| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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The .pc files generated in the root directory are used as part of the
build; they should never be installed. Use the versions from the
exporters subdirectory--which should be installed--as the .pc files
which are distributed with FreeBSD. This avoids the need for "fixing up"
these files after the fact (see `crypto/openssl/BSDmakefile` for more
details as part of this change).
Garbage collect `secure/lib/libcrypto/Makefile.version`, et al,
as they're orphaned files. They were technically unused prior to this
change as the vendor process properly embeds the version numbers in
various files, but this commit formalizes the removal.
This correction/clarification on the .pc files will be made in an
upcoming release of OpenSSL [1].
References:
1. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/28803
Suggested by: Richard Levitte (OpenSSL project)
MFC after: 3 days
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D53043
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These files contain build host paths and other configuration details
that can be regenerated via the standard vendor import process. Don't
clutter up the FreeBSD tree with these files.
Add the paths to .gitignore to prevent them from accidentally being
added in a future update.
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D53044
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MFC with: 046c625e9382
Fixes: 046c625e9382 ("crypto/openssl: update to 3.5.4")
Reported by: Herbert J. Skuhra <herbert@gojira.at>
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This change includes all necessary changes required to update to OpenSSL
3.5.4.
More information about the 3.5.4 release can be found in the relevant
release notes (see 8e12a5c4eb3507846b5 for more details).
Merge commit '8e12a5c4eb3507846b507d0afe87d115af41df40'
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Out-of-bounds read & write in RFC 3211 KEK Unwrap (CVE-2025-9230)
Timing side-channel in SM2 algorithm on 64 bit ARM (CVE-2025-9231)
Out-of-bounds read in HTTP client no_proxy handling (CVE-2025-9232)
Obtained from: OpenSSL
Approved by: so
Security: FreeBSD-SA-25:08.openssl
Security: CVE-2025-9230
Security: CVE-2025-9231
Security: CVE-2025-9232
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This change updates the build artifacts to match the 3.5.3 release. Much
of the change involves updating version numbers and release dates to
match the release version's metadata.
MFC after: 1 week
MFC with: 88b8b7f0c4e9948667a2279e78e975a784049cba
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This change updates the sources for crypto/openssl. The subsequent
commit will update the build artifacts to match the 3.5.3 release.
More details about the update can be found in the related vendor branch
commits.
MFC after: 1 week
Merge commit 'aed904c48f330dc76da942a8ee2d6eef9d11f572'
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Prior to this change, CC was not being passed through to Configure,
which was resulting in failures when Configure was running compiler
checks.
Pass through CC via `WRK_ENV` to Configure so the compiler is defined
properly as part of the initial build.
MFC after: 1 month
Fixes: d18058b7b850 ("crypto/openssl: apply polish to new vendor import process")
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D52595
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This change does the following 2 things:
- Makes the build more repeatable by isolating the environment. This
prevents bmake from leaking variables into gmake and makes the overall
process a bit more robust.
- Add debug printouts to make the process more straightforward to the
reader and whoever is executing doing the current vendor import.
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D52420
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This change adds a custom BSD makefile containing multiple high-level PHONY
targets, similar to targets provided by the ports framework.
The Makefile does the following:
- Reruns Configure with a deterministic set of arguments to ensure that
all appropriate features have been enabled/disabled in OpenSSL.
- Preens the pkgconfig files to remove duplicate paths in their
`CFLAGS` and `includedir` variables.
- Rebuilds all ASM files to ensure that the content contained is fresh.
- Rebuilds all manpages to ensure that the content contained in the
manpages is fresh.
Some additional work needs to be done to make the manpage regeneration
"operation" reproducible (the date the manpages were generated is
embedded in the files).
All dynamic configuration previously captured in
`include/openssl/configuration.h` and `include/crypto/bn_conf.h` has been
moved to `freebsd/include/dynamic_freebsd_configuration.h` and
`freebsd/include/crypto/bn_conf.h`, respectively. This helps
ensure that future updates don't wipe out FreeBSD customizations to
these files, which tune behavior on a per-target architecture basis, e.g.,
ARM vs x86, 32-bit vs 64-bit, etc.
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D51663
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Migrate to OpenSSL 3.5 in advance of FreeBSD 15.0. OpenSSL 3.0 will be
EOL after 2026-09-07.
Approved by: philip (mentor)
Sponsored by: Alpha-Omega Beach Cleaning Project
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D51613
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Approved by: philip (mentor)
Sponsored by: Alpha-Omega Beach Cleaning Project
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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Also remove some dead assignments.
Obtained from: openssl (e78c8b791c0e03e750ef7196bc7bfee8e5bd00a0)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Requested by: Phillip Sabatino
Sponsored by: Dell, Inc.
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MFC after: 1 week
MFC with: 0d0c8621fd181e507f0fb50ffcca606faf66a8c2
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D49297
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This release incorporates the following bug fixes and mitigations:
- [CVE-2024-13176](https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2024-13176
- [CVE-2024-9143](https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2024-9143)
Release notes can be found at:
https://openssl-library.org/news/openssl-3.0-notes/index.html
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D49296
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This is a companion commit to the OpenSSL 3.0.15 update.
`opensslv.h` was regenerated via the following process:
```
cd crypto/openssl
./config
git reset --hard
gmake include/openssl/opensslv.h
```
`Makefile.inc` has been updated to match.
MFC after: 1 week
MFC with: a7148ab39c03abd4d1a84997c70bf96f15dd2a09
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D46603
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This release incorporates the following bug fixes and mitigations:
- Fixed possible denial of service in X.509 name checks ([CVE-2024-6119])
- Fixed possible buffer overread in SSL_select_next_proto() ([CVE-2024-5535])
Release notes can be found at:
https://openssl-library.org/news/openssl-3.0-notes/index.html
Co-authored-by: gordon
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D46602
Merge commit '108164cf95d9594884c2dcccba2691335e6f221b'
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Update download locations.
Remove references to FREEBSD-Xlist.
Remove reference to the fips module that has been removed.
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Merge commit 'e60dbfd00b009d424dfc5446d132872c93dd0aed'
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GCC 14 (but not earlier versions) warns about a missing prototype
for getrandom(). Include <sys/random.h> explicitly to bring in the
prototype rather than depending on a nested include. While here,
stop defining sysctl_random() since it is no longer used.
Reviewed by: brooks
Fixes: 838b6caababb openssl: use getrandom(2) instead of probing for getentropy(2)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D45995
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The probing for getentropy(2) relies on re-declaring getentropy(2)
as weak and checking the address, but this is incompatible with
the _FORTIFY_SOURCE symbol renaming scheme. It's always present on
all supported FreeBSD versions now so we could cut it down to
unconditional use, but there's another segment for getrandom(2)
already that's cleaner to just add us to.
We should upstream this.
Reviewed by: kib (earlier version), markj
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D45976
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This is a companion commit to the OpenSSL 3.0.14 update.
MFC after: 3 days
MFC with: 44096ebd22ddd0081a357011714eff8963614b65
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This release resolves 3 upstream found CVEs:
- Fixed potential use after free after SSL_free_buffers() is called (CVE-2024-4741)
- Fixed an issue where checking excessively long DSA keys or parameters may be very slow (CVE-2024-4603)
- Fixed unbounded memory growth with session handling in TLSv1.3 (CVE-2024-2511)
MFC after: 3 days
Merge commit '1070e7dca8223387baf5155524b28f62bfe7da3c'
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FreeBSD also defines {make|swap|get|set}context for backward
compatibility, despite also exposing POSIX_VERSION 200809L in FreeBSD
15-current.
FreeBSD has defined these interfaces since FreeBSD 4.7, released over 20
years ago, so no further nuance in FreeBSD version number is necessary.
Pull Request: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23885
Sponsored by: Netflix
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fips/legacy providers"
This change is still under review and should not have been merged
directly to main (yet).
This is a case and point for using `push.default` to nothing instead of
matching or simple.
This reverts commit 42ce242e353065dfbaa248955f6657005a395a95.
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providers
This change introduces a static copy of the fips and legacy linker version maps
generated by the OpenSSL 3.0.13 build process.
This unbreaks the fips and legacy providers by not exposing unnecessary
symbols from the fips/legacy provider shared objects shared with other
providers (base, default) and libcrypto.
More discussion:
Prior to this change, loading the fips provider indirectly from a
FreeBSD 14.0-CURRENT and 15.0-CURRENT host would result in a
process-wide deadlock when invoking select OpenSSL APIs
(CONF_modules_load* in this particular example).
Speaking with the upstream maintainers [1], it became obvious that
the FreeBSD base system was incorrectly building/linking the fips
provider, resulting in a symbol collision at runtime, and thus a
process-wide deadlock in specific circumstances. The fips provider
would deadlock when trying to acquire a write lock on internal
structures which should have only been available to the base and
default providers, as certain preprocessor ifdefs only allow specific
internal calls to be made with the base and default providers.
1. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/24202
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D44892
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Reported by: "Herbert J. Skuhra" <herbert@gojira.at>
Fixes: 74fe298c8299
MFC after: 3 days
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Reported by: "Herbert J. Skuhra" <herbert@gojira.at>
Fixes: 9eb4e0b42d7c
MFC after: 3 days
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* Fixed PKCS12 Decoding crashes ([CVE-2024-0727])
* Fixed Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys
([CVE-2023-6237])
* Fixed POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting vector registers on
PowerPC CPUs which support PowerISA 2.07 ([CVE-2023-6129])
* Fix excessive time spent in DH check / generation with large Q
parameter value ([CVE-2023-5678])
Release notes can be found at
https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-3.0-notes.html.
Approved by: emaste
MFC after: 3 days
Merge commit '9dd13e84fa8eca8f3462bd55485aa3da8c37f54a'
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OpenSSL 3.0.12 addresses:
* Fix incorrect key and IV resizing issues when calling
EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex2() or EVP_CipherInit_ex2()
with OSSL_PARAM parameters that alter the key or IV length
([CVE-2023-5363]).
Relnotes: Yes
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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This removes a guard condition that prevents KTLS being enabled for
receiving in TLS 1.3. Use the correct sequence number and BIO for
receive vs transmit offload.
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit 7c78932b9a4330fb7c8db72b3fb37cbff1401f8b
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- Don't unpad records, check the outer record type, or extract the
inner record type from TLS 1.3 records handled by the kernel. KTLS
performs all of these steps and returns the inner record type in the
TLS header.
- When checking the length of a received TLS 1.3 record don't allow
for the extra byte for the nested record type when KTLS is used.
- Pass a pointer to the record type in the TLS header to the
SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE message callback. For KTLS, the old
pointer pointed to the last byte of payload rather than the record
type. For the non-KTLS case, the TLS header has been updated with
the inner type before this callback is invoked.
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit a5fb9605329fb939abb536c1604d44a511741624)
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When KTLS receive is enabled, pending data may still be present due to
read ahead. This data must still be processed the same as records
received without KTLS. To ease readability (especially in
consideration of additional checks which will be added for TLS 1.3),
add a helper variable 'using_ktls' that is true when the KTLS receive
path is being used to receive a record.
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit 031132c297e54cbc20404a0bf8de6ed863196399
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KTLS implementations currently assume that the start of the in-kernel
socket buffer is aligned with the start of a TLS record for the
receive side. The socket option to enable KTLS specifies the TLS
sequence number of this initial record.
When read ahead is enabled, data can be pending in the SSL read buffer
after negotiating session keys. This pending data must be examined to
ensurs that the kernel's socket buffer does not contain a partial TLS
record as well as to determine the correct sequence number of the
first TLS record to be processed by the kernel.
In preparation for enabling receive kernel offload for TLS 1.3, move
the existing logic to handle read ahead from t1_enc.c into ktls.c and
invoke it from ktls_configure_crypto().
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit 85773128d0e80cd8dcc772a6931d385b8cf4acd1
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FreeBSD's kernel TLS supports Chacha20 for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit 77f3936928068bee9d7e0c6939709ac179cb1059
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OpenSSL 3.0.11 addresses:
POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupts XMM registers on Windows (CVE-2023-4807)
Relnotes: Yes
Pull request: https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/852
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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Add missing AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET to armv8_rng_probe(). Also add
these to the functions defined by gen_random(), and note that this Perl
sub prints the assembler out directly, not going via the $code xlate
mechanism (and therefore coming before the include of arm_arch.h). So
fix this too.
In KeccakF1600_int, AARCH64_SIGN_LINK_REGISTER functions as
AARCH64_VALID_CALL_TARGET on BTI-only builds, so it needs to come before
the 'adr' line.
Change-Id: If241efe71591c88253a3e36647ced00300c3c1a3
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17653)
Obtained from: OpenSSL 3a23f01268ec
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This change adds optional support for
- Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication (PAuth) and
- Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI)
features to the perl scripts.
Both features can be enabled with additional compiler flags.
Unless any of these are enabled explicitly there is no code change at
all.
The extensions are briefly described below. Please read the appropriate
chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual for the complete
specification.
Scope
-----
This change only affects generated assembly code.
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication
--------------------------------
Pointer Authentication extension supports the authentication of the
contents of registers before they are used for indirect branching
or load.
PAuth provides a probabilistic method to detect corruption of register
values. PAuth signing instructions generate a Pointer Authentication
Code (PAC) based on the value of a register, a seed and a key.
The generated PAC is inserted into the original value in the register.
A PAuth authentication instruction recomputes the PAC, and if it matches
the PAC in the register, restores its original value. In case of a
mismatch, an architecturally unmapped address is generated instead.
With PAuth, mitigation against ROP (Return-oriented Programming) attacks
can be implemented. This is achieved by signing the contents of the
link-register (LR) before it is pushed to stack. Once LR is popped,
it is authenticated. This way a stack corruption which overwrites the
LR on the stack is detectable.
The PAuth extension adds several new instructions, some of which are not
recognized by older hardware. To support a single codebase for both pre
Armv8.3-A targets and newer ones, only NOP-space instructions are added
by this patch. These instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware
which does not support Armv8.3-A. Furthermore, this patch only considers
cases where LR is saved to the stack and then restored before branching
to its content. There are cases in the code where LR is pushed to stack
but it is not used later. We do not address these cases as they are not
affected by PAuth.
There are two keys available to sign an instruction address: A and B.
PACIASP and PACIBSP only differ in the used keys: A and B, respectively.
The keys are typically managed by the operating system.
To enable generating code for PAuth compile with
-mbranch-protection=<mode>:
- standard or pac-ret: add PACIASP and AUTIASP, also enables BTI
(read below)
- pac-ret+b-key: add PACIBSP and AUTIBSP
Armv8.5-A Branch Target Identification
--------------------------------------
Branch Target Identification features some new instructions which
protect the execution of instructions on guarded pages which are not
intended branch targets.
If Armv8.5-A is supported by the hardware, execution of an instruction
changes the value of PSTATE.BTYPE field. If an indirect branch
lands on a guarded page the target instruction must be one of the
BTI <jc> flavors, or in case of a direct call or jump it can be any
other instruction. If the target instruction is not compatible with the
value of PSTATE.BTYPE a Branch Target Exception is generated.
In short, indirect jumps are compatible with BTI <j> and <jc> while
indirect calls are compatible with BTI <c> and <jc>. Please refer to the
specification for the details.
Armv8.3-A PACIASP and PACIBSP are implicit branch target
identification instructions which are equivalent with BTI c or BTI jc
depending on system register configuration.
BTI is used to mitigate JOP (Jump-oriented Programming) attacks by
limiting the set of instructions which can be jumped to.
BTI requires active linker support to mark the pages with BTI-enabled
code as guarded. For ELF64 files BTI compatibility is recorded in the
.note.gnu.property section. For a shared object or static binary it is
required that all linked units support BTI. This means that even a
single assembly file without the required note section turns-off BTI
for the whole binary or shared object.
The new BTI instructions are treated as NOPs on hardware which does
not support Armv8.5-A or on pages which are not guarded.
To insert this new and optional instruction compile with
-mbranch-protection=standard (also enables PAuth) or +bti.
When targeting a guarded page from a non-guarded page, weaker
compatibility restrictions apply to maintain compatibility between
legacy and new code. For detailed rules please refer to the Arm ARM.
Compiler support
----------------
Compiler support requires understanding '-mbranch-protection=<mode>'
and emitting the appropriate feature macros (__ARM_FEATURE_BTI_DEFAULT
and __ARM_FEATURE_PAC_DEFAULT). The current state is the following:
-------------------------------------------------------
| Compiler | -mbranch-protection | Feature macros |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| clang | 9.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------+
| gcc | 9 | expected in 10.1+ |
-------------------------------------------------------
Available Platforms
------------------
Arm Fast Model and QEMU support both extensions.
https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fast-models
https://www.qemu.org/
Implementation Notes
--------------------
This change adds BTI landing pads even to assembly functions which are
likely to be directly called only. In these cases, landing pads might
be superfluous depending on what code the linker generates.
Code size and performance impact for these cases would be negligible.
Interaction with C code
-----------------------
Pointer Authentication is a per-frame protection while Branch Target
Identification can be turned on and off only for all code pages of a
whole shared object or static binary. Because of these properties if
C/C++ code is compiled without any of the above features but assembly
files support any of them unconditionally there is no incompatibility
between the two.
Useful Links
------------
To fully understand the details of both PAuth and BTI it is advised to
read the related chapters of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual
(Arm ARM):
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0487/latest/
Additional materials:
"Providing protection for complex software"
https://developer.arm.com/architectures/learn-the-architecture/providing-protection-for-complex-software
Arm Compiler Reference Guide Version 6.14: -mbranch-protection
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101754/0614/armclang-Reference/armclang-Command-line-Options/-mbranch-protection?lang=en
Arm C Language Extensions (ACLE)
https://developer.arm.com/docs/101028/latest
Addional Notes
--------------
This patch is a copy of the work done by Tamas Petz in boringssl. It
contains the changes from the following commits:
aarch64: support BTI and pointer authentication in assembly
Change-Id: I4335f92e2ccc8e209c7d68a0a79f1acdf3aeb791
URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/42084
aarch64: Improve conditional compilation
Change-Id: I14902a64e5f403c2b6a117bc9f5fb1a4f4611ebf
URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43524
aarch64: Fix name of gnu property note section
Change-Id: I6c432d1c852129e9c273f6469a8b60e3983671ec
URL: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/44024
Change-Id: I2d95ebc5e4aeb5610d3b226f9754ee80cf74a9af
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16674)
Reviewed by: emaste, Pierre Pronchery <pierre@freebsdfoundation.org>
Obtained from: OpenSSL 19e277dd19f2
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D41940
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This is directly inspired from the equivalent document for OpenSSH.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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When $label == "0", $label is not truthy, so `if ($label)` thinks there isn't
a label. Correct this by looking at the result of the s/// command.
Verified that there are no changes in the .S files created during a normal
build, and that the "0:" labels appear in the translation given in the error
report (and they are the only difference in the before and after output).
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit 9607f5ccf285ac9988a86f95c5ad9f92b556a843
Reviewed by: markj
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D41587
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No functional change intended.
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OpenSSL 3.0.10 addresses:
- CVE-2023-3817
- CVE-2023-3446
- CVE-2023-2975
(Note that the vendor branch commit incorrectly referenced 3.0.9.)
Relnotes: Yes
Pull request: https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/808
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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OpenSSL 3 supports a modular architecture, allowing different providers
to bring specific implementations of cryptographical algorithms. One
such provider, "fips", ships with OpenSSL 3 directly, and groups
algorithms that can be FIPS 140-2 validated.
The import of OpenSSL 3.0.9 was building this provider incorrectly,
missing symbols required for proper operation.
In addition, without the change in OpenSSL's crypto/bn/bn_const.c, the
FIPS module fails loading: `Undefined symbol "ossl_bignum_modp_1536_p"`.
This change is consistent with crypto/bn/bn_dh.c though.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Pull Request: https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/787
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They break the !amd64 builds due to an underspecified include path and
will be re-applied once that's fixed.
Reported by: Ronald Klop <ronald-lists@klop.ws>
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OpenSSL 3 supports a modular architecture, allowing different providers
to bring specific implementations of cryptographical algorithms. One
such provider, "fips", ships with OpenSSL 3 directly, and groups
algorithms that can be FIPS 140-2 validated.
The import of OpenSSL 3.0.9 was building this provider incorrectly,
missing symbols required for proper operation.
In addition, without the change in OpenSSL's crypto/bn/bn_const.c, the
FIPS module fails loading: `Undefined symbol "ossl_bignum_modp_1536_p"`.
This change is consistent with crypto/bn/bn_dh.c though.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Pull Request: https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/787
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Migrate to OpenSSL 3.0 in advance of FreeBSD 14.0. OpenSSL 1.1.1 (the
version we were previously using) will be EOL as of 2023-09-11.
Most of the base system has already been updated for a seamless switch
to OpenSSL 3.0. For many components we've added
`-DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L` to CFLAGS to specify the API version,
which avoids deprecation warnings from OpenSSL 3.0. Changes have also
been made to avoid OpenSSL APIs that were already deprecated in OpenSSL
1.1.1. The process of updating to contemporary APIs can continue after
this merge.
Additional changes are still required for libarchive and Kerberos-
related libraries or tools; workarounds will immediately follow this
commit. Fixes are in progress in the upstream projects and will be
incorporated when those are next updated.
There are some performance regressions in benchmarks (certain tests in
`openssl speed`) and in some OpenSSL consumers in ports (e.g. haproxy).
Investigation will continue for these.
Netflix's testing showed no functional regression and a rather small,
albeit statistically significant, increase in CPU consumption with
OpenSSL 3.0.
Thanks to ngie@ and des@ for updating base system components, to
antoine@ and bofh@ for ports exp-runs and port fixes/workarounds, and to
Netflix and everyone who tested prior to commit or contributed to this
update in other ways.
PR: 271615
PR: 271656 [exp-run]
Relnotes: Yes
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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(cherry picked from commit 8ecb489345f08012fdc92a202a40119891cac330)
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"adrl" is a pseudo-instruction used to calculate an address relative
to PC. It's not recognized by clang resulting in a compilation error.
I've stumbled upon it when trying to integrate the bsaes-armv7 assmebly
logic into FreeBSD kernel, which uses clang as it's default compiler.
Note that this affect the build only if BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY is
defined, which is not the default option in OpenSSL.
The solution here is to replace it with an add instruction.
This mimics what has already been done in !BSAES_ASM_EXTENDED_KEY logic.
Because of that I've marked this as trivial CLA.
No objections from: jkim
Obtained from: OpenSSL commit 27093ba73372935fe4ef91d0a45ce6ea90a1ac8e
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D39091
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