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-rw-r--r--sys/security/audit/audit.c2
-rw-r--r--sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_db.c28
-rw-r--r--sys/security/audit/audit_pipe.c1
-rw-r--r--sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c47
-rw-r--r--sys/security/audit/bsm_errno.c2
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c4
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c4
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c8
8 files changed, 58 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit.c b/sys/security/audit/audit.c
index 7ec50d990d4e..876776e5f62e 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ audit_record_dtor(void *mem, int size, void *arg)
* call into the BSM assembly code to initialize it.
*/
static void
-audit_init(void)
+audit_init(void *dummy __unused)
{
audit_trail_enabled = 0;
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_db.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_db.c
index c9f3d5c8a549..358162544287 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_db.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm_db.c
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
+#include <contrib/ck/include/ck_queue.h>
+
/*
* Hash table functions for the audit event number to event class mask
* mapping.
@@ -64,21 +66,21 @@
struct evclass_elem {
au_event_t event;
au_class_t class;
- LIST_ENTRY(evclass_elem) entry;
+ CK_LIST_ENTRY(evclass_elem) entry;
};
struct evclass_list {
- LIST_HEAD(, evclass_elem) head;
+ CK_LIST_HEAD(, evclass_elem) head;
};
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITEVCLASS, "audit_evclass", "Audit event class");
-static struct rwlock evclass_lock;
static struct evclass_list evclass_hash[EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE];
-
-#define EVCLASS_LOCK_INIT() rw_init(&evclass_lock, "evclass_lock")
-#define EVCLASS_RLOCK() rw_rlock(&evclass_lock)
-#define EVCLASS_RUNLOCK() rw_runlock(&evclass_lock)
-#define EVCLASS_WLOCK() rw_wlock(&evclass_lock)
-#define EVCLASS_WUNLOCK() rw_wunlock(&evclass_lock)
+static struct mtx evclass_mtx;
+#define EVCLASS_LOCK_INIT() mtx_init(&evclass_mtx, "evclass_lock", NULL, MTX_DEF)
+#define EVCLASS_WLOCK() mtx_lock(&evclass_mtx);
+#define EVCLASS_WUNLOCK() mtx_unlock(&evclass_mtx);
+/* make these do something if we ever remove entries from the hash */
+#define EVCLASS_RLOCK() {}
+#define EVCLASS_RUNLOCK() {}
/*
* Hash table maintaining a mapping from audit event numbers to audit event
@@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ au_event_class(au_event_t event)
EVCLASS_RLOCK();
evcl = &evclass_hash[event % EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE];
class = 0;
- LIST_FOREACH(evc, &evcl->head, entry) {
+ CK_LIST_FOREACH(evc, &evcl->head, entry) {
if (evc->event == event) {
class = evc->class;
goto out;
@@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ au_evclassmap_insert(au_event_t event, au_class_t class)
EVCLASS_WLOCK();
evcl = &evclass_hash[event % EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE];
- LIST_FOREACH(evc, &evcl->head, entry) {
+ CK_LIST_FOREACH(evc, &evcl->head, entry) {
if (evc->event == event) {
evc->class = class;
EVCLASS_WUNLOCK();
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ au_evclassmap_insert(au_event_t event, au_class_t class)
evc = evc_new;
evc->event = event;
evc->class = class;
- LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&evcl->head, evc, entry);
+ CK_LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&evcl->head, evc, entry);
EVCLASS_WUNLOCK();
}
@@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ au_evclassmap_init(void)
EVCLASS_LOCK_INIT();
for (i = 0; i < EVCLASSMAP_HASH_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
- LIST_INIT(&evclass_hash[i].head);
+ CK_LIST_INIT(&evclass_hash[i].head);
/*
* Set up the initial event to class mapping for system calls.
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_pipe.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_pipe.c
index fb773fd04297..4d9815467e1a 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_pipe.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_pipe.c
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ static const struct filterops audit_pipe_read_filterops = {
.f_attach = NULL,
.f_detach = audit_pipe_kqdetach,
.f_event = audit_pipe_kqread,
+ .f_copy = knote_triv_copy,
};
/*
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c b/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
index 40b2fb3d1c9f..f50c627b7515 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/audit_syscalls.c
@@ -54,6 +54,29 @@
#ifdef AUDIT
+static int
+audit_priv_check_cred(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ error = priv_check_cred(cred, priv);
+ if (error == EPERM && jailed(cred)) {
+ /*
+ * The audit system calls historically returned ENOSYS when
+ * invoked from within a jail, and some userspace applications
+ * handle that case specially. Thus, convert the error here.
+ */
+ error = ENOSYS;
+ }
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static int
+audit_priv_check(struct thread *td, int priv)
+{
+ return (audit_priv_check_cred(td->td_ucred, priv));
+}
+
/*
* System call to allow a user space application to submit a BSM audit record
* to the kernel for inclusion in the audit log. This function does little
@@ -592,9 +615,7 @@ sys_getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap)
{
int error;
- if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
- return (ENOSYS);
- error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
+ error = audit_priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
if (error)
return (error);
return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid, uap->auid,
@@ -609,8 +630,6 @@ sys_setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
au_id_t id;
int error;
- if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
- return (ENOSYS);
error = copyin(uap->auid, &id, sizeof(id));
if (error)
return (error);
@@ -624,7 +643,7 @@ sys_setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
if (error)
goto fail;
#endif
- error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
+ error = audit_priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
if (error)
goto fail;
newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = id;
@@ -650,9 +669,7 @@ sys_getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
int error;
cred = td->td_ucred;
- if (jailed(cred))
- return (ENOSYS);
- error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
+ error = audit_priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
if (error)
return (error);
if (cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6)
@@ -674,8 +691,6 @@ sys_setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
struct auditinfo ai;
int error;
- if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
- return (ENOSYS);
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo, &ai, sizeof(ai));
if (error)
return (error);
@@ -689,7 +704,7 @@ sys_setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
if (error)
goto fail;
#endif
- error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
+ error = audit_priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
if (error)
goto fail;
bzero(&newcred->cr_audit, sizeof(newcred->cr_audit));
@@ -715,11 +730,9 @@ sys_getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
{
int error;
- if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
- return (ENOSYS);
if (uap->length < sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr))
return (EOVERFLOW);
- error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
+ error = audit_priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
if (error)
return (error);
return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit, uap->auditinfo_addr,
@@ -734,8 +747,6 @@ sys_setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
struct auditinfo_addr aia;
int error;
- if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
- return (ENOSYS);
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia, sizeof(aia));
if (error)
return (error);
@@ -752,7 +763,7 @@ sys_setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
if (error)
goto fail;
#endif
- error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
+ error = audit_priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT);
if (error)
goto fail;
newcred->cr_audit = aia;
diff --git a/sys/security/audit/bsm_errno.c b/sys/security/audit/bsm_errno.c
index 6bc110cf0237..1f3b12735b84 100644
--- a/sys/security/audit/bsm_errno.c
+++ b/sys/security/audit/bsm_errno.c
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static const struct bsm_errno bsm_errnos[] = {
#else
ERRNO_NO_LOCAL_MAPPING,
#endif
- ES("Authenticateion error") },
+ ES("Authentication error") },
{ BSM_ERRNO_ENEEDAUTH,
#ifdef ENEEDAUTH
ENEEDAUTH,
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c
index d742b5dcbc3a..b0776160cc74 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ mac_policy_xlock_assert(void)
* Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks.
*/
static void
-mac_init(void)
+mac_init(void *dummy __unused)
{
LIST_INIT(&mac_static_policy_list);
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ mac_init(void)
* kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup.
*/
static void
-mac_late_init(void)
+mac_late_init(void *dummy __unused)
{
mac_late = 1;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c b/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c
index 8a6549214380..bf95c008e2f2 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c
@@ -246,7 +246,9 @@ ugidfw_rulecheck(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule,
}
if (rule->mbr_subject.mbs_flags & MBS_GID_DEFINED) {
- match = ((cred->cr_rgid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max &&
+ match = ((cred->cr_gid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max &&
+ cred->cr_gid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_min) ||
+ (cred->cr_rgid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max &&
cred->cr_rgid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_min) ||
(cred->cr_svgid <= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_max &&
cred->cr_svgid >= rule->mbr_subject.mbs_gid_min));
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c b/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
index 7a5ac2e01f75..2bcff7bba973 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
@@ -1650,7 +1650,7 @@ rule_grant_supplementary_groups(const struct rule *const rule,
const bool current_has_supp = (gid_flags & MDF_CURRENT) != 0 &&
(gid_flags & MDF_SUPP_MASK) != 0;
id_nb_t rule_idx = 0;
- int old_idx = 1, new_idx = 1;
+ int old_idx = 0, new_idx = 0;
if ((gid_flags & MDF_ANY_SUPP) != 0 &&
(gid_flags & MDF_MAY_REJ_SUPP) == 0)
@@ -1992,6 +1992,10 @@ check_proc(void)
/*
* Only grant privileges if requested by the right executable.
*
+ * As MAC/do configuration is per-jail, in order to avoid confused
+ * deputy situations in chroots (privileged or unprivileged), make sure
+ * to check the path from the current jail's root.
+ *
* XXXOC: We may want to base this check on a tunable path and/or
* a specific MAC label. Going even further, e.g., envisioning to
* completely replace the path check with the latter, we would need to
@@ -2003,7 +2007,7 @@ check_proc(void)
* setting a MAC label per file (perhaps via additions to mtree(1)). So
* this probably isn't going to happen overnight, if ever.
*/
- if (vn_fullpath(curproc->p_textvp, &path, &to_free) != 0)
+ if (vn_fullpath_jail(curproc->p_textvp, &path, &to_free) != 0)
return (EPERM);
error = strcmp(path, "/usr/bin/mdo") == 0 ? 0 : EPERM;
free(to_free, M_TEMP);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-11-23 11:24:56 +0000