diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'secure/lib/libcrypto/man/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3')
| -rw-r--r-- | secure/lib/libcrypto/man/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3 | 255 |
1 files changed, 104 insertions, 151 deletions
diff --git a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3 b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3 index 666885270148..f65fd87806df 100644 --- a/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3 +++ b/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.3 @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 4.14 (Pod::Simple 3.40) +.\" -*- mode: troff; coding: utf-8 -*- +.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man v6.0.2 (Pod::Simple 3.45) .\" .\" Standard preamble: .\" ======================================================================== @@ -15,29 +16,12 @@ .ft R .fi .. -.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will -.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left -.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will -.\" give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to do unbreakable dashes and -.\" therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C' expand to `' in nroff, -.\" nothing in troff, for use with C<>. -.tr \(*W- -.ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' +.\" \*(C` and \*(C' are quotes in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>. .ie n \{\ -. ds -- \(*W- -. ds PI pi -. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch -. if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch -. ds L" "" -. ds R" "" . ds C` "" . ds C' "" 'br\} .el\{\ -. ds -- \|\(em\| -. ds PI \(*p -. ds L" `` -. ds R" '' . ds C` . ds C' 'br\} @@ -69,78 +53,26 @@ .\} .rr rF .\" -.\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2). -.\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts. -. \" fudge factors for nroff and troff -.if n \{\ -. ds #H 0 -. ds #V .8m -. ds #F .3m -. ds #[ \f1 -. ds #] \fP -.\} -.if t \{\ -. ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu%2u))*.13m) -. ds #V .6m -. ds #F 0 -. ds #[ \& -. ds #] \& -.\} -. \" simple accents for nroff and troff -.if n \{\ -. ds ' \& -. ds ` \& -. ds ^ \& -. ds , \& -. ds ~ ~ -. ds / -.\} -.if t \{\ -. ds ' \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\'\h"|\\n:u" -. ds ` \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\`\h'|\\n:u' -. ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'^\h'|\\n:u' -. ds , \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10)',\h'|\\n:u' -. ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu-\*(#H-.1m)'~\h'|\\n:u' -. ds / \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\z\(sl\h'|\\n:u' -.\} -. \" troff and (daisy-wheel) nroff accents -.ds : \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H+.1m+\*(#F)'\v'-\*(#V'\z.\h'.2m+\*(#F'.\h'|\\n:u'\v'\*(#V' -.ds 8 \h'\*(#H'\(*b\h'-\*(#H' -.ds o \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu+\w'\(de'u-\*(#H)/2u'\v'-.3n'\*(#[\z\(de\v'.3n'\h'|\\n:u'\*(#] -.ds d- \h'\*(#H'\(pd\h'-\w'~'u'\v'-.25m'\f2\(hy\fP\v'.25m'\h'-\*(#H' -.ds D- D\\k:\h'-\w'D'u'\v'-.11m'\z\(hy\v'.11m'\h'|\\n:u' -.ds th \*(#[\v'.3m'\s+1I\s-1\v'-.3m'\h'-(\w'I'u*2/3)'\s-1o\s+1\*(#] -.ds Th \*(#[\s+2I\s-2\h'-\w'I'u*3/5'\v'-.3m'o\v'.3m'\*(#] -.ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u*4/10)'e -.ds Ae A\h'-(\w'A'u*4/10)'E -. \" corrections for vroff -.if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'|\\n:u' -.if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u' -. \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr) -.if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \ -\{\ -. ds : e -. ds 8 ss -. ds o a -. ds d- d\h'-1'\(ga -. ds D- D\h'-1'\(hy -. ds th \o'bp' -. ds Th \o'LP' -. ds ae ae -. ds Ae AE -.\} -.rm #[ #] #H #V #F C +.\" Required to disable full justification in groff 1.23.0. +.if n .ds AD l .\" ======================================================================== .\" -.IX Title "SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3" -.TH SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3 "2022-07-05" "1.1.1q" "OpenSSL" +.IX Title "SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3ossl" +.TH SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY 3ossl 2026-04-07 3.5.6 OpenSSL .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l .nh -.SH "NAME" -SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb, SSL_verify_client_post_handshake, SSL_set_post_handshake_auth, SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth \&\- set peer certificate verification parameters -.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.SH NAME +SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, +SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, +SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, +SSL_verify_cb, +SSL_verify_client_post_handshake, +SSL_set_post_handshake_auth, +SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth +\&\- set various SSL/TLS parameters for peer certificate verification +.SH SYNOPSIS .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" .Vb 1 \& #include <openssl/ssl.h> @@ -158,21 +90,36 @@ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify, SSL_CTX_ \& void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val); \& void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val); .Ve -.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.SH DESCRIPTION .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBctx\fR to be \fBmode\fR and specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function -shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. +shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. \fBctx\fR \fBMUST NOT\fR be NULL. .PP \&\fBSSL_set_verify()\fR sets the verification flags for \fBssl\fR to be \fBmode\fR and specifies the \fBverify_callback\fR function to be used. If no callback function -shall be specified, the \s-1NULL\s0 pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. In +shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for \fBverify_callback\fR. In this case last \fBverify_callback\fR set specifically for this \fBssl\fR remains. If no special \fBcallback\fR was set before, the default callback for the underlying \&\fBctx\fR is used, that was valid at the time \fBssl\fR was created with \&\fBSSL_new\fR\|(3). Within the callback function, \&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR can be called to get the data index -of the current \s-1SSL\s0 object that is doing the verification. +of the current SSL object that is doing the verification. +.PP +In client mode \fBverify_callback\fR may also call the \fBSSL_set_retry_verify\fR\|(3) +function on the \fBSSL\fR object set in the \fIx509_store_ctx\fR ex data (see +\&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3)) and return 1. +This would be typically done in case the certificate verification was not yet +able to succeed. +This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the calling application +with \fBSSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY\fR. +The application can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status +information needed for the verification. +Calling \fBSSL_connect\fR\|(3) again resumes the connection attempt by retrying the +server certificate verification step. +This process may even be repeated if need be. +Note that the handshake may still be aborted if a subsequent invocation of the +callback (e.g., at a lower depth, or for a separate error condition) returns 0. .PP \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR sets the maximum \fBdepth\fR for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for \fBctx\fR. @@ -181,121 +128,124 @@ verification that shall be allowed for \fBctx\fR. verification that shall be allowed for \fBssl\fR. .PP \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR and \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR enable the -Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that -post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If \fBval\fR is 0 +Post\-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that +post\-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If \fBval\fR is 0 then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb()\fR if no certificate is provided at initialization. .PP \&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR causes a CertificateRequest message to be -sent by a server on the given \fBssl\fR connection. The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag must -be set; the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flag is optional. -.SH "NOTES" +sent by a server on the given \fBssl\fR connection. The SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag must +be set; the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flag is optional. +.SH NOTES .IX Header "NOTES" The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically -or'ed \fBmode\fR flags: -.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0" 4 +or\*(Aqed \fBmode\fR flags: +.IP SSL_VERIFY_NONE 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_NONE" \&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request to the client, so the client will not send a certificate. .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the -certificate verification process can be checked after the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake +certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake using the \fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3) function. The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result. -.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0" 4 +.IP SSL_VERIFY_PEER 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_PEER" \&\fBServer mode:\fR the server sends a client certificate request to the client. The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process -fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is +fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. The behaviour can be controlled by the additional -\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0 and -\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 flags. +SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE and +SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flags. .Sp \&\fBClient mode:\fR the server certificate is verified. If the verification process -fails, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is +fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an -anonymous cipher is used, \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is ignored. -.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT\s0" 4 +anonymous cipher is used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored. +.IP SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT" -\&\fBServer mode:\fR if the client did not return a certificate, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 -handshake is immediately terminated with a \*(L"handshake failure\*(R" alert. -This flag must be used together with \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 +\&\fBServer mode:\fR if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL +handshake is immediately terminated with a "handshake failure" alert. +This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. .Sp -\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0) -.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE\s0" 4 +\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see BUGS) +.IP SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE" \&\fBServer mode:\fR only request a client certificate once during the connection. Do not ask for a client certificate again during -renegotiation or post-authentication if a certificate was requested +renegotiation or post\-authentication if a certificate was requested during the initial handshake. This flag must be used together with -\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 +SSL_VERIFY_PEER. .Sp -\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0) -.IP "\s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0" 4 +\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see BUGS) +.IP SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE 4 .IX Item "SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE" \&\fBServer mode:\fR the server will not send a client certificate request during the initial handshake, but will send the request via -\&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR. This allows the \s-1SSL_CTX\s0 or \s-1SSL\s0 -to be configured for post-handshake peer verification before the +\&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR. This allows the SSL_CTX or SSL +to be configured for post\-handshake peer verification before the handshake occurs. This flag must be used together with -\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER.\s0 TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre\-TLSv1.3 connections. +SSL_VERIFY_PEER. TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre\-TLSv1.3 connections. .Sp -\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see \s-1BUGS\s0) +\&\fBClient mode:\fR ignored (see BUGS) .PP -If the \fBmode\fR is \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 none of the other flags may be set. +If the \fBmode\fR is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set. .PP -The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in +If verification flags are not modified explicitly by \f(CWSSL_CTX_set_verify()\fR +or \f(CWSSL_set_verify()\fR, the default value will be SSL_VERIFY_NONE. +.PP +The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built\-in verification procedure or using another application provided verification function set with \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback\fR\|(3). -The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An +The following descriptions apply in the case of the built\-in procedure. An application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information and the \fBverify_callback()\fR function, but the way this information is used may be different. .PP \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()\fR and \fBSSL_set_verify_depth()\fR set a limit on the -number of certificates between the end-entity and trust-anchor certificates. +number of certificates between the end\-entity and trust\-anchor certificates. Neither the -end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates count against \fBdepth\fR. If the +end\-entity nor the trust\-anchor certificates count against \fBdepth\fR. If the certificate chain needed to reach a trusted issuer is longer than \fBdepth+2\fR, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be issued. -The depth count is \*(L"level 0:peer certificate\*(R", \*(L"level 1: \s-1CA\s0 certificate\*(R", -\&\*(L"level 2: higher level \s-1CA\s0 certificate\*(R", and so on. Setting the maximum -depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-entity and 3 the -trust-anchor). +The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate", "level 1: CA certificate", +"level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum +depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end\-entity and 3 the +trust\-anchor). The default depth limit is 100, -allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate \s-1CA\s0 certificates and +allowing for the peer certificate, at most 100 intermediate CA certificates and a final trust anchor certificate. .PP The \fBverify_callback\fR function is used to control the behaviour when the -\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and +SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and receives two arguments: \fBpreverify_ok\fR indicates, whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not (preverify_ok=0). \fBx509_ctx\fR is a pointer to the complete context used for the certificate chain verification. .PP The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level -(the root \s-1CA\s0 certificate) and worked upward to the peer's certificate. +(the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer\*(Aqs certificate. At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is stored in \fBx509_ctx\fR and \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=0. By applying X509_CTX_store_* functions \fBverify_callback\fR can locate the certificate -in question and perform additional steps (see \s-1EXAMPLES\s0). If no error is +in question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES). If no error is found for a certificate, \fBverify_callback\fR is called with \fBpreverify_ok\fR=1 before advancing to the next level. .PP The return value of \fBverify_callback\fR controls the strategy of the further verification process. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 0, the verification -process is immediately stopped with \*(L"verification failed\*(R" state. If -\&\s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and -the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake is terminated. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 1, +process is immediately stopped with "verification failed" state. If +SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and +the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If \fBverify_callback\fR returns 1, the verification process is continued. If \fBverify_callback\fR always returns -1, the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification +1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using \&\fBSSL_get_verify_result\fR\|(3) or by maintaining its @@ -303,27 +253,30 @@ own error storage managed by \fBverify_callback\fR. .PP If no \fBverify_callback\fR is specified, the default callback will be used. Its return value is identical to \fBpreverify_ok\fR, so that any verification -failure will lead to a termination of the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake with an -alert message, if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 is set. +failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an +alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set. .PP After calling \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR, the client will need to add a certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can successfully authenticate. This must be called before \fBSSL_connect()\fR. .PP \&\fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR requires that verify flags have been -previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication +previously set, and that a client sent the post\-handshake authentication extension. When the client returns a certificate the verify callback will be invoked. A write operation must take place for the Certificate Request to be sent to the client, this can be done with \fBSSL_do_handshake()\fR or \fBSSL_write_ex()\fR. Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time. .PP -When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket +When post\-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket message is sent to the client. -.SH "BUGS" +.PP +Post\-handshake authentication cannot be used with QUIC. +\&\fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR has no effect if called on a QUIC SSL object. +.SH BUGS .IX Header "BUGS" -In client mode, it is not checked whether the \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 flag -is set, but whether any flags other than \s-1SSL_VERIFY_NONE\s0 are set. This can -lead to unexpected behaviour if \s-1SSL_VERIFY_PEER\s0 and other flags are not used as +In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag +is set, but whether any flags other than SSL_VERIFY_NONE are set. This can +lead to unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags are not used as required. .SH "RETURN VALUES" .IX Header "RETURN VALUES" @@ -332,10 +285,10 @@ The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information. The \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR function returns 1 if the request succeeded, and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined to determine the failure reason. -.SH "EXAMPLES" +.SH EXAMPLES .IX Header "EXAMPLES" The following code sequence realizes an example \fBverify_callback\fR function -that will always continue the \s-1TLS/SSL\s0 handshake regardless of verification +that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with more informational output. .PP @@ -345,7 +298,7 @@ The example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client certificates. .PP The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data -into/retrieve application data from the \s-1SSL\s0 structure +into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure (see \fBCRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\|(3), \&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3)). .PP @@ -458,15 +411,15 @@ into/retrieve application data from the \s-1SSL\s0 structure \&\fBSSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx\fR\|(3), \&\fBSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb\fR\|(3), \&\fBCRYPTO_get_ex_new_index\fR\|(3) -.SH "HISTORY" +.SH HISTORY .IX Header "HISTORY" -The \s-1SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE\s0 option, and the \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR +The SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE option, and the \fBSSL_verify_client_post_handshake()\fR and \fBSSL_set_post_handshake_auth()\fR functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. -.SH "COPYRIGHT" +.SH COPYRIGHT .IX Header "COPYRIGHT" -Copyright 2000\-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000\-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. .PP -Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use +Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy -in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |