIMEOUT 5 /* per-try timeout in seconds */ +#define KEY_NRETRY 12 /* number of retries */ + +#ifdef DEBUG +#define debug(msg) (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); +#else +#define debug(msg) +#endif /* DEBUG */ + +/* + * Hack to allow the keyserver to use AUTH_DES (for authenticated + * NIS+ calls, for example). The only functions that get called + * are key_encryptsession_pk, key_decryptsession_pk, and key_gendes. + * + * The approach is to have the keyserver fill in pointers to local + * implementations of these functions, and to call those in key_call(). + */ + +cryptkeyres *(*__key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL)(uid_t, void *arg) = 0; +cryptkeyres *(*__key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL)(uid_t, void *arg) = 0; +des_block *(*__key_gendes_LOCAL)(uid_t, void *) = 0; + +static int key_call( u_long, xdrproc_t, void *, xdrproc_t, void *); + +int +key_setsecret(const char *secretkey) { - return (-1); + keystatus status; + + if (!key_call((u_long) KEY_SET, (xdrproc_t)xdr_keybuf, + (void *)secretkey, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_keystatus, &status)) { + return (-1); + } + if (status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("set status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_setsecret, __key_setsecret, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_secretkey_is_set(void) + +/* key_secretkey_is_set() returns 1 if the keyserver has a secret key + * stored for the caller's effective uid; it returns 0 otherwise + * + * N.B.: The KEY_NET_GET key call is undocumented. Applications shouldn't + * be using it, because it allows them to get the user's secret key. + */ + +int +key_secretkey_is_set(void) { + struct key_netstres kres; + + memset((void*)&kres, 0, sizeof (kres)); + if (key_call((u_long) KEY_NET_GET, (xdrproc_t)xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_key_netstres, &kres) && + (kres.status == KEY_SUCCESS) && + (kres.key_netstres_u.knet.st_priv_key[0] != 0)) { + /* avoid leaving secret key in memory */ + memset(kres.key_netstres_u.knet.st_priv_key, 0, HEXKEYBYTES); + return (1); + } return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_secretkey_is_set, __key_secretkey_is_set, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_encryptsession_pk(char *remotename, netobj *remotekey, des_block *deskey) +int +key_encryptsession_pk(char *remotename, netobj *remotekey, des_block *deskey) { - return (-1); + cryptkeyarg2 arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.remotekey = *remotekey; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_ENCRYPT_PK, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg2, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("encrypt status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_encryptsession_pk, __key_encryptsession_pk, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_decryptsession_pk(char *remotename, netobj *remotekey, des_block *deskey) +int +key_decryptsession_pk(char *remotename, netobj *remotekey, des_block *deskey) { - return (-1); + cryptkeyarg2 arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = remotename; + arg.remotekey = *remotekey; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_DECRYPT_PK, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg2, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("decrypt status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_decryptsession_pk, __key_decryptsession_pk, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_encryptsession(const char *remotename, des_block *deskey) +int +key_encryptsession(const char *remotename, des_block *deskey) { - return (-1); + cryptkeyarg arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = (char *) remotename; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_ENCRYPT, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("encrypt status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_encryptsession, __key_encryptsession, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_decryptsession(const char *remotename, des_block *deskey) +int +key_decryptsession(const char *remotename, des_block *deskey) { - return (-1); + cryptkeyarg arg; + cryptkeyres res; + + arg.remotename = (char *) remotename; + arg.deskey = *deskey; + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_DECRYPT, (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyarg, &arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("decrypt status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_decryptsession, __key_decryptsession, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_gendes(des_block *key) +int +key_gendes(des_block *key) { - return (-1); + if (!key_call((u_long)KEY_GEN, (xdrproc_t)xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_des_block, key)) { + return (-1); + } + return (0); } -__sym_compat(key_gendes, __key_gendes, FBSD_1.0); -static int -__key_setnet(struct key_netstarg *arg) +int +key_setnet(struct key_netstarg *arg) { - return (-1); + keystatus status; + + + if (!key_call((u_long) KEY_NET_PUT, (xdrproc_t)xdr_key_netstarg, arg, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_keystatus, &status)){ + return (-1); + } + + if (status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("key_setnet status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + return (1); +} + + +int +key_get_conv(char *pkey, des_block *deskey) +{ + cryptkeyres res; + + if (!key_call((u_long) KEY_GET_CONV, (xdrproc_t)xdr_keybuf, pkey, + (xdrproc_t)xdr_cryptkeyres, &res)) { + return (-1); + } + if (res.status != KEY_SUCCESS) { + debug("get_conv status is nonzero"); + return (-1); + } + *deskey = res.cryptkeyres_u.deskey; + return (0); +} + +struct key_call_private { + CLIENT *client; /* Client handle */ + pid_t pid; /* process-id at moment of creation */ + uid_t uid; /* user-id at last authorization */ +}; +static struct key_call_private *key_call_private_main = NULL; +static thread_key_t key_call_key; +static once_t key_call_once = ONCE_INITIALIZER; +static int key_call_key_error; + +static void +key_call_destroy(void *vp) +{ + struct key_call_private *kcp = (struct key_call_private *)vp; + + if (kcp) { + if (kcp->client) + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + free(kcp); + } +} + +static void +key_call_init(void) +{ + + key_call_key_error = thr_keycreate(&key_call_key, key_call_destroy); } -__sym_compat(key_setnet, __key_setnet, FBSD_1.0); + +/* + * Keep the handle cached. This call may be made quite often. + */ +static CLIENT * +getkeyserv_handle(int vers) +{ + void *localhandle; + struct netconfig *nconf; + struct netconfig *tpconf; + struct key_call_private *kcp; + struct timeval wait_time; + struct utsname u; + int main_thread; + int fd; + +#define TOTAL_TIMEOUT 30 /* total timeout talking to keyserver */ +#define TOTAL_TRIES 5 /* Number of tries */ + + if ((main_thread = thr_main())) { + kcp = key_call_private_main; + } else { + if (thr_once(&key_call_once, key_call_init) != 0 || + key_call_key_error != 0) + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + kcp = (struct key_call_private *)thr_getspecific(key_call_key); + } + if (kcp == (struct key_call_private *)NULL) { + kcp = (struct key_call_private *)malloc(sizeof (*kcp)); + if (kcp == (struct key_call_private *)NULL) { + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + if (main_thread) + key_call_private_main = kcp; + else + thr_setspecific(key_call_key, (void *) kcp); + kcp->client = NULL; + } + + /* if pid has changed, destroy client and rebuild */ + if (kcp->client != NULL && kcp->pid != getpid()) { + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + } + + if (kcp->client != NULL) { + /* if uid has changed, build client handle again */ + if (kcp->uid != geteuid()) { + kcp->uid = geteuid(); + auth_destroy(kcp->client->cl_auth); + kcp->client->cl_auth = + authsys_create("", kcp->uid, 0, 0, NULL); + if (kcp->client->cl_auth == NULL) { + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + } + /* Change the version number to the new one */ + clnt_control(kcp->client, CLSET_VERS, (void *)&vers); + return (kcp->client); + } + if (!(localhandle = setnetconfig())) { + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + tpconf = NULL; +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) + if (uname(&u) == -1) +#else +#if defined(i386) + if (_nuname(&u) == -1) +#elif defined(sparc) + if (_uname(&u) == -1) +#else +#error Unknown architecture! +#endif +#endif + { + endnetconfig(localhandle); + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + while ((nconf = getnetconfig(localhandle)) != NULL) { + if (strcmp(nconf->nc_protofmly, NC_LOOPBACK) == 0) { + /* + * We use COTS_ORD here so that the caller can + * find out immediately if the server is dead. + */ + if (nconf->nc_semantics == NC_TPI_COTS_ORD) { + kcp->client = clnt_tp_create(u.nodename, + KEY_PROG, vers, nconf); + if (kcp->client) + break; + } else { + tpconf = nconf; + } + } + } + if ((kcp->client == (CLIENT *) NULL) && (tpconf)) + /* Now, try the CLTS or COTS loopback transport */ + kcp->client = clnt_tp_create(u.nodename, + KEY_PROG, vers, tpconf); + endnetconfig(localhandle); + + if (kcp->client == (CLIENT *) NULL) { + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + kcp->uid = geteuid(); + kcp->pid = getpid(); + kcp->client->cl_auth = authsys_create("", kcp->uid, 0, 0, NULL); + if (kcp->client->cl_auth == NULL) { + clnt_destroy(kcp->client); + kcp->client = NULL; + return ((CLIENT *) NULL); + } + + wait_time.tv_sec = TOTAL_TIMEOUT/TOTAL_TRIES; + wait_time.tv_usec = 0; + (void) clnt_control(kcp->client, CLSET_RETRY_TIMEOUT, + (char *)&wait_time); + if (clnt_control(kcp->client, CLGET_FD, (char *)&fd)) + _fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, 1); /* make it "close on exec" */ + + return (kcp->client); +} + +/* returns 0 on failure, 1 on success */ static int -__key_get_conv(char *pkey, des_block *deskey) +key_call(u_long proc, xdrproc_t xdr_arg, void *arg, xdrproc_t xdr_rslt, + void *rslt) { - return (-1); + CLIENT *clnt; + struct timeval wait_time; + + if (proc == KEY_ENCRYPT_PK && __key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL) { + cryptkeyres *res; + res = (*__key_encryptsession_pk_LOCAL)(geteuid(), arg); + *(cryptkeyres*)rslt = *res; + return (1); + } else if (proc == KEY_DECRYPT_PK && __key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL) { + cryptkeyres *res; + res = (*__key_decryptsession_pk_LOCAL)(geteuid(), arg); + *(cryptkeyres*)rslt = *res; + return (1); + } else if (proc == KEY_GEN && __key_gendes_LOCAL) { + des_block *res; + res = (*__key_gendes_LOCAL)(geteuid(), 0); + *(des_block*)rslt = *res; + return (1); + } + + if ((proc == KEY_ENCRYPT_PK) || (proc == KEY_DECRYPT_PK) || + (proc == KEY_NET_GET) || (proc == KEY_NET_PUT) || + (proc == KEY_GET_CONV)) + clnt = getkeyserv_handle(2); /* talk to version 2 */ + else + clnt = getkeyserv_handle(1); /* talk to version 1 */ + + if (clnt == NULL) { + return (0); + } + + wait_time.tv_sec = TOTAL_TIMEOUT; + wait_time.tv_usec = 0; + + if (clnt_call(clnt, proc, xdr_arg, arg, xdr_rslt, rslt, + wait_time) == RPC_SUCCESS) { + return (1); + } else { + return (0); + } } -__sym_compat(key_get_conv, __key_get_conv, FBSD_1.0); diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/publickey.5 b/lib/libc/rpc/publickey.5 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..db95c4617b50 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/publickey.5 @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +.Dd October 19, 1987 +.Dt PUBLICKEY 5 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm publickey +.Nd "public key database" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Pa /etc/publickey +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Pa /etc/publickey +is the public key database used for secure +RPC (Remote Procedure Calls). +Each entry in +the database consists of a network user +name (which may either refer to +a user or a hostname), followed by the user's +public key (in hex +notation), a colon, and then the user's +secret key encrypted with +its login password (also in hex notation). +.Pp +This file is altered either by the user through the +.Xr chkey 1 +command or by the system administrator through the +.Xr newkey 8 +command. +The file +.Pa /etc/publickey +should only contain data on the +.Tn NIS +master machine, where it +is converted into the +.Tn NIS +database +.Pa publickey.byname . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr chkey 1 , +.Xr publickey 3 , +.Xr newkey 8 , +.Xr ypupdated 8 diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_secure.3 b/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_secure.3 index ca99b06b556d..ce59bba7115f 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_secure.3 +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_secure.3 @@ -1,17 +1,34 @@ .\" -.Dd August 10, 2025 -.Dt RPC_SECURE 3 +.Dd February 16, 1988 +.Dt RPC 3 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm rpc_secure .Nd library routines for secure remote procedure calls .Sh SYNOPSIS .In rpc/rpc.h +.Ft AUTH * +.Fo authdes_create +.Fa "char *name" +.Fa "unsigned window" +.Fa "struct sockaddr *addr" +.Fa "des_block *ckey" +.Fc +.Ft int +.Fn authdes_getucred "struct authdes_cred *adc" "uid_t *uid" "gid_t *gid" "int *grouplen" "gid_t *groups" .Ft int .Fn getnetname "char *name" .Ft int .Fn host2netname "char *name" "const char *host" "const char *domain" .Ft int +.Fn key_decryptsession "const char *remotename" "des_block *deskey" +.Ft int +.Fn key_encryptsession "const char *remotename" "des_block *deskey" +.Ft int +.Fn key_gendes "des_block *deskey" +.Ft int +.Fn key_setsecret "const char *key" +.Ft int .Fn netname2host "char *name" "char *host" "int hostlen" .Ft int .Fn netname2user "char *name" "uid_t *uidp" "gid_t *gidp" "int *gidlenp" "gid_t *gidlist" @@ -21,11 +38,101 @@ These routines are part of the .Tn RPC library. +They implement +.Tn DES +Authentication. See .Xr rpc 3 for further details about .Tn RPC . .Pp +The +.Fn authdes_create +is the first of two routines which interface to the +.Tn RPC +secure authentication system, known as +.Tn DES +authentication. +The second is +.Fn authdes_getucred , +below. +.Pp +Note: the keyserver daemon +.Xr keyserv 8 +must be running for the +.Tn DES +authentication system to work. +.Pp +The +.Fn authdes_create +function, +used on the client side, returns an authentication handle that +will enable the use of the secure authentication system. +The first argument +.Fa name +is the network name, or +.Fa netname , +of the owner of the server process. +This field usually +represents a +.Fa hostname +derived from the utility routine +.Fn host2netname , +but could also represent a user name using +.Fn user2netname . +The second field is window on the validity of +the client credential, given in seconds. +A small +window is more secure than a large one, but choosing +too small of a window will increase the frequency of +resynchronizations because of clock drift. +The third +argument +.Fa addr +is optional. +If it is +.Dv NULL , +then the authentication system will assume +that the local clock is always in sync with the server's +clock, and will not attempt resynchronizations. +If an address +is supplied, however, then the system will use the address +for consulting the remote time service whenever +resynchronization +is required. +This argument is usually the +address of the +.Tn RPC +server itself. +The final argument +.Fa ckey +is also optional. +If it is +.Dv NULL , +then the authentication system will +generate a random +.Tn DES +key to be used for the encryption of credentials. +If it is supplied, however, then it will be used instead. +.Pp +The +.Fn authdes_getucred +function, +the second of the two +.Tn DES +authentication routines, +is used on the server side for converting a +.Tn DES +credential, which is +operating system independent, into a +.Ux +credential. +This routine differs from utility routine +.Fn netname2user +in that +.Fn authdes_getucred +pulls its information from a cache, and does not have to do a +Yellow Pages lookup every time it is called to get its information. .Pp The .Fn getnetname @@ -54,6 +161,72 @@ Inverse of .Fn netname2host . .Pp The +.Fn key_decryptsession +function +is an interface to the keyserver daemon, which is associated +with +.Tn RPC Ns 's +secure authentication system +.Tn ( DES +authentication). +User programs rarely need to call it, or its associated routines +.Fn key_encryptsession , +.Fn key_gendes +and +.Fn key_setsecret . +System commands such as +.Xr login 1 +and the +.Tn RPC +library are the main clients of these four routines. +.Pp +The +.Fn key_decryptsession +function +takes a server netname and a +.Tn DES +key, and decrypts the key by +using the public key of the server and the secret key +associated with the effective uid of the calling process. +It +is the inverse of +.Fn key_encryptsession . +.Pp +The +.Fn key_encryptsession +function +is a keyserver interface routine. +It +takes a server netname and a des key, and encrypts +it using the public key of the server and the secret key +associated with the effective uid of the calling process. +It +is the inverse of +.Fn key_decryptsession . +.Pp +The +.Fn key_gendes +function +is a keyserver interface routine. +It +is used to ask the keyserver for a secure conversation key. +Choosing one +.Qq random +is usually not good enough, +because +the common ways of choosing random numbers, such as using the +current time, are very easy to guess. +.Pp +The +.Fn key_setsecret +function +is a keyserver interface routine. +It is used to set the key for +the effective +.Fa uid +of the calling process. +.Pp +The .Fn netname2host function converts from an operating-system independent netname to a diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.3 b/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.3 index e6fd8a0da6e4..4abd4b14c475 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.3 +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.3 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ .\" $NetBSD: rpc_soc.3,v 1.2 2000/06/07 13:39:43 simonb Exp $ .\" -.Dd August 10, 2025 +.Dd February 16, 1988 .Dt RPC_SOC 3 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ to perform the requested service, and then sends back a reply. Finally, the procedure call returns to the client. .Pp +Routines that are used for Secure +.Tn RPC ( DES +authentication) are described in +.Xr rpc_secure 3 . +Secure +.Tn RPC +can be used only if +.Tn DES +encryption is available. +.Pp .Bl -tag -width indent -compact .It Xo .Ft void @@ -1691,6 +1701,7 @@ This routine modifies the global variable Service implementors usually do not need this routine. .El .Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr rpc_secure 3 , .Xr xdr 3 .Rs .%T "Remote Procedure Calls: Protocol Specification" diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.c b/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.c index e293a2ccf22f..c63b89594ce6 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.c +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/rpc_soc.c @@ -379,13 +379,36 @@ clnt_broadcast(u_long prog, u_long vers, u_long proc, xdrproc_t xargs, * Create the client des authentication object. Obsoleted by * authdes_seccreate(). */ -static AUTH * -__authdes_create(char *servername, u_int window, struct sockaddr *syncaddr, +AUTH * +authdes_create(char *servername, u_int window, struct sockaddr *syncaddr, des_block *ckey) +/* + * char *servername; // network name of server + * u_int window; // time to live + * struct sockaddr *syncaddr; // optional hostaddr to sync with + * des_block *ckey; // optional conversation key to use + */ { - return (NULL); + AUTH *dummy; + AUTH *nauth; + char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + + if (syncaddr) { + /* + * Change addr to hostname, because that is the way + * new interface takes it. + */ + if (getnameinfo(syncaddr, syncaddr->sa_len, hostname, + sizeof hostname, NULL, 0, 0) != 0) + goto fallback; + + nauth = authdes_seccreate(servername, window, hostname, ckey); + return (nauth); + } +fallback: + dummy = authdes_seccreate(servername, window, NULL, ckey); + return (dummy); } -__sym_compat(authdes_create, __authdes_create, FBSD_1.0); /* * Create a client handle for a unix connection. Obsoleted by clnt_vc_create() diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth.c b/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth.c index b8a9a8f33ebb..eb61171733d6 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth.c +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth.c @@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ _authenticate(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg) case AUTH_SHORT: dummy = _svcauth_short(rqst, msg); return (dummy); +#ifdef DES_BUILTIN + case AUTH_DES: + dummy = _svcauth_des(rqst, msg); + return (dummy); +#endif default: break; } @@ -181,6 +186,9 @@ svc_auth_reg(int cred_flavor, case AUTH_NULL: case AUTH_SYS: case AUTH_SHORT: +#ifdef DES_BUILTIN + case AUTH_DES: +#endif /* already registered */ return (1); diff --git a/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth_des.c b/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth_des.c index 8fde5512e53f..d4736cc851e8 100644 --- a/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth_des.c +++ b/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth_des.c @@ -34,8 +34,17 @@ */ /* - * svcauth_des.c, server-side des authentication. - * This functionality was removed in FreeBSD 15.0. + * svcauth_des.c, server-side des authentication + * + * We insure for the service the following: + * (1) The timestamp microseconds do not exceed 1 million. + * (2) The timestamp plus the window is less than the current time. + * (3) The timestamp is not less than the one previously + * seen in the current session. + * + * It is up to the server to determine if the window size is + * too small . + * */ #include "namespace.h" @@ -56,27 +65,458 @@ #include <rpc/svc_auth.h> #include "libc_private.h" +extern int key_decryptsession_pk(const char *, netobj *, des_block *); + +#define debug(msg) printf("svcauth_des: %s\n", msg) + +#define USEC_PER_SEC ((u_long) 1000000L) +#define BEFORE(t1, t2) timercmp(t1, t2, <) + +/* + * LRU cache of conversation keys and some other useful items. + */ +#define AUTHDES_CACHESZ 64 +struct cache_entry { + des_block key; /* conversation key */ + char *rname; /* client's name */ + u_int window; /* credential lifetime window */ + struct timeval laststamp; /* detect replays of creds */ + char *localcred; /* generic local credential */ +}; +static struct cache_entry *authdes_cache/* [AUTHDES_CACHESZ] */; +static short *authdes_lru/* [AUTHDES_CACHESZ] */; + +static void cache_init(void); /* initialize the cache */ +static short cache_spot(des_block *, char *, struct timeval *); /* find an entry in the cache */ +static void cache_ref(short sid); /* note that sid was ref'd */ + +static void invalidate(char *); /* invalidate entry in cache */ + +/* + * cache statistics + */ +static struct { + u_long ncachehits; /* times cache hit, and is not replay */ + u_long ncachereplays; /* times cache hit, and is replay */ + u_long ncachemisses; /* times cache missed */ +} svcauthdes_stats; + /* * Service side authenticator for AUTH_DES */ -static enum auth_stat -__svcauth_des(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg) +enum auth_stat +_svcauth_des(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg) { - return (AUTH_FAILED); + + long *ixdr; + des_block cryptbuf[2]; + struct authdes_cred *cred; + struct authdes_verf verf; + int status; + struct cache_entry *entry; + short sid = 0; + des_block *sessionkey; + des_block ivec; + u_int window; + struct timeval timestamp; + u_long namelen; + struct area { + struct authdes_cred area_cred; + char area_netname[MAXNETNAMELEN+1]; + } *area; + + if (authdes_cache == NULL) { + cache_init(); + } + + area = (struct area *)rqst->rq_clntcred; + cred = (struct authdes_cred *)&area->area_cred; + + /* + * Get the credential + */ + ixdr = (long *)msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_base; + cred->adc_namekind = IXDR_GET_ENUM(ixdr, enum authdes_namekind); + switch (cred->adc_namekind) { + case ADN_FULLNAME: + namelen = IXDR_GET_U_LONG(ixdr); + if (namelen > MAXNETNAMELEN) { + return (AUTH_BADCRED); + } + cred->adc_fullname.name = area->area_netname; + bcopy((char *)ixdr, cred->adc_fullname.name, + (u_int)namelen); + cred->adc_fullname.name[namelen] = 0; + ixdr += (RNDUP(namelen) / BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT); + cred->adc_fullname.key.key.high = (u_long)*ixdr++; + cred->adc_fullname.key.key.low = (u_long)*ixdr++; + cred->adc_fullname.window = (u_long)*ixdr++; + break; + case ADN_NICKNAME: + cred->adc_nickname = (u_long)*ixdr++; + break; + default: + return (AUTH_BADCRED); + } + + /* + * Get the verifier + */ + ixdr = (long *)msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.high = (u_long)*ixdr++; + verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.low = (u_long)*ixdr++; + verf.adv_int_u = (u_long)*ixdr++; + + + /* + * Get the conversation key + */ + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + netobj pkey; + char pkey_data[1024]; + + sessionkey = &cred->adc_fullname.key; + if (! getpublickey(cred->adc_fullname.name, pkey_data)) { + debug("getpublickey"); + return(AUTH_BADCRED); + } + pkey.n_bytes = pkey_data; + pkey.n_len = strlen(pkey_data) + 1; + if (key_decryptsession_pk(cred->adc_fullname.name, &pkey, + sessionkey) < 0) { + debug("decryptsessionkey"); + return (AUTH_BADCRED); /* key not found */ + } + } else { /* ADN_NICKNAME */ + sid = (short)cred->adc_nickname; + if (sid < 0 || sid >= AUTHDES_CACHESZ) { + debug("bad nickname"); + return (AUTH_BADCRED); /* garbled credential */ + } + sessionkey = &authdes_cache[sid].key; + } + + + /* + * Decrypt the timestamp + */ + cryptbuf[0] = verf.adv_xtimestamp; + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + cryptbuf[1].key.high = cred->adc_fullname.window; + cryptbuf[1].key.low = verf.adv_winverf; + ivec.key.high = ivec.key.low = 0; + status = cbc_crypt((char *)sessionkey, (char *)cryptbuf, + 2*sizeof(des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW, + (char *)&ivec); + } else { + status = ecb_crypt((char *)sessionkey, (char *)cryptbuf, + sizeof(des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW); + } + if (DES_FAILED(status)) { + debug("decryption failure"); + return (AUTH_FAILED); /* system error */ + } + + /* + * XDR the decrypted timestamp + */ + ixdr = (long *)cryptbuf; + timestamp.tv_sec = IXDR_GET_LONG(ixdr); + timestamp.tv_usec = IXDR_GET_LONG(ixdr); + + /* + * Check for valid credentials and verifiers. + * They could be invalid because the key was flushed + * out of the cache, and so a new session should begin. + * Be sure and send AUTH_REJECTED{CRED, VERF} if this is the case. + */ + { + struct timeval current; + int nick; + int winverf; + + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + window = IXDR_GET_U_LONG(ixdr); + winverf = IXDR_GET_U_LONG(ixdr); + if (winverf != window - 1) { + debug("window verifier mismatch"); + return (AUTH_BADCRED); /* garbled credential */ + } + sid = cache_spot(sessionkey, cred->adc_fullname.name, + ×tamp); + if (sid < 0) { + debug("replayed credential"); + return (AUTH_REJECTEDCRED); /* replay */ + } + nick = 0; + } else { /* ADN_NICKNAME */ + window = authdes_cache[sid].window; + nick = 1; + } + + if ((u_long)timestamp.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) { + debug("invalid usecs"); + /* cached out (bad key), or garbled verifier */ + return (nick ? AUTH_REJECTEDVERF : AUTH_BADVERF); + } + if (nick && BEFORE(×tamp, + &authdes_cache[sid].laststamp)) { + debug("timestamp before last seen"); + return (AUTH_REJECTEDVERF); /* replay */ + } + (void)gettimeofday(¤t, NULL); + current.tv_sec -= window; /* allow for expiration */ + if (!BEFORE(¤t, ×tamp)) { + debug("timestamp expired"); + /* replay, or garbled credential */ + return (nick ? AUTH_REJECTEDVERF : AUTH_BADCRED); + } + } + + /* + * Set up the reply verifier + */ + verf.adv_nickname = (u_long)sid; + + /* + * xdr the timestamp before encrypting + */ + ixdr = (long *)cryptbuf; + IXDR_PUT_LONG(ixdr, timestamp.tv_sec - 1); + IXDR_PUT_LONG(ixdr, timestamp.tv_usec); + + /* + * encrypt the timestamp + */ + status = ecb_crypt((char *)sessionkey, (char *)cryptbuf, + sizeof(des_block), DES_ENCRYPT | DES_HW); + if (DES_FAILED(status)) { + debug("encryption failure"); + return (AUTH_FAILED); /* system error */ + } + verf.adv_xtimestamp = cryptbuf[0]; + + /* + * Serialize the reply verifier, and update rqst + */ + ixdr = (long *)msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + *ixdr++ = (long)verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.high; + *ixdr++ = (long)verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.low; + *ixdr++ = (long)verf.adv_int_u; + + rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_flavor = AUTH_DES; + rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_base = msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_length = + (char *)ixdr - msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + + /* + * We succeeded, commit the data to the cache now and + * finish cooking the credential. + */ + entry = &authdes_cache[sid]; + entry->laststamp = timestamp; + cache_ref(sid); + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + cred->adc_fullname.window = window; + cred->adc_nickname = (u_long)sid; /* save nickname */ + if (entry->rname != NULL) { + mem_free(entry->rname, strlen(entry->rname) + 1); + } + entry->rname = (char *)mem_alloc((u_int)strlen(cred->adc_fullname.name) + + 1); + if (entry->rname != NULL) { + (void) strcpy(entry->rname, cred->adc_fullname.name); + } else { + debug("out of memory"); + } + entry->key = *sessionkey; + entry->window = window; + invalidate(entry->localcred); /* mark any cached cred invalid */ + } else { /* ADN_NICKNAME */ + /* + * nicknames are cooked into fullnames + */ + cred->adc_namekind = ADN_FULLNAME; + cred->adc_fullname.name = entry->rname; + cred->adc_fullname.key = entry->key; + cred->adc_fullname.window = entry->window; + } + return (AUTH_OK); /* we made it!*/ } -__sym_compat(_svcauth_des, __svcauth_des, FBSD_1.0); /* + * Initialize the cache + */ +static void +cache_init(void) +{ + int i; + + authdes_cache = (struct cache_entry *) + mem_alloc(sizeof(struct cache_entry) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ); + bzero((char *)authdes_cache, + sizeof(struct cache_entry) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ); + + authdes_lru = (short *)mem_alloc(sizeof(short) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ); + /* + * Initialize the lru list + */ + for (i = 0; i < AUTHDES_CACHESZ; i++) { + authdes_lru[i] = i; + } +} + + +/* + * Find the lru victim + */ +static short +cache_victim(void) +{ + return (authdes_lru[AUTHDES_CACHESZ-1]); +} + +/* + * Note that sid was referenced + */ +static void +cache_ref(short sid) +{ + int i; + short curr; + short prev; + + prev = authdes_lru[0]; + authdes_lru[0] = sid; + for (i = 1; prev != sid; i++) { + curr = authdes_lru[i]; + authdes_lru[i] = prev; + prev = curr; + } +} + + +/* + * Find a spot in the cache for a credential containing + * the items given. Return -1 if a replay is detected, otherwise + * return the spot in the cache. + */ +static short +cache_spot(des_block *key, char *name, struct timeval *timestamp) +{ + struct cache_entry *cp; + int i; + u_long hi; + + hi = key->key.high; + for (cp = authdes_cache, i = 0; i < AUTHDES_CACHESZ; i++, cp++) { + if (cp->key.key.high == hi && + cp->key.key.low == key->key.low && + cp->rname != NULL && + bcmp(cp->rname, name, strlen(name) + 1) == 0) { + if (BEFORE(timestamp, &cp->laststamp)) { + svcauthdes_stats.ncachereplays++; + return (-1); /* replay */ + } + svcauthdes_stats.ncachehits++; + return (i); /* refresh */ + } + } + svcauthdes_stats.ncachemisses++; + return (cache_victim()); /* new credential */ +} + + +#if (defined(sun) || defined(vax) || defined(__FreeBSD__)) +/* + * Local credential handling stuff. + * NOTE: bsd unix dependent. + * Other operating systems should put something else here. + */ +#define UNKNOWN -2 /* grouplen, if cached cred is unknown user */ +#define INVALID -1 /* grouplen, if cache entry is invalid */ + +struct bsdcred { + uid_t uid; /* cached uid */ + gid_t gid; /* cached gid */ + int grouplen; /* length of cached groups */ + gid_t groups[NGRPS]; /* cached groups */ +}; + +/* * Map a des credential into a unix cred. * We cache the credential here so the application does * not have to make an rpc call every time to interpret * the credential. */ -static int -__authdes_getucred(void *adc, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, +int +authdes_getucred(struct authdes_cred *adc, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, int *grouplen, gid_t *groups) { - return (0); + unsigned sid; + int i; + uid_t i_uid; + gid_t i_gid; + int i_grouplen; + struct bsdcred *cred; + + sid = adc->adc_nickname; + if (sid >= AUTHDES_CACHESZ) { + debug("invalid nickname"); + return (0); + } + cred = (struct bsdcred *)authdes_cache[sid].localcred; + if (cred == NULL) { + cred = (struct bsdcred *)mem_alloc(sizeof(struct bsdcred)); + authdes_cache[sid].localcred = (char *)cred; + cred->grouplen = INVALID; + } + if (cred->grouplen == INVALID) { + /* + * not in cache: lookup + */ + if (!netname2user(adc->adc_fullname.name, &i_uid, &i_gid, + &i_grouplen, groups)) + { + debug("unknown netname"); + cred->grouplen = UNKNOWN; /* mark as lookup up, but not found */ + return (0); + } + debug("missed ucred cache"); + *uid = cred->uid = i_uid; + *gid = cred->gid = i_gid; + *grouplen = cred->grouplen = i_grouplen; + for (i = i_grouplen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + cred->groups[i] = groups[i]; /* int to short */ + } + return (1); + } else if (cred->grouplen == UNKNOWN) { + /* + * Already lookup up, but no match found + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * cached credentials + */ + *uid = cred->uid; + *gid = cred->gid; + *grouplen = cred->grouplen; + for (i = cred->grouplen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + groups[i] = cred->groups[i]; /* short to int */ + } + return (1); +} + +static void +invalidate(char *cred) +{ + if (cred == NULL) { + return; + } + ((struct bsdcred *)cred)->grouplen = INVALID; } -__sym_compat(authdes_getucred, __authdes_getucred, FBSD_1.0); +#endif + |